This is a discussion on The best strategy to defending Singapore Island within the Military Strategy and Tactics forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; I found a NBR Analysis (Vo. 14, No. 2, Aug 2003) titled: "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: ...
I found a NBR Analysis (Vo. 14, No. 2, Aug 2003) titled: "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and Projection" by Sheldon W. Simon and I quote a small section of what he wrote and in particular, what he said about Singapore:
"Of America’s three closest Southeast Asian security partners, (Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines), only Singapore’s armed forces are sufficiently technologically proficient to interact with U.S. forces in a manner comparable to Japan, the ROK, and Australia...
Singapore’s defense concerns focus entirely on its own neighborhood. As a major international port and business center, maintaining freedom of the SLOCs and air routes is essential to the city-state’s prosperity. This core interest fits well with U.S. East Asian strategy... Moreover, Singapore is the only Southeast Asian military to have an active rapid deployment force, which operates in an integrated manner with the navy and air force...
While the city-state prefers U.S. defense technology because of its superiority and logistical advantages, Singapore also maintains a complex system of licensed production, assembly, and technology agreements with Britain, France, Italy, Israel, Thailand, Sweden, and Taiwan...
The United States has solidified its security ties to Singapore with a logistics facility, which provides a surge capacity during crises, and was used in Operation Enduring Freedom. Moreover, the new Changi Naval Base, with its deep-water capability, permits the berthing of U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Despite these close ties, Singapore is not completely satisfied with its U.S. defense relationship. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) desires full technology release on all systems it purchases. That is, Singapore wishes to have the right to modify U.S. technology to fit its own needs. Therefore, it is less concerned with maintaining interoperability with the United States than with integrating U.S. equipment into Singapore’s own armed forces doctrine...
At bottom, Singapore believes defense to be essentially its own responsibility. What it wants from the United States, therefore, is increased technology transfer to enhance its independent military capability. Singapore is more enthusiastic about multilateral anti-terrorist cooperation, though even along this dimension the city - state seems more comfortable sharing intelligence with the United States than its neighbors...
Protecting the Strait of Malacca where 1,100 supertankers pass eastbound annually is of great concern to Singapore. A terrorist incident could disrupt traffic simply by causing insurance rates to skyrocket... Terrorist groups have engaged in piracy according to the Malaysian Institute for Maritime Affairs. The MILF and Abu Sayyaf from the Philippines have attacked vessels in the Sulu Sea; and although some anti-piracy cooperation occurs among the littoral states, obstacles remain... This is a particular problem when pirates flee into Indonesian waters among that country’s thousands of islands..."
As the Americans noted, Singapore believes defense is our own responsibility. While the SAF desires interoperability with other forces it is also designed to operate on it's own, if need be.
Last edited by OPSSG; January 3rd, 2011 at 03:54 AM.
Quoted for truth: Vietnam is the only country in SEA, which has a "collective memory" for a full scale (defensive) war.
17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.
During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.
I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA) which I would like to share:
(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;
(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262);
(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);
(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;
(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and
(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.
While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).
In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).
So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.
Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.
Last edited by OPSSG; March 8th, 2009 at 04:18 AM.
17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.
During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.
I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA) which I would like to share:
(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;
(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262);
(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);
(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;
(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and
(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.
While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).
In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).
So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.
Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.
Are you implying that there is a possibility that China wants to nab us?
In any case, a move like that would probably provoke Commonwealth intervention. (I hope so)
Anyway, I'm sure the US doesn't want to lose it's SEA assets, especially, to put in those capitalist terms, losing them to those "godless red heathens". We are investment money for the West. (SEA that is)
17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.
During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.
I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA) which I would like to share:
(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;
(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262);
(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);
(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;
(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and
(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.
While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).
In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).
So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.
Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.
Well in my personal opinion you don't need to be worried about
PLA Because you are in a ASEAN country
in south Asia Singapore is strongest
Politely,economically,strategically
Are you implying that there is a possibility that China wants to nab us?
You don't have to automatically assume that we should prepare for a bellicose China, as the sole possibility of an external threat. It was a historical fact that the Imperial Japanese Army invaded us and that there was a war between a current ASEAN member (Vietnam) and China in recent memory. IMHO, there is only a very, very slim chance that China might adopt an aggressive posture once again.
Even Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou is less concerned about a bellicose China and are planning to phase-out conscription and move towards a fully professional force. This may indicate that the Taiwanese are now less worried about a China invasion threat (or it could be an internal vote getting issue for the KMT).
Quote:
Originally Posted by Tavarisch
In any case, a move like that would probably provoke Commonwealth intervention. (I hope so)
Philippines and Thailand are official US allies, so they have uncle sam. The non-alligned countries in ASEAN (like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei) have more to worry about.
The Commonwealth is an association with a shared historical past but it is not structured for any form of military action. An agreement of relevance to Malaysia and Singapore (in relation to external threats or against Indonesia) is the FPDA with Australia, UK and NZ. Please bear in mind that in the past Malaysia under Dr. M had opted not to participate in certain FPDA exercises.
Last edited by OPSSG; March 9th, 2009 at 09:10 PM.
Anyway, I'm sure the US doesn't want to lose it's SEA assets, especially, to put in those capitalist terms, losing them to those "godless red heathens". We are investment money for the West. (SEA that is)
I think that it is in the interest of the US and China to work together but there is no guarantee that they will navigate the path smoothly or that all choices made will be rational (or in our national interest). Given Malaysia's track record of 'condemning' the US and that what leaders like Dr. M said on his blog and I quote:
"I would like to have the Malaysian Armed Forces attack the United States and Israel but I don't think the Government and the MAF would agree with me..." (over the Palestinians in Gaza issue),
if I were a Malaysian I would not be so complacent (that the US will automatically come to your country's aid), especially if it is on an issue like an offshore drilling rights or EEZ issues. Keep in mind that China views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers whenever it suits China. The BBC and the Independent have reported on recent incidents. This is similar to the April 2001 incident, when a Chinese fighter jet collided in midair with a USN EP-3 and the 24 crew members were detained by the Chinese military for 11 days.
Please remember that US pull out after the Vietnam war demonstrated that ASEAN countries are a part of their interest but we are not their core interest (the US core interest is keeping the SLOCs open). Save for our geo-strategic position, our countries' respective national interests are not always part of their core interest. OTOH Singapore has tried to remain aligned with US interests and have offered the USN the use of our facilities.
Quote:
Originally Posted by shockwave11
Well in my personal opinion you don't need to be worried about
PLA Because you are in a ASEAN country
in south Asia Singapore is strongest
Politely,economically,strategically
no need to be worried sir
I am not worried.
However, I believe in taking the prudent precaution of keeping our military capability up to date and engaging China to ensure her peaceful rise.
Last edited by OPSSG; March 9th, 2009 at 09:54 PM.
I think that it is in the interest of the US and China to work together but there is no guarantee that they will navigate the path smoothly or that all choices made will be rational (or in our national interest). Given Malaysia's track record of 'condemning' the US and that what leaders like Dr. M said on his blog and I quote:
"I would like to have the Malaysian Armed Forces attack the United States and Israel but I don't think the Government and the MAF would agree with me..." (over the Palestinians in Gaza issue),
if I were a Malaysian I would not be so complacent (that the US will automatically come to your country's aid), especially if it is on an issue like an offshore drilling rights or EEZ issues. Keep in mind that China views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers whenever it suits China. The BBC and the Independent have reported on recent incidents. This is similar to the April 2001 incident, when a Chinese fighter jet collided in midair with a USN EP-3 and the 24 crew members were detained by the Chinese military for 11 days.
Please remember that US pull out after the Vietnam war demonstrated that ASEAN countries are a part of their interest but we are not their core interest (the US core interest is keeping the SLOCs open). Save for our geo-strategic position, our countries' respective national interests are not always part of their core interest. OTOH Singapore has tried to remain aligned with US interests and have offered the USN the use of our facilities.
I am not worried.
However, I believe in taking the prudent precaution of keeping our military capability up to date and engaging China to ensure her peaceful rise.
Oh my god
CHINA is not a devil
And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power
it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars,misssiles,jet engines,sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power
and
if we are worried about nuclear war then USA is a big devil
ok yes
Singapore must have military power to tackle all other external powers
First of all, due to our small size, Singapore does not tackle external powers. Instead, we engage them in peaceful dialogue.
Quote:
Originally Posted by shockwave11
Oh my god CHINA is not a devil
No one is demonizing China. Likewise do not demonize other countries.
However, China can and have made things difficult for countries like Singapore, who are trying to engage China. In contrast to Mynmar, the PLA's response to the Wenchuan earthquake showed China's human face and the international community supported China's efforts. In fact, PLA's Deputy Chief of General Staff, LG Ma Xiaotian just concluded a three day visit to Singapore, which follows from the 2008 dialogue initiatives.
What China has done in relation to incidents with the USN is of your own country's making. No one in ASEAN is anti-China but China must behave herself. This incident brings to mind China's clumsy and assertive attempts to signal its intention to enforce its territorial claim near and around the Spratly Islands in the 1980s. In 1988, China's navy sank three Vietnamese ships in the Spratly Islands region. In a refreshing change in tone, China in Nov 2002 signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" and the 2003 declaration of peace to promote the development of the resources in the disputed islands signed in the Philippines.
You need to grow up. My earlier post is mild and valid criticism of China's bad behaviour. If you cannot accept this criticism - it reflects more on your maturity than anything else.
Quote:
Originally Posted by shockwave11
And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars, missiles, jet engines, sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power
You need to improve your English and you should be proud that China's PLA is modernizing. Hopefully, the PLA's modernization will not be used for aggression. How re-assured other countries feel in relation to China's rise depends on how China behaves.
Last edited by OPSSG; March 13th, 2009 at 05:09 AM.
Oh my god
CHINA is not a devil
And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power
it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars,misssiles,jet engines,sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power
and
if we are worried about nuclear war then USA is a big devil
ok yes
Singapore must have military power to tackle all other external powers
nuclear power is no low tech or easy make. its extremely hard and high tech. missles arent that much of other western powers ones. electronic warefare isnt far off, their cyberwarefare is extremely impressive since theyve hacked into foreign military database on several ocassions already. the only weak point is engines. and equipping their large army. its easy to make a army modern if its small army, but china has a big army so it takes longer and more money for them to standardise through the military chain.
back to singapore, have good political dialogue is the only suggestion, they have very small military force, and their terroitory is small, so no where to manuver in war. so not much of military defence is available. so political dialogue is the way to go.
As all of us know, Singapore nowadays can being consider the most modern army in South East Asia. With a stable economy and politics, add with good relation with most of NATO nation especially US, British & Israel.
However, with land area only about 800km2, urban terrain and population about 4 million, it's seem hard to defending this island from all direction.
The WW II has show the result when Japanese Empire Army success occupied the island and drive-out the strongest British Empire who defending the island.
To have a defence strategy, one has to also have a threat.
What is the threat to Singapore?
Why does it seem hard to defend Singapore? Its a very large fortress with a very big moat. The strategy would be one of a naval and air blockade, but I should think this would take longer than most regional neighbours could afford, or would be allowed to stage.
What would be the incentive for attacking Singapore? Its value is economic, and the destruction of this economic value in the ensuing combat would render any campaign against it, even if successful, meaningless.
Besides that Singapore is a global strategic economic hub. Disruption to its function would be felt all over the World, and reaction would be reciprocal, with or without diplomatic links between Singapore and other states.
The occupation of Singapore by the Japanese was part of a much wider regional strategy, and can not be used as an example to base considerations of Singapore's strategy as a city-state.
One of the critical chinks in Singapore's defensive chain-mail is NOT a military one, but one of sustainability. Singapore has ZERO ability to grow or produce enough food to feed it's population (simply no arable land available), it relies totally on external exports. Rice, dairy, meat, cereals all have to be imported by ship or transferred across the causeway from Malaysia.
If, say for arguments sake, Malaysia closed the causeway and threatened to mine the approaches to Singapore then, strong military or not, the country would face tough times. The 900, 000 odd expats would leave for one, which would have a massive impact upon the economy. Singapore's fiscal reserves are extremely robust and will be able to provide a buffer to any financial crunch, however the population can't eat money!
Singapore's only choice under the circumstances would be to move North and seize land for agricultural production, and / or expand it's MCM/ASW capabilities to the point where it can guarantee clear sea-lanes.
I am aware that FutureTank is banned but I think it is necessary to address some of the issues presented by his post and the posts by riksavage and ReAl PrOeLiTeZ as they contain some related issues.
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
What is the threat to Singapore?
Good question and I'll have a go at answering one aspect.
Currently, there is a possibility of a troubled peace with our immediate neighbours. This includes the possibility of some state and non-state actors not honouring signed agreements (and they have their stated willingness or intent to do so) so as to introduce sudden disruption to the economy of Singapore.
In fairness, Malaysia has NEVER cut off water supply to Singapore (the two water agreements expires in 2011 and in 2061, respectively). However, during times of tension, or domestic political upheaval in Malaysia, often there would be calls by local Malaysian politicians to cut off the water supply in violation of international law. In fact, Singapore gets blamed for very imaginative things by Malaysian politicians including floods in Malaysia (which I would believe is caused by weather patterns !?).
Indonesia also suddenly cut-off the supply of sand to Singapore in Feb 2007. This was recognized as having an adverse economic impact on Singapore and we have since found other sources of sand supply. Of significance however, was the need for us to draw down our stockpile of sand (which I must admit I did not know we had, prior to the dispute). Further, in May 2008, the Regional Indonesian Assembly of Batam threatened to block ConocoPhilips' ability to supply natural gas to Singapore (under a 20 year long term sales contract), as the some gas supplied to Singapore passes through Batam via the Grissik-Batam-Singapore Pipeline (as Batam at that time was suffering from alternate power cuts and who can blame them for being upset). BTW ConocoPhilips earns more revenue by selling natural gas to Singapore, as we buy at a higher price. Batam on the other hand buys at lower prices and are also not committed to a long term contract.
While the disputes with the Indonesian navy (over the sand and granite issues) and their local authorities (over natural gas supplies for power generation) are not immediate causes for war, they are potentially disruptive to Singapore's economy.
OTOH, you could also argue that given the more interdependent nature of the economies of the 3 above mentioned countries, there is less incentive to go to war. Over the last 40 years, intra-ASEAN trade has grown, enriching our peoples, which has helped set the stage for the possibility of greater geo-strategic stability. The current problem is more related to the uneven distribution of wealth.
Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
Why does it seem hard to defend Singapore? Its a very large fortress with a very big moat...
Obviously not an informed response on prior postings in this thread. Please see posts #81 (Ans to 5 Qns on SG defence) and #88 (SG was never a fortress). I really don't care to defend those posts but the above remarks indicate a failure to read the thread before commenting.
Quote:
Originally Posted by riksavage
One of the critical chinks in Singapore's defensive chain-mail is NOT a military one, but one of sustainability. Singapore has ZERO ability to grow or produce enough food to feed it's population (simply no arable land available), it relies totally on external exports. Rice, dairy, meat, cereals all have to be imported by ship or transferred across the causeway from Malaysia.
As far as I know no city is totally self reliant on food and water supplies, so what you said is not surprising. However, it is well known that we do have food reserves stock piles for everyone in Singapore to cater for short term disruptions. Further, we have also attempted to diversify our various food supply source countries, as a risk management strategy.
If there is a city model for us to examine on being self sufficient in food within city boundaries, please let me know.
In fact, Singapore is also vulnerable to a sudden disruption of natural gas supply from Indonesia, as we do have long term contracts in place to buy natural gas from Indonesia via two pipelines via the West Natuna Transportation System and the previously mentioned Grissik-Batam-Singapore Pipeline.
Quote:
Originally Posted by ReAl PrOeLiTeZ
im pretty sure everything yes i mean everything is imported reliant, they cannot self sustain their own country. just to give people some insight
Your insight presented here was stated by riksavage and also in post #81.
Quote:
Originally Posted by riksavage
If, say for arguments sake, Malaysia closed the causeway and threatened to mine the approaches to Singapore then, strong military or not, the country would face tough times.
With the economic recession ahead, expatriates are being forced to leave Singapore as their companies downsize. So some expatriates are leaving as we speak and that is to be expected.
Singapore's ability to respond with force on an act of aggression pre-disposes a regional challenge geared towards either an asymmetric or non-state action. Further, I am of the view that it is very, very unlikely that Malaysia would ever close the causeway and mine the approaches to Singapore, as an economic blockage of this sort would be seen as an unambiguous act of war by Singapore. More importantly, such acts are not in the interest of Malaysia (as we are mutually interdependent major trading partners). Further, other regional and extra-regional powers would immediately intervene.
Quote:
Originally Posted by riksavage
Singapore's only choice under the circumstances would be to move North and seize land for agricultural production...
IMHO, I would not say that war is the ONLY choice, as we are really not interested in setting up a farming colony, particularly, if we can buy from alternate primary producing sources.
@riksavage, what do you think? Have I got it wrong?
Quote:
Originally Posted by riksavage
...and / or expand it's MCM/ASW capabilities to the point where it can guarantee clear sea-lanes.
We are working on acquiring better ASW capabilities but we cannot be self sufficient in MCM (as we have only 4 Bedok Class mine clearing ships). If SLOCs in this region is disrupted via mines, there would be an international mine sweeping effort...
Last edited by OPSSG; March 26th, 2009 at 11:51 AM.
Any attacker would have to come to terms with the RSAF which has 24 F15SG(possibly more orders in the very near future), 70+ F16s Blk 52/ 52 plus...
Red, have we double counted the 7 block-15 F-16s given to Thailand (we bought 8 but 1 crashed)?
The block-15 were originally bought under Peace Carvin I. Please see the F-16.net link for a recount of the total RSAF F-16 numbers (I count a total of 62 planes in their table, of which 22 are F-16Cs but the source also states that Singapore has 70 F-16s).
Peace Carvin IV (Delivered 2003-2004) F-16D* Block 52 x20
I previously emailed Greg, whom you cited for the numbers (about the double counting error but he has not done an update). Note that according to F-16.net the 10x Peace Carvin II F-16D*s, the 2x Peace Carvin III F-16D*s and the 20x Peace Carvin IV F-16D*s are equipped with the extended spine for the ECM-suite.
Last edited by OPSSG; March 29th, 2009 at 05:43 AM.
The block-15 were originally bought under Peace Carvin I. Please see the F-16.net link for a recount of the total RSAF F-16 numbers (I count a total of 62 planes, of which 22 are F-16Cs).
OPSSG, the lattest info that I see stated only halved of Sing F-16's operated from Singapore. Off course I realize why the other halved still stationed in US, however is it still cost effective under current circumstances (with economic crisis in hand)
I know the DSA with us still in tough negotiations phase (again), however you already have with Thailand and Australia..why not just move those F-16 in US to Australia or Thai's ?
