The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

[Crunchy]

First I suggest to change this thread's name to:
"Defending Singapore - ASEAN's perspective"

[Crunchy]

Indeed Burma is the black sheep among ASEAN.
With their size of land & population you cannot ignore them, but as long as they do not start some reforms (even small ones) there is no way for further integration.
The situation in Burma plays in the hand of many outsiders, who want to see ASEAN as weak union..
Maybe situation will change after 2010. But I have a feeling that they are already a "province" of the PRC.

Our technological & industrial base is currently not large enough to create our own def industry.
But if member states would procure new systems together, we could put more pressure on the supplier('s nation) for:
-local assembling ( first step to independence)
-barter trade (some members are short on hard currency)
-offset
-relieve political pressure (from the supplier & buyer) -> less political dependence

I think we could start with small scale procurement of gear for SF. This would not catch much attention.

[Red]

Originally Posted by Tavarisch

So are you saying potential weapon engineers from Malaysia may have to work in Singapore? I do not like the sound of that notion........ It's bad as it is with all the other experts and professionals leaving the country for other opportunities.

Not too sure what exactly you are alluding to..? But yeah, I guess they are welcome to work in the republic if they can pass through extensive id checks.

Unless the Malaysian government can ensure that the brightest and best students get to the top of thier respective fields(including governance and politics), they would probably leave. I know I would. My two cents. I dont know much about it anyway.

[Waylander]

Originally Posted by Tavarisch

Just because you have common currency and free traveling doesn't mean you don't hate the other person. There are Frenchmen who still hate Englishmen for some old dispute made during the medieval Era.

There are also Englishmen and Frenchmen that hate Germans for World War 2. Then, there is also Yugoslavia.

Some people having a bias against each other is hardly an evidence of hate between our countries. And we are talking about a minority as little as it gets.

The current problems between the EU member countries are maybe as low as it is possible between different countries on this earth.
If they would be even lower we would have a united european country by now.

The amount of freedom, cooperation, free trade and peace enjoyed in the EU is lightyears ahead of every other organization on this planet.

I wouldn't even have interrupted this thread if you wouldn't have made that weird statement.
Stating that we in the EU hate each other and the ASEAN nations are much better in this regard is as wrong as one can be.
BTW, how often have you travelled through europe?

PS: Ex-Yugoslavia is not the EU. This is a totally different situation. And the by now handles this problem rather well I would think. Especially when one considers how the neighbours in other parts of this world sort out the problems of the black sheeps in their area.
The integration of many former WarPac countries is also an evidence for what the EU achieved.

[OPSSG]

@Waylander

Thank you for educating our younger thread participants. You input is always welcomed and you have not interrupted this thread.

In support of your post, I want to point out that:

(i) In 1991, Malaysia and Indonesia have conducted a joint military exercise, codenamed Malindo Darsasa 3AB. It involved an airborne assault by paratroopers in southern Johor. If the name of the airborne assault, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout'), as well as the choice of a drop zone just 18km from Singapore, were not sufficiently provocative, the scheduling of the airdrop on Aug 9th - Singapore's 26th National Day - most certainly was. The SAF's response was measured and we triggered an open mobilisation in response.

(ii) According to a senior Malaysian military officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 (slightly more than 10 years ago) as politicians on both sides of the Causeway argued over the status of a CIQ checkpoint. News articles from the period chronicle the public exchanges, but say nothing of the defence postures that the SAF and MAF adopted during this period.

For details, please read the full story by David Boey. Thankfully, Malaysia-Singapore relations are much improved since Dr. M left office. OTOH, Indonesia-Singapore relations are not doing as well given the Feb 2007 sand dispute issue. However, we are trying to mend fences, having just solved a boundary dispute by negotiation in Feb 2009 (which the Jakarta Post acknowledges to be at the absolute disadvantage to Singapore). For more details, see my post #106 in the RSN thread. So in short, there is much less trust in ASEAN compared to Europe.

Originally Posted by Crunchy

Indeed Burma is the black sheep among ASEAN.
With their size of land & population you cannot ignore them, but as long as they do not start some reforms (even small ones) there is no way for further integration. The situation in Burma plays in the hand of many outsiders, who want to see ASEAN as weak union..

Maybe situation will change after 2010. But I have a feeling that they are already a "province" of the PRC.

@Crunchy,

I am really pleased at how well the original ASEAN 6 are getting along with Vietnam in contrast to Myanmar. And Myanmar is really our black sheep.

Originally Posted by Crunchy

Indeed Burma is the black sheep among ASEAN.
With their size of land & population you cannot ignore them, but as long as they do not start some reforms (even small ones) there is no way for further integration. The situation in Burma plays in the hand of many outsiders, who want to see ASEAN as weak union..

Maybe situation will change after 2010. But I have a feeling that they are already a "province" of the PRC.

If we push Myanmar away, we will just push them into the open arms of China. OTOH, if we do nothing, Myanmar is like a stone tied around ASEAN's neck. So we have to decide what to do. ASEAN's problem is that we do not have a stick but also do not have enough carrots, let me explain:

(i) ASEAN members do not have the will to invade/fight with Myanmar so we do not have a stick.

(ii) The problem is that ASEAN itself does not have enough carrots (our ability to offer aid, trade and weapons) to get Myanmar to change.

Originally Posted by Crunchy

Our technological & industrial base is currently not large enough to create our own def industry.
But if member states would procure new systems together, we could put more pressure on the supplier('s nation) for:
-local assembling ( first step to independence)
-barter trade (some members are short on hard currency)
-offset
-relieve political pressure (from the supplier & buyer) -> less political dependence

By local assembling, I think you mean licensed manufacturing and that is being done in Malaysia for items like the M4 and some other products. I'm not sure about other similar initiatives by other ASEAN countries.

However, if we talk about purchasing or manufacturing sophisticated engineering based systems, like naval ships, Brunei and Malaysia have faced some problems. OTOH, Singapore is recognized as a smart buyer, integrator and user of weapons systems. Further, we have some capability to build/design our own weapons and weapons systems, including NATO standard ammunition.

The problem is that most of the weapons systems and ammunition that Singapore make are too expensive for other ASEAN members to buy. What some ASEAN countries want is for Singapore to 'sell' (not at a market rate) or give weapons (such as artillery guns and even rifles). Take for example, we have a problem with the Indonesian navy and they are not very nice even after we give things to them (to build relationship and as a reward).

I am not keen for ASEAN countries to engage in barter trade or offsets to buy/sell weapons or ammunition. This sort of ideas will lead to even more corruption as it provides middlemen an opportunity to take a larger cut. Further, Singapore can sell our weapons for money (such as the Warthog and our locally designed LPD), so why would we want to be paid by counter trade?

Further, there are mind-set differences between Vietnam and Singapore in defence matters. Singapore can make navy ships for Vietnam but Vietnam will not want to buy them. This is because Vietnam will not understand Singapore's western style navy, which is designed to be interoperable with the USN and RAN. The RSN values automation (Vietnam has more than enough people), electronic warfare (to jam missiles attacking us), advanced electronics and communications systems (to link our ships, submarines, UAVs, USVs, fighters and AWACs), whereas Vietnam just wants cheap and good ocean patrol vessels. We are also a heavy user of UAVs and USVs. Just like cars, why buy a Toyota Camry with an expensive hifi set (like a Singapore designed navy ship) when you can buy a motorbike.

Even our Victory Class corvettes that were commissioned in the 1990s (which we think is becoming out-dated) have too much expensive features for the Vietnam navy (weapons, sensors and electronics is where things get really expensive). In many ways, more important than price, it is a mind-set difference that prevents Vietnam's armed forces from inter operating with the SAF. We have a western mind-set and Vietnam has a Russian equipment mindset. It will take 10 to 20 years of development before your generals will believe that wars can be fought our way. Besides, your generals will tell our generals: What do you know? Singapore has never fought a war.

I want to be optimistic about prospects for security cooperation in ASEAN but I also have to be realistic about the scope of cooperation.

[OPSSG]

For those with a professional military background, please accept my apologies for stating the obvious and I stand ready to be corrected.

In the prior discussions, I note that there was some confusion in certain terms and these conceptual difficulties resulted in fellow forum participants becoming confused and I would like to make an attempt to provide some basic clarifications via answering 5 questions:

Basic Conceptual Terms Defined
(1) Strategy - The overall concept of using military power to achieve political and/or military ends

(2) Tactics*** - The art of winning battles and engagements (and this idea is always tied to a specific area of operations, usually at a lower level of command and against a specific enemy)

(3) Battle - A violent collision of forces at a specific time and place

(4) Concept of Operations - The planned positioning and movement of forces to gain an advantage over the aggressor

------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ***The following definition of tactics may also be used:

(i) The employment of units in combat (FM 3-0).

(ii) It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. (FM 3-0 & FM 3-90).

When I talk about military strategy, I mean the use of military power to achieve political and/or military ends. It is clear from the prior posts that Singapore has some military power. However, our ability to be seen in exercising this power is constrained by current geo-political reality.


Q1: Why is Singapore so reluctant to use military power as a strategy?

Ans: We use the SAF to achieve political ends but usually not to conduct war (because war in of itself is a blunt policy tool). The SAF is usually used by Singapore to win friends and influence other countries (and not to fight with them). An example of the SAF in non-combat roles is all the humanitarian relief deployments (eg. the Dec 2004 Tsunami) or peace support ops. And the SAF contributes to peace support ops too. If we can achieve the same political goal by negotiations or diplomatic efforts:- Why not? Further, the mere presence of the SAF deters potential aggressors from using force. So ironically, the presence of military power, may reduce the necessity of using military power.


Q2: Why does Singapore focus so much attention on air power?

Ans: Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, win air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our tactical advantage to enable us to establish local superiority in battles.


Q3: Why build the Singapore navy, when you have air power?

Ans: We are not self sufficient in food (over the long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open. Further, air power can have a multiplier effect on the RSN's capabilities and gives us a greater choice of tactics in any naval battle.


Q4: Singapore has a strong but small* air force and navy, why do you need an army?

Ans: Because without an army we cannot hold physical ground (we would have to give up the possibility of using forward defence as a potential tactic, if we cannot hold ground) and it would create a force imbalance, that can be easily overcome by a capable aggressor. Further, we are not a true island like NZ or the UK (where they are separated by miles and miles of water), as we are physically connected by 2 land bridges to Malaysia (and therefore physically connected to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia). In WWII, the causeway was demolished by the British but the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were able to cross it in a few hours and bring over their troops, tanks and supplies. So IMHO, a strong army component is essential in any land battle (keeping in mind that the IJA invaded Singapore by a land route). Our army components include recce elements (like LRRPS), armoured battle groups, infantry, artillery, combat engineers and so on.

Originally Posted by Ananda

Fortress Singapore have no choice to play with conventional defence...once it's breach...she'll be lost since unlike the others that can retreat to the rural and jungles to make unconventional resistance, that choices in my opinion regretfully does not applicable to Singapore...

Q5. What do you mean when you say that Singapore is capable of hybrid warfare?

Ans: Just as insurgent commandos can set off bombs at Orchard Road and at the former Ambassador Hotel (during the 'Konfrontasi'), conventional armies are capable of unconventional attacks. For example, Operation Rimau carried by the Z Special Unit in WWII. Singapore's own SOF last saw action in the 1991, at the SQ117 hijack and our NDU have undergone deployments in Iraqi waters for the last 5 years. So it is important to understand that the SAF (while it is not designed as a guerrilla warfare organisation) has well trained unconventional forces that will be employed as part of our concept of operations in any battle (which is often called hybrid warfare**). Please remember, that conceptually, the same or similar tactics are available to both the aggressor and the defender. Our investment in training, technology and organization are but tools in an attempt to stack odds in our favour. That is why we don't ever intend to fight fair or only conventionally. So please do not assume that the SAF will cede any area of specific competence to any potential aggressor (like unconventional warfare). While warfare is inherently unpredictable, our army is not small in numbers and our defence of Singapore will be considered, dynamic and robust. Let me end with a quote from Clausewitz:

"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult... the difficulties accumulate... so that one always falls short of the intended goal... [and this] distinguishes real war from war on paper."

Footnotes:
*Small being a relative concept when compared to regional powers (the RSAF has the best trained and largest combat aircraft fleet amongst the ASEAN countries). The RSN has arguably the most capable naval fleet amongst the ASEAN countries (in terms of force balance).

**Hybrid warfare or swarming are only tactics. Our country's strategy is to live in peace with our neighbours and try to get along with the regional powers, if possible.

[cm07]

To be honest, ST (Singapore Technologies) sells plenty of firearms and munitions to neighbouring countries (with the exception of Malaysia). However, this is neither prolific nor prominent in order to avoid being implicated as co-murderers when the same weapons are used in human-rights sensitive conflicts.

With regards to how Singapore defends itself in a conflict - certainly plans are already in place for all three individual/combined scenarios : Land, Sea and/or Air.

Do note that Singapore has SIG/INT capabilities to monitor traffic up to 300Km away or more. Any plane and ship heading in the direction of Singapore will be queried and identified long before the actual arrival. Any object that fails to establish communications will be intercepted with armed/live war machines. (This has happened before and each time, the media will cover the incident quite closely for a day or two )

Attempts to inflitrate by land checkpoints will be dealt with the Immigration and their advance scanners. Unless the aggressor intends to sneak in armed troops, over a long peroid of time,in little boats as smugglers do with illegal immigrants(even then, there's the coast guard to avoid), there's little chance of an aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

Should any neighbouring country announce purchase or clear intent to purchase SRBMs or similar tactical missiles, Singapore will definitely acquire ABM systems that are comprehensive enough easily deal with such threats and at the same time (for convienience and cost effectiveness) handle cruise missiles / ICBMs.

The question still goes back to under what circumstances would such force be used publicly against Singapore.

[Crunchy]

Originally Posted by OPSSG

Besides, your generals will tell our generals: What do you know? Singapore has never fought a war.

@ OPSSG: Thanks for your answer.

Quoted for truth: Vietnam is the only country in SEA, which has a "collective memory" for a full scale (defensive) war.

[OPSSG]

Originally Posted by cm07

To be honest, ST (Singapore Technologies) sells plenty of firearms and munitions to neighbouring countries (with the exception of Malaysia). However, this is neither prolific nor prominent in order to avoid being implicated as co-murderers when the same weapons are used in human-rights sensitive conflicts.

For most parts of this thread, we are discussing the best strategy to defend Singapore from an external threat (originating from outside of ASEAN). There are 3 points to note in relation to Indonesia:

(i) Singapore seeks peace with Indonesia. To have peace with Indonesia, we must try to work with whoever is in power. IMO, the normalization of Indonesia-Singapore relations provided the benign regional threat environment that enabled Singapore's economic growth in 1970s and 1980s, when we were most vulnerable to external threats. In return, for this peace, we also have to accept that we cannot actively intervene in the domestic politics of Indonesia or act against their national interests (and to be consistent, we should also resist any Indonesian / Malaysian attempt to intervene in our domestic politics).

(ii) Developing an arms industry enhances Singapore defence posture and keeps our costs down. This means we have to accept that guns don't kill people, people kill people. Having an arms industry means we sell guns. In fact, US, Sweden, Russia, China, Pakistan, Korea and Israel all sell arms to some ASEAN countries. Some of these arms selling countries have little or no constraints on selling their arms (and likewise we cannot be expected to act very far outside of international arms selling norms). Therefore, I would not dare to take moral high ground on arms sales save to say that we will comply with relevant UN resolutions.

(iii) The strongest diplomatic message we have sent to a fellow ASEAN country thus far is to abstain from a UN vote, to indicate our disapproval.

Originally Posted by cm07

With regards to how Singapore defends itself in a conflict - certainly plans are already in place for all three individual/combined scenarios : Land, Sea and/or Air.

Yes, certain types of drawer plans are standard. We should expect no less from the SAF.

In fact, the Australian military had conducted (with UK, US, Canadian and New Zealand participation) ‘Exercise Rainbow Serpent’, that simulated a peace enforcement exercise in a regional country that assisted them in planning for their INTERFET deployment in East Timor. The Aussies, as lead country, augmented by US naval power, showed their impressive military capabilities. Because of their ability to plan well and rapid deployment plan, the local militias were not able to effectively resist. In fact, their naval deployment had to contend with 'aggressive' patrols by Indonesian submarines. Therefore we have much to learn from our FPDA partner.

Originally Posted by cm07

Do note that Singapore has SIG/INT capabilities to monitor traffic up to 300Km away or more. Any plane and ship heading in the direction of Singapore will be queried and identified long before the actual arrival. Any object that fails to establish communications will be intercepted with armed/live war machines. (This has happened before and each time, the media will cover the incident quite closely for a day or two )

It is much further than 300 km, even if our aircraft and other intelligence assets remain only in Singapore air-space. Thailand will also also be acquiring an AEW aircraft and we know that certain Malaysian navy ships have some intelligence gathering capability. I am not sure about other ASEAN countries.

Originally Posted by cm07

Attempts to infiltrate by land checkpoints will be dealt with the Immigration and their advance scanners. Unless the aggressor intends to sneak in armed troops, over a long period of time,in little boats as smugglers do with illegal immigrants(even then, there's the coast guard to avoid), there's little chance of an aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

We try to watch our small border closely but illegal immigration is still present (at low levels) and if Mas Selamat can escape, we should not be too complacent.

However, I do agree that there's little chance of a large aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

[OPSSG]

I have copied and modified this post from another thread. What I say here is speculative but you decide if it makes sense.

IMHO, the issue is more complex. Indonesia has F-5Es, F-16A/Bs (which replaced their MiG-21s) and Su-30MKs. Why is it that they can operate their older F-5E squadron (and at the same time have difficulty operating their block 15 F-16s delivered in 1989)? Why was flying Indonesia's western fighter planes never a real problem under President Suharto's rule until 1999 (over the East Timor issues)?

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Please tell me again if Indonesia had purchased the required weapons for their Russian aircraft and explain why there are reported problems with their relatively new purchases (and lack of spare parts or avionics problems is always an excuse)? Keeping in mind that Indonesia has some 'capability' to 'manufacture' other aircraft types?

Are their problems related to a lack of technical expertise, an embargo or a lack of planning (in stocking parts and reliance on outside help for engineering support)?

IMO Indonesia could have been less affected by a US arms embargo!

Traditionally, whatever Suharto asked from Singapore, our government will give it to him (and we also deferred to Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN). They say jump, we say how high (but the key is that they did not ask for too much). If they wanted to borrow NVG or UAVs (to suppress their internal conflicts), we will lend it to them. If he wanted weapons, these would be sold at friendship prices or given to the TNI. If they need engineering support for their fighters (and we have no problems keeping our F-5s & F-16s flying) Singapore would have provided it in the past (on the idea that in general they do not harm our interests).

That relationship changed when Suharto fell from power. We become the little red dot to be kicked around for political expediency. They also decided to renegotiate all prior agreements (on the basis that Singapore got more out of it) and sought ways to make life difficult - like cutting off the sale and supply of sand and granite to Singapore and even arresting a Singaporean for alleged illegal acts in 2007. The relationship thus became conditional even though we stood down a portion of our defence to help Indonesia after the 24 Dec 2004 Tsunami. Everything (though only relevant equipment was selected) and everyone on alert during X'mas (RSN & RSAF troop lift and even an army division HQ, deployed, as a task force) was activated to help them and we deployed our first wave in 5 days not knowing if the insurgency was active after the Tsunami and we did not know if delivering the aid through TNI would make us legitimate targets for the rebels.

In return for the bad treatment, Singapore is also renegotiating our terms of engagement with the TNI, that is why I provided a link of the Indonesians seeking help from Turkey (but not getting it). Thanks to a passage of time (and their inability to keep planes flying) Indonesia is rediscovering the benefits of working with Singapore again and we use mostly western made equipment.

In contrast to our relationship with Indonesia, Singapore donated/transferred 3 F-16As and 4 F-16Bs (all Block 15) to Thailand in 2005 (as a reward for allowing us to use their airbase and other training arrangements). I am not saying that we could have donated the F-16s to Indonesia with the embargo in place, at the relevant time, but it signals our ability to give to friends. Hmm... we have 6 more retired/unused missile gunboats (Anyone else want to be our friends?)

Note: Why give away F-16A/Bs to the Thai military when we still use F-5s? It is a diplomatic Thai-Singapore signal that too many observers fail to see. And how did the Thai navy reward Singapore Inc. recently (before the military government stepped down)?

My point is embargo or not, if Indonesia did not harm Singapore's interests, their planes will still fly (if they asked). That is why I kept pointing out that there is lots of non-US expertise and sub-systems available for the F-16 platform. It is a safe choice (they just have to cultivate F-16 operators as friends).

[Tavarisch]

Originally Posted by OPSSG

I have copied and modified this post from another thread. What I say here is speculative but you decide if it makes sense.

IMHO, the issue is more complex. Indonesia has F-5Es, F-16A/Bs (which replaced their MiG-21s) and Su-30MKs. Why is it that they can operate their older F-5E squadron (and at the same time have difficulty operating their block 15 F-16s delivered in 1989)? Why was flying Indonesia's western fighter planes never a real problem under President Suharto's rule until 1999 (over the East Timor issues)?

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Please tell me again if Indonesia had purchased the required weapons for their Russian aircraft and explain why there are reported problems with their relatively new purchases (and lack of spare parts or avionics problems is always an excuse)? Keeping in mind that Indonesia has some 'capability' to 'manufacture' other aircraft types?

Are their problems related to a lack of technical expertise, an embargo or a lack of planning (in stocking parts and reliance on outside help for engineering support)?



My point is embargo or not, if Indonesia did not harm Singapore's interests, their planes will still fly (if they asked). That is why I kept pointing out that there is lots of non-US expertise and sub-systems available for the F-16 platform. It is a safe choice (they just have to cultivate F-16 operators as friends).

It could be because Indonesia doesn't have the money to fly them or to get those sub-systems as you suggest.....

And let's not forget the rather heavy anti-US feeling over there, considering the fact that the majority of the population are Muslim.

However, the same Anti-US feeling here in Malaysia apparently didn't stop us from flying F/A-18s, so I don't really know.

[Ananda]

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Moneeyyy....

A senior Venezuellan Airforce Officer was being asked (If I'm not mistaken on latest Air Defence Review) when they're coming to Brazil with 6 F-16 A (for inter Latin Amarican Exercise), why they still can fly those F-16 even with the on-going US embargo...??
He simply said...'when you have a lot of money..you can buy anything you want through the internet'...

Maybe he's being modest on the internet issues..however what he's said..when you got money...Embargo is not an issue...
Well look on Iran...30 years of embargo and their F-5, F-4 & F-14 are still flying well...

After Soeharto (and even today)...we still have big issue on the availability for financing our Military Expenditure...In paper we might be an approximately USD 500 bio Economy....but last year we can only provide USD 4 bio (0.8% of GDP) for overall our armed forces budget...

Also there's a strong speculation many people in current political circle wants to enlarge the effect on US Embargo..so providing enough reasoning to go outside US on getting new equipments....

Current replacement schedulle;
1 sq of OV-10 being proposed to be replaced by Super Tucano...
1 sq of Hawk MK 53 with....T-50/M439 (still watching if Singapore or UEA choose it)

1 sq of F-5..???? as I've mentioned on other thread...the Defence Ministry wants Rusian Stuff...the Airforce wants F-16 Block 52 (2 Sq for replacing F-5 and current F-16 A)...

Also a lot of speculation here on replacing F-5 and F-16 with 2 sq of ex Qatary Mirage 2000...if that happen and true..well Frenchie will have last laugh considering their stuff being throw back in the last end of the 80's for F-16...

Indonesian procurement still show a lot of speculation...even in Soeharto era...(especially considering his family muddling through the process)...
One of the most infamous ones is the procurement of Hawk 100/200...the price of those planes that Indonesia has to paid close to the price of F-16 at that time..Everybody knows that the airforce wants more F-16..and no airforce sane mind wants to get Hawk 100/200 as the exchange...and mind you at that time the US still wlling to provide us with additional F-16..

How's this going to play at the end....well the interesting show's still not finish..

[OPSSG]

Originally Posted by Ananda

Realistically...can you made Fortress Singapore holding over one month on your own against outside MAJOR Forces..???

Technically, Singapore in WWII was never a fortress in the way of Fort Eben-Emael (the strongest fortress in the world prior to the start of WWII), whose artillery pieces dominated several important bridges over the Albert Canal which German forces intended to use to advance into Belgium. However, the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael also demonstrated that:

(i) the era of static fixed defences had ended; and
(ii) commando raids and unconventional warfare are tools of conventional armies.

In a battle that took place between 10 -11 May 1940 airborne troops landing via the use of gliders and were able to disable the defences of the fortress. Simultaneously, the rest of the German assault force had landed near the three bridges over the Albert Canal and brought them under German control. German forces were then able to utilize the bridges to aid in the invasion of Belgium. There is a 5 part video series of this story.

Fort Eben Emael-Part 1

Likewise, in World War II, the Japanese attacked Malaya and Pearl Harbor almost at the same time. In a similar act of tactical brilliance and excellent command of operational art by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), Malaya and Singapore both fell faster than the IJA had hoped. I also previously provided a link to a Pointer Monograph on this battle.

The net effect of these successes was to give rise to the idea of manoeuvre theory in land warfare that existed even prior to that period (as exemplified by the writings of by Basil Liddell-Hart and others). The concept of manoeuvre in warfare is, in its simplest form, to employ
movement to apply one’s own strength against enemy weakness while avoiding the reverse. There is an excellent 2008 edition of an Australian army publication that explains The Fundamentals of Land Warfare. Their thinking represents the ‘world’s best practice’ in strategic thinking about land power. Please look at:

(i) Chpt 2: Influences on land warfare; and
(ii) Chpt 4: Conduct of Land Warfare (which includes manoeuvre theory as a theoretical foundation to understand modern combined arms operations).

This is a good reference point of what we in ASEAN can learn from a nation with an advanced military doctrine. That is why I took a considered view that our defence of ASEAN against any external aggression must be dynamic, considered and utilizing all the tools are our disposal. If we ever need to engage in a collective defence, we must assume it is against a very capable opponent.

However, I would like to say that despite the claims by fellow forum participants of prevailing anti-US sentiments in their respective countries, I would say that this is:

(i) not an anti-US or anti-western scenario; and
(ii) ASEAN forces are so overmatched by US forces that it is pointless to consider it.

Rather, it is to contemplate an invasion by an external party (like the Imperial Japanese Army) but not against US led forces. It is also useful to note that the USN has a logistic presence in Singapore and therefore we welcome their presence in our Changi naval base.

Whichever forum member that want to contemplate an ASEAN fight against US led forces, please stand on your own. I do not want to be associated with such posts.

Originally Posted by Ananda

None of us in SEA have strong INDEPENDENT Military Industries...whatever Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand...produce locally...all basically depends to the outside sources....

Which all again show under realistic scenario...not one of SEA countries can invade each other...thus potential threat will come from outside SEA...which if that happen not one of us will be able to hold indefinitely...without outside SEA help...

In recent days, ASEAN has started to reconsider what steps we can initiate to consider a security community. The ASEAN Defence Ministers discussed a broad range of security issues including adopting three papers, namely:

(i) the "ADMM-Plus: Principles for Membership";
(ii) "The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief"; and
(iii) "ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security".

While the concept of a security community is not a defence pack, it is a start. In fact, Australia and the US have each brought forth their respective views on how to promote defence cooperation. In the case of Australia, we must keep in mind the existing FPDA.

[OPSSG]

Originally Posted by Tavarisch

And let's not forget the rather heavy anti-US feeling over there, considering the fact that the majority of the population are Muslim.

@Ananda

What do you think? Is there still rising anti-US sentiments after Clinton's visit or are things slowly getting better?

Originally Posted by Tavarisch

However, the same Anti-US feeling here in Malaysia apparently didn't stop us from flying F/A-18s, so I don't really know.

Agreed and it also did not stop Malaysia recently from accepting the US gift of coastal radars.

[Ananda]

@Ananda
What do you think? Is there still rising anti-US sentiments after Clinton's visit or are things slowly getting better?

Anti US....They're always anti US sentiment even in Soeharto era..
However Mc Donalds, Pizza Hut & KFC are the biggest fast food franchise in Indonesia...and keep going strong with other US franchise like Starbucks, Domino's Pizza etc,etc...:

Those people that burn US flag, and cry anti US in front of US embassy...will gladly throw their anti US banner....if the guys across the embassy fences shout 'there're oppening for US Visa'....

Face it...there are a lot of grieviences in the Moeslem world on US...but only one that really matter..."ISRAEL"...As long as that matter is not resolve...anti US sentiment will still creaping back...no matter who's in charge in Washington...

Hey...I'm a Moeslem...with a touch of US Education...I really HATE BUSH...but does'nt mean I'm anti US..
Those feeling are more in tune on what most of us feeling in here..we devinetely Anti BUSH...but not necceseraly anti US...

Just like wrote on previous post above...
We don't want to buy US equipments because, we don't trust US will not embargo us further in the future...and also their stuff is just too pricy...which we believe we can got value of money using Rusian or Frenchie stuffs..

However if the US can provide them cheaply..(like the coastal radars...and new upgrading for the Herkies...)..than we probably will take them...