This comment was first published at: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/245/
The Unites States sent its new Vice President to the Munich Security Conference to state, amongst other things, that the programme for the installation of elements of the BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) system in Europe will continue - but that Russian worries about such a move will be taken into consideration. And Russia did send its First Deputy Prime Minister there to reiterate, among other things, their opposition to the whole BMD concept in general and its European arm in particular – but also to suggest that these issues would better be discussed within the framework of negotiations for a new nuclear arms limitation treaty to replace START when it expires this December.
There clearly is some preliminary diplomatic manoeuvring already underway, and the fact that both nations sent to the Conference a high-ranking but not absolutely top level official, and furthermore not directly responsible for key foreign policy or defence decisions, was most certainly not incidental. Waiting for developments ahead, it would perhaps be useful to briefly recall the main points of the issue at hand.
1) According to the official version, the US has launched a very major programme which involves enormous technological challenges and requires quite substantial investments for the sole purpose of protecting its national territory from the threat of “rogue states’” ICBMs, which DO NOT EXIST, but if they existed could perhaps carry nuclear warheads, which DO NOT EXIST. Furthermore, these non-existing missiles carrying non-existing warheads are a major threat, in that they could end up in the hands of madmen who cannot be kept at bay through deterrence (although even Hitler was), and against whom, for some curious reason, it is also not possible to act pre-emptively – even though this possibility is explicitly mentioned in the current National Security Strategy of the US. Hence, a BMD system is needed.
Such a paranoid approach is utterly impossible to reconcile with logic and rationality and could only be accepted through a deliberate suspension of critical analysis based upon political and ideological factors.
2) The US BMD programme is, rather, intended to produce a deep shift in the current overall strategic balance, or more accurately, set of balances that stem from the possession of missile-delivered nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal has been accurately described as “nuclear primacy,” i.e. a situation very similar to that prevailing in the late 1940s when the US was the only country with both a nuclear arsenal and a delivery system. “Nuclear primacy” would enable the US to launch conventional military operations at various levels, while at the same time maintaining the Damocles’ sword of nuclear weapons hanging over the head of its actual or potential enemies – but without being itself vulnerable to even the more limited forms of deterrence, in the hands of any opponent.
Although BMD systems are, by definition, defensive in nature and working mechanisms, the strategic goal of their deployment is markedly offensive, being intended to enable the US to use military force (or the threat thereof) against any conceivable adversary without having to fear a retaliatory attack and thus remain free from any form or external pressure or coercion in its decision-making process. War, which in the framework of deterrence (not to mention MAD) is a fear-inspiring issue to be handled with outmost care, thus comes back to a “continuation of foreign policy through other means.”
3) The presence of a BMD system acts in the above direction at two levels:
3a) As regards actual or potential small/medium nuclear powers (Iran and North Korea, but also China, India, Pakistan, France, the UK and Israel), the BMD degrades nearly to zero the capacity to maintain a deterrence vis-à-vis the US. In addition to their significance at a regional level, the nuclear arsenals of these countries are based upon the concept that was originally formulated in De Gaulle’s France as “deterrence from the weak to the strong,” and which is currently mentioned in the nuclear doctrines of both China and India as “minimum sufficient deterrent” - that is, to keep a very small number of warheads and delivery means, however sufficient to inflict intolerable damage to any aggressor, even including a superpower.
It is quite obvious in this context that even the limited BMD assets, as already in place, do strongly reduce the deterrent effect of, for example, the 20-30 or so Chinese DF-5 and DF-31 missiles. With the complete BMD network in place (the silos at Fort Greeley, Vandenberg and in Poland, the 18 AEGIS ships modified to use SM-3 missiles, the ABL airborne laser, the KEI interceptors, and more to come) no country in the world, with the partial exception of Russia, will be able to deter the US. The strategic impact of this situation cannot be overestimated.
It is sometimes suggested that eliminating the credibility of the concept of “minimum sufficient deterrence” could be of some help in preventing the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), because such weapons would lose much of their significance. This does not seem to hold water on a global scale, however, in that the reasons for the “race to the bomb” are in many cases rooted in regional conflicts and rivalries. But it would arguably work against Iran and North Korea, both of which are desperately trying to develop something that would deter the US and which, once the BMD system is in place, would see this elusive goal move beyond its reach.
3b) As regards Russia, the American BMD system does significantly affect the credibility of its deterrent (while remaining far from eliminating it) in that it interferes with the Russian ability to carry out a retaliation counter-attack (counter-value, i.e. against cities) following a hypothetical US “first strike” attack (counter-force, i.e. against ICBM silos).
In order to understand why it is so, even though the capabilities of the BMD architecture as currently planned are far below what would be needed to counter a massive nuclear attack, it is necessary to appreciate that we are still within the realm of “classical” nuclear strategy, whereby nuclear weapons do matter not because there is a real intention to use them, but rather because of the positions of relative superiority (or balance) stemming from their possession. In this context, the real (or planned, or estimated, or hoped for) capabilities of the BMD bases in the US and Europe to intercept a certain fraction of a notional Russian ICBM attack are not that significant. The key issue is rather that the overall credibility of the Russian deterrence is being weakened.
In the purely theoretical hypothesis of a US “first strike,” Russia could only react by launching a counter-value retaliation attack with its surviving missiles. But the BMD system would be able to intercept at least some of them, leaving the Russians in total uncertainty as regards their targeting, while Russia would then remain wholly exposed to the devastating US counter-value retaliation strike. Russia would thus be forced to choose between not reacting and surrendering, or reacting and accepting their being destroyed.
In order to prevent possible misunderstandings, I must stress that I don’t believe for a moment that the US would actually wish to launch a nuclear “first strike” against Russia. Indeed, I’m pretty certain that such a hypothesis is not even remotely under consideration. But I do believe that the US is aiming at a situation whereby this could come to be regarded as belonging to the rational realm of the possible available options. This simple theoretical possibility would be quite sufficient to destroy the strategic parity under MAD and thus grant the US a clear ascendancy over Russia.
To the risk of becoming boring, I must repeat once again that the fact that any feasible and affordable BMD architecture that would be able to intercept but a small fraction of a Russian retaliation attack is irrelevant. What matter is, the Russians would no longer be able to threaten the US with the assured destruction of, say, New York and Los Angeles, and this implies that their deterrence is no longer completely credible.
4) It is certainly possible to suggest that the real strategic goal the US is pursuing consists in eliminating the deterrent capabilities of small/medium nuclear powers, and it is not that interested in weakening the Russian deterrence. But even so, such a weakening is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of a BMD system being deployed – which provides ample justification for Russian alarm.
5) As regards the radar station in the Czech Republic and the interceptor silos in Poland, unless my memory fails me these installations were originally described as part and parcel of the US BMD architecture, and as such intended to protect the US and the US alone. It is only at a later date, and in practice at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, that there suddenly were talks of this system having ALSO a possible function for the defence of Europe. But even though NATO did announce in Bucharest its intention to regard the radar and the silos as a “contribution” to its notional future BMD architecture, there is not the slightest indication of the systems being eventually placed under NATO control or even simply being declared for NATO use. Control will remain exclusively in US hand.
NATO had originally formulated a requirement for an ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) system, intended to protect its out-of-area deployments. Furthermore, the Alliance commissioned a study on the feasibility of a full-scale ABM system to defend the entire territory of its European members, and based on the results of this study it was pondering the political and strategic convenience/opportunity of actually deploying such a system.
But although there was no formal announcement of the NATO nuclear strategy being shifted from MAD to BMD, and although such a momentous matter was never brought to the attention of the national Parliaments, in Bucharest NATO authorities all of a sudden began behaving as if the notion of the need for a Europe-wide BMD network was set in stone. It is quite difficult not to perceive this as but a bow to US diplomatic pressure, in order to provide a European fig leaf to the US BMD installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.
It is also difficult to imagine how the European members of the NATO Alliance, who are all struggling to keep their conventional armed forces to a bare minimum level of efficiency, and whose cumulative efforts can be measured by the current abysmal status of exceedingly important programmes such as NATO AGS or NATO airlift, could really be willing to invest enormous amounts of money in order to defend themselves from a threat, which currently DOES NOT EXIST and which is not very likely to materialise at any future time.
Should anyone be able to come forward with a rational hypothetical strategic scenario, whereby a nuclear-capable Iran would wish to attack European countries, I would really be interested in hearing it. This, of course, short of the said European countries taking part in a US or/an Israeli attack against Iran.
The Unites States sent its new Vice President to the Munich Security Conference to state, amongst other things, that the programme for the installation of elements of the BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) system in Europe will continue - but that Russian worries about such a move will be taken into consideration. And Russia did send its First Deputy Prime Minister there to reiterate, among other things, their opposition to the whole BMD concept in general and its European arm in particular – but also to suggest that these issues would better be discussed within the framework of negotiations for a new nuclear arms limitation treaty to replace START when it expires this December.
There clearly is some preliminary diplomatic manoeuvring already underway, and the fact that both nations sent to the Conference a high-ranking but not absolutely top level official, and furthermore not directly responsible for key foreign policy or defence decisions, was most certainly not incidental. Waiting for developments ahead, it would perhaps be useful to briefly recall the main points of the issue at hand.
1) According to the official version, the US has launched a very major programme which involves enormous technological challenges and requires quite substantial investments for the sole purpose of protecting its national territory from the threat of “rogue states’” ICBMs, which DO NOT EXIST, but if they existed could perhaps carry nuclear warheads, which DO NOT EXIST. Furthermore, these non-existing missiles carrying non-existing warheads are a major threat, in that they could end up in the hands of madmen who cannot be kept at bay through deterrence (although even Hitler was), and against whom, for some curious reason, it is also not possible to act pre-emptively – even though this possibility is explicitly mentioned in the current National Security Strategy of the US. Hence, a BMD system is needed.
Such a paranoid approach is utterly impossible to reconcile with logic and rationality and could only be accepted through a deliberate suspension of critical analysis based upon political and ideological factors.
2) The US BMD programme is, rather, intended to produce a deep shift in the current overall strategic balance, or more accurately, set of balances that stem from the possession of missile-delivered nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal has been accurately described as “nuclear primacy,” i.e. a situation very similar to that prevailing in the late 1940s when the US was the only country with both a nuclear arsenal and a delivery system. “Nuclear primacy” would enable the US to launch conventional military operations at various levels, while at the same time maintaining the Damocles’ sword of nuclear weapons hanging over the head of its actual or potential enemies – but without being itself vulnerable to even the more limited forms of deterrence, in the hands of any opponent.
Although BMD systems are, by definition, defensive in nature and working mechanisms, the strategic goal of their deployment is markedly offensive, being intended to enable the US to use military force (or the threat thereof) against any conceivable adversary without having to fear a retaliatory attack and thus remain free from any form or external pressure or coercion in its decision-making process. War, which in the framework of deterrence (not to mention MAD) is a fear-inspiring issue to be handled with outmost care, thus comes back to a “continuation of foreign policy through other means.”
3) The presence of a BMD system acts in the above direction at two levels:
3a) As regards actual or potential small/medium nuclear powers (Iran and North Korea, but also China, India, Pakistan, France, the UK and Israel), the BMD degrades nearly to zero the capacity to maintain a deterrence vis-à-vis the US. In addition to their significance at a regional level, the nuclear arsenals of these countries are based upon the concept that was originally formulated in De Gaulle’s France as “deterrence from the weak to the strong,” and which is currently mentioned in the nuclear doctrines of both China and India as “minimum sufficient deterrent” - that is, to keep a very small number of warheads and delivery means, however sufficient to inflict intolerable damage to any aggressor, even including a superpower.
It is quite obvious in this context that even the limited BMD assets, as already in place, do strongly reduce the deterrent effect of, for example, the 20-30 or so Chinese DF-5 and DF-31 missiles. With the complete BMD network in place (the silos at Fort Greeley, Vandenberg and in Poland, the 18 AEGIS ships modified to use SM-3 missiles, the ABL airborne laser, the KEI interceptors, and more to come) no country in the world, with the partial exception of Russia, will be able to deter the US. The strategic impact of this situation cannot be overestimated.
It is sometimes suggested that eliminating the credibility of the concept of “minimum sufficient deterrence” could be of some help in preventing the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), because such weapons would lose much of their significance. This does not seem to hold water on a global scale, however, in that the reasons for the “race to the bomb” are in many cases rooted in regional conflicts and rivalries. But it would arguably work against Iran and North Korea, both of which are desperately trying to develop something that would deter the US and which, once the BMD system is in place, would see this elusive goal move beyond its reach.
3b) As regards Russia, the American BMD system does significantly affect the credibility of its deterrent (while remaining far from eliminating it) in that it interferes with the Russian ability to carry out a retaliation counter-attack (counter-value, i.e. against cities) following a hypothetical US “first strike” attack (counter-force, i.e. against ICBM silos).
In order to understand why it is so, even though the capabilities of the BMD architecture as currently planned are far below what would be needed to counter a massive nuclear attack, it is necessary to appreciate that we are still within the realm of “classical” nuclear strategy, whereby nuclear weapons do matter not because there is a real intention to use them, but rather because of the positions of relative superiority (or balance) stemming from their possession. In this context, the real (or planned, or estimated, or hoped for) capabilities of the BMD bases in the US and Europe to intercept a certain fraction of a notional Russian ICBM attack are not that significant. The key issue is rather that the overall credibility of the Russian deterrence is being weakened.
In the purely theoretical hypothesis of a US “first strike,” Russia could only react by launching a counter-value retaliation attack with its surviving missiles. But the BMD system would be able to intercept at least some of them, leaving the Russians in total uncertainty as regards their targeting, while Russia would then remain wholly exposed to the devastating US counter-value retaliation strike. Russia would thus be forced to choose between not reacting and surrendering, or reacting and accepting their being destroyed.
In order to prevent possible misunderstandings, I must stress that I don’t believe for a moment that the US would actually wish to launch a nuclear “first strike” against Russia. Indeed, I’m pretty certain that such a hypothesis is not even remotely under consideration. But I do believe that the US is aiming at a situation whereby this could come to be regarded as belonging to the rational realm of the possible available options. This simple theoretical possibility would be quite sufficient to destroy the strategic parity under MAD and thus grant the US a clear ascendancy over Russia.
To the risk of becoming boring, I must repeat once again that the fact that any feasible and affordable BMD architecture that would be able to intercept but a small fraction of a Russian retaliation attack is irrelevant. What matter is, the Russians would no longer be able to threaten the US with the assured destruction of, say, New York and Los Angeles, and this implies that their deterrence is no longer completely credible.
4) It is certainly possible to suggest that the real strategic goal the US is pursuing consists in eliminating the deterrent capabilities of small/medium nuclear powers, and it is not that interested in weakening the Russian deterrence. But even so, such a weakening is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of a BMD system being deployed – which provides ample justification for Russian alarm.
5) As regards the radar station in the Czech Republic and the interceptor silos in Poland, unless my memory fails me these installations were originally described as part and parcel of the US BMD architecture, and as such intended to protect the US and the US alone. It is only at a later date, and in practice at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, that there suddenly were talks of this system having ALSO a possible function for the defence of Europe. But even though NATO did announce in Bucharest its intention to regard the radar and the silos as a “contribution” to its notional future BMD architecture, there is not the slightest indication of the systems being eventually placed under NATO control or even simply being declared for NATO use. Control will remain exclusively in US hand.
NATO had originally formulated a requirement for an ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) system, intended to protect its out-of-area deployments. Furthermore, the Alliance commissioned a study on the feasibility of a full-scale ABM system to defend the entire territory of its European members, and based on the results of this study it was pondering the political and strategic convenience/opportunity of actually deploying such a system.
But although there was no formal announcement of the NATO nuclear strategy being shifted from MAD to BMD, and although such a momentous matter was never brought to the attention of the national Parliaments, in Bucharest NATO authorities all of a sudden began behaving as if the notion of the need for a Europe-wide BMD network was set in stone. It is quite difficult not to perceive this as but a bow to US diplomatic pressure, in order to provide a European fig leaf to the US BMD installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.
It is also difficult to imagine how the European members of the NATO Alliance, who are all struggling to keep their conventional armed forces to a bare minimum level of efficiency, and whose cumulative efforts can be measured by the current abysmal status of exceedingly important programmes such as NATO AGS or NATO airlift, could really be willing to invest enormous amounts of money in order to defend themselves from a threat, which currently DOES NOT EXIST and which is not very likely to materialise at any future time.
Should anyone be able to come forward with a rational hypothetical strategic scenario, whereby a nuclear-capable Iran would wish to attack European countries, I would really be interested in hearing it. This, of course, short of the said European countries taking part in a US or/an Israeli attack against Iran.
