Is it time for the UK abandon nuclear weapons.

[A4kscooter]

The UK has reducing Army numbers, is disbanding RAF squadrons and cutting the Navy surface fleet while still maintaining a nuclear deterrent which is to be replaced.
Is now time to withdraw the nuclear deterrent and spend the money on maintaining a larger Navy (additional T45s and ordering a larger number of replacement frigates etc), keeping army number at current levels and the Air Force ordering a Nimrod replacement etc?

 

[Troothsayer]

No.

For starters it would take a huge leap of faith to even assume the defence budget would see even half the savings from not having a nuclear deterrent.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

For starters it would take a huge leap of faith to even assume the defence budget would see even half the savings from not having a nuclear deterrent.

Absolutely. It's highly likely the Treasury would take most of the money back and try to fob the services off with small change.

 

[Quiller]

Absolutely. It's highly likely the Treasury would take most of the money back and try to fob the services off with small change.

Don't get angry gents and ladies...but if Britain drops is nuclear weapons... then it isn't a world power anymore, just a european backwater. And no, Argentina doesn't matter in the equation. And at the present rate, America's "nuclear umbrella" is vastly contracted and leaking, while other countries are, at least, claiming to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals. Are they or not? Who knows. But apparently unilateral reductions aren't viewed by global powers as particularly noble or farsighted, but as sign of weakness and capitulation. Bottom line: if you unload your pistol and smile and the other guy merely replaces his FMJ bullets with hollow points -- you've lost.

How can we achieve disarmament when the threats remain real and active?

 

[Vanguard]

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESIJ_C9mUBI"]Yes, Prime Minister: Nuclear Deterrent- Scrapping Trident - YouTube[/nomedia]

Sir Humprey says no, still as valid as the day it was made.

 

[STURM]

Is now time to withdraw the nuclear deterrent and spend the money on maintaining a larger Navy

Scrapping the nuclear deterrent would drastically effect the U.K.'s special relationship with Uncle Sam and would effect the U.K's standing in the world, not only from a military viewpoint but also diplomatically.

 

[Sampanviking]

Total disarmament is probably a step to far and no likely detrimental to UK interests.

Maybe the question should be about changing the nature of that deterrent?

Currently the UK has what is probably the most expensive option; the cold war era always at Sea, posture ready to respond to the 10 minute warning.

I think this is unnecessary today, as that kind of clear and present danger no longer exists. There are other delivery systems far cheaper and actually far more relevant to the current security environment.

 

[RobWilliams]

Total disarmament is probably a step to far and no likely detrimental to UK interests.

Maybe the question should be about changing the nature of that deterrent?

Currently the UK has what is probably the most expensive option; the cold war era always at Sea, posture ready to respond to the 10 minute warning.

I think this is unnecessary today, as that kind of clear and present danger no longer exists. There are other delivery systems far cheaper and actually far more relevant to the current security environment.

I'll try to find the document I read this in, but it talks about why the UK chooses a Sea-based deterrant than either land/air.

I can't remember it exactly, but they worked out that having Trident on subs was cheaper, less vunerable (than static silos/airfields) and more acceptable in the public eye. (The latter because where could they put nuclear missile silos? They're having enough trouble trying to find a place to relocate that missile store in Coulport)

I'll keep looking for the doc.

 

[the concerned]

Could we not develop a submarine that say had 18 tubes 6 fitted for trident plus the other 12 fitted for cruise missile deployment.

 

[RobWilliams]

Could we not develop a submarine that say had 18 tubes 6 fitted for trident plus the other 12 fitted for cruise missile deployment.

The idea of a nuclear-capable but not nuclear-armed SSBN is what the US/UK are working on in the form of the Common Missile Compartment for Ohio/Vanguard replacements. It'll have have a capacity of 12 missiles but will have the potential to launch conventional cruise missiles like Tomohawk and it should supposedly be simple to do so.

CMC Program to Define Future SSBN Launchers for UK, USA

 

[StobieWan]

Total disarmament is probably a step to far and no likely detrimental to UK interests.

Maybe the question should be about changing the nature of that deterrent?

Currently the UK has what is probably the most expensive option; the cold war era always at Sea, posture ready to respond to the 10 minute warning.

I think this is unnecessary today, as that kind of clear and present danger no longer exists. There are other delivery systems far cheaper and actually far more relevant to the current security environment.

You can't change "the nature of the deterrent" because continual at sea deployment is the minimum credible deterrent.

Anything cheaper than that ceases to be a deterrent - we'd have nuclear *strike* but not a deterrent.

 

[RobWilliams]

You can't change "the nature of the deterrent" because continual at sea deployment is the minimum credible deterrent.

Anything cheaper than that ceases to be a deterrent - we'd have nuclear *strike* but not a deterrent.

Agreed. For the UK, sea-based nuclear deployment is the most sensible option.

The following quote + image is from a 2006 White Paper about the UKs Nuclear deterrent and about why we maintain Trident on submarines rather than surface ships/silos/aircraft.

The process by which these options were identified, and the details of our assessment of them, is set out in Annex B. We rejected the large aircraft option primarily because of vulnerability to pre-emptive attacks and because of the costs involved in procuring new large aircraft and the supporting refuelling tankers, providing new infrastructure, and designing and procuring a new cruise missile. Silo-based systems in the UK could be a credible deterrent only against states with a limited nuclear capability, and even then there would be significant additional costs compared to a submarine-based system capable of deterring all credible threats. A deterrent based on surface ships would be less capable, more vulnerable and no less expensive than a submarine-based solution.

In regards to land-based missile silos, i'll raise again the issue about the potential need to re-locate the missile facility at Coulport, imagine the difficulty trying to justify to locals why there's nowhere else to put that silo. But to me, sub-based does seem the most logical choice for the UK, the sub-based system can give what land/air based cannot - a degree of invulnerability in that whilst any potential adversary would be wise to nuke Faslane should the need arise, they know there's a sub somewhere which can hit back.

http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/unitedkingdom2006.pdf

nifty NAO document published in '08

Ministry of Defence: The United Kingdom

 

[StobieWan]

You could *potentially* base silos at known targets, say, London and Birmingham, then add in ABM defences in the outlying areas so you'd be defending the silos from an incoming strike plus the cities they'd be based in.

Politically however...

We had land based missiles back in the fifties for a brief time - Thor, under a dual control arrangement with the USAF but these were above ground launch systems, defended usually by Bloodhound missiles. Folk weren't keen on having the missiles nearby - and a modern permanent missile silo would have to be well defended from ground attack, large enough to preclude mortar or other indirect fire from the perimeter and have the right geology to support an underground silo.


Can't see it being palatable.

 

[gf0012-aust]

there's another rub to this, colocating (and maintaining) military capability in populated areas in times of war is one of those ugly things that triggers the various UN Conventions, Hague, Geneva, Berne etc...

I would imagine that the local population would get a tad excited at the prospect of turning into potential collateral targets if an enemy were unable to "guarantee" precision and containment of effect.

It certainly becomes an issue for all when you consider that military facilities built decades ago and usually in "isolated areas" have seen the civilian population progressively encroach upon or get closer and closer as population expands

 

[MrConservative]

Scrapping the nuclear deterrent would drastically effect the U.K.'s special relationship with Uncle Sam and would effect the U.K's standing in the world, not only from a military viewpoint but also diplomatically.

.... and weaken its current status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council which would significant downstream consequences.

 

[StobieWan]

there's another rub to this, colocating (and maintaining) military capability in populated areas in times of war is one of those ugly things that triggers the various UN Conventions, Hague, Geneva, Berne etc...

I would imagine that the local population would get a tad excited at the prospect of turning into potential collateral targets if an enemy were unable to "guarantee" precision and containment of effect.

It certainly becomes an issue for all when you consider that military facilities built decades ago and usually in "isolated areas" have seen the civilian population progressively encroach upon or get closer and closer as population expands

Well, in the UK, basically, the concept of separation of military and civilian is a bit of a fudge if you start talking in terms of a nuclear exchange. I live 30 miles out from the edge of London and we're inside the "skin burns, structural damage to light buildings" template for a 1mt weapon. RAF Northwood (home to a tri service base and KEYCHAIN) is about ten miles or so south of me, nearer London. In fact, a large chunk of the M1 (the biggest North/South road link) would be danger close for a 2,000lb conventional LGB aimed at Northwood.

(I was helping out at a gig in Northwood one night and this grizzled submariner gleefully pointed out past the dance floor and explained that the bunker for KEYCHAIN was barely a hundred meters in that direction. Was very tempted to reply in a fake Russian accent asking for a slightly more precise bearing, while holding my mobile phone open to the GPS/Fix app but I figured there were too many Royal Marines present to bear that joke..)

You see some similar things even in the US, which is pretty big, where missile silos for Minutemen have gone from "out in the boonies" to "in the 'burbs.." over thirty years.

Coming back on topic, we're really stuck with the fact that CASD using four boats, with the active patrol boat out at sea is the most economical and minimum nuclear deterrent. It's out of sight, doesn't need anyone's permission to go places or break any laws regarding over flight (which switching to cruise missiles would!)

It's either give up the deterrent or keep it - there's no scope to reduce it's nature by much. I'd argue we could get more conventional use out of it using the new CMC if we bought a fifth boat, with the intention of using one for nuclear and one for conventional strike at all times, keeping three out for work up/training/deep maintenance.

You'd keep separation of roles, and see some sort of tangible benefit in terms of getting more cruise missiles to sea for conventional strike - I believe the CMC will have some arrangement to drop in some sort of sleeve inside a Trident tube to hold a VLS arrangement for multiple missiles making it fairly straight forward to change roles.

 

[Sampanviking]

Too many things to answer all in one, but I do appreciate the difficulty in finding a suitable land location for the stationing of a nuclear weapons.
Yes of course when dealing with the political difficulties caused by the prospect of an accident or an attack, it would be impossible to find anywhere where no one would mind that much or even notice. Liverpool probably springs to mind, but other than that.....

More seriously though, does the current posture actually have any modern day relevance. Are we facing enemies so clearly identified and targeted that the instance response of allways at sea, is even necessary?

I mean, even if the UK was attacked with WMD, how long would it be before we even realised an attack had actually taken place, let alone be able to identify the culprit?

The UNSCPM argument is interesting. but in many ways self defeating, as it is an argument of last resort when all other military arguments have failed to give justification. I see it as self defeating as a last resort argument too, as it merely highlights the flimsy pretext by which we still cling to "leading world power status" when all the indicators in all parameters tell a very different story.

 

[StobieWan]

More seriously though, does the current posture actually have any modern day relevance. Are we facing enemies so clearly identified and targeted that the instance response of allways at sea, is even necessary?

I mean, even if the UK was attacked with WMD, how long would it be before we even realised an attack had actually taken place, let alone be able to identify the culprit?

The latest threat to a Nato country came from Russia and that was within the last two weeks...

The deterrent force isn't aimed at or effective against some nutjob smuggling in a dirty bomb, but it is and remains effective at deterring a number of other nation states who have the capability to launch against us.

Put another way, standing that capability down, then trying to bring it back because the world changed the week or decade after would be almost impossible. I'd suggest we try and plan further than next month for our strategic requirements,

Ian

 

[MrConservative]

The UNSCPM argument is interesting. but in many ways self defeating, as it is an argument of last resort when all other military arguments have failed to give justification. I see it as self defeating as a last resort argument too, as it merely highlights the flimsy pretext by which we still cling to "leading world power status" when all the indicators in all parameters tell a very different story.

Disagree. Why it is important for the UK to remain a member of the UNSC 5 is that it is even more important for the US and a considerable many of other nations for the UK to remain. The US can live with the UNSC status quo and resists changes - if that does changes the downstream effects come into play. Britain''s nuclear capability is a huge arbiter in keeping the status quo.

 

[Sampanviking]

The latest threat to a Nato country came from Russia and that was within the last two weeks...

The deterrent force isn't aimed at or effective against some nutjob smuggling in a dirty bomb, but it is and remains effective at deterring a number of other nation states who have the capability to launch against us.

Put another way, standing that capability down, then trying to bring it back because the world changed the week or decade after would be almost impossible. I'd suggest we try and plan further than next month for our strategic requirements,

Ian

Hmm hardly clear and present though was it, nor a direct threat to the UK. Neither to be honest would a UK deterrent have any appreciable effect on the outcome of that situation should it ever turn hot in the future.

That scenario also leads to the question of how "independent" our deterrent actually is. Could we even physically launch in retaliation if Washington was not in agreement?

To Mr Conservative
Trying to maintain a status quo in a world that is rapidly changing is a futile effort and will generally take you at great fiscal and indeed diplomatic cost to an inevitable climbdown in the future that could have been carried at little cost or damage far earlier. Real power will not be denied as that is the nature of power. If too many members of the UNSCPM are no longer truly relevant, it will simply devalue the institution to that of an old buffers club, while real power makes its own arrangements, elsewhere.