A question about supplies.

[merocaine]

I have a question about supplies.

How much material does an Infantry Division/ Armoured Division keep in hand?
How closely does the fuel follow the spearheads during an advance?

How long could a Division keep fighting if cut off?

I was thinking about the Stalingrad Campain, the Germans managed to hang on for a couple of months before having to surrender. Is that the exception rather than the rule?

If say a couple of Modern armoured divisions were cut off during an advance, how long would they have before running out of fuel, to effect a breakout?

I know this is a bit of a how long is a piece of string question, but one that must feature in logistical planning.

Cheers

 

[JHC]

Well, when Stlingrad was surrounded they got supplies from Luftwaffe, i cant recall the exact numbers, but they got like 70% of what they asked for, which was already a minimum. In todays battlefield i have no clue, intressting thread thu

 

[kato]

Dien Bien Phu in 1954 would probably be a similar example to Stalingrad.

Although without armor really (except for ten M24), as only paratrooper and airmobile forces were involved on the French side.

The base was completely cut off early February, with assaults and artillery barrages starting mid March. The Legion d'Etranger held it until early May, with virtually no external supply (about 100 tons of supplies arrived, as well as a few hundred men reinforcements by parachute), and on some positions fought until they were out of water and ammunition.

As for a modern armor division ... uh, i'd say one or two days without supply. Seriously.

 

[Sea Toby]

Not very long, a month perhaps. It all depends on how much was stocked into the warehouses before the siege and how much was brought with them. Frankly, I don't think there is an exact amount. Situations change. Marines, on the other hand, bring a month's worth of supplies when they land. Supplies are always on the move. Individual troops in companies might have a day or two on hand.

 

[Waylander]

And one has to remember that Stalingrad was a rather static, infantry heavy battle in a city which still had countable supplies already in it.

Open field operations by a mechanized division are something totally different and with broken supply lines they are down in a few days if they have to fight (like Kato said).

In the end having a larger city nearby might save a division.

 

[kato]

The problem is not so much fuel and ammunition by the way. As long as you don't move around, and hold strict fire discipline, that can last a couple days at least. Especially as long as your organic supply is safe.

Water will become a real problem, quick. A division of 15,000 men, even on short rations in moderate climate, will still need at least 60,000 liters of drinkable water - per day! Similar with food - for the same 15,000 men, on MREs, you need around hundred standard pallets per day.
So, until you secure a source for both of those, you're looking at the cargo of 20-30 trucks being consumed within one day. Without ammunition or fuel.

 

[Waylander]

That's what I meant with open field operations. If you want to perform some serious mechanized warfare you are going to be out of fuel within a couple of days.
Ammo might last longer but could also be worse even if you are able to hold strict fire dsicipline.

And exactly because of that and the food and water problem I am talking of cities being easier to hold with broken supply lines.

In a city one is able to perform a better static defense and one has a much bigger chance to aquire additional food, water and maybe even fuel than in the field.

 

[eckherl]

I would tend to agree with Kato also and say 2 to 3 days of logistical supplies for a sizable modern Mechanized unit. As far as my tank platoons combat load for food and water it was fairly easy to carry 3 days worth during the initial load out, bullets and fuel were a different matter, some of you would be surprised on how fast a modern MBT can fire a combat load of ammunition in constant contact with a opposing force.

 

[kato]

I'm harping on the water cuz i know my way around that

Back in the 90s, my division was still a full Armor Division. Water transport (and sourcing) in the Bundeswehr is not handled by logistics units, but by specialized engineers, usually shafted off to NBC units.

Hence my battalion contained the only (peacetime active) water transport platoon for the division. There were 12 trucks in this platoon, able to transport 72,000 liters of drinking water. Another 48 trucks (roughly) were "convertible" for drinking water, but this would take about 2 days, and would take them away from the NBC Decon role (usually done for deployments - e.g. the German troops in KFOR used to have two water transport platoons assigned). In wartime, this would double, as a second battalion would become active.

So, 10th Armor Division would regularly have 144,000 liters of water available to them organic in wartime. 720,000 liters if the division came "prepared". Would last 2-3 days on the organic stuff, 8-10 days if "prepared". Once a viable source is found, the water transport platoons would be plenty capable of harvesting it and distributing it. Viable sources are water reservoirs of any kind, size and shape, both open and closed with standardized access.

Afaik, the situation is pretty similar with fuel, as far as organic transport and timing goes - if 10th AD had to fight outside Germany. Why this? Because inside Germany, CEPS (NEPS in Schleswig-Holstein) could pump fuel into any AoR in most cases, and the division had the necessary specialized forces to access CEPS.

edit:

Numbers from memory. Add in an assortment of 5-gallon water canisters spread through all the units of the division too of course, might last another day.

 

[Waylander]

Hmmm, usually we took more than the normal canister of water with us but also additional 20 litres in one of these flexible plastic water dispensers. Not to forget some bottles of coke, lemonade, etc.

I would also add that normally we avoided the food brought to us by the logistic guys as often as possible. Most of the time we ate the stuff we had brought with us.

Should war happen I expect every tank to be filled with water (Or other drinks) and food right up to the top. The same goes for every other unit which operates vehicles and has some available storage room.
Should be enough for another couple of days.

Real problems are for example the infantry units having to drive around in APCs and IFVs with very limited storage room apart from the individual rucksacks which are normally completely full with the ususal combat load.

 

[swerve]

And one has to remember that Stalingrad was a rather static, infantry heavy battle in a city which still had countable supplies already in it.

Open field operations by a mechanized division are something totally different and with broken supply lines they are down in a few days if they have to fight (like Kato said).

In the end having a larger city nearby might save a division.

That reminds me of an argument I once had with a Greek. He just couldn't get it into his head that the Turkish troops in Thrace couldn't (in the short term) be cut off from fuel, food, mechanics, mechanical spares, etc., regardless of what happened to the Bosporus bridges & boat traffic. I once had a similar discussion with someone who couldn't get it into his head that the amount of military equipment in Japan was not particularly relevant to a discussion of the ability of Japan to supply such things as lighters, barges, trucks, metal mesh for runways, ramps, & so on for the use of troops in Korea.

 

[merocaine]

Cheers for the replies, as to an armoured unit having only a couple of days of operational mobility, I guess thats why the sortie to relief is considered one of the most difficult operations.

As a side question, during world war two the Germans and Russians both sought to encircle each other, with envelopements and double envelopements taking place on a regular basis during campains.
In the west there were a couple of attempts, such as after the normandy battles, and with operation market garden(more an attempt to unhinge the german front) but none were prosocuted sucessfully.
Has Nato as successer to the Western Allies ever developed a docterine which seeks the envelopement battle, such as the deep battle concept of the WarPac?

 

[eckherl]

Cheers for the replies, as to an armoured unit having only a couple of days of operational mobility, I guess thats why the sortie to relief is considered one of the most difficult operations.

As a side question, during world war two the Germans and Russians both sought to encircle each other, with envelopements and double envelopements taking place on a regular basis during campains.
In the west there were a couple of attempts, such as after the normandy battles, and with operation market garden(more an attempt to unhinge the german front) but none were prosocuted sucessfully.
Has Nato as successer to the Western Allies ever developed a docterine which seeks the envelopement battle, such as the deep battle concept of the WarPac?

That would have been a major challenge for NATO to conduct such operations until the whole big picture was bestowed upon them, German forces had more of a offensive posture that they were willing to take over other NATO commanders.

 

[Waylander]

A problem is that with the forces arranged against NATO it would have been, as Eckherl said, extremely difficult to perform anything which is bigger than a local counterattack.

And when the big picture is finally undestood by SACEUR and its little helpers most reserve brigades might already be needed to hold of the WarPac units breakung through the frontlines.

During Desert Storm one could see something like an attempt to encircle the enemy.