Indian Defence News

ngatimozart

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I've started this as a catch all for general Indian defence related news.

To start apparently the Indian govt has started the blacklisting process against Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica) by beginning to cancel all procurement projects with Leonardo. This is a result of the bribery allegations against Finmeccanica with the VVIP AW101 project.

In an apparently unrelated move the Rafale deal has stalled due to Indian bureaucratic paralysis after the Indian Defence General Director of Acquisition has been forced to step aside for undisclosed reasons.

Funding is also creating problems for the Army with the majority of funds meant for acquisitions and weapons being used to fund salaries instead. Hence the Indian Army is looking at ways of increasing its tooth to tail ratio including rationalising troop numbers. Meanwhile the Air Force are awaiting finalised projects to be approved whilst the rupee depreciates against the US$. They argue that they facing a "severe resource crunch" unless the govt acts quickly.

It appears that Indian defence acquisition is at situation normal status.
 

ngatimozart

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Three new committees have been formed to advise on Indian defence procurement reforms. This new initiative has drawn criticism from military officials and analysts, who state that all this will do is delay acquisitions already awaiting approval, that are urgently required. This appears to be just adding another bureaucratic layer to an ongoing reform process that is already overly long.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Some of the criticisms in the link apply to Canada as well. Totalitarian governments like China can modernize their militaries more effectively than democracies like India.

From the article, " Experts suggest India could resolve some issues by appointing a single person in charge of the armed forces, or outline priorities in a national security doctrine". One would think that this is what a defence minister is for.:) Then again, we have had several defence ministers and none of them have accomplished much.
 

ngatimozart

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The Indian defence budget has been released and it's stand fast and carry on. New weapons purchases suffer under India’s latest defense budget. There's no real room for any new defence acquisitions because they have only been allocated enough to fund existing acquisition programs and I think even then, they'll be struggling. 1/3rd goes to military pensions, 1/4 to acquistions and the balance to operational expenditure.
 

OPSSG

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Post 1 of 2: Update on LAC Fiasco

1. An Indian Army patrol that was attacked by the PLA with nail-studded rods on 16 June 2020 has suffered 20 deaths and 76 injured in the clash with China in the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The good news is that 4 of the critically injured soldiers are out of danger.

2. As an external observer, I see the Delhi’s response as limited and lacking in resolve. That being the case, Beijing will use the standard Leninist tactic of 'probe with a bayonet – If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.' IMHO, only when the Delhi, as the weaker and less prepared party, steel up their resolve, will this probing process by Beijing stop. Having steel in their resolve does not mean going to war. It also does not mean a short term deployment of more Indian troops to the LAC (which is temporary in nature) or the knee jerk burning of Chinese flags. IMHO, having steel in their resolve may mean:
(i) investing in even more roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them to the border fast enough to pre-empt any Chinese counter deployment;​
(ii) speeding up the retirement of antiquated MiG-21s and acquiring modern fighters as replacement and investing in better IFF systems (to prevent friendly fire) — to routinely protect and defend Indian airspace;​
(iii) improving ISR capability through the acquisition and deployment of 3 new squadrons of advanced UAVs to patrol the LAC along with the necessary improvements made to 3 to 4 airbases near the LAC to house additional fighter squadrons with hardened aircraft shelters; and​
(iv) providing better support to troops on the LAC by having 12 to 24 hour notice to move, QRFs (to be housed/stationed at various staging points along the LAC), properly supported with adequate numbers of CH-47F Chinooks with IFF systems (to conduct a company sized troop lift of men and their organic helicopter-lift vehicles, in 1 wave, for each of these QRF battalions) and a flight of AH-64E Apaches to protect the troop lift. The Bronco would be the ideal low ground pressure vehicle in this role for the QRF battalions.​
3. On the one hand, following the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers along the LAC, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said “peace-loving” India was capable of giving a fitting reply if provoked.

They are more or less joined at the hip with Pakistan highly dependent upon the PRC economically and more so as each day passes.
4. On the other hand, actions of China and Pakistan, to raise tensions with India at their respective LACs are coordinated. This will present the Indian Army with a dilemma to split their focus.

5. "On 16 June 2020, in the late evening hours, Pakistan initiated unprovoked ceasefire violation along the LOC in Naugam Sector by firing mortars and other weapons," the defence spokesman was quoted as saying by news agency PTI. He said Indian Army strongly retaliated to Pakistan's unprovoked firing.

6. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said the extremely violent incident on Monday night “will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship” between the two neighbours. Both accused troops of the other side for violating the understanding reached by their respective senior commanders on June 6 but agreed to "cool down" tensions on the ground "as soon as possible" and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border area. Jaishankar also said the Chinese side reneged on the June 6 agreement on de-escalation and disengagement along the LAC when it sought to erect a structure in the Galwan valley “on the Indian side of the LAC... While this became a source of dispute, the Chinese side took pre-meditated and planned action that was directly responsible for the resulting violence and casualties.”

7. The Indian Army’s Mountain Strike Corps has been hit by lack of funds and the ITBP’s requirements for all-weather border posts at Pangong long been delayed. Most importantly, while Report(s) of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence highlighting depressing delays – 68% of Indian Army equipment is classified as ‘vintage.’ Further, the PLA is prepared consolidate their gains on the ground and Chinese diplomats are prepared to handle Indian protests by diplomatic channels. What strong message did India send?

8. As a journalist and former solider, Ajai Shukla, is speaking truth to power against the lies of his country’s politicians. The PLA(AF) flies some 2,000 combat aircraft – more than thrice the size of the IAF. The 1962 Sino-Indian war was fought entirely between land troops, with neither side using its air force or navy against each other. But in a military face-off today, the PLA(AF), will operate in numbers from the ten-odd air bases in Tibet. To degrade the IAF, the PLA would very likely begin the war with cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Indian air bases in Tezpur, Bagdogra and Hashimara, using missiles from the PLA’s Second Artillery. This might be preceded, or accompanied, by a carefully directed cyber attack to disable the IAF’s surveillance network, satellite communications and command and control systems. His 2012 article, “Don’t fight 1962 all over again”, contains key insights of reforms needed.

(i) He said that: “Indian Army needs to rethink its strategy, relying on local partnership as in the 1950s, rather than on an overwhelming presence that could start being resented...​
(ii) This must involve a three-fold action plan:​
Firstly, recruit at least twenty territorial army battalions from local tribes, which will defend their homeland fiercely against the Chinese, rather than relying on regular army battalions....​
Secondly, rather than committing the bulk of our regular army battalions into defensive deployments aimed at stopping the Chinese at the border, reorganise these formations into offensive strike groups that are geared, trained and equipped to retaliate against any Chinese incursion with counter-incursions into Tibet...​
Thirdly, create the infrastructure of roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them​
(iii) In his view, “it is foolish to adopt an entirely defensive deployment, and that too focused almost exclusively on the areas in which the Chinese attacked in 1962 (as if to say that the Chinese would just dust out the old plans and re-implement those, instead of coming up with an entirely new plan). Instead of trying to unilaterally fight the 1962 war all over again, [India] should let [the PLA] come in, defeat them in-depth, and simultaneously launch ripostes in pre-decided sectors with pre-prepared, pre-rehearsed and properly supported strike groups.”​
(iv) He has also given talks on the 1962 War, that India lost, to ensure lessons learnt are retained.
 

OPSSG

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Post 2 of 2: A lose-lose outcome

9. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have built public support in large part on hyper nationalism and a promise of future greatness. This often translates into jingoism and aggressive rhetoric, particularly when playing to a domestic audience. Such an approach was evidenced in Chinese coverage of the PLA maneuvers in the Himalayas. Equally, despite Delhi's announcement Saturday of easing tensions, leading Indian government figures struck an aggressive tone with Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah telling a rally of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that "any intrusion into the the borders of India will be punished."


10. India will now impose costs on China whenever it tries its favourite salami-slicing tactics in a bid to incrementally grab territory, a move that marks a decisive change in India's long-standing border management policy to largely maintain “peace and tranquility” along the Line of Actual Control, said top official sources. The “days of walk-in options for the PLA are over” said the sources, even as Indian armed forces went on their highest state of alert along the 3,488-km LAC as well as the eastern seaboard after the bloody skirmish in the Galwan Valley.

11. China has in the last three decades, transformed its military, and is prepared to use the same to pursue its policy. It has enforced a status quo with respect to border infrastructure on its own terms. In the meanwhile, the clueless Indian ministry of defence is belatedly re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of carrying firearms in the forward areas, given that PLA has flouted the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013 BDCA) and 4 other agreements, including the 1996 CBM on the LAC Agreement — these agreements lay down norms to exercise restraint in use of weapons during confrontations. But that is for border policing in normal times and not during military operations. The agreement does not lay down any restrictions on carriage of weapons. Moreover, when the lives of soldiers is threatened, the commander on the spot can use all weapons at his disposal, including artillery fire. The decision to not carry weapons was deliberate and a wrong one taken by the military hierarchy.

12. Despite the potential for clashes at the LAC, five major Sino-Indian agreements have – until now – largely kept the peace. The first of these, the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), signed in September 1993, is the “mother agreement.” It was supplemented with the 1996 confidence-building measures (CBM) on the LAC agreement; a 2005 standard operating procedures for patrols that come into contact agreement; a 2012 agreement that sets out processes for consultation and co-operation; and, most recently, the 2013 BDCA. Both Beijing and New Delhi realise that a mutually delineated LAC would end the uncertainty that causes troop clashes. The 1996 agreement explicitly notes the need for a “common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India–China border areas”. It states that the two sides “agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible”. However, China stonewalls the exchange of LAC maps, keeping alive the window for clashes.

13. In the standoff between India’s 14 Corps led by Lt General Harinder Singh and the Xinjiang Military Command, Major General Lin Liu, we see a fiasco unfolding at multiple levels for both Beijing and Delhi.
On the one hand, the PLA and the CCP have a PR fiasco for initiating the attack and killing Indian soldiers with nail-studded rods. The PLA is shown as engaging in thuggery, not soldiering —destroying PLA’s hard earned international reputation, as military professionals, by its strong participation in numerous UN peacekeeping operations and its evacuation of 35,860 Chinese nationals stranded in riot-torn Libya were rescued in a huge air, sea and land operation in Feb and Mar 2011. This thuggish mindset is like the Johnson South Reef Skirmish that took place on 14 March 1988, where the PLA(N) was perfectly willing to gun down Vietnamese troops attempted to erect the Vietnamese flag on the reef.​
On the other, the Indian BJP government suffered from a credibility gap given its hyper nationalist language usage, obvious spin control with lies and actual actions — where it is ONLY re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of not carrying firearms. There is also a gap the Indian ability to conduct timely ISR to support its unarmed troops under attack. And I am not even sure if they have a QRF for timely rescue of the injured. The BJP government should have given powers to the the Indian Armed Forces to make emergency procurements to stock up its war reserves, months ago (and not just after 20 had died). If that had been authorised months ago, it would have signalled real resolve.​

14. IMO, like China’s propaganda mouth pieces, BJP’s jingoistic rhetoric also does not allow critical engagement in any sphere. It projects anything critical of the BJP ruling party as anti-national. The reality is that it is the BJP that decided to procure only 36 Dassault Rafale in a Euro €7.87 billion contract (and failing to order a 2nd tranche of 36 more). Likewise the previous government failed to conclude the MRCA tender for 126 fighters and only ordered 11 C-17s by moving too slowly before the line closed (when they had a requirement for 16). In the 2011 C-17 contract, for 10 aircraft, was worth US$4.7 billion, India had an option to purchase 6 more C-17s over its order of ten. However, a lack of funds ensured that the follow-on order was not processed.

15. From China’s arms procurement perspective, India does not have a competent arms procurement process —India’s ruling party and its opposition can never find a bipartisan path forward to spend on defence. Even now, with Indian soldiers dead and injured the politicians are more or less engaging in political stunts to blame each other rather than finding a fix to their problems in defence. Correctly understood, it has a ministry of defeat, instead. The Indian defence ministry also took years to sign the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the US, despite years of buying American weapons. Without COMCASA, the Americans had to strip out equipment on aircraft sold to India, including crucial comms equipment for the Indian P-8Is.

16. The real art of public policy is not treating security and prosperity as strict alternatives but finding ways that get the most for both. PLA’s June 2020 hostile action to gain some inconsequential land along the LAC has resulted China destroying the trust created by prior border agreements and creating another enemy, when they could have kept India in the neutral camp.

(i) China’s self defeating approach extends to the Nov 2016 HK Terrex episode, where Chinese intelligence caused HK to detain Singapore’s armoured vehicles being shipped back from Taiwan — earning the distrust of another ‘neutral,’ who has now entered the F-35B club in Asia, along with Japan. Singapore's recent purchase of the F-35B fighter jets is part of the vital and longstanding relationship shared between the two countries, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Mr Rene Clarke Cooper, said on 10 Feb 2020. Speaking to global media, Mr Cooper also said that “the US-Singapore partnership is one very clear tangible example of the United States' commitment to a very free and open Indo-Pacific for all states in the region," he added. The US government has approved the sale of up to 12 F-35Bs to Singapore, the first sale to a country in South-east Asia.​

(ii) Many in the Indo-Pacific are hedging with the rise of China. With Trump’s unpredictability, there is strong incentive for Japan, Indonesia and Australia, as G20 members, to grow closer bilateral defence and economic ties. On the diplomatic front, the 6 Dec 2019 joint statement from the Australia–Indonesia foreign and defense ministers’ meeting expressed “serious concerns” about developments in the South China Sea. The rare united statement is a starting point for more discussions on how both countries could work together on strengthening sovereignty.​
(iii) In Southeast Asia, there is no “one-size-fits-all” narrative regarding China. While many countries are increasing ties with China to hedge against declining US influence, the survey also underscored how power dynamics in Southeast Asia are about much more than just the US and China. Japan and India, are also viewed as major players, with Indonesia holding significant influence in its own right.​
(iv) China’s unnecessary turn to hostility with its neutral neighbours has increased hedging behaviour in Asia, resulting in the trilateral naval exercise involving India, Singapore and Thailand in Sep 2019 that includes HTMS Kraburi and RSS Tenacious, from Thailand and Singapore. The Indian Navy was represented by INS Ranvir, INS Kora, and INS Sukanya along with a P8I MPA.​
 
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Metekhan

New Member
Can they really handle the Chinese army? They have good new weapons as you see in the video below. But still they have no chance against them I believe.
 

OPSSG

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Wrong analysis of alternatives does not help solve the border problem

1. The importance of this crisis is clear. China has taken by force small pieces of territory that India perceives as its own. In doing so, China crossed two important Indian red lines: seizing territory and killing Indian soldiers. Do modern conquests typically involve large, valuable areas or smaller areas whose worth one must squint to discern? And what can be done in response? Answering these questions exposes the surprising normalcy of what has happened in Ladakh. To my mind and most western security analysis, deterrence “is the use of a threat (explicit or not) by one party in an attempt to convince another party not to upset status quo” (Quackenbush, 2010: 60). More specifically, deterrence is the persuasion of an aggressor that the cost and/or risk of a given course of action he might take outweighs its benefits (George & Smoke, 1974: 11). Where the preference is not to fight.

2. In common with the Chinese mindset, deterrence for the Indians is a mutual relationship that involves communication and signaling and assumes that states in competition or conflict make decisions in accordance with rational cost-benefit calculations that can be manipulated (Mazarr & Goodby, 2011).

3. But the key difference is China’s willingness to fight, as a next step, to communicate to the Indians in the language of deterrence by shedding blood. That is why I worry a lot when I see an Indian reporter say:
“...China clearly wants more. India faces the choice of moving towards becoming a vassal state or purposefully safeguarding its sovereignty and self-respect. True, China is several times more powerful and wealthy than India, and a military confrontation would incur a heavy cost. However... Sovereignty has a price and sometimes that price has to be paid.”​
4. I believe that the CCP’s strategy must be understood correctly — as the fait accompli. Each fait accompli is a calculated gamble and the CCP bet that it could take small areas in Ladakh without provoking India to start a wider war. So far, that bet has played out in Beijing’s favor, but the crisis is not over. I suspect that China’s motive is to establish deterrence against India by a limited border skirmish and the Indian politicians must be prepared to suffer deaths to draw a line and after that happens, to seek a path to peace. The choice is not about becoming a vassal state or sovereignty. The choice for India is to be sovereign but to pay for such unpreparedness in blood. That is to engage in war planning but execute with clear stop lines.

5. China’s encroachments in Ladakh share the most baffling quality of conquest in recent decades: risking military conflict for such a small territorial payoff. Only when the Indians are in a position to make such a payment, can they get China to withdraw to their side in a manner that minimises the amount of bloodshed for this border dispute.

6. It is my suspicion that India is headed to a path of a limited war with China. Peaceful coexistence and restoration of Sino-Indian relations after a limited war would not be possible without wisdom and pragmatism by the leaders on both sides.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
China's trick is to do everything bit by bit, slowly, over a long period. The chinese expect that India regards loosing a small piece of land is not worth a full war. But over the years these small bits together are quite large of course.

And this trick can be very successful, just look to the Spratly Sea. The last decades china has built many 'fishermen villages' and 'scientific laboratoria for peaceful purposes' at that place, and now a large part of that sea is under control of china.

Also the process of strengthening the control over Hong Kong, is step by step and slowly but sure.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
believe that China’s ability to mobilize people and resources to safeguard China's core interests, is far greater than that of Indonesia. It is likely that by 2035, China will ask for your country’s leader to surrender even more of Indonesia’s interests in favour of China.
China always try to get into each countries politicall establishment and buy their influence in. They're doing it in Asean, South Asia, Middle East, Africa, even in Europe and North America.
We know some Indonesian politicall circle already under Chinese influence. However China create own problem for their own private interest by asking and demanding too far and I can say too soon.

This COVID 19 also change many domestic perspective in many countries about China accountability, like it or not for China or their supporter everywhere (including their ten cents army on lines). While at the same time they are demanding more from their neighbors. They simply willingly playing to US accusations circles.

It's getting harder to be pro Chinese. Off course they will always play business and Investment card, but US simply showing one thing (at least in Asean), China demand part of your sovereign rights. That what China with their action in SCS, just dig themselves deeper toward US playbook.
 

ngatimozart

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It's an interesting read but I don't agree that practice of maritime trade warfare is confined to the dustbin of history as some theorists suggest. I agree with the author that in today's world it will be somewhat complicated because of the nature of modern shipping practices, but it can still be prosecuted to the detriment of the enemy. Whilst some argue that in the modern context choke points no longer apply, I would argue that is a fallacy because whilst shipping companies will divert around a war zone, it comes at a cost both in time and money. With modern day logistics practices of just in time delivery, such delays have an ongoing impact throughout the supply chain. If it is military related then those delays can have impacts upon operations. Also some combatants may not have scruples about sinking neutral flagged ships as well. It's happened before and will happen again.

Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces.

So I think that maritime trade warfare is very much still in the toolbox.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces
That's when Pakistan come to play. This is where China will support Pakistan whatever they can. US influence on Pakistan day by day, bit by bit being replaced by China.

India can't attack China Sea and Land routes (road and belt routes) in Arabian sea and Central Asia without have to pacified Pakistan first.
Despite all the talk on Indian analysts and fan boys, they can't pacified Pakistan without committing most of their Armed Forces, which left them open to China.

As long as Pakistan in China's camp, there's not much India can do to attack China's route in Arabian sea and Central Asia.
China's with Pakistan can also circumstances Malaca strait. All they have to do it's get Iranian oils through Central Asia and Pakistan ports. India can't do anything without all out attack to Pakistan with the risk left their northern borders with China open for Invasion.
 

OPSSG

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That's when Pakistan come to play. This is where China will support Pakistan whatever they can. US influence on Pakistan day by day, bit by bit being replaced by China.

India can't attack China Sea and Land routes (road and belt routes) in Arabian sea and Central Asia without have to pacified Pakistan first.
Beyond the fact that Pakistan’s rail system can be disrupted by India, the Indian Air Force and Navy faced off with Pakistan during:
(a) Operation Safed Sagar by the Indian Air Force; and​
(b) Operation Talwar by the Indian Navy​
both in May and July 1999.​

Operation Talwar was a demonstration of Indian Naval capability that involved the largest ever deployment of Indian combatant ships. The Pakistan Navy was forced avoid the Indian Navy and it was later revealed that the blockade of Karachi and interruption of oil supply, caused an operational pause by Pakistan that aided Operation Vijay by the Indian Army. It has been chronicled that Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif indicated after the conflict that — the Indian Navy blockaded Karachi — Pakistan had fuel supplies only for six days of conventional combat due to the blockade.
Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces
Forgive my off topic reply on this thread — with a different take on shipping that I hope adds to the discussion.

1. In Asia, trade is strategy. Nothing unites North East Asian (NE Asian) interests like a threat to their shipping — which is why, both Korea and Japan have deployed naval ships to the Gulf of Aden.

2. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Japan, Korea, Taiwan or Singapore; and in a capitalistic society, businesses will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving China’s cargo in the Indian Ocean to get round an Indian blockade. Just as the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake, the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake.

3. Three points to note: One, attempts by Indian strategists to talk about disrupting Chinese (aka NE Asian) trade routes in the Indian Ocean is not credible. Two, as a non-aligned state (free of alliance responsibilities), Indian attempts to get more than lip service sympathy from ASEAN members with regards to its border issues, with China or Pakistan, is doomed to failure. Three, China’s 3,700 plus merchant ships carry cargo from not just China but for NE Asia, and vice versa for the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese merchant ships in these interlinked economies. Any Indian Navy attempt to disrupt commercial shipping will make it a pariah state.
(a) A simple way for China to avoid Indian Navy attempts to do so, would be to reflag 15% to 30% of Chinese flagged merchant ships to another flag (eg. Singapore, Panama, Marshall Islands, and Hong Kong to name 4 of the top 5 flag states). About 8,600 ships fly the Panamanian flag. By comparison China has just over 3,700 registered vessels. From decision to the massive reflagging (for 550 to 1,100 ships), this administrative task can be done in about 3 to 4 weeks. In the event of an Indian blockade, the PLA(N), wil just escort some of their own remaining merchant ships, with higher value cargos in convoys — in 2019, China had a 335-ship naval fleet, according to a US Congressional Research Service report — the PLA(N) is also well rehearsed in forming counter piracy escort groups for the last 12 years. The PLA(N) has the capability to conduct convoy escorts for its own merchant ships on the scale of Operation Earnest Will, conducted by the Americans, in 1987.​
(b) If the Indian Navy plays its cards wrongly, and their dispute with the PLA(N) affects innocent merchant traffic, the RAN, JMSDF, ROKN, ROCN and RSN could end up running escorts to convoy NE Asian and Oceania cargo routes transiting through the Indian Ocean — esp container liner trade that is currently controlled by:​
(i) Mitsui OSK Lines, NYK and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha;​
(ii) Hyundai Merchant Marine, CK Line, Dongjin Shipping, Don Woo Shipping, Dong Young Shipping, Hansung Line, Heueng-A Shipping, KMTC, Namsung Shipping, Pan Continental Shipping, Pan Ocean, Sinokor Shipping, SM Line and Tai Young Shipping;​
(iii) Evergreen Line and Yang Ming Marine Transport; or​
(iv) Pacific International Line.​
(c) Japanese, Korean, Indonesian and Singaporean owned or flagged cargo ships would just enjoy high cargo usage — from a multi-modal transport cost point of view, cargo moved by sea is much cheaper than rail.​
(d) For the energy trade, to evade an Indian Navy blockage, Chinese SOEs could also buy a portion of its supply from other trading hubs (eg. Singapore) or from sources that do not need to sail through the Indian Ocean. The LNG and oil will be owned by MNCs importing it into a port outside the reach of the Indian Navy — the Chinese would buy it there — thereafter, their merchant ships pick it up from the trading hub — by-passing an useless Indian Ocean blockage.​
4. China is not at war with Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or ASEAN members (like Indonesia and Singapore) and the businesses of these countries will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving container cargoes, bulk cargoes, oil and LNG cargoes that are ultimately destined for China, at a later stage, and transiting through the Indian Ocean. The reverse is also true, just because China has a border dispute with India, it does not mean that the PLA(N) is free to escalate in any manner it likes.

5. Like the Koreans and Japanese, Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have directly supported PLA(N) modernization goals and provided invaluable experience operating in distant waters. Lessons learned have spawned PLA(N) innovations in doctrine, operations, and international coordination. Many of the insights gleaned during deployments are applicable to security objectives closer to home; some officers enjoy promotion to important positions after returning. Anti-piracy operations have been a springboard for China to expand considerably its maritime security operations, from evacuating its citizens from Libya and Yemen to escorting Syrian chemical weapons to their destruction and participating in the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. So great are the benefits to China’s global maritime presence and enhanced image at home and abroad that when Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations finally wind down, Beijing will have to develop new means to address its burgeoning overseas interests.

6. As I said earlier, trade in strategy. IMHO, SLOCs are part of the global commons that capable navies exist to protect.
 
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tonnyc

Well-Known Member
I want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.

For Pakistan to pick a fight with India, even if India is distracted by a conflict with China, is a major risk. India may decide to concede some land to China and then turning around to crush Pakistan for good. China may call Pakistan batie, but this relationship fundamentally is based on realpolitik and realpolitik can easily see China deciding that they've gotten what they want and let Pakistan to fend themselves, calling for "peace in the region" and offering mediation but not lifting a single finger in terms of military assistance. After all, despite sharing a border, China can't easily use those mountain passes to invade India. The logistics are tough. On the other hand, the Indian-Pakistani border is wide open.

Pakistan knows this, or at least their higher ups do. So rather than an all out support for China in a Chinese-Indian conflict, I expect a more measured and cautious reaction.
 

ngatimozart

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I want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.

For Pakistan to pick a fight with India, even if India is distracted by a conflict with China, is a major risk. India may decide to concede some land to China and then turning around to crush Pakistan for good. China may call Pakistan batie, but this relationship fundamentally is based on realpolitik and realpolitik can easily see China deciding that they've gotten what they want and let Pakistan to fend themselves, calling for "peace in the region" and offering mediation but not lifting a single finger in terms of military assistance. After all, despite sharing a border, China can't easily use those mountain passes to invade India. The logistics are tough. On the other hand, the Indian-Pakistani border is wide open.

Pakistan knows this, or at least their higher ups do. So rather than an all out support for China in a Chinese-Indian conflict, I expect a more measured and cautious reaction.
Yep, but China also regard the Pakistani ports as quite important for their access to the Indian Ocean. One could almost classify them as strategic Chinese assets in that sense. So I wouldn't necessarily dismiss the idea of China not militarily supporting Pakistan against India.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
Yep, but China also regard the Pakistani ports as quite important for their access to the Indian Ocean. One could almost classify them as strategic Chinese assets in that sense. So I wouldn't necessarily dismiss the idea of China not militarily supporting Pakistan against India.
Yes, but that's two different scenarios there. If India attacks Pakistan, China will help Pakistan because it is in their strategic interest to do so. But if China and India got into a dispute, well, what's in it for Pakistan? A long standoff between India and China sapping Indian strength may be more beneficial to Pakistan strategically.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.
True, but I think the scenario being talk about here for Pakistan involvement based on scenarios on China by passing Malaca Strait and used land transport through Central Asia and Sea Lane toward Pakistan ports to transport oil imports to China Interior.

The safety on that routes can be compromise by India, but for Indian to compromise that route will means they have to pacified Pakistan first.
India can pacified Pakistan, there's no doubt in there. However to do that, they have to commit most of their forces.
As India pretext to pacified Pakistan in this scenario is for compromising Chinese routes, then China will come to equation. India simply can't afford to take both Pakistan and India in same time.

Thus if we back to topic of SCS, with China road and belt policies to open trade routes through Central Asia and Pakistan Ports, China in my opinion already open another safe route that basically quite safe from other potential opposition except US.

But I agree there's no guarantee that Pakistan will involve conflict with India only on China benefits and vice versa. They will involve only if India try to compromise China's routes in their territory or the ones that India has to reach over their territory.
 
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