This is a discussion on Australian Maritime Doctrine within the Geo-strategic Issues forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; Originally Posted by ASSAIL
The often varied discussion on the RAN thread regarding the future frigate (SEA 5000) and future ...
The often varied discussion on the RAN thread regarding the future frigate (SEA 5000) and future OCV (SEA 1180), the numbers and mix, the types of systems etc has promted me to skim through the Navy publication "Australian Maritime Doctrine" http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default...ts/Amd2010.pdf in the hope that there would be some guidance for me to make an informed comment.
I found it to be basic at best, plenty of motherhood statements but if I was given a task to shape the ORBAT of the RAN, that doc would give little guidance and I was disappointed to say the least. Having ferreted around the USN sites in particular, finding a context for the LCS's, there was plenty of relevent direction.
It appears that there is a very specific plan in the USN, the 30 year shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress for regular scrutiny, that gives a sense of continuity for both Maritime Doctrine and naval shipbuilding. There doesn't appear to be the same control over the force structure development in the RAN as it seems to be hijacked by the politicians from time to time
The reason that I'm concerned is, as I have posted on the RAN thread, there must be balance created between 5000 and 1180 but I can't see it.
In the linked doctrine, the total space given to the Patrol forces reads " In a major conflict, the Patrol Boats will contribute to a local patrol and surveillance effort, particularly for inshore and harbour defences. They may also insert small parties ashore where needed" Not much doctrinal development there
If you have time to go through it, the Seapower Conference from last year may give you some more insights ? I still have not had time to go through it yet, and it was in Feb last year
Edit: just to clarify, I know the 2013 Conference is timed in conjunction with the IFR, just having a dig at the lead up to the worlds longest election campaign
If you have time to go through it, the Seapower Conference from last year may give you some more insights ? I still have not had time to go through it yet, and it was in Feb last year
Edit: just to clarify, I know the 2013 Conference is timed in conjunction with the IFR, just having a dig at the lead up to the worlds longest election campaign
Thanks mate, you would assume that the linked doc to the officicial website of the RAN and carrying such a grand title would carry a bit more gravitas and currency though. I'll plow through 2012PACIFIC asap.
Thanks mate, you would assume that the linked doc to the officicial website of the RAN and carrying such a grand title would carry a bit more gravitas and currency though. I'll plow through 2012PACIFIC asap.
Totally agree, I read it when it come out along with the Amphib stuff around the same time and after several hundred pages, well we will never get that time back.......
Rather than another post here is a bit more light reading and viewing
As I understand it the last one here AMD 2010 was the fist in the current thinking around Australian Maritime Doctrine, it is the first time I have found the other one so will have to skim over it to see if it is any more informative
Totally agree, I read it when it come out along with the Amphib stuff around the same time and after several hundred pages, well we will never get that time back.......
Rather than another post here is a bit more light reading and viewing
As I understand it the last one here AMD 2010 was the fist in the current thinking around Australian Maritime Doctrine, it is the first time I have found the other one so will have to skim over it to see if it is any more informative
Two paragraphs within the paper caught my attention;
"A unit that does not contribute to the overall protection of the (maritime) force and is not a mission essential unit provides limited utility to future maritime combat power."
and,
There are key assumptions provided in the paper and the assumption that caught my attention 11(c) was; "The ADF will, in general, only acquire and develop capabilities that are structured and designed for combat operations. However, ADF capabilities will be regularly applied to other operations...."
Remembering that this paper is referring to a future goal,2025, I can only hope that these two statements are firmly in the minds of the procurement team for SEA 1180. Clearly, a suped up ACPB does not meet the requirements and should not be considered, which brings me back to my recent hobby horse, that SEA1180 and 5000 must be absolutely complimentary.
The University of Woolongong paper by Richard Menhinick (see aussienscale post above) was a great insight despite its relative obsolesence,( ie before the LHD's as he part advocates)
It should be compusory reading for all defence parliamentarians, suits and uniforms before they take any decisions. It really puts the development of Australian Maritime Doctrine in context and shows the totally blinkered DA (Defence of Australia) policies espoused by Dibb and his cohorts to be patently discredited by recent history.
Last edited by ASSAIL; February 8th, 2013 at 12:33 AM.
The University of Woolongong paper by Richard Menhinick (see aussienscale post above) was a great insight despite its relative obsolesence,( ie before the LHD's as he part advocates)
Was a very good read.I wonder if operating bare bases for the RAAF is more expensive,than operating an Aircraft Carrier? Once again the article did have a lot of good point's in favour of having organic air cover for the fleet.Also showed a number of historical events that can not be discarded.It would be good if the government did have a debate on this subject.
Was a very good read.I wonder if operating bare bases for the RAAF is more expensive,than operating an Aircraft Carrier? Once again the article did have a lot of good point's in favour of having organic air cover for the fleet.Also showed a number of historical events that can not be discarded.It would be good if the government did have a debate on this subject.
The Bare bases wouldn't come anywhere near the cost of operating an aircraft carrier. Their construction would have been a fairly straightforward engineering project, and their maintenence would probably require a couple of dozen men and women assigned to each base on a full time basis at most.
Compare that to an aircraft carrier that requires fuel, and including flight wing, a crew of 1,000-1,500 and its a bargain.
Maybe AMPT10E has an update on the status of "Plan Blue" - as thats the other long term paper that should be considered...
Plan Blue, like pretty much every 'strategic' document is basically dead due to budget cuts (current and future). We can't even really start the re-writing process since the fiscal future continues to be uncertain.
The Bare bases wouldn't come anywhere near the cost of operating an aircraft carrier. Their construction would have been a fairly straightforward engineering project, and their maintenence would probably require a couple of dozen men and women assigned to each base on a full time basis at most.
Compare that to an aircraft carrier that requires fuel, and including flight wing, a crew of 1,000-1,500 and its a bargain.
True enough, but what does concern me about Bare Bases is activation and sustainment ?
Also the sunk cost in the construction and maint of such a capability, after all have we not all argued the point that what direct threat does the Australian mainland have ? So why Bare Bases on the very same area we all agree that are not in any danger of invasion or on the opposite, too distant for us to make any effective mission improbable ?
So what it the purpose of the Bare Bases ? What is the tactical, strategic and doctrinal reason for these bases ?
True enough, but what does concern me about Bare Bases is activation and sustainment ?
Also the sunk cost in the construction and maint of such a capability, after all have we not all argued the point that what direct threat does the Australian mainland have ? So why Bare Bases on the very same area we all agree that are not in any danger of invasion or on the opposite, too distant for us to make any effective mission improbable ?
So what it the purpose of the Bare Bases ? What is the tactical, strategic and doctrinal reason for these bases ?
Cheers
For the same reason the Yanks built a few isolated airstrips in the north during WWII, dispersal of aircraft over a wide area and closer to the AO or in a modern version to cover the air sea gap or Indonesian archipelago.
I have been lead to believe that during Interfet that RAAF Scherger was brought up to operational use, how true it is I don't know
True enough, but what does concern me about Bare Bases is activation and sustainment ?
Also the sunk cost in the construction and maint of such a capability, after all have we not all argued the point that what direct threat does the Australian mainland have ? So why Bare Bases on the very same area we all agree that are not in any danger of invasion or on the opposite, too distant for us to make any effective mission improbable ?
So what it the purpose of the Bare Bases ? What is the tactical, strategic and doctrinal reason for these bases ?
Cheers
Something worth keeping in mind with respect to the bare bases in the North. If those airfields were not there and maintained to one degree or another, then any time a military aircraft had to fly through the North could have a very long way to go should something happen.
While they might not be used as fully functional airfields all the time, and there might be little threat of invasion from the Indonesians, there are some awfully long distances to be flown. Having the bare bases available to be reinforced for a forward operating airbase gives the ADF much greater flexibility.
-Cheers
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"I'm doing the same thing I do every night, Pinky..." comment from one lab mouse to another.
Something worth keeping in mind with respect to the bare bases in the North. If those airfields were not there and maintained to one degree or another, then any time a military aircraft had to fly through the North could have a very long way to go should something happen.
While they might not be used as fully functional airfields all the time, and there might be little threat of invasion from the Indonesians, there are some awfully long distances to be flown. Having the bare bases available to be reinforced for a forward operating airbase gives the ADF much greater flexibility.
-Cheers
Good points, but still concerns me about our ability to activate but more importantly, do we have to ability to sustain and supply for an extended period ? Those same long distances (And I have driven them by 4wd) impose some rather big logistical issues
