Afghanistan Thread

I thought I might start an Afghanistan Thread,

My opinion is that it is not going to end very favourably, and it might be an opportune time to ask what went wrong, (assuming of course that my view that things will not end favourably is correct)

What went wrong, In no particular order;

Lack of troops in Afghanistan, transfer or resources to Iraq sure did not help

Lack of committment to fight corruption,

Inability to train the Afghan Army and Police force well. We have been going now for more than ten years and apparently only one Brigade of the Afghan Army is capable of operating independantly. Ten years is a long time.

Lack of balance between development and military resources. If development is about getting the population to think of Nato forces favourably, as well as improving quality of life for the populace (altusistic reasons), it could be argued that resources should ideally be split 50:50 between both development and military.

I recall listening to the radio around 2006. An aid worker from Afghanistan called up and said that the aid going into the country was minimal compared to the military resources. She predicted this would come back to bite us, turns out that I think she was right.

Aid money not spent well. Mondays Four Corners program asserted that only five percent of the aid money actually reaches everyday Afghan people. 5 percent of 60 billion people is only 3 billion dollars.

When spending aid money, giving it to consulants, and officials etc has its place, however aid can be done in other ways. Example give $1000 to a family to build a well, or a small irrigation project. If they do the job successfully, then give them more work, say $3000 to fix a small bridge, or $5000 to build a school class room. If the original $1000 is just stolen with nothing to show for it, then dont give that family any more money in the future, spend the money elsewhere. Kinda like a natural selection process, choose the people that do work, and dont steal the money.

Not taking quite as much care with collateral damage. Example dropping 1000 pound bombs on a house where rifile fire has come from. Yes you may well kill the insurgents, but as risk of killing a lot of civilians in the process. Credit where its due, in recent years Nato has apparently improved its performance in this sector greatly.

Not paying the soldiers in the Afgan army enough money. What do they earn, three dollars a day, makes it hard a soldier to risk their life when they are not being treated so well.

Lack of soldiers and civilians that speak the native language. How many speak Pashtun? A concerted effort to train thousands in the Pashtun language and other languages would probably have been cost effective.

Using jets when turbprop aircraft would be more suitable. Jets cost say $16000 an hour to operate, turboprops around $600 an hour. The turboprop flies slower, allowing for more time to see what is being targeted is a valid target, and not a civilian.

Demonising the Taliban. Here I get into opinion even more. I think Al-Queda is evil, however the Taliban is a separate group. I dont think there evil, please note that I dont agree with their aims, and am not a supporter. Fighting them initially was probably the right thing to do. On the flip side they brought stability to Afghanistan though their treatment of women was woeful, plus they allowed Al-Queda to operate in their area. Possibly in private some Taliban people see the hosting of Al_Queda as an error of judgement (cant say that I really know)

Too much centralisation of power. If power was devolved to village and regional level, and resources allocated as such, there might be a large pool of goodwill towards Nato forces compared to what it is now.

just a few talking points
Mostly my opinion.. not a factual essay
I dont know if my views are correct, just a part of my thinking based on what I have been taking in for the last ten years.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
A lot of the issues have been discussed in depth the another thread - Is the US's position in Afghanistan precarious?

One of the best best books on the subject of what went wrong is Ahmad Rashid's 'Descent Into Darkness'. In short, a golden opputunity was missed in the 200/2004 period when the Taliban was weak and when the bulk of the population was welcoming the presence of foreign troops in the hope that this would bring change. Instead of putting emphasis on development/aid projects, very little effort was placed in that direction and of course, the main priority shifted to Iraq. At that stage the Europeans were very keen to get involved but the Pentagon, which was at odds with the State Department, was slow to bring them in. It was thought by the Americans that the Taliban was defeated and that there was little need to divert attention and resources towards building the country and offering the locals an alternative. Then there was also the problem of Pakistan, that was playing a double game as part of its national strategy and the U.S. strategy of propping up the warlords to cut costs and avoid the need for large numbers of U.S. trooops to be deployed.
 
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