This is a discussion on What strategy can we use to win in Afganistan? within the Geo-Strategic Defense forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; Originally Posted by Ray17
I believe Afghanistan has a 2500 km border with Pakistan.
That will mean an immense amount ...
I believe Afghanistan has a 2500 km border with Pakistan.
That will mean an immense amount of troops manning posts.
One wonders if it is feasible.
However, all efforts must be made to contain the international threat of terrorism.
I accept that it is easier said than done!
Have you guys seen this article: "A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency" by Steven Goode? While there might be concerns about his approach, do take a look at the table on page number 52 where he sets out the different counter insurgencies and some of the relevant numbers.
I don't have the answers but there's some people who are thinking about issues arising from the same question:- How many troops is enough?
Have you guys seen this article: "A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency" by Steven Goode? While there might be concerns about his approach, do take a look at the table on page number 52 where he sets out the different counter insurgencies and some of the relevant numbers.
I don't have the answers but there's some people who are thinking about issues arising from the same question:- How many troops is enough?
That's a good article. A few years ago during the height of the Iraq War, I worked for a think tank that was contracted to CAA to look at insurgency/counterinsurgency warfare. I utilized some of those historical cases, not all of them since the cases were specific to having a foreign interlocutor. I wonder if he used any of my data.
Anyway, when it comes to COIN strategy and determining tie-down ratios one should be wary of the cases being used. There is too much deference given to the Malaya Emergency (since it was successful, it is well sourced, and there was a perfect peak and decline to the violence) and even Ireland. The MRLA was a pathetic insurgency; they didn't have any stand-off weapons (maybe two mortars and no rockets)...all small arms. Plus it was isolated to a minority of a minority population and did not receive much outside funding..
The conventional wisdom is the more COIN forces used the less the violence becomes. Generally this is the case though not a perfect correlation in my view, since it discounts additional variables (e.g. the effectiveness of the insurgency, outside support, etc.) In Ireland the force ratios were something on the order of 35 to 1 in favor of the British, and it still took roughly 30 years to kill the insurgency, so who knows what will happen in Afghanistan.
@Herodotus, thanks for sharing. The above is an interesting post.
On a side note:
Is it just me or is there a lack of information on ANA's artillery in sources on their order of battle (click to see LWJ's complied 'order of battle')? This to my eye seems to be a glaring omission for the king of the battlefield (there's some basic info there but it seems to be written an after thought).
If anyone has information on ANA artillery, be it just the organic 81mm platoon (that each Kandak should have) or artillery battalions that should be part of any of the 7 ANA Corp commands, please post such news in this thread.
IMHO, the ANA needs to have both mortar fire controllers (MFCs) from the organic mortar platoon to accompany their rifle companies as they fight and also forward observers (FOs) in their artillery organization that joins the Kandaks for their missions. From the news releases I've seen, it seems as if the ANA only has infantry units and no supporting arms capabilities. The US military should have broadly similar roles but the titles may differ or have evolved due to the current joint fires emphasis.
Herodotus, you may already know this but I'll just say it here so that we can be on the same page. FOs are trained artillery officers and they are attached sent from an artillery battalion to an infantry unit to support their maneuvers. Typically, the FOs from an artillery unit come to an infantry battalion as a team (to call for fire support) with their boss, who is usually called a FSO (or fire support officer). Conceptually, the FSO assists the CO of an infantry battalion with fire support planning. I'm sure a US or Indian forum member can provide the correct terminology/titles for American or Indian equivalents, if they are different.
Thus far, I don't see any news on the ANA setting up their own artillery school or artillery units acting in support of the Kandaks. I would suspect the coalition would not want to trust ANA artillery at this stage but the ISAF would need to lay the ground work now. If the ANA do not master the use of artillery, they are going to be in big trouble when the bulk of coalition forces eventually leave. Thus far, there does not seem to be any focus on helping the ANA develop their capabilities for indirect fire support.
Last edited by OPSSG; March 11th, 2010 at 09:04 AM.
There is too much deference given to the Malaya Emergency (since it was successful, it is well sourced, and there was a perfect peak and decline to the violence) and even Ireland. The MRLA was a pathetic insurgency; they didn't have any stand-off weapons (maybe two mortars and no rockets)...all small arms. Plus it was isolated to a minority of a minority population and did not receive much outside funding..
The Malayan Emergency certainly has had too much deference placed on it but I think its got more to do with the fact that it stands out as a near perfect example of how to conduct a counter insurgency campaign, rather than its successful outcome.There were other counter insurgency campaigns that were won militarily but ended up being political failures. Had the Malayan campaign been mishandled from the start it could easily have gone out of control, despite the lack of material support from Communist China and the lack of widespread local support for the MRLA. One of the key lessons learnt from the Malaya experience, apart from over reliance on fire power, was that to defeat a counter insurgency you also need to build a nation. Though the situation in Afghanistan is most certainly more complex and challenging than Malaya, I believe many of the lessons learnt in Malaya still apply in Afghanistan.
The MRLA or ''communist terrorists'' as they were later called by the government started off with Japanese and Allied WW2 surplus but later managed to get hold off small numbers of RPG-2s, M-16s and AK-47s smuggled in via the northern border. Apart from the odd RCL or mortar [which damaged a Caribou in an attack on Sungei Besi], they never had anything heavier. IMO another bonus for the government was that the top cadre of the MRLA were more intellectuals and idealists rather than guerilla fighters.
In the late 60s and early 70's, Malaysian troops in the field discovered that tactics employed by the VC in South Vietnam were had been passed on to the MRLA. Another successful counter insurgency campaign that has received much less coverage than Malaya, was the Confrontation. Does anyone have any good online sources on the Philippine campaign against the Huks?
There are two different nomenclatures for indirect fire controllers/
Mor
MFC = Mortar Fire Controller. They direct fire in an attack.
Mor OP = Mortar Observation Post. In defence.
Artillery
FOO = Forward Observation Officer (in attack)
Arty OP in defence.
The FOO or Arty Op is with the Company.
The Battery Commander is with the CO.
Today's insurgency/ terrorism cannot be equated with the Malaysian insurgency. The insurgents and terrorists have sophisticated weapons and are better trained under foreign military advisor and training staff (Taliban footages would indicate the same).
They are funded and supported by foreign govt and have safe sanctuary to R&R and regroup.
Today's insurgency/ terrorism cannot be equated with the Malaysian insurgency. The insurgents and terrorists have sophisticated weapons and are better trained under foreign military advisor and training staff (Taliban footages would indicate the same).
They are funded and supported by foreign govt and have safe sanctuary to R&R and regroup.
And unlike the Taliban, the MRLA didn't enjoy the same level of support from the local population. The MRLA enjoyed some level of support from portions of the local community in Southern Thailand but never from the Thai government. As a whole the situation in Afghanistan certainly cannot be equated with Malaya, being much more complex and on a much larger scale. Having said that, I believe however that the Malayan Emergency was important in the sense that many fundamental lessons in counter insurgency, many of which still hold true, were learnt.
Ray17, have there been any reports of ISI or Pakistani army officers still being in the field advising the Talibs? According to either Steven Coll's or Ahmad Rashid's book, even after 9/11 when Pakistan had become a partner in the ''War On Terror'', there were still Pakistani advisors in the field.
Last edited by STURM; March 11th, 2010 at 09:52 AM.
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It's not a matter of equating them, it's a matter of a certain type of warfare, certain types of operations. Even if the level of the insurgencies is incomparable, the principles of COIN operations, corrected for local conditions/insurgency strength/your force org should still hold true.
Read this dispatch from Michael Yon called 'The Bridge', which deals with the issue of who is in-charge of the Tarnak bridge. The Canadian press are of course not happy, as can be seen from this report because of finger pointing.
The purpose of posting this story is to demonstrate that in coalition, there will be problems. Even if all forces in the same area of operations (AO) are from one country, there will be boundary issues for the different commanders in charge on that AO. To me, that issue is not that something went wrong and someone died. Rather, how does the coalition resolve ambiguity over who owns the ground after an incident? If the ambiguity is not resolved after an incident, then, IMO, the problem will probably never get resolved. And boundary problems are but just one aspect of warfare.
Last edited by OPSSG; March 11th, 2010 at 11:37 PM.
The Malayan Emergency certainly has had too much deference placed on it but I think its got more to do with the fact that it stands out as a near perfect example of how to conduct a counter insurgency campaign, rather than its successful outcome
One correlates to the other, and I did mention that it had a perfect peak and decline to the violence/KIAs.
Quote:
Originally Posted by STURM
.There were other counter insurgency campaigns that were won militarily but ended up being political failures
That isn't necessarily the case...a military victory should be a political victory as well...Clausewitz correlates this. If you mean tactical victories...sure Algeria, Vietnam, the Counterinsurgency killed more bad guys but they are still considered defeats.
Quote:
Originally Posted by STURM
.Had the Malayan campaign been mishandled from the start it could easily have gone out of control, despite the lack of material support from Communist China and the lack of widespread local support for the MRLA.
Well, it was mishandled at the start which is why COIN ops still took 12 years. The Briggs Plan wasn't put into place until 1950 and the violence did not peak until '52, or '53.
Quote:
Originally Posted by STURM
One of the key lessons learnt from the Malaya experience, apart from over reliance on fire power, was that to defeat a counter insurgency you also need to build a nation. Though the situation in Afghanistan is most certainly more complex and challenging than Malaya, I believe many of the lessons learnt in Malaya still apply in Afghanistan.
Well, the British also promised Malaya its independence and thus a withdrawal of British troops. Also, certain aspects of that COIN ops probably are not repeatable in the current Afghan conflict (e.g. forced removal of citizens).
Ray17, have there been any reports of ISI or Pakistani army officers still being in the field advising the Talibs? According to either Steven Coll's or Ahmad Rashid's book, even after 9/11 when Pakistan had become a partner in the ''War On Terror'', there were still Pakistani advisors in the field.
The Taliban are considered as 'strategic assets' by the ISI. They can be used to further Pakistan's policy without any blame coming on the Army or the Pakistan govt.
Media report and even the US have stated that while on one side the Pak Army is fighting the Taliban, the ISI is protecting the Taliban.
I am not too sure, but I saw a news report emanating from Pakistan on the internet, where the journalist wondered where are those who were captured during the SWAT operation by the Pakistan Army and how come some who were said to have been killed are still roaming alive
That is a highly over-simplified assessment by the writer. I would urge you to refrain from posting articles from sources that pander to certain ethnic & religious affiliations. The writer puts all regional and international actors along with the Taliban & Al-Qaeda in one big pot and ends up with a foul tasting broth.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ray17
The Taliban are considered as 'strategic assets' by the ISI. They can be used to further Pakistan's policy without any blame coming on the Army or the Pakistan govt.
Media report and even the US have stated that while on one side the Pak Army is fighting the Taliban, the ISI is protecting the Taliban.
Differentiation is paramount here. Pakistan Army & ISI are taking out the Pakistani Taliban since they are a threat to Pakistan's security interests. Afghan Taliban do not have anything against Pakistan; hence they are not treated in the same manner.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ray17
I am not too sure, but I saw a news report emanating from Pakistan on the internet, where the journalist wondered where are those who were captured during the SWAT operation by the Pakistan Army and how come some who were said to have been killed are still roaming alive
Hundreds of mid-level commanders of Pakistani Taliban have been paraded for the media already. And as we are all aware, both Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud have perished in drone strikes. Meanwhile, in the past three weeks, Pakistan has also arrested some of the big-fish of the Afghan Taliban network.
From what I know, these arrested Afghan Taliban leaders were pursuing talks with Karzai regime via Saudi and indirect Western contacts with the concerned parties trying to side-track Pakistani interests in any forth-coming solution. Hence, the Pakistanis moved in and detained them so as to retain bargaining chips in any solution that comes about.
It is very clear and obvious, there will be NO settlement to the Afghan issue until or unless Pakistan is taken onboard as the key player and its security interests addressed. All strategies that seek to minimize Pakistan's role in Afghanistan are doomed from the get-go.
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That is a highly over-simplified assessment by the writer. I would urge you to refrain from posting articles from sources that pander to certain ethnic & religious affiliations. The writer puts all regional and international actors along with the Taliban & Al-Qaeda in one big pot and ends up with a foul tasting broth.
I appended that to indicate the mindset prevailing in Pakistan so that one does not base one's views on merely what we think is the mindset prevailing based on our reports. That report of this journalist is a mild one. Read the vernacular media and you ears will burn with the bile being spewed and the vernacular media is the true Pakistan! It is my personal opinion that unless one knows what moves the people, one cannot formulate a plan to achieve one’s aim.
It is a common adage in most armies - Know your Enemy. And you cannot know your enemy without knowing how he ticks.
Sun Tsu said
It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles.
Thus, in my wisdom, faulted that it may appear to you, I appended it. We have to know the mindset so that we can cut our coat as per the cloth!
To believe that Pakistan is doing a whole lot against the Taliban, let us ponder a wee bit.
Pakistan could crush the Baluchi rebellion which was equally bad as the Pakistani Taliban, therefore, why are they floundering in FATA and NWFP that too when the US drones are picking up the most dreaded of their militants? Could Pakistan not do it when they are but home grown and known ‘enemies’?
No matter what the international media would want one to believe, it is obvious that unless the Pakistani population is with the war on terror, which they are not, there is no solution and the Govt of Pak can only mouth pious platitudes.
Quote:
Differentiation is paramount here. Pakistan Army & ISI are taking out the Pakistani Taliban since they are a threat to Pakistan's security interests. Afghan Taliban do not have anything against Pakistan; hence they are not treated in the same manner.
Hundreds of mid-level commanders of Pakistani Taliban have been paraded for the media already. And as we are all aware, both Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud have perished in drone strikes. Meanwhile, in the past three weeks, Pakistan has also arrested some of the big-fish of the Afghan Taliban network.
From what I know, these arrested Afghan Taliban leaders were pursuing talks with Karzai regime via Saudi and indirect Western contacts with the concerned parties trying to side-track Pakistani interests in any forth-coming solution. Hence, the Pakistanis moved in and detained them so as to retain bargaining chips in any solution that comes about. .
That is your belief and that is what the international media would want one to believe so that it is a sop to all the sad happening taking place in an endless void that is not bringing the desired result and think all is well!.
The US drones are the most effective ones which have really eliminated the leaders and not the Pakistanis, who are supposed to have the boots on ground and the intelligence inputs. Why did they fail and the US succeeded who have no equations with the locals overtly?
One can always arrest people and parade them as various top leaders. Read the vernacular media and check what they have to say.
Quote:
It is very clear and obvious, there will be NO settlement to the Afghan issue until or unless Pakistan is taken onboard as the key player and its security interests addressed. All strategies that seek to minimize Pakistan's role in Afghanistan are doomed from the get-go.
Pakistan has to be on board since the supply route goes through Pakistan or else as Armstrong said, they would be history!
Differentiation is paramount here. Pakistan Army & ISI are taking out the Pakistani Taliban since they are a threat to Pakistan's security interests. Afghan Taliban do not have anything against Pakistan; hence they are not treated in the same manner.
The Pakistani Taliban, who subcribe to the same ideology and share the same goals of the Afghan Taliban have been a threat to Pakistan for quite a while. The key question IMO is whether the Pakistan government went into the tribal areas because it was really in Pakistan's interest or because it was due to pressure from Uncle Sam?
If the Pakistan government was really serious in taking out the local Taliban why hasn't it rooted out the jihadist elements in the military? Despite the Pakistani Taliban being a serious threat to the lnstability of Pakistan, why does the Pakistan government continue to turn a blind eye to militant activities in Pakistan which include active recruiting and fundraising, not to mention the thousands of madrassahs which continue to churn out volunteers for 'jihad'? Pakistan's major problem is on one hand it has to please Uncle Sam who provides financial aid and some level of protection against India, but on the other hand, it has elements in its military and population who openly sympthatise with the aims of the Afghan Taliban.
Last edited by STURM; March 12th, 2010 at 04:13 AM.
Well, it was mishandled at the start which is why COIN ops still took 12 years. The Briggs Plan wasn't put into place until 1950 and the violence did not peak until '52, or '53.
The fact that the Emergency was only officially declared over in 1960 was I believe due to a number of factors and not due to mishandling during the start of the Emergency.Indeed it was mishandled from the start. But then again, most governments faced with an insurgency threat, tend to start off underestimating the nature of the threat and the counter measures needed. IMO the difference in Malaya was that the British were relatively fast in formulating their ''hearts and minds'' programmes by winning over the Chinese population and having a clear chain of command under civilian control with various intel bodies complemeting one another and operating in unison. A major advantage the Brits in Malaya had over the Coalition in Afghanistan was a much better understanding of the local culture, customs and mindset. In pre-independance Malaya, it was common even for junior level British district officers to speak the Malay language and also in many cases Chinese.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Herodotus
Well, the British also promised Malaya its independence and thus a withdrawal of British troops.
A major advantage for the Brits was that the presence of British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya was not unwelcomed by the majority of the local population, who were in no hurry to see a speedy withdrawal of these troops. The timetable for British troop withdrawal from Malaya was dictated by results in the field against the MRLA and internal British politics, not by the need to sooth any fears amongst the Malayan population.
Last edited by STURM; March 12th, 2010 at 07:24 AM.
