This is a discussion on Australian Army Discussions and Updates within the Army & Security Forces forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; Originally Posted by riksavage
I could see this coming.
SF (SAS/Commando) are the dominant Aussie players in A-Stan, I bet ...
SF (SAS/Commando) are the dominant Aussie players in A-Stan, I bet if you asked them what they would prefer - Option A - more state of the art light deployable guns, which can be underslung and deployed to remote FOB's by Chinook (such as the M777A2), or heavy SPA, which will need to be transported on a low-loader or make its own way under escort to the FOB. I know which system I would be gunning for (excuse the pun).
I can see the SPA's being put on the back burner under the current Government.
SF aren't looking for major artillery, its not their core business, and they don't need it for the way that they fight.
arty support comes from a number of areas, getting aust arty in place just to support a SF requirement (which doesn't exist anyway) is dead money.
they're after other things - not large cal arty.
SF works on mobility, and most of the SF mission types are based on kill/capture scenarios without visible support - they rely on flight time support if pressed - not land support. If SF require metal on target to assist then thats the job of the JTACs to call it in, or if they need back up at an organic level then thats what the other taxis (air and land) and other units (Cmdo) are for.
________________ A corollary of Finagle's Law, similar to Occam's Razor, says:
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity"
See what coming? Something that isnt happening? As to SF they don't want M777s or SP155s. They don't fight that way.
You are wrong, SF units across the board in A-Stan have been using all tools in the tool box to support operations including land based artillery. Saying they don;t 'fight that way' is simply ridiculous. If you are operating out of a remote FOB, and that FOB has a light gun, mortar or CAS on call you will use what ever the designated forward observation officer decides to call-in based on what he requires (HE, Smoke, 500lb smart/dumb munition, Hellfire, kitchen sink, you name it). if you are deploying against a specific target a fire suport plan will have been drafted detailing on-call support, and that can be just about anything dependent on the mission and what call-signs are on stand-by.
There is no need to have light air-deployable guns for service in Afghanistan. All guns in theatre simply sit in FOBs and patrol bases and don't go anywhere at all. It doesn't matter a bit whether the gun is a light gun or a SP gun. The guns at TK have changed from a single Dutch PzH2000 to a few US M777 without any real change of coverage at all. Perhaps more to the point, it is false economy to deploy the guns by air when a useful load of shells will have to travel by road anyway, unless you want to tie up all your lift assets flying around bombs,
Its probably worth pointing out that a single 155 gun at TK can cover about 40% of Oruzgan. Stick a gun at each of the main patrol bases and you could cover over 60% of Oruzgan, including absolutely anyway anyone would bother to go. Currently 81mm mortars do the job in the patrol bases without any dramas.
You are wrong, SF units across the board in A-Stan have been using all tools in the tool box to support operations including land based artillery.
They will use whatever tools they can get - but there is a priority. Missions that are kill/capture/ISR are fundmentally mobility tasks. what they need in any given event will be approp support. Missions are planned within overwatch and support paramters - IOW getting arty support is not their core business but getting it if they need it in a timely manner is part of the planning set. arty comes in the form of coalition arty emplacements and whatever the JTAC is governing in that location
Quote:
Originally Posted by riksavage
Saying they don;t 'fight that way' is simply ridiculous.
It needs to be viewed against their taskings. They are running black, not green missions
Quote:
Originally Posted by riksavage
If you are operating out of a remote FOB, and that FOB has a light gun, mortar or CAS on call you will use what ever the designated forward observation officer decides to call-in based on what he requires (HE, Smoke, 500lb smart/dumb munition, Hellfire, kitchen sink, you name it). if you are deploying against a specific target a fire suport plan will have been drafted detailing on-call support, and that can be just about anything dependent on the mission and what call-signs are on stand-by.
agree - but they don't seek arty themselves, they seek to have support in place and on call where needed. SF travel light
________________ A corollary of Finagle's Law, similar to Occam's Razor, says:
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity"
Well, the dutch operated their PzH2000s mostly from fixed positions but there also were occassions where they used their mobility to support bigger operations. There their protected mobility was usefull.
Not that field guns aren't well suited for a theater like A-stan but as said before the idea of flying the guns to every remote FOB when it is needed is dubious. One needs to support them by land anyway. In some operations the PzHs fired roughly 4000 rounds. Transporting this by heli is a logistical nightmare for the overextended ISAF helicopter ressorces.
There are a range of advantages of using a self propelled gun for static operations. As demonstrated in VietNam and now Afghanistan. They include:
Fire through bombardment. When the enemy is shelling your own base you want to shoot back. With a towed gun the crew have to run the risk of being hit by the bombardment while they operate the gun.
Fire endurance. Most of the loading functions of an SP gun is automated making them much easier to operate for sustained bombardments than towed, manually loaded and trained guns.
Self sustainment. SP guns are integral units with everything they need to operate on board – just add fuel, ammo and humans. Towed guns need a lot more infrastructure to operate.
Rapid response. Turreted SP guns can quickly bring their gun to bear on any target while towed guns need to be manually swung around to face the threat bearing.
Mobility. The SP gun’s firing position can be located outside the base so as to minimize disruption to the base when firing. The gun simply races a few hundred meters and starts shooting. This was the SOP for the Dutch PzH2000s in TK. Also the gun can displace rapidly under protection with a unit of fire to another firing position to provide extended reach.
Bigger is Better. The longer barrel and larger chamber of the L52 155mm allows for more accurate conventional fires and/or longer range.
There are a range of advantages of using a self propelled gun for static operations. As demonstrated in VietNam and now Afghanistan. They include:
Fire through bombardment. When the enemy is shelling your own base you want to shoot back. With a towed gun the crew have to run the risk of being hit by the bombardment while they operate the gun.
Fire endurance. Most of the loading functions of an SP gun is automated making them much easier to operate for sustained bombardments than towed, manually loaded and trained guns.
Self sustainment. SP guns are integral units with everything they need to operate on board – just add fuel, ammo and humans. Towed guns need a lot more infrastructure to operate.
Rapid response. Turreted SP guns can quickly bring their gun to bear on any target while towed guns need to be manually swung around to face the threat bearing.
Mobility. The SP gun’s firing position can be located outside the base so as to minimize disruption to the base when firing. The gun simply races a few hundred meters and starts shooting. This was the SOP for the Dutch PzH2000s in TK. Also the gun can displace rapidly under protection with a unit of fire to another firing position to provide extended reach.
Bigger is Better. The longer barrel and larger chamber of the L52 155mm allows for more accurate conventional fires and/or longer range.
Direct Fire. Don’t have a tank on hand?
My issue with tracked SPA (my personal opinion) in A-Stan over light tubes, is deployability, moving a tracked asset to a rural site requires route clearence, engineers to strengthen bridges, infantry to protect the movement, IED mitigation (reactive & bar armour) & REME assets in case it breaks down. Compare this to lifting a light gun (105/155mm) under a Chinook.
The Vietnam comparison is irrelevant because VBIED & the IED threat was minimal plus SPA was moved as part of a much larger full-on battalion deployment, which were left largely untouched by the NVA. Whilst a light gun is unprotected in the FOB (no armour), they have proved battle winners and have not lost a single crew member to counter battery fire.
Air assets are vulnerable to weather conditions and have a limited weapons load. Light gun crews can sleep next to the gun-line and have 100+ rounds to hand, including HE, Phos & Smoke.
The Aussie desire for SPA mirrors NATO Northern Europe - heavy armour & SPA followed by armoured bridge layers and engineering units. All unnecessary for recent Aussie deployments in ET and A-Stan. Even if we had a GWIII, there is no way Gillard would deploy an armoured brigage, she would do what every other Aussie PM has done since Vietnam and deploy SFwith the odd training team in tow to demonstrate Aussie commitment to the Alliance. This view has been reinforced by her recent comments.
I'm trying not to be critcal, but the Aussie military is SF top heavy, so why not build capabilities around reinforcing this tool in the box, rather than trying to tick all the boxes with a tiny land army vs. population size.
Last edited by riksavage; October 8th, 2010 at 10:13 AM.
The Vietnam comparison is irrelevant because VBIED & the IED threat was minimal plus SPA was moved as part of a battalion deployment, which were left largely untouched.
LOL. Yeah there wasn't much of an IED threat because the VC/NVA had no shortage of landmines.
Quote:
Originally Posted by riksavage
Whilst a light gun is unprotected in the FOB (no armour), they have proved battle winners and have not lost a single crew member to counter battery fire.
Yep because they stay under cover when being shelled.
Your loyalty to the light gun is well and good but it doesn't have much to do with the nature of warfare.
LOL. Yeah there wasn't much of an IED threat because the VC/NVA had no shortage of landmines.
Yep because they stay under cover when being shelled.
Your loyalty to the light gun is well and good but it doesn't have much to do with the nature of warfare.
Come on, the Vietnam landmine threat did not trigger the kind of MRAP development we are witnessing today. Yes they had landmines, but if you look at the death ratios very few soldiers were killed by landmines vs. small arms when compared with A-Stan today.
My argument is all about deploying artillery quickly in an environment where we have secure remote sites, but insecure MSR's. The helicopter is king, so why not use firepower, which can be deployed very quickly by a rotary asset? SPA has a role, but not in hilly areas, which requires rapid infultration and extraction, could be manned one day and evacuated the next as dictated by the threat.
But field guns are not used this way in A-stan. They are brought to a FOB (by land) and are supported mostly by Land. (I know of no deployments by air).
When operations took place outside of artillery cover from FOBs the PzHs where brought forward. This is an elemental advantage as an Operation might take place in order to conquer and hold a new area. In this case there are no FOBs in this area from which a field gun could operate. A PzH with a security detachment can easily provide support in such a case as shown by the dutch.
Abraham provided alot of other reasons why a SPH is usefull, too.
One needs much more field guns in different FOBs to be able to control the same bubble a modern 52cal SPH does.
Come on, the Vietnam landmine threat did not trigger the kind of MRAP development we are witnessing today. Yes they had landmines, but if you look at the death ratios very few soldiers were killed by landmines vs. small arms when compared with A-Stan today.
I’m sorry but this is total nonsense. Mines and IEDs were a major weapon used in VietNam that had significant effect on the battlefield. 16% of all US KIA in VietNam were caused by mines/IEDs but in some combat units the radio was higher (57%).
As to there being no MRAP development this was not quite true. There was considerable effort to develop improved mine protection for US combat and mine/IED clearance operations. The nature of the battlefield was very different to Iraq/’Ghan with much shorter and denser road routes for supplies so it was much harder for the VC/NVA to target allied road routes. Also the US had far greater availably of aviation assets which were used in part as a counter to enemy mining.
I’m sorry but this is total nonsense. Mines and IEDs were a major weapon used in VietNam that had significant effect on the battlefield. 16% of all US KIA in VietNam were caused by mines/IEDs but in some combat units the radio was higher (57%).
As to there being no MRAP development this was not quite true. There was considerable effort to develop improved mine protection for US combat and mine/IED clearance operations. The nature of the battlefield was very different to Iraq/’Ghan with much shorter and denser road routes for supplies so it was much harder for the VC/NVA to target allied road routes. Also the US had far greater availably of aviation assets which were used in part as a counter to enemy mining.
Look at the attached stats for NATO, since 2008 over 50% of hostile deaths was caused by IEDS.
Compare this to 16% for Vietnam. The comment about some units suffering as much as 50% will be driven by role, the same way bomb disposal officer injuries & deaths are higher when compared to cooks and bottle washers. And let's not forget the huge amount of material loss caused by IED strikes along the MSR's. Moving and sustaining SPA is a far more complex exercise than moving and sustaining a 105/155mm light gun battery by rotary lift.
My argument stands, in a hilly, largely rural environment with poor infrastructure and unsecure MSR's where rotary is king you are better off utilising highly mobile light guns, particularly if you wish to take the fight to the enemy in remote areas rather than remain hunkered down in and around urban centres.
You're still missing the point. You essentially can't sustain artillery by rotary lift, at least if you don't want to tie up the majority of your lift assets flying around bombs. There's little point flying in the guns if you have to truck in the bombs anyway - you might as well just truck in the guns as well. When the biggest limitation to operations in Afghanistan is the availability of rotary lift assets, no commander is going to tie up his helicopters flying around bombs.
Considering there are no Australian patrol bases that aren't regularly resupplied by road, and that a having a gun or mortar in each patrol base covers absolutely everywhere that Australians are going to operate, why would you have to fly guns anywhere? Even when the special forces dudes operate in Helmand or Kandahar they are operating under the fires umbrella of the forces that own that real estate.
You're still missing the point. You essentially can't sustain artillery by rotary lift, at least if you don't want to tie up the majority of your lift assets flying around bombs. There's little point flying in the guns if you have to truck in the bombs anyway - you might as well just truck in the guns as well. When the biggest limitation to operations in Afghanistan is the availability of rotary lift assets, no commander is going to tie up his helicopters flying around bombs.
Considering there are no Australian patrol bases that aren't regularly resupplied by road, and that a having a gun or mortar in each patrol base covers absolutely everywhere that Australians are going to operate, why would you have to fly guns anywhere? Even when the special forces dudes operate in Helmand or Kandahar they are operating under the fires umbrella of the forces that own that real estate.
Don't agree, It's about having another tool in the box. You have the crews in theatre already deployed with the Brits, there is no reason why you can't deploy light gun for your own use rather than relying on your allies.
Compare this to 16% for Vietnam. The comment about some units suffering as much as 50% will be driven by role, the same way bomb disposal officer injuries & deaths are higher when compared to cooks and bottle washers. And let's not forget the huge amount of material loss caused by IED strikes along the MSR's. Moving and sustaining SPA is a far more complex exercise than moving and sustaining a 105/155mm light gun battery by rotary lift.
My argument stands, in a hilly, largely rural environment with poor infrastructure and unsecure MSR's where rotary is king you are better off utilising highly mobile light guns, particularly if you wish to take the fight to the enemy in remote areas rather than remain hunkered down in and around urban centres.
Okay, you managed to give a description on how much of the US logistics was handled in Vietnam. AFAIK the level of rotary lift currently available in Afghanistan is comparatively limited, which is why much/most of the supply is done via what passes for a road network. Rotary lift is used for rapid movement of troops and critical supplies. Adding in a requirement that rotary lift provide regular artillery resupply would just break the system.
Part of the issue with there being limited availability in terms of rotary lift has to do with what sorts of equipment different nations have been contributing to Afghan operations. The other part of the equation is Afghanistan itself. Helicopters do not operate as effectively in hot and high areas as they do in cooler air and/or at lower altitudes. This means that heavy lift helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook, or CH-53 Sea Stallion/Super Stallion, or Mi-8/17 'Hip' or Mi-28 'Halo' would be needed to meet the required levels of ammunition transportation.
If Oz were to deploy any of the M777's which IIRC are on order, pending delivery, to the Ghan with the intention of being able to ferry them around regularly via helicopter... Then 1/3rd of the ADF's heavy rotary lift would be deployed, just to support a single gun... The first Ch-47 would be used to carry the M777, gun crew and some ammunition. The second CH-47 would then be used to just carry in (regularly) ammunition. The MRH-90 on order and entering service would be unsuitable since they cannot carry the M777 version which Australia is getting, nor could they realistically transport sufficient quantities of ammunition. Assuming that the MRH-90 was not effected by the hot & high conditions of the Ghan, each flight to the FOB could only carry ~90 rounds of 155 mm ammunition. Given the ease which a gun could be called upon to provide a high volume of fire, that quantity would last a gun less than 20 minutes of sustained high volume fire.
In short, going with something like the M777 does not 'get around' the IED problem effecting the MSR. At least, not unless/until a significantly greater portion of heavy rotary lift assets become available.
-Cheers
________________
"I'm doing the same thing I do every night, Pinky..." comment from one lab mouse to another.
