The possibilities of a Sino-Indian border war in the next decade.

[woden]

In his latest blog entry Iskander Rehman takes a look at the rapidly deteriorating security situation along India's Northeastern border with China. He says that although things are tense and both countires have massively reinforced their military presence along the LAC or line of actual control,some of the claims in the Indian media that a Chinese attack will occur in the next five to ten years may be somewhat overstated.
He does stress the fact, however, that things are volatile and unpredictable, and that India should prepare for any contingency.
What do people think of his analysis? After reading the article do you think this is a crisis the world may have to deal with in the course of the next decade?

India and the world. (http://indiangeopolitics.blogspot.com/)

[The Swordman]

In his latest blog entry Iskander Rehman takes a look at the rapidly deteriorating security situation along India's Northeastern border with China. He says that although things are tense and both countires have massively reinforced their military presence along the LAC or line of actual control,some of the claims in the Indian media that a Chinese attack will occur in the next five to ten years may be somewhat overstated.
He does stress the fact, however, that things are volatile and unpredictable, and that India should prepare for any contingency.
What do people think of his analysis? After reading the article do you think this is a crisis the world may have to deal with in the course of the next decade?

India and the world. (http://indiangeopolitics.blogspot.com/)

In a medium time range (five to ten years) China and India will face each other in a number of matters, not to mention economics. Both economies are dependent from raw resources that have to be purchased abroad, both politics aim to be dominant. Think about Birmania and Pakistan as the most likely place to see things go hot.
Pakistan is the real detonator here. Instable, economically weak, exposed from attacks by Taleban and politically shattered after the end of dictatorship. They got at least 100 nuclear devices ready to be used. That makes them the biggest target ever for al-Quaeda and a possible shortcut for the Iran's WMD program.
Here we don't have five years. Maybe two, tops.

[Sampanviking]

I think the answer has to be "only if India really wants one".

China has spent a lot of time over the last few decades resolving its border disputes and doing so by and large, without acrimony. If China is now spending more time on India, it is because it is the last major unresolved land border issue left.

I think China is annoyed with India intransigence, primarily because of the background to the dispute. To China there is something almost adolescent about India's position, namely a post colonial hangover that it seems unwilling to shake off. China would have more sympathy if it were dealing with a genuine historical border, but its annoyance is fed by the fact that the boundary is an arbitrary line drawn by a drunken Irishmen in the service of the Raj!.

To China to argue over a boundary bequeathed by former colonial occupiers is demeaning and its message to India is, bluntly, to gain a little more self respect and grow up!

That being said China will want to settle with serious diplomacy, but it does have to be serious, which is the message China is currently delivering. The chance of conflict is to my mind very small, but China is a great believer in Carrots and Sticks, both of which tend to come on the large side!

[Palnatoke]

namely a post colonial hangover

Maybe China should stop its "colonial adventure" in (or cultural destruction of) Tibet, before throwing the "colonialismn" card, which is one of the few things left of the current regime's socialistic roots.

[woden]

Sampanviking you are obviously a Chinese nationalist with little or no knowledge of the subtleties underlying the border dispute.
Please don't post just to engage in mindless rhetoric, it would be great if people actually read the article and took time to discuss the real issues at stake.
For example, would the death of the Dalai Lama precipitate a Chinese cross-border strike in Tawang?

[OPSSG]

Sampanviking you are obviously a Chinese nationalist with little or no knowledge of the subtleties underlying the border dispute.

Please don't post just to engage in mindless rhetoric, it would be great if people actually read the article and took time to discuss the real issues at stake.

For example, would the death of the Dalai Lama precipitate a Chinese cross-border strike in Tawang?

Are you sure you want to adopt such a tone in your posts? I may not agree with everything Sampanviking says in his posts, but I would never attempt to label his posts as 'mindless rhetoric'. Why are you trying to behave like a troll? Learn to disagree without resorting to calling names - attack the ideas not the man.

I have refrained from commenting as I believe it is your right to express you opinion and your possible concurrence with the thoughts expressed therein. BTW, I found your link to be a less than useful perspective in understanding the future of Sino-Indian relations, so I am not surprised at his reaction.

And since you are interested, why don't you start the ball rolling by identifying the issues at stake. In particular, the genesis of the sources of disputes and the all important external geopolitical context.

[charles34]

If india and china did go to war, who would be on india's side? how about on china's side?

[woden]

Are you sure you want to adopt such a tone in your posts? I may not agree with everything Sampanviking says in his posts, but I would never attempt to label his posts as 'mindless rhetoric'. Why are you trying to behave like a troll? Learn to disagree without resorting to calling names - attack the ideas not the man.

I have refrained from commenting as I believe it is your right to express you opinion and your possible concurrence with the thoughts expressed therein. BTW, I found your link to be a less than useful perspective in understanding the future of Sino-Indian relations, so I am not surprised at his reaction.

And since you are interested, why don't you start the ball rolling by identifying the issues at stake. In particular, the genesis of the sources of disputes and the all important external geopolitical context.

OPSSG, I tend to be relatively straightforward when debating issues, when i see evidence of BS I call it and then move on to engage in discussion. It's just tiring and a tad discouraging to see PRC apologists pop up as soon as one attempts to discuss Sino-Indian relations in a civilized manner. You object to me naming sampanviking's post mindless rhetoric, but if you reread it you will see that that is exactly what it is. A sample:
"China would have more sympathy if it were dealing with a genuine historical border, but its annoyance is fed by the fact that the boundary is an arbitrary line drawn by a drunken Irishmen in the service of the Raj!.

To China to argue over a boundary bequeathed by former colonial occupiers is demeaning and its message to India is, bluntly, to gain a little more self respect and grow up."
If this isn't PRC propaganda then what is? As for the accusation of not contributing to the debate, if you reread my posts you will see that I actually did ask several questions regarding Sino-Indian relations. (Whereas you contributed nothing I'm afraid to say :confused:)

Anyway, moving on now-no hard feelings my friend.
You wished to know more about the main issues behind Sino-Indian relations. Here is a brief backgrounder in the hope that now we can engage in proper debate. I hope this will be of help to you.

Main issues of contention:

The border issue:

Both countries share the longest disputed frontier in the world (more than 2100 miles), which stretches from Northern Kashmir, to the Northeastern Province of Arunachal Pradesh. In 1962, rising tensions on both sides of the border led to a lightning Chinese assault, which resulted in a humiliating defeat for India, and the Chinese occupation of 16,500 square miles of territory previously owned by its transhimalayan neighbour. India also accuses Pakistan of having illegally ceded a slice of disputed Kashmiri territory, in Aksai Chin, to the PRC in 1963. China, for its part, after having more or less relinquished its claim over Sikkim, periodically declares that the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to the historical 'Greater Tibet', and therefore falls under its jurisdiction.

China's 'all-weather' friendship with Pakistan:

China has been Pakistan's staunchest ally over the years, bolstering its conventional military capabilites, as well as actively assisting it in the establishment of its nuclear weapons programme from the late 80s onwards, building all three of Pakistan's first three nuclear power plants and providing it with ready to launch M-9, M-11 and Dong Feng 21 ballistic missiles.

India's growing proximity to the US:

During the Cold War, New Delhi's relations with Washington were frequently marked by a fair degree of acrimony, largely due to the evolving strategic environment. To summarise at the risk of simplifying an incredibly complex period of diplomatic history, the United States viewed India as little more than the Soviet Union's regional surrogate, and New Delhi strongly disapproved of Washington's proximity to its CENTO ally, Pakistan, and of its growing ties with the PRC after Kissinger's furtive visit to Beijing in 1971.

Times have changed, however, since the end of the Cold War, and India’s emergence as major regional power has given it a lot more strategic significance than before. India’s blue-water navy, nuclear capabilities, powerful armed forces, high rate of economic growth and huge economic potential are all factors that make India loom a lot larger on America’s radar screen. India is also a vibrant and multiethnic parliamentary democracy and, as such, is far more attractive to the current American administration than other forms of authoritarian regimes in Asia. Containing China is just one aspect of the budding strategic partnership in-between the world’s largest and oldest democracy. Indeed, the US views India as a vital partner in the upholding of maritime security in vitally important sea lanes, and as an ally in the war on terror with a sizeable degree of experience in counterterrorism and often convergent threat perceptions, both being the target of Islamist terrorist cells.

The 'String of Pearls':

Pentagon analysts have famously dubbed China’s ‘string of pearls strategy’, its plan to acquire several strategically placed ports of call, naval bases and listening posts in friendly countries in order to protect the billions of dollars worth of trade that pass through strategically salient sea lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits. For the Chinese military, who live in fear that in the event of a major conflict with the US, a naval blockade would suffice to cut off nearly all of China’s energy supplies overnight; the Chinese Navy’s deployment in areas such as the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea is a question of future survival and as such, entirely legitimate in nature. To the Indian strategic community, however, the 'string of pearls' is a 'constricting noose', threatening to contain and encircle India in its own backyard. I will bring this all up again, and in far greater detail when I do some blog entries on the Navy sometime later on in the month.

Signs of normalisation:

Surging trade:

Bilateral trade has been surging forward at a breakneck speed over the past few years, attaining 29 billion USD in the first six few months of 2008, which represents an increase of more than 69% over the figures at the same period last year. China has now overtaken the US to become India's number one trading partner.

Mutual Concessions:

India frequently reiterates China's sovereignty over Tibet, which is another extremely sensitive issue in Sino-Indian relations, as India harbours the Tibetan government in exile at Dharamsala; and China, for its part, has tacitly recognized India's claims over Sikkim. China has also attempted to appear more neutral in its official declarations during Indo-Pakistani conflicts, (such as during the Kargil War in 1999), even though behind the scenes it continues to bolster Pakistan's military apparatus.

The multiplication of bilateral visits:

A sustained level of high-ranking bilateral visits has ensured a certain new 'comfort level' in Sino-Indian dealings. At each meeting, a plethora of MOUs( Memorandums of Understanding), CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) and other agreeements are signed, on issues as varied as the sharing of hydrological data to the mutual reduction of troops along certain areas of the LAC (the line of actual control, i.e, the informal border).

[woden]

If india and china did go to war, who would be on india's side? how about on china's side?

I know that for the Divine Matrix simulations described in the article, the Indian military command took into account the possibility of a Sino-Pakistani alliance, with the Chinese attacking in the northeast and the Pakistanis in the west. Whether this would actually occur in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict is another matter. China, for its part, has frequently threatened to intervene during Indo-Pakistani conflicts, whether it be in 1965 or in 1971, but has always refrained from doing so.
As for India, I'm pretty sure it would stand alone :shudder
Although one cannot discount the possibility of countries such as the US, Great Britain and France, or even Russia, discreetly supplying India with additional weaponry and intelligence during the conflict.

[Sampanviking]

Woden, how exactly do you hope to be able to make any kind of determination as to the possibility of Sino-Indian relations deteriorating to the point of conflict if you do not start from the foundations of the current points of view of both Governments?

As you yourself state, China officially claims all of Tibet South as its sovereign territory, but to view this as nothing more than an opening negotiating position would be naive in the extreme. If China had no interest in negotiating then it would simply deliver an ultimatum, one which the PLA would be well within its ability to deliver, a fact acknowledged over the last few days by India's outgoing Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and Navy chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta.

Don’t have capability or intention to match China force for force: Navy chief (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Don-t-have-capability-or-intention-to-match-China-force-for-force--Navy-chief/500573/)

If India wants China to budge on its claim, then it will need to accept that the inherited border cannot be used as the basis of the dispute resolution.

Furthermore China has hinted that it has other weapons in its armoury if India refuses to negotiate the issues:

Break India, says China think-tank - India - NEWS - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/india/Split-India-says-China-think-tank/articleshow/4883573.cms)

Personally I find this unlikely as a course of action as it does not want to induce further instability into the region.

Otherwise talk about the Dalia Lama is pretty much a red herring, the Tibet Issue has not been a defining one durring the DL's lifetime and becomes significantly less likely after his demise.

So again, regarding the question of the thread about the possibility of conflict, I would say negligible unless India shows not the slightest interest of engaging with China in any meaningful sense or indeed initiates hostilities itself.

[woden]

Woden, how exactly do you hope to be able to make any kind of determination as to the possibility of Sino-Indian relations deteriorating to the point of conflict if you do not start from the foundations of the current points of view of both Governments?


As you yourself state, China officially claims all of Tibet South as its sovereign territory, but to view this as nothing more than an opening negotiating position would be naive in the extreme. If China had no interest in negotiating then it would simply deliver an ultimatum, one which the PLA would be well within its ability to deliver, a fact acknowledged over the last few days by India's outgoing Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and Navy chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta.

Don’t have capability or intention to match China force for force: Navy chief (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Don-t-have-capability-or-intention-to-match-China-force-for-force--Navy-chief/500573/)

If India wants China to budge on its claim, then it will need to accept that the inherited border cannot be used as the basis of the dispute resolution.

Furthermore China has hinted that it has other weapons in its armoury if India refuses to negotiate the issues:

Break India, says China think-tank - India - NEWS - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/india/Split-India-says-China-think-tank/articleshow/4883573.cms)

Personally I find this unlikely as a course of action as it does not want to induce further instability into the region.

Otherwise talk about the Dalia Lama is pretty much a red herring, the Tibet Issue has not been a defining one durring the DL's lifetime and becomes significantly less likely after his demise.

So again, regarding the question of the thread about the possibility of conflict, I would say negligible unless India shows not the slightest interest of engaging with China in any meaningful sense or indeed initiates hostilities itself.

Thx for relaunching the discussion Sampanviking, now things are getting interesting :)
Regarding Arunachal Pradesh, if you study the historical background of the Sino-Indian border dispute, you will see that the Chinese have gradually shifted their attention from Aksai Chin to India's Northeast. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PRC was considering tacitly relinquishing its claims on Arunachal in exchange of Indian formal recognition of its sovereignty over Aksai Chin, which was unlawfully handed over to China by its ally, Pakistan, in 1963.
Since the late 1990s, as the Chinese obsession over Tibet as grown however, its determination to control everything it believes historically belongs to Tibet's sphere of influence has as well. Hence their hardening position over Arunachal Pradesh, which they continue to call Southern Tibet.
As for the Dalai Lama,his demise would be far from meaningless. Tibet has always been THE defining issue in Sino-Indian relations, all specialists of Sino-Indian relations, first and foremost John Garver, would concur on this point.

Amazon.com: Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (9780295980744): John W. Garver: Books

Many security specialists feel that the death of his holiness would lead to a radicalisation of the Tibetan movement, as without the Dalai Lama's calming influence, there would be nothing to hold back the new generation of Tibetan freedom fighters that no longer believe in non-violence. There is also the question of the Dalai Lama's reincarnation. The Chinese are extremely jittery over this.

As for your claims that the PLA could simply impose its viewpoints if that was its desire, I'm afraid that it is not so simple. China's last 'punitive border raid' against Vietnam was a monumental strategic blunder which resulted in a very high casualty rate for PLA grunts, who were outclassed by the Vietnamese soldiers who knew the terrain and fought with nationalist fervour.
While China still maintains an upper hand in terms of conventional strength along the LAC, the article clearly shows that India is bolstering its defences along its side of the border, and China would definitely get a bloody nose if it engaged in overtly aggressive actions.
An extract from Iskander Rehman's article illustrating these points:

"And while China holds a sizeable advantage in terms of conventional power in the Himalayas, India is still very much capable of giving the PLA a bloody nose in select areas along the LAC,such as Ladakh, for example, where the recent upgrading by the IAF of high altitude airstrips and the presence of experienced mountain troops such as the Ladakh ‘Snow Tiger’ Scouts unit, put India in a relatively strong position. Nobody in China's strategic community wants a repeat of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war,which was meant to be a 'swift lesson' and which instead saw the Chinese advance falter and then get bogged down due to unexpectedly heavy Vietnamese resistance."

You mentioned the 'China should break up India' piece. That piece has been disavowed by the so-called think tank, it was written by a nationalist nobody. Furthermore, China which has to deal with its own fissiparous movements in Tibet and Xinjiang and the rising discontent of its population fed up with corruption, inequality and authoritarian rule, would be foolish in the extreme if it attempted to enact such a policy against India. As you yourself mentioned, it would destabilise the region.

I, too, think that it is more or less unlikely that conflict will break out in the coming years-but there are potentially two destabilising factors that could provoke it sooner than expected:
-the announced reincarnation of the DL in Tawang or Sikkim.
- rising internal discontent in China which may incite China to attempt to unite the Chinese people by launching a war which would instrumentalize Han nationalism.

Can anyone else think of any other potentially destabilising factors that have not yet been mentioned?

[Palnatoke]

Well my five cents:

Yes, some form of a conflict between China and India is "likely". I do think that it is "most likely" that this conflict will be cold war like, though with the possibility of flaring up in border skirmishes. It's "less likely" that we will see a major border confrontation, though that depends mostly on India's ability to match and check Chinese aggression.

Infact, within the next 20 years, I rate it as "likely" that we will have a cold war scenario between China and proxies on one side and USA, Europe, south east asian countries and proxies on the other side.
India will not be able to stay neutral, and naturally will choose side against China.

In the long term, The chinese socity and system is unstable as it is. At the same time China, by virtue of population size, will become, not a rich, but a huge economy with a massive potential. An attribute of this giant is it's lack of secure strategical ressources, spanning from food to energy. Which forces it to be outward oriented.
In the coming decades this "outwardness" will clash more and more with other global players (US, EU etc). This is allready happening in Africa, where china's policy of dealing and surporting the most dispicable regimes (f.ex. Sudan) as long as they provide raw ressources, is clashing with US and european interests.

The chineese political system, which is an anachronismn, that have only survived through an unholy allience with capitalismn, transforming it into a system that shares a lot of traits with 20th century facistic systems, can, by historical analogy, only attempt to stabilize it self by fueling an agressive nationalismn.
This nationalismn together with the forseeable clashes with other powers will surely have the potential to escalate the situation, into a cold war scenario.

Ofcourse all this can stay as an evil dream, if China manages to commit it self to real political reforms aimed at establishing a modern democracy - but I don't see that happening, and I don't think that it will happen as long as the current regime is able to deliver economical progress.

[OPSSG]

OPSSG, I tend to be relatively straightforward when debating issues, when i see evidence of BS I call it and then move on to engage in discussion. It's just tiring and a tad discouraging to see PRC apologists pop up as soon as one attempts to discuss Sino-Indian relations in a civilized manner....

I see still on the same point, with the same tone. I just love people with a big blind spot. :)

...To China to argue over a boundary bequeathed by former colonial occupiers is demeaning and its message to India is, bluntly, to gain a little more self respect and grow up.

If this isn't PRC propaganda then what is? As for the accusation of not contributing to the debate, if you reread my posts you will see that I actually did ask several questions regarding Sino-Indian relations.

I disagree. Sampanviking's disagreement with your point of view is not necessarily PRC propaganda. It's a perspective - though not one you find as agreeable. Grow up! No need to get your panties in a twist just because the response to your posts was not what you hoped.

Whereas you contributed nothing I'm afraid to say

Make up your mind. Do you want to continue to troll? Or do you seek to engage positively?

Anyway, moving on now-no hard feelings my friend.

You are right. I couldn't careless about what you think. I generally do not like to respond to new forum members, like you, simply because I haven't decided if you have anything worthwhile to contribute. Keep going down your current road. I'm slowly making my mind up about you and your persona.

So again, regarding the question of the thread about the possibility of conflict, I would say negligible unless India shows not the slightest interest of engaging with China in any meaningful sense or indeed initiates hostilities itself.

I agree, in the bigger scheme of things, it's a much ado about nothing. The simple reason is that India is not in a military position to threaten China (a fact admitted by India's seniormost serving commander (http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090811/jsp/frontpage/story_11346512.jsp)).

IMHO, the best PLA troops and equipment are currently facing Taiwan, which is a reflection of China's priorities. So unless there is a massive realignment of the various PLA regional commands, I don't think any significant escalation is in the cards.

[woden]

To engage in some substantial debate, here is a very interesting Financial Times article that has more or less the same take on Chinese intentions towards India.

FT.com / Asia-Pacific / India - China aims to block India?s place in the sun (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/26b241ba-8809-11de-82e4-00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=htt p%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F26b241ba-8809-11de-82e4-00144feabdc0.html&_i_referer=)

To quote John Elliot,

"China has been encircling India by developing influence and outposts in Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, and wants to usurp India’s major role in controlling the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.

Pakistan, which China has armed and helped become a nuclear power, has been destabilising India first in Punjab (in the 1980s) and then in Kashmir. China has also for years been encouraging separatist forces in India’s north-eastern states, including Assam, and will no doubt use its growing clout in Myanmar – and Bangladesh – to increase those activities. In the future it could perhaps use its growing influence in Sri Lanka – where it is developing a naval base and advised the government in the recent defeat of the Tamil Tiger separatists – to cause unrest among linked Tamil communities in southern India.

It has also strengthened its border claims – for example by opposing a $3bn Asian Development Bank aid project in Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian border state that China claims as “south Tibet”. And it tried to block international approval of the recent India-US nuclear deal with the US.

This is of course a dangerous game and sometimes India has to respond – recently for example by moving fighter jets to the China border.

I have heard a former senior Indian bureaucrat argue privately that China’s basic – and permanent – aim is to force India to focus on domestic issues and thus thwart it becoming a future international rival.

China, according to this view – which is surely correct – is determined to be the world’s sole superpower after America, and does not want that status to be upset by a strong and democratic India backed by the US and Europe. Its tactics have become more insistent in the past two years as it has become irritated by India’s growing links with the US, culminating in the nuclear deal.

Everything that China does in relation to India therefore has to be seen through that prism. India will not fragment into 20 or 30 pieces – it is far too unified for that – but there is no prospect of permanent peace and co-operation between the two countries because, as the internet writer has said, “there cannot be two suns in the sky”.

[Schumacher]

.......This is allready happening in Africa, where china's policy of dealing and surporting the most dispicable regimes (f.ex. Sudan) as long as they provide raw ressources, ..........

Yeah, I hear you, my friend. Don't you just wish China would stop supporting all these despicable regimes around the world like buying all these IOUs and bankrolling the regime that invaded & occupy Iraq and Afghanistan, just to name a few. :D

[OPSSG]

Palnatoke, I respectfully disagree with your point of view.

Yes, some form of a conflict between China and India is "likely". I do think that it is "most likely" that this conflict will be cold war like, though with the possibility of flaring up in border skirmishes. It's "less likely" that we will see a major border confrontation, though that depends mostly on India's ability to match and check Chinese aggression.

I don't think so. It is not in China's national interest to provide ammunition to their strategic competitors, like India, to enable them to cast China's past behaviour in a poorer light than it is already currently seen by the western media.

In fact, within the next 20 years, I rate it as "likely" that we will have a cold war scenario between China and proxies on one side and USA, Europe, south east asian countries and proxies on the other side.

Then you have not been paying attention to:

(i) the Sino-Vietnamese attempts to resolve their border disputes and the real progress they have made thus far; and

(ii) the fact that the US is only now belatedly taking steps to cede to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Amity_and_Cooperation_in_Southeast_Asia) , which is in part due to the fact that Australia, China and India have signed the TAC. Again, a fact not widely reported in western main stream media.

I have previously posted links on ASEAN in other threads and I do not intent to re-post them here or rehash the discussion. OTOH, there are continuing disputes in the South China Sea.

India will not be able to stay neutral, and naturally will choose side against China.

It is currently clear that India has chosen not to side with China and I would expect that it is not in India's interest to do so.

In the long term, The Chinese society and system is unstable as it is.

While, there are may sources of instability in China, as it grows, I think, to focus on these growing societal tensions without placing them in their proper context may be misleading.

I wouldn't claim to be an expert on China but there are also many sources of stability that is not immediately obvious until you've spent some time in China. If you are interested, we can have a offline discussion outside of this thread on this issue.

At the same time China, by virtue of population size, will become, not a rich, but a huge economy with a massive potential. An attribute of this giant is it's lack of secure strategical resources, spanning from food to energy. Which forces it to be outward oriented.

OK. I see the point you are making.

In the coming decades this "outwardness" will clash more and more with other global players (US, EU etc). This is already happening in Africa, where china's policy of dealing and supporting the most despicable regimes (f.ex. Sudan) as long as they provide raw resources, is clashing with US and European interests.

But the problem is with the characterization of China's policies. IMO, China doesn't have the luxury of only working with the non-despicable regimes, if they are to advance their interests in competition with US and European interests. And more importantly, there are certain commonality of interests too (between China and the West). The key to moving forward is finding the commonality of interests.

The Chinese political system, which is an anachronism, that have only survived through an unholy alliance with capitalism, transforming it into a system that shares a lot of traits with 20th century fatalistic systems, can, by historical analogy, only attempt to stabilize it self by fueling an aggressive nationalism.

I don't think so. The aggressive nationalism of the kind seen in China is not something only fermented by the Communist Party of China (CPC). The aggressive nationalism that manifests itself is more of a by-product of the world view of many Chinese nationals residing in China (and their understanding of China's position in recent history). As more of China's new elite travel and study abroad, they bring with them a moderating influence on the China's interested publics.

This nationalism together with the forseeable clashes with other powers will surely have the potential to escalate the situation, into a cold war scenario.

IMO, it is not in China's national interests to escalate. China under Deng opened China to foreign investment. In so doing the CPC wanted to reorient the Chinese economy away from agriculture and heavy industry and toward export-oriented industries. By doing so the CPC increased living standards, imported technology and improved the productivity of China's workforce. Back then, Deng was betting that the effort would not destabilize China. In so doing, the economy of China is a lot more inter-connected to the world economy than the Eastern block ever was at the height of the Cold War.

Ofcourse all this can stay as an evil dream, if China manages to commit it self to real political reforms aimed at establishing a modern democracy - but I don't see that happening, and I don't think that it will happen as long as the current regime is able to deliver economical progress.

The key to understanding China is this. IMHO, the CPC will win any free and fair election in China (if they were interested in the Western Democratic Model and in conducting such elections). Unfortunately, the CPC are clearly not interested in a Western political model and have no interest in taking steps in that direction.

[woden]

In the coming decades this "outwardness" will clash more and more with other global players (US, EU etc). This is allready happening in Africa, where china's policy of dealing and surporting the most dispicable regimes (f.ex. Sudan) as long as they provide raw ressources, is clashing with US and european interests.


I agree with you Palnatoke.
Unfortunately, China's nefarious policies in support of despicable regimes do not only extend to Africa, but also to Burma, Pakistan, North Korea, and the list goes on.
Wherever there are massive human rights violations, you can generally find a CCP official discreetly negotiating the construction of a mine, a pipeline, or handing out wads of cash and shiploads of weaponry. Chinese officials only recently seem to be catching on the disastrous effect this has on China's standing in world affairs.

[Schumacher]

I agree with you Palnatoke.
Unfortunately, China's nefarious policies in support of despicable regimes do not only extend to Africa, but also to Burma, Pakistan, North Korea, and the list goes on.
Wherever there are massive human rights violations, you can generally find a CCP official discreetly negotiating the construction of a mine, a pipeline, or handing out wads of cash and shiploads of weaponry. Chinese officials only recently seem to be catching on the disastrous effect this has on China's standing in world affairs.

I agree with you too. Sad isn't it, so many despicable regimes in this despicable world.
In that part of the world, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal can count on some Chinese support to varying degree all because of that despicable Indian regime being their neighbor.

[woden]

Does anyone have more info on Chinese force structure in Tibet? Iskander Rehman touches on it in the article but it would be good to have some more info on the forces in presence on both sides of the LAC.

[Palnatoke]

OPSSG

On a good day I like to be in agreement with what you say, but I, sadly, think that things are going to go bad.

Let's view it from a "western" viewpoint. While I don't think that china relatively will reach western economical standards for the next 50 years, China doesn't have to, in order to become a economical power the equal of the west. This, I think, is not a problem in it self, in a capitalistic system we should prosper by china's rising prosperity and all should be good.
BUT China got a suspect political system, and the west has a history with such political systems. When China gets "close enough" to key interests, the west will react: The confrontation seems unavoidable.

My best hope, OPSSG, is the interest in making money. Greed is, after all, perhaps our best hope for peacefull coexistence!

[OPSSG]

Broadly, I see the glass as half full and you see the glass as half empty (with regards to China). And we may both yet be correct.

On a good day I like to be in agreement with what you say, but I, sadly, think that things are going to go bad.

One of the joys and pain in taking part in a forum where the members are from different countries. The presence of a diversity of opinions. :D

Let's view it from a "western" viewpoint. While I don't think that china relatively will reach western economical standards for the next 50 years, China doesn't have to, in order to become a economical power the equal of the west. This, I think, is not a problem in it self, in a capitalistic system we should prosper by china's rising prosperity and all should be good.

Part of the reason for China's rapid economic growth initially was the huge influx of foreign direct investments (FDI) into China to serve external markets. Today, China's listed companies are starting to go abroad and making their own FDI decisions in other countries. Fundamentally, China currently lacks an internal consumer market and needs to rely on exports for continued economic growth. China's consumer market is nothing compared to the dynamics and money-rotating consumer atmosphere in Hong Kong, the EU or the US. A fact that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is also aware. If the investment and consumption cycles are not disrupted, there is every chance of rising prosperity.

I note that our discussion is moving further and further away from the topic being discussed and I'll like to stop, out of respect for the topic starter.

My best hope, OPSSG, is the interest in making money. Greed is, after all, perhaps our best hope for peaceful coexistence!

IMO, there's plenty of greed to go around.:D

[A.Mookerjee]

In his latest blog entry Iskander Rehman takes a look at the rapidly deteriorating security situation along India's Northeastern border with China. He says that although things are tense and both countires have massively reinforced their military presence along the LAC or line of actual control,some of the claims in the Indian media that a Chinese attack will occur in the next five to ten years may be somewhat overstated.
He does stress the fact, however, that things are volatile and unpredictable, and that India should prepare for any contingency.
What do people think of his analysis? After reading the article do you think this is a crisis the world may have to deal with in the course of the next decade?

India and the world. (http://indiangeopolitics.blogspot.com/)

Both India and China need to keep credibility as peace loving responsible nations, who can, with the United States keep peace in Asia. I believe, Asia is going to be assisted because Japan, China and India are going to grow economically, and this will act as an impetus for the rest of Asia. If I may make a correction, Japan has grown economically. It is true, that the Chinese military might in Asia, is only considered when one considers India. India and China have the largest military forces in Asia. But, India will be China's largest trade partner in the future, perhaps. India and China have the opportunity in trading terms with each other, because they are neighbors. In Asia, the other nations will grow at their pace, but I do not see other important trading nations like Indonesia, and Malaysia, being of very great importance individually in trading terms on a large scale. It is true, that weapons systems like the Su-30 Mk-1 is not purchased by India with Pakistan in mind. The Su-30 can stay airborne it is said, for quite a number of hours. An air force conflict between Pakistan and India, will not need the Su-30 Mk-1. The Su-30 was considered when Mr George Fernandez was the defense minister, and the then defense minister called China "threat No 1", or something to that effect. India has a defensive aviation doctrine. For the Sukhoi 30 to be effective, the aircraft needs to defend with flying for around six hours a sortie. This can only be required, if India was to combat a large number of aircraft. Perhaps, India is looking at 300 Sukhoi's in her arsenal. The other multi role aircraft have their own uses, which India wants to tender and procure. I do not see India and China involved in a conflict, which will strain relations between the nations, and strain relations in Asia. If India or China were to occupy territory of the neighboring nation after a conflict, then that would be the end of the India China relationship.

[OPSSG]

There's a Washington Times article on the PLA, which deals with their modernization efforts in non-technical terms below:

People's Army not standing still (http://www.washtimes.com/news/2009/aug/12/peoples-army-not-standing-still/?feat=home_commentary)

Aug 12, 2009 - The first unfolding trend line is the professionalization of the PLA. Central authorities embarked on a course to professionalize the PLA a decade and a half ago, and the results of those policies are coming to fruition in the form of a more competent and capable military. PLA business enterprises have closed so military officers no longer have to choose between running a business and professional training.

Corruption is being exposed, and merit-based promotions are now the norm. A streamlined PLA has also transferred domestic security missions to the People's Armed Police, so the PLA can focus more intensely on traditional military missions. And perhaps most important, the quality of PLA training has improved toward greater joint force cooperation as well as more realistic scenarios across a wide range of contingencies.

The second trend to note is China's continuing advances in defense-industrial capability. After decades of reverse engineering from foreign technologies and experimentation through domestic research and development, the PLA is moving closer to a sustainable modern indigenous defense-industrial system. The PLA of the near future will be less vulnerable to potential supply disruptions in time of conflict, and will be better positioned to acquire the specific capabilities required for China's unique circumstances.

The third trend line relates to China's acquisition strategy. It is a priority for China to acquire capabilities specifically oriented toward countering U.S. military strengths. China's aerospace programs in anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons are potential "game-changers" for U.S. operations. A successful ASBM program could expand the threat envelope for U.S. aircraft carriers to a distance where traditional carrier-based flight operations become impractical. Likewise, the ASAT program threatens satellites that the U.S. military relies on for intelligence, communication and navigation.

A fourth trend line also relates to PLA acquisitions, but it also speaks to evolving doctrine, strategy and tactics. China is investing heavily in the next generation of asymmetric warfare capabilities. This is most evident in Chinese cyberwarfare capabilities...

...

Finally, China's burgeoning foreign military diplomacy presents a new and difficult set of challenges for the United States and our allies. The PLA is actively pursuing the objective of extended its global reach and influence through securing strategic access to key ports and bases... This threatens to alter the strategic balance, not only by expanding PLA reach, but also by potentially limiting or denying access for the United States and others in the same areas...

While the above article has a limited utility, it's a good starting point to frame a discussion on the latest PLA developments over the last 5 years. One of our moderators has produced a list of the top 20 systems (http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/08/top-20-list.html) that joined PLA service which may be of interest. IMO, a lot of the systems in top 20 list is geared towards dealing with Taiwan (as an important symbolic issue and naval security issue), though a few of those 20 systems listed would clearly have an impact on the Indian geo-strategic calculus.

IMO, a strategic planning for potential conflict over Taiwan will continue to dominate China's geo-political calculus (for more details, read this article by George Friedman (http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article5059.html)). For China, the primary problem posed by Taiwan is naval. Taiwan is positioned in such a way that it can readily serve as an air and naval base that could isolate maritime movement between the South China Sea and the East China Sea, effectively leaving the northern Chinese coast and Shanghai isolated. Taiwan would not be important to China unless it became actively hostile or allied with or occupied by a hostile power such as the United States. If that happened, its geographical position would pose an extremely serious problem for China. Therefore the greatest military threat to China is the USN (and it is not India). As far as the Chinese flow of imports and exports is concerned, the Malacca Strait, is a key chokepoint (see: 'Chokepoints: Maritime Ec Concerns in SE Asia' (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA319445&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)).

Today, China (with a GDP of about US$4.4 trillion and a population of over 1.33 billion) is highly dependent on seaborne trade and the USN is in a position to blockade China's trade, if it wished. Therefore, China's primary military interest is to raise the price of a blockade so high that the Americans would not attempt it. However, China continues to face the law of unintended consequences with her naval build up.

Let me explain further. Each time China launches a new submarine or deploys a new weapons system, a small bell of alarm would go off in Japan (with a GDP of about US$4.92 trillion and a population of over 127 million). Other US allies like S. Korea (with a GDP of about US$947 billion and a population of over 49 million) and Australia (with a GDP of about US$1.01 trillion and a population of over 21 million) are also monitoring the situation closely. IMO, it is not a coincidence that Japan, operates 6 AEGIS vessels in 2 classes (with the Atago class (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atago_class_destroyer) and the Kongo class (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kong%C5%8D_class_destroyer)) and S. Korea, operates 6 KDX-II AGEIS vessels (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KDX-II) and is planning to operate another 3 KDX-III class AEGIS vessels (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_Sejong_the_Great_class_destroyer). Australia is also planning to build 3 AEGIS vessels. Further, all 3 US-allied countries build and operate their own very capable submarine fleets.

Imagine the alarm bells going off in the capitals of the various countries in the Asia Pacific, if there was a resurgence of actual armed conflict in involving China and India at their border regions (or for that matter, Vietnam or Malaysia over in the South China Sea). I'm sure the above 'neutrals' mentioned will be driven deeper into the US's embrace, as they seek a counter weight to China's rise. IMO, it is not in China's national interest to unite the divergent interests present in the Asia Pacific by presenting herself as the 'clear and present danger' to be guarded against (when China's soft power (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7996300.stm) is making significant inroads).

[Palnatoke]

OPSSG

While I generally agree with your analysis and finds it sound, I think you are forgetting what I consider to be the most likely confrontation(s) and resons for confrontation.

Consider, Oil. In 25 years it's a fair guess that most of the known and remaining oil ressources wiil be concentrated in the ME and Russia.

The importance of a, future, powerfull China is the abillity for regimes in ME but also Russia to use China as a balance against the US and EU. I suggest that in the future we will see a lot of, mostly "cold" but also "hot" conflicts in the ME (a volatile and dysfunctional region), either directly involving US/EU or proxies thereoff. China will get involved in the mess, (because it, as we have assumed, can ) Though this will most likely take place per proxy.

This will be the main global confrontation of the future. Countries like India or the asian countries won't be able to stay out of this confrontation. And this estabishes the hostile relation.

Secondly, I believe that countries like India and China are in a position to "thrive on the other's demise". By that I mean that while the US/EU trades with China to mutual benefit. It's a little bit more hard to see India's advantage in trading with China- a country that got a 100% comparativ advantage and is richer with, for an unforseeable future, a huge untapped human ressource pool. Further more India and China competes directly in attracting foreign direct investments. At some point India must realize that they need the labour intensive industry to develop their socity. Industry that China has attracted while India more or less slept while dreaming of a highly advanced economy that's only real for a limited number of indians.

So while EU/US will feel threathed by China, they will have the benefit of trade to moderate possible excesses. India will more likely have an interest in trading less, and that other people trades less, with China.

[OPSSG]

While I generally agree with your analysis and finds it sound, I think you are forgetting what I consider to be the most likely confrontation(s) and reasons for confrontation.

I only entered this thread to provide a different perspective (and to point out some areas not previously considered). I certainly don't intend to try to change anyone's existing or considered point of view on the prospects of a Sino-Indian conflict.

IMO, we are looking at the situation from different perspectives and possibly using different basic assumptions.

Consider, Oil. In 25 years it's a fair guess that most of the known and remaining oil resources will be concentrated in the ME and Russia.

That is possible, but I really don't have an informed opinion on oil reserves. I admit I don't know. The topic of oil reserves is not something I read about in-depth, though I'm aware of a few unflattering articles on China and her need for oil.

The importance of a, future, powerful China is the ability for regimes in ME but also Russia to use China as a balance against the US and EU. I suggest that in the future we will see a lot of, mostly "cold" but also "hot" conflicts in the ME (a volatile and dysfunctional region), either directly involving US/EU or proxies thereof. China will get involved in the mess, (because it, as we have assumed, can ) Though this will most likely take place per proxy.

I don't know. You are citing too many variables. I can't express an opinion on such complex interactions between so many parties (especially if we have to take into account the various proxies, some of whom may not act rationally). IMO, the scope you propose for the discussion is just too wide for me to even attempt a response. This is because any wide ranging discussion of the scope you propose will lead me to express my thoughts about various groups in a over simplified manner that may lead to stereotyping. I believe that if we stereotype, it often says more about us than the group/country we are ostensibly discussing.

Secondly, I believe that countries like India and China are in a position to "thrive on the other's demise". By that I mean that while the US/EU trades with China to mutual benefit. It's a little bit more hard to see India's advantage in trading with China- a country that got a 100% comparative advantage and is richer with, for an unforeseeable future, a huge untapped human resource pool. Further more India and China competes directly in attracting foreign direct investments. At some point India must realize that they need the labour intensive industry to develop their society. Industry that China has attracted while India more or less slept while dreaming of a highly advanced economy that's only real for a limited number of Indians.

I admit that I don't understand how you arrived at your position.

Edit: IMHO, China and India are serving different niches in the world economy and there is only some overlap. In other words, in the international division of labour, they are not really competing with each other. Further, any remaining Indian hindrances to FDI are in part driven by their prior attempt at self-sufficiency and current Indian bureaucratic inertia. The Indian legislative framework, the existence of corruption, the inability of the Indian Government to remove bottlenecks to development and the impact of their domestic politics results in a business environment that is not conclusive to larger FDI inflows. Therefore, I don't think the Indians want to compete on the same basis for FDI nor would they want so much change in such a short time.

So while EU/US will feel threatened by China, they will have the benefit of trade to moderate possible excesses. India will more likely have an interest in trading less, and that other people trades less, with China.

I don't understand the basis upon which you can postulate as a source of Sino-Indian conflict. To be clear, I do not disagree with you. I can't agree or disagree when I don't understand the point you are making. Sorry. :unknown

[OPSSG]

This is my last post on this thread, as I do think we are moving towards off-topic territory.

I agree with you Palnatoke.

Unfortunately, China's nefarious policies in support of despicable regimes do not only extend to Africa, but also to Burma, Pakistan, North Korea, and the list goes on.

Wherever there are massive human rights violations, you can generally find a CCP official discreetly negotiating the construction of a mine, a pipeline, or handing out wads of cash and shiploads of weaponry. Chinese officials only recently seem to be catching on the disastrous effect this has on China's standing in world affairs.
I agree with you too. Sad isn't it, so many despicable regimes in this despicable world.

In that part of the world, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal can count on some Chinese support to varying degree all because of that despicable Indian regime being their neighbor.

This will be the main global confrontation of the future. Countries like India or the Asian countries won't be able to stay out of this confrontation. And this establishes the hostile relation.

Countries are not people. Countries do not act out of an emotion or because it is moral to do so. Most of the time, countries act to further their national interests. Therefore, anthropomorphizing countries is not particularly useful when looking at the geopolitical reality and people who persist on doing so are posturing. All I ask is that a forum participant in this thread measure both China and India by the same yard stick of their respective national interests, which is in-turn informed by their geo-political reality.

If we are not to be blindly Sino-phobic, wouldn't India also have growing oil and natural resource needs? Keep in mind also that China's one-child policy has ensured that her demographics will change rapidly within this generation. What are the Indians doing to ensure their future energy and resource security?

What about India who will in time become the most populous nation in the world? Keep in mind that India has 456 million people living under the poverty line (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poverty_in_India) (42% of the total Indian population) and about 300 million people without primary education. How does India intend to feed their illiterate, poor and hungry? These are some of the questions an objective forum participant in this thread will need to ask.

[charles34]

whose side would russia and japan be on if china and india went to war?

[The Swordman]

The one-child policy worked for China for many years but will not work in the near future. An aging population, think about Japan or Italy, put up a big problem about healtcare and retirement programs. China government knows that for sure but find a new equilibrium will not be easy.
India is growing in multiple directions, with little coordination and a lack of a nation-wide perspective. In the near future that country will become the most populated in the world with the same lack of economical equilibrium that exists today.
The need of raw resources will grove for both countries as of the need for more and more food. Africa and the south east Asia will become the confrontation ground.

[woden]

whose side would russia and japan be on if china and india went to war?

Thanks for putting the conversation back on track :)
If there was a border conflict in-between India and China it's highly unlikely that either Japan or the Russian Federation would step in militarily.
Japan, however, would undoubtedly be behind India, as both countries espouse the same democratic values and share security concerns regarding Chinese naval expansion and nationalism. India is concerned by China's said 'string of pearls' strategy and Japan is riled by China's increasingly belligerent stance in the South China Sea and around the disputed Senkaku Islands. In 2005 several cities in China were shook by violent anti-Japanese riots and a recent issue of the PRC funded Global Times published an intensely xenophobic editorial on India.
Both India and Japan have therefore greatly upgraded their military ties over the past four to five years in order to counter the growing Chinese threat in their backyards and regularly participate in joint naval exercises. In the event of a Sino-Indian conflict, Japan would probably diplomatically back India and discreetly provide intelligence on China's naval deployments in case the PRC chose to escalate things beyond a merely land-based border conflict.
Russia, on the other hand, would be caught in something of a quandary. Moscow and New Delhi have a long history of cooperation, and Russia does still have some abiding security concerns vis-à-vis China, mostly to do with the alleged stealing of Russian military technology and the waves of illegal Chinese immigration swamping some remote areas of Siberia. Both countries are also vying for influence in Central Asia, which has become the theatre for a new form of Great Game.
At the same time, both Russia and China are members of the SCO, and both states have managed to normalize their relations after years of hostility. Russia would probably not want to throw that all to the wind by publicly backing India. Once again, however, one cannot discount the possibility of Russia discreetly providing India with intelligence on Chinese troop deployments, or with advanced military hardware that the PRC do not have access to. This could give India more of an 'edge' in the event of a conflict.

[funtz]

There is a balance in the current line of control, and the only available option is to accept the ground reality and the existing border, India and PRC do not possess the capability to take over land the land they claim, they can fight all they want in the air or the sea, but the dotted line in the map is not going to change.

So why would there be a conflict?

Reasons for resources and economy seem to be very immature, as a conflict is a the thing that will make the situation worse.

[julnap]

I don't think China would attack India as Taiwan and the South China Sea take higher priorities.

I can't say if India would attack China though - that is a possibility

[funtz]

There is no place from where an Indian attack on PRC is feasible.

Along Leh & Laddak, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh there is an established balance.