The Soviet Tank Gamble

[Tavarisch]

It occurs to me that Soviet designers emphasize somewhat on low-hulls. The principle here is that the tank's low profile should make it harder to hit. But looking back on the previous Gulf Wars, the gamble hasn't paid off. T-72s , T-62s and T-55s still got their turrets blown off jack-in-the-box style, but several other factors play a role here as well.

But think about it, the entire purpose of a low hull is to give it a low-profile right? On a reverse slope position, the gun depression has to be low. Low profile of Soviet tanks means not being able to depress the gun very far down. This forces the tank to go either slightly forwards on the slope to be able to target enemies from hull-down which in this case negates the low-profile in the first place, or attempt a near-suicidal assault and charge over the slope while the enemy flings 120mm Sabots and TOW missile at you.

Sure, they could prepare a position on a slope in minutes with the built in dozers for the T-72s (and it's cousins after the T-64). But it probably takes the enemy less time to charge their tanks over that slope while they get things sorted out.

This question in turn leads to another one. The low-profile of Soviet tanks has lead to a severe space problem within the tank, which is why some of the ammo is inside the fighting compartment. Very dangerous, as we have seen in the past few years. (Chechenya, Iraq, Georgia) My suggestion would be to widen the hull to allow a larger auto-loader carousel OR dump the carousel idea completely and use a bustle mounted loader instead, as the Ukrainians have done with their shiny new Oplots. The last thing one wants to do is not have the extra ammo at all, the carousel only has 28 rounds, maybe good for short-term ops but what about those week long ones?

Hopefully, any credible new design that isn't top-secret or based on rumors corrects this principle flaw.

Please, lads and ladies debate this topic with a modicum of civility. Surely enough there is credible evidence as to why this design is still overlooked?

[Chrom]

It
Please, lads and ladies debate this topic with a modicum of civility. Surely enough there is credible evidence as to why this design is still overlooked?

You portray tank as purery defencive weapon (far from being the case), and even that defencive weapon in quite isolated cirumstances. For example, marginaly prepared position will allow soviet tanks to take "hull down" position just as well as western tanks. Even unprepared position will give large benefit to soviet tank - funny, even more than for western tanks due to, exactly, lower hull. Average 1-1.5m roughness will give for T-72 almost 2 times better protection than for M-60 or even M1.

But of course soviet style viewed tank mainly as offensive (in tactical definition) weapon, leaving defensive actions largerly to self-propelled artillery or specialized anti-tank vehicles.

In all cases (offensive of defensive) soviets emphased the need for mobility.

Thus, they likes for smaller hulls as it gives very substancial advantage while being on the move - either attacking, or just relocating to different position after succesful shot.
In war against competent, equal enemy tank dug in discovered position - dangerless dead tank.

Always remember - hull down firing from unprepared position is quite isolated case in tank-to-tank battles.

As for ammo near the crew... this have very little to do with space. M60 or Leopard examples (even newer than T-64/T-72), which also had they ammo stored together with crew, or newer modernizations of T-72/T-90 - which separates ammo from crew - shows us what lack of space do not prevent separation ammo from the crew.

Face it, T-64/T-72 is ancient design, developed in years when noone had such feature as separate ammo compartment. In normal case, if USSR continues exists, in early 90x we would see new, revolutionary design in soviet service with all current gizmos like separate ammo, APS, ERA, thermals, etc. Just about in same time as (some of) such features became widespread between Western armies.

[Tavarisch]

You portray tank as purery defencive weapon (far from being the case), and even that defencive weapon in quite isolated cirumstances. For example, marginaly prepared position will allow soviet tanks to take "hull down" position just as well as western tanks. Even unprepared position will give large benefit to soviet tank - funny, even more than for western tanks due to, exactly, lower hull. Average 1-1.5m roughness will give for T-72 almost 2 times better protection than for M-60 or even M1.

But of course soviet style viewed tank mainly as offensive (in tactical definition) weapon, leaving defensive actions largerly to self-propelled artillery or specialized anti-tank vehicles.

In all cases (offensive of defensive) soviets emphased the need for mobility.

Thus, they likes for smaller hulls as it gives very substancial advantage while being on the move - either attacking, or just relocating to different position after succesful shot.
In war against competent, equal enemy tank dug in discovered position - dangerless dead tank.

Always remember - hull down firing from unprepared position is quite isolated case in tank-to-tank battles.

The fact is assaulting a target that is on the other side of the reverse slope is very risky. Yes, the Soviet Tank is for offense, but Soviet commanders know better than to simply go over a reverse slope and get themselves killed. Usual tactics dictate that 2 tanks in a platoon will be in cover providing support fire or observation from the slope, whiles the other two or three will perform the assault. The fact is that the ineffective barrel depression requires the T-series a more prepared hull-down position, consuming time. In the amount of time that is used for preparation, an enemy unit can a) go around you or b) Charge right at you while you get your entrenching tool out.

The question of impromptu defense comes to mind. What if your S2 staff just reported an entire platoon of heavies coming down about 200m your way and you're on a slope? The Abrams maybe a fuel-hungry beast, but it's pretty fast for 68 tonnes. It can probably cover the distance fast enough to over-run the entire platoon on the reverse slope.

With more precise weapons being used and developed on ground, I think the T-72 turret is still quite a presentable target at hull-down. This is because in an unprepared state, the tank's gun depression is not good enough, meaning that the tank must move further up the slope and present more of it's surface area, given that the T-72 doesn't have any time to prepare, which is most likely the case. This completely negates the small profile of the T-72 in the reverse slope situation. So, what we can infer is that the low-hull makes reverse slope battles harder for Soviet Armor.

In any case, mobility maybe a factor, but Western FCS for tanks tend to be sophisticated enough to smoothly track a T-72 at full-speed and blow it up.

Even then, another danger presents itself in full. Cramped fighting compartment which also has ammo in it. By having a separated ammo compartment, it would be much safer. Sure, the tank may still be useless if the compartment blows up, but at least you save three men to fight another day. Oh, and you save yourself the bother of locating the Flying Turret as well. (well, not really. In most cases, the turret just lands where it used to be.)

Oh, and who says the ammo isn't separate from the crew on NATO tanks? As far as I know, the Leo 2, Abrams and Chally 2 feature this.

[Firn]

This is a topic which should be governed by reason not false pride.

Some soviet tanker experience in WWII:

We changed direction there and headed towards Dvinsk. We did not attack. It was very rare that we had to advance in a classical manner against organized defense lines. The Germans usually arranged some ambush, where they used “ArtStorms", sort of self-propelled artillery equipped with 75 mm guns. They moved quietly, had low-profile construction and easily disguised, were extremely hard to detect. We advanced in a march column order, as an advance point, a few tanks in front, the others at some distance. If the Germans arranged an ambush that meant that advance point would be knocked out surely. Those alive would get out, remaining tanks would open fire. However where to shoot? God knows! Germans already disappeared. After some shooting, we would fold up into a march column again and be after them. Once caught up with the enemy we would annihilate them.

Once we came across such an ambush. Two tanks, which were ahead of us, were burnt, the third one was retreating firing back. They stuck a billet right under the turret bed and it caught fire. Meantime we turned away from the road, the engines died, ran out of fuel. That is why we heard people scream inside the burning machine.

On the tactical defence a AFV with a low profile is easier to camouflage and to hide. The Stridsvagn 103 for example was based on the great successes of the Stugs and was built for such ambushes from hull-down positions. The latter would have been more difficult to achieve for the T-80 in an fluid battle.

All in all the soviet tank designs features have to be seen as part of whole and in context with the Soviet doctrine.

The very basics of the defense (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/17-15/chp4.htm)

[Tavarisch]

This is a topic which should be governed by reason not false pride.

Some soviet tanker experience in WWII:



On the tactical defence a AFV with a low profile is easier to camouflage and to hide. The Stridsvagn 103 for example was based on the great successes of the Stugs and was built for such ambushes from hull-down positions. The latter would have been more difficult to achieve for the T-80 in an fluid battle.

All in all the soviet tank designs features have to be seen as part of whole and in context with the Soviet doctrine.

The very basics of the defense (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/17-15/chp4.htm)


Allow me to point out the fact that we are strictly talking about reverse slopes. Of course a 103 is easier to hide and conceal on relatively flat land, but how does one go about doing it on a reverse slope whereby the elevation is a disadvantage?

Soviet Doctrine clearly dictates a massive tank assault to break through enemy lines. Clearly this was mainly for the open plains of Germany. What of hilly terrain?

[Firn]

Allow me to point out the fact that we are strictly talking about reverse slopes. Of course a 103 is easier to hide and conceal on relatively flat land, but how does one go about doing it on a reverse slope whereby the elevation is a disadvantage?

Stridsvagn 103


Soviet Doctrine clearly dictates a massive tank assault to break through enemy lines. Clearly this was mainly for the open plains of Germany. What of hilly terrain?

Soviet Doctrine was a bit more complex than a massive tank assault, but this is should not be discussed here. But soviet tanks were certainly also built to operate in concert with the other arms in terrain which isn't flat. The particular decision has to do with that a low depression and high elevation increases cost and forces other changes like a higher and heavier turret.

Defense by tanks can not be reduced on the hasty hull down position on a reversed slope. There has been and there will be a great many excellent positions, in flat, hilly or urban terrain which isn't based on a reversed slope...

I guess that much of this take comes from the tank battles of Sinai in the Yon Kippur war

Yon Kippur War

Around minute 9.

[kato]

Clearly this was mainly for the open plains of Germany.
60-70% of Germany is not exactly flat.

One solution would be to not stand at the top of the hill, but rush down, and once you're on the slope, you have the necessary depression. If you're doing a rushing motion anyway, it makes sense.
In a holding position firing down a slope, one could also prepare with sloped embattlements.

Also remember that the tank battalion of course doesn't travel alone. If there's discovered troops on the reserve slope - which you see once you're at the top at the latest - the accompanying artillery will have to say something about it.

[Feanor]

Soviet tank design was built for a single, and very specific conflict. That conflict never happened. Instead Soviet armor was used in a variety of other conflicts, and other types of terrain, often with other doctrines. Hence why the flaw is a serious drawback.

Now to get into the specifics.

The fact is assaulting a target that is on the other side of the reverse slope is very risky. Yes, the Soviet Tank is for offense, but Soviet commanders know better than to simply go over a reverse slope and get themselves killed. Usual tactics dictate that 2 tanks in a platoon will be in cover providing support fire or observation from the slope, whiles the other two or three will perform the assault. The fact is that the ineffective barrel depression requires the T-series a more prepared hull-down position, consuming time. In the amount of time that is used for preparation, an enemy unit can a) go around you or b) Charge right at you while you get your entrenching tool out.


Soviet tank platoons I believe were 3 tanks strong, with 3 platoons and a command tank to a company.

The question of impromptu defense comes to mind. What if your S2 staff just reported an entire platoon of heavies coming down about 200m your way and you're on a slope? The Abrams maybe a fuel-hungry beast, but it's pretty fast for 68 tonnes. It can probably cover the distance fast enough to over-run the entire platoon on the reverse slope.


Then the Soviet tanks would most likely withdraw, using arty, air, or AT weapons to coutner the Abrams. This is not the job they're meant for.

With more precise weapons being used and developed on ground, I think the T-72 turret is still quite a presentable target at hull-down. This is because in an unprepared state, the tank's gun depression is not good enough, meaning that the tank must move further up the slope and present more of it's surface area, given that the T-72 doesn't have any time to prepare, which is most likely the case. This completely negates the small profile of the T-72 in the reverse slope situation. So, what we can infer is that the low-hull makes reverse slope battles harder for Soviet Armor.

What time period are we talking about? More precise weapons are a feature of modern armies after the most recent RMA. The T-72 would have been phased out in the 90s as the USSR went through it's own RMA.

In any case, mobility maybe a factor, but Western FCS for tanks tend to be sophisticated enough to smoothly track a T-72 at full-speed and blow it up.

Time period.

Even then, another danger presents itself in full. Cramped fighting compartment which also has ammo in it. By having a separated ammo compartment, it would be much safer. Sure, the tank may still be useless if the compartment blows up, but at least you save three men to fight another day. Oh, and you save yourself the bother of locating the Flying Turret as well. (well, not really. In most cases, the turret just lands where it used to be.)

Oh, and who says the ammo isn't separate from the crew on NATO tanks? As far as I know, the Leo 2, Abrams and Chally 2 feature this.

All 3 being later designs then the T-72. Designs experimenting with separate compartments did exist (iirc the Soviet T-84 designs considered the option, as did the Object 640).

[kato]

On the Leo 2, only the ready ammo in the turret is in an armored bunker. The other 27/29 rounds are stored left of the driver in an open rack.

At least on the A4 and A5, no idea if they changed it with the A6.

[Chrom]

Allow me to point out the fact that we are strictly talking about reverse slopes. Of course a 103 is easier to hide and conceal on relatively flat land, but how does one go about doing it on a reverse slope whereby the elevation is a disadvantage?

Soviet Doctrine clearly dictates a massive tank assault to break through enemy lines. Clearly this was mainly for the open plains of Germany. What of hilly terrain?

No, not nessesary tank assault. Actually, soviet doctrine rather required artillery to burn passage throu enemy lines. Tanks are not meant to be used in "frontal" assault against enemy defence. Tank divisions are designed for maximum mobility, they are meant to break behind enemy lines throught ALREADY made (by artillery, aviation, etc) passage and then wreck as much havoc as possible behind enemy lines.

As for gun depression... there is no doubt what greater depression is good and give sizeable benefits. Noone questioning that. But you try to present it as "holy grail", winning answer in any situation. But reality is far from that. Gun depression is very important in rare situations and quite usefull in many other situation - but in most cases this advantage could be compensated by other means or by short preparation. As i said, there will be cases when all this is not possible or dont work - then tought luck.

Clearly, T-xx is compomise in that regard, and soviet designers thought lower siluette and weight give advantage much more often than additial gun depression.

[Chrom]

On the Leo 2, only the ready ammo in the turret is in an armored bunker. The other 27/29 rounds are stored left of the driver in an open rack.

At least on the A4 and A5, no idea if they changed it with the A6.

Yes, as i said separate ammo compartment is 80x designs feature, and even then keep in mind absolutely most NATO tanks didnt had it till 90x.

Moreover, there is still big question how much this separate ammo compartment really reduces crew casualities. I havent seen any credible research on that matter.

P.S. Always keep in mind time period. T-64/T-72 were great tanks for they time, untill about later 80x. Then western hull designs came ahead. In about that time USSR also planned to phase out T-64/T-72 and replace in with something new, but we all know what happened...

[Tavarisch]

@ Firn

Nice video, it gives me the impression that the S-tank is actually a large turret with wheels. Never knew anything about the thing, but now I do. Thanks. (PS: That depression thing is a very cool feature.)

@ Feanor

I should've added the other tank platoon to that sentence. Sorry about that.

More precise weapons, i.e weapons after the Second Gulf War. The Abrams was accurate enough at that time to actually hit a T-72. (Read a source about the M829 having serious accuracy issues before they made the M829A1 version, forgot the source)

I am was under the impression that the T-72, especially the '85 and after variants of the B production model, would still equip forward Soviet formations, such as the GSFG. Unless they had T-80s only, which wouldn't be really a surprise for.

Russian tanks still lack the ammo compartment separation. It may not be all that great, but I'm sure the crewmen would be thankful to not fly with the turret (or be burned in the process) when a penetration occurs. Current tanks in Russian service seems to still be stuck with this flaw.

@Chrom

I don't deny the fact that T-64s and T-72s were a great threat to NATO in the Cold War, but today aircraft make short work of them, much to their detriment. However, their ability to launch AT-11s would be a very useful advantage up until today. They still pose a threat, though I doubt an individual T-72B will be able to stand up to something like a Leo 2A4 in a frontal attack.

I wasn't aware of a new tank development before the Soviet collapse. Enlighten me please.

[Firn]

@ Firn

Nice video, it gives me the impression that the S-tank is actually a large turret with wheels. Never knew anything about the thing, but now I do. Thanks. (PS: That depression thing is a very cool feature.)


It seems the Svedish designer studied WWII very carefully and clearly noticed just how well the Stug III did and how cost-effective it was. Both the terrain and the strategic situation of Sveden suits and suited such type of AFV very well. According to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sturmgesch%C3%BCtz_III#cite_note-achtungpanzer-1) they claimed until the spring of 1944 ~ 20000 tanks. While such numbers are alway a bit problematic there can be no doubt that it was an excellent, cost-effective AFV who was in the tactical defense very much respected by the soviet tankers as their own accouts prove.

One could perhaps remark that the Soviets built the T-55 in the spirit of the T-34 (cheap, very reliable, robust, large gun, universal tank) with a nod to the Stug III (cheap, reliable, heavily armored front, large gun, very low silhouette).

[Waylander]

One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

[Feanor]

More precise weapons, i.e weapons after the Second Gulf War. The Abrams was accurate enough at that time to actually hit a T-72. (Read a source about the M829 having serious accuracy issues before they made the M829A1 version, forgot the source)

You mean... after 2003?

I am was under the impression that the T-72, especially the '85 and after variants of the B production model, would still equip forward Soviet formations, such as the GSFG. Unless they had T-80s only, which wouldn't be really a surprise for.

Not 20 years later they wouldn't.

Russian tanks still lack the ammo compartment separation. It may not be all that great, but I'm sure the crewmen would be thankful to not fly with the turret (or be burned in the process) when a penetration occurs. Current tanks in Russian service seems to still be stuck with this flaw.

Because current Russian tanks in service were practically all made in the USSR, and ALL were designed in the USSR.


I don't deny the fact that T-64s and T-72s were a great threat to NATO in the Cold War, but today aircraft make short work of them, much to their detriment. However, their ability to launch AT-11s would be a very useful advantage up until today. They still pose a threat, though I doubt an individual T-72B will be able to stand up to something like a Leo 2A4 in a frontal attack.

Of course they're outdated today. The T-64 isn't even in active duty service in the Russian army. The T-62 is with the 42 MRD. But the 42nd MRD doesn't exist any more (3 motor rifles brigades have been formed out of it) and right before the recent rounds of reforms, there were rumors about T-90 deliveries to the NCMD. I would think it logical to replace the older T-62s first.

The T-72 was due to start being replaced in the 90's, with the Object 187 which was supposed to be the intergenerational tank, while the Object 195 was supposed to be the next (4th) generation tank.

I wasn't aware of a new tank development before the Soviet collapse. Enlighten me please.

Object 187(MESHWAR - Òåõíèêà - "Îáúåêò 187" (http://www.meshwar.vistcom.ru/tech/ob187.htm)), Object 640(Black Eagle T-80UM2), and Object 195(T-95) all existed in the Soviet days as projects, as far as I know.

[Tavarisch]

You mean... after 2003?



Not 20 years later they wouldn't.



Because current Russian tanks in service were practically all made in the USSR, and ALL were designed in the USSR.



Of course they're outdated today. The T-64 isn't even in active duty service in the Russian army. The T-62 is with the 42 MRD. But the 42nd MRD doesn't exist any more (3 motor rifles brigades have been formed out of it) and right before the recent rounds of reforms, there were rumors about T-90 deliveries to the NCMD. I would think it logical to replace the older T-62s first.

The T-72 was due to start being replaced in the 90's, with the Object 187 which was supposed to be the intergenerational tank, while the Object 195 was supposed to be the next (4th) generation tank.



Object 187(MESHWAR - Òåõíèêà - "Îáúåêò 187" (http://www.meshwar.vistcom.ru/tech/ob187.htm)), Object 640(Black Eagle T-80UM2), and Object 195(T-95) all existed in the Soviet days as projects, as far as I know.

Yeah, I was always wondering why they even bother to have T-62s in service. Why not upgrade some of those older T-64s and sell those really old T-62s to some other country? Or make them target practice.

So, the rumored T-95 project and the Ob 640 were Soviet designs? I thought they were designs made by private individual companies... Maybe if the Soviets live up till the late nineties they would've been on the Victory Day parades. But, 4th Generation tank designs are not a good reason for a communist dictatorship (at least in a de facto sense) to live on it seems. (Ironically, communism is AGAINST dictatorship)

Looks like the T-90 must have had some of it's designs from the 187, looks really similar. Would the muzzle break have made a difference at all?

[Feanor]

The T-90 became what the Object 187 was supposed to be. The stop-gap design combining the best features of T-72B and T-80U. Interestingly enough the original name for the Object 187 was supposed to be T-90.

[Tavarisch]

Was the 187 considered an economy tank like the T-72? Or was it suppose to be a economic and technological compromise between the T-72B and T-80U?

And speaking of T-80s, isn't it more economic to build a T-90 nowadays? Tests conducted state that the T-90 out performs the T-80U, though I am entirely unsure of whether this is true. 1.3 million USD for something like this is a pretty good deal if you have the money, in comparison with the T-80Us 5 million plus.

[StevoJH]

Was the 187 considered an economy tank like the T-72? Or was it suppose to be a economic and technological compromise between the T-72B and T-80U?

And speaking of T-80s, isn't it more economic to build a T-90 nowadays? Tests conducted state that the T-90 out performs the T-80U, though I am entirely unsure of whether this is true. 1.3 million USD for something like this is a pretty good deal if you have the money, in comparison with the T-80Us 5 million plus.

The T80 is out of production, Russia is currently only producing the T90.

[Tavarisch]

The T80 is out of production, Russia is currently only producing the T90.

So T-80 plants are making T-90s?

[Feanor]

First off the T-90A is 2.2 million. Second off there is only one plant left operating. the UralVagonZavod or UVZ for short. OmskTransMash which produced the T-80U is out of business, and has been sold off. It's repair facilities were bought by our MoD, and the production facilities were bought by UVZ. The Kirov Factory in St. Peters doesn't produce tanks anymore and neither does the Chelyabinsk Traktorniy Zavod (or ChTZ for short).

[Tavarisch]

First off the T-90A is 2.2 million. Second off there is only one plant left operating. the UralVagonZavod or UVZ for short. OmskTransMash which produced the T-80U is out of business, and has been sold off. It's repair facilities were bought by our MoD, and the production facilities were bought by UVZ. The Kirov Factory in St. Peters doesn't produce tanks anymore and neither does the Chelyabinsk Traktorniy Zavod (or ChTZ for short).

A few sources say the T-90 (I think without the A suffix intentionally) is at a cost of 1.3 million USD. Maybe this is without the ERA and SHTORA? Or were those estimates? I think those might've been estimates. Correct me if I'm wrong.

What's the annual production of the T-90 anyway?

[Feanor]

I don't know what the total annual run is. I know what the annual domestic orders are.

~31 over 2004-5, 31 in 2006, 31 in 2007, 62 in 2008, and allegedly 93 in 2009 (with 93 to be produced in 2010 and 2011 each). When you realize that Indian tanks are still being delivered, along with the Algerian and Cypriot orders, I don't know what it comes out to.

EDIT: I do know there were public statements from UVZ stating that they are able to rapidly raise tank production should the government request it.

[Crunchy]

Do they plan to keep the T90 production line while preparing/build a second in the next few years for the new T-xx or will they stop producing the T90 as soon as orders are fullfilled and switch to the new one completely?

[Tavarisch]

Do they plan to keep the T90 production line while preparing/build a second in the next few years for the new T-xx or will they stop producing the T90 as soon as orders are fullfilled and switch to the new one completely?

Again, the T-90 is a stop-gap measure. It's going through low-level production. If Russia were to be as economically strong as it were under Soviet times, they'd have replace the entire T-72 fleet by less than 10 years, I think. Soviet tank production ran at about a few thousand a year (not entirely sure of the figure, but I do know it's within the thousands), but from various factories.

[FutureTank]

It occurs to me that Soviet designers emphasize somewhat on low-hulls. The principle here is that the tank's low profile should make it harder to hit. But looking back on the previous Gulf Wars, the gamble hasn't paid off. T-72s , T-62s and T-55s still got their turrets blown off jack-in-the-box style, but several other factors play a role here as well.
Soviet designers did not emphasise low hulls. There was a general desire for a compact design that allowed greater concealment and manoeuvrability.
Thats how all tanks explode when the internal ammo detonates...

But think about it, the entire purpose of a low hull is to give it a low-profile right?
No, the purpose is to lower the centre of gravity. Believe it or not, but tanks did roll over during the Second Word War. Also, the curvature of the armour allowed better protection, and this invited lower profile.

On a reverse slope position, the gun depression has to be low. Low profile of Soviet tanks means not being able to depress the gun very far down. This forces the tank to go either slightly forwards on the slope to be able to target enemies from hull-down which in this case negates the low-profile in the first place, or attempt a near-suicidal assault and charge over the slope while the enemy flings 120mm Sabots and TOW missile at you.
This is a myth started with the German tanks by the Allies in the West. There are plethora of reverse slope positions EVERYWHERE in Europe, and globally. Its called ambient terrain undulation. Any undulation below 5m is usually not evident on the topographic military maps, but a tank hull height is about 1.5m. The driver need only ease it up onto the undulation that is usually 1.5-3.5m in height to gain a hull-down position with no need to depress the main gun. To attain a reverse slope firing position as was illustrated in articles and books that supported this view, the tanker first needs to find a convenient height that is a good tactical position, offers a good LOS, and can be accessed over a less than 60 degree slope, because in the illustrations it usually looked like a nice 30-45 degrees slope that looks like a concrete ramp :).

Then they have to crawl up it and position themselves in such a way as to make a quick exit to a hide because firing a 105mm or 120mm weapon on top of a hill is VERY visible unless there is a wood or a hill behind the firing tank. THEN the firer has to cope with loosing LOS of the enemy as they manoeuvre on the reverse slope to the next position! Of course all this happens after they have survived the artillery putting down the obligatory harassing fire on top of the ridge "just in case" and have not lost their optics, or have not had their track blown off by a near miss (something US Army only discovered in 1988) in which case they will be busy trying to fix the track on a slope, which is always an interesting exercise that "builds character" as they say :)


Sure, they could prepare a position on a slope in minutes with the built in dozers for the T-72s (and it's cousins after the T-64). But it probably takes the enemy less time to charge their tanks over that slope while they get things sorted out.
Dig? Who uses tanks to dig? They are for scooping soil ahead of the tank to form a quick berm that will offer additional armour to the tank in an open terrain. A tank round will go through the fresh earth anyway, but the ATGW won't.

This question in turn leads to another one. The low-profile of Soviet tanks has lead to a severe space problem within the tank, which is why some of the ammo is inside the fighting compartment
The ammo is inside the compartment because that is where it has always been. Truth is that if a tank's fighting compartment is penetrated, the crew will not be in any state to make use of the safe ammunition, even if it is untouched. Given this lesson gained over 4 years of armoured warfare there was a widely held belief that the ease of being able to rapidly access the ammunition by all members of the crew is better than having it safe after they are forced to abandon the tank. If this tank is captured, it provides the enemy with a ready supply of ammunition!

Very dangerous, as we have seen in the past few years. (Chechenya, Iraq, Georgia) My suggestion would be to widen the hull to allow a larger auto-loader carousel OR dump the carousel idea completely and use a bustle mounted loader instead, as the Ukrainians have done with their shiny new Oplots. The last thing one wants to do is not have the extra ammo at all, the carousel only has 28 rounds, maybe good for short-term ops but what about those week long ones?
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result :)

Hopefully, any credible new design that isn't top-secret or based on rumors corrects this principle flaw. Maybe you would like to go to Tagil and show those engineers how to do it?

Surely enough there is credible evidence as to why this design is still overlooked?
Yes, because there is also a design flaw in the NATO tanks... they are on average 20t heavier! With that sort of weight, the distribution of it is such that you want to put as much of the weight as close to the engine as possible to increase its efficiency. By putting the bustle over the engine, the weight that has to be pushed ahead of the engine is reduced by that weight of the bustle, the ammunition and the surrounding armour, about 10t+. Its the old friction and gravity equation.
Of course to do this, the design requires a very large turret ring, so to portray this as an advantage, the NATO designers claim the NATO tanks are more ergonomic, forgetting that tanks are not made to ensure a comfy ride. You really do not want to be tossed around the turret as the driver tries to frantically take evasive action. In a T-34 tankers would just grab onto the gun, or push against the walls to keep themselves steady. This is why they have those padded helmets which replaced early leather motorcycle helmets seen on very early tank crews who did not realise this aspect of tank driving.
Weigh distribution in general is a problem not just for driving the tank, but also for its automotive components, like the transmission and the gearbox. What people often forget is that having the engine push a 60-70t vehicle up a slope to take up a hull-down firing position is very expensive in fuel, and quite stressful on the transmission. Unlike a family car, the tank's transmission has to be serviced every few hundred hours of operation.
The turret overhang makes assuming some hull down positions dangerous because of the possible need to place the tank in a poor gradient while traversing the slope with the gun pointing to the side because it can place 15% of the tanks' weight outside its hull, and this can cause it to topple on a slope.
.
The bottom line is that every engineering design team tries its best and takes their trade-offs. There are few tanks that are perfect, but if a country can make more of them, so much the better.

[Falstaff]

The ammo is inside the compartment because that is where it has always been. Truth is that if a tank's fighting compartment is penetrated, the crew will not be in any state to make use of the safe ammunition, even if it is untouched. Given this lesson gained over 4 years of armoured warfare there was a widely held belief that the ease of being able to rapidly access the ammunition by all members of the crew is better than having it safe after they are forced to abandon the tank. If this tank is captured, it provides the enemy with a ready supply of ammunition!

Without almost any knowledge regarding tanks, I'm just wondering:
Is that so? I was thinking that inside the crew compartment provisions are made to ensure that despite penetration in lets say not so important/vital areas of the tank the crew will be able to fight on, e.g. spall liners and the likes.
I'm thinking of the recent incident when a Fennek in Afghanistan got a door hit by an RPG and the jet crossed the vehicle, blew out the opposite door without much more damage than giving a big shock to the crew.


And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result :)


Isn't that what the blow out panels are for?


Yes, because there is also a design flaw in the NATO tanks... they are on average 20t heavier! With that sort of weight, the distribution of it is such that you want to put as much of the weight as close to the engine as possible to increase its efficiency. By putting the bustle over the engine, the weight that has to be pushed ahead of the engine is reduced by that weight of the bustle, the ammunition and the surrounding armour, about 10t+. Its the old friction and gravity equation.


What's the point of reducing the weight ahead of the engine? This part I don't understand? And what does that have to do with engine efficiency?

As I said, no knowledge, just wondering.

[Waylander]

If a tank is penetrated it doesn't automatically mean that the whole crew is incapable to fight on.
With one heavily and one lightly wounded crewmember a 4 men MBT is still able to fight, at least until replacement crews can take over.

And a turret with a seperated ammo compartment is not going to fly.
The energy is going to get blown out of the blowout panels.
And that has been shown to work with the Abrams.

[Feanor]

Do they plan to keep the T90 production line while preparing/build a second in the next few years for the new T-xx or will they stop producing the T90 as soon as orders are fullfilled and switch to the new one completely?

Given that they've been promising to show the new tank (presumably Object 195) publicly for years, and have yet to do it, and given that no dates have been given for a serial production run, I suspect that the new tank is a low priority right now. I don't even know if the Object 195 will see a serial production run, or if they will simply use it as the basis for the new MBT concept that they're trying to get a joint-development on with India.

[FutureTank]

Without almost any knowledge regarding tanks, I'm just wondering:
Is that so? I was thinking that inside the crew compartment provisions are made to ensure that despite penetration in lets say not so important/vital areas of the tank the crew will be able to fight on, e.g. spall liners and the likes.

I'm thinking of the recent incident when a Fennek in Afghanistan got a door hit by an RPG and the jet crossed the vehicle, blew out the opposite door without much more damage than giving a big shock to the crew.
It is almost impossible to predict the effects of all penetrations, and I was mostly considering a penetration by a tank round rather than an RPG. A dedicated AT missile warhead is also more predictable in how it behaves, but a tank gunner can these days put two rounds in the same spot within seconds.

"a big shock to the crew"? Have you ever had your life flash before your eyes? That's called combat shock. If that crew was able to continue, it would only be because of the extra adrenalin, but different people react in different ways to hits like that. After the adrenalin subsides there is a high probability of depression and mental trauma if not dealt with promptly. These can be just as incapacitating as the physical trauma.

In a current crop of tanks the state of armour is such that the penetrating warhead/round is unlikely to have the force to complete double (through) penetration, and they are designed to do maximum damage on penetration. Spall liners only do so much and are not predictable either due to the variety of ways the penetration can occur. But, of course they help.

Isn't that what the blow out panels are for?
That is the theory, but how that really works in every case is harder to predict. No one sat there exploding hundreds of tank rounds in tens of bustles on a real tank to get a greater statistical model. Its a design principle.
Here is what a blow out panel looks like when it worked http://i.pbase.com/g4/50/673650/2/61666698.S9nZ4BtA.jpg
Here is the top view of another set of panels that worked http://lh5.ggpht.com/_L1AQitLIbd4/RzpO1J2GgYI/AAAAAAAASbs/MvDwtOp0qWo/abrams_20_182.jpg
However on may lighter tanks the turret will fly simply because it lacks the mass to resist the forces created by the ammunition detonation. This is the issue in the design philosophy that seeks a more compact vehicle, or at least a turret. A bustle uses more armour, armour adds weight, weight needs a larger powerplant, larger powerplant needs more fuel, more fuel needs more volume, more volume needs more armour, more armour invites the enemy to design a larger gun, larger enemy gun requires more armour, etc., ad infinitum....potentially
Then there is the top attack like this case http://www.independence05.com/blog/uploaded_images/2006-08MerkavadestroyedinSouthofLebanon-785731.jpg

What's the point of reducing the weight ahead of the engine? This part I don't understand? And what does that have to do with engine efficiency?
Its physics. The engine produces force. It produces enough force to counter those of friction and gravity acting on the tank's mass. The more mass there is in front of the engine, the greater force it requires to propel the mass of the tank when it has to be pushed up an elevation to counter gravity. Consider the trains where the rails are used to eliminate the friction, but when that choo choo is going up-hill, it is struggling to pull the wagons behind itself because of gravity. Sometimes a second engine is attached at the rear to add the push force to the pull force.

In a tank the location of the engine is not purely historical because of the perception of head-on tactical engagements where the winning side wanted to at least salvage the engines if the tank was destroyed because they are expensive to produce. In fact, as can be seen with the Merkava, the engine can be at the front pulling the mass of the tank. The physical forces acting on the tank do not change. What changes is the design philosophy.
A part of that design is the engine maintainability as illustrated here File:AGT1500 engine and M1 tank.JPEG - Wikimedia Commons (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:AGT1500_engine_and_M1_tank.JPEG)
However, the further the mass, or any part of it, from the origin of the force, the greater the factor of friction acting on it because of the longer track required to support the mass in a tank. Because the friction is least at the point where the force is applied, the engine well, and because the turret can not be placed on top of the engine, it is placed as close to it as possible. The Soviet philosophy therefore is very conventional in attempting to keep the entire package as compact as possible, producing faster, more manoeuvrable and less logistically dependent designs.

This design philosophy is not based in engineering, but in doctrine. Soviet doctrine was developed over a decade from 1933 as an operational-strategic one in nature, while the Allied (future NATO) doctrine was developed over two years, and is primarily tactical in nature based on the German (Wehrmacht) thinking.

[Marc 1]

No, the purpose is to lower the centre of gravity. Believe it or not, but tanks did roll over during the Second Word War. Also, the curvature of the armour allowed better protection, and this invited lower profile.

No, very much a minor consideration. Form follows function - a lower height is desirable because it makes concealment/cover selection easier and make the tank a smaller target. They are not designed to be low so they do not roll over

This is a myth started with the German tanks by the Allies in the West. There are plethora of reverse slope positions EVERYWHERE in Europe, and globally.

No Tavarisch is right. When the older soviet designed vehicles came up to the top of a ridge to a hull down position their guns cannot depress as far as western designs which limits which hills can be used for this type of engagement. It is not a myth.

Then they have to crawl up it and position themselves in such a way as to make a quick exit to a hide because firing a 105mm or 120mm weapon on top of a hill is VERY visible unless there is a wood or a hill behind the firing tank. THEN the firer has to cope with loosing LOS of the enemy as they manoeuvre on the reverse slope to the next position! Of course all this happens after they have survived the artillery putting down the obligatory harassing fire on top of the ridge "just in case" and have not lost their optics, or have not had their track blown off by a near miss (something US Army only discovered in 1988) in which case they will be busy trying to fix the track on a slope, which is always an interesting exercise that "builds character" as they say :)

Tanks do not operate independently. When one fires and goes to move it does not matter that they have lost LOS, others in the sub unit will be observing and advising. The latest Link 22 type systems will allow unparalleled situational awareness - so this will be a non-issue. I find it hard to believe that the US army only found out in 1988 that tank running gear is vulnerable to artillery fire. It is well known that a 155mm artillery barage can have quite an effect on an armoured vehicles ability to fight - optics, aerials etc are all vulnerable, idlers, roadwheels etc would also be affected that could lead to a tracked vehicle throwing a track.


Dig? Who uses tanks to dig? They are for scooping soil ahead of the tank to form a quick berm that will offer additional armour to the tank in an open terrain. A tank round will go through the fresh earth anyway, but the ATGW won't.

Firstly, semantics. You know what he meant. Secondly, where do you think the berm comes from? From earth scooped out behind the berm. If done correctly in the right soil conditions the tank can effectively have a low berm and be virtually hull down below ground level. Good cover. Sure a tank round will probably go thro6 feet of earth but it will be going a fair bit slower and may even have been deflected.


The ammo is inside the compartment because that is where it has always been.

The latest western tank designs have made advances in crew survivability from surrounding stowed ammunition with water jackets to the use of blow off panels and armoured doors inside the turret bussle to increase crew survivability.


And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result :)

Rubbish, see above.

Yes, because there is also a design flaw in the NATO tanks... they are on average 20t heavier! With that sort of weight, the distribution of it is such that you want to put as much of the weight as close to the engine as possible to increase its efficiency. By putting the bustle over the engine, the weight that has to be pushed ahead of the engine is reduced by that weight of the bustle, the ammunition and the surrounding armour, about 10t+. Its the old friction and gravity equation.

Again, rubbish. Lets go back to basics shall we? The design of an armoured vehicle is a series of trade-offs and compromises. Nearly all western MBT's designed in the last 40 years have been designed around this set of compromises (in no particular order):

1. Needs to be large enough to be habitable for the crew for days at a time shut down in an NBC environment (habitability is a significant issue for soviet designs).

2. Should be well protected - armour means weight.

3. Should be well armed - a 120mm gun requires a large turret to accomodate it and crew (again see habitability) this has lead to a large diameter turret ring.

4. Should have decent mobility (powerful engine/gearbox combination)

5. Must not be too heavy or large in size or transporting the vehicle becomes problematic. It used to be the width of the vehicle was determined y the size of rail tunnels - these days it would possibly be the internal dimensions of an airlifter. Weight will limit strategic and tactical mobility.

How these differing aims were achieved depended on the priorities placed on each design team. The poms decided that armour was the most important consideration when the Chieftan was designed, the French placed emphasis on mobility AMX 30 and the Leopard 1 was possibly the best compromise among this generation of tanks. The next generation the design seemed to settle at a common standard of around 60 to 70 tonnes, 120mm gun, 1000 -1500hp engines. Common requirements tend to produce common designs. The tanks are 20 tonnes too heavy compared to what? Soviet designs?


Of course to do this, the design requires a very large turret ring, so to portray this as an advantage, the NATO designers claim the NATO tanks are more ergonomic, forgetting that tanks are not made to ensure a comfy ride. You really do not want to be tossed around the turret as the driver tries to frantically take evasive action. In a T-34 tankers would just grab onto the gun, or push against the walls to keep themselves steady.

Try that in a modern tank and the stabilisation system will ensure that anyone hanging onto the main armament will be pulped as the gun elevates and depresses. Having riden in a Leopard cross country with stab engaged I was damn glad that there was a big metal guard to keep me from being thrown against the breach as it moved up and down. Its not about 'comfort' as you keep saying - its about trying to minimise crew fatigue levels - warfare is a 24hour business, and particularly during the type of blitzkreig assaults experienced by the armoured forces under Gudarian in 1940 and GW I and GWII, this is a major consideration. In some cases the only times the tankers got to dismount was to reload and refuel for days at a time.

Also its not about steadying yourself whilst the tank scoots to another firing position, crew are not there to hang on for dear life, they will be using their optics, searching for threats/targets, firing the gun whilst on the move and loading the gun. Manhandling a 120mm round in the confines of a turret is difficult enough when stationary - space is not a 'luxury' with current crew numbers and techniques. Sure it is possible to eliminate the loader, but then you have the additional workload of other tasks placed onto the other 3 crew (an argument all by itself).


Weigh distribution in general is a problem not just for driving the tank, but also for its automotive components, like the transmission and the gearbox. What people often forget is that having the engine push a 60-70t vehicle up a slope to take up a hull-down firing position is very expensive in fuel, and quite stressful on the transmission. Unlike a family car, the tank's transmission has to be serviced every few hundred hours of operation.

Your facts to support this? Tank transmissions and drivetrains are perfectly well designed for their task. They are designed to accellerate a 70tonne vehicle up slopes etc. Is this your 20 tonnes overweight hobby horse we are seeing here? The vehicle transmission is designed for its task whether it is a 50kg motoor scooter or a 70 tonne MBT. Fuel, yes it uses quite a bit of fuel to push 70 tonnes up a hill, but I don't think that is a tactical consideration, rather a supply and sustainment issue. Also what is this rubbish about where the weight is located adding to or subtracting from efficiency? Where the weight is has absolutely no bearing in a tracked design beyond the engineering challenge the suspension designers face.

The turret overhang makes assuming some hull down positions dangerous because of the possible need to place the tank in a poor gradient while traversing the slope with the gun pointing to the side because it can place 15% of the tanks' weight outside its hull, and this can cause it to topple on a slope.

Sounds like rubbish to me. If anything a bussle on a turret will help counterbalance the weight of the gun. There are certain limits anyway to using a cross slope as a hull down position - namely the gun depression limits. Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle, so cross slope positioning and the risk of the vehicle rolling over is not an issue. Most tracked vehicles by virtue of their design has a much lower centre of gravity than wheeled vehicles - This seems also to be a hobby horse of yours - I haven't seen the internet littered with pictures of MBT's on their lids.
.
The bottom line is that every engineering design team tries its best and takes their trade-offs. There are few tanks that are perfect, but if a country can make more of them, so much the better.
Right...quantity beats quality :rolleyes: I do not want to be a digger in any army you are responsible to equip.

[FutureTank]

No, very much a minor consideration. Form follows function - a lower height is desirable because it makes concealment/cover selection easier and make the tank a smaller target. They are not designed to be low so they do not roll over
in the case of tanks, form follows doctrine, not function. The T-54 turret came from the JS-3 design concept.
I know it may be hard to believe, but while tanks in combat spend only a fraction of their time in concealment, they spend far more of their time manoeuvring, and they can come to grief more often than one would think when manoeuvring.

No Tavarisch is right. When the older soviet designed vehicles came up to the top of a ridge to a hull down position their guns cannot depress as far as western designs which limits which hills can be used for this type of engagement. It is not a myth.
The Soviet tanks were never designed to "came up to the top of a ridge to a hull down position"! Do you know where the "Western" tactic came from?

Tanks do not operate independently. When one fires and goes to move it does not matter that they have lost LOS, others in the sub unit will be observing and advising. The latest Link 22 type systems will allow unparalleled situational awareness - so this will be a non-issue. I find it hard to believe that the US army only found out in 1988 that tank running gear is vulnerable to artillery fire. It is well known that a 155mm artillery barage can have quite an effect on an armoured vehicles ability to fight - optics, aerials etc are all vulnerable, idlers, roadwheels etc would also be affected that could lead to a tracked vehicle throwing a track.
Please! I know tanks do not operate independently, and so do all tankers! If one tank fires, the assumption those being fired on can make is there is that there are other tanks close to the position from which the fire came from. I do not want to get into semantics, but the crew of a NATO tank in the 60s, 70s and 80s would have been largely focusing on their own fight after loosing LOS. Sure they listen to net, but own visual is an important awareness factor in combat.
Nope, the US Army had to redo its data on artillery effectiveness after someone pointed out the difference between its modelling and that of the Soviet one which reckoned artillery was twice as effective. Turned out the Soviet model was correct.

Firstly, semantics. You know what he meant. Secondly, where do you think the berm comes from? From earth scooped out behind the berm. If done correctly in the right soil conditions the tank can effectively have a low berm and be virtually hull down below ground level. Good cover. Sure a tank round will probably go thro6 feet of earth but it will be going a fair bit slower and may even have been deflected.
I'd know what he meant if he said what he meant.
"If done correctly in the right soil conditions"?
Those attachments on Soviet tanks are not so much for digging. They can create a hasty position that will protect against AT missiles. A 120mm round will go through more than 6feet of piled soil IMHO but I don't have firm figures.

The latest western tank designs have made advances in crew survivability from surrounding stowed ammunition with water jackets to the use of blow off panels and armoured doors inside the turret bussle to increase crew survivability.
Yes, but all that costs in added weight.

I think I have seen one penetration in the bustle from a sabot on an M1 and the turret did not fly off, but that proves very little since there was no ammunition detonation or even cook-off. Maybe that area in the bustle was empty.

Again, rubbish. Lets go back to basics shall we? The design of an armoured vehicle is a series of trade-offs and compromises. Nearly all western MBT's designed in the last 40 years have been designed around this set of compromises (in no particular order):

1. Needs to be large enough to be habitable for the crew for days at a time shut down in an NBC environment (habitability is a significant issue for soviet designs).

2. Should be well protected - armour means weight.

3. Should be well armed - a 120mm gun requires a large turret to accomodate it and crew (again see habitability) this has lead to a large diameter turret ring.

4. Should have decent mobility (powerful engine/gearbox combination)

5. Must not be too heavy or large in size or transporting the vehicle becomes problematic. It used to be the width of the vehicle was determined y the size of rail tunnels - these days it would possibly be the internal dimensions of an airlifter. Weight will limit strategic and tactical mobility.

How these differing aims were achieved depended on the priorities placed on each design team. The poms decided that armour was the most important consideration when the Chieftan was designed, the French placed emphasis on mobility AMX 30 and the Leopard 1 was possibly the best compromise among this generation of tanks. The next generation the design seemed to settle at a common standard of around 60 to 70 tonnes, 120mm gun, 1000 -1500hp engines. Common requirements tend to produce common designs. The tanks are 20 tonnes too heavy compared to what? Soviet designs?

When designing tanks, one starts with simple things like physics, stress and strain, tensions, etc.
"Poms decided that armour was the most important consideration when"....they designed the Centurion. In fact they wanted the heavy tank so much, they designed the trailers to go with them because the largest BA trailer at the time was 40t. The Chieftain was designed based on the British Armoured Corps experience with the Tigers. However, this was based on a flawed understanding of the Soviet doctrine that they Shared with the Americans, and the Germans. The weight of Soviet tanks had nothing to do with it. The AMX 30 and the Leopard I were both designed with specific doctrines in mind, and not weight considerations. They were both replacing the Panther.
The question was raised in therm of Soviet tanks have a flaw, and that flaw is essentially the 20t difference in weight it takes to design a NATO heavy tank due to the very systems you described. I simply addressed this premise.

Try that in a modern tank and the stabilisation system will ensure that anyone hanging onto the main armament will be pulped as the gun elevates and depresses. Having riden in a Leopard cross country with stab engaged I was damn glad that there was a big metal guard to keep me from being thrown against the breach as it moved up and down. Its not about 'comfort' as you keep saying - its about trying to minimise crew fatigue levels - warfare is a 24hour business, and particularly during the type of blitzkreig assaults experienced by the armoured forces under Gudarian in 1940 and GW I and GWII, this is a major consideration. In some cases the only times the tankers got to dismount was to reload and refuel for days at a time.
However, we are not discussing modern tanks.

Also its not about steadying yourself whilst the tank scoots to another firing position, crew are not there to hang on for dear life, they will be using their optics, searching for threats/targets, firing the gun whilst on the move and loading the gun. Manhandling a 120mm round in the confines of a turret is difficult enough when stationary - space is not a 'luxury' with current crew numbers and techniques. Sure it is possible to eliminate the loader, but then you have the additional workload of other tasks placed onto the other 3 crew (an argument all by itself).
There used to be a five man crew in a 120mm armed US Tank.

Your facts to support this? Tank transmissions and drivetrains are perfectly well designed for their task. They are designed to accellerate a 70tonne vehicle up slopes etc. Is this your 20 tonnes overweight hobby horse we are seeing here? The vehicle transmission is designed for its task whether it is a 50kg motoor scooter or a 70 tonne MBT. Fuel, yes it uses quite a bit of fuel to push 70 tonnes up a hill, but I don't think that is a tactical consideration, rather a supply and sustainment issue. Also what is this rubbish about where the weight is located adding to or subtracting from efficiency? Where the weight is has absolutely no bearing in a tracked design beyond the engineering challenge the suspension designers face.
There is quite a bit of difference in designing automotive parts in a 60t tank to a motor scooter.

Sounds like rubbish to me. If anything a bussle on a turret will help counterbalance the weight of the gun. There are certain limits anyway to using a cross slope as a hull down position - namely the gun depression limits. Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle, so cross slope positioning and the risk of the vehicle rolling over is not an issue. Most tracked vehicles by virtue of their design has a much lower centre of gravity than wheeled vehicles - This seems also to be a hobby horse of yours - I haven't seen the internet littered with pictures of MBT's on their lids.
Yes, it all sounds like rubbish, but the bustle has no counterbalancing role in the design. It will prove dangerous however in certain firing positions in some designs.
"Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle" - and why would the tank commander do that?
There area few pictures of MBTs on their lids, but there have not been all that many MBTs in tank-vs-tank combat, and when they are there is little time to take pictures.
I don't have hobby horses.

Right...quantity beats quality :rolleyes: I do not want to be a digger in any army you are responsible to equip.
Well, its about time you leaned that la fortune est toujours, comme disait le pauvre M. de Turenne, pour les gros bataillons, fortune is always, as poor Mr. de Turenne used to say, for the big battalions. Cf. [1673 Mme de Sévigné Letter 22 Dec.]
Ultimately the numerically inferior but more sophisticated force will find itself in attrition warfare where the sophistication gap had been reduced. That's why there was an Armistice in Korea, and NATO never attacked the Warsaw Pact. I can go on with examples...

[Falstaff]

Its physics. The engine produces force. It produces enough force to counter those of friction and gravity acting on the tank's mass. The more mass there is in front of the engine, the greater force it requires to propel the mass of the tank when it has to be pushed up an elevation to counter gravity. Consider the trains where the rails are used to eliminate the friction, but when that choo choo is going up-hill, it is struggling to pull the wagons behind itself because of gravity. Sometimes a second engine is attached at the rear to add the push force to the pull force.

(...)

However, the further the mass, or any part of it, from the origin of the force, the greater the factor of friction acting on it because of the longer track required to support the mass in a tank. Because the friction is least at the point where the force is applied, the engine well, and because the turret can not be placed on top of the engine, it is placed as close to it as possible. The Soviet philosophy therefore is very conventional in attempting to keep the entire package as compact as possible, producing faster, more manoeuvrable and less logistically dependent designs.


Excuse me, but physically this is highly incorrect. An engine produces torque, not force. This torque is then transmitted through the drive train to the drive sprocket, where we have a transformation from torque to force via lever. This is where the force is applied. It is then transmitted further through the tracks, which we can think of as a belt transmission, to the ground where it interacts to propel the vehicle.
The efficiency of the engine is an inherent characteristic of its design, the efficiency of the drive train (to the drive sprocket) however is largely dependant on how "long" (figuratively) the drive train is. Yes, there is friction, among other things like torsion and slip. That's why the drive sprocket is in the rear, when the engine is in the rear, or in the front, when the engine is in the front.
This has nothing to do with the distribution of weight. You can place the engine wherever you want, it doesn't matter for its efficiency. It matters for the efficiency of the drive train though, but again, not because of weight distribution.
Considering the tracks I'm pretty much sure that an even weight distribution is the ideal situation for maximum efficiency.

The train example you chose is a bad one, for several reasons, as first of all in the configuration you mentioned the reason a push configuration can climb steeper hills than a pull configuration has to do with the shift of the center of gravity towards the engine and the fact that a railroad engine has wheels. I won't explain that now, for my (and the other readers') convenience.

Besides that I was under the impression that the bustle is located where it is just because it is best protected there in head-to-head engagements. Would be rather silly to place it in front of the turret, eh ;)

[Marc 1]

in the case of tanks, form follows doctrine, not function. The T-54 turret came from the JS-3 design concept.
I know it may be hard to believe, but while tanks in combat spend only a fraction of their time in concealment, they spend far more of their time manoeuvring, and they can come to grief more often than one would think when manoeuvring.

Semantics again. And doctrine determines function which influences form. Why is it in any way relevant to the conversation that the T54's turret came from the JS 3 concept? Sprinking book facts through your text does little to aid your credibility. Back on topic, tanks do in fact spend great gobs of their time stationary which is why the fuel consumption of the M1's gas turbine was such an issue. Whilst I have never been to a two way rifle range I have exercised often with 1 Armd - and apart from a Leopard stuck fast in a really soft piece of ground ,have yet to see one 'come to grief' let alone roll over (which was you earlier assertation that you seem to be backing away from).

The Soviet tanks were never designed to "came up to the top of a ridge to a hull down position"! Do you know where the "Western" tactic came from?

No, they weren't designed that way because the soviet doctrine emphasized offensive manouvre warfare. But as we all know warfare doesn't always go according to plan and the advantages in designing an MBT with good mobility and a low silhouette turn into disadvantages when the MBT is used in say the defence. The western designs are more adaptable to other types of warfare.

I don't know where the Western tactic came from or what it is, but I have been trained to employ tanks in offensive and defensive operations.

Please! I know tanks do not operate independently, and so do all tankers! If one tank fires, the assumption those being fired on can make is there is that there are other tanks close to the position from which the fire came from. I do not want to get into semantics, but the crew of a NATO tank in the 60s, 70s and 80s would have been largely focusing on their own fight after loosing LOS. Sure they listen to net, but own visual is an important awareness factor in combat.
Nope, the US Army had to redo its data on artillery effectiveness after someone pointed out the difference between its modelling and that of the Soviet one which reckoned artillery was twice as effective. Turned out the Soviet model was correct.

Oh right so it wasn't: "(something US Army only discovered in 1988)" The US army knew about the possibility of a mobility kill with artillery before 1988 except that they had underestimated it effectiveness. So what? Artillery was still going to be used against armoured formations if for no other reason that it keeps the crews buttoned down and buggers up their situational awareness. Employing 155's against armour was something I was taught in 1987. To paraphrase you, I'd have known what you meant if you had said what you really meant.


I'd know what he meant if he said what he meant.

Just a guess, english is his second language - and he does pretty damn well if you ask me. I worked out what he meant, you wanted to nit pick.

"If done correctly in the right soil conditions"?

Yeah - kinda hard to dig yourself through say a granite shelf.

Those attachments on Soviet tanks are not so much for digging. They can create a hasty position that will protect against AT missiles. A 120mm round will go through more than 6feet of piled soil IMHO but I don't have firm figures.

So being hull down is no advantage?


Yes, but all that costs in added weight.

So you don't think the added weight of crew survivability features such as water jackets around ammunition stowage, and armoured door/blowoff panels is a good idea... Strange that you have so little regard for crew - highly trained crew are irreplacable which is why nations that value the experience and lives of their crew have designed tanks like the Merkava.

I think I have seen one penetration in the bustle from a sabot on an M1 and the turret did not fly off, but that proves very little since there was no ammunition detonation or even cook-off. Maybe that area in the bustle was empty.

Seems to fly in the face of what you said before about any hit to the bussle resulting in a flying turret.

When designing tanks, one starts with simple things like physics, stress and strain, tensions, etc.

Seriously? You don't think they had to examine the basic ideas -the big three - firepower,protection and mobility first? When you reach decisions on the first three then it becomes an engineering issue of stresses, grades of steel and construction methodologies. This continual insistence of rebuttal for the sake of substituting words really only annoys people Future Tank. My original point was that tanks have evolved the way they have due to the tradeoffs that were made for each design. The soviets compromise in their designs meant their MBTs were comparitively light, fairly well protected, well armed and with a excellent mobility, but the cramped/poorly insulated working conditions for the crew mean that fatigue is a definate issue as is the problem of main gun depression. The Indian Army has found that the internal temps are playing havoc with electronic equipment, and that retrofitting anything inside the turret is difficult due to the lack of space.

"Poms decided that armour was the most important consideration when"....they designed the Centurion. In fact they wanted the heavy tank so much, they designed the trailers to go with them because the largest BA trailer at the time was 40t. The Chieftain was designed based on the British Armoured Corps experience with the Tigers. However, this was based on a flawed understanding of the Soviet doctrine that they Shared with the Americans, and the Germans.

The poms have had a history of heavy 'infantry tanks stretching back to the Matilda, Churchill, Centurion. They did not need to copy the experiemce with the Tigers. What flawed understanding of soviet doctrine? The western cold war tanks were basically designed to counter a massed invasion of soviet tanks, thus mobility, especially for the pommy designs was accorded a lower priority than protection and firepower (the 120mm was then the largest fitted to a NATO tank).

The weight of Soviet tanks had nothing to do with it.

The AMX 30 and the Leopard I were both designed with specific doctrines in mind, and not weight considerations. They were both replacing the Panther.
The question was raised in therm of Soviet tanks have a flaw, and that flaw is essentially the 20t difference in weight it takes to design a NATO heavy tank due to the very systems you described. I simply addressed this premise.

You are waffling here. Why is it a flaw to have a tank that weighs 20t more than the soviets? We have just gone over why the tanks have turned out the way they have. It's like saying that a Toyota Landcruiser is a flawed design because it weighs 1 tonne more than a Suzuki Jimny. The vehicles are different sizes - of course there will be different weights.

However, we are not discussing modern tanks.

Really? From the first post in this thread, first, second and third lines:

"It occurs to me that Soviet designers emphasize somewhat on low-hulls. The principle here is that the tank's low profile should make it harder to hit. But looking back on the previous Gulf Wars, the gamble hasn't paid off. T-72s , T-62s..."

I didn't know that T72's were WWII designs... Must have just scraped into the Battle of Berlin.


There used to be a five man crew in a 120mm armed US Tank.

And a crew of 18 in a German A7V. But that is irrelevant to this discussion.


There is quite a bit of difference in designing automotive parts in a 60t tank to a motor scooter.

But the principles are the same. You missed the point entirely. The engineer looks at the parameters and produces a transmission to meet the requirements. The soviet designers would have designed and selected their transmission with the weight class of vehicle in mind, the same as the western designers. The point was the transmission is designed to do the job regardless of it being designed for a motor scooter or MBT. Inferring that one will be stressed to a higher level to support your assertation that western tanks are overweight is wrong.


Yes, it all sounds like rubbish, but the bustle has no counterbalancing role in the design. It will prove dangerous however in certain firing positions in some designs.

So, let me get this straight, gun out the front, but adding weight overhanging the turret at the back is going to have no counterbalancing effect? What drugs are you on? The only hazard that a bustle or any overhang for that matter brings is to act as a shot trap - ie deflecting the incoming round in toward the turret ring. What threat were you referring to?

"Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle" - and why would the tank commander do that?

Are you serious or do you just like typing for the sake of it? Gee, thickest armour toward the most likely threat - why would a tank commander do that? Obviously you have not seen the way armour moves in bounds - they will nose up to a hull down firing position, then when given the word to move, will reverse into the dead ground (never straight over the top), then move forward at a different (usually lower)point of the ridge. The same technique for retreating in bounds.

There area few pictures of MBTs on their lids, but there have not been all that many MBTs in tank-vs-tank combat, and when they are there is little time to take pictures.

So if there isn't time to take pictures there must be heaps of after action reports about tanks that have just rolled wouldn't there? Tanks are used for training too - often times quite realistic training - yet I still don't see great numbers of tracked vehicles that have rolled onto their sides. About the only photos you will find in any numbers are shots of M113's that have gone end over end due to the driver grabbing the pivots too damn hard or at too high a speed. Again that is a specific well known issue relating to how that vehicle is operated and has little to do with the relative height of the Centre Of Gravity

I don't have hobby horses.

You could be right here - just the inability to admit when you are wrong, which, because you are still arguing the same dead point, just makes it look like you have certain agendas.


Well, its about time you leaned that Cf. [1673 Mme de Sévigné Letter 22 Dec.]
Ultimately the numerically inferior but more sophisticated force will find itself in attrition warfare where the sophistication gap had been reduced. That's why there was an Armistice in Korea, and NATO never attacked the Warsaw Pact. I can go on with examples...

Did you forget that the septics were at a massive numerical inferiority in the Gulf War? They seemed to win pretty decisively there. Past 'losses' such as Vietnam were not lost because the yanks had superior technology rather than superior numbers that battle was lost because the politicians bottled out.

[FutureTank]

Excuse me, but physically this is highly incorrect. An engine produces torque, not force. This torque is then transmitted through the drive train to the drive sprocket, where we have a transformation from torque to force via lever. This is where the force is applied. It is then transmitted further through the tracks, which we can think of as a belt transmission, to the ground where it interacts to propel the vehicle.
The efficiency of the engine is an inherent characteristic of its design, the efficiency of the drive train (to the drive sprocket) however is largely dependant on how "long" (figuratively) the drive train is. Yes, there is friction, among other things like torsion and slip. That's why the drive sprocket is in the rear, when the engine is in the rear, or in the front, when the engine is in the front.
This has nothing to do with the distribution of weight. You can place the engine wherever you want, it doesn't matter for its efficiency. It matters for the efficiency of the drive train though, but again, not because of weight distribution.
Considering the tracks I'm pretty much sure that an even weight distribution is the ideal situation for maximum efficiency.

The train example you chose is a bad one, for several reasons, as first of all in the configuration you mentioned the reason a pull configuration can climb steeper hills than a pull configuration has to do with the shift of the center of gravity towards the engine and the fact that a railroad engine has wheels. I won't explain that now, for my (and the other readers') convenience.

Besides that I was under the impression that the bustle is located where it is just because it is best protected there in head-to-head engagements. Would be rather silly to place it in front of the turret, eh ;)

I didn't go into the greater engineering detail as I didn't think it was necessary, and I agree that he train was not a good example. However, it seems to me that locating the engine as close to the centre of gravity of the vehicle as possible significantly aids design efficiency. I even remember an article on it somewhere a few years ago (though not specific to tanks).

[Falstaff]

I didn't go into the greater engineering detail as I didn't think it was necessary, and I agree that he train was not a good example. However, it seems to me that locating the engine as close to the centre of gravity of the vehicle as possible significantly aids design efficiency. I even remember an article on it somewhere a few years ago (though not specific to tanks).

The sense of placing as much mass as possible towards the center of gravity wrt motorized vehicles is that this reduces the moment of inertia when turning. See e.g. sports cars with a mid-engine. And in cars it certainly helps to gain an even weight distribution, if you shift the heavy compact mass of the engine towards the middle.
So in tanks the sense perhaps lies in improved mobility, but certainly not in propulsion efficency. I don't know however if the placement of a tank engine (as the rest of the tank is pretty heavy compared to the engine, other than in cars) makes that much of a difference there.

[FutureTank]

The sense of placing as much mass as possible towards the center of gravity wrt motorized vehicles is that this reduces the moment of inertia when turning. See e.g. sports cars with a mid-engine. And in cars it certainly helps to gain an even weight distribution, if you shift the heavy compact mass of the engine towards the middle.
So in tanks the sense perhaps lies in improved mobility, but certainly not in propulsion efficency. I don't know however if the placement of a tank engine (as the rest of the tank is pretty heavy compared to the engine, other than in cars) makes that much of a difference there.

You are right, but it did make a difference once in tank design history. Remember the BTs based on Christy's ideas? The fast tank never really left the heads of Soviet designers even in the 80s, and the T-90 is a testament to this in a way though it is not a new design.
This has been largely lost from Western AFV design thinking, except maybe in the light tracked types.
However, this "need for speed" was still a dominant factor in Soviet tank design through the 80s based on the tempo they set to the offensives. Also, not sure how widely you read, but in many Soviet armour tactical publications they emphasise tactical manoeuvre, as in by individual tanks taking as much advantage from topography, to reinforce the idea of driving in a highly aggressive manner. Every Soviet tank memoir emphasises this manner of driving. Naturally what suffers most is the torsion bar.
I will try to find that article on the vehicle's centre of gravity relationship to overall design.

[Marc 1]

You are right, but it did make a difference once in tank design history. Remember the BTs based on Christy's ideas? The fast tank never really left the heads of Soviet designers even in the 80s, and the T-90 is a testament to this in a way though it is not a new design.
This has been largely lost from Western AFV design thinking, except maybe in the light tracked types.
However, this "need for speed" was still a dominant factor in Soviet tank design through the 80s based on the tempo they set to the offensives. Also, not sure how widely you read, but in many Soviet armour tactical publications they emphasise tactical manoeuvre, as in by individual tanks taking as much advantage from topography, to reinforce the idea of driving in a highly aggressive manner. Every Soviet tank memoir emphasises this manner of driving. Naturally what suffers most is the torsion bar.
I will try to find that article on the vehicle's centre of gravity relationship to overall design.

The Christie tank and BT series had their engine in the rear, turret in the centre and driver at the front - much lke current designs. How does this wash with your assertation that the mass needs to be centralised? One of the fastest tracked vehicles in recent service would be the brits Scimitar/Scorpion varients. Official top speed 80kph, unofficially, quite a bit more - they are front engined.

[Abraham Gubler]

The Christie tank and BT series had their engine in the rear, turret in the centre and driver at the front - much lke current designs. How does this wash with your assertation that the mass needs to be centralised? One of the fastest tracked vehicles in recent service would be the brits Scimitar/Scorpion varients. Official top speed 80kph, unofficially, quite a bit more - they are front engined.

Welcome to the world of FutureTank... he's ideas are to military science as Scientology is to psychology.

Compartmentalised ammunition in a turret bustle, forward mounted engines, etc does not mean the tank's centre of gravity is somehow upset if it is designed in from start. The Abrams was designed to have the weight of its ammunition in the turret bustle. The Merkava was designed to have the engine in the front. Both Abrams and Merkava are neither front or rear loaded but have perfectly normal centres of gravity (ie in the centre).

Also the density of tank gun ammunition is actually quite low compared to armour, suspension, engines, etc. in a tank. Chemical propellant inherently has an oxidizer leading to quite low density. Only someone completely ignorant of basic engineering principles would assert that these design features inherently lead to a tank being 'unbalanced' and somehow unable to drive fast.

The idea that tactical and operational speed has been lost from 'western' tank design a crazy assertion. The FCS vehicles are designed to be the fastest tank in a tactical, operational and strategic sense ever seen on any battlefield. Abrams, Leopard 2, etc all designed for high speed. Even the much mobility maligned Merkava 1/2/3 were designed for high sustained speed cross country (more a function of suspension travel than power to weight) as Israel's operational theatres lacked road infrastructure (Golan, Sinai).

[FutureTank]

Semantics again. And doctrine determines function which influences form. Why is it in any way relevant to the conversation that the T54's turret came from the JS 3 concept? Sprinking book facts through your text does little to aid your credibility. Back on topic, tanks do in fact spend great gobs of their time stationary which is why the fuel consumption of the M1's gas turbine was such an issue. Whilst I have never been to a two way rifle range I have exercised often with 1 Armd - and apart from a Leopard stuck fast in a really soft piece of ground ,have yet to see one 'come to grief' let alone roll over (which was you earlier assertion that you seem to be backing away from).

The suggestion is that the Soviet designs do not care about crew survival. However, the design of T-34 clearly was superior in ensuring crew survival because it prevented penetration of armour in a better way.
The design of the JS-3 turret further enhanced this crew protection with the then available technology and design philosophies.
Maybe M1s spent a great deal of time stationary in combat, but not Soviet tanks, by and large. Keep looking and you will find such photos from many different armed forces posted online. Just today I was reading that in the very first batch of M26s deployed to Europe, one collapsed a bridge and tumbled into the river below. I have seen pictures of USMC M1 on its top, and a similar one for a Merkava. Stuff like that happens, though maybe not often now days, and not in Australia. In combat it happened far more often

No, they weren't designed that way because the soviet doctrine emphasised offensive manoeuvre warfare.
Care to share why you think the Soviet tanks follow that 'flawed' design philosophy?

But as we all know warfare doesn't always go according to plan and the advantages in designing an MBT with good mobility and a low silhouette turn into disadvantages when the MBT is used in say the defence.
Oh really? You don't suppose German tank destroyers were any good in defence during the Second World War?

The western designs are more adaptable to other types of warfare.
I don't want to be again accused of semantics, so did you really mean 'warfare', or tactical and operational postures?

I don't know where the Western tactic came from or what it is, but I have been trained to employ tanks in offensive and defensive operations.
Yes, but you never served in Europe, did you?

Oh right so it wasn't: "(something US Army only discovered in 1988)" The US army knew about the possibility of a mobility kill with artillery before 1988 except that they had underestimated it effectiveness. So what? Artillery was still going to be used against armoured formations if for no other reason that it keeps the crews buttoned down and buggers up their situational awareness. Employing 155's against armour was something I was taught in 1987. To paraphrase you, I'd have known what you meant if you had said what you really meant.
No, the US Army grossly underestimated the effectiveness of their own and Soviet Artillery for 40 years after the Second World War. This means that they battery would be firing twice as much ground burst HE rather than air burst to keep the tank commanders' heads down. Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. However, here again we have the supposed flaw in Soviet tank design, although it is the larger NATO tanks that would, statistically speaking, be more exposed to damage and therefore enforced crew dismounting due to being larger.
I hasten to remind you that the M1, Challenger and Leopard II all appeared after 1984 in any significant numbers in Europe. Their predecessors were not particularly superior in terms of crew survival to the Soviet models. They all took two decades do get from concept to field in which time Soviets deployed not only two generations of tanks, but two competitive models in one generation, introducing autoloaders and functional gun-launched AT missiles.

Just a guess, english is his second language - and he does pretty damn well if you ask me. I worked out what he meant, you wanted to nit pick.
Ok, I didn't realise that, so my appologies.

Yeah - kinda hard to dig yourself through say a granite shelf.
"If done correctly in the right soil conditions"? - no, seriously, you expect someone to jump out and start doing soil testing?

So being hull down is no advantage?
Its not a "hull down" position, but a temporary anti-missile scrape. Believe it or not, the Soviet tankers also train to assume hull down positions. Its not like the European terrain is completely devoid of spots where a Soviet tank does not need to expose itself too much to fire. Nor is the terrain prevalent to allow ubiquitous hull down positions for NATO tanks. All crews are trained to look for most suitable positions.

So you don't think the added weight of crew survivability features such as water jackets around ammunition stowage, and armoured door/blowoff panels is a good idea... Strange that you have so little regard for crew - highly trained crew are irreplacable which is why nations that value the experience and lives of their crew have designed tanks like the Merkava.
I didn't say I think these crew survival measures are a bad idea. What I say is that their lack in Soviet tanks is not a design flaw. Even in the Merkava the crew survival philosophy was only brought home by the 1973 war, and was not implemented until 1979 I think, three years after T-80 entered production.

Seems to fly in the face of what you said before about any hit to the bussle resulting in a flying turret.
Maybe that was an overly spurious comment to make given lack of statistical evidence. However, based on bustle detonation, even with the blow out panels I think the turret fighting compartment would not be unaffected, which is what most people seem to assume.
That is however the least of the crew's problem. In the case of the M1 SEP, the surviving crew will be left in the midst of combat with, perhaps, six rounds in the hull. I suppose you know how long those last...

Seriously? You don't think they had to examine the basic ideas -the big three - firepower,protection and mobility first?
Nope. Firepower and protection are both matters of physics. Mobility was determined by the norms guided by doctrine in the Soviet Army that was the design bureaus' sole client. Organisational velocity if you will. What was considered though which was not a matter of science, was the industrial production capacity for a new design. That is where the T-64 came a cropper. The other 'big one' is of course the crews you keep talking about. The Soviet Army found that they just could not allocate enough conscripts to crew the more complex designs in the offing in the 60s, so they reduced the crew and increased the support personnel numbers. I can't remember who, but someone worked out that if the essential field support personnel are added to the tank's crew, then a Soviet 3-crew tank has a crew of 5, while the then new NATO tanks had crews of 7-8. And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, and because NATO designers were attempting to design catch-up models for two decades. Again, no flaw.

When you reach decisions on the first three then it becomes an engineering issue of stresses, grades of steel and construction methodologies. This continual insistence of rebuttal for the sake of substituting words really only annoys people Future Tank. My original point was that tanks have evolved the way they have due to the tradeoffs that were made for each design. The soviets compromise in their designs meant their MBTs were comparitively light, fairly well protected, well armed and with a excellent mobility, but the cramped/poorly insulated working conditions for the crew mean that fatigue is a definate issue as is the problem of main gun depression.
But I'm not rebutting. In what way did the Soviets compromise their designs? That they were "cramped/poorly insulated working conditions"? As I understand it the T-54 was a comparative limousine tot he T-34/85, never mind the 76mm armed model. Sure the Americans went from crewing medium M4s to heavy M26s and their M46 redesigns. I suspect that had the Soviet Army chosen to adopt the JS-3 as their point of MBT design origin they too would have had the volume to introduce all sorts of creature comforts. Are you saying that doing more with less in tank warfare is a flaw?
When people start comparing "apples with apples", I will happily listen.

The Indian Army has found that the internal temps are playing havoc with electronic equipment, and that retrofitting anything inside the turret is difficult due to the lack of space.
Which electronic equipment? You mean this?
Confirming the Jane's report, senior Army officers told this newspaper that the French Catherine thermal imaging (TI) camera, which gives the T-90's Belarussian (Peling IG-46) night sight its 3 km range and higher accuracy, is not "adequately tropicalised" and hence prone to malfunctioning in the extreme heat of the Rajasthan desert region, where temperatures inside the MBT routinely average between 55ºC and 60ºC.
Is it a flaw in the Soviet design that the French electronics don't function in Indian deserts?
Here India Army´s T-72 Upgrade Program - Project RHINO [Archive] - Military Photos (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/archive/index.php/t-17039.html) is an article on the T-72 Indian upgrade planning c.2004. So you take a state-designed tank that had state enterprises design upgrade systems and subsytems for, and you try and fit systems and subsystems designed by non-state commercial enterprises that never intended their product to go into the T-72. What were those Soviet designers thinking of? :rolleyes:
Where is the flaw in design here?

[FutureTank]

The poms have had a history of heavy 'infantry tanks stretching back to the Matilda, Churchill, Centurion. They did not need to copy the experiemce with the Tigers.
Matilda was a heavy tank by British standards, but was same weight as the T-34, but undergunned. Churchill was an infantry support tank, not a heavy tank. Centurion was however a 'universal' tank (redesignated from Cruiser) that in reality was the first British "medium tank" in the Panther "mould" that had also been referred to in the Panzertruppen as a 'universal tank'. The only reason that there was no "British Tiger" is because the UK was industrially exhausted.

What flawed understanding of soviet doctrine? The western cold war tanks were basically designed to counter a massed invasion of soviet tanks, thus mobility, especially for the pommy designs was accorded a lower priority than protection and firepower (the 120mm was then the largest fitted to a NATO tank).
Not at all. The British and Americans were convinced by the Germans that IF they had had enough Tigers and Panthers, they would have stopped the Red Army as they stopped the Allies in Normandy. Until early 1980s that was the basic understanding of tank warfare in NATO, and the designs went accordingly. Quite the contrary to lots of NATO heavy tanks sitting in hull down positions image, the actual doctrine was essentially that of the Wehrmacht with very minor national differences between the big four, and later three NATO tank users, and that is small combined armies groups based on battalion-brigade headquarters "pinching off" Soviet deep thrusts into West Germany. However, Germans never really "got" the Red Army's operational methods, which is why they lost in repeated Soviet offensives.

You are waffling here. Why is it a flaw to have a tank that weighs 20t more than the soviets? We have just gone over why the tanks have turned out the way they have. It's like saying that a Toyota Landcruiser is a flawed design because it weighs 1 tonne more than a Suzuki Jimny. The vehicles are different sizes - of course there will be different weights.
Not waffling. The premise is that the Soviet tanks have a flaw in ignoring crew survival and the NATO tanks don't. What I, perhaps clumsily, tried to point out is that placed in the Soviet doctrinal context the NATO tanks would also have a flaw, and that flaw would equal to about 20t of the design. If the Soviet designers were given different doctrinal contexts, maybe those of the IDF, they too would perhaps produce a 70t heavy tank with near-100% crew survival potential.

Really? From the first post in this thread, first, second and third lines:

"It occurs to me that Soviet designers emphasize somewhat on low-hulls. The principle here is that the tank's low profile should make it harder to hit. But looking back on the previous Gulf Wars, the gamble hasn't paid off. T-72s , T-62s..."

I didn't know that T72's were WWII designs... Must have just scraped into the Battle of Berlin.
Ignoring your sarcasm for a moment, I guess it depends what you see as modern. The T-72 belongs to the same generation of tanks as the M60A1, Leopard 1, and Chieftain, going into production in 1971. Aside from the low hull, I don't see very many significant differences in the design approach to crew survival. The M60 was a continued evolution of the M26/46. The Leopard was really a Panther design philosophy using 1960s technology, and Chieftain....well, the British have to be different by finally getting "their Tiger" :)
None of these tanks were present in the Gulf War. Moreover the low profile was not a significant factor in the defeat of the Iraqi armoured troops (see last quote).
Again, no flaw discernible.

And a crew of 18 in a German A7V. But that is irrelevant to this discussion. I think its relevant since the fifth man was an assistant loader. It shows a different predisposition in general towards greater crew comfort, while not having a clue about doctrine. It was in fact the "American Tiger" designed sharing many M47/48 components, but intended to engage Soviet tanks at long range. Its elevation was 8 degrees, only three greater than its contemporary T-54, but no one claimed it flawed. Instead though...it went to be used by the Marines as an infantry support tank! The T-54 of course begun design during the war, and was intended to outrange the Tiger II. So, in 1957 they were surpassed by the US 65t design. I don't see a flaw here either.

But the principles are the same. You missed the point entirely. The engineer looks at the parameters and produces a transmission to meet the requirements. The soviet designers would have designed and selected their transmission with the weight class of vehicle in mind, the same as the western designers. The point was the transmission is designed to do the job regardless of it being designed for a motor scooter or MBT. Inferring that one will be stressed to a higher level to support your assertion that western tanks are overweight is wrong.
I can only base what I say on combat experiences of various designs. Both Soviet and German heavy tanks had transmission and other chassis issues, German tanks worse so than the Soviet. The IDF also had to do a lot of work on the M48s which was integrated into the M60 that should have been M48A7. However I accept that you are largely correct in the process of how transmissions are selected.

So, let me get this straight, gun out the front, but adding weight overhanging the turret at the back is going to have no counterbalancing effect? What drugs are you on? The only hazard that a bustle or any overhang for that matter brings is to act as a shot trap - ie deflecting the incoming round in toward the turret ring. What threat were you referring to?
Was that reference to drugs necessary?

The bustle is there to increase the load of the tank. Guess where most of the original 55 rounds for the 105mm gun went in the M1? Or the 42 rounds of the SEP version Australia bought? But wait, the bustle is AS vulnerable to penetration as the rest of the turret! Without some way of venting ammunition detonation (not "cook off") it would be deadly, so the "crew safety features" are actually sheer necessity in the design! And what of the Israelis? Well, they have a "dry turret" now because all the ammunition is back in the hull in the Merkava IV.
The hull is also where the Soviet tanks keep much of the ammunition, so again, no significant flaw in 30 year old design.

The gun does not need a counterbalance, and you well know it, since it has a recoil system like all ordnance pieces.

Given a certain slope gradient and the perpendicular position of the turret up-slope, the tank has a chance of toppling backwards. This was the problem with the Soviet KV-2 that was compounded by the inadequate recoil absolution for its much larger gun. Admittedly it is not a great worry, but in the heat of combat the driver may not be aware of the turret position and the gunner may not be aware of the hull orientation.

Are you serious or do you just like typing for the sake of it? Gee, thickest armour toward the most likely threat - why would a tank commander do that? Obviously you have not seen the way armour moves in bounds - they will nose up to a hull down firing position, then when given the word to move, will reverse into the dead ground (never straight over the top), then move forward at a different (usually lower)point of the ridge. The same technique for retreating in bounds.
Actually given the proposed gun depression, the location of the hull would be such that the depth of the elevation crest it is behind would be of far greater protection from returned fire than its own frontal armour. If you are suggesting that reversing [straight back]? into the dead ground is what you would do, than I would say that a much better solution is to approach the crest obliquely which not only allows the driver the option of reversion, but also going forward down the slope (never straight over the top). It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

So if there isn't time to take pictures there must be heaps of after action reports about tanks that have just rolled wouldn't there? Tanks are used for training too - often times quite realistic training - yet I still don't see great numbers of tracked vehicles that have rolled onto their sides. About the only photos you will find in any numbers are shots of M113's that have gone end over end due to the driver grabbing the pivots too damn hard or at too high a speed. Again that is a specific well known issue relating to how that vehicle is operated and has little to do with the relative height of the Centre Of Gravity
I guess you will need to do a bit of research. Although prevalent during the Second World War, toppling tanks are found in wartime and peacetime since, even in training.

You could be right here - just the inability to admit when you are wrong, which, because you are still arguing the same dead point, just makes it look like you have certain agendas.
I'm quite happy to admit I'm wrong, when I am suitably convinced of it.

Did you forget that the septics were at a massive numerical inferiority in the Gulf War? They seemed to win pretty decisively there. Past 'losses' such as Vietnam were not lost because the yanks had superior technology rather than superior numbers that battle was lost because the politicians bottled out.
Did you forget that the 'septics' had integrated battlegroup networking while the Iraqis had even their tactical radios jammed? What about the fact that the Iraqi T-72s were firing 20 year old ammunition meant for the M60s? How about lack of combat leadership in many Iraqi armoured units? I could go on.
Again, there does not seem to be a Soviet tank design flaw, but the organisational flaw by the user.

However, you ask ANY 'septic' officer, from any Arm what the requisite superiority ratio is on the offensive, and he/she will tell you it is 3:1. As a matter of fact most won't even know why its 3:1, but they all know it. The Soviet Army prefers 6:1 local superiority in the breakthrough as this makes things a bit easier, roughly compatible to "hot knife through butter" when an offensive is conducted by an integrated combined arms force.

[Marc 1]

The way this forum is designed it does not show the previous argument prior to a quote. You like that fact don't you as you often spear off at a tanget when quoting.

The suggestion is that the Soviet designs do not care about crew survival. However, the design of T-34 clearly was superior in ensuring crew survival because it prevented penetration of armour in a better way.
The design of the JS-3 turret further enhanced this crew protection with the then available technology and design philosophies.

This quote you are replying to was this exchange:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
in the case of tanks, form follows doctrine, not function. The T-54 turret came from the JS-3 design concept.
I know it may be hard to believe, but while tanks in combat spend only a fraction of their time in concealment, they spend far more of their time manoeuvring, and they can come to grief more often than one would think when manoeuvring.

Semantics again. And doctrine determines function which influences form. Why is it in any way relevant to the conversation that the T54's turret came from the JS 3 concept?

Where have I said anywhere in this exchange that soviet designs do not care about crew survival? I was questioning why you suddenly stuffed a factoid into the conversation. You quote then twist the conversation.


Maybe M1s spent a great deal of time stationary in combat, but not Soviet tanks, by and large.

Right, so all those emplaced tanks dug in behind berms that the Iraqis had in GW1 and 2 were not tanks of soviet origin? I guess I missed them running about all over the countryside... We are talking about how tanks are employed not what soviet doctrine was. Remember, soviet designs are used by a great many nations other than the russians. Where is your source for this claim that soviet tanks don't spend large amounts of time stationary.

Keep looking and you will find such photos from many different armed forces posted online. Just today I was reading that in the very first batch of M26s deployed to Europe, one collapsed a bridge and tumbled into the river below.

Again, this conversation was in rebuttal to your claims that MBT's frequently roll over. I fail to see how the stupidity of the crew or the senior commanders in route planning is the fault of the tank. The baqsic point may had escaped you but the tank did not roll over because of its high centre of gravity. Before you sart hammering away how a superior lighter soviet design wouldn't have collapsed the bridge in the first place, give me some evidence of that bridges load rating.

I have seen pictures of USMC M1 on its top, and a similar one for a Merkava. Stuff like that happens, though maybe not often now days, and not in Australia. In combat it happened far more often

There have been around 10,000 plus M1's produced and it has been in service since 1979. Over a thousand Merkava's produced too since 1979 - of course there will be some photos showing these vehicles on their lids in millions of track miles any vehicle can have incidents caused by operator stupidity. Incidentally, a bare photo does not explain how it happened that the tank was on its lid - enough explosive or a steep enough drop will see any vehicle inverted. My point was that these tanks are not inherently unstable as was your earlier contention. I'm sure I can find plenty of pictures showing soviet designs upside down.

Care to share why you think the Soviet tanks follow that 'flawed' design philosophy?

Re read my earlier posts - I have already made my point.

Oh really? You don't suppose German tank destroyers were any good in defence during the Second World War?

Again, you lead off on a tangent. The german tank destroyers were largely produced as a time and production expediency. Soviet tank production was many times greter than the production of the german types. There were very few scenarios where a tank destroyer was a better weapon than a conventional tank.

I don't want to be again accused of semantics, so did you really mean 'warfare', or tactical and operational postures?

You are fishing.


Yes, but you never served in Europe, did you?

Nor did you, so what makes you an expert in armoured warfare? I at least have served in a Mech Inf battalion and therefore probably have a better understanding of the employment of armour than you have gained from books/websites.


No, the US Army grossly underestimated the effectiveness of their own and Soviet Artillery for 40 years after the Second World War. This means that they battery would be firing twice as much ground burst HE rather than air burst to keep the tank commanders' heads down. Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. However, here again we have the supposed flaw in Soviet tank design, although it is the larger NATO tanks that would, statistically speaking, be more exposed to damage and therefore enforced crew dismounting due to being larger.

Again off on a tangent. Let me remind you of the original conversation:

FT: Nope, the US Army had to redo its data on artillery effectiveness after someone pointed out the difference between its modelling and that of the Soviet one which reckoned artillery was twice as effective. Turned out the Soviet model was correct.

Me: Oh right so it wasn't: "(something US Army only discovered in 1988)" The US army knew about the possibility of a mobility kill with artillery before 1988 except that they had underestimated it effectiveness. So what? Artillery was still going to be used against armoured formations if for no other reason that it keeps the crews buttoned down and buggers up their situational awareness. Employing 155's against armour was something I was taught in 1987. To paraphrase you, I'd have known what you meant if you had said what you really meant.

I particularly like this quote: Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. And you think that the western military forces don't mind being shelled? How do the soviets take measures to avoid artillery? IIRC only the US and Israeli's have operational systems that can defeat a limited number artillery rounds. A barrage by a regiment? No C- RAM will protect against say 6 rounds fired for effect.

As to your point about the western tanks having larger silhouettes and therefore being hit and disabled more than soviet tanks is not that significant in terms of an artillery barrage - its not as though we are comparing a Wiesel Mk 1 with an MBT. These days its unlikely that you'd be facing a conventional barrage - there is going to be a good chance of either copperhead style rounds being used or an autonomous bomblet that will perform a top attack using an EFP. In these cases size won't matter.


I hasten to remind you that the M1, Challenger and Leopard II all appeared after 1984 in any significant numbers in Europe. Their predecessors were not particularly superior in terms of crew survival to the Soviet models. They all took two decades do get from concept to field in which time Soviets deployed not only two generations of tanks, but two competitive models in one generation, introducing autoloaders and functional gun-launched AT missiles.

Don't know where you are heading with this or what this has to do with artillery effects on tanks, but I'll play. The only recent conflict of any size featuring western tanks vs soviet tanks of the 50/60's generation were the 6 day war or the Yom Kippur war. I can only find stats showing relative losses, and the arab forces lost 2 to 5 times as many tanks. Yom Kippur War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War) .

What does it prove that the soviets fielded twice as many models in the time the western forces introduced one? Maybe the soviets needed more models to try and play catch up. Maybe it was a state directed decision to ensure the factories were kept in production. It says nothing about the effectiveness of the tanks. Your point about the gun launched AT missle and autoloaders is not news. The US developed the M551 Shillelagh system in 1960's -it was not particularly successful - perhaps with further development it could have worked. Why did the americans not pursue the system - I'd guess because if you want amissile on an armed vehicle you can always fit an external launcher a-la M2/M3 Tow launcher. As to your point about autoloaders the AMX-13 used one back in 1953. The reason why autoloaders are a contentious selection is that a 3 crew tank has one less crew member to assist in maintaining the vehicle, and one person less that can be used to man radios/picquets. Autoloaders depending on their design can limit the number of different ammunition loadouts that can be carried or loaded


"If done correctly in the right soil conditions"? - no, seriously, you expect someone to jump out and start doing soil testing?

Of course not, I was merely pointing out that a tank mounted dozer blade cannot dig in rock.

Its not a "hull down" position, but a temporary anti-missile scrape.

Your assertation that tank dozers are only good to make a small bund for protection against ATGW's is wrong. I have watched a Leopard 1 MTD dig itself a scrape that was around twice the length of the hull and around 1.3m deep in around 15 mins. Bunds are unlikely to provide protection against ATGW's with top attack profiles anyway.

Believe it or not, the Soviet tankers also train to assume hull down positions. Its not like the European terrain is completely devoid of spots where a Soviet tank does not need to expose itself too much to fire. Nor is the terrain prevalent to allow ubiquitous hull down positions for NATO tanks. All crews are trained to look for most suitable positions.

I'm sure they are trained to assume hull down poisitions. However, and this is about the third time I've said it due to the design limitations of soviet designs their main armament cannot be depressed as far as western designs thus limiting the number of reverse slope positions that can be used. This means that the crew in the soviet tank either need to expose more of their vehicle or ignore positions that a western tank could use.


I didn't say I think these crew survival measures are a bad idea. What I say is that their lack in Soviet tanks is not a design flaw. Even in the Merkava the crew survival philosophy was only brought home by the 1973 war, and was not implemented until 1979 I think, three years after T-80 entered production.

Here we go again twisting quotes without having a good look at what was written and why. Here's the original exchange:

Originally Posted by Marc 1
The latest western tank designs have made advances in crew survivability from surrounding stowed ammunition with water jackets to the use of blow off panels and armoured doors inside the turret bussle to increase crew survivability.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Yes, but all that costs in added weight.

Me: So you don't think the added weight of crew survivability features such as water jackets around ammunition stowage, and armoured door/blowoff panels is a good idea... Strange that you have so little regard for crew - highly trained crew are irreplacable which is why nations that value the experience and lives of their crew have designed tanks like the Merkava.

You initially dismissed these crew survival measures as something that added weight - implying therefore that they were not necessary. Now you are saying that the soviet tanks NOT having crew survivabilty features is not a design flaw? I must have missed reading somewhere that the soviet designs are impenatrable by any means - that would be the only circumstance I can think of where you wouldn't want to provide crew protection where possible. Then you go on to provide excuses as to why soviet designs could not consider this. I think, and this is only from hazy memory, that the Chieftans had their ammunition stored in water jackets as long ago as the 60's. Soviets were not worried about crew survivability as much as ease of manufacture and quantity.


[QUOTE=FutureTank;174893]Maybe that was an overly spurious comment to make given lack of statistical evidence. However, based on bustle detonation, even with the blow out panels I think the turret fighting compartment would not be unaffected, which is what most people seem to assume.

OK, lets do this again:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Falstaff:Isn't that what the blow out panels are for?
Waylander: And a turret with a seperated ammo compartment is not going to fly.
The energy is going to get blown out of the blowout panels.
And that has been shown to work with the Abrams.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Me: Rubbish, see above.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
I think I have seen one penetration in the bustle from a sabot on an M1 and the turret did not fly off, but that proves very little since there was no ammunition detonation or even cook-off. Maybe that area in the bustle was empty.

Me: Seems to fly in the face of what you said before about any hit to the bussle resulting in a flying turret.

Show me in this entire exchange where anybody has stated that the tank can go on fighting after the blow off panels have done their bit to save the crew's life? The point is, and I've made it before a highly trained tank crew is irreplacable - a tank is easier to replace. Look at it this way seeing as you seem to have little regard for crew safety, think of all the parts of the tank that can be salvaged because the blow off panels have ensured the turret wasn't bblown clean off the vehicle.

That is however the least of the crew's problem. In the case of the M1 SEP, the surviving crew will be left in the midst of combat with, perhaps, six rounds in the hull. I suppose you know how long those last...

Right... so it's therefore your assertation that its better to have the crew killed and the turret physically made to fly that have the crew live and only have 6 rounds in the hull available to fight on with.:onfloorl:

[Marc 1]

Nope. Firepower and protection are both matters of physics. Mobility was determined by the norms guided by doctrine in the Soviet Army that was the design bureaus' sole client. Organisational velocity if you will. What was considered though which was not a matter of science, was the industrial production capacity for a new design. That is where the T-64 came a cropper. The other 'big one' is of course the crews you keep talking about. The Soviet Army found that they just could not allocate enough conscripts to crew the more complex designs in the offing in the 60s, so they reduced the crew and increased the support personnel numbers. I can't remember who, but someone worked out that if the essential field support personnel are added to the tank's crew, then a Soviet 3-crew tank has a crew of 5, while the then new NATO tanks had crews of 7-8. And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, and because NATO designers were attempting to design catch-up models for two decades. Again, no flaw.

What a load of drivel. The soviet union with a largely conscript army could not find enough people to crew its tanks? Firepower and mobility are both matters of physics? Gee thats a useful statement - just a tad obvious I'd think. This would be a useful point to make if you expanded why you just stated the obvious to argue a point. Organisational velocity? What's that? That phrase doesn't link in any way to the sentence before or after it, it's drivel. Perhaps it's the speed the high command of an organisation achieves when fired from a cannon?

I particularly like this point: And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, So there is no flaw in Soviet tank designs because the Soviet Union was outproducing Nato?
So western tank designers are continually playing catch up are they? During Desert Storm the Iraqui's had quite a few tank engagements between the 500 T-72's they owned and the M1's and Challengers of the coalition. if these tanks were superior surely that would have offset any tactical disadvantage due to Iraqui ineptitude, yet in nearly every engagement the kill ratio was what 20 or 50 to one? Doesn't seem to support your point very well does it? Egypt for example has traditionally purchased soviet equipment. Recently it has purchased M1's tanks and Mig 29SMT's. If the current Russian designs were so superior why would the Egyptians who have no particular affiliation chose the Abrams over current Russian designs? Could it be that the better tank is a western design?


But I'm not rebutting. In what way did the Soviets compromise their designs? That they were "cramped/poorly insulated working conditions"?

You are being disingenuous again that is far from the only issue I have mentioned others.

As I understand it the T-54 was a comparative limousine tot he T-34/85, never mind the 76mm armed model. Sure the Americans went from crewing medium M4s to heavy M26s and their M46 redesigns.

Relevance?

I suspect that had the Soviet Army chosen to adopt the JS-3 as their point of MBT design origin they too would have had the volume to introduce all sorts of creature comforts. Are you saying that doing more with less in tank warfare is a flaw?

The Js-2 had a weight of 46 tonnes, I can only guess that the JS-3 was heavier compared to the T34-85 at 32 tonnes. That level of interior volume and armour has a cost in weight, so IF the soviets had pursued this line of tanks they too would have ended up with an equivalent weight to western designs. Where is the 'more with less' equation here?


When people start comparing "apples with apples", I will happily listen.

We are comparing MAIN BATTLE TANKS - it is apples with apples.


Which electronic equipment? You mean this?

Is it a flaw in the Soviet design that the French electronics don't function in Indian deserts?
Here India Army´s T-72 Upgrade Program - Project RHINO [Archive] - Military Photos (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/archive/index.php/t-17039.html) is an article on the T-72 Indian upgrade planning c.2004. So you take a state-designed tank that had state enterprises design upgrade systems and subsytems for, and you try and fit systems and subsystems designed by non-state commercial enterprises that never intended their product to go into the T-72. What were those Soviet designers thinking of? :rolleyes:
Where is the flaw in design here?

Where do we start - lack of a climate control system to the detriment of the crew and electronics. A space so constrained that it makes future upgrades difficult (technology does evolve) just for starters. There's a very good chance a western design would not have needed to be upgraded in the first place, and if it was necessary, upgrades seem to accomplished a fair bit easier and with more success.

[FutureTank]

The way this forum is designed it does not show the previous argument prior to a quote. You like that fact don't you as you often spear off at a tanget when quoting.

This quote you are replying to was this exchange:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
in the case of tanks, form follows doctrine, not function. The T-54 turret came from the JS-3 design concept.
I know it may be hard to believe, but while tanks in combat spend only a fraction of their time in concealment, they spend far more of their time manoeuvring, and they can come to grief more often than one would think when manoeuvring.

Semantics again. And doctrine determines function which influences form. Why is it in any way relevant to the conversation that the T54's turret came from the JS 3 concept?

Where have I said anywhere in this exchange that soviet designs do not care about crew survival? I was questioning why you suddenly stuffed a factoid into the conversation. You quote then twist the conversation.

It seems to me that you are trying to read my thoughts, rather than my replies.

The premise of this thread is that the Soviet tank designs are deficient in engineering that ensures greater survival of the crew. Its not a factoid that the shape of the T-54/55 production design borrowed much from the JS-3 turret design.

The pre-production T-54 retained a modified T-44 turret. It suggests to me that every effort was made in the design stage to produce the best crew survival optimised vehicle given technology of 1947. This was not done in either Centurion or the M46 at a later stage to the same degree.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Maybe M1s spent a great deal of time stationary in combat, but not Soviet tanks, by and large.
Right, so all those emplaced tanks dug in behind berms that the Iraqis had in GW1 and 2 were not tanks of soviet origin? I guess I missed them running about all over the countryside... We are talking about how tanks are employed not what soviet doctrine was. Remember, soviet designs are used by a great many nations other than the russians. Where is your source for this claim that soviet tanks don't spend large amounts of time stationary.

How tanks are employed by one state that purchases tanks from another state can not be used to invalidate the initial tank design specifications, or the suitability of the production model for the primary client. I note that Iran and Iraq used considerable amounts of sophisticated hardware in their war only to achieve operations based in attrition. Neither side was able, for various reasons, to capitalise on the systems they procured to achieve decisive victory. However, this did not invalidate those systems individually, or as part of the suit of systems in other armed forces.

Please note that at the Kursk Bulge the T-34s were also employed dug in, with considerable success despite ostensibly superior, if untried, technology. However, this was largely due to the wider operational factors which on balance were not available to the Iraqi Army. Similarly, the M1 tank was used in combat for the first time during GW1, but unlike the Wehrmacht, the US Army had a substantial amount of time to not only debug the design after production begun, but to even acclimatise it in the theatre!

Soviet doctrine, despite misinterpretation by some in the 1960s, is not about throwing thousands of tanks at the enemy, but about using combined arms groups in a dynamic manoeuvre oriented offensive.

For source on how much Soviet tanks were intended to spend stationary in combat based on their published doctrinal discussion up to the mid 1980s I recommend Simpkin's Red Armour where he worked out rather pedantically the times for up to the Tank Army level.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Keep looking and you will find such photos from many different armed forces posted online. Just today I was reading that in the very first batch of M26s deployed to Europe, one collapsed a bridge and tumbled into the river below.

Again, this conversation was in rebuttal to your claims that MBT's frequently roll over. I fail to see how the stupidity of the crew or the senior commanders in route planning is the fault of the tank. The basic point may had escaped you but the tank did not roll over because of its high centre of gravity. Before you sart hammering away how a superior lighter soviet design wouldn't have collapsed the bridge in the first place, give me some evidence of that bridges load rating.

My claim is that MBT's frequently rolled over in combat.

Soviet tanks also rolled over, and route planning had nothing to do with it. I am not going to go an look for the rating of a bridge collapsed by a Pershing during the Second World War. It goes to crew safety argument. The design of the T-34 included lowering the centre of gravity in part to prevent roll overs experienced by the models it was to replace. It may seem trivial to you now, but in the 1930s and 1940s this was not uncommon when operating off road.

If you think that roll overs are trivial, have a look at the Bradley driver's manual that had BIG RED WARNING on the first page about roll overs, and then check out the number of casualties sustained in Iraq from accidental BFV roll-overs. And no, I am not going to find that for you. Its online.
Sure its harder to roll a 70t M1 in peacetime, but it has been done by the more adventurous drivers. I have seen images of Soviet tanks rolled over also, including T-55 (in Germany), T-62 (in Afghanistan), and T-72 (in Belarussia). Its not something any armoured force likes to advertise, right?

You will be surprised at what happens with tanks in combat. I have an eye witness report of a T-34 that literally ran into and onto a Panther during combat.

[FutureTank]

Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Oh really? You don't suppose German tank destroyers were any good in defence during the Second World War?

Again, you lead off on a tangent. The german tank destroyers were largely produced as a time and production expediency. Soviet tank production was many times greter than the production of the german types. There were very few scenarios where a tank destroyer was a better weapon than a conventional tank.

Not so. Marders I/2/3, maybe, but STuG design and Panzerjagers' was intended to work with the Panthers and Tigers, and they did very effectively as a team.
Soviets produced their own turretless tank destroyers to try and replicate this tactic, but with achieving lower profile in a tank it became obvious that tanks can replicate the tank/tank-destroyer team just as effectively, and more so, and the production of turretless tank-destroyers largely stopped in the Soviet Union.

However, I have to admit that I had never seen a source that argued the influence from tank-destroyer tactics on the post-war Soviet tank design. The Soviet doctrinal publications such as "Tank company on the defensive" do however significantly reflect the wartime tank/tank-destroyer teaming tactics within the company.
Of course that's to be expected since all such publications begin with "based on the experience in the Great Patriotic War"!

[Marc 1]

Matilda was a heavy tank by British standards, but was same weight as the T-34, but undergunned. Churchill was an infantry support tank, not a heavy tank. Centurion was however a 'universal' tank (redesignated from Cruiser) that in reality was the first British "medium tank" in the Panther "mould" that had also been referred to in the Panzertruppen as a 'universal tank'. The only reason that there was no "British Tiger" is because the UK was industrially exhausted.

Again evading my point - the poms did have a history of heavy tank production - the Matilda predated the T34 by a number of years and was considered a heavy tank in its day. Just because it was labeled an infantry tank doesn't change its characteristics. There was in fact a british 'Tiger' called the TOG 2. This design could have been further developed but was abandonned in favour of the Centurion which should have been a decent match for the Tiger, but arrived too late to see action in WW11.


Not at all. The British and Americans were convinced by the Germans that IF they had had enough Tigers and Panthers, they would have stopped the Red Army as they stopped the Allies in Normandy. Until early 1980s that was the basic understanding of tank warfare in NATO, and the designs went accordingly. Quite the contrary to lots of NATO heavy tanks sitting in hull down positions image, the actual doctrine was essentially that of the Wehrmacht with very minor national differences between the big four, and later three NATO tank users, and that is small combined armies groups based on battalion-brigade headquarters "pinching off" Soviet deep thrusts into West Germany. However, Germans never really "got" the Red Army's operational methods, which is why they lost in repeated Soviet offensives.

I forget which german general when asked by Hitler what sort of tank the general needed to stop the soviets replied T-34's. His somewhat ironic comments went unheeded and the rest is history. It wasn't the germans who never really 'got' the soviet tactics, it was Hitler who mandated such stupidities as not allowing withdrawl, not permitting his senior commanders any operational lattitude that was of great assistance to the soviets. The choice between cheap and plentiful or expensive and more capable was a simple choice for the west. Smaller standing armys had to look at quality over quantity, they had no choice. Unlike the USSR that could field an army as large as the politbureau demanded, western democracies need to satisfy voters, so maintaining an army the size of the eastern block countries was never going to happen.


Not waffling. The premise is that the Soviet tanks have a flaw in ignoring crew survival and the NATO tanks don't. What I, perhaps clumsily, tried to point out is that placed in the Soviet doctrinal context the NATO tanks would also have a flaw, and that flaw would equal to about 20t of the design. If the Soviet designers were given different doctrinal contexts, maybe those of the IDF, they too would perhaps produce a 70t heavy tank with near-100% crew survival potential.

Therefore we conclude that the soviet tanks were perfect for the then soviet doctrine. What of other 200+ countries that don't share this doctrine? NATO tanks do not have a 'flaw'. To have a tank with the technology of the day when their structures were originally designed (70's/80's) that offers the level of protection, mobility firepower and crew comfort (as well as the smaller facets such as limits on elevation depression etc) the vehicles happened to be around 20t more than soviet designs. Perhaps the next generation (such as FCS) will be much lighter than Soviet designs, according to your logic, this means that soviet designs have a design flaw.


Ignoring your sarcasm for a moment, I guess it depends what you see as modern. The T-72 belongs to the same generation of tanks as the M60A1, Leopard 1, and Chieftain, going into production in 1971. Aside from the low hull, I don't see very many significant differences in the design approach to crew survival. The M60 was a continued evolution of the M26/46. The Leopard was really a Panther design philosophy using 1960s technology, and Chieftain....well, the British have to be different by finally getting "their Tiger" :)
None of these tanks were present in the Gulf War. Moreover the low profile was not a significant factor in the defeat of the Iraqi armoured troops (see last quote).

US marines were equipped with M60's during GW1. What was the ratio M60's to T- 72 in kills?But once again you are forgetting the origins of this quote which was you telling me this was not about modern tanks.:rolleyes:


I think its relevant since the fifth man was an assistant loader. It shows a different predisposition in general towards greater crew comfort, while not having a clue about doctrine. It was in fact the "American Tiger" designed sharing many M47/48 components, but intended to engage Soviet tanks at long range. Its elevation was 8 degrees, only three greater than its contemporary T-54, but no one claimed it flawed. Instead though...it went to be used by the Marines as an infantry support tank! The T-54 of course begun design during the war, and was intended to outrange the Tiger II. So, in 1957 they were surpassed by the US 65t design. I don't see a flaw here either.

Again we need to see context here:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Of course to do this, the design requires a very large turret ring, so to portray this as an advantage, the NATO designers claim the NATO tanks are more ergonomic, forgetting that tanks are not made to ensure a comfy ride. You really do not want to be tossed around the turret as the driver tries to frantically take evasive action. In a T-34 tankers would just grab onto the gun, or push against the walls to keep themselves steady.

Me:Try that in a modern tank and the stabilisation system will ensure that anyone hanging onto the main armament will be pulped as the gun elevates and depresses. Having riden in a Leopard cross country with stab engaged I was damn glad that there was a big metal guard to keep me from being thrown against the breach as it moved up and down. Its not about 'comfort' as you keep saying - its about trying to minimise crew fatigue levels - warfare is a 24hour business, and particularly during the type of blitzkreig assaults experienced by the armoured forces under Gudarian in 1940 and GW I and GWII, this is a major consideration. In some cases the only times the tankers got to dismount was to reload and refuel for days at a time.

Originally Posted by Marc 1
Also its not about steadying yourself whilst the tank scoots to another firing position, crew are not there to hang on for dear life, they will be using their optics, searching for threats/targets, firing the gun whilst on the move and loading the gun. Manhandling a 120mm round in the confines of a turret is difficult enough when stationary - space is not a 'luxury' with current crew numbers and techniques. Sure it is possible to eliminate the loader, but then you have the additional workload of other tasks placed onto the other 3 crew (an argument all by itself).

FT: There used to be a five man crew in a 120mm armed US Tank.

So originally you started telling people that space was a luxury and that thankers in T34's just hung on to the breach of the main armament. When it was pointed out to you that taking that kind of action in a moder tank will see you pulped by the stab system, and that the crew aren't there just to hang on anymore, you decide to tell people for no apparent reason that there was a US tank with a crew of 5? To what end? To then say the US didn't have a clue about doctrine? Who's doctrine? A crew of 5 was not unusual in an allied tank at the end of WW11 - instead of manning a hull mounted MG this crew member was used to assist loading. Once again you demonstrate that you cannot argue effectively, you switch topics and try to divert. Why not just admit you are wrong?


I can only base what I say on combat experiences of various designs. Both Soviet and German heavy tanks had transmission and other chassis issues, German tanks worse so than the Soviet. The IDF also had to do a lot of work on the M48s which was integrated into the M60 that should have been M48A7. However I accept that you are largely correct in the process of how transmissions are selected.

How magnanamous of you. Trying to obfuscate by the drivel about reliability levels of WW2 and Korean war designs has little relevance.


Was that reference to drugs necessary?

Pretty hard to take the high moral ground when you are seeking to mislead and misrepresent

The bustle is there to increase the load of the tank. Guess where most of the original 55 rounds for the 105mm gun went in the M1? Or the 42 rounds of the SEP version Australia bought? But wait, the bustle is AS vulnerable to penetration as the rest of the turret! Without some way of venting ammunition detonation (not "cook off") it would be deadly, so the "crew safety features" are actually sheer necessity in the design! And what of the Israelis? Well, they have a "dry turret" now because all the ammunition is back in the hull in the Merkava IV.
The hull is also where the Soviet tanks keep much of the ammunition, so again, no significant flaw in 30 year old design.

Again misrepresentation. I have never stated that the soviet designs are flawed due to their ammunition being stored in the hull. Just mounting the rounds in the hull is not sufficient, not all engagements occur with the tank hull down - I'm willing to bet there is also a significant shielding system around the Merkava's ammunition storage. The turret bustle is at the rear of the turret - given that the turret will normally face the expected threat that reduces the probability of a hit in this area significantly. If the bustle is penetrated it still protects the crew. Problem? No.

The gun does not need a counterbalance, and you well know it, since it has a recoil system like all ordnance pieces.

Yet again stop misquoting me. Here is what I have said:

Sounds like rubbish to me. If anything a bussle on a turret will help counterbalance the weight of the gun. There are certain limits anyway to using a cross slope as a hull down position - namely the gun depression limits. Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle, so cross slope positioning and the risk of the vehicle rolling over is not an issue.

Note I said counterbalances the turret, not the gun.

Given a certain slope gradient and the perpendicular position of the turret up-slope, the tank has a chance of toppling backwards. This was the problem with the Soviet KV-2 that was compounded by the inadequate recoil absolution for its much larger gun. Admittedly it is not a great worry, but in the heat of combat the driver may not be aware of the turret position and the gunner may not be aware of the hull orientation.

Sounds like a design and testing issue to me. This is what Google has to say about the KV2:

While impressive on paper, it had been designed as a slow-moving bunker-buster. It was less useful in the type of highly mobile, fluid warfare that developed in World War II. The turret was so heavy it was difficult to traverse on non-level terrain, and it was expensive to produce. Only about 250 KV-2s were made, all in 1940-41, making it one of the rarer Soviet tanks.

Ironically, more weight (you know that evil thing you keep harping about) may have provided a cure. But seriously if you are using this 3.65m tall monstrosity whose trunions seem to be about a meter higher than a modern MBT as an example of how unstable MBT's are you are clutching at straws.


Actually given the proposed gun depression, the location of the hull would be such that the depth of the elevation crest it is behind would be of far greater protection from returned fire than its own frontal armour.

Err, that's the idea of being hull down.

If you are suggesting that reversing [straight back]? into the dead ground is what you would do, than I would say that a much better solution is to approach the crest obliquely which not only allows the driver the option of reversion, but also going forward down the slope (never straight over the top).

Get out your pen and start rewriting tactics manuals for quite a few army's then, as this is not the usual way they operate. Think about it - if you aproach the crest at a say 45 degree angle and either go too far or find an enemy vehicle coming up the same crest from the other side, you are exposing your weaker side armour. Lets say you fire a shot and then move forward, even if you turn quickly the enemy will have an idea which side you are likely to appear around and train their weapons appropriately. Many MBT transmissions incorporate more than one reverse ratio to enable faster reversing.

It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Angles of depression I have been able to find: T54/55 -5 degrees, T62 -5 degrees T-64 ? T-72 -6 degrees T-80 -4 degrees. T-90 ? degrees. I cannot find 18 degrees - unless you are talking elevation which is of course the exact opposite and would prove that you really do have no idea. One of the main reasons that limits main armament depression in an MBT isn't necessarily the hull, but the fact that there is not enough height inside the turret to allow the breech to recoil. It is one of the main reasons why western tanks are higher. The trunions are usually placed higher in western tanks as well as this means less depression restrictions by the hull. This is not just 'handy' when firing from a reverse slope, but means the main armament is less likely to find its stops when trying to track a target whilst moving across rough ground.

Incidentally, unless the mortar fire is some form of anti armour round conventional fragmentation/HE rounds will have little effect.


II guess you will need to do a bit of research. Although prevalent during the Second World War, toppling tanks are found in wartime and peacetime since, even in training.

I'd better get a warning out to all tankies then. Strange that you hear about MRAPS rolling but not tanks. The armys of the world must have some huge shared conspiracy to keep the knowledge of these death traps to themselves eh?

II'm quite happy to admit I'm wrong, when I am suitably convinced of it.

I'm suitably convinced that you will never change your mind, so don't go looking for any further replies.


IDid you forget that the 'septics' had integrated battlegroup networking while the Iraqis had even their tactical radios jammed? What about the fact that the Iraqi T-72s were firing 20 year old ammunition meant for the M60s? How about lack of combat leadership in many Iraqi armoured units? I could go on.
Again, there does not seem to be a Soviet tank design flaw, but the organisational flaw by the user.

You'll have to explain how you fire ammunition intended for a rifled 105mm gun from a 125mm smoothbore. Go ahead, make all the excuses you want - the stories are legion about how the poor bloody Iraqi tankers could not even see the yanks and poms with their night vision gear and were being picked off en masse.

IHowever, you ask ANY 'septic' officer, from any Arm what the requisite superiority ratio is on the offensive, and he/she will tell you it is 3:1. As a matter of fact most won't even know why its 3:1, but they all know it. The Soviet Army prefers 6:1 local superiority in the breakthrough as this makes things a bit easier, roughly compatible to "hot knife through butter" when an offensive is conducted by an integrated combined arms force.

What has this got to do with the price of fish? here's a little tip, some of us do know about these ratio's, after all we don't just sit around polishing brass and boots - for officers there is actually a module on Tactics that if you fail will end your career. If you like I can still quote for you artillery planning ranges of both the RAG and the DAG (that should excite you - they were after all based on soviet weapons and doctrine when I leaned them 21 years ago). But I fail to see what this has to do with the discussion.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I don't want to be again accused of semantics, so did you really mean 'warfare', or tactical and operational postures?

You are fishing.


Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Yes, but you never served in Europe, did you?

Nor did you, so what makes you an expert in armoured warfare? I at least have served in a Mech Inf battalion and therefore probably have a better understanding of the employment of armour than you have gained from books/websites.

And I can say that you are being evasive and speculative.

What makes you think that someone who has never served in combat in a European theatre during the Cold War has greater understanding of tank design than someone who has never served in a mechanised infantry unit in Australia? :)

In 1986 an Artillery officer was able to show that most Armor officer who did serve in Europe missed the point of Soviet armoured operations for the better part of three decades, and all he did was pretty much read books. What followed was the most significant doctrinal rewrite in the US Army history.

Not that I don't respect your experience, but how is that relevant to the premise that the Soviet tank designs are flawed?

[Marc 1]

My claim is that MBT's frequently rolled over in combat.

If you think that roll overs are trivial, have a look at the Bradley driver's manual that had BIG RED WARNING on the first page about roll overs, and then check out the number of casualties sustained in Iraq from accidental BFV roll-overs. And no, I am not going to find that for you. Its online.
.

Sincewhen is a BFV an MBT? Keep clutching for those straws, the world is laughing

[Abraham Gubler]

My claim is that MBT's frequently rolled over in combat.


And do you know why? It has very little to the reason a conventional car will roll over on a road ie high centre of gravity and sharp corner driving.

Tanks roll over because of two reasons. Most often it is because they are driving cross country and get onto too much side slope and slip over...

The other reason is they are driving too fast for tracked vehicles. Tracks interact with the vehicle in a very different way to wheels. When traveling very fast (>60-80 kph) a tracked vehicle can be flipped by introducing too much of a differential between one track's speed and the other. Usually caused by a applying the turn control too rapidly or one track hitting an obstacle.

As to the argument about Soviet tank design vs Western tank design... The Soviet tank industry was geared towards production of numbers above all else. Something like reducing the internal volume of a T-64 so it will have comparable armour, mobility and firepower to a western tank at 66% of the weight enabled a 50% increase in production compared to a tank similar to a western design. This was a very good thing to do in the Soviet philosophy.

That this reduction in volume resulted in the trade away of being able to depress the gun turret and the use of highly combustible gun propellant stored in the crew compartment - both significant reductions in survivability - was something the Soviets were willing to accept. The Swedes made a similar trade away in the design of the S-Tank but they chose to lose the fire on the move capability. There is significant parametric, analytic and combat evidence to suggest that the Swedes made the right choice.

Interestingly Morozov (the T-64's designer) wanted to replace the T-64 with the Object 450 (aka Prospective, T-74, NST) a crew in hull, external gun vehicle. By removing the turret all together the Soviet's would have kept down internal volume but without the limitations of the T-64's compact turret (no depression, crew and propellant mix). But by the 1970s the Russians were very conservative and turned down the T-74 because of fears of replicating the T-64 introduction to service disaster.

[Marc 1]

What makes you think that someone who has never served in combat in a European theatre during the Cold War has greater understanding of tank design than someone who has never served in a mechanised infantry unit in Australia? :)

Err, that would be everybody then, as nobody has ever served in combat in a European theatre during the cold war. The enemy I studied was the Kamarian Armed forces. They co-incidentally were equipped almost exclusively with soviet weapons and used largely soviet tactics, despite being based on an island that I've never seen before just south of the Indonesian archipeligo. So despite never having been in Europe, I know a little about how the soviet forces operate, their equipment and their tactics. My knowledge is old, outdated and rusty, someone like Waylander could probably set both of us right on many points. But I do know that much of what you spout is wrong, and worse that rather than admitting that, you attempt to twist words, meanings and deflect rather than admit it.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
No, the US Army grossly underestimated the effectiveness of their own and Soviet Artillery for 40 years after the Second World War. This means that they battery would be firing twice as much ground burst HE rather than air burst to keep the tank commanders' heads down. Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. However, here again we have the supposed flaw in Soviet tank design, although it is the larger NATO tanks that would, statistically speaking, be more exposed to damage and therefore enforced crew dismounting due to being larger.

Again off on a tangent. Let me remind you of the original conversation:

FT: Nope, the US Army had to redo its data on artillery effectiveness after someone pointed out the difference between its modelling and that of the Soviet one which reckoned artillery was twice as effective. Turned out the Soviet model was correct.

Me: Oh right so it wasn't: "(something US Army only discovered in 1988)" The US army knew about the possibility of a mobility kill with artillery before 1988 except that they had underestimated it effectiveness. So what? Artillery was still going to be used against armoured formations if for no other reason that it keeps the crews buttoned down and buggers up their situational awareness. Employing 155's against armour was something I was taught in 1987. To paraphrase you, I'd have known what you meant if you had said what you really meant.

I particularly like this quote: Not that it matters since given the Soviets did understand the true effectiveness of the artillery, they would take measures not to encounter it. And you think that the western military forces don't mind being shelled? How do the soviets take measures to avoid artillery? IIRC only the US and Israeli's have operational systems that can defeat a limited number artillery rounds. A barrage by a regiment? No C- RAM will protect against say 6 rounds fired for effect.

As to your point about the western tanks having larger silhouettes and therefore being hit and disabled more than soviet tanks is not that significant in terms of an artillery barrage - its not as though we are comparing a Wiesel Mk 1 with an MBT. These days its unlikely that you'd be facing a conventional barrage - there is going to be a good chance of either copperhead style rounds being used or an autonomous bomblet that will perform a top attack using an EFP. In these cases size won't matter.

For the purpose of this thread's premise we are discussing Soviet tank survivability, i.e. any designs to the late 1980s.

As a matter of fact the tactical approach to enemy artillery in the 60s and 70s by the NATO tanks was to button up and wait it out. They were expected to come out of it with minor external damage unless the crew was extremely unlucky to suffer a direct hit. Artillery fires on actual units are difficult to simulate in peacetime, and the questioning of the artillery data in the US Army only begun after considerable persuasion by the Israelis in the 1970s. It is my understanding that this effectively halted the XM1 project for several years. The data verification did not become public until 1988, but was probably available in the final stages of M1 and Bradley design phases c.1978/9. I'm only speculating here, but it coincides with the late Brigadier Simpkin's invitation to several times visit the United States, and the commencement of research into the Soviet operational art as a stand-alone intensive project by the US Staff College. The argument probably went something like, if we got artillery data wrong, what else?

Not only do Soviet tanks have lower profile, but they have significantly lower surface area susceptible to frag/debris damage than NATO tanks where typical artillery burst (155mm) is concerned.

Soviet tank units had, and Russian units retain, organic artillery for providing counter-battery fire. In NATO this allocation is at brigade level, where as in the WP forces this was at regimental level. However, you are suggesting that there is not much a tank unit can do about damage if hit by artillery, and you are right about that. There is very little that can be done about damage or direct hits from artillery in so far as tank design is concerned though. Moving out of the fire at top speed is advisable, but until the advent of the last generation of NATO tanks the Soviet designs were significantly faster. This is the reason the M551 was used in OPFOR training, because it was the only armoured vehicle to approach the speed of the T-72 off road.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I hasten to remind you that the M1, Challenger and Leopard II all appeared after 1984 in any significant numbers in Europe. Their predecessors were not particularly superior in terms of crew survival to the Soviet models. They all took two decades do get from concept to field in which time Soviets deployed not only two generations of tanks, but two competitive models in one generation, introducing autoloaders and functional gun-launched AT missiles.

Don't know where you are heading with this or what this has to do with artillery effects on tanks, but I'll play. The only recent conflict of any size featuring western tanks vs soviet tanks of the 50/60's generation were the 6 day war or the Yom Kippur war. I can only find stats showing relative losses, and the arab forces lost 2 to 5 times as many tanks. Yom Kippur War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia .

What does it prove that the soviets fielded twice as many models in the time the western forces introduced one? Maybe the soviets needed more models to try and play catch up. Maybe it was a state directed decision to ensure the factories were kept in production. It says nothing about the effectiveness of the tanks. Your point about the gun launched AT missle and autoloaders is not news. The US developed the M551 Shillelagh system in 1960's -it was not particularly successful - perhaps with further development it could have worked. Why did the americans not pursue the system - I'd guess because if you want amissile on an armed vehicle you can always fit an external launcher a-la M2/M3 Tow launcher. As to your point about autoloaders the AMX-13 used one back in 1953. The reason why autoloaders are a contentious selection is that a 3 crew tank has one less crew member to assist in maintaining the vehicle, and one person less that can be used to man radios/picquets. Autoloaders depending on their design can limit the number of different ammunition loadouts that can be carried or loaded

The point is that the last generation of NATO tanks is the one with most significant advances in crew survivability engineering philosophy included in designs. It took 20 years, and Israeli combat experience to force this philosophy on NATO designers.

The NATO designers were playing catch-up because in every case it took two decades to bring these designs into field service.

The Soviet designers had nothing to catch-up to because the Leopard 1 was a very conventional design that used conventional armour and a conventional gun designed at the end of the Second World War. The US design had been incremental from M26, and the Chieftain was likewise a conventional heavy tank, with the larger gun as expected. These were in line with 0 doctrinal development impact on design specifications. The only noticeable departure from predecessors was the noticeable trend towards more convex turret shapes...like in the T-55.

On the other hand Soviet designers sought to introduce technologies with the T-64/T-72 that would be called 'value added features' in the commercial sector, seeking to enhance combat performance within own doctrinal context and independently of development, or lack there of, in the West. The composite armour, larger gun, autoloader and missile in the load, and compact engine/transmission arrangement all were innovative approaches to solving specific design requirement problems of crew survival in 1964. Not only that, but they were willing to support competitive designs in the process, and in production, this being the final of the 'big five' factors that tested the design. NATO tanks are never tested by limited production.

The M551 Shillelagh platform was a waste of taxpayers' money. If the Cavalry didn't find use for a 152mm flachette round in Vietnam, it would go down in history as the most confused tank design ever by anyone. A light tank, supporting leg infantry with 20 rounds and 9 missiles, intended to be deployed far from its logistic support? Sometimes one has to ask, what were they thinking?

The AMX-13 will stand as a testament to great innovative designers that worked on it. That France could produce the design immediately after the war, and export it so widely in the 50s and 60s is a testament to the recognition of the model's performance as a combat vehicle for its time.

Your points about the autoloaders are of course valid.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Its not a "hull down" position, but a temporary anti-missile scrape.

Your assertation that tank dozers are only good to make a small bund for protection against ATGW's is wrong. I have watched a Leopard 1 MTD dig itself a scrape that was around twice the length of the hull and around 1.3m deep in around 15 mins. Bunds are unlikely to provide protection against ATGW's with top attack profiles anyway.

I was referring to the KMT mine ploughs http://data4.primeportal.net/ce/carrey/kmt_mine_plough/images/kmt_mine_plough_04_of_32.jpg that can also be used to create fast scrapes, not entrenching dozer blades which are usually used by the combat engineer vehicles.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Believe it or not, the Soviet tankers also train to assume hull down positions. Its not like the European terrain is completely devoid of spots where a Soviet tank does not need to expose itself too much to fire. Nor is the terrain prevalent to allow ubiquitous hull down positions for NATO tanks. All crews are trained to look for most suitable positions.

I'm sure they are trained to assume hull down poisitions. However, and this is about the third time I've said it due to the design limitations of soviet designs their main armament cannot be depressed as far as western designs thus limiting the number of reverse slope positions that can be used. This means that the crew in the soviet tank either need to expose more of their vehicle or ignore positions that a western tank could use.


[quote=FutureTank;174893]I didn't say I think these crew survival measures are a bad idea. What I say is that their lack in Soviet tanks is not a design flaw. Even in the Merkava the crew survival philosophy was only brought home by the 1973 war, and was not implemented until 1979 I think, three years after T-80 entered production.

Here we go again twisting quotes without having a good look at what was written and why. Here's the original exchange:

Originally Posted by Marc 1
The latest western tank designs have made advances in crew survivability from surrounding stowed ammunition with water jackets to the use of blow off panels and armoured doors inside the turret bussle to increase crew survivability.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Yes, but all that costs in added weight.

Me: So you don't think the added weight of crew survivability features such as water jackets around ammunition stowage, and armoured door/blowoff panels is a good idea... Strange that you have so little regard for crew - highly trained crew are irreplacable which is why nations that value the experience and lives of their crew have designed tanks like the Merkava.

You initially dismissed these crew survival measures as something that added weight - implying therefore that they were not necessary. Now you are saying that the soviet tanks NOT having crew survivabilty features is not a design flaw? I must have missed reading somewhere that the soviet designs are impenatrable by any means - that would be the only circumstance I can think of where you wouldn't want to provide crew protection where possible. Then you go on to provide excuses as to why soviet designs could not consider this. I think, and this is only from hazy memory, that the Chieftans had their ammunition stored in water jackets as long ago as the 60's. Soviets were not worried about crew survivability as much as ease of manufacture and quantity.

This is a silly discussion!
Of course Soviet designers are concerned with crew survivability because a dead crew does not fight!

What I am saying is that there were different solutions to achieving crew survivability.
One was to enhance the fighting characteristics of the tank by innovative design features WHILE maintaining essentially same design volume and weight of a medium tank.
Another is to substantially increase the volume and weight of the vehicle to accommodate crew survivability features. This increase by default due to adopted design philosophy allowed more armour, and mandated larger powerpack in a heavy tank.

Given that the last generation NATO tanks have same physical size weapon as the T-64, everything else amounts to extra 20t of predominantly armour. To me this spells a rather obvious lack of engineering creativity. Somehow, others read this as a "flaw" in Soviet designs!

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Maybe that was an overly spurious comment to make given lack of statistical evidence. However, based on bustle detonation, even with the blow out panels I think the turret fighting compartment would not be unaffected, which is what most people seem to assume.
OK, lets do this again:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Falstaff:Isn't that what the blow out panels are for?
Waylander: And a turret with a seperated ammo compartment is not going to fly.
The energy is going to get blown out of the blowout panels.
And that has been shown to work with the Abrams.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
And what if the penetration is in the bustle? Believe me that the turret will achieve free flight in the result

Me: Rubbish, see above.

Originally Posted by FutureTank
I think I have seen one penetration in the bustle from a sabot on an M1 and the turret did not fly off, but that proves very little since there was no ammunition detonation or even cook-off. Maybe that area in the bustle was empty.

Me: Seems to fly in the face of what you said before about any hit to the bussle resulting in a flying turret.

Show me in this entire exchange where anybody has stated that the tank can go on fighting after the blow off panels have done their bit to save the crew's life? The point is, and I've made it before a highly trained tank crew is irreplacable - a tank is easier to replace. Look at it this way seeing as you seem to have little regard for crew safety, think of all the parts of the tank that can be salvaged because the blow off panels have ensured the turret wasn't bblown clean off the vehicle.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
That is however the least of the crew's problem. In the case of the M1 SEP, the surviving crew will be left in the midst of combat with, perhaps, six rounds in the hull. I suppose you know how long those last...

Right... so it's therefore your assertation that its better to have the crew killed and the turret physically made to fly that have the crew live and only have 6 rounds in the hull available to fight on with.

Firstly there is no guarantee that the blow-off panels will contain all ammunition detonation under every bustle penetration scenario, and bustle penetration is just one possibility.
The bustle penetration represents a very small percentage of hit probability even from the side aspect, and at the average engagement range of 1,200m with modern tank ammunition sadly the issue of crew survival is academic, and based mostly on luck. Mostly the crew has to attempt and not get hit.

Reducing the number of crew to 3 reduces casualties by 25% even before combat starts.

Secondly, if you think that the enemy tank crew will be satisfied with one round hit on a last generation NATO tank, you are ill informed about tank gunnery. Unless that turret is spewing flame from the crew access, it is very likely to receive another two or three rounds within seconds. This is particularly true when the shooter knows about the 'safety feature' of the enemy tank that requires firing at least another round 'for good measure'.

Here is another news flash: tank crews die at prodigious rate in armoured combat. The armour is a bit deceptive as a visual assurance of survival. Even in an "infantry war" like Vietnam, the "highest loss-rate for any MOS was 11E (Armor Crewman) 27% KIA"

From the Strategypage forum
"Casualties amoung the crews were in excess of 100%." Casualties for the Israelis were horrific. Over 50% of all tankers and 70% of armor officers in the IDF became casualties during the war. The Barak Brigade officer casualties amounted to all officers in the original unit and reinforcements, except the brigade S-2 and the chaplain. The brigade commander and S-3 were killed outright during the battle. Sources: Post war briefings at FT Knox (when I was in AOB) and War of Atonement by Herzog.
IDF tanks were Pattons and Centurions, so there3 was not much thinking about crew survival in NATO during the design and development of those tanks also it seems.

My assertion is therefore that it is better to design a tank which is balanced and meets many different service requirements, including crew survival. In terms of Soviet tanks designed in the 1950s-1970s, I think they are just fine. When the Russian designers come up with a new model, we can compare it to the 1980s NATO designs, shall we?

[Abraham Gubler]

IDF tanks were Pattons and Centurions, so there3 was not much thinking about crew survival in NATO during the design and development of those tanks also it seems.

A classic example of why you are so very wrong Greg. If you try and reduce battlefield results down to such a simplistic determination you are likely to be wrong. That you do so to support your preconceived conclusions guarantees you are wrong.

Israeli tank crew casualties in the '73 war had a lot more to do with the tactical situation than comparative tank design. Tanks outnumbered and surrounded of even the most robust design tend to result in high levels of casualties.

There was also a high proportion of tanks hit by HEAT warheads and subsequent hydraulic fires. Not something that tank designers were well aware of before '73. After '73 considerable effort was put into defeating HEAT warheads and reducing the danger of hydraulic fires.

Certainly in '73 the most vulnerable tank in the world to HEAT fires was the T-64 and the T-72. While western tank designers learnt from the experience the Soviets didn't.

My assertion is therefore that it is better to design a tank which is balanced and meets many different service requirements, including crew survival. In terms of Soviet tanks designed in the 1950s-1970s, I think they are just fine. When the Russian designers come up with a new model, we can compare it to the 1980s NATO designs, shall we?

More foolishness. For one the M1, Challenger, Merkava and Leopard II were all designed in the 1970s. For two the Soviets designed many tanks in the 1980s. It was their decision to focus on the T-80 and T-90, block improvements of the T-64 and T-72 rather than build the clean sheet design like the T-74. That they did so shows how much concern they had for 'balanced' tank design.

As to the assertion that the T-64, T-72 and their derivatives are somehow more balanced than western tanks. That is equally misguided. The only advantage in any performance figure is they are cheaper to build requiring less materials and labour. Even the fuel consumption advantage of the T-64 and T-72 was squandered by the Soviets in their first echelon tank at their demise; the T-80.

You continue to post more and more counter-knowledge. It may be you perverted world view but much of it is baseless. That you can be shown to be wrong at every turn and never catch a breath says it all...

[Abraham Gubler]

Given that the last generation NATO tanks have same physical size weapon as the T-64, everything else amounts to extra 20t of predominantly armour. To me this spells a rather obvious lack of engineering creativity. Somehow, others read this as a "flaw" in Soviet designs!

This is completely wrong. Trying to posit flawed data to support your view point is incredibly dishonest. Though I would imagine you have no actual idea what the physical size of a T-64 actually is?

The T-64 family have internal volumes of around 11 cubic metres. Western tanks like the M1, Leopard 2 and Challenger have an internal volume of around 18 cubic metres. The T-64 is 60% of the physical size. The only engineering creativity the Soviets have shown is to sacrifice capability: gun depression and ammunition compartmentalisation. That the Swedes were able to cut size by the same regard and keep low gun depression and complete ammunition compartmentalisation shows just who was being creative.

[Abraham Gubler]

The M551 Shillelagh platform was a waste of taxpayers' money. If the Cavalry didn't find use for a 152mm flachette round in Vietnam, it would go down in history as the most confused tank design ever by anyone. A light tank, supporting leg infantry with 20 rounds and 9 missiles, intended to be deployed far from its logistic support? Sometimes one has to ask, what were they thinking?

It’s a well known fact what "they were thinking". The US Army had designed the world's best airborne tank of the 1950s. The T92 light tank. Then the Soviets unveiled the PT-76 amphibious tank and the US Congress demanded the future US Army light tank be amphibious. So the T92 was sent to the museum and the M551 developed. Copying the Soviets is not a good idea...

This is the reason the M551 was used in OPFOR training, because it was the only armoured vehicle to approach the speed of the T-72 off road.
So very wrong! The M551 was used for OPFOR because it was the cheapest tracked vehicle in US Army storage.

As a matter of fact the tactical approach to enemy artillery in the 60s and 70s by the NATO tanks was to button up and wait it out. They were expected to come out of it with minor external damage unless the crew was extremely unlucky to suffer a direct hit. Artillery fires on actual units are difficult to simulate in peacetime, and the questioning of the artillery data in the US Army only begun after considerable persuasion by the Israelis in the 1970s. It is my understanding that this effectively halted the XM1 project for several years. The data verification did not become public until 1988, but was probably available in the final stages of M1 and Bradley design phases c.1978/9. I'm only speculating here, but it coincides with the late Brigadier Simpkin's invitation to several times visit the United States, and the commencement of research into the Soviet operational art as a stand-alone intensive project by the US Staff College. The argument probably went something like, if we got artillery data wrong, what else?

So very, very wrong. The effects of artillery splinters were a well known factor for Western tank designers. People like Brig. Richard Simpkin (who was not an artillery officer; Royal Tank Regiment) raised a lot of awareness of the concentrations of Soviet artillery destruction norms that would lead to statistical destruction of NATO tanks via direct hits (ie they would shoot enough rounds into an area occupied by a tank unit that at least one round would fall into each of the square meterages occupied by a tank).

It is important to place this effect into the conext which was moving form a nuclear battlefield expected in the 50s and 60s into there being a first stage conventional fight for West Germany. In the presence of direct nuclear attack laying low was the best countermeasure. Though the same dispersion, operational movement to concentration that protect against nuclear targeting also protected against high concentration artillery fires.

Not only do Soviet tanks have lower profile, but they have significantly lower surface area susceptible to frag/debris damage than NATO tanks where typical artillery burst (155mm) is concerned.

Not correct in the slightest. Soviet efforts to reduce volume were focused on the vertical dimension not the horizontal. The Sovet tank has roughly the same surface area exposed to top attack as a Western tank. The standard Western 155mm shell for anti-tank use is the M483 DPICM shell (cluster round) which attacks from the top. The M483 was introduced into service in 1975. NATO tanks on the defensive would also fight from two step turret down, hull down fighting positions which would only expose the top to attack during bombardment (compared to advance to contact Soviet tank formations).

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Nope. Firepower and protection are both matters of physics. Mobility was determined by the norms guided by doctrine in the Soviet Army that was the design bureaus' sole client. Organisational velocity if you will. What was considered though which was not a matter of science, was the industrial production capacity for a new design. That is where the T-64 came a cropper. The other 'big one' is of course the crews you keep talking about. The Soviet Army found that they just could not allocate enough conscripts to crew the more complex designs in the offing in the 60s, so they reduced the crew and increased the support personnel numbers. I can't remember who, but someone worked out that if the essential field support personnel are added to the tank's crew, then a Soviet 3-crew tank has a crew of 5, while the then new NATO tanks had crews of 7-8. And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, and because NATO designers were attempting to design catch-up models for two decades. Again, no flaw.

What a load of drivel. The soviet union with a largely conscript army could not find enough people to crew its tanks? Firepower and mobility are both matters of physics? Gee thats a useful statement - just a tad obvious I'd think. This would be a useful point to make if you expanded why you just stated the obvious to argue a point. Organisational velocity? What's that? That phrase doesn't link in any way to the sentence before or after it, it's drivel. Perhaps it's the speed the high command of an organisation achieves when fired from a cannon?

I particularly like this point: And this just happens to describe the factors that Soviets think are important in considering a tank design, the 'big five': suitability for production, ease of crew and support personnel training, and combat characteristics you mentioned. Again there is no flaw because the Soviet Union was outproducing NATO in tanks, So there is no flaw in Soviet tank designs because the Soviet Union was outproducing Nato?
So western tank designers are continually playing catch up are they? During Desert Storm the Iraqui's had quite a few tank engagements between the 500 T-72's they owned and the M1's and Challengers of the coalition. if these tanks were superior surely that would have offset any tactical disadvantage due to Iraqui ineptitude, yet in nearly every engagement the kill ratio was what 20 or 50 to one? Doesn't seem to support your point very well does it? Egypt for example has traditionally purchased soviet equipment. Recently it has purchased M1's tanks and Mig 29SMT's. If the current Russian designs were so superior why would the Egyptians who have no particular affiliation chose the Abrams over current Russian designs? Could it be that the better tank is a western design?

Were you an officer in the Army?

The Soviet union lost about 27 miilion in the war, and another estimated 25 miiilion shortfall in births. Besides that much of the education infrastructure in the most populated part of the Soviet Union was largely destroyed. It lost almost 50% of secondary and close to 75% of tertiary teaching staff. These populations, or the education resources to produce technologically capable personnel for the more advanced tanks of the 1960s were still not available, and the damage of war to the population and education infrastructure was not restored in the Soviet Union until late 1960s, though some argue that this was never achieved during USSR's being. Absolute country population numbers do not necessarily reflect its ability to provide suitable personnel for its armed forces.

You seemed to not understand that firepower and mobility are largely a matter of physics. It was not my intention to in any way insult you. Sometimes stating the obvious is useful in a discussion to establish that both parties are on the 'same page' as it were.

Organisational velocity is reflective of the norms used by the Soviet Army planner based on stated operational tempo rates at each level of command from tactical to strategic. Its a short way to express what I just said, and Simpkin used a whole chapter to explain and define it. It s foreign concept in NATO doctrines.

Suitability of the design for production, particularly wartime production, was one of the design selection criteria in the Soviet Union. It is pointless if the design is very safe for the crew, but insufficient number of units can be produced to win a war, right?

Let me rewrite what you said below
During the 1991 Desert Storm the 44 Iraqi divisions, of which 42 were combat ineffective, had an unknown number of tank engagements between the estimated 500 early model export version T-72's they owned and the unknown number of 1980s made and upgraded M1's and Challengers of the coalition. if these tanks were superior surely that would have offset any tactical disadvantage due to Iraqui ineptitude, yet in nearly every engagement the kill ratio was what 20 or 50 to one?
Even simple logic suggests that a more recent design is likely to be more advanced than an older design.
However, I will once again state the obvious that the crew is part of the crew survival systems included in the design.It is equally obvious that engineering for incompetence is an unachievable goal in tank design.

Egyptian purchase of the M1 was mostly for foreign relations and domestic politics reasons. The purchase was in part paid for by Saudi Arabia and in part because "the country has used the US military aid program that accompanied the 1979 Camp David Accords to replace much of that equipment with American items. The country began a co-production program for M1 Abrams tanks in 1988, which involves kit assembly in Egypt but outsources sensitive functions like adding the M1’s special armor." However, by 1991 not even a company was fielded by the Egyptian Army, and the Egyptian 3rd Armored and 3rd Mechanized Divisions came to Saudi Arabia with T-62s. Then they requested more M1s after they realised that Bush is likely to win the election and was likely to take a hard stand towards Iraq. Last I heard though is that Egyptians have a lot of problems servicing their tanks, and an estimated 35% are in fact not combat worthy.

[FutureTank]

The Christie tank and BT series had their engine in the rear, turret in the centre and driver at the front - much lke current designs. How does this wash with your assertation that the mass needs to be centralised? One of the fastest tracked vehicles in recent service would be the brits Scimitar/Scorpion varients. Official top speed 80kph, unofficially, quite a bit more - they are front engined.

I don't know where I know this from, so need a bit of time to get back to where I got this idea in the first place.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I suspect that had the Soviet Army chosen to adopt the JS-3 as their point of MBT design origin they too would have had the volume to introduce all sorts of creature comforts. Are you saying that doing more with less in tank warfare is a flaw?

The Js-2 had a weight of 46 tonnes, I can only guess that the JS-3 was heavier compared to the T34-85 at 32 tonnes. That level of interior volume and armour has a cost in weight, so IF the soviets had pursued this line of tanks they too would have ended up with an equivalent weight to western designs. Where is the 'more with less' equation here?


But they did not pursue the this heavy tank line of design philosophy, and ended up with c.40t tanks with same gun. In 1980 the T-80 was still 43t.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
When people start comparing "apples with apples", I will happily listen.

We are comparing MAIN BATTLE TANKS - it is apples with apples.


Yes, the main battle tank is the tank mostly used in a given national Army. This was achieved not by engineering design in the US Army, but by administrative action of renaming the M26 from a 'heavy tank' to a 'main tank', later main battle tank, in the way the British Army renamed the Centurion from a 'cruiser' to a 'universal' tank.

The previous "main" tank in both the US and the British armies was the M4 Sherman at 30.3t. The renaming of the M26 increased the weight of the main tank to 41.7t, i.e. by 11.4t or 37.6%. In the case of Centurion the increase was to 51t by 20.7t or 68.3%. The Cromwell, another 'cruiser tank', was only 27.9t.

Conversely the Soviet wartime main tank, the T-34/85, weighed 32t and was replaced by the T-54 at 36t and T-55 at 40.5t, increases of 4t and 8.5t respectively. These were increases of 12.5% and 26.5% respectively by 1958.

Now you may not be aware of it, but before apples reach the shops, they are sorted, or graded into sizes among other categories. This assures that if a customer purchases a tray of apples, they re all same size in the tray. The main apple in the tray is usually the medium apple because smaller apples are soled for canning purposes, and very large fruit are sold for cooking.

What you are doing with the tanks is renaming the heavy tanks "main" and selling them as "medium". So I comes to the market and I see your "main" tanks and next to them are these smaller "medium" tanks, and sure, they look great, but, you only get a dozen to the "tray", of the "main", but you get 24 to the "tray" of the "mediums".

So yes, we are comparing "main" battle tanks, but that does not describe their most important weight classification that guides oh so many other engineering factors, including crew survivability, right?

So, can the NATO tank designers produce a medium tank? No.
They can produce an infantry fighting vehicle in the same weight class though, so maybe next decade

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Which electronic equipment? You mean this?

Is it a flaw in the Soviet design that the French electronics don't function in Indian deserts?
Here India Army´s T-72 Upgrade Program - Project RHINO [Archive] - Military Photos is an article on the T-72 Indian upgrade planning c.2004. So you take a state-designed tank that had state enterprises design upgrade systems and subsytems for, and you try and fit systems and subsystems designed by non-state commercial enterprises that never intended their product to go into the T-72. What were those Soviet designers thinking of?
Where is the flaw in design here?

Where do we start - lack of a climate control system to the detriment of the crew and electronics. A space so constrained that it makes future upgrades difficult (technology does evolve) just for starters. There's a very good chance a western design would not have needed to be upgraded in the first place, and if it was necessary, upgrades seem to accomplished a fair bit easier and with more success.

I think you missed the question.
Where is the fault of the Soviet designers that the Indians are having problems with adopting the T-72 to THEIR needs?

Clearly in the original specification for the T-72 export version there was no specification for a climate control system. If it had been installed on the T-72, they would have been way ahead of their time since the Australian Army only installed them in 1997. Of course it could be that ADF didn't really care about the comforts of the Australian tankers before that year.

The T-72 tank has been modernised and upgraded over the past four decades. So far the observed trend is that electronics, the primary internal form of upgrade are only getting smaller, and more adaptable to internal tank spaces. For example some electronic modules can now be moulded to the available spaces in the tank rather than manufactured in the old boxy forms. This is likely to only get easier, not harder.

[Abraham Gubler]

Now you may not be aware of it, but before apples reach the shops, they are sorted, or graded into sizes among other categories. This assures that if a customer purchases a tray of apples, they re all same size in the tray. The main apple in the tray is usually the medium apple because smaller apples are soled for canning purposes, and very large fruit are sold for cooking.

What you are doing with the tanks is renaming the heavy tanks "main" and selling them as "medium". So I comes to the market and I see your "main" tanks and next to them are these smaller "medium" tanks, and sure, they look great, but, you only get a dozen to the "tray", of the "main", but you get 24 to the "tray" of the "mediums".

So yes, we are comparing "main" battle tanks, but that does not describe their most important weight classification that guides oh so many other engineering factors, including crew survivability, right?

So, can the NATO tank designers produce a medium tank? No.
They can produce an infantry fighting vehicle in the same weight class though, so maybe next decade

What a load of semantical crap, its not even good semantics, its very poor. Tanks unlike apples are not sorted into weight class at the start of the battle. It isn't boxing. Featherweights have to fight heavyweights if they want to or not. The same applies for intellectual class of online posters here at DT. In which case I would classify FutureTank as well in the 'tankette' category. Not even a Bren carrier...

As to their being no NATO medium tank... The Leopard 1 and AMX 30 would be classified as such. So would the "XM1202 Mounted Combat System Tank, Combat, Full Tracked: Medium". The Leopard 1 and AMX 30 were built with 1950s technology and full allotment of volume for typical tank functions. So they scarified armour weight. The XM1202 built with 21st century technology was able to significantly reduce internal volume.

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Matilda was a heavy tank by British standards, but was same weight as the T-34, but undergunned. Churchill was an infantry support tank, not a heavy tank. Centurion was however a 'universal' tank (redesignated from Cruiser) that in reality was the first British "medium tank" in the Panther "mould" that had also been referred to in the Panzertruppen as a 'universal tank'. The only reason that there was no "British Tiger" is because the UK was industrially exhausted.

Again evading my point - the poms did have a history of heavy tank production - the Matilda predated the T34 by a number of years and was considered a heavy tank in its day. Just because it was labeled an infantry tank doesn't change its characteristics. There was in fact a british 'Tiger' called the TOG 2. This design could have been further developed but was abandonned in favour of the Centurion which should have been a decent match for the Tiger, but arrived too late to see action in WW11.

Matilda was used in combat as a medium tank

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Not at all. The British and Americans were convinced by the Germans that IF they had had enough Tigers and Panthers, they would have stopped the Red Army as they stopped the Allies in Normandy. Until early 1980s that was the basic understanding of tank warfare in NATO, and the designs went accordingly. Quite the contrary to lots of NATO heavy tanks sitting in hull down positions image, the actual doctrine was essentially that of the Wehrmacht with very minor national differences between the big four, and later three NATO tank users, and that is small combined armies groups based on battalion-brigade headquarters "pinching off" Soviet deep thrusts into West Germany. However, Germans never really "got" the Red Army's operational methods, which is why they lost in repeated Soviet offensives.

I forget which german general when asked by Hitler what sort of tank the general needed to stop the soviets replied T-34's. His somewhat ironic comments went unheeded and the rest is history. It wasn't the germans who never really 'got' the soviet tactics, it was Hitler who mandated such stupidities as not allowing withdrawl, not permitting his senior commanders any operational lattitude that was of great assistance to the soviets. The choice between cheap and plentiful or expensive and more capable was a simple choice for the west. Smaller standing armys had to look at quality over quantity, they had no choice. Unlike the USSR that could field an army as large as the politbureau demanded, western democracies need to satisfy voters, so maintaining an army the size of the eastern block countries was never going to happen.

Right, the Hitler lost the war, and forced designs of bad tanks and could not get enough troops into the front line. :rolleyes:

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Not waffling. The premise is that the Soviet tanks have a flaw in ignoring crew survival and the NATO tanks don't. What I, perhaps clumsily, tried to point out is that placed in the Soviet doctrinal context the NATO tanks would also have a flaw, and that flaw would equal to about 20t of the design. If the Soviet designers were given different doctrinal contexts, maybe those of the IDF, they too would perhaps produce a 70t heavy tank with near-100% crew survival potential.

Therefore we conclude that the soviet tanks were perfect for the then soviet doctrine. What of other 200+ countries that don't share this doctrine? NATO tanks do not have a 'flaw'. To have a tank with the technology of the day when their structures were originally designed (70's/80's) that offers the level of protection, mobility firepower and crew comfort (as well as the smaller facets such as limits on elevation depression etc) the vehicles happened to be around 20t more than soviet designs. Perhaps the next generation (such as FCS) will be much lighter than Soviet designs, according to your logic, this means that soviet designs have a design flaw.

Countries face the same choice as Australia of where to buy their tanks, and make selection best they can
I'm not sure what you see as advantages NATO tanks had over Soviet tanks in crew survivability before the last Cold War Generation

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Ignoring your sarcasm for a moment, I guess it depends what you see as modern. The T-72 belongs to the same generation of tanks as the M60A1, Leopard 1, and Chieftain, going into production in 1971. Aside from the low hull, I don't see very many significant differences in the design approach to crew survival. The M60 was a continued evolution of the M26/46. The Leopard was really a Panther design philosophy using 1960s technology, and Chieftain....well, the British have to be different by finally getting "their Tiger"
None of these tanks were present in the Gulf War. Moreover the low profile was not a significant factor in the defeat of the Iraqi armoured troops (see last quote).

US marines were equipped with M60's during GW1. What was the ratio M60's to T- 72 in kills?But once again you are forgetting the origins of this quote which was you telling me this was not about modern tanks.

Please, the USMC M60s was the last M60 upgrade version! And I don't think they actually engaged any Iraqi tanks
Well, its about Soviet tanks as the thread says. No new Soviet tank has been fielded that has been designed before the end of the Cold War.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I think its relevant since the fifth man was an assistant loader. It shows a different predisposition in general towards greater crew comfort, while not having a clue about doctrine. It was in fact the "American Tiger" designed sharing many M47/48 components, but intended to engage Soviet tanks at long range. Its elevation was 8 degrees, only three greater than its contemporary T-54, but no one claimed it flawed. Instead though...it went to be used by the Marines as an infantry support tank! The T-54 of course begun design during the war, and was intended to outrange the Tiger II. So, in 1957 they were surpassed by the US 65t design. I don't see a flaw here either.

Again we need to see context here:

Originally Posted by FutureTank
Of course to do this, the design requires a very large turret ring, so to portray this as an advantage, the NATO designers claim the NATO tanks are more ergonomic, forgetting that tanks are not made to ensure a comfy ride. You really do not want to be tossed around the turret as the driver tries to frantically take evasive action. In a T-34 tankers would just grab onto the gun, or push against the walls to keep themselves steady.

Me:Try that in a modern tank and the stabilisation system will ensure that anyone hanging onto the main armament will be pulped as the gun elevates and depresses. Having riden in a Leopard cross country with stab engaged I was damn glad that there was a big metal guard to keep me from being thrown against the breach as it moved up and down. Its not about 'comfort' as you keep saying - its about trying to minimise crew fatigue levels - warfare is a 24hour business, and particularly during the type of blitzkreig assaults experienced by the armoured forces under Gudarian in 1940 and GW I and GWII, this is a major consideration. In some cases the only times the tankers got to dismount was to reload and refuel for days at a time.

Originally Posted by Marc 1
Also its not about steadying yourself whilst the tank scoots to another firing position, crew are not there to hang on for dear life, they will be using their optics, searching for threats/targets, firing the gun whilst on the move and loading the gun. Manhandling a 120mm round in the confines of a turret is difficult enough when stationary - space is not a 'luxury' with current crew numbers and techniques. Sure it is possible to eliminate the loader, but then you have the additional workload of other tasks placed onto the other 3 crew (an argument all by itself).

FT: There used to be a five man crew in a 120mm armed US Tank.

So originally you started telling people that space was a luxury and that thankers in T34's just hung on to the breach of the main armament. When it was pointed out to you that taking that kind of action in a moder tank will see you pulped by the stab system, and that the crew aren't there just to hang on anymore, you decide to tell people for no apparent reason that there was a US tank with a crew of 5? To what end? To then say the US didn't have a clue about doctrine? Who's doctrine? A crew of 5 was not unusual in an allied tank at the end of WW11 - instead of manning a hull mounted MG this crew member was used to assist loading. Once again you demonstrate that you cannot argue effectively, you switch topics and try to divert. Why not just admit you are wrong?

The comment re hanging on for dear life in a T-34 was actually from a memoir. It illustrates the vast improvement made in the design of the fighting compartment in the T-54. I have no argument about what happens in tanks designed since the Second World War, or even at the end of it. My point is that flaws were being steady corrected in Soviet tanks over the history of their design
Having an assistant loader in the M103 suggests a certain thinking about tank design in the US. The JS-3 had a crew of 4, and it seems the loaders of 120mm armed tanks now can handle their ammunition alone. That thinking is comfort. The M26 was adopted as much for its heavier armour and larger gun as for being comfortable and big because the M4 was a fairly bad tank to fight in
Reference to doctrine was to question the creation of the M103, and then its use as an infantry support tank with the USMC. What was the thinking behind this tank in terms of its utility?
In the Sherman, the most widely used Allied medium tank the fifth crewman was a co-driver, but he was using the bow .30cal The intention was to have the ability to relieve the driver on march, but from my reading drivers hated anyone else driving the tank, so the guy ended up using the MG and making tea
Arguing effectively? All you have done is to pick on every point I make without stating why you think the Soviet tanks were flawed aside from comparing them with the incomparable

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I can only base what I say on combat experiences of various designs. Both Soviet and German heavy tanks had transmission and other chassis issues, German tanks worse so than the Soviet. The IDF also had to do a lot of work on the M48s which was integrated into the M60 that should have been M48A7. However I accept that you are largely correct in the process of how transmissions are selected.

How magnanamous of you. Trying to obfuscate by the drivel about reliability levels of WW2 and Korean war designs has little relevance.

What?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Was that reference to drugs necessary?

Pretty hard to take the high moral ground when you are seeking to mislead and misrepresent

So you decided on the lower approach?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
The bustle is there to increase the load of the tank. Guess where most of the original 55 rounds for the 105mm gun went in the M1? Or the 42 rounds of the SEP version Australia bought? But wait, the bustle is AS vulnerable to penetration as the rest of the turret! Without some way of venting ammunition detonation (not "cook off") it would be deadly, so the "crew safety features" are actually sheer necessity in the design! And what of the Israelis? Well, they have a "dry turret" now because all the ammunition is back in the hull in the Merkava IV.
The hull is also where the Soviet tanks keep much of the ammunition, so again, no significant flaw in 30 year old design.

Again misrepresentation. I have never stated that the soviet designs are flawed due to their ammunition being stored in the hull. Just mounting the rounds in the hull is not sufficient, not all engagements occur with the tank hull down - I'm willing to bet there is also a significant shielding system around the Merkava's ammunition storage. The turret bustle is at the rear of the turret - given that the turret will normally face the expected threat that reduces the probability of a hit in this area significantly. If the bustle is penetrated it still protects the crew. Problem? No.

And what is the problem with the Soviet tanks not having this "feature"?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
The gun does not need a counterbalance, and you well know it, since it has a recoil system like all ordnance pieces.
Yet again stop misquoting me. Here is what I have said:

Sounds like rubbish to me. If anything a bussle on a turret will help counterbalance the weight of the gun. There are certain limits anyway to using a cross slope as a hull down position - namely the gun depression limits. Normally a tank will approach a crest to achieve a hull down position by driving forward -thickest armour at the front of the vehicle, so cross slope positioning and the risk of the vehicle rolling over is not an issue.

Note I said counterbalances the turret, not the gun.

Marc 1, how does one counterbalance a turret? And why, fiven it is mounted in the turret ring?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Given a certain slope gradient and the perpendicular position of the turret up-slope, the tank has a chance of toppling backwards. This was the problem with the Soviet KV-2 that was compounded by the inadequate recoil absolution for its much larger gun. Admittedly it is not a great worry, but in the heat of combat the driver may not be aware of the turret position and the gunner may not be aware of the hull orientation.

Sounds like a design and testing issue to me. This is what Google has to say about the KV2:

While impressive on paper, it had been designed as a slow-moving bunker-buster. It was less useful in the type of highly mobile, fluid warfare that developed in World War II. The turret was so heavy it was difficult to traverse on non-level terrain, and it was expensive to produce. Only about 250 KV-2s were made, all in 1940-41, making it one of the rarer Soviet tanks.

Ironically, more weight (you know that evil thing you keep harping about) may have provided a cure. But seriously if you are using this 3.65m tall monstrosity whose trunions seem to be about a meter higher than a modern MBT as an example of how unstable MBT's are you are clutching at straws.

Ok, I'll get back to you on this, since I see some real data is required

[FutureTank]

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Actually given the proposed gun depression, the location of the hull would be such that the depth of the elevation crest it is behind would be of far greater protection from returned fire than its own frontal armour.

Err, that's the idea of being hull down.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
If you are suggesting that reversing [straight back]? into the dead ground is what you would do, than I would say that a much better solution is to approach the crest obliquely which not only allows the driver the option of reversion, but also going forward down the slope (never straight over the top).

Get out your pen and start rewriting tactics manuals for quite a few army's then, as this is not the usual way they operate. Think about it - if you approach the crest at a say 45 degree angle and either go too far or find an enemy vehicle coming up the same crest from the other side, you are exposing your weaker side armour. Lets say you fire a shot and then move forward, even if you turn quickly the enemy will have an idea which side you are likely to appear around and train their weapons appropriately. Many MBT transmissions incorporate more than one reverse ratio to enable faster reversing.

"if you approach the crest at a say 45 degree angle and either go too far or find an enemy vehicle coming up the same crest from the other side" - er, no, that requires a new tank driver course manual, not tactics.
Tactics is where a unit seeks to occupy a defensive, position with no prior area recon, and is surprise at close range. S**t happens, but less rarely if one looks where he is going
I don't understand how the enemy is supposed to see which way the tank is exiting the firing position through the smoke and dust of the plume that conceals the turret only. The driver obviously does not gun the engine so the tank can be observed by its exhaust, so likelihood of being fired on only remains from the mortars, or some organic artillery. In either case I doubt the crew wants to stuff around doing three point turns on a slope rather than just scooting away in the facing direction
Of course I have no practical experience and just observe based on my reading and talking with those that had

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Angles of depression I have been able to find: T54/55 -5 degrees, T62 -5 degrees T-64 ? T-72 -6 degrees T-80 -4 degrees. T-90 ? degrees. I cannot find 18 degrees - unless you are talking elevation which is of course the exact opposite and would prove that you really do have no idea. One of the main reasons that limits main armament depression in an MBT isn't necessarily the hull, but the fact that there is not enough height inside the turret to allow the breech to recoil. It is one of the main reasons why western tanks are higher. The trunions are usually placed higher in western tanks as well as this means less depression restrictions by the hull. This is not just 'handy' when firing from a reverse slope, but means the main armament is less likely to find its stops when trying to track a target whilst moving across rough ground.

No, as it was explained to me the procedure works differently. The gun is lowered over the side, and the tank edges up to the crest side on. The gunner observes through the barrel, then the tank tanks a "roll" back, the gun is loaded, and comes up to the crest again to fire at available elevation, which are the numbers you quoted. However, when I asked a former Soviet tanker (currently officer in a training unit) about this depression he said the West makes too much of it. It is rare in his experience to not find a hull down position, and in nay case tanks are for moving not for sitting around on reverse slopes.

Incidentally, unless the mortar fire is some form of anti armour round conventional fragmentation/HE rounds will have little effect.

Soviet doctrine suggests differently, but the data I have came from the Western experience and suggests as you say, that mortar fire is ineffective

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I guess you will need to do a bit of research. Although prevalent during the Second World War, toppling tanks are found in wartime and peacetime since, even in training.

I'd better get a warning out to all tankies then. Strange that you hear about MRAPS rolling but not tanks. The armys of the world must have some huge shared conspiracy to keep the knowledge of these death traps to themselves eh?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
I'm quite happy to admit I'm wrong, when I am suitably convinced of it.

I'm suitably convinced that you will never change your mind, so don't go looking for any further replies.

Ok

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
Did you forget that the 'septics' had integrated battlegroup networking while the Iraqis had even their tactical radios jammed? What about the fact that the Iraqi T-72s were firing 20 year old ammunition meant for the M60s? How about lack of combat leadership in many Iraqi armoured units? I could go on.
Again, there does not seem to be a Soviet tank design flaw, but the organisational flaw by the user.

You'll have to explain how you fire ammunition intended for a rifled 105mm gun from a 125mm smoothbore. Go ahead, make all the excuses you want - the stories are legion about how the poor bloody Iraqi tankers could not even see the yanks and poms with their night vision gear and were being picked off en masse.

The Iraqi 125mm APFSDS round had been designed in the 1970s to deal with the likes of M60, and had been taken out of Soviet service by this stage, and used for training only

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
However, you ask ANY 'septic' officer, from any Arm what the requisite superiority ratio is on the offensive, and he/she will tell you it is 3:1. As a matter of fact most won't even know why its 3:1, but they all know it. The Soviet Army prefers 6:1 local superiority in the breakthrough as this makes things a bit easier, roughly compatible to "hot knife through butter" when an offensive is conducted by an integrated combined arms force.

What has this got to do with the price of fish? here's a little tip, some of us do know about these ratio's, after all we don't just sit around polishing brass and boots - for officers there is actually a module on Tactics that if you fail will end your career. If you like I can still quote for you artillery planning ranges of both the RAG and the DAG (that should excite you - they were after all based on soviet weapons and doctrine when I leaned them 21 years ago). But I fail to see what this has to do with the discussion.
Tanks, aside from crew survivability, are also designed to perform in a certain way, individually and in units and formations. Force ratios as you know have to do with the reality that an attacking force will, all things being equal, take casualties. Clearly in Iraq not all things were equal, and it had nothing to do with crew survivability.

[eckherl]

One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

Thus some of the reasons why T series tanks are less accurate and are in need of additional boresighting sessions, they just recently started realizing the benefits of a good MRS device located at the end of the tube.

[eckherl]

Do they plan to keep the T90 production line while preparing/build a second in the next few years for the new T-xx or will they stop producing the T90 as soon as orders are fullfilled and switch to the new one completely?

No new Russian T-95 will make its debute any time soon, you can expect T-80 and 90 series to go thru a series of upgrades to keep them soldiering on for at least another decade, this will include a bustle mounted loading system on both series tanks also for safety purposes for the crew, ease in uploading the vehicles and give the potential for long rod growth for KE projectiles.

[eckherl]

Again, the T-90 is a stop-gap measure. It's going through low-level production. If Russia were to be as economically strong as it were under Soviet times, they'd have replace the entire T-72 fleet by less than 10 years, I think. Soviet tank production ran at about a few thousand a year (not entirely sure of the figure, but I do know it's within the thousands), but from various factories.

No, the T-90 is not viewed as a stop gap measure and the only reason why Russian units are not getting them in a timely fashion is due to current threats to the country, cost and exporting them out to other countries. kind of the same situation inregards to BMP 3, how many of those are Russian units getting.

[Abraham Gubler]

No, the T-90 is not viewed as a stop gap measure and the only reason why Russian units are not getting them in a timely fashion is due to current threats to the country, cost and exporting them out to other countries. kind of the same situation inregards to BMP 3, how many of those are Russian units getting.

The countries of the former Soviet Union have effectively recovered their GDP to the levels of the Soviet Union at the fall. However much of this economic regrowth is not in heavy industry sectors as the Soviet economy was hugely skewered in this areas favour. Also modern Russia is spending a tiny fraction of its GDP on defence compared to the Russian part of the Soviet Union. Russia is only spending about 2.5% of GDP on Defence compared to the Soviet Union that was spending upwards of 20%. The USA spends about 4% on defence and most other countries under 2%. Despite increasing defence spending Russia faces a huge opportunity deficit thanks to the lack of investment in defence industry infrastructure back to the Soviet era and the past 20 years of low defence spending. The Russians would need to completely modernise their industry to even be able of building a new blank sheet tank.

[Feanor]

No new Russian T-95 will make its debute any time soon, you can expect T-80 and 90 series to go thru a series of upgrades to keep them soldiering on for at least another decade, this will include a bustle mounted loading system on both series tanks also for safety purposes for the crew, ease in uploading the vehicles and give the potential for long rod growth for KE projectiles.

Just out of curiousity, how do you know this? And when can we expect to see it?

No, the T-90 is not viewed as a stop gap measure and the only reason why Russian units are not getting them in a timely fashion is due to current threats to the country, cost and exporting them out to other countries. kind of the same situation inregards to BMP 3, how many of those are Russian units getting.

To the best of my knowledge one bltn of BMP-3s was procured annually 2006-2008. I'm not sure if the numbers increased from there onward.

The countries of the former Soviet Union have effectively recovered their GDP to the levels of the Soviet Union at the fall. However much of this economic regrowth is not in heavy industry sectors as the Soviet economy was hugely skewered in this areas favour. Also modern Russia is spending a tiny fraction of its GDP on defence compared to the Russian part of the Soviet Union. Russia is only spending about 2.5% of GDP on Defence compared to the Soviet Union that was spending upwards of 20%. The USA spends about 4% on defence and most other countries under 2%. Despite increasing defence spending Russia faces a huge opportunity deficit thanks to the lack of investment in defence industry infrastructure back to the Soviet era and the past 20 years of low defence spending. The Russians would need to completely modernise their industry to even be able of building a new blank sheet tank.

UVZ has modernized quite extensively since 1999, mainly due to the production of the T-90S for India, T-90A for domestic, and T-90SA for the Algerians. Overall the T-90 has seen a serial run of around 1000 units since the India order opened up. Interestingly enough even right now in the crisis, while railroad car production at UVZ has slowed down and around 20 000 workers were laid off in the railroad department, the tank assembly line is still working with no lay-offs in sight.

It's also the only tank plant left in Russia. So when you say industry I'm assuming you're also referring to the sub-manufacturers such as JSC Spetstehnika, and OAO "Motovilikhinskiye zavody".

[FutureTank]

One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

This is probably correct when accuracy at long ranges is required. However, at the time of Soviet tank designs, and NATO, the average engagement range in Europe was 700-900m. Even in the North African Campaign of the Second World War the average engagement LOS was 1,100m.

Aside from the fact that at the time Soviet tanks were not doctrinally required to fight predominantly from hull-down positions, was this a significant consideration for NATO designers?

It seemed to me that the reasoning behind Soviet designs was that a penetration at the average range from a 105mm or a 120mm gun was likely to be disabling if not destructive to their tanks, and same applied to the effect of a 115mm or 125mm round on NATO tanks. It is virtually impossible to miss a tank at 900m even with a less accurate gun using even T-55 optics, regardless of it being 40t or 60t.
Penetration anywhere outside of the frontal armour at that range was likely with 1970s technology, and would be disabling even if no ammunition was detonated inside. There are just too many systems inside the fighting compartment of a Cold War tank since c.1956 for a penetration to miss everything. Even at the 80s level of computerisation, a single power surge would likely to have fried every chip in most systems.

Also, three crew in a turret and the gun's breech, even with more volume of a NATO tank, will still occupy more than 50% of the internal turret volume, and therefore there is at least a 50/50 chance of a wound on at least one crewman, or damage to the breech. I suspect, due to lack of published statements, that the thinking of Soviet designers was, if they must have a 50/50% chance of a casualty in the turret, they may as well reduce the number of crew to two. The autoloader also reduces the size of the breech somewhat. Mind you that's academic if the carousel is hit.

Was lack of accuracy in Soviet tanks considered a factor by US designers or British or German armoured forces?

In the XM1, "Crew survivability was the number one priority for the new tank.", however what many forget that the primary factor in this is, er....armour! With all the best intentions, the M1A1 HA did not enter production until 1988, and only just over 600 of these were available for the Gulf War in 1991. Depleted uranium has two and a half times the density of steel. It was only added on the front turret armour which is based on WW2 data of tank vs tank greatest number of hits in combat data.

Does that mean that despite knowing this the US designers neglected the crew for four decades and only woke up to the fact in 1988? Nope, its just that the science and technology were not there to offer the degree of protection desired in a head-to-head tank engagement until 1988.

It also means that they expected Soviet gunnery to be accurate enough to hit the front of the M1 turret at 900m under combat conditions and after a cross country march that may have affected stabilisation in Soviet tanks, and so they took appropriate steps to remedy this.

Ultimately all the upgrades, but chiefly armour, added 8t to the burden of the AGT-1500 engine. This may have been acceptable for a force that only fielded 5,000 vehicles, but the Soviet Army fielded more than that in T-64s alone! It was simply uneconomical to increase fuel consumption of such a much larger fleet that would include the T-72s and T-80s, a fleet of at least 15,000 tanks. Still they tried as anyone who remembers the "Dolly Parton" frontal armour upgrades knows.

[Firn]

UVZ has modernized quite extensively since 1999, mainly due to the production of the T-90S for India, T-90A for domestic, and T-90SA for the Algerians. Overall the T-90 has seen a serial run of around 1000 units since the India order opened up. Interestingly enough even right now in the crisis, while railroad car production at UVZ has slowed down and around 20 000 workers were laid off in the railroad department, the tank assembly line is still working with no lay-offs in sight.

It's also the only tank plant left in Russia. So when you say industry I'm assuming you're also referring to the sub-manufacturers such as JSC Spetstehnika, and OAO "Motovilikhinskiye zavody".

So how many T-90s can be produced or can be purchased by the Russian Army? And how well does the T-90 address the points raised by Waylander and Eckerl about the accuracy?

[Marc 1]

Originally Posted by Waylander
One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

This is probably correct when accuracy at long ranges is required. However, at the time of Soviet tank designs, and NATO, the average engagement range in Europe was 700-900m. Even in the North African Campaign of the Second World War the average engagement LOS was 1,100m.

Aside from the fact that at the time Soviet tanks were not doctrinally required to fight predominantly from hull-down positions, was this a significant consideration for NATO designers?

It seemed to me that the reasoning behind Soviet designs was that a penetration at the average range from a 105mm or a 120mm gun was likely to be disabling if not destructive to their tanks, and same applied to the effect of a 115mm or 125mm round on NATO tanks. It is virtually impossible to miss a tank at 900m even with a less accurate gun using even T-55 optics, regardless of it being 40t or 60t.
Penetration anywhere outside of the frontal armour at that range was likely with 1970s technology, and would be disabling even if no ammunition was detonated inside. There are just too many systems inside the fighting compartment of a Cold War tank since c.1956 for a penetration to miss everything. Even at the 80s level of computerisation, a single power surge would likely to have fried every chip in most systems.

Also, three crew in a turret and the gun's breech, even with more volume of a NATO tank, will still occupy more than 50% of the internal turret volume, and therefore there is at least a 50/50 chance of a wound on at least one crewman, or damage to the breech. I suspect, due to lack of published statements, that the thinking of Soviet designers was, if they must have a 50/50% chance of a casualty in the turret, they may as well reduce the number of crew to two. The autoloader also reduces the size of the breech somewhat. Mind you that's academic if the carousel is hit.

Was lack of accuracy in Soviet tanks considered a factor by US designers or British or German armoured forces?

In the XM1, "Crew survivability was the number one priority for the new tank.", however what many forget that the primary factor in this is, er....armour! With all the best intentions, the M1A1 HA did not enter production until 1988, and only just over 600 of these were available for the Gulf War in 1991. Depleted uranium has two and a half times the density of steel. It was only added on the front turret armour which is based on WW2 data of tank vs tank greatest number of hits in combat data.

Does that mean that despite knowing this the US designers neglected the crew for four decades and only woke up to the fact in 1988? Nope, its just that the science and technology were not there to offer the degree of protection desired in a head-to-head tank engagement until 1988.

It also means that they expected Soviet gunnery to be accurate enough to hit the front of the M1 turret at 900m under combat conditions and after a cross country march that may have affected stabilisation in Soviet tanks, and so they took appropriate steps to remedy this.

Ultimately all the upgrades, but chiefly armour, added 8t to the burden of the AGT-1500 engine. This may have been acceptable for a force that only fielded 5,000 vehicles, but the Soviet Army fielded more than that in T-64s alone! It was simply uneconomical to increase fuel consumption of such a much larger fleet that would include the T-72s and T-80s, a fleet of at least 15,000 tanks. Still they tried as anyone who remembers the "Dolly Parton" frontal armour upgrades knows.

When you quote a poster you are replying or commenting directly in response to that post. You do know that don't you? Have another look at Waylanders post - he is referring to the fact that because the soviet designs do not depress as far as western designs, when travelling across country the stabilisation system will hit its limits (ie not be able to keep the assigned point of aim) as well as a NATO design. This has bugger all to do with range. Even at a range of 20 meters if you cannot bring the barrel of your main armament to bear you cannot hit the target. Quoting factoids about the north african campaign will not change that fact.

Then you proceed to regale us with casualty figres and volume figures if a turret is penetrated. Why? This has nothing to do with the ability of a tanks stab system or the limits imposed by its design. Where did you get these figures? In one of your previous posts you claim the reason for the automatic loader is because the russian army could not find enough conscripts to put a loader in every tank. Now you claim the designers made this call to limit casualties? Which is it?

Your final paragraph is that adding 8 tonnes of armour adds an impost to the fuel consumption that only the US with its fleet of 5000 tanks can bear, but the Russians with a fleet of 15,000 cannot afford it? For starters you'd probably find the addition of 8 tonnes would have a barely perceptable increase in fuel usage - certainly a justifiable one give the benefits of uparmouring.

[Waylander]

Thanks Marc. You just beat me with your reply.
As you said hitting your maximum elevation has nothing to do with range at all.
Your aim is screwed and it is quite unimportant how far away your target is.

And hitting your max. elevation is quite easy with a Leo II during a cross country ride.
It is even much more easy with a T-72.

I may also add some thoughts to Future Tank's posts when I have some more time.

[Abraham Gubler]

The design of the Object 430 (that became the T-64) in 1958 had nothing to do with demographics. The automatic loader was selected like the 5TD engine and low turret roof height (limiting depression) to drastically reduce the internal volume and hence armoured volume and therefore weight.

As to Soviet demographics they were hardly effected by a one person reduction of tank crew strength. Especially since this reduction resulted in an increased maintenance burden and more maintainers. Since the Soviets retained an active tank park of around 35,000 vehicles this is less than 1% of active army strength. Hardly a significant impact to go from four to three per crew.

The Soviet Union under Khrushchev dealt with the WW2 caused baby drain in the late 50s, early 60s by reducing the size of the ground force and replacing their combat power with nuclear missiles. New vehicles like the BMP were the solution to the reduction in infantry bayonets in the 60s, not reducing tank crew size.

Another example of FT fantasy. Not as bad as his belief that tank gun depression is dependent on how steep the front of a tank is angled (as in the Sherman) when its all about turret roof height... :onfloorl:

[Wooki]

This is probably correct when accuracy at long ranges is required. However, at the time of Soviet tank designs, and NATO, the average engagement range in Europe was 700-900m. Even in the North African Campaign of the Second World War the average engagement LOS was 1,100m.

Aside from the fact that at the time Soviet tanks were not doctrinally required to fight predominantly from hull-down positions, was this a significant consideration for NATO designers?

It seemed to me that the reasoning behind Soviet designs was that a penetration at the average range from a 105mm or a 120mm gun was likely to be disabling if not destructive to their tanks, and same applied to the effect of a 115mm or 125mm round on NATO tanks. It is virtually impossible to miss a tank at 900m even with a less accurate gun using even T-55 optics, regardless of it being 40t or 60t.
Penetration anywhere outside of the frontal armour at that range was likely with 1970s technology, and would be disabling even if no ammunition was detonated inside. There are just too many systems inside the fighting compartment of a Cold War tank since c.1956 for a penetration to miss everything. Even at the 80s level of computerisation, a single power surge would likely to have fried every chip in most systems.

Also, three crew in a turret and the gun's breech, even with more volume of a NATO tank, will still occupy more than 50% of the internal turret volume, and therefore there is at least a 50/50 chance of a wound on at least one crewman, or damage to the breech. I suspect, due to lack of published statements, that the thinking of Soviet designers was, if they must have a 50/50% chance of a casualty in the turret, they may as well reduce the number of crew to two. The autoloader also reduces the size of the breech somewhat. Mind you that's academic if the carousel is hit.

Was lack of accuracy in Soviet tanks considered a factor by US designers or British or German armoured forces?

In the XM1, "Crew survivability was the number one priority for the new tank.", however what many forget that the primary factor in this is, er....armour! With all the best intentions, the M1A1 HA did not enter production until 1988, and only just over 600 of these were available for the Gulf War in 1991. Depleted uranium has two and a half times the density of steel. It was only added on the front turret armour which is based on WW2 data of tank vs tank greatest number of hits in combat data.

Does that mean that despite knowing this the US designers neglected the crew for four decades and only woke up to the fact in 1988? Nope, its just that the science and technology were not there to offer the degree of protection desired in a head-to-head tank engagement until 1988.

It also means that they expected Soviet gunnery to be accurate enough to hit the front of the M1 turret at 900m under combat conditions and after a cross country march that may have affected stabilisation in Soviet tanks, and so they took appropriate steps to remedy this.

Ultimately all the upgrades, but chiefly armour, added 8t to the burden of the AGT-1500 engine. This may have been acceptable for a force that only fielded 5,000 vehicles, but the Soviet Army fielded more than that in T-64s alone! It was simply uneconomical to increase fuel consumption of such a much larger fleet that would include the T-72s and T-80s, a fleet of at least 15,000 tanks. Still they tried as anyone who remembers the "Dolly Parton" frontal armour upgrades knows.
It beggars my mind as to why you are still allowed to Post. The above is simply drivel. The M1's engine is more than capable of handling the extra weight derived from the HA package. In fact it has growth for more. The main reason it is governed is to prevent track separation at high speeds as it would simply run away and cause an accident.

The M1's survivability suite IS an iterative development of 1970's technology.

The ranges you quote are just nuts. No American TC will let an adversary approach to a range that makes the enemy's kill zone effective, period. They will be killed at the maximum range practicable and every relevant R&D program I am aware of is to extend the range and effectiveness of the M1's own kill zone to make this as sure a thing as possible.

And the list goes on and on. I just don't have the time and so admit defeat. It is my sincere wish that you be silenced as I am fed up with the pollution you attempt to pass as informed debate. It is a joke.

cheers

w

[Feanor]

So how many T-90s can be produced or can be purchased by the Russian Army? And how well does the T-90 address the points raised by Waylander and Eckerl about the accuracy?

I don't know how many can be produced, or can be purchased. I know this year 93 are/will be purchased (no confirmation of deliveries is available, but that's how many were planned).

I don't know that the T-90A does anything at all to address the stabilization issue, or the ammunition cooking off problem. Strictly speaking it's a T-72 layout, with all major subsystems replaced by a more modern variant.

[FutureTank]

Originally Posted by Waylander
One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

When you quote a poster you are replying or commenting directly in response to that post. You do know that don't you? Have another look at Waylanders post - he is referring to the fact that because the soviet designs do not depress as far as western designs, when travelling across country the stabilisation system will hit its limits (ie not be able to keep the assigned point of aim) as well as a NATO design. This has bugger all to do with range. Even at a range of 20 meters if you cannot bring the barrel of your main armament to bear you cannot hit the target. Quoting factoids about the north african campaign will not change that fact.

Then you proceed to regale us with casualty figres and volume figures if a turret is penetrated. Why? This has nothing to do with the ability of a tanks stab system or the limits imposed by its design. Where did you get these figures? In one of your previous posts you claim the reason for the automatic loader is because the russian army could not find enough conscripts to put a loader in every tank. Now you claim the designers made this call to limit casualties? Which is it?

Your final paragraph is that adding 8 tonnes of armour adds an impost to the fuel consumption that only the US with its fleet of 5000 tanks can bear, but the Russians with a fleet of 15,000 cannot afford it? For starters you'd probably find the addition of 8 tonnes would have a barely perceptable increase in fuel usage - certainly a justifiable one give the benefits of uparmouring.

When is a tank travelling cross-country with stabilisation engaged other than in cases of expected combat?
"Even at a range of 20 meters if you cannot bring the barrel of your main armament to bear you cannot hit the target." - You seriously suggest this is the case with Soviet designs that use stabilisation? Soviet tankers are also trained to fire if stabilisation fails, and even if the sighting fails, by sighting through the barrel if all else fails. It seems to me the NATO tankers are similarly trained.
Claimed inability to hit a target goes to the size of the target at a given range, right?
Are you only able to think in single variables? Yes, there was a shortage in conscripts (still is), and yes they sought to limit casualties at the same time. Where do you think a surviving crew goes to after they get out? You think every Soviet tank HAD a crew?!
I'm not going to do the maths for you in either the question of internal tank volumes or the burden of additional fuel with increased weight. Lets just say that the "trivial amount" ends up in several thousand additional support vehicles for the Soviet Army, and that's just in the forces which woudl have been immediately committable to the West German front.

[FutureTank]

The design of the Object 430 (that became the T-64) in 1958 had nothing to do with demographics. The automatic loader was selected like the 5TD engine and low turret roof height (limiting depression) to drastically reduce the internal volume and hence armoured volume and therefore weight.

As to Soviet demographics they were hardly effected by a one person reduction of tank crew strength. Especially since this reduction resulted in an increased maintenance burden and more maintainers. Since the Soviets retained an active tank park of around 35,000 vehicles this is less than 1% of active army strength. Hardly a significant impact to go from four to three per crew.

The Soviet Union under Khrushchev dealt with the WW2 caused baby drain in the late 50s, early 60s by reducing the size of the ground force and replacing their combat power with nuclear missiles. New vehicles like the BMP were the solution to the reduction in infantry bayonets in the 60s, not reducing tank crew size.

Another example of FT fantasy. Not as bad as his belief that tank gun depression is dependent on how steep the front of a tank is angled (as in the Sherman) when its all about turret roof height... :onfloorl:

You know far less than you think

[FutureTank]

It beggars my mind as to why you are still allowed to Post. The above is simply drivel. The M1's engine is more than capable of handling the extra weight derived from the HA package. In fact it has growth for more. The main reason it is governed is to prevent track separation at high speeds as it would simply run away and cause an accident.

The M1's survivability suite IS an iterative development of 1970's technology.

The ranges you quote are just nuts. No American TC will let an adversary approach to a range that makes the enemy's kill zone effective, period. They will be killed at the maximum range practicable and every relevant R&D program I am aware of is to extend the range and effectiveness of the M1's own kill zone to make this as sure a thing as possible.

And the list goes on and on. I just don't have the time and so admit defeat. It is my sincere wish that you be silenced as I am fed up with the pollution you attempt to pass as informed debate. It is a joke.

cheers

w

"The M1's engine is more than capable of handling the extra weight derived from the HA package." - yes of course, but it reduced top speed and endurance, hasn't it :) Its a matter of fact stated by the US Army. In fact you can put even more armour on the M1 until it only crawls at 40km/h on the road and has to be refueled every 100km, and still say the engine can cope.

"The main reason it is governed is to prevent track separation at high speeds as it would simply run away and cause an accident" - you mean it doesn't work at those speeds. Accidents is where one says OOPS. Everything else has different terminology.

"iterative development" - this is a term used in project management, not in operational use of a production model. So you are saying the M1 was still an ongoing project in 1988? In fact the Army rushed the M1 into production, and subsequently it took three years to field it.

"No American TC will let an adversary approach to a range that makes the enemy's kill zone effective, period. " - yes of course. So which TC had a say in where the hills, forests and structures are located when choosing a position? You take what you get and you go with it, was the tanker law in Europe during the Cold War. Choosing a position is subject to orders that are NOT "see if you can find a max LOS and hope the Russians come through it". Ever heard of tank vs tank engagements at 50m? Neither side INTENDED to fight those either at any time in history of armoured warfare, but it happened.

We are free to communicate civilly, or not. Your choice.

[Abraham Gubler]

When is a tank travelling cross-country with stabilisation engaged other than in cases of expected combat?
"Even at a range of 20 meters if you cannot bring the barrel of your main armament to bear you cannot hit the target." - You seriously suggest this is the case with Soviet designs that use stabilisation? Soviet tankers are also trained to fire if stabilisation fails, and even if the sighting fails, by sighting through the barrel if all else fails. It seems to me the NATO tankers are similarly trained.
Claimed inability to hit a target goes to the size of the target at a given range, right?

Perhaps Marc should have explained to you how stabilisation works in the vertical axis as the tank is in motion. He can be excused for not doing so as someone making the sort of assertions you do would be extremely foolish to do so without such a basic level of understanding.

As the tank moves across the ground its hull pitches up and down as it climbs and descends bumps and slopes. Even tanks with very high suspension arm movement like the Merkava (60cm) will pitch up and down a lot as most ground is extremely uneven (even plains and deserts). As the tank pitches up and down the stabilisation system detects this and adjusts the elevation of the gun to compensate so it stays on the level required to engage the target.

Now this is where the T-64 and descendants come into trouble. If a tank has only minimal gun depression then if it pitches up above the angular differential between the maximum depression and the line to the target then the gun can’t continue to train on the target. So the target is lost. If the tank continues to pitch up beyond the maximum depression then the stabilisation systems frame of reference will no longer relate to the target’s actual location and the gun won’t be tracking the target when the tank returns to a level pitch.

So apart from being limited in its ability to use terrain to hide itself while keeping its gun bearing on a target the lack of depression also reduces the ability of stabilisation to compensate for moving across country.

[Marc 1]

Perhaps Marc should have explained to you how stabilisation works in the vertical axis as the tank is in motion. He can be excused for not doing so as someone making the sort of assertions you do would be extremely foolish to do so without such a basic level of understanding.


Yes, quite right Abraham, I had just assumed that Future Tank would know how it worked - after all he seems to know a lot more about armoured warfare than people who have served in armoured or mechanised units.

Then again, maybe there was that clue that he really does not have the first schmik about what he is tallking about when he told us that soviet tanks are able to depress their main armament to"18 degrees of depression".
Vis:

Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Hmm, I blame myself...:onfloorl:

[FutureTank]

Yes, quite right Abraham, I had just assumed that Future Tank would know how it worked - after all he seems to know a lot more about armoured warfare than people who have served in armoured or mechanised units.

Then again, maybe there was that clue that he really does not have the first schmik about what he is tallking about when he told us that soviet tanks are able to depress their main armament to"18 degrees of depression".
Vis:

Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Hmm, I blame myself...:onfloorl:

Hmmm, sorry, that was meant to be 8 degrees of depression, not 18. You should have pointed that out sooner since it was clearly wrong.
The published depression is about 6 degrees, but in fact 2 more more can be achieved. However, I don't see much difference between 6 and 9 degrees. Most hull-down positions will have been occupied well before engagement, and crew can just get out and remove enough soil to allow the extra 3 degrees if it is that crucial.

Google autoloader in combination with the T-72 or T-80 and you will find either stills, or a YouTube video of how one looks and works.

The 125mm T-72 gun is actually much shorter inside the turret than one might suppose from knowledge of manually loaded weapons. The rammer comes up to it. The gun breech is shorter than that in the 120mm weapon, and has no other protrusions like safety guards on the manual loaded guns. It can in fact travel greater distance in the vertical than is apparent from the outside because the only contact it has is with the stub case ejector.
It seems to me that the T-64 and T-80 autoloader, although not storing the ammunition in same way, would also allow this space for the breech to travel in the vertical. This is what allows the greater than often published depression of the gun.

At least this is what I have been told, and having not seen this myself, I can only rely on that information. I have no reason to suspect that that source was wrong.

I'll see what it says regarding the accuracy and adjusting calibration in the T-80 gunner's manual, and get back to you.

[Abraham Gubler]

This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, [B]up to 18 degrees of depression.

Wow! Even if the gun mounting would actually allow you to lower the gun so much it would be a one shot wonder. In recoil the breech would hit the turret roof and knock itself out of battery and the crew out of their wits... And you can’t, the T-72’s mantlet and turret structure does not allow for depression of the gun below 6 degrees. Its physically impossible unless you remove everything in the gun except the barrel...

Maybe FT should do a geometry course so he can actually understand what is going on... Because the gun barrel is not mounted directly above the front hull roof it's angle does not determine maximum depression. What determines depression is turret roof height to allow for the recoiling of the breech. Why some turret designs have a lifting flap to allow for more depression, eg LAV-105.

[Marc 1]

I received this as a reply from Future Tank. As FT has basically called me a liar on this and therefore I'll need some external backup, can anybody confirm the role of Infantry for FT since he doesn't believe me?

Exchange below:



Marc1. The only combat arm that can sieze and hold ground regardless of season, weather or terrain is infantry. That is a fact. At the end of the day, grunts win battles. But this is a pointless discussion because all modern armies are combined arms teams individual corps are not used in isolation.


FT: I really do not comprehend what it is they teach in the Australian Army if I have to explain this to you. The role of infantry in mobile warfare is NOT to "sieze and hold ground". That was true in the Napoleonic Era! The role of infantry, and the entire combined arms group, is to to get to the enemy Presidential Palace and blow the president's brains out with the biggest gun they have. The role of infantry in such an operation is to support armour ON THE MOVE.



Re: Role of Infantry

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Quote:
Originally Posted by Marc 1
You know, I was going to issue a detailed rebuttal of your points, but then you decide to tell me, someone who spent 6 years of my life as an infantryman that I didn't know my job. Here is the official role of the Royal Australian Infantry Corps:

"The role of Infantry is to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and to repel attack, by day or night, regardless of season, weather or terrain."

Infantry Officer | Defence Jobs (http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/army/jobs/InfantryOfficer/?availability=reserve)


It's been 14 years since I wore a uniform, so you'll have to forgive me that what I had written was not word for word. Infantry is the only corps that can achieve this.

Sayonara, you are not worth wasting any more time on.

FT: I'm not impressed by ranks, only by ideas. If an LT has a better idea than a LTGEN, I'd go with the LT.

So the recruitment site is your final argument? A final statement on the future doctrine of the Australian Army is in the first sentence of the LT job description for the first three years? You are right, I was wasting my time.

Taking and holding positions is for the supply troops
Taking and holding position only works well if you are the first to that position

Are you trying to impress me with 6 years in the Army? Brigadier H.A. Young CO Canadian 6th Brigade also thought he knew what he was doing, and he had been in the Army far longer than you. Read about it, will you. pp.119-12, Tank Tactics, Roman Jarymowycz.


Other links:

http://www.dfrt.gov.au/Decisions/2004/Reasons%20for%20Decision%20Combat%20Clerk%20and%20 Soreman.pdf (second sentence, second para)

RAINF - Stay ARMY - ARMY (http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/stayarmy/RAINF.asp) (second sentence first para. Gee it must be important to be the second thing that is said)

Governor General of Australia ~ Speeches (http://www.gg.gov.au/governorgeneral/speech.php?id=373) (paraphrased in the 5th paragraph - but what would Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC (Retd) know?)

Please excuse the thread hijack.

[Abraham Gubler]

Hmmm, sorry, that was meant to be 8 degrees of depression, not 18. You should have pointed that out sooner since it was clearly wrong.
The published depression is about 6 degrees, but in fact 2 more more can be achieved. However, I don't see much difference between 6 and 9 degrees. Most hull-down positions will have been occupied well before engagement, and crew can just get out and remove enough soil to allow the extra 3 degrees if it is that crucial.

More falsehoods. The front of the T-72's hull does not limit the depression of the gun barrel until at least 10 degrees of depression. This idea that you can rotate to the side and have less obstruction to your depression is completely false. 6 degrees is the limit thanks to the mantlet, breech, roof and recoil movement. It has nothing to do with anything outside the turret.

[Marc 1]

Hmmm, sorry, that was meant to be 8 degrees of depression, not 18. You should have pointed that out sooner since it was clearly wrong.

Umm, I did, but as usual you ignored it and took off on a tangent:

Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Marc1: Angles of depression I have been able to find: T54/55 -5 degrees, T62 -5 degrees T-64 ? T-72 -6 degrees T-80 -4 degrees. T-90 ? degrees. I cannot find 18 degrees - unless you are talking elevation which is of course the exact opposite and would prove that you really do have no idea. One of the main reasons that limits main armament depression in an MBT isn't necessarily the hull, but the fact that there is not enough height inside the turret to allow the breech to recoil. It is one of the main reasons why western tanks are higher.

I've been looking forward to using this emoticon...:nutkick

[Abraham Gubler]

Read about it, will you. pp.119-12, Tank Tactics, Roman Jarymowycz.

Yep everything you ever need to know about warfare can be found on pages 119 to 12... whatever that means...

The example of infantry shooting the president in his palace is a classic example of infantry holding and seizing ground.

Infantry have this role because until a nuclear powered humanoid robot comes along (aka Terminator) a trained unit of humans with weapon is the only thing that can occupy all the space and time occupied by humans.

Tanks are a transitory weapon. They only exist on the battlefield for a proportion of time - that time being when the tank is crewed, fueled and operational. They are also far too big to access most human space. They do however have a range of advantages compared to a human in being involved in kinetic weapons fight. All of this is why proficient armies utilize combined arms teams to control the battlespace.

[FutureTank]

I received this as a reply from Future Tank. As FT has basically called me a liar on this and therefore I'll need some external backup, can anybody confirm the role of Infantry for FT since he doesn't believe me?

Exchange below:



Marc1. The only combat arm that can sieze and hold ground regardless of season, weather or terrain is infantry. That is a fact. At the end of the day, grunts win battles. But this is a pointless discussion because all modern armies are combined arms teams individual corps are not used in isolation.


FT: I really do not comprehend what it is they teach in the Australian Army if I have to explain this to you. The role of infantry in mobile warfare is NOT to "sieze and hold ground". That was true in the Napoleonic Era! The role of infantry, and the entire combined arms group, is to to get to the enemy Presidential Palace and blow the president's brains out with the biggest gun they have. The role of infantry in such an operation is to support armour ON THE MOVE.



Re: Role of Infantry

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Quote:
Originally Posted by Marc 1
You know, I was going to issue a detailed rebuttal of your points, but then you decide to tell me, someone who spent 6 years of my life as an infantryman that I didn't know my job. Here is the official role of the Royal Australian Infantry Corps:

"The role of Infantry is to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and to repel attack, by day or night, regardless of season, weather or terrain."

Page Not Found | Defence Jobs (http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/army/j...bility=reserve)

It's been 14 years since I wore a uniform, so you'll have to forgive me that what I had written was not word for word. Infantry is the only corps that can achieve this.

Sayonara, you are not worth wasting any more time on.

FT: I'm not impressed by ranks, only by ideas. If an LT has a better idea than a LTGEN, I'd go with the LT.

So the recruitment site is your final argument? A final statement on the future doctrine of the Australian Army is in the first sentence of the LT job description for the first three years? You are right, I was wasting my time.

Taking and holding positions is for the supply troops
Taking and holding position only works well if you are the first to that position

Are you trying to impress me with 6 years in the Army? Brigadier H.A. Young CO Canadian 6th Brigade also thought he knew what he was doing, and he had been in the Army far longer than you. Read about it, will you. pp.119-12, Tank Tactics, Roman Jarymowycz.


Other links:

http://www.dfrt.gov.au/Decisions/2004/Reasons%20for%20Decision%20Combat%20Clerk%20and%20 Soreman.pdf (second sentence, second para)

RAINF - Stay ARMY - ARMY (http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/stayarmy/RAINF.asp) (second sentence first para. Gee it must be important to be the second thing that is said)

Governor General of Australia ~ Speeches (http://www.gg.gov.au/governorgeneral/speech.php?id=373) (paraphrased in the 5th paragraph - but what would Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC (Retd) know?)

Please excuse the thread hijack.

You should have posted everything, and not only what you choose, in the order and context in which it was sent, with no omissions, and in the Australian Army thread.

If you ask Major General Michael Jeffery if he agrees with your Infantry role definition or mine, I know he would agree with mine given his command of the SAS. Trust me, no one in the Infantry wants to be in combat more than the absolute minimum despite better pay. The first to be attacked in 1991 were not Iraqi tanks, but the Iraqi command infrastructure, repeatedly, by the Coalition ground, air and naval forces. Iraqi tanks were an afterthought.

[Abraham Gubler]

I don't see much difference between 6 and 9 degrees. Most hull-down positions will have been occupied well before engagement, and crew can just get out and remove enough soil to allow the extra 3 degrees if it is that crucial.

Gun depression is not about being in a hull down position. Its about using a reverse slope position to create a hull down effect. There are many hull down positions available on level ground, including the two step fighting hull.

Nor is gun depression something only useful in a prepared defensive position. As a tank moves across the battlefield its crew try and use terrain to reduce their exposure to enemy fires and observation. Being able to depress your gun enables you to utilize everything from a gentle slope to a retaining wall to get more of your tank under cover.

As to the difference in -5 degrees depression and -10 degrees... Well to someone without any practical experience 5 degrees may not sound like a big number since there are 360 degrees in a circle. But its a 100% difference (sound better) and is highly significant considering the dominance of horizontal relationships in land combat.

If the Israeli Army had been equipped with Soviet designed tanks in 1973 their would be no Israel. Syrian tanks would have literally driven under their guns through the Golan and into northern Israel and not stopped to they reached Haifa and Tel Aviv. But by being able to depress their guns the Centurions were able to limit their exposure to enemy fires enough to be able to sell themselves dearly and stop the invasion.

[Abraham Gubler]

If you ask Major General Michael Jeffery if he agrees with your Infantry role definition or mine, I know he would agree with mine given his command of the SAS. Trust me, no one in the Infantry wants to be in combat more than the absolute minimum despite better pay. The first to be attacked in 1991 were not Iraqi tanks, but the Iraqi command infrastructure, repeatedly, by the Coalition ground, air and naval forces. Iraqi tanks were an afterthought.

Even I can't take this crazy trolling and flame baiting anymore.

Words of wisdom:

"Never argue with an idiot. They bring you down to their level and beat you with experience."

[Marc 1]

You should have posted everything, and not only what you choose, in the order and context in which it was sent, with no omissions, and in the Australian Army thread.

You really want to dig yourself deeper? The rest of the PM you sent me (yep all three pages) won't fit on here, so I'll post the 15,000 words of the second of three shall I? See next post.

If you ask Major General Michael Jeffery if he agrees with your Infantry role definition or mine, I know he would agree with mine given his command of the SAS.

Your arrogance is quite astonishing - you know a Major General, ex SAS now Ex Governor General and Military Cross recipient is going to agree with you?

Trust me, no one in the Infantry wants to be in combat more than the absolute minimum despite better pay. The first to be attacked in 1991 were not Iraqi tanks, but the Iraqi command infrastructure, repeatedly, by the Coalition ground, air and naval forces. Iraqi tanks were an afterthought.

And again further twaddle and answers to questions nobody has asked. I think you get 'promoted' here on the forum for number of posts, not number of words, do give that a thought before posting pointless trivia again.

[FutureTank]

Umm, I did, but as usual you ignored it and took off on a tangent:

Originally Posted by FutureTank View Post
It is certainly a much faster way of getting out of the mortar fire. Backing up down a slope can be tricky sometimes.
This, is actually how the Soviet tankers do it, depressing their guns over the side which allows, depending on the model, up to 18 degrees of depression.

Marc1: Angles of depression I have been able to find: T54/55 -5 degrees, T62 -5 degrees T-64 ? T-72 -6 degrees T-80 -4 degrees. T-90 ? degrees. I cannot find 18 degrees - unless you are talking elevation which is of course the exact opposite and would prove that you really do have no idea. One of the main reasons that limits main armament depression in an MBT isn't necessarily the hull, but the fact that there is not enough height inside the turret to allow the breech to recoil. It is one of the main reasons why western tanks are higher.

I've been looking forward to using this emoticon...:nutkick

Well, I missed that.
As for the emoticon, officers are also gentlemen, even after they live the forces. You were probably not one even when you were in them.

[Marc 1]

Sorry guys, but I'd hate to be accused of trying to mislead...
The relevant exerpt is in red, you can make of the garbage (both his and mine) before and after what you will:

Edit: Incidentally the purple text I doubt. This bloke was a LtCol during Desert Storm, so I'm not sure how he was able to brief people on his activities during desert storm when he was a major.


Re: how I think

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Marc 1: Gee what a can't win situation but if they do have the advantage of ground they have lost the initiative. Crumbs, why did the poms and Europeans even bother trying to defend? If the outcome was so clear cut why didn't the soviets just roll across the border? It can't have been for nuclear reasons as the soviets had the only real anti ABM system operational around Moscow and more warheads than NATO.
FT: Its good for domestic politics if the public believes they have a viable Army, that's why. It also removes significant numbers from the unemployment pool, aids development, serves civil defence purposes, etc.
Had Australia suffered the sort of losses the Soviets did in the Second World War, you may have understood why the Soviets never attacked, but I guess it was not in your Army education content. The Soviet STRATEGIC posture was defensive since 1954. Its just that their operational doctrine, HAD IT COME TO WAR, would have been offensive. The best offensive is a quick offensive, because after that it becomes attrition. Only attritional warfare requires tank designs that ensure crew survival so they can get into the next tank. Attritional warfare is a far deadlier option in warfare than the offensive. NATO didn't even use the term 'operational' in their doctrinal texts until 1960s, and the US Army officers still had to be explained what it means in the 1980s
I'm getting weary of spelling out the basics to you.

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
However, not one NATO ... (text omitted) force securing initiative by means of the offensive.

Marc 1: Of course they can't guarantee the ground advantage. But being the defender the NATO forces are going to use natural obstacles and ground to their best advantage - be stupid not to.
FT: Did you miss out on your military history courses? On the offensive the point is to destroy the enemy's capability to conduct combat by destroying their logistics. Defended positions are left behind to be dealt with by the artillery and air support. This is what happened for the last three years of combat on the Eastern Front. When Montgomery tried to fight his way into the teeth of such a defensive position during the Normandy breakout, he lost so many tanks they had to scrape armoured course finishing classes for tankers to replace crews in UK and Canada. There were Canadian infantry units that had 50% losses sustained in hours of combat. Red Army learned this in 1941/42. The Soviet military liaison officer with 21AG HQ who SAID SO, but since he was only a "Russian" no one listened to him.
And I repeat, securing ground advantage involves FINDING SUITABLE GROUND. What do you do when no suitable ground advantage can be found?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
Securing initiative is at the very core of 20th century military thought, and tanks...(text omitted) Cavalry as armour is the Arm of decision, not waiting.

Marc1: What is that all about? On the one hand you praise the cavalry/armour as being the arm to gain initiative, no argement there the term we used to use was 'shock action' IIRC. Then try to discredit infantry because they are nowhere as mobile? The only combat arm that can sieze and hold ground regardless of season, weather or terrain is infantry. That is a fact. At the end of the day, grunts win battles. But this is a pointless discussion because all modern armies are combined arms teams individual corps are not used in isolation.
FT: I really do not comprehend what it is they teach in the Australian Army if I have to explain this to you. The role of infantry in mobile warfare is NOT to "sieze and hold ground". That was true in the Napoleonic Era! The role of infantry, and the entire combined arms group, is to to get to the enemy Presidential Palace and blow the president's brains out with the biggest gun they have. The role of infantry in such an operation is to support armour ON THE MOVE. The only time they stop is to refuel and load up. They fight, eat, sleep and shit on the move. Period. And, they do it wherever the tank goes. Can you assure me that a wheeled vehicle, even an 8x8, can go everywhere a tank goes? One of the major modifications to the M1 was to allow faster refuelling because even seconds matter. Israelis claim that because of the Merkava design they can rearm a tank in under 10 minutes even with exhausted crews. In fact the support people just shove it through the back, allowing the crew extra few minutes of rest

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
The issue of this tank design effectiveness, based on analysis of the 1991 Gulf... (text omitted) You may be more privileged in having access to this information.

Marc1: No, not privy to anything more than you can find except a briefing from an Australian Army engineer LtCol who was resonsible for the breaches in the minefields/obstacles that 3 US divisions used. I don't know about it being 'interestingly quiet'. If I were a tanker, I wouldn't be releasing a book boasting about standing off 3km away in the total dark and plinking Iraqi tanks that couldn't even see you. And when the Iraqi's did get a shot that many of the shots didn't penetrate. Yeah, be a great book - in the same way that strangling kittens is not really seen as socially acceptable. On the Abrams wiki page it lists 20 tanks disabled/destroyed during GW1. Possibly one M1 was disabled due to Iraqi MBT fire. M1 Abrams - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1_Abrams_Tank)
FT: I was at his briefing before he made LTCOL. The number of engineer battalions was more than doubled over usual divisional OOB under his command if the memory serves me right. You mentioned the MANY tank engagements, and now you are talking about one shot? There is such a thing as statistical analysis. I'm sure it was conducted, so I am curious why it had not been released if it would sound so great. Maybe because direct comparison between Latest 1991 M1 upgrade and unmodified Iraqi T-72 would not look so good, what with all the other factors thrown in? What was that you were saying about twisting, deflecting, and obfuscating the discussion?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
Abraham Goubler (whom I will not reply due to his lack of civility) is of course right in that the force has no choice but to fight regardless of it facing medium or heavy opponent.

Marc1: And he is correct. Don't blame the yanks for bringing a gun to a knife fight.
FT: lol That's the best joke I have heard in a long time. Until 1979 the yanks brought a nuclear warhead to a gun fight After that they brought a double-handed sword to a knife fight

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
But, here is what was said in the Soviet Union at the time before the 1991 Gulf War
(Heaps deleted)
this dynamism was seen to be displayed by the Iraqi command!

Marc1: Even so, for the Iraqi tankers including the much vaunted and supposedly well equipped and lead Republican Guards to have maybe knocked out one Abrams that cannot be just the US advantages listed by the soviets. They have a vested interest in making excuses for their product because they obviously want to sell more of them.
FT: Yes, but ultimately an Iraqi officer had to give orders. Soviets only sent training personnel to train the trainers with the initial batch of deliveries of every piece of technology. That was during the Iran-Iraq War. So what is the Soviet fault in designing the T-72, that they failed to foresee incompetence on the level of an entire military structure of the client?

[QUOTE=FutureTank]The Soviet doctrine at the time was in
Quote:
Seizing the initiative at the .... (text omitted) strategic considerations in Iraq not making that decision.
Marc1: But Saddam didn't, so its a moot point.
FT: The Soviet Union never attacked NATO either, so the whole discussion is a moot point, but neither you, nor the dozens of people like you over the years admit this. So who is twisting, deflecting, and obfuscating?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
All this is called a "wider perspective" which the premise of this thread, as many similar threads on many other forums, lacks.

Marc1: What wider perspective? Go and reread the question asked by Tavarisch. He asked the question and it has been answered. If you think explaining that the soviets value surprise is part of the answer, or that surprise surprise a soviet general is making excuses for the poor performance of the tanks supplied to Iraq is necessary then go ahead, bring then up, but don't expect these points are going to change the basic truth that soviet tanks were designed to a price, for a specific type of offensive manouvre warfare and are generally inferior IMO to the latest generation of NATO MBT's.
FT: I think that you are neither reading the original [two] questions, nor your own answers! Soviet tanks were designed during a certain period of history. After that the modifications one can make to them are limited by design. It is therefore a given that any western tanks that were designed AFTER the Soviet designs went into production would be superior. AND, because they have more room inside, more modifications and upgrades are possible. However, with miniaturisation in electronics this proved to be unnecessary.
I think you have a problem with understanding that a tank is a complex system, and its design is guided by balancing many influences, and a single answer will not suffice
[COLOR="Blue"]Tovarisch's two questions are predicated on the "hull-down" hang up, notably he says Sure, they could prepare a position on a slope in minutes with the built in dozers for the T-72s (and it's cousins after the T-64). But it probably takes the enemy less time to charge their tanks over that slope while they get things sorted out. but this is tactical illiteracy! One does not start to prepare a hull-down position with the enemy approaching in sight, and within minutes of overrun!
His second question is based in logistical illiteracy that My suggestion would be to widen the hull to allow a larger auto-loader carousel OR dump the carousel idea completely and use a bustle mounted loader instead, as the Ukrainians have done with their shiny new Oplots. The last thing one wants to do is not have the extra ammo at all, the carousel only has 28 rounds, maybe good for short-term ops but what about those week long ones? Aside from widening the hull would require drastic changes to national rail infrastructure, what tank ONLY uses their original load for a week in combat involving other tanks? Even in the infantry support role a tank is likely to go through its load in a couple of days. You should inform Tovarisch how many DU rounds alone the US tanks went through in the 100 hours of Desert Storm

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
Where tanks are concerned, in 1992 Soviet/Russian view was that
Quote:
"Tanks are an endangered species when the other side enjoys control of the air." Quality beats quantity, but there still has to be enough of it to matter.
All this is really old news.

Marc1: Waffle. That has been the case since tankbuster Hurricanes roamed the skies over the wester desert or the Stuka and Henschel's over the eastern front. Now with LGB's and any aircraft that can carry or designate can go 'tank plinking'.
FT: But there still had to be enough of such aircraft to matter. If there were enough aircraft, why make tanks? Stalin said that the Red Army needed Schturmoviks more than air itself, but did not order the tank production to slow down The A-10 went into service three years before M1. Maybe the M1 was a waste of time?

Quote:
Originally Posted by FutureTank
As it happens I do like Soviet tank designs. They show elegance of thought, innovation, balance, economy and a strong fit to the doctrinal principles under which the force which uses them will operate.

Marc1: So, the soviet designs work well for soviet doctrine - that's a given. What is also a given is that they also were employed in large numbers because the soviet union believed in the doctrine quantity over quality. That's not a philosophy that washes well in the west or even probably in modern Russia. Even China is going away from quantity to quality.
FT: No, its not that they believed in quality over quantity, but in speed over protection. Quantity was imposed by the virtue of strategic and operational planning. Quantity only mattered in local tactical breakthroughs, and every level of ground force organisation was to be afforded a chance at achieving this, and that required quantity
Times change, and so do strategic planning considerations, and their influence on engineering design of military systems
I

[FutureTank]

One has to temember that a smaller gun depression also has another disadvantage.
While riding cross country a tank with a smaller depression is more prone to hit the limits of his gun elevation and depression with the result that the aim is more often disrupted.

While modern stabilization systems have no problem staying on target during cross country rides they tend to come to their limits more often than one might think just due to the fact that one can stabilize only as much as your gun depression/elevation allows it.

The T-80B manual gunnery section shows a little box with a switch that says travel mode and combat mode. This allows the stabilisation to be disengaged during travel mode. (ref. Object 219R: reminder for the gunner, p.15, Moscow 1987)

[Tavarisch]

Seems a lot has transpired when I was gone. I have been able to, at least briefly, bring myself up to speed with the argument.

First off, more civility if you will. To both parties that is. Throwing off insults, sarcastic statements and jokes only serve to further provoke other people, not strengthen your argument.

It seems that the topic has fast moved from the argument that I expected, which was whether or not the low-height turret in a Soviet/Russian Tank should be replaced, to an argument meant to defend and attack each point presented by each person. It's okay with me, but I was expecting more of suggestions as to what to do with the so-called "flaw". (since not everyone regards a low-height turret to be such)

In any case, to clear up on Semantics...

I was talking about SOVIET TANKS, however since most tanks in Russia's inventory were made from that time-period, it is only fair to support your arguments with examples of the present time. (That means the current era in case people like FT misinterprets.)

[Marc 1]

Seems a lot has transpired when I was gone. I have been able to, at least briefly, bring myself up to speed with the argument.

First off, more civility if you will. To both parties that is. Throwing off insults, sarcastic statements and jokes only serve to further provoke other people, not strengthen your argument.

It seems that the topic has fast moved from the argument that I expected, which was whether or not the low-height turret in a Soviet/Russian Tank should be replaced, to an argument meant to defend and attack each point presented by each person. It's okay with me, but I was expecting more of suggestions as to what to do with the so-called "flaw". (since not everyone regards a low-height turret to be such)

In any case, to clear up on Semantics...

I was talking about SOVIET TANKS, however since most tanks in Russia's inventory were made from that time-period, it is only fair to support your arguments with examples of the present time. (That means the current era in case people like FT misinterprets.)

Apologies for the unseemly breakdown of civility - it was probably mutually provoked. However the topic being lead astray - I'll not be sticking my hand up for that.

On subject - the simple answer is a taller turret with the trunions mounted higher. The probable next gen solution though is an auto loader, an unmanned turret and crew in the hull. The gun can then be mounted as high as you wish without incurring the weight penalty of enclosing the entire space for crew survivability.

Cheers,