View Full Version : Australia is not ready for war
StingrayOZ
March 30th, 2009, 07:04 PM
I guess we take this as a sign we need to spend more on defence or at least hold those accountable for ferk ups.
"There is a bias within Defence towards investing in the future force rather than giving government the fully functioning options they really need today."
Hmm well if we had planned for the future in the past then we would have a fully functioning force.
We aren't ideally placed, but I think we could hold our own. Once we get 12 SH, 12 growlers, 12 new subs, 4 AWD's, 2 LHD's, new choppers, new lifters, wedgetail etc it will be a different game..
BILLIONS of dollars of fighter jets, warships and military equipment cannot be used in their current state because they would be too vulnerable to enemy fire.
A critical lack of upgraded weaponry has left the Australian Defence Force unable to deploy most of its frontline fighters or warships at short notice against any enemy with modern air defence systems or anti-ship missiles.
An investigation by The Australian reveals much of the ADF's most powerful weaponry is awaiting upgrades or promised replacements and is useful only for training purposes or deployment on operations where there is little or no risk of high-level conflict.
As such, the ADF, which receives $22 billion in taxpayer funds each year, cannot conduct any high-level operations without substantial support from coalition forces such as the US.
Former Defence official Allan Behm said: "I think the public would be absolutely astonished and gobsmacked to think we spend so much on defence every year and yet we can't send much of it into harm's way because it won't work or it will not survive in a contest."
Defence experts say none of the RAAF's soon-to-be-retired F-111 strike bombers nor the majority of the 71 F/A-18 Hornet fighters can be used against modern air defences because they lack sufficient electronic protection.
Similarly, they say the navy's eight Anzac frigates cannot be sent into a hotly contested war zone because of a lack of defensive weaponry, while the four other frigates, the FFGs, are still unavailable after a bungled and delayed $1.5 billion upgrade.
Experts say the problem reflects a litany of delayed equipment upgrades as well as a Defence Department mindset that focuses more heavily on future purchases than on current operations. They say the proper balance between current and future defence needs has been lost.
Daniel Cotterill, former chief of staff for Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon, told The Australian: "There is a bias within Defence towards investing in the future force rather than giving government the fully functioning options they really need today."
The Government is in the final stages of preparing a Defence white paper that will outline a multi-billion-dollar shopping list of new planes, ships and hi-tech weaponry. But the ADF is in a parlous state of readiness for serious conflict.
A deficiency in anti-submarine warfare capabilities means the navy would be unlikely to risk sending surface ships into zones where enemy subs were present.
Andrew Davies, an analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said: "Our ability to actively search for submarines is very limited to short-range technologies and we have little or no ability to successfully fire a weapon at a modern submarine."
Only half of the six-boat Collins-Class submarine fleet is available and a shortage of crew would make it impossible to sustain operations for long.
The army cannot deploy any of its 33 Blackhawk helicopters into warzones, including Afghanistan, because they remain vulnerable to shoulder-launched missiles.
It is also considered unlikely to deploy its M113 armoured personnel carriers because, despite receiving a $500 million upgrade, the M113s are considered vulnerable to large improvised explosive devices, such as those used by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Experts say the Government needs to pressure the ADF to make its existing equipment more operationally effective rather than wait for future replacements.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25267127-601,00.html
IPA35
March 31st, 2009, 01:53 AM
We are not ready for war neither, so a budget increase and new doctrine are needed.
Shortage of sub crews is quite a common problem these days.
But you don't need 12.
OPSSG
April 1st, 2009, 04:31 AM
After reading a couple of articles by The Australian, and as an outside observer, IMHO, while the articles written contain an element of truth, they are also very much slanted to a certain angle so as to imply incompetence. This reporting style is not intended to 'fair and balanced' and layman readers should realise that the writers' intent is to be critical.
Let me cite another article by The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25264936-28737,00.html) below to illustrate:
IF there were a moment when the fragile relationship between Joel Fitzgibbon and the defence establishment finally snapped, it might have been the surprise attack the minister launched on his own flock in Brisbane last October.
On that day Fitzgibbon did what previous defence ministers have rarely done: he gave his own defence force a blunt public spray about its big-picture priorities and its lack of preparedness for battle. Fitzgibbon was angry about not having the option of deploying the army's Black Hawk helicopters into Afghanistan. The minister had been taking political heat over an inadequate number of NATO medical evacuation choppers available for Australian troops at their base in Tarin Kowt, in Oruzgan province.
"If we do see a strategic and tactical justification for sending Black Hawks to Afghanistan tomorrow, we would be unable to do so as they lack the electronic warfare self-protection they require," Fitzgibbon lamented. "We spend a lot of time thinking and talking about important capability as we look far out into the future, but we seem to spend much less time talking about the capability we need to do the things we do right now and on a regular basis."
The minister's comments broke the rules of keeping such criticism in-house. Defence likes to see its ministers keep a stiff upper lip in public, confining any criticism to private meetings. Fitzgibbon put his department offside on that day, but he also made a telling point. Few Australians are fully aware that tens of billions of dollars' worth of front-line weaponry from the navy, air force and army cannot be sent to war today unless it is a low-level, low-risk operation.
What rubbish! Mr. Joel Fitzgibbon is the current minister of defence and it is his current responsibility to make tough choices. As minster, you take the current state of the ADF as the sum of it's prior procurement choices, which prior ministers sitting in his role were also responsible for.
No ministry of defence and no minister of defence has a crystal ball to look into the future. In fact, the world over, everyone recognises all militaries do get some of it wrong and it is always necessary to adapt once conflict starts. This is the role of the current incumbent minister and he cannot just cry and say that his predecessors gave him a bad hand.
Across the entire ADF, an alarming amount of expensive military equipment is not in a suitable upgraded condition to be sent to war. This is the legacy of project mismanagement and a Defence Department mindset that focuses more heavily on the defence force of tomorrow than on the force of today.
"It really is amazing how little (equipment) can be actually deployed overseas when we have a defence budget of more than $22billion," says Andrew Davies, an analyst with the country's premier independent military think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Yes, it is fair to say that there has been project mismanagement but it is also disingenuous to say that the ADF should not look to the future, as I'm sure the next minister of defence would like to blame Mr. Joel Fitzgibbon for the decisions he made today. All defence forces must look to the future to some extend and make an educated guess. If you don't, you are doomed to repeat the same mistakes.
For some reason, Mr. Joel Fitzgibbon has convinced the reporter he is not the problem and has a political body armour that seems bullet proof. If only the troops deployed can have the same invincibility as the minister.
In fact, if serving ADF officers want to disagree with the minister, the only alternative is to resign. Now that seems to be hardly fair that a minister can take political pot shots but the ADF is not allowed to respond.
The F-111 strike bomber, which will be retired next year, can't be deployed to a hot war zone because it has insufficient electronic warfare self-protection and is too easily detected by enemy radar. "The F-111 has the radar cross-section of a house and (it) would have great survivability issues in a modern threat environment," Cotterill says. "I don't think the Government would deploy one of those to a hot fighting war."
That conclusion has precedents. In the 1990s the F-111s were not able to deploy to Operation Desert Fox (against Iraq) because they lacked the required radar warning systems. Similarly, most of the air force's 71 F/A-18 Hornets can't be deployed against modern air defence systems because they have not yet been upgraded with a mature electronic warfare capability.
Defence says only 16 F/A-18s have received electronic warfare upgrades and even these have been given only an "interim electronic warfare capability", raising doubts about their deployability.
"Most ADF aircraft could not operate in an environment where there was a radar-based air defence because of electronic warfare self-protection issues," ASPI's Davies says.
And how old is the F-111 platform? Does a platform need to be upgraded in its life cycle? If you need to use it, upgrade it. If it was not upgraded, it was a decision of the minister too...
The availability and speed at which electronic warfare upgrades develop means that in the life cycle of the F-18 platform, it may need EW upgrades (which means the current minister should fix it, if upgrades are needed). Further, this lack of an EW upgrade does not make the F-18 any less capable against immediate regional air threats (and hence it's deterrence value), which are admittedly much lower.
The army's ability to provide armoured personnel carriers for its troops in a war zone also has been undermined because of doubts about the deployability of one of its three types of armoured vehicles: the M113 armoured personnel carrier.
Defence has spent almost $500 million refurbishing the more than 400 of the Vietnam War-era M113s, only to find that they may be vulnerable to roadside bombs, rockets and mines used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"While the upgraded vehicles will protect occupants against small arms, anti-personnel mines, light anti-armour weapons, and shrapnel, the vehicle will remain vulnerable to 12.5mm or larger projectiles, medium to heavy anti-armour weapons, large improvised explosive devices and anti-armour mines," Davies says.
...
The same promise will be made by the Rudd Government in its forthcoming white paper. But the Government needs to focus more clearly on the reality of today, rather than the elusive armada of tomorrow.
Many forces around the world that are operating M113s are opting to upgrade them rather than remove the M113s from service. Australia is not unique in this respect and you have got to criticise the decision in context. The ADF also decided to purchase the ASLAV (http://www.armedforces-int.com/categories/light-armoured-vehicles/australian-service-light-armoured-vehicle-aslav.asp) and other vehicles. The ASLV is suited for deployment in Afgahnistan, so it is used. There is nothing wrong with deciding to upgrade the M113s and deciding not to deploy them.
IIRC, the M113s were used in East Timor and most observers would agree that the deployment there was a success. Right? Not every piece of equipment in current ADF inventory is suitable for every operating environment. Therefore, when the criticisms are cast in this light, it is seen by me as not a fair or a balanced approach.
However, it is fair to point to the failure of the defence industry to complete the upgrades in timely manner and any other deficiencies in the upgrade plans.
So, my message is beware of false prophets with a machine gun style criticism. Please read everything in context.
ThePuss
April 1st, 2009, 05:38 AM
OPSSG that was a very well thought out and articulated post and I agree with all your points.
Drawing from my own area of experience I disagree how the article clames that the ANZAC class is defenceless......32 ESSM cutting edge SAMs, An extremely accurate 5" Gun, 8 of the latest Harpoon SSM's, 16 state of the art Nuka decoys, Embarked S-70B, latest's generation light weight torpedo in the form of the MU-90, 2 x Mini Typhoon night-day remote operated 50'cal mounts, SRBOC.... and the list goes on but apparently we could only defend ourselves in a low threat environment.
OPSSG
April 1st, 2009, 09:31 AM
OPSSG that was a very well thought out and articulated post and I agree with all your points.
Many thanks for the compliments. As an external observer, I'm just giving my 2 cents, as I could not stand the unfair criticism directed at the ADF by The Australian.
I came to a moment of realization when interacting with another new DT forum participant. It was then I realised that the general public in Australia may not be well served by main stream press. Some lay people do not fully understand that many within mainstream press are more interested in increasing viewship/readership. There is also a short cycle focus on reporting of 'scandals'. Or what I would call fast food news. This is not conducive to fair and balanced reporting. I thought I should challenge such misguided attempts at unfair criticism.
Aussie Digger
April 1st, 2009, 10:12 AM
About the Hornets,
It isn't correct anyway. 16x of them have received all the upgrades they are EVER going to get (except for JASSM integration, which is continuing, but the warshots haven't been delivered yet anyway, AFAIK). Their EW systems are as capable as the US Navy's frontline Hornet EW systems...
The remainder will be completed in less than 12 months.
The only capabilities they haven't yet got is JASSM and the ELTA wide-band jamming pod, which is not carried by EVERY fighter, but rather is a capability employed within a force package.
RAAF are capable of deploying a package of Hornets to whatever level of warfare the Government chooses to deploy to. Of course, one cannot expect a general media journalist to understand these things...
barra
April 1st, 2009, 03:15 PM
About the Hornets,
It isn't correct anyway. 16x of them have received all the upgrades they are EVER going to get (except for JASSM integration, which is continuing, but the warshots haven't been delivered yet anyway, AFAIK). Their EW systems are as capable as the US Navy's frontline Hornet EW systems...
The remainder will be completed in less than 12 months.
The only capabilities they haven't yet got is JASSM and the ELTA wide-band jamming pod, which is not carried by EVERY fighter, but rather is a capability employed within a force package.
RAAF are capable of deploying a package of Hornets to whatever level of warfare the Government chooses to deploy to. Of course, one cannot expect a general media journalist to understand these things...
The 16 Hornets that received the interim upgrade had the EW boxes and new antennas fitted. As the system chosen, ALR-67 V3, was an upgraded version of the original EW suite it was easy to do. The full upgrade requires replacement of the cabling which involves considerable downtown for the aircraft (again).
The only problems with HUG has been the pace of the upgrade, perhaps we would have been better off doing the entire upgrade on each aircraft at the same time. Could Aus. industry have been able to cope with such a large upgrade?
Other valid criticisms not explored is a previous Defence Minister trying to force the BAE -2000 EW system on the Hornet fleet. This wasted 5 years as the system was clearly unsuitable for a fast jet. His interest only lay in the fact that the BAE EW workshop was in his electorate and meant more jobs. How this turns into the RAAFs fault for not having combat aircraft ready to deploy is beyond me. The quality of Aust defence journalism is patchy (not you Abe), as an example a recent article by Tom Muir in ADM, I think, points out that Wedgetail would make a great platform for Link 16, well blow me why didn't we think of that!!!!
Misguided Fool
April 1st, 2009, 04:53 PM
Sorry if i'm being dense, but who the hell would Australia fight? Papua new Guinea? New Zealand?
I think it's better that they're investing for the future because from my point of view they have a chronic shortage of enemies, unless you consider China with their eyes on the Spratlys as a threat!
mickk
April 1st, 2009, 07:20 PM
We have been fighting with outdated equipment since Federation. The quality of the people makes up for the constant generation behind equipment.
Indonesia is all we have to worry about in terms of credible threats. They still want PNG, they still want Australia.
What we need is a Coast Guard to actively protect our seas from poachers and pirates.
OPSSG
April 1st, 2009, 08:58 PM
Sorry if i'm being dense, but who the hell would Australia fight? Papua new Guinea? New Zealand?
There are multiple challenges, multiple countries of concern and a host of regional security concerns (the information I post below is already in DT).
Going back a few years earlier (to 1962–1966), remember a little something called the 'Konfrontasi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia%E2%80%93Malaysia_confrontation)', in which the ADF was deployed. What about the armed struggle against the Malayan communist party, in which, the ADF was also involved?
When East Timor declared itself independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor. You are really misguided if you think that developments in Indonesia is not a concern for Australia. More recently, in 1999, the Australian led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) prevented anti-independence Timorese militias from completing a punitive scorched-earth campaign. With timely Australian intervention, the anti-independence Timorese militias still killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and forcibly pushed 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. Could you not say that Indonesia exported instability to East Timor? In fact, prior to the 1999 INTERFET intervention, the ADF conducted a simulated a peace enforcement exercise with UK, US, Canadian and NZ participation. This helped prepare the ADF to some extent for the intervention. In 1999, the Aussies, as lead country, augmented by US naval power, showed their impressive military capabilities. Because of the rapid deployment plan, the anti-independence Timorese militias were not able to effectively resist. In fact, the INTERFET naval deployment had to contend with 'aggressive' patrols by Indonesian submarines.
Indonesia is all we have to worry about in terms of credible threats. They still want PNG, they still want Australia.
What we need is a Coast Guard to actively protect our seas from poachers and pirates.
The security challenge presented by Indonesia is far greater than just the possibility of an invasion of Australian territory. Did you forget about the Bali bombings? As other forum participants have noted, the ADF has been involved in providing training in regional counter terrorism and anti-piracy efforts.
Further, being able to defend Australian territory alone is meaningless if the ADF cannot keep her vital SLOCs open. In this respect, Australia's leadership in keeping the FPDA relevant is exemplary. Just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Australia. In fact, for a period, a spike in piracy in the Malacca Straits caused the Joint War Committee of Lloyds to designate the area a 'war risk' zone for marine insurance purposes. This designation was removed in 2006 (http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/Features_from_Lloyds/Market_removes_Malacca_Straits_from_the_List.htm).
Did you also know that Malaysia and Indonesia continue to have outstanding territorial disputes in the Ambalat region (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20081212.aspx)? And that there was a minor incident at sea between the two navies? How do you think Australia's SLOCs would be affected if the dispute intensified into conflict?
I think it's better that they're investing for the future because from my point of view they have a chronic shortage of enemies, unless you consider China with their eyes on the Spratlys as a threat!
You are certainly misguided. Do you remember the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979)? Keep in mind that China also views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers whenever it suits China. In 1988, China's navy sank three Vietnamese ships in the Spratly Islands region. Need I go on? And I have not even brought in NE Asia security concerns into the equation.
Misguided Fool
April 2nd, 2009, 03:07 AM
There are multiple challenges, multiple countries of concern and a host of regional security concerns (the information I post below is already in DT).
Going back a few years earlier (to 1962–1966), remember a little something called the 'Konfrontasi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia%E2%80%93Malaysia_confrontation)', in which the ADF was deployed. What about the armed struggle against the Malayan communist party, in which, the ADF was also involved?
When East Timor declared itself independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor. You are really misguided if you think that developments in Indonesia is not a concern for Australia. More recently, in 1999, the Australian led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) prevented anti-independence Timorese militias from completing a punitive scorched-earth campaign. With timely Australian intervention, the anti-independence Timorese militias still killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and forcibly pushed 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. Could you not say that Indonesia exported instability to East Timor? In fact, prior to the 1999 INTERFET intervention, the ADF conducted a simulated a peace enforcement exercise with UK, US, Canadian and NZ participation. This helped prepare the ADF to some extent for the intervention. In 1999, the Aussies, as lead country, augmented by US naval power, showed their impressive military capabilities. Because of the rapid deployment plan, the anti-independence Timorese militias were not able to effectively resist. In fact, the INTERFET naval deployment had to contend with 'aggressive' patrols by Indonesian submarines.
The security challenge presented by Indonesia is far greater than just the possibility of an invasion of Australian territory. Did you forget about the Bali bombings? As other forum participants have noted, the ADF has been involved in providing training in regional counter terrorism and anti-piracy efforts.
Further, being able to defend Australian territory alone is meaningless if the ADF cannot keep her vital SLOCs open. In this respect, Australia's leadership in keeping the FPDA relevant is exemplary. Just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Australia. In fact, for a period, a spike in piracy in the Malacca Straits caused the Joint War Committee of Lloyds to designate the area a 'war risk' zone for marine insurance purposes. This designation was removed in 2006 (http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/Features_from_Lloyds/Market_removes_Malacca_Straits_from_the_List.htm).
Did you also know that Malaysia and Indonesia continue to have outstanding territorial disputes in the Ambalat region (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20081212.aspx)? And that there was a minor incident at sea between the two navies? How do you think Australia's SLOCs would be affected if the dispute intensified into conflict?
You are certainly misguided. Do you remember the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979)? Keep in mind that China also views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers whenever it suits China. In 1988, China's navy sank three Vietnamese ships in the Spratly Islands region. Need I go on? And I have not even brought in NE Asia security concerns into the equation.
1) How was taking part in Malaysia like a full scale war?
2) The intervention in east Timor - how was that like fighting a full scale war?
I don't know about you, but the title "Australia is not ready for a war" to me sounds like a full scale war scenario, not a skirmish or a standoff or a minor internvention.
3) You mentioned the Bali bombings - that wasn't on Australian soil, and i don't believe i don't think in a full scale war, with censorship, propaganda and monitoring, terrorism would be much of an issue, especially on Australian soil.
4) There have been many minor conflicts ... how many have escalated into war?
5) I don't think Australia has the manpower to counter the Chinese "threat" in the region, and i think this lack of manpower can be partly nullified if the Australian forces in the future are very technologically advanced. China right now, compared to in the future, is a minor "threat", and i think that the Australian government's 'bias' is well founded.
OPSSG
April 2nd, 2009, 05:13 AM
I don't know about you, but the title "Australia is not ready for a war" to me sounds like a full scale war scenario, not a skirmish or a standoff or a minor intervention.
Fair enough. You can take a restrictive view and limit it to traditional large scale warfare. Or you can take a more holistic view and see it from the angle of security challenges. However, a restrictive view certainly ignores the lessons of history and some 'non-traditional' wars vie in destructiveness with the greatest of conventional conflicts.
IMHO, if the balance of military power is unequal, the response will more likely be asymmetrical. When compared to most Southeast Asian countries, Australia is a true 'middle power' in military and economic terms. Hence, their actions will have an impact on actions of state and non-state actors in Southeast Asia. In fact, there are articles stating that Australia is positioning herself as a global partner to the US and not just a regional security partner.
1) How was taking part in Malaysia like a full scale war?
You can choose to see the fight against the Malayan Communist Party (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chin_Peng) or the fight against the Indonesian infiltrators into Malaya as NOT WAR. But I think, it would be fair to call these military deployments at least a form of low intensity conflict (LIC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_intensity_conflict)). See FM100-20 on Military Operations in LIC (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/index.html) for more details. For me, I would see LIC as a form of warfare and is part of the spectrum of capabilities of a capable armed forces. The ADF is well regarded for this reason.
In particular, the 'Konfrontasi', involved regular Indonesian soldiers who fought in that conflict. Well, I would see that as limited war but still war.:D
2) The intervention in East Timor - how was that like fighting a full scale war?
3) You mentioned the Bali bombings - that wasn't on Australian soil, and i don't believe i don't think in a full scale war, with censorship, propaganda and monitoring, terrorism would be much of an issue, especially on Australian soil.
4) There have been many minor conflicts ... how many have escalated into war?
I think, it would be accurate to say that Indonesia and Australia had the potential to go to war over East Timor. Strong US and Australian support ensured that elements of the TNI who were supportive of the anti-independence Timorese militias were retrained. If these rouge TNI elements were not restrained, war could have easily resulted. The ADF's level of preparedness, speed of deployment, amount of force deployed by the ADF (by using light armour) and the MEU stationed as a fighting reserve combined to ensure that the rouge TNI elements were surprised by the speed and scale of the deployments. This resulted in a restrained response. War was prevented by a show of actual force. And the campaign of terror against the East Timorese was ended. There is an interesting article on 'Australia’s East Timor Experience: Military Lessons and Security Dilemmas' by James Cotton (http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/other/symposium/pdf/sympo_e2002_10.pdf).
So you are going to hold that against ADF for being prepared and not being drawn into an irregular war? :confused: Give the Australians a break, the ADF did very well and they have every right to be proud of their men in uniform. ;)
With regards to anti-terrorist activities after the Bali bombings, a number of Americans tend to label it as part of the War on Terror (WOT). Likewise, I'm not very comfortable with the WOT label but it requires a state response to a growing regional security issue. Australian citizens were being targeted and the ADF has a positive role to play in anti-terror training in Southeast Asia.
Please note that the conflicting EEZ claims (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/snyder/south_china_sea1.html) by various states in the South China Sea does not remove the threat of piracy, in fact, conflicting claims created a lawless zone. Please read this article on 'Martime ambushes off the Mangkai passage (http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0182009.pdf)' as a new source of security related problems.
5) I don't think Australia has the manpower to counter the Chinese "threat" in the region, and i think this lack of manpower can be partly nullified if the Australian forces in the future are very technologically advanced. China right now, compared to in the future, is a minor "threat", and i think that the Australian government's 'bias' is well founded.
China is the US's near peer competitor (http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5104/kurth.newmaritimestrategy.pdf). It is not a problem to be solved by middle powers like Australia alone. The contributions and positions of the US and other US allies like S. Korea and Japan (http://www.waseda-giari.jp/sysimg/imgs/200808si_03_lin_paper.pdf) have to be taken into consideration. Let's just avoid this discussion, as I have no wish to further respond on this topic.
I'll let the Australian members of the forum take over this discussion, as I am only an external observer. I have no real interest in further defending the capabilities of the ADF other than to say that I am grateful for their capabilities.
Misguided Fool
April 2nd, 2009, 10:46 AM
I'll let the Australian members of the forum take over this discussion, as I am only an external observer. I have no real interest in further defending the capabilities of the ADF other than to say that I am grateful for their capabilities.
I don't doubt the capabilities of the ADF - infact, my point is that the ADF's current capabilities should not be a priority, because right now, Australia faces few security challenges. Thus what i mean is that the "bias" of the Austrian defense department planning for the future is well founded - i agree with their idea of not spending on current equipment but researching for the future, as Australia right now isn't exactly in a precarious position (as you mentioned the help of the US, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, India perhaps is always available) and has good relations with ASEAN as a whole, if i'm not mistaken?
OPSSG
April 3rd, 2009, 05:21 AM
I already pointed out LIC is war. LIC is always a challenge to any conventional military lacking in ability to respond to a broad spectrum of threats. And the potential for LIC type of conflicts in Southeast Asia is a security challenge for Australia.
Eg: Does India/Pakistan have a good LIC capabilities to deal with Muslim separatists/terrorists, even though they are both nuclear powers? The answer must be: NO! The Indian and Pakistani armies are more ready to fight each other conventionally than to deal with LIC in their respective countries. BTW, Pakistan does not need or want to fight India - they just have to support insurgents, which is a LIC type of security challenge. Think of how my description on LIC conflict preparedness apply to the challenges faced by Australia.
...right now, Australia faces few security challenges...
Without sufficient qualification - WRONG!
IMHO,the security challenges in the Asia Pacific are increasing (of which Australia is a part of).
... help of the US, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, India...
Remember amongst countries, there are no permanent friendships, there are only permanent interests. South Korea and Japan are not natural allies (and are potential competitors) Because of bitter historical reasons, most Koreans are not fans of the Japanese. How does Australia's permanent interests factor in between Korea and Japan?
India was certainly unhappy with Pakistan over the Mumbai attacks. It is in US interests is not to allow both sides to go to war. Please identify the permanent common security interests of India with Australia (in relation to the rise of China), if you think they are going to be great allies.
I'm not willing to respond further, as you don't read enough. There is a complex interplay of national interests, some of which are competing. To think that these countries have a unity of interest - is WRONG!
...and has good relations with ASEAN as a whole, if i'm not mistaken?
Can you treat ASEAN as one unitary security interest block? Indonesia is often seen as the de facto leader of ASEAN. Is the interests of ASEAN a subset of Indonesian interest? Did I not mention that Australia could have gone to war with Indonesia over East Timor? Did the ADF, leading the INTERFET forces not score a win against the anti-independence Timorese militias? Read the links provided, don't assume!
There are also weak states in ASEAN who have a poor record in fighting and dealing with insurgents / terrorists / pirates. These are security challenges that will also affect Australia.
Which country in ASEAN does Australia have the closest cooperative military relationship with (under the FDPA umbrella)? Please read and think before responding. You don't seem to read my posts when responding to them, so I'm going to stop responding to your posts in this thread.
Misguided Fool
April 3rd, 2009, 11:18 AM
I already pointed out LIC is war. LIC is always a challenge to any conventional military lacking in ability to respond to a broad spectrum of threats. and the potential for LIC type of conflicts in Southeast Asia is a security challenge for Australia.
Eg: Does India/Pakistan have a good LIC capabilities to deal with Muslim separatists/terrorists, even though they are both nuclear powers? The answer must be: NO! The Indian and Pakistani armies are more ready to fight each other conventionally than to deal with LIC in their respective countries. BTW, Pakistan does not need or want to fight India - they just have to support insurgents, which is a LIC type of security challenge. Think of how my description on LIC conflict preparedness apply to the challenges faced by Australia.
Without sufficient qualification - WRONG!
IMHO,the security challenges in the Asia Pacific are increasing (of which Australia is a part of).
Remember amongst countries, there are no permanent friendships, there are only permanent interests. South Korea and Japan are not natural allies (and are potential competitors) Because of bitter historical reasons, most Koreans are not fans of the Japanese. How does Australia's permanent interests factor in between Korea and Japan?
India was certainly unhappy with Pakistan over the Mumbai attacks. It is in US interests is not to allow both sides to go to war. Please identify the permanent common security interests of India with Australia (in relation to the rise of China), if you think they are going to be great allies.
I'm no willing to respond further, as you don't read enough. There is a complex interplay of national interests, some of which are competing. To think that these countries have a unity of interest - is WRONG!
Can you treat ASEAN as one unitary security interest block? Indonesia is often seen as the de facto leader of ASEAN. Is the interests of ASEAN a subset of Indonesian interest? Did I not mention that Australia could have gone to war with Indonesia over East Timor? Did the ADF, leading the INTERFET forces not score a win against the anti-independence Timorese militias? Read the links provided, don't assume!
There are also weak states in ASEAN who have a poor record in fighting and dealing with insurgents / terrorists / pirates. These are security challenges that will also affect Australia.
Which country in ASEAN does Australia have the closest cooperative military relationship with (under the FDPA umbrella)? Please read and think before responding. You don't seem to read my posts when responding to them, so I'm going to stop responding to your posts in this thread.
Lol, you seem to do a bit of overassuming / putting words into my mouth that simply aren't there.
LIC problems are more of a natural threat with significant proportions of disaffected people in the country. India has a population of 13% muslims who are generally disaffected and not integrated, providing a strong breeding ground for terrorists.
Once again, Australia faces no major conventional threat, and that is what the original article is hinting at increasing (conventional spending). Australia WILL in the future face a more substantial conventional threat.
I don't think any regionalist alliance like ASEAN will be subsidiary to the interests of one state, especially if it isn't especially bigger / more powerful than them (eg, US dominated NATO where they were bigger/more powerful, Russia dominated the warsaw pact similarly).
You seem to mention numerous "security" challenges thare are not conventionally related. It's been proven (in vietnam, afghanistan) that no amount of conventional superiority in munitions, technology, etc will stop a determined guerrilla or non conventional fighting force. The main article was about boosting current conventional force spending, not increased spending on counter terrorism, that is more relevant to what "security" challenges that you are talking about :rolleyes:.
You seem to be focussing very heavily on the fact that Australia faces considerable "security" challenges, having completely twisted the fact that the original article is about conventional warfare and relevant armament.
I don't doubt that what you say about assymetric warfare in relation to Australia is correct. You've got a blue name so you probably know what you're talking about. My point is that i agree with Australia's defense spending going more NOW towards R&D than boosting current equipment, because Australia's need in the future will be much greater agains the "potential" threat of China.
I believe that in the future that the region will be dominated by two main players, India and China. It's been predicted that by 2050 India's economy will surpass China's, and China's will surpass the US by 2020-30. Can you seriously suggest that power politics regional one upmanship will not result in Australia being drawn into alliance with either India or China? And that's assuming that the two powers end up as antagonists, which historically has been the trend (although recently there has been a slight thawing of relations). There is also the fact that China's main maritime interests are it's island chain policy (string of pearls, first tier, second tier, third tier) and more importantly supply of key resources through the Straits of Malacca (although to an extent this will be less of the case when China gets their pipeline built through Burma).
Once again, i state that it is more important, in my view, that Australia focusses on tomorrow instead of today, because while current threats might be present (in the unconventional form if no other), in the future there is potential for a much more precarious situation. That's what the article, and in my view, this topic is about; not terrorism/insurgencies but conventional forces.
Also, you say that the security challenges are increasing. Well, if they're increasing now, what's to say that they won't have increased by much more in the future?
You mentioned East Timor, and i reply with the fact that the countries DIDN'T go to war over East Timor. It was like all the US and Soviet spending during the cold war. Totally pointless, considering the assymetric threats both countries actually face (the US in Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia in Chechnya). What's more important in my view is researching for the future when a chance of a conflict, or atleast that of one upmanship (eg, the Cuban Missile Crisis) is significant.
While i never said that the countries are united in their interests, are you seriously suggesting that in some doomsday scenario if China invaded South Korea, Japan and the US wouldn't intervene? And that India wouldn't at least issue embargoes? WHile i agree that the concept of a full out war in south east asia is surreal and hopefully unrealistic, that's what militaries are meant for; fighting wars against similarly equipped and trained forces, not insurgencies.
Thus, once again referring back to the original post, you seem to be arguing that Australia faces considerable security risks in form of assymetric players, while the original post is talking about conventional forces (submarines, aircraft). While i don't doubt that conventional superiority probably helps when combatting an insurgency, unless one side is willing to torch the land and destroy the forests, an insurgency can live on, and this doesn't even consider places like Afghanistan that are mostly mountain / desert anyway! And i'm arguing that increasing conventional force levels today isn't important, that planning for the future SHOULD be a priority, as threats on the whole range of spectrum are likely to increase, from asymmetric to conventional.
Just out of question, what is your point? :P
Jecito
April 3rd, 2009, 02:22 PM
Really quite pathetic that the blackhawks can't even be cleared to operate in Afghanistan. If they can't be deployed to a warzone what good are they? Does the MANPAD risk outweigh the risk of letting Australians die waiting for NATO medical evacuation. And why does Australia keep bludging off NATO/US. If Rudd is really serious about Afghanistan why not deploy the tigers, hornets, artillery etc. Australia spends $22 billion dollars on its military and is it alot better equipped and trained then most of the world, but the most it can supply is 1000 soldiers. And then blaming NATO for not doing more. Canada is supplying close to 3000, the Netherlands almost double Australia's commitment. Australia is on par with Romania in the amount of troops in the field. What an achievement to be proud of...
icelord
April 4th, 2009, 06:34 AM
Really quite pathetic that the blackhawks can't even be cleared to operate in Afghanistan. If they can't be deployed to a warzone what good are they? Does the MANPAD risk outweigh the risk of letting Australians die waiting for NATO medical evacuation. And why does Australia keep bludging off NATO/US. If Rudd is really serious about Afghanistan why not deploy the tigers, hornets, artillery etc. Australia spends $22 billion dollars on its military and is it alot better equipped and trained then most of the world, but the most it can supply is 1000 soldiers. And then blaming NATO for not doing more. Canada is supplying close to 3000, the Netherlands almost double Australia's commitment. Australia is on par with Romania in the amount of troops in the field. What an achievement to be proud of...
Too scared, too easy. The idea of a great strain on the ADF has been a common misconception for many years, hell we hear how a lone frigate in the gulf is a drain on our capability...its hogwash, we spend more time in Jervis Bay then on deployment, which we would rather anyway. As for the Army, the only strain is caused on deploying a force not designed as the central part of a combat scenario. Special Forces are not just in name. the combat force element is combined with a SF detachment, not an Element working for a lone company of commandos.
Infantry would be far more efficient and capable for Afghanistan then SF are, the infantry are better for rotation and use in diverse ranges, SF should be there to hit hard and fast when a operation requires it,not hearts and minds but skulls and bones.
When you use a elite unit you waste their valuable training on minor projects handled better by a infantry platoon or sapper unit. The reconstruction forces have shown they are better at relieving pressure on the deployment itself, and given the 4RAR more time to concentrate on the bigger picture.
The greatest problem is that dead soldiers mean dead votes for the other guy, it takes on party to speak against a large deployment, and 2-3 dead soldiers, for the govt. of any nature to quiver into a withdrawl, ala spain in Iraq, and any Euro country thats pulled back after a, what can be described in comparisson with US losses as tiny casualty number.The problem with a 24/7 govt. is that they rely on decisions within 24/7,and results in even less time.
Icelord
i truely havn't had a decent rant in a while...i'm back ppl:nutkick
What we need is a Coast Guard to actively protect our seas from poachers and pirates.
yeah about that, head to the navy discussion, ull find enough info against the concept to realise its a silly and waistful idea, 2 small a country and 2 much already invested in a capable force of rotating trained personnel, and i want to head nth on patrollies once my current posting is up, a CG would'nt help that.:rolleyes:
IPA35
April 4th, 2009, 06:37 AM
I actually thinking the Australians are doing a good job.
They are basically doing exactly what the dutch mitary SHOULD do if we had a more competent government...
Aussie Digger
April 4th, 2009, 09:51 AM
What we need is a Coast Guard to actively protect our seas from poachers and pirates.
What is the Coast Guard going to do, that the ADF, Australian Customs and State and Federal Fisheries departments, aren't doing right now?
Another bureaucracy for the sake of bureaucracy? That's what Labor wanted too, before they actually got into power and realised that simply creating a Coast Guard is an answer to NOTHING.
What IS the answer, is funding a credible maritime surveillance and response capability. A capable domestic and foreign Law Enforcement capability and a highly capable Domestic and Foreign intelligence capability.
Call it whatever you like, but THIS is what Australia requires to secure itself from non-warlike threats, but until Government is prepared to fund and resource these required capabilities properly, making blanket statements like, "What we need is a Coast Guard" is worse than useless, because it diverts attention away from the real ISSUES.
Aussie Digger
April 4th, 2009, 11:04 AM
Really quite pathetic that the blackhawks can't even be cleared to operate in Afghanistan. If they can't be deployed to a warzone what good are they?
Perhaps that is why they are in the process of being replaced? Come 2014 they will all be retired...
How much money should be spent on them for 5 or less years of remaining service?
Does the MANPAD risk outweigh the risk of letting Australians die waiting for NATO medical evacuation. And why does Australia keep bludging off NATO/US.
The EW argument is a load of shite. It's the Government's unwillingness to increase the size and therefore cost of the deployment, that has meant the Blackhawks haven't been deployed. Y
There are argument about "hot and high" performance for our Blackhawks, when fitted with the necessary ballistic armour they would need (MANPADS aren't the threat, "trashfire" - small arms fire is) to go to Afghanistan and the subsequent flight time they would have, but Government COULD have upgraded the Blackhawk engines, to improve their performance. There are plenty of T700 upgrade options, all it would take would be for Defmin Fitzgibbon to stick his hand in the Government's pockets and pull out a few tens of million. They did exactly the SAME THING for the Chinooks in the space of about 3 months...
Here's a solution even. Tell ya what, KRudd, pay everyone due to be "given" $900.00 next week, $890.00 instead. That's only $10 per person less than what they are already getting. Who is going to complain about $10, less?
8.7 million persons are expected to get the $900.00 bonus, that's $87m that could be spent on upgrading the Blackhawk helo's engines, so we can give our poor diggers, who you LOVE being photographed with SO much, 2x Blackhawk helicopters, to provide 24/7 medivac support.
If you are worried about the "fallout", save the $87m to be spent on upgraded Blackhawk announcement to ANZAC day (25 April). NO-ONE in Australia, or anywhere in the world, most likely, will criticise the Government spending money on a project to help SAVE digger's lives on ANZAC day.
If Rudd is really serious about Afghanistan why not deploy the tigers, hornets, artillery etc. Australia spends $22 billion dollars on its military and is it alot better equipped and trained then most of the world, but the most it can supply is 1000 soldiers.
1. Tigers aren't operational yet. I expect they won't be available for deployment for at least 12 months, yet.
2. Hornets? Yep, no problem. There is no reason in the world, why a RAAF Hornet detachment couldn't be deployed to Afghanistan. They are more than capable enough, they would go a LONG way to placating our allies, who already grumble about our relative capability, but lack of Except cost. The importance of our deployment to Afghanistan is empirically measured against the cost, both financial and in potential casualties. Hence why we haven't deployed any real combat assets.
3. Artillery? We've gone the cheap way for that. We've deployed our own 81mm mortars and we have elements from 4th Field Regiment serving with a British artillery unit. Our regular (ie: non-"special") forces are not undertaking combat operations. All our regular army "contacts" (the ones we see video on from time to time) are basically self-defence in nature.
We are deployed in Oruzgan province in Afghanistan. The Dutch are providing overwatch for us and we have Dutch PZH-2000 155mm self propelled guns, operating in support of us. There is really no point in send our little pea-shooter 105's or 155's, when the Dutch are there already with SPG's...
If we are not sending line infantry to undertake combat operations, what do we need our own artillery for?
And then blaming NATO for not doing more. Canada is supplying close to 3000, the Netherlands almost double Australia's commitment. Australia is on par with Romania in the amount of troops in the field. What an achievement to be proud of...
Yep we are p*ss weak. All rhetoric and no real action. Our soldiers are actually gaining an undeserved reputation, thanks to the collective spinelessness of our Governments...
Is defeating terrorism important or not?
If it is, get a battalion group over there and take up the fight to the insurgents. If it's not, bring our boys back home and stop pretending we actually care...
barra
April 4th, 2009, 06:29 PM
The subject seems to have moved to the shape of any increase in our forces in A'stan and our record so far in Iraq and A'stan. So I think will put my 2 cents worth forward here.
Since 2003 Aust Governments have taken a casualty averse approach to deploying the ADF. For example RAAF Hornets did not go downtown Baghdad, thus avoiding the "supermez" because the EW system was not "good enough". Thing is it was good enough for USMC Hornets, exact same system. Aust govt has played a "smart" game of seemingly politically "risky" deployments to placate our great and powerfull friend, but also kept those deployments on a tight leash to avoid messy and politically hurtfull casualties. The Horward Govt was quite skilled at doing this but the Rudd Govt has stepped up the rhetoric by berating our allies for not doing more when we are doing exactly the same thing! They are making us look like idiots in the eyes of our long time allies US, UK and Canada.
So the shape of any ADF increase in A'stan, as looks likely. I think an Infantry Battalion is a must with supporting SF, Armour, Artillery and wokka wokka's. Thats what the Army calls a combined arms team, right? The RAAF CRC deployment is due to end in 3-4 months, the numbers involved there are about the same required for a small detachment of Hornets, say 4-6. Recently I noticed that RAAF Hornets have been experimenting with what they call a "Goofy Load" configuration. Last time I saw that was late 2002 early 2003, just coincidence? ;)
Aussie Digger
April 5th, 2009, 12:12 AM
The RAAF CRC deployment is due to end in 3-4 months, the numbers involved there are about the same required for a small detachment of Hornets, say 4-6. Recently I noticed that RAAF Hornets have been experimenting with what they call a "Goofy Load" configuration. Last time I saw that was late 2002 early 2003, just coincidence? ;)
Do these "goofy loads" look anything like?
If not, any hints would be welcome, please...
old faithful
April 5th, 2009, 01:04 AM
A Bn group would definatley be very effective in the Stan, particully useing the "fireforce" tactics employed by the RLI in the Rhodesian war.
3RAR used these tactics several times on ex, includeing K92. basiclly they revolve on SF pinpointing targets, and adviseing infantry units of vunerable times and exact location of the enemy, very fast reaction times are required, and the use of helo,s is a must. so the blackhawks would have to be deployed, as would 155 arty. but it would give RAINF valuable battle experience that they are just not getting, and contribute to the effort in Afghanistan.
SASR would need to remain in place, The Bn group could rotate through protection duties for the reconstruction task farce (force ;)) and still supply 2 ready reaction coy groups as well as support coy. it would be a win win situation for the ADF.
barra
April 5th, 2009, 05:19 AM
Do these "goofy loads" look anything like?
If not, any hints would be welcome, please...
Not quite, a goofy load uses one of the wet stations as a weapon hard point. Stations 3, 5 and 7 are wet stations on classic Hornets. With a goofy load station 3 or 7 would have a weapon and the other two wet stations have jugs (Super Hornet has 5 wet stations). This config has been used by the USMC to free up a hardpoint for an extra weapon in Iraq and A'stan. The photo shows a VER with a JDAM and GBU, AFAIK you can't carry two GBU's on a VER (which was the case in 2003). They could certainly be fitted and carried in flight on a VER, the restriction must be related to the point of release. Maybe not enough space after weapon release for the tail fins to deploy?? I am unsure if a JDAM and GBU can be used on a VER. If VER's can be used in this way, with either two JDAMs or a JDAM and GBU per station it certainly improves the Hornets weapons carrying capability which was found lacking in 2003.
barra
April 5th, 2009, 05:25 AM
A Bn group would definatley be very effective in the Stan, particully useing the "fireforce" tactics employed by the RLI in the Rhodesian war.
3RAR used these tactics several times on ex, includeing K92. basiclly they revolve on SF pinpointing targets, and adviseing infantry units of vunerable times and exact location of the enemy, very fast reaction times are required, and the use of helo,s is a must. so the blackhawks would have to be deployed, as would 155 arty. but it would give RAINF valuable battle experience that they are just not getting, and contribute to the effort in Afghanistan.
SASR would need to remain in place, The Bn group could rotate through protection duties for the reconstruction task farce (force ;)) and still supply 2 ready reaction coy groups as well as support coy. it would be a win win situation for the ADF.
Agree 100%, question is does Kev 07 and little Fitz have the gumption to commit??? Would also like to see the Abrams deployed as well.
Aussie Digger
April 5th, 2009, 09:26 AM
Not quite, a goofy load uses one of the wet stations as a weapon hard point. Stations 3, 5 and 7 are wet stations on classic Hornets. With a goofy load station 3 or 7 would have a weapon and the other two wet stations have jugs (Super Hornet has 5 wet stations). This config has been used by the USMC to free up a hardpoint for an extra weapon in Iraq and A'stan. The photo shows a VER with a JDAM and GBU, AFAIK you can't carry two GBU's on a VER (which was the case in 2003). They could certainly be fitted and carried in flight on a VER, the restriction must be related to the point of release. Maybe not enough space after weapon release for the tail fins to deploy?? I am unsure if a JDAM and GBU can be used on a VER. If VER's can be used in this way, with either two JDAMs or a JDAM and GBU per station it certainly improves the Hornets weapons carrying capability which was found lacking in 2003.
Hmm, very interesting.
I was of the understanding that dual carriage and employment of JDAM from a single pylon, was possible from the Hornet, thanks to the BRU-55 being procured along with JDAM. I never knew that LGB's could be launched from the inside of the BRu-55. I've heard that the fins extending on weapons launch, tend to tear holes in the tanks, which is obviously not ideal...
This shot might have just been a PR shot, but it would be a useful capability to carry LGB/JDAM per pylon. Of course, RAAF could also splash out on Laser JDAM and carry 2x per pylon as well, but one can't have everything...
I've noticed that for dual carriage of LGB's on other tactical aircraft, a vertically staggered (or "slant" as some seem to call it) styled carrier is required.
These are seen lately on F-16 pics, around the place...
OPSSG
April 6th, 2009, 04:03 AM
According to some sources (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures), in absolute dollar terms, Australia's defence spending is ranked 13th and behind the following Asian powers:
(i) China (ranked 2nd)
(ii) Japan (ranked 6th)
(iii) India (ranked 9th)
(iv) S. Korea (ranked 12th)
The next Asian powers ranked behind Australia is spending are Taiwan (ranked at 21st), Pakistan (ranked at 23rd) and Singapore (ranked at 24th). BTW, I know spending is not a good way of ranking capabilities, but I think these numbers are a good starting point for discussion.
So when AD says Australia is 'p*ss weak', how are you guys comparing / measuring it? :)
I'm just a little curious, as I think despite their large conventional warfare capabilities of India and Pakistan, their armies are very ill equipped to deal with the current LIC type of security challenges that they face. So in a way, despite the numbers, they are not able to operate equally effectively at a different end of the conflict spectrum. OTOH, in terms of counting the number of soldiers, the ADF is very much smaller than all the countries listed above. It's force structure is not geared towards acting alone in massive conventional warfare (with say a country like Indonesia).
In fact, I continue to worry about LICs in Indonesia and the Philippines (where at least 17 persons were killed (http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cagayan-de-oro/bukidnon-clash-kills-17) in April 2009), which to me is still war. To quote Frank Hoffman (JFQ, issue 52, 1stQ 2009), writing on 'Hybrid Warfare and Challenges':
'Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly.'
I also share his view that our enemies will always get a vote and they will hit us where we are least prepared.
Since 2003 Aust Governments have taken a casualty averse approach to deploying the ADF. For example RAAF Hornets did not go downtown Baghdad, thus avoiding the "supermez" because the EW system was not "good enough". Thing is it was good enough for USMC Hornets, exact same system. Aust govt has played a "smart" game of seemingly politically "risky" deployments to placate our great and powerfull friend, but also kept those deployments on a tight leash to avoid messy and politically hurtful casualties...
AD and barra, thanks for the additional input on the Hornets issue and it certainly places the various news reports in their proper context.
The Horward Govt was quite skilled at doing this but the Rudd Govt has stepped up the rhetoric by berating our allies for not doing more when we are doing exactly the same thing! They are making us look like idiots in the eyes of our long time allies US, UK and Canada.
Do Australians generally support more Diggers in Afghanistan?
Is the Rudd Govt going to be trapped by its own rhetoric? As you said, there may be some preparations to send more fighting troops (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25267124-5013871,00.html).
So the shape of any ADF increase in A'stan, as looks likely. I think an Infantry Battalion is a must with supporting SF, Armour, Artillery and wokka wokka's. Thats what the Army calls a combined arms team, right? The RAAF CRC deployment is due to end in 3-4 months, the numbers involved there are about the same required for a small detachment of Hornets, say 4-6.
If they send more, it is my hope that the participation will be structured in a way to enable the ADF to develop or polish its current capabilities.
phreeky
April 6th, 2009, 08:44 AM
Do Australians generally support more Diggers in Afghanistan?
That's a tough question. IMO overall probably not, however I believe the opposite is true when you only consider those that would actually consider such issues at the voting booth (but I guess going any further into that is bordering on politics).
FutureTank
April 24th, 2009, 09:23 PM
Australian defence and the ADF have been mismanaged by both the Labour and Liberal governments, and not just in terms of actual conventional warfare capability building, but the underlying national defence industry development that can support such capabilities as required by the strategic policy, and the organisational project management within the Defence community.
When compared to other similar national defence forces, in terms of conventional capabilities Australia's defence seems a shadow of a force, not really capable of performing significant strategic missions, barely capable of operational deployment, and only barely having the tactical force structure to engage in conventional warfare within the region.
Australia has been fortunate in that since the Second World War it has only been called upon to participate in low intensity conflicts where best deployment options suited well trained dismounted or partially mobile infantry as the primary means of conducting combat operations.
Aussie Digger
April 25th, 2009, 11:30 AM
When compared to other similar national defence forces, in terms of conventional capabilities Australia's defence seems a shadow of a force, not really capable of performing significant strategic missions, barely capable of operational deployment, and only barely having the tactical force structure to engage in conventional warfare within the region.
So, who in the "region" has a superior tactical force structure and why is ours, so obsolete?
Barely capable of operational deployment?
Er, I think you'll find we have somewhere in the vicinity of 12x declared operational deployments, running simultaneously...
What is a significant strategic mission? Does Timor count? What about the Solomans? Bearing in mind YOU said strategic.
What does TNCG mean to YOU at a "strategic" level?
FutureTank
April 25th, 2009, 10:49 PM
So, who in the "region" has a superior tactical force structure and why is ours, so obsolete?
Barely capable of operational deployment?
Er, I think you'll find we have somewhere in the vicinity of 12x declared operational deployments, running simultaneously...
What is a significant strategic mission? Does Timor count? What about the Solomans? Bearing in mind YOU said strategic.
What does TNCG mean to YOU at a "strategic" level?
Part of the problem in answering these questions is that the Australian Governments never really had any idea of what the strategic role of the ADF is supposed to be when decoupled from the US defence policy. What should the ADF do as a means of projecting Australian national security policy even where there is no US support for it, or where support can not be provided due to a lack of capability? It seems that neither of these options were ever considered as part of security planning for a sovereign and independent national policy. Being a member of the ANZUS does not diminish the Australian Government's responsibility for just such a policy approach as a primary consideration.
The answer has always been that protecting Australian global economic links is the strategic mission of the ADF. Protecting Australia's territorial claims is the reason for ADF's existence, and need not even be written into the policy that seeks to underwrite sovereignty! Because Australian global economic links are quite obviously very different to the US economic links, clearly the reliance on the US to support keeping them open and not threatened has been the core hope of the ANZUS alliance. Can national security policies be really based on assumptions of everlasting good will and support? Home security is ultimately the responsibility of the owner, and not the Neighbourhood Watch or the Police Service. Right?
However, there are two big oceans out there, and the RAN has no capability to patrol, never mind control the shipping lanes should someone try to force their trade policy on ours. Control of large expenses of ocean require far more than a few frigates or robotic surveillance aircraft. The announcement that the RAN submarine fleet will be expanded to 12 boats should have been made in the 1990s at the latest. How these are going to be crewed is an entirely different matter when the RAN is struggling to crew all available boats now.
In any case, its about time the Australian political parties came clean with the public and explained that we are a maritime nation, and that we are therefore dependent on keeping maritime lanes of trade that assure our desired collective standards of living secure. This can not be done indefinitely with reliance on the USA, and at some stage we will have to take responsibility for our own national security.
The difficulty of exerting control and protecting shipping is being illustrated off the coast of Somalia now by rag-tag populations of pirates using nothing more than ramshackle fleet of rust buckets and inflatables. If such a campaign was initiated against Australian trade lanes in our region, could the RAN cope?
Control of sea can not be achieved with just frigates or the odd submarine since they lack the surveillance capability in a very large area of responsibility. The only way to exert this control is through use of carrier-born aircraft because control implies having an offensive capability with a fairly quick response time that neither the Global Hawk, nor the P-3 or the yet-to-fly P-8 will offer.
What I'm suggesting is that the RAN should be able to put into a potential naval combat area a balanced task force with the usual naval "combined arms" configuration used by other maritime nations. There is no reason that the RAN can't do this given other nations with similar defence expenditures can manage to deploy such task forces.
Operational deployment to me means moving sufficient force over required distance in required time to make a strategic difference. In a conventional warfare scenario with confronting any number of threats in the two-ocean region the best RAN can do now is a couple of frigates and a submarine on at best a week's notice (assuming Darwin station). Given the growth in regional naval forces, this is just not good enough any more. The unfortunate truth is that small rich populations are going to be increasingly seen as valid targets in a world of large poor populations, and we have three of some of the largest in the World in the region. Only a task force with organic logistic support can offer the sort of operational response required, given the strategic considerations above.
12x declared operational deployments? There is some confusion over the terms since the movement of an Army company by sea to Solomons is also an "operation" but it is not operational. All RANvessels are of course deemed to be operational when not undergoing work being done to them. East Timor was the last, and only second, RAN operational deployment since the Vietnam War.
East Timor does count as a strategic mission because essentially Australia is now underwriting Timor Leste's national security, and this means the increase in the potential confrontation with Indonesia, or any entity/s that it may evolve into in future.
The Solomons do not constitute a strategic mission because regardless of the changes in Solomons, or Australia's willingness to influence them, they will not create a significant impact on the Australian national security unless something drastic happens, like PRC commencing the building of a naval base in the Solomons.
Operation Catalyst is not strategic for the ADF since it is operating as part of a much larger force for which it is strategic. At best it can be considered 'strategic; in the sense that the ADF personnel are gaining valuable experience in operating within a strategic environment, but the role they play is tactical.
Operation Resolute is actually a part of what national navies do anyway! I don't even understand why it has an operation name because operations by definitions are sort of deployment projects, and not ongoing use of assets as mandated by the Australian Constitution. Is the Australian Government committed to ending Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone patrolling?
I think that above all the Australian Government must realise, and voice this realisation to the Australian public to garner political support, that the global strategic situation has in the recent few years changed dramatically, undoing the development in our region that took five centuries to evolve. The routes across the Indian and the Pacific are no longer just those of seeking out new markets by the Europeans, but also the means of competitors reaching the European, and now the US markets, a proposition that was never envisaged when the liberal economic theory was developed. Moreover, the major players in the new global economic trade are not even playing by the liberal economic rules. The creation of the NEW freight route and Central Asian overland options, and the projected reduction in dependence by the developed countries of the Northern hemisphere on West Asian oil will reduce the importance they attach to force projection in the Indian-Pacific region. The development of the P-4 may be a precursor to the realignment of regional trade routes. Australia will need to find own resources from which to secure its national well being in future.
Please enlighten me on what TNCG stands (for you) for as it seems to be new to me, and is not found elsewhere in Defence Talk forums, so I can't even get an idea of what it means had you had used it here before.
Feanor
April 26th, 2009, 04:25 AM
Home security is ultimately the responsibility of the owner, and not the Neighbourhood Watch or the Police Service. Right?
Wrong. Home security is the responsibility of the police. Any crime fighting activity is not to be done by local vigilates, but by professionals.
Now as to your idea, it definetly sounds good. Except that the US will (for the forseeable future) remain allied to Australia, and will continue to support your trade links. So tell me how the politicians that you mention should sell a huge military budget hike to the public in order to create capabilities currently provided by the presence of the US free of charge, and unlikely to ever be used or ever be necessary.
FutureTank
April 26th, 2009, 06:02 AM
Wrong. Home security is the responsibility of the police. Any crime fighting activity is not to be done by local vigilates, but by professionals.
Now as to your idea, it definetly sounds good. Except that the US will (for the forseeable future) remain allied to Australia, and will continue to support your trade links. So tell me how the politicians that you mention should sell a huge military budget hike to the public in order to create capabilities currently provided by the presence of the US free of charge, and unlikely to ever be used or ever be necessary.
Feanor, I think you misunderstood. There was no mention of any 'vigilantes' in what I wrote. Ultimately the security of Australia is the responsibility of Australians.
The USA may remain allied with Australia, but that does not mean it underwrites Australian national security. There will be situations in which the USA may not support Australia's use of forces, and visa versa.
There is no need for a huge budget hike. Better management would be far more welcome. Same budget as now would have seen the ADF lavishly equipped by comparison had there been more effective Defence planning and management, including that of Defence industry sector, had the Liberal and later Labour governments going back to the late 70s not got used to the "USA crutch". Lets not forget that in 1946 Australia was the most developed country in the Indian-Pacific region with shipbuilding, armoured vehicle building and ordnance manufacturing capabilities. Today we are a net Defence importer, nay, dependent.
Where in case of some items of equipment like fighter planes this is understandable since apparently not even the USA can now afford development and production of such advanced aircraft in its own right, in the case of simpler platforms like infantry fighting vehicles we should have had a better product than an armoured bus...er...master. We did buy LAVs from Canada while spending years redesigning a 60s rush job (M113). Australia should be able to manufacture its own artillery, including self propelled, given we have world-standard development in metals technology. We should be able to design and build out own combat and combat support vessels given we are a continent three-ocean nation.
We should be able to do lots of things, but we can't because there Australian Governments have never supported defence industry as a matter of national security priority, and much of the population does not understand that having this capability is tantamount to the difference between having a life saving operation in the country, or having to travel overseas for one.
For example we are a country with one of the oldest and safest records for flying. Air transport is vital for Australia as a domestic and international means of communication. And yet we can't even put together a military tactical transport to replace the C-130, having to buy (it seems) the C-27. Even if the design and development of such an aircraft was too much of an effort for the Australian defence industry, what about regional cooperation? Surely the effort shared with states like Japan, South Korea and Singapore would have been well worth the effort?
The outcome of this mismanagement? The Army does not own one major piece of equipment designed in Australia. The navy sails in mostly European-designed vessels, with the exception of the patrol boats. The RAAF had to even buy turbo-prop trainers from Switzerland, and this after building fighter planes during the Second World War in which Switzerland didn't even participate! If we are the "clever country" why do we keep paying other people for high tech defence equipment?
Add up all the licence fees, fees for all the support provided from external suppliers, all the training that can only be conducted overseas, all the technology transfer programs required to integrate this technology, and employing all the foreign consultants and contractors, and you will get a pile of cash more than the $15 billion ADF was asked to save to cope with its procurement program over the next decade. And, in return you will get more local employment, design and development, innovation, and greater public awareness of the purpose for and contribution of the defence industry and Defence in general.
As for having "capabilities currently provided by the presence of the US free of charge, and unlikely to ever be used or ever be necessary", this is not true. We are not in a static World. Australia faces a very insecure arc across its global periphery from South Africa, along the East coast of Africa to the Persian Gulf, along the southern coast of West Asia, India, South-East Asia, and into the East Asian region. About the only safe route for Australian shipping in the long term is via Hawaii and Panama. The way to the largest and richest market on Earth for Australia lies mostly through troubled waters indeed. The USN will not be everywhere, all the time, for posterity. The Australian Government needs to realise this now given creation of replacement capabilities is likely to take a generation to develop. Can you tell what the globe will be like in 20 years?
Marc 1
April 26th, 2009, 09:18 AM
For example we are a country with one of the oldest and safest records for flying. Air transport is vital for Australia as a domestic and international means of communication. And yet we can't even put together a military tactical transport to replace the C-130, having to buy (it seems) the C-27. Even if the design and development of such an aircraft was too much of an effort for the Australian defence industry, what about regional cooperation? Surely the effort shared with states like Japan, South Korea and Singapore would have been well worth the effort?
The outcome of this mismanagement? The Army does not own one major piece of equipment designed in Australia. The navy sails in mostly European-designed vessels, with the exception of the patrol boats. The RAAF had to even buy turbo-prop trainers from Switzerland, and this after building fighter planes during the Second World War in which Switzerland didn't even participate! If we are the "clever country" why do we keep paying other people for high tech defence equipment?
Future Tank, I think you misunderstand just exactly how expensive your proposals are. Just to reply to your proposal about why we are not designing and manufacturing our own C130 replacement - basically it's about cost. In case you haven't noticed, a company the size of Airbus is several years and billions of dollars behind on delivering an airframe not massively larger than the C130.
The only other airframes in competition to the C130 are the Japanese C-X (extensive governmental support - but at least Japan has an aerospace industry) the just launched Embraer - again like Airbus from a manufacturers point of view plenty of money and aviation experience to draw on. Some of the designs from the Former Soviet Union could be refreshed I guess, but again this is from a nation with vast resources and an established aviation history. The last time we produced anything that was locally designed and built was the Nomad - complete with its in flight detatchable tail. Plus, we need say 12 - 20 airframes. If nobody else orders the aircraft all of the billions of dollars of development costs need to be amortised against 20 airframes. Oh, good - we've got these fabulous transports, but sorry chaps we've had to spend all the money we had set aside for the JSF... Or would the scenario play out like this - billions of dollars additional for defence and a PM being asked by Kerry O'Brien, Can you explain to the Australian people Prime Minister, why we needed to make our own C130 replacements when we could have bought off the shelf from Lockheed for hundreds of millions of dollars less per airframe?
Artillery - same deal. We need what 50 tubes total? Again you would be looking at probably a billion dollar plus program to produce one calibre (say the 155's) you could leverage off that for a few hundred million for the 105's. Again, how much do you want to pay per gun?
Question Future Tank, assuming you have a car, why did you buy a ready made one? After all I'm sure you could have comissioned a team of engineers and stylists yourself. Could it be that you would consider it far too expensive to do that? Why is Australia any different?
FutureTank
April 26th, 2009, 10:24 AM
Future Tank, I think you misunderstand just exactly how expensive your proposals are. Just to reply to your proposal about why we are not designing and manufacturing our own C130 replacement - basically it's about cost. In case you haven't noticed, a company the size of Airbus is several years and billions of dollars behind on delivering an airframe not massively larger than the C130.
No, you misunderstand....primarily because you didn't read what I said. There is a decades-long history of mismanagement, so catching up now is harder and expensive. Ever heard of EADS-CASA? Not so long ago they were making simple small turboprop tactical transports, and NOW they are part of the A400M consortium. The aircraft are being partly assembled in their plant. Some of their aircraft are being produced in Indonesia under licence. Will Australian industry have the capability to produce the C-27J in Australia?
The only other airframes in competition to the C130 are the Japanese C-X (extensive governmental support - but at least Japan has an aerospace industry) the just launched Embraer - again like Airbus from a manufacturers point of view plenty of money and aviation experience to draw on. Some of the designs from the Former Soviet Union could be refreshed I guess, but again this is from a nation with vast resources and an established aviation history. The last time we produced anything that was locally designed and built was the Nomad - complete with its in flight detatchable tail. Plus, we need say 12 - 20 airframes. If nobody else orders the aircraft all of the billions of dollars of development costs need to be amortised against 20 airframes. Oh, good - we've got these fabulous transports, but sorry chaps we've had to spend all the money we had set aside for the JSF... Or would the scenario play out like this - billions of dollars additional for defence and a PM being asked by Kerry O'Brien, Can you explain to the Australian people Prime Minister, why we needed to make our own C130 replacements when we could have bought off the shelf from Lockheed for hundreds of millions of dollars less per airframe?
What billions of dollars? The RAAF know the C-130 inside out. Lots of other nations fly C-130s and woudl not mind purchasing something equivalent, but not priced in US dollars.
Artillery - same deal. We need what 50 tubes total? Again you would be looking at probably a billion dollar plus program to produce one calibre (say the 155's) you could leverage off that for a few hundred million for the 105's. Again, how much do you want to pay per gun?
Ok, we need more than 50 tubes really, but India needs several hundred. There are other countries we could sell to. However, lets say we don't have the technology to make the actual tubes. Can we make the rest fo the ordnance, carriage, trails, recoil mechanism, that the tube bought elsewhere can be mounted into? Can we make a self-propelled platform for the weapon?
How did it get that South Korea, South Africa and Singapore are bidding to supply ADF its guns?
Question Future Tank, assuming you have a car, why did you buy a ready made one? After all I'm sure you could have comissioned a team of engineers and stylists yourself. Could it be that you would consider it far too expensive to do that? Why is Australia any different?
That is disingenuous as a question. Lots of Australians do make their own cars by assembling them, often from specially made parts, and matching engines and other components to make far better performers than the production models from Ford, Toyota or dare I say Holden.
Australia used to be able to make its own cars until GM forced its own design on Holden. And then the Government laments of the brain drain when there is no way for the brains to make a decent dollar from exporting manufactured goods because everything is bought in.
However, if I don't have a car, I can try my luck with public transport.
What do you do when you don't have a defence industry, or have one that runs like the public transport, slow, never on time, shared for convenience, and stops blocks away from where you want to be. That's why people get cars. They own the problem of transport, and are in control of the process of getting from A to B.
From 20 years of looking I don't see the ADF being in control.
There is a myth that "small players" can't compete or indeed be profitable. Its not true. Look at the number of countries not so much larger than Australia in terms of population and economy, and some quite a bit smaller, being successful in the global defence industry. The media always points to the USA when talking about Australian defence procurement, but the US is itself now buying from the smaller more efficient producers than from the decades-long project dinosaurs like Lockheed.
FutureTank
April 26th, 2009, 10:38 AM
In any case, the question was, is Australia not ready for war, and the answer is yes its not ready. To be ready for war, one has to have the logistic support to sustain it, and currently that logistic support comes predominantly from a variety of suppliers in the USA and Europe, and soon maybe Asia and Africa. This means that the ADF has to fight with what it has until that breaks down or runs out of ammo. Unless the ADF is hoping for the 2003-type "quick victory"? Australian geographic position almost obligates self-sufficiency in terms of defence because the "cavalry" may not always arrive in time as it did during the Second World War.
StingrayOZ
April 26th, 2009, 10:34 PM
There is no point in manufacturing a copy of a C-130. The C-130 modern varients are extremely complicated and the C-17 is even more complicated (which we would forfit buy designing and making C-130 copies). We do not operate enough frames to make this an acceptable choice. Airbus has nations like France, germany and UK all buying airframes and still haven't made anything decent out of it.
We do make parts for the C-130 here, flaps and the like out of carbon fiber, its not fantastic but if your arguement is more local production of parts (licenced) then yes. Lets persue that!
Australia should have persued a Bou replacement (perhaps not like the C27J) before, but again we would have to partner with someone like the UK or Canada to ensure enough airframes. We could have done something like that.
We could have made some sort of cheap training aircraft if we had partnered with other countries.
We can't intergrate modern flight systems for a helicopter. Seasprite.
We can make submarines essentially from scratch. That is impressive, we do assemble fighter, helicopters and ships here. We do design and make ships/boats. We should take more steps in local production in this area.
Bushmaster is a fine vechical that was the right product at the right time. Its a project that did well, that is finding overseas customers. Its not all about making T-72 knock offs, we are not china.
Ford and Holden are exactly the sort of vechical you should buy. There are largely designed and made in Australia and add massive manufacturing capability for Aerospace industries.
Ford making aluminium I6 blocks locally will mean Australia can now produce large quanities of aluminium engines. Holden wanted to and couldn't find funding for the V6 plant, Ion/BTR are dead and we lost lots of manufacturing capacity with them.
Its not about milling up your own V12 block and making your own spaceframe. Its about having sustainable, profitable mass manufacting industries in Australia. We need more aluminium capabilities, more carbon fiber capabilities. Sustainable planning for all defence industries.
FutureTank
April 27th, 2009, 01:11 AM
There is no point in manufacturing a copy of a C-130. The C-130 modern varients are extremely complicated and the C-17 is even more complicated (which we would forfit buy designing and making C-130 copies). We do not operate enough frames to make this an acceptable choice. Airbus has nations like France, germany and UK all buying airframes and still haven't made anything decent out of it.
We do make parts for the C-130 here, flaps and the like out of carbon fiber, its not fantastic but if your arguement is more local production of parts (licenced) then yes. Lets persue that!
I beg to differ, but if the Australian industry can not make an aircraft that has been flown by the RAAF for yonks, it should go back to competing in moped manufacture with Thailand.
The basic airframe can be manufactured in Australia. Hydraulics, fuel systems, control systems, all can be made in Australia. Ok, so we can't make a whole engine, but we should be able to licence produce one in Australia. Or at least major blocks of one. That we can't make flight controls for a military aircraft is pathetic. I know I am oversimplifying it, but we are not talking a high performance strike fighter here.
The question is, can the RAAF transport aircraft be sustained in a conventional war situation, and the answer is....not without the USA logistic support. That support is 11,631km away from Townsville! Maybe Americans will set up a special support facility for us in Hawaii 7,523km away, but suppliers capable of manufacturing all the parts around Australia would be a lot better.
Australia should have persued a Bou replacement (perhaps not like the C27J) before, but again we would have to partner with someone like the UK or Canada to ensure enough airframes. We could have done something like that.
And why do we have to partner just with the NATO countries? Both the Labour (Keating) and the Liberal (Howard) governments bleated about Australia not benefiting from the sort of economic scales of production that are available to the EU countries, but NEITHER had done much to try and foster this sort of economic cooperation in the I-P region. And mind you, the South Koreans, Singaporeans and the Japanese, never mind the Taiwanese, all design their weapons to fit NATO standards. We had at least a 20 year gap to design and build a Caribou replacement! In that time I recon I could have built one by hand in the back of the house! This is not even a C-130! Let me give you the specs, simple, low maintenance, turboprop to lift an infantry platoon or small vehicle. Just needs rough landing gear. Americans put together the F-35 in 20 years, and Australia could not even replace a light tactical cargo aircraft! How ready are we for war?
We could have made some sort of cheap training aircraft if we had partnered with other countries.
What's complicated about the BAe Hawk? Why would we even want to partner? Its 1960s technology with two decades of refinement. In fact all we had to do is redesign the A-4s into something smaller and more economical, and would have had ourselves not only a decent training jet, but also a light attack one also. Instead of glorying about how we always beat the Poms in cricket, maybe just once we can make something without writing to London about it, and let them have the Ashes for a year?
We can't intergrate modern flight systems for a helicopter. Seasprite.
Yes, and I see that we are getting 27 replacements helos. Someone should go to jail over that waste of A$1.1 billion, but no one will. I wonder where we can get extra money for domestic R&D effort and supporting defence industry? How about not buying crap from others, or trying to refurbish old technology?
We can make submarines essentially from scratch. That is impressive, we do assemble fighter, helicopters and ships here. We do design and make ships/boats. We should take more steps in local production in this area.
Yes, from scratch, but in a wartime we would not have a decade, or even 24 months to complete one. Mind you the Collins experience I'm sure will have taught some lessons in Adelaide.
Bushmaster is a fine vechical that was the right product at the right time. Its a project that did well, that is finding overseas customers. Its not all about making T-72 knock offs, we are not china.
The only problem is, its not really an infantry combat vehicle, is it? You would not send infantry off against T-72 knock-offs in a Bushmaster. By the way, the M1 was made to counter the T-72s, so if Australia could build something more up to date in terms of design, but on same principles, maybe like the Leclerc? We don't need a high rate of production, or volume. But, domestic capability could have resulted in three regiments rather than one, which would have made the Australian Army far more ready for war since 1996 when the Army should have started looking for a replacement. It is still looking for a replacement to the M113. I think the only other significant country in I-P region without an IFV is the Philipines, although it does have some AIFVs that were successors to the M113.
Ford and Holden are exactly the sort of vechical you should buy. There are largely designed and made in Australia and add massive manufacturing capability for Aerospace industries.
Ford making aluminium I6 blocks locally will mean Australia can now produce large quanities of aluminium engines. Holden wanted to and couldn't find funding for the V6 plant, Ion/BTR are dead and we lost lots of manufacturing capacity with them.
And? Can we build replacements for the Land Rovers or not? Most of the public may not realise it, but they are really valuable type of vehicles in a war.
Its not about milling up your own V12 block and making your own spaceframe.
Agreed.
Its about having sustainable, profitable mass manufacting industries in Australia. We need more aluminium capabilities, more carbon fiber capabilities. Sustainable planning for all defence industries.
Yes...but who's job is it to manage that? By the way, why do they have to be profitable? What they are manufacturing, is usually equipment that is going to be consumed over 20-30 years by a client that is more into survival than profitability. The cost of recruiting, training and keeping a squad of infantrymen in service over their initial three-four years easily equals the cost of a production IFV, assuming it is not a Bradley. With all the upgrades and maintenance, over a generation the vehicle more than pays back for itself if it is still representing a viable combat platform. Can this be said for the M113 now? How well do you think they will go against Indonesian BMPs in one possible scenario? So, ready for war?
I had been following Australian Defence matters for about 20 years now. What I have noticed are two trend: the ADF is always talking about the future while never having actual NOW capability, and Defence is usually up there with sex and religion, not to be discussed in polite company.
Feanor
April 27th, 2009, 05:21 AM
He's actually absolutely correct. You're advocating developing
1) Tactical lift.
2) Naval production.
3) Artillery.
4) Light armor.
The price tag for all of that development and integration is huge. And if you're thinking about exports, think again. The export market is a very harsh place. Look at Sweden, who has a long time history of independent development. They're currently being forced to cut back on development, and instead are working closer with other European countries, and in particular with the US. Mainly because they can no longer offset the development costs with domestic purchases, and can't win enough export orders to make it worth while.
And the bottom line is that it's just cheaper to get it abroad. Now you talk about mismanagement. Can you point out specific instances? Or is that your general opinion without anything to support it?
FutureTank
April 27th, 2009, 06:38 AM
"New threats, new tactics and new technologies will continue to evolve and we as a defence organisation need to use gatherings such as this to stay ahead of the game and ensure that the forces we field to meet the threats of the 21st century are the best trained, best equipped and best motivated troops on the modern battlefield."
New threats?
New tactics?
New technologies?
Does the Minister know what he is talking about?
To my best knowledge there has not been any evidence of new threats for the past decade since the operation in East Timor. Indonesia is now a potential threat to Timor Leste, and Australia underwrites its security.
The tactics used on land, at sea and in the air remain at those of Cold War or earlier. Certainly the operations in Afghanistan continue in the same way they had as far back as the Soviet period, the refugees take the same routes to reach Australia, and nothing much changed in the air.
The only new technologies that might pose a threat to Australia has been the development of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, mostly Pakistan. If Pakistan turns an Islamic state, the anti-ballistic capability of the ships to be purchased by the RAN will come in handy since Australian infidels are busy in Afghanistan now. However, this is a capability Australia should have had a long time ago because China is still a communist state, and so no different to the Soviet Union of the Cold War days.
Best trained troops? Well, if we only had enough of them. Even most regular battalions are under strength, and the Navy can't effectively crew all its ships now, while the RAAF is always looking for more aircraft support personnel. Probably Australian troops are best trained because many are also overworked.
Best equipped, but for what? He has now approved what amounts to a complete replacement of the old M113 fleet with the Bushmasters that are only good for internal security duties in a low intensity conflict scenario. The refurbished M113s are still representing the thinking of 1960s in terms of employing infantry, which is the most numerous and important part of the Army. While another navy of RAN size and disposing of same budged can put to sea two task forces with each having a small F-35B equipped aircraft carrier and an LPD, both with troops trained to dedicated operations from these vessels, Australia will have only the LHD in its TF and no fixed wing element. It will use the regular infantry who will cross-train for land and amphibious operations. When they go ashore in their modified M113s and escorted by the new Abrams tanks, they will have no air cover or air defence because the RBS70 the Army has can not be fired on the move from atop the M113. With the elimination of the F-111s Australia, located at the edge of the Indian-Pacific region, will not have a long range strike element either.
Best motivated by what, denying combat service to the infantry, or giving the gunners 120mm mortars?
From May 2005 to December 2007 the Army accepted for service ten Tiger helicopters, but the Dutch still provide aviation fire support for Australian troops in Afghanistan. I would have though that the Army could train eight pilots and their support crews in three years. The RAAF could also help out, if only by deploying the Hawks in light attack role that can also be used to train Afghani pilots, but nope, no RAAF for combat duties. Maybe a RAN patrol boat or two to operate from Kenya (a Commonwealth country) in counter-pirate role? Nope, stretched with the boat people as it is.
The Minister also thinks that "We must pay attention to providing the best protection possible to the soldiers we put into harm's way by ensuring our vehicles take advantage of the most up-to-date protective technologies to ensure their survivability against modern-day threats,".
What up-to-date protective technologies does he think can be added to the Bushmaster to counter 12.7mm or larger calibre fire, or some of the more modern Russian RPGs? Maybe he is talking about the LAND 121 vehicles, but the United States' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Program is unlikely to be delivered inside 3 years, and the Obama Administration really hope to be out of Afghanistan by then.
FutureTank
April 27th, 2009, 08:20 AM
He's actually absolutely correct. You're advocating developing
1) Tactical lift.
2) Naval production.
3) Artillery.
4) Light armor.
The price tag for all of that development and integration is huge. And if you're thinking about exports, think again. The export market is a very harsh place. Look at Sweden, who has a long time history of independent development. They're currently being forced to cut back on development, and instead are working closer with other European countries, and in particular with the US. Mainly because they can no longer offset the development costs with domestic purchases, and can't win enough export orders to make it worth while.
And the bottom line is that it's just cheaper to get it abroad. Now you talk about mismanagement. Can you point out specific instances? Or is that your general opinion without anything to support it?
Lets see....
Spain has about the same sized armed forces as Australia, and about the same defence budget
It had developed capability for building own
1) tactical lift
2) naval production
3) no artillery
4) light armour
Three out of four is not bad.
The price tag for all of that development and integration IS huge, but what about the added value to the national economy and security?
So if Sweden is going out of business, Australia should not even consider being entrepreneurial? But Sweden does provide for itself ok.
Examples of mismanagement...where do you want me to start?! Almost every platform and system in the ADF inventory over the last 50 years has been stuffed up to some degree.
However, this thread is not about mismanagement of ADF projects, but its readiness for war.
At what point in the last 60 years had Australian forces been able to say they are fully capable of engaging in a conventional conflict with another state in defence of Australian interests?
Lets say that Indonesia has a change of government, and that new administration decides to reinvade Timor-Leste. Is Australia prepared to engage in full blown war in Timor? I seriously doubt it. There is no capability to lift and deploy even a whole brigade, never mind a reinforced one. Can the Australian, and I presume NZ, navies regain control of the Timorese waters? Can we handle loosing a frigate or a submarine? Will the Super Hornets offer required support when operating at the extreme of the combat range? Can the RAN/RNZN sustain combat effort in Timor? Can the ADF take to the offensive and occupy the Sawu island?
Marc 1
April 27th, 2009, 09:30 AM
Lets see....
Spain has about the same sized armed forces as Australia, and about the same defence budget
It had developed capability for building own
1) tactical lift
2) naval production
3) no artillery
4) light armour
Three out of four is not bad.
The price tag for all of that development and integration IS huge, but what about the added value to the national economy and security?
So if Sweden is going out of business, Australia should not even consider being entrepreneurial? But Sweden does provide for itself ok.
Examples of mismanagement...where do you want me to start?! Almost every platform and system in the ADF inventory over the last 50 years has been stuffed up to some degree.
However, this thread is not about mismanagement of ADF projects, but its readiness for war.
At what point in the last 60 years had Australian forces been able to say they are fully capable of engaging in a conventional conflict with another state in defence of Australian interests?
Lets say that Indonesia has a change of government, and that new administration decides to reinvade Timor-Leste. Is Australia prepared to engage in full blown war in Timor? I seriously doubt it. There is no capability to lift and deploy even a whole brigade, never mind a reinforced one. Can the Australian, and I presume NZ, navies regain control of the Timorese waters? Can we handle loosing a frigate or a submarine? Will the Super Hornets offer required support when operating at the extreme of the combat range? Can the RAN/RNZN sustain combat effort in Timor? Can the ADF take to the offensive and occupy the Sawu island?
Future Tank, mate I recant. You are absolutely right we should produce everything ourselves. Bugger it, why not an F-35 competitor too! I just wonder how we'd go as a nation with defence spending being at what 10% of GDP?
Have you ever thought that there are reasons why the countries that have their own military industries have them for a reason other than cost effectiveness?
Sweden. A very near neighbour of the then Soviet Russia didn't want to be seen as taking sides with Nato or the Warpac countries (neutral). Also blessed with fairly unique weather and geography so much of the off the shelf gear didn't fit their requirements EG Hagglunds bv206. So they went it alone with many projects not because it was cheaper, but it was politically expedient and the gear was designed to suit their requirements.
South Africa. Faced sanctions due to their stance on Apharteid (SP?) - they were fighting a conflict in Angola and no bugger would sell them armaments. SO they built their own. And despite the buckets of dollars, they haven't been that successful either - how many Rooivalks have been sold? How much do you think that cost to develop and market? The G6 (despite what I thought would have been a shoe in for Aussie conditions in the early 90's) hasn't exactly set the world on fire either.
Spain. An industry that has been largely supported by its own government. Here is the list of aircraft that CASA built before it integrated with EADS and produced the Cn235 and 295: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:CASA_aircraft
Note which nations operate the aircraft. These airframes were clearly sold on the basis of cost or to areas that were on some sort of blackban list for US equipment. The few that were bought by the US are not even listed here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_United_States_military_aircraft
They were not bought in any numbers by western airforces because they were not good enough. Is this what you want for our aircrew and the diggers in the back?
Brazil. Again political considerations etc.
Look at it another way, the UK used to manufacture nearly all of their own transport aircraft and had a thriving aviation industry. Manufacturers like Blackburn, Armstrong Whitworth, Avro etc. Why aren't they still producing aircraft for britain? Because they made some poor decisions about what to produce and they couldn't sell their goods. What's to say we wouldn't make the same blunders - and we are virtually starting from scratch. If you want to encourage local manufacturers give Gippsland Aeronatics a bit of encouragement to design something larger than the GA-8. Start small, and look for progress in a decade. Believe it or not they have acquired the rights to build Nomads from scratch. Unless there have been modifications I don't think they'll set the world on fire either - then again, maybe they will litterally set parts of the world on fire if they start falling out of the sky sans tails (be happy to be proven wrong though).
I think you are seriously underestimating the amount of work that goes into designing a state of the art military transport. The A400 is a state of the art turboprop transport that is massively late and as has recently been revealed is not even making its design parameters. This is a company that has the aeronautical experience to produce thousands of airliners, backed by 6 governments and 200 firm orders that has just revealed that the design was significantly overweight and that the payload instead of being 40 tonnes will be more like 32 tonnes. Oops! And no, I don't think it's right to simply send our pilots and diggers in the back to war in something like a Nomad.
And no, Australians don't make their own cars (as disingenuous as you consider it) they tend to modify already existing vehicles - much the same way we tried to modify the M113's. There is nothing ground breaking in lengthening and updating M113's, many countries around the world have done exactly that. Yet, rather than take an existing off the shelf solution, we had to go down the path of reinventing the wheel again. Compared with designing an producing a brand new AFV or tactical transport aircraft, this is simple stuff, yet the project is years late and millions over budget. And you want us to produce a Caribou replacement?
@Stingray OZ, Fords I6 donk whilst one of the most efficient I6 engines due to its continual development over the past 40 years, has an iron block. Alloy head arrived in the early 1980's.
Sandhi Yudha
April 27th, 2009, 10:35 AM
Kevin Rudd to announce Australia's biggest military build-up since World War II
- Defence white paper to be released
- Will be biggest boost to military since WWII
- Multi-billion-dollar investment in defence
KEVIN Rudd is set to announce Australia's biggest military build-up since World War II, led by a multi-billion-dollar investment in maritime defence, including 100 new F-35 fighters, a doubling of the submarine fleet, and powerful new surface warships.
The new defence white paper will outline plans for a fundamental shake-up of Australia's defence organisation to ensure that the nation can meet what the Prime Minister sees as a far more challenging and uncertain security outlook in Asia over the next two decades.
China's steadily growing military might and the prospect of sharper strategic competition among Asia's great powers are driving the maritime build-up, which will see new-generation submarines and warships equipped with cruise missiles, and a big new investment in anti-submarine warfare and electronic warfare platforms, including new naval helicopters.
The white paper will consider the emerging non-traditional threats to Australia, including cyber security, climate change and its associated risk of large uncontrolled people movements, The Australian reports.
Senior government sources say Mr Rudd has insisted that defence spending remain largely insulated from the Government's budget difficulties, but the Defence Department will still have to find at least $15 billion of internal savings over the next decade to help pay for the $100 billion-plus long-term equipment plan.
Mr Rudd said yesterday the delivery of the white paper was proving "acutely challenging as we work to defend ourselves from the global economic storm".
"It is the most difficult environment to frame the Australian budget in modern economic history. It is also the most difficult environment to frame our long-term defence planning in modern economic history as well," he told the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce.
"Nevertheless the Government will not resile even in the difficult times from the requirement for long-term coherence of our defence planning for the long-term security of our nation. This is core business for government.
"That is why we have forged ahead in our preparation of the defence white paper because national security needs do not disappear because of the global recession. If anything, those needs become more acute."
Funding pressures will mean the navy will not get a fourth air warfare destroyer, and the delivery of the first batch of the RAAF's F-35 joint strike fighters will slip by at least one year to 2014-15.
The huge cost of paying for the next-generation defence force, due to be detailed in the white paper and the forthcoming 10-year defence capability plan, will have little impact on the defence budget over the the next four years.
Apart from the air warfare destroyers and the F-35 fighters, most of the planned defence purchases will not have to be paid for until well into the next decade and beyond.
Mr Rudd and Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon are expected to release the long-awaited white paper as early as next week, with the more detailed 10-year defence capability plan due to published by mid-year.
The naval build-up will be led by a planned 12-strong submarine fleet expected to replace the Collins-class boats from 2025.
It will enable the RAN to deploy up to seven boats to protect Australia's northern approaches, including key maritime straits running through the Indonesian archipelago, at times of high threat.
The white paper will outline the requirement for a new class of eight 7000-tonne warships equipped with ballistic missile defence systems similar to the three air warfare destroyers already on order that will eventually replace the Anzac frigates.
A new class of 1500-tonne corvette-size patrol boats able to take a helicopter is slated to replace the Armidale-class vessels from the mid-2020s.
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,27574...16-421,00.html
swerve
April 27th, 2009, 11:32 AM
Lets see....
Spain has about the same sized armed forces as Australia, and about the same defence budget
It had developed capability for building own
1) tactical lift
2) naval production
3) no artillery
4) light armour
...
1) With heavy government (including Indonesian) support, had some success in the basic low-cost market. Imports engines complete. Greatest success (with one major problem, at present) has been since being folded into EADS, which turned it into the assembler of tactical lift supplier for much of Europe, as part of a multi-national firm, with component suppliers spread across a continent Your Australian solution can't work like that.
2) A success - but built on a civil shipbuilding industry many times the size of Australias.
3) Spain has built its own artillery. It builds its own 155mm L/52 gun - but I've not heard of orders other than by the Spanish army. Same firm as the AFVs.
4) Spains builder of armoured vehicles had to be rescued. It's now a subsidiary of a US firm, building one tank under licence (with strict demarcation to ensure the technology does not spill over to the rest of the firm, as it's designed by a competitor of the current owners), & (in collaboration with another subsidiary of the firm, in another country), an IFV which is part of the parent firms overall product line. Other vehicles are out of production, & Spain now imports other AFVs.
What does this tell us? That the example you put forward is dependent for its successes either on a pre-existing national industrial specialism, or on merging into a large, transnational, system. i.e. in the latter case, abandoning the autarky you seek. Australia has the first, to some extent, in vehicles - hence Bushmaster. Fine, a niche Australia can do well in. It also has the possibility of similar success in naval radars, & maybe some other niches. But the sort of general, across the board indigenous design, development & production you advocate has never come remotely near success in any country with similar resources or spending.
kato
April 27th, 2009, 07:32 PM
3) Spain has built its own artillery. It builds its own 155mm L/52 gun - but I've not heard of orders other than by the Spanish army. Same firm as the AFVs.
Colombia bought 13 units in 2007.
Spains builder of armoured vehicles had to be rescued. It's now a subsidiary of a US firm
Actually, the AFV-developing part of INI/SEPI, Enesa (Pegaso brand, specifically the BMR-600 series) was bought by Iveco.
Santa Barbara only ran one of the production plants and apparently took over the BMR designs with the sale of Enesa (although i'm not sure whether Iveco didn't take over the BMR design as well, since they bought the full company and the full Pegaso brand!) before it was bought by GDLS 10 years later.
an IFV which is part of the parent firms overall product line
ASCOD was developed a decade before GDLS bought Santa Barbara in 2001, and started production 5 years before the buy. The Austrian producer was bought by GDLS in 2003. Afaik, the design is still co-owned by the two subsidiaries, not the parent company (which does make a difference).
Aussie Digger
April 27th, 2009, 10:58 PM
"New threats, new tactics and new technologies will continue to evolve and we as a defence organisation need to use gatherings such as this to stay ahead of the game and ensure that the forces we field to meet the threats of the 21st century are the best trained, best equipped and best motivated troops on the modern battlefield."
New threats?
New tactics?
New technologies?
In the region we face, there certainly are new threats:
1. Introduction of new fighters jets (modern SU-27/30 variants, advanced F-16 variants, advanced F-15 variants, J-10 and evolving Chinese designed fighters).
2. Surface warfare vessels (Singapore's La Fayette based designs, Malaysia has a new class of frigate recently introduced into service and Pakistan, India, China, South Korea and Japan are all building new designs on top of their existing powerful fleets),
3. submarines( Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, China, Pakistan and India are all introducing new submarine fleets).
4. Main battle tanks (Pakistan, India, China, Singapore, Malayasia, South Korean, Japan, Taiwan all have advanced MBT capabilities with new or near new fleets)
5. Infantry fighting vehicles (an enormous range, most of which dwarf the capability of our M113AS3/4),
6. Anti-tank guided weapons (an enormous range, headlined by Javelin which we possess, but available in types and quantities that weren't even 10 years ago)
7. Artillery, most nations in SEA and wider Asia possess a significantly enhanced artillery capability to us. Singapore, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, India, Japan and Pakistan all possess towed and self-propelled 155mm (and similiar) artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems.
8. Air defence systems. Most nations in SEA and wider Asia possess an air defence system substantially more capable than ours. Our C4ISR capability might be sound, but the GBAD systems we possess are a very limited capability in the scheme of things...
Need I go on?
Does the Minister know what he is talking about?
Not really in my opinion...
To my best knowledge there has not been any evidence of new threats for the past decade since the operation in East Timor. Indonesia is now a potential threat to Timor Leste, and Australia underwrites its security.
Military threat is increasingly constantly. Try a bit of research into the matter, you might be surprised...
The tactics used on land, at sea and in the air remain at those of Cold War or earlier. Certainly the operations in Afghanistan continue in the same way they had as far back as the Soviet period, the refugees take the same routes to reach Australia, and nothing much changed in the air.
The only new technologies that might pose a threat to Australia has been the development of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, mostly Pakistan. If Pakistan turns an Islamic state, the anti-ballistic capability of the ships to be purchased by the RAN will come in handy since Australian infidels are busy in Afghanistan now. However, this is a capability Australia should have had a long time ago because China is still a communist state, and so no different to the Soviet Union of the Cold War days.
God you are lacking into insight. Tell you what, go and research Afghanistan and Iraq and LEARN what our troops are actually doing there.
You clearly have no clue whatsoever.
As a prime example of changing tactics, here is one little acronym. It's called IED...
Best trained troops? Well, if we only had enough of them. Even most regular battalions are under strength, and the Navy can't effectively crew all its ships now, while the RAAF is always looking for more aircraft support personnel. Probably Australian troops are best trained because many are also overworked.
And what deployment have we been unable to meet? We possess 7 operational infantry battalions now, with the 8th - 8/9RAR still building up. Approximately 1.5 infantry battalions in total out of the regular force is actually deployed on operations now.
Significant numbers are available for deployment and though it's quite fashionable to point out how "stretched" we are and argue about our force being unable to complete even a "Timor style" mission, I would point out that at NO point did we ever have MORE than 3 infantry battalions, plus supporting elements deployed to Timor, even in late 1999 / early 2000.
2 RAR, 3 RAR and 5/7 RAR were the battalions in the "first wave" of Interfet. 1 RAR, 4 RAR and 6 RAR stayed at home and built up for replacement of these battalions, which they did in 2000.
We now have an additional full strength battalion available over and above what we had then and if you think availability of infantry within the battalions is a current problem, you might ask yourself why battalions are having to run infantry IET courses within their own units, in addition to those run at Singleton...
Best equipped, but for what? He has now approved what amounts to a complete replacement of the old M113 fleet with the Bushmasters that are only good for internal security duties in a low intensity conflict scenario.
Rubbish. Northern Ireland was a low intensity conflict. Afghanistan and Iraq are MASSIVELY different in intensity and the Bushmaster has proven outstanding in these operations.
In addition, the Bushmaster has NOT replaced the M113 (except within B Squadron 3/4 Cav) but rather is a SUPPLEMENT to it.
You might have noticed that Defmin FITZGIBBIN announced an order for an additional 81x M113AS3/4's a few months back? Primarily a result of the additional battalions under ELF/HNA. That brings the order book for M113AS3/4 to 431 vehicles in total.
The order book for Bushmasters is now about 720 vehicles and we have 257 ASLAV vehicles (of all variants).
That's a light armoured vehicle fleet of about 1400 light armoured vehicles, when all delivered.
Compare this to the pre-Bushmaster days of about 550 in-service M113's and 112 ASLAV variants.
A significant difference no? And a completely different force to the one you seem to think exists...
The refurbished M113s are still representing the thinking of 1960s in terms of employing infantry, which is the most numerous and important part of the Army.
If you think carrying infantry in armoured vehicles is obsolete, I'm glad YOU are not the Defmin. We'd have had hundreds of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan otherwise...
As to the refurbished M113 idea. Apparently not everyone thinks upgrading old vehicles is such a bad idea.
Australia is doing it, America has done it (M113A3), Israel has done it and the UK are doing a similar upgrade with their Bulldog upgrades of FV432 "boxed" armoured vehicles...
While another navy of RAN size and disposing of same budged can put to sea two task forces with each having a small F-35B equipped aircraft carrier and an LPD, both with troops trained to dedicated operations from these vessels, Australia will have only the LHD in its TF and no fixed wing element. It will use the regular infantry who will cross-train for land and amphibious operations.
And? The concept is proven on a regular basis. It's called exercise Sea Lion...
When they go ashore in their modified M113s and escorted by the new Abrams tanks, they will have no air cover or air defence because the RBS70 the Army has can not be fired on the move from atop the M113.
Apparently the Air Warfare Destroyers and ANZAC class frigates won't have air defence capabilities, eh?
Apparently RAAF doesn't possess air defence capabilities eh?
The RBS-70's aren't fired from the top of M113's, that is true. They are fired from their own Perentie 6x6 wheeled vehicles and in future the Land Rover replacement under LAND 125, or possibly Bushmaster.
Again, research helps here.... :)
With the elimination of the F-111s Australia, located at the edge of the Indian-Pacific region, will not have a long range strike element either.
Aha.. The old F-111 range issue. This is the weakest argument you've delivered yet. What is the useful strike range of the F-111 anyway, off hand?
Best motivated by what, denying combat service to the infantry, or giving the gunners 120mm mortars?
WTF?
There are no 120mm mortars in-service in the ADF.
From May 2005 to December 2007 the Army accepted for service ten Tiger helicopters, but the Dutch still provide aviation fire support for Australian troops in Afghanistan. I would have though that the Army could train eight pilots and their support crews in three years.
The French have more than 10x Tigers in-service, how many have they got operating, on deployment?
It is a brand new aircraft that has not even reached INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY in any Country (Germany, Spain, France or Australia yet).
Of course we cannot deploy it. We have more than 8 pilots and battle captains trained, but that is not enough, yet.
The RAAF could also help out, if only by deploying the Hawks in light attack role that can also be used to train Afghani pilots, but nope, no RAAF for combat duties. Maybe a RAN patrol boat or two to operate from Kenya (a Commonwealth country) in counter-pirate role? Nope, stretched with the boat people as it is.
Yes RAAF could help out, but why on Earth would you deploy Hawks? No PGMs, no targetting capability beyond a gun sight and the Mk 1 eyeball and no EWSP capability because they are a TRAINER...
As to training Afghan pilots, are you for real? What the hell do they need training on a lead in fighter designed to train F/A-18 pilots for?
Why not F/A-18 Hornets?
The Minister also thinks that "We must pay attention to providing the best protection possible to the soldiers we put into harm's way by ensuring our vehicles take advantage of the most up-to-date protective technologies to ensure their survivability against modern-day threats,".
What up-to-date protective technologies does he think can be added to the Bushmaster to counter 12.7mm or larger calibre fire, or some of the more modern Russian RPGs? Maybe he is talking about the LAND 121 vehicles, but the United States' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Program is unlikely to be delivered inside 3 years, and the Obama Administration really hope to be out of Afghanistan by then.
Applique armour, just as the Dutch have done woiuld be a start...
Reactive armour packages exist...
Active protection systems exist...
As for US being out of Afghanistan in 3 years. Show me a link that says so, because I call utter BS and only your lack of insight to claim this.
They are in fact in the process of significantly ramping up their deployed forces in the Ghan.
StingrayOZ
April 28th, 2009, 02:11 AM
@Stingray OZ, Fords I6 donk whilst one of the most efficient I6 engines due to its continual development over the past 40 years, has an iron block. Alloy head arrived in the early 1980's.
What I was actually refering to is the next generation I6 engine that will be an aluminium block. http://www.autoblog.com/2008/11/21/ford-australia-saves-jobs-and-inline-6-with-big-investment/
Machines that can quickly machine (or hydroform) and manufacture complicated items out of aluminium and other metals (like blocks and heads) are extremely valuable during war time. Combined with carbon fiber ovens, and high technology suppliers (silicon chip fabrication plants). Not just the machines, but the ability to maintain and operate them.
During war time it, factories like Ford and Holden could easily be adapted to manufacture other items. More importantly the people that work at them have strong understanding of manufacturing, design, logistics, and can train others or assist in setting up other operations etc.
Have you ever visted Australian manufacturing sites? Most utilise WWII era methology and technology.
The Auto industry in Australia almost single handedly drives Australian manufacturing in all areas forward due to its competiveness.
Marc 1
April 28th, 2009, 02:21 AM
What I was actually refering to is the next generation I6 engine that will be an aluminium block. http://www.autoblog.com/2008/11/21/ford-australia-saves-jobs-and-inline-6-with-big-investment/
What next generation engine? That's just marketing spin to disguise the fact that this iron blocked engine dates back to the 1960's. It's the original Grandfather's axe - 5 different handles, 3 heads and all. I'm not knocking the design, it is incredibly well regarded due to years of careful honing, upgrading and development - the I6 turbo is a world beater, but I6 doesn't work so well from a modern day packaging point of view which is why this great engine will remain a small niche product in Ford's down under outpost.
That press release was the spin that Ford's marketing department put on the news that Ford would no longer be importing the 3.7 V6. The majority of the money was spent on getting the old donk to meet the tougher emissions standards - if it wasn't for the GFC the Aussie I6 would be a gonner.
Where does it say in your link that the new engine will have an aluminium block? You may have been duped by the fact the block has been painted to match the aluminium head - marketing at it's best- allude to one thing, but not confirm it with words.
Proof is in the spec sheet: http://www.alto.com.au/alto-ford/new-vehicles-detail/ford-falcon-g6e-turbo-fg/1876
StingrayOZ
April 28th, 2009, 02:58 AM
This is not for the FG. This is post Euro IV emissions.
http://www.countrycars.com.au/Editorial/ArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=41772
While the current motor has all the necessary hardware in its cylinder heads - twin overhead cams, four valves a cylinder and variable valve timing - to be competitive, the cast-iron engine block takes that bit longer to reach operating temperature.
Any engine runs below its optimum while warming up and that extra time it takes for the Barra engine to warm up is believed to make the difference in emissions tests.
I have heard from other sources it is going to be aluminium, but again, it hasn't happend so anything is possible. Graphite grey iron is also another option...
swerve
April 28th, 2009, 05:14 AM
Colombia bought 13 units in 2007.
Ta. I missed that.
Actually, the AFV-developing part of INI/SEPI, Enesa (Pegaso brand, specifically the BMR-600 series) was bought by Iveco.
Santa Barbara only ran one of the production plants and apparently took over the BMR designs with the sale of Enesa (although i'm not sure whether Iveco didn't take over the BMR design as well, since they bought the full company and the full Pegaso brand!) before it was bought by GDLS 10 years later.
ASCOD was developed a decade before GDLS bought Santa Barbara in 2001, and started production 5 years before the buy. The Austrian producer was bought by GDLS in 2003. Afaik, the design is still co-owned by the two subsidiaries, not the parent company (which does make a difference).
Ah, that explains the Spanish army fondness for IVECO designs nowadays. Doesn't affect the principle, though. Spain does not have an independent armoured vehicle industry. Its producers are integrated into multi-national firms, & building under licence, or joint products. There is no hint of the autarky that has been put forward as an aim for Australia.
FutureTank
April 28th, 2009, 05:52 AM
Future Tank, mate I recant. You are absolutely right we should produce everything ourselves. Bugger it, why not an F-35 competitor too! I just wonder how we'd go as a nation with defence spending being at what 10% of GDP?
Did I say to make an F-35? Mind you, the RAAF could be flying the Typhoon by now.
Spain GDP (PPP) 2008 $1,397 trillion Defence budget US$18,974 (1.36%)
Australia GDP (PPP) 2008 $795.305 billion Defence budget US$15,744 (1.98%)
Now go and compare the force structures between Australia and Spain.
Have you ever thought that there are reasons why the countries that have their own military industries have them for a reason other than cost effectiveness?
Self-sufficiency? Technological advancement? Cooperation with allies?
Sweden. A very near neighbour of the then Soviet Russia didn't want to be seen as taking sides with Nato or the Warpac countries (neutral). Also blessed with fairly unique weather and geography so much of the off the shelf gear didn't fit their requirements EG Hagglunds bv206. So they went it alone with many projects not because it was cheaper, but it was politically expedient and the gear was designed to suit their requirements.
And? Lets see. Australia. Its very near neighbour is Indonesia that buys equipment from France (non-NATO) and former USSR. Further to the north is Communist China with an ever increasing defence budget. Its blessed with fairly unique weather and geography, so much of the off the shelf gear didn't fit their requirements. So rather then designing own equipment, the ADF bought some from other states like the M113s that had to be modified, but are not suitable for amphibious operations in the tropics, and LAVs that had to be modified, and are only somewhat suitable for amphibious operations, and Bushmasters which are unsuitable for amphibious operations (so can't follow the LAVs), but are suitable for the weather, and M1 Abrams, which are suitable for amphibious operations, but we need the USMC for that. But hey, its not like the ADF actually considered amphibious operations as a significant doctrinal concern despite the region to the north being all islands and coastlines. No, unlike Sweden that thought about its weather and geography in the 1950s, the ADF started developing its amphibious operations as a doctrine in 2007 when the planned capability first became a promise.
South Africa. Faced sanctions due to their stance on Apartheid (SP?) - they were fighting a conflict in Angola and no bugger would sell them armaments. SO they built their own. And despite the buckets of dollars, they haven't been that successful either - how many Rooivalks have been sold? How much do you think that cost to develop and market? The G6 (despite what I thought would have been a shoe in for Aussie conditions in the early 90's) hasn't exactly set the world on fire either.
And? Maybe they have not sold the equipment, but they have self propelled artillery in the park, and they have the capability to sell it...to the ADF.
Spain. An industry that has been largely supported by its own government. Here is the list of aircraft that CASA built before it integrated with EADS and produced the Cn235 and 295: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:CASA_aircraft
But the Australian Government has been saying it supports Defence Industry for at least 30 years! It is only because of the experience and success of CASA that EADS integration became possible.
[QUOTE=Marc 1;173318] Note which nations operate the aircraft. These airframes were clearly sold on the basis of cost or to areas that were on some sort of blackban list for US equipment. The few that were bought by the US are not even listed here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_United_States_military_aircraft
They were not bought in any numbers by western airforces because they were not good enough. Is this what you want for our aircrew and the diggers in the back?
And the ADF doesn't buy on the consideration of cost? However, it is now so committed to integration into the US forces structure that we are becoming tied to US systems and therefore expenditures made based on entirely different budgetary considerations. The ADF is not the US Army, US Navy or the US Air Force. It is, by its mode of operation, structure, past history and its regional 'terrain' more of a national equivalent of the USMC. Wherever the Australian defence forces go, they go by ship, the exception being Afghanistan. Where as the operation of small integrated amphibious task forces should have been the modus operandi for the ADF since the Second World War, as it stands now we can't even make a decent flat bottomed landing craft!
In any case, there is no law that says we have to make cheap and bad tactical lift aircraft. We could do worse than an Osprey, which are expensive and bad.
Brazil. Again political considerations etc.
Ok, and? There are always political considerations. Check out F-22 no-sale.
Look at it another way, the UK used to manufacture nearly all of their own transport aircraft and had a thriving aviation industry. Manufacturers like Blackburn, Armstrong Whitworth, Avro etc. Why aren't they still producing aircraft for britain? Because they made some poor decisions about what to produce and they couldn't sell their goods. What's to say we wouldn't make the same blunders - and we are virtually starting from scratch. If you want to encourage local manufacturers give Gippsland Aeronatics a bit of encouragement to design something larger than the GA-8. Start small, and look for progress in a decade. Believe it or not they have acquired the rights to build Nomads from scratch. Unless there have been modifications I don't think they'll set the world on fire either - then again, maybe they will litterally set parts of the world on fire if they start falling out of the sky sans tails (be happy to be proven wrong though).
If you never never go, you never never know? Sounds familiar? What's to say that if the UK manufacturers made bad decisions, Australian manufacturers would also? Got to start somewhere though, right?
I think you are seriously underestimating the amount of work that goes into designing a state of the art military transport. The A400 is a state of the art turboprop transport that is massively late and as has recently been revealed is not even making its design parameters. This is a company that has the aeronautical experience to produce thousands of airliners, backed by 6 governments and 200 firm orders that has just revealed that the design was significantly overweight and that the payload instead of being 40 tonnes will be more like 32 tonnes. Oops! And no, I don't think it's right to simply send our pilots and diggers in the back to war in something like a Nomad.
And? Did you consider that being a massive organisation backed by six governments is not always of a benefit to an engineering project? Until recently Australians were servicing and still are all Qantas aircraft. Are you saying that a C-17 is more complex than a 747? If it is, its not by much. I am not underestimating anything, though I am sceptical about how an aircraft can be built after years of design that is 32t overweight also.
And no, Australians don't make their own cars (as disingenuous as you consider it) they tend to modify already existing vehicles - much the same way we tried to modify the M113's. There is nothing ground breaking in lengthening and updating M113's, many countries around the world have done exactly that. Yet, rather than take an existing off the shelf solution, we had to go down the path of reinventing the wheel again. Compared with designing an producing a brand new AFV or tactical transport aircraft, this is simple stuff, yet the project is years late and millions over budget. And you want us to produce a Caribou replacement?
And this is what I'm saying. The spending should be on developing skills that would eliminate this waste of time and money. What did we actually gain as a benefit from refurbished 1960s M113 hulls? Some aluminium at 1960s prices? As I understand it the hulls were completely stripped back. So we could attempt to make everything else, but just could not put a chassis and hull together? Tenix could have been commissioned to do a parallel prototyping project while they are at it for the LAND400 to see what they could put together using as much of the materials and parts being used in refurbishing the M113s.
Why can't we do the simple stuff? Simple stuff is what a defence force needs in war. On the one hand we have DSTO which government assures us is at cutting edge of research and development, and on the other hand we cant get the breaks to work on the M113AS4?
Marc 1
April 28th, 2009, 10:19 AM
This is not for the FG. This is post Euro IV emissions.
http://www.countrycars.com.au/Editorial/ArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=41772
While the current motor has all the necessary hardware in its cylinder heads - twin overhead cams, four valves a cylinder and variable valve timing - to be competitive, the cast-iron engine block takes that bit longer to reach operating temperature.
Any engine runs below its optimum while warming up and that extra time it takes for the Barra engine to warm up is believed to make the difference in emissions tests.
I have heard from other sources it is going to be aluminium, but again, it hasn't happend so anything is possible. Graphite grey iron is also another option...
In that same article you cite a bit further down the page:
Although Ford casts aluminium cylinder heads at Geelong, it seems the company is unwilling to extend that competence to cylinder blocks. Perhaps head office has ruled out the prospects of investing any money in an inline engine
Note the date of this article: July 07. Economic reality set in, no V6 from North America, so Ford spent the bare minimum (21 million) on yet another overhaul for the next 4 years until Euro V. Given that this was just a 'life extension' program they were not going to invest the dollars to develop an aluminium block, not when parent company is like the rest of the detroit carmakers, a basket case albeit in better shape than GM and Chrysler.
I've searched - but can't find any evidence that Ford will be switching to an aluminium block.
FutureTank
April 28th, 2009, 11:23 AM
In the region we face, there certainly are new threats:
1. Introduction of new fighters jets (modern SU-27/30 variants, advanced F-16 variants, advanced F-15 variants, J-10 and evolving Chinese designed fighters).
2. Surface warfare vessels (Singapore's La Fayette based designs, Malaysia has a new class of frigate recently introduced into service and Pakistan, India, China, South Korea and Japan are all building new designs on top of their existing powerful fleets),
3. submarines( Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, China, Pakistan and India are all introducing new submarine fleets).
4. Main battle tanks (Pakistan, India, China, Singapore, Malayasia, South Korean, Japan, Taiwan all have advanced MBT capabilities with new or near new fleets)
5. Infantry fighting vehicles (an enormous range, most of which dwarf the capability of our M113AS3/4),
6. Anti-tank guided weapons (an enormous range, headlined by Javelin which we possess, but available in types and quantities that weren't even 10 years ago)
7. Artillery, most nations in SEA and wider Asia possess a significantly enhanced artillery capability to us. Singapore, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, India, Japan and Pakistan all possess towed and self-propelled 155mm (and similiar) artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems.
8. Air defence systems. Most nations in SEA and wider Asia possess an air defence system substantially more capable than ours. Our C4ISR capability might be sound, but the GBAD systems we possess are a very limited capability in the scheme of things...
Need I go on?
Do go on, but about threats. All of the above are capabilities, and I'm sure the Minister was referring to threats that need to be considered by Australia.
God you are lacking into insight. Tell you what, go and research Afghanistan and Iraq and LEARN what our troops are actually doing there.
You clearly have no clue whatsoever.
As a prime example of changing tactics, here is one little acronym. It's called IED...
Improvised Explosive Devices...you mean like the booby traps that the Japanese used t set up during World War Two that were different to those the Australian troops got used to Germans setting up in North Africa? Are we talking new tactics or new acronyms? :rolleyes:
What are Australian troops doing in Afghanistan? Hmm, that would be base security, area patrolling, setting up ambushes, pursuit and clearance ops. I can go on, and that's just the infantry. What the SASR do is classified as always, and had been since the Malaya Emergency.
And what deployment have we been unable to meet? We possess 7 operational infantry battalions now, with the 8th - 8/9RAR still building up. Approximately 1.5 infantry battalions in total out of the regular force is actually deployed on operations now.
Significant numbers are available for deployment and though it's quite fashionable to point out how "stretched" we are and argue about our force being unable to complete even a "Timor style" mission, I would point out that at NO point did we ever have MORE than 3 infantry battalions, plus supporting elements deployed to Timor, even in late 1999 / early 2000.
2 RAR, 3 RAR and 5/7 RAR were the battalions in the "first wave" of Interfet. 1 RAR, 4 RAR and 6 RAR stayed at home and built up for replacement of these battalions, which they did in 2000.
Oh, 1.5 is it? That's as in six INFANTRY COMPANIES?
Catalyst - 1st Squadron Group, Australian Special Air Service Regiment (equivalent to about two platoons), Platoon (+) from 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando), D Troop, Incident Response Regiment (four platoons)
Astute - B and C Companies, 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and one attached battery as infantry
Anode - company in Australia committed to deployment
Slipper - one infantry company and three SOTG platoons (+)
Even counting Anode, and the SOTG troops as 'infantry', that gives five companies of infantry. Its only six if one counts the company of reserves usually sent to Solomons for Anode as needed. In reality there are three infantry companies deployed overseas as we speak, not even a complete battalion.
Btw, I think one of the 1 RAR companies was also in the "first wave" of Interfet, AKA Operations Spitfire, Warden and Stabilise. There were also gunners deployed as infantry, but who's counting, right?
We now have an additional full strength battalion available over and above what we had then and if you think availability of infantry within the battalions is a current problem, you might ask yourself why battalions are having to run infantry IET courses within their own units, in addition to those run at Singleton...
Available for what? The RAN/RAAF combined could not lift one extra battalion above those available now, and certainly not with their complement of Bushmasters without leasing a civilian Ro-Ro vessel.
They are running the in-battalion IET courses because of the reduction in the Singleton course length, what two years ago? (I forget)
Rubbish. Northern Ireland was a low intensity conflict. Afghanistan and Iraq are MASSIVELY different in intensity and the Bushmaster has proven outstanding in these operations.
Oh, low intensity? Its always low intensity unless you are one of the 719 casualties that got killed by the 'old tactics'
murder 157
booby-trap devices 97
gun-fire and attack on foot patrol 51
sniper fire 40
abduction and murder 19
ambush of foot patrol 14
foot patrol under machine-gun fire 7
attack on a border post 5
undercover intelligence operations 5
mortar attack 3
helicopter under fire 1
bomb attacks 140
mobile patrol was shot at 63
land-mines 49
sniper engaging a foot patrol 28
detonation of explosive device 15
'friendly fire' (includes 2 shot by RUC). 8
soldiers on guard duty shot by snipers 6
para-military Loyalist attacks 5
rocket attack 3
civilian attack on foot patrol 2
APC crushed soldier 1
What if East Timor turned into an Australian Northern Ireland? Would Bushmaster still be an outstanding vehicle? And lets face it, Australians were only involved in protecting their own training and local activities and not so much combat in Iraq. In Afghanistan the ADF has just been lucky. However, the intensity is really only just now starting to pick up there.
In addition, the Bushmaster has NOT replaced the M113 (except within B Squadron 3/4 Cav) but rather is a SUPPLEMENT to it.
Oh I don't know. With the new order there will be as many Bushmasters in the Army and the RAAF as the total M113 fleet, including storage, the best of which were used for the AS3/4 upgrade. What do you reckon is supplementing what?
You might have noticed that Defmin FITZGIBBIN announced an order for an additional 81x M113AS3/4's a few months back? Primarily a result of the additional battalions under ELF/HNA. That brings the order book for M113AS3/4 to 431 vehicles in total.
Yes, was wondering about those. I think that probably they are only to allow expansion of the unit parks (including Reserves) to what they should have been if they had a 'normal' force structure budgeted in the 90s! My other thought was that maybe they are intended to transform the 1 and 2RAR into mechanised infantry since both trained in Sea Lion, but...they are useless in a surf :confused:
The order book for Bushmasters is now about 720 vehicles and we have 257 ASLAV vehicles (of all variants).
That's a light armoured vehicle fleet of about 1400 light armoured vehicles, when all delivered.
But ASLAVs are not infantry vehicles and the so equipped squadrons are not really intended to fight as infantry.
Compare this to the pre-Bushmaster days of about 550 in-service M113's and 112 ASLAV variants.
A significant difference no? And a completely different force to the one you seem to think exists...
Makes not an ounce of difference. No Bushmaster could go where an ASLAV could go in the wet season, and neither could follow an M113 in every type of terrain in the region, while the later could not keep up with the M1. Numbers don't always tell the whole story.
If you think carrying infantry in armoured vehicles is obsolete, I'm glad YOU are not the Defmin. We'd have had hundreds of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan otherwise...
I think you just put your words into my mouth. What I said is that we should not put infantry into a vehicle for which "The original concept was that the vehicle would be used solely for transportation, bringing the troops forward under armor and then having them dismount for combat; the M113 would then retreat to the rear."
As to the refurbished M113 idea. Apparently not everyone thinks upgrading old vehicles is such a bad idea.
Australia is doing it, America has done it (M113A3), Israel has done it and the UK are doing a similar upgrade with their Bulldog upgrades of FV432 "boxed" armoured vehicles...
This is disingenuous. In bot the US and British armies the upgraded APCs serve in solely support roles not frontline infantry combat vehicles. AFAIK the Australian AS3/4 upgrade has not received anything like the armour package of the Israeli version.
And? The concept is proven on a regular basis. It's called exercise Sea Lion...
Ah, so you think that all those countries with infantry trained for dedicated operations from amphibious ships are wasting their time?
Apparently the Air Warfare Destroyers and ANZAC class frigates won't have air defence capabilities, eh?
And the East Timor border is 172km long. That leaves a 72km gap in air defence...
Apparently RAAF doesn't possess air defence capabilities eh?
They do...just not very good swimmers :)
The RBS-70's aren't fired from the top of M113's, that is true. They are fired from their own Perentie 6x6 wheeled vehicles and in future the Land Rover replacement under LAND 125, or possibly Bushmaster.
Again, research helps here.... :)
Have you ever seen the air defence version? I have not, but knew the Rapiers were the trailer part. In any case, its off-road capability does not compare with the rest of the fleet of vehicles, and neither does its survivability in a conventional conflict that may call for AD. I said they are not fired from M113, because that is not, as far as I know, the practice in the ADF, although it is elsewhere. It should really be fired from an M113/Bushmaster turret if it is to fit into the Army's doctrine and force structure of the mechanised/motorised infantry battalion. Currently its a toss up which is the weakest link in the Army, the AD or the towed artillery.
Aha.. The old F-111 range issue. This is the weakest argument you've delivered yet. What is the useful strike range of the F-111 anyway, off hand?
Who cares?!
WTF?
There are no 120mm mortars in-service in the ADF.
Most of the combat operations are performed by the SO troops, not the infantry.
Obviously you have not heard proposals on acquiring 120mm mortars and where to get personnel to serve them....
The French have more than 10x Tigers in-service, how many have they got operating, on deployment?
How is this relevant to the ADF?
It is a brand new aircraft that has not even reached INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY in any Country (Germany, Spain, France or Australia yet).
I'm assuming they did not start training pilots and crew from scratch using school leavers :) That will teach me for making assumptions :) Fair go....three years!
Of course we cannot deploy it. We have more than 8 pilots and battle captains trained, but that is not enough, yet.
Well, if I'm impatient to see them in action, I can only imagine how the serving personnel must feel....
Yes RAAF could help out, but why on Earth would you deploy Hawks? No PGMs, no targetting capability beyond a gun sight and the Mk 1 eyeball and no EWSP capability because they are a TRAINER...
Trainer shmainer, its an air force jet aircraft. Isn't that why they are painted in low vis scheme and not some gaudy RAAF red? They are low maintenance and shorter take off aircraft, and there are no targets that need advance targeting capability (though can be fitted), and even some rocket and gun pods will do...good fun :) Easier to ship to Afghanistan also. Not sure how the F-18 fits into a C-17. Americans used a C-5 Galaxy to deliver the initial batch F/A-18s.
Anyway, RAAF thinks its a two-seat advanced trainer/light attack fighter, and is armed with 30 mm Aden cannon, Sidewinder missiles, and light bombs. I bet it can also fire rockets. Love those 2.75" rockets :)
As to training Afghan pilots, are you for real? What the hell do they need training on a lead in fighter designed to train F/A-18 pilots for?
The Hawks are not designed to train F/A-18 pilots, but pilots that will LATER train on F/A-18 after their initial flight training. The idea is that after Hawk they can say they can fly a jet. By that stage maybe Australia can sell Afghanistan some of its F/A-18 Hornets as it starts to receive F-35s? Mind you there will be so many F-16s and F-18s for sale soon that I think I will be able to afford one to fly to the corner store for milk and eggs :)
Applique armour, just as the Dutch have done woiuld be a start...
Reactive armour packages exist...
Active protection systems exist...
Yep, I'm all for it...lets go....:) Oh, er, hmmmm, wait....not sure that's going to be in the White Paper...but we can hope :(
As for US being out of Afghanistan in 3 years. Show me a link that says so, because I call utter BS and only your lack of insight to claim this.
What link? I do not live by the Internet alone. That's when the next US election is due, and Democrats are known as much for getting into wars as for getting out of them. The "significant ramping up" is, at a guess, so that in three years time Obama can declare a significant withdrawal (see Bush's preparation for the last US election with Iraq), hopefully after he has declared Bin Ladin dead by any means short of nuclear weapons. Either that, or he will announce general conscription and a campaign to occupy Pakistan (just kidding :) ), because short of that Afghanistan's security can not be ensured for all the money in China, and everyone knows it.
Marc 1
April 28th, 2009, 12:36 PM
Did I say to make an F-35? Mind you, the RAAF could be flying the Typhoon by now.
Sarcasm, Future Tank, that's why I suggested we make an F35 competitor. Why not? you advocate we make everything else. On the Typhoon, why would we want to replace our 4th generation F/A 18's with 4.5 gen Typhoons that will have to be in service for at least the next 20 years? In 15 years time I would expect at least China of our neighbours to be fielding full 5th generation airframes - are you advocating that it would have been smarter to deliberately equip our airforce with something that would be overmatched by a competitor? Nice of you to think that its OK for our pilots to take a knife to a gun fight. The F-35 will ensure we maintain a technological edge in our region for the next 15 years then be at least comparable for the 10 years after that I'm guessing.
Spain GDP (PPP) 2008 $1,397 trillion Defence budget US$18,974 (1.36%)
Australia GDP (PPP) 2008 $795.305 billion Defence budget US$15,744 (1.98%)
Now go and compare the force structures between Australia and Spain.
Why do we have the same goals, needs, allies? We certainly don't have the same budget from the bald figures.
Self-sufficiency? Technological advancement? Cooperation with allies?
How is co-operation with our allies going to be furthered by having a different equipment to our allies? Perhaps you'd like to explain that.
And? Lets see. Australia. Its very near neighbour is Indonesia that buys equipment from France (non-NATO) and former USSR. Further to the north is Communist China with an ever increasing defence budget. Its blessed with fairly unique weather and geography, so much of the off the shelf gear didn't fit their requirements. So rather then designing own equipment, the ADF bought some from other states like the M113s that had to be modified, but are not suitable for amphibious operations in the tropics, and LAVs that had to be modified, and are only somewhat suitable for amphibious operations, and Bushmasters which are unsuitable for amphibious operations (so can't follow the LAVs), but are suitable for the weather, and M1 Abrams, which are suitable for amphibious operations, but we need the USMC for that. But hey, its not like the ADF actually considered amphibious operations as a significant doctrinal concern despite the region to the north being all islands and coastlines. No, unlike Sweden that thought about its weather and geography in the 1950s,
OK, lots of rubbish here. M113's have never been suitable for true amphibious ops anywhere regardless of whether its the tropics or not. Besides, how is the latitude relevant to how well a vehicle will do in amphibous ops? The M113A1's ability to 'swim' itself is very limited. Trust me when I say that even swimming the M113's in the Georges River gave me the willies big time the few times I did it.
Can you explain to me why you consider the Abrams to be suitable for ampibious ops, yet the Bushmaster is not? All of the vehicles we operate cannot be swum ashore across a beach head - all are landed by landing craft, if their wheel loadings are too high for a soft sandy surface Engineers, lay a form of matting to enable vehicles to traverse the beach.
the ADF started developing its amphibious operations as a doctrine in 2007 when the planned capability first became a promise.
Really? Tthe ADF developed only developed doctrine on Amphibious ops in 2007? In the late 80's early 90's 6 RAR was tasked with maintaining the skillsets required in the ADF for amphibious operations. Whilst we were no Royal Marines, the battalion used to deploy on exercise off the Tobruk fairly regularly. I still have strong recollections of surfing large waves in a 23 tonne USMC AAV7A1 during a practice landing at Big Sur in California in preparation for an amphibious landing from the USS Fort McHenry.
And? Maybe they have not sold the equipment, but they have self propelled artillery in the park, and they have the capability to sell it...to the ADF.
And, we are not going to buy it. Given that before Apharteid, the South Africans did pretty much as everone else did - bought equipment off the shelf , the only reason they developed their own is because no bugger would sell to them. Worse, their return on this massive investment in their arms industry has been bugger all. How can you guarantee if we went down the same path investing heavily in developing weaponry and aircraft that they would sell overseas? You are asking an awful lot of faith of the Australian public. You saw how badly the previous government fared over a failed $1.1 billion dollar contract for the Seasprites - do you think they want to stick their necks out to build from scratch a multi billion dollar C130 competitor?
Spain. An industry that has been largely supported by its own government. Here is the list of aircraft that CASA built before it integrated with EADS and produced the Cn235 and 295: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:CASA_aircraft
But the Australian Government has been saying it supports Defence Industry for at least 30 years! It is only because of the experience and success of CASA that EADS integration became possible.
[QUOTE=FutureTank;173389]And the ADF doesn't buy on the consideration of cost?
In nearly all cases through life cost is a far more important consideration than the off the shelf price. With the exception of GP boots generally our equipment has been purchased on ability and capability. The Leopards were a more expensive choice than the competing M-60's, the Collins class cost a stack more than purchasing Off the shelf from a european shipyard etc.
However, it is now so committed to integration into the US forces structure that we are becoming tied to US systems and therefore expenditures made based on entirely different budgetary considerations. The ADF is not the US Army, US Navy or the US Air Force. It is, by its mode of operation, structure, past history and its regional 'terrain' more of a national equivalent of the USMC. Wherever the Australian defence forces go, they go by ship, the exception being Afghanistan. Where as the operation of small integrated amphibious task forces should have been the modus operandi for the ADF since the Second World War, as it stands now we can't even make a decent flat bottomed landing craft!
What's your point here? Can you tell me why it is wrong to purchase quality equipment from an ally that we know will be interoperable? Why do you believe we need to emulate the USMC closely? As far as I can tell the USMC lacks AWACS, has bugger all fixed wing airlift just for starters. The USMC makes up its deficiencies by being able to integrate with the USN, USAF and Army. If the USMC made up the sole defence capability of the USA it would look very different. Why should our forces be configured for amphibious assault? That doesn't sit well with the political aims of governments various over the past 50 years - way too agressive and quite limited in capabilty.
In any case, there is no law that says we have to make cheap and bad tactical lift aircraft. We could do worse than an Osprey, which are expensive and bad.
Name one single competing airframe that will do what the osprey does. The US is large enough that it can fund these niche capabilites - incidentally, the USMC (remember the mob you worship) will be the biggest users of these "expenxive and bad" machines. You are correct, we could make an expensive and capable tactical airlift aircraft. Problem is that is no guarantee it would sell. Arguably our Bushmaster offers as much protection as the much vaunted MRAP's, yet whereas the MRAP's are considered top heavy and ill suited to Afghanistan (necessitating the development of the MRAP lite), the Bushmaster is right at home there as well as on the streets of Iraq. Despite the Bushie being what looked like a shoe in for the MRAP contract, the US chose parochially, and on the basis of cost (which has probably proven to be more expensive as they have had to order the lIte too). So despite making a state of the art vehicle, the Bushmaster is despite a few Pommy and Dutch orders not as yet an export success. So much for your theory of make a world beater and the orders will roll in. They may, but there are no guarantees.
If you never never go, you never never know? Sounds familiar? What's to say that if the UK manufacturers made bad decisions, Australian manufacturers would also? Got to start somewhere though, right?
Refer my point about the Bushmaster above.
And? Did you consider that being a massive organisation backed by six governments is not always of a benefit to an engineering project? Until recently Australians were servicing and still are all Qantas aircraft. Are you saying that a C-17 is more complex than a 747? If it is, its not by much. I am not underestimating anything, though I am sceptical about how an aircraft can be built after years of design that is 32t overweight also.
Wrong. Qantas outsource deep maintenance on some airframes overseas. No, I've never said the C-17 is more complex than a 747 - in fact I've never mentioned either aircraft. There is a massive difference between doing deeper level maintenance and building our own aircraft. Even I can service and change the clutch on a car. Buggered If I have the knowledge or the skill to make a car from scratch though.
I am not underestimating anything, though I am sceptical about how an aircraft can be built after years of design that is 32t overweight also.
Err, pot calling the kettle black here. Read more carefully what I said - the payload has dropped from 40 tonnes to 32 tonnes due to the airframe being overweight. This is very significant because quite a few of the nations planning on purchasing A400's have armoured vehicles in design to take advantage of the 40 tonne payload capability - that has suddenly been reduced by 8 tonnes!
And this is what I'm saying. The spending should be on developing skills that would eliminate this waste of time and money. What did we actually gain as a benefit from refurbished 1960s M113 hulls? Some aluminium at 1960s prices? As I understand it the hulls were completely stripped back. So we could attempt to make everything else, but just could not put a chassis and hull together? Tenix could have been commissioned to do a parallel prototyping project while they are at it for the LAND400 to see what they could put together using as much of the materials and parts being used in refurbishing the M113s.
I don't understand what point you are making here. Did you realise that for the past 30 years M113A1's have been being stripped down to the bare shell and the vehicle goes through a rebuild process that basically 'zero times' the machine at Bandiana. This deep rebuild process happens at set intervals on all hulls. Despite this experience we have with the M113 and variants, and the collective experience of countries around the world upgrading their M113's we had enough problems just with a basic upgrade of the propulsion system and turret. And you want us to make a MICV from scratch ( using second hand bits from M113's) err, yeah that sounds cheap.
Why can't we do the simple stuff?
Because it's not so simple, and therefore not cheap. With the Collins class there was no existing design that satisfied our need for near nuclear boat size and endurance, in a conventional hull. So we didn't have much choice but to take the risk to extensively modify an existing design. Whereas to replace the Caribou, the only real exact replacement is only another Caribou (Viking aircraft in Canada can produce newies), but do we need an exact copy? Have our needs changed? Are ther not existing aircraft out there where someone else has taken the risk and worn the development cost that would satidfy the requirements? Yep, CN 295, CN235, C27J, possibly even V-22 Osprey etc. Why build our own?
Simple stuff is what a defence force needs in war.
No. As we have a small defence force and speaking as an ex servie, we need the best that's available. We cannot aford to lose equipment or personnel - something that the diggers I'm sure would be grateful to know. There are some pieces of equipment that are in my mind 'stopgap' measures, M113AS3 for exampleis ok to deploy in the SP region on peacekeeping tasks, and to keep the necessary skillsets in driving/operating/maintaining tracked battle taxi's whilst Land 400 gets us a proper MICV. I'm sure the heads of army would prefer CV90's but we only have a finite budget, something you fail to understand.
On the one hand we have DSTO which government assures us is at cutting edge of research and development, and on the other hand we cant get the breaks to work on the M113AS4?
And yet you still advocate we make far more complicated and technical equipment from scratch?
Marc 1
April 28th, 2009, 12:57 PM
Oh, low intensity? Its always low intensity unless you are one of the 719 casualties that got killed by the 'old tactics'
Err.... good one. Do you even understand that warfare is divided into different clasifications depending on the type of conflict expected. There is a world of difference between forces configured to fight a high intensity conflict such as the classical Russian forces streaming through the Fulda gap into Germany, and a few paddies taking pot shots with semi or even full automativc weapons and the odd explosive device.
What if East Timor turned into an Australian Northern Ireland? Would Bushmaster still be an outstanding vehicle? And lets face it, Australians were only involved in protecting their own training and local activities and not so much combat in Iraq. In Afghanistan the ADF has just been lucky. However, the intensity is really only just now starting to pick up there.
The Bushmaster has had IED's detonated underneath them on many occasions in Afghanistan and Iraq yet I believe not one occupant has lost their life in one. Given the level of threat, what more do you want?
swerve
April 28th, 2009, 02:13 PM
... With the Collins class there was no existing design that satisfied our need for near nuclear boat size and endurance, in a conventional hull. ....
A quibble: IIRC there was one, but the Japanese won't export submarines.
FutureTank
April 29th, 2009, 12:47 AM
It seems to me that it would be productive to stay on the subject of the thread, that is ADF's capabilities and readiness for a war, and not get off on a tangent here and there, so I will just ignore those points which are not relevant.
Sarcasm, Future Tank, that's why I suggested we make an F35 competitor. Why not? you advocate we make everything else. On the Typhoon, why would we want to replace our 4th generation F/A 18's with 4.5 gen Typhoons that will have to be in service for at least the next 20 years? In 15 years time I would expect at least China of our neighbours to be fielding full 5th generation airframes - are you advocating that it would have been smarter to deliberately equip our airforce with something that would be overmatched by a competitor? Nice of you to think that its OK for our pilots to take a knife to a gun fight. The F-35 will ensure we maintain a technological edge in our region for the next 15 years then be at least comparable for the 10 years after that I'm guessing.
Marc 1, we may differ in this because I doubt very much that China will be fielding even a 4th generation fighter in 20 years time. I do expect the Chinese to field a far larger air force in 20 years time that will seek to apply mass where quality is lacking. The Chinese are very poor on innovation. Anything they field will likely be 'borrowed' technology.
Having said that, the discussion of F-35 is unproductive because the decision has been made. Maybe I should not have suggested that RAAF be flying Typhoons, though the capability would be unaffected and readiness brought forward by years (the point I was making).
Why do we have the same goals, needs, allies? We certainly don't have the same budget from the bald figures.
But we don't have the same goals, needs and allies.
We don't have the same budget because of Spain's larger number of aircraft, two aircraft carriers and much larger armoured vehicle park, including hundreds of tanks, IFVs and SP artillery. Given the ADF does not have same Land component needs as Spain (due to NATO's Cold War commitments) the ADF should have been able, all other things being equal, to manage a similar Naval component structure which we DO need.
One glaing problem in the ADF is the lack of a viable F-111 replacement. No one except the Russians makes long range maritime strike jet any more because Europeans have much smaller areas to control, and Americans operate from mobile platforms we don't have. This RAAF requirement is a unique one, restricted to just a few global powers, none of which produce this type of aircraft.
How is co-operation with our allies going to be furthered by having a different equipment to our allies? Perhaps you'd like to explain that.
But I think we are talking in different terms. You are talking in singular, ally, the USA, and I am talking in plural, regional allies, of which at least five can be relied on in the long term. Its not wise to place all your eggs in one basket (old English saying).
OK, lots of rubbish here. M113's have never been suitable for true amphibious ops anywhere regardless of whether its the tropics or not. Besides, how is the latitude relevant to how well a vehicle will do in amphibous ops? The M113A1's ability to 'swim' itself is very limited. Trust me when I say that even swimming the M113's in the Georges River gave me the willies big time the few times I did it.
That was my point. Despite recent 'dry' deployments, much of our immediate region is very watery, including on land, but we lack a true amphibious infantry vehicle with a combat potential comparable to several potential opponents in combat. Certainly it seems to me it would make sense to have such vehicles for the two infantry battalions likely to deploy by this mode. Instead we are getting two more battalion's worth of M113s.
Can you explain to me why you consider the Abrams to be suitable for ampibious ops, yet the Bushmaster is not? All of the vehicles we operate cannot be swum ashore across a beach head - all are landed by landing craft, if their wheel loadings are too high for a soft sandy surface Engineers, lay a form of matting to enable vehicles to traverse the beach.
I don't consider the M1 suitable for amphibious operations, but the USMC does. I don't consider Bushmasters suitable for amphibious operations because these, if opposed, even after they get a bit inland, are not true infantry combat vehicles and can not be committed to what are likely to be high intensity situations.
Really? Tthe ADF developed only developed doctrine on Amphibious ops in 2007? In the late 80's early 90's 6 RAR was tasked with maintaining the skillsets required in the ADF for amphibious operations. Whilst we were no Royal Marines, the battalion used to deploy on exercise off the Tobruk fairly regularly. I still have strong recollections of surfing large waves in a 23 tonne USMC AAV7A1 during a practice landing at Big Sur in California in preparation for an amphibious landing from the USS Fort McHenry.
My tern fir sarcasm...I must have missed seeing AAV7A1 in the 6 RAR's park :) In any case, what the Australian Army does with its few old flat-bottoms is not amphibious operations but ship-to-shore delivery. Having participated in them, you will know that coming ashore is tricky, and such places are not as widely available as one would hope. There is a huge difference in operating amphibious APCs/IFVs and LCHs.
And, we are not going to buy it. Given that before Apharteid, the South Africans did pretty much as everone else did - bought equipment off the shelf , the only reason they developed their own is because no bugger would sell to them. Worse, their return on this massive investment in their arms industry has been bugger all. How can you guarantee if we went down the same path investing heavily in developing weaponry and aircraft that they would sell overseas? You are asking an awful lot of faith of the Australian public. You saw how badly the previous government fared over a failed $1.1 billion dollar contract for the Seasprites - do you think they want to stick their necks out to build from scratch a multi billion dollar C130 competitor?
It seems to me that the Australian public has the wide held belief that they are members of one of the advanced economies in the World. As I said, someone should go to jail for the Super Seasprite fiasco. However, failure in one project does not necessarily predicate a failure in another. In fact I would suggest it fosters learning from mistakes and succeeding.
In nearly all cases through life cost is a far more important consideration than the off the shelf price. With the exception of GP boots generally our equipment has been purchased on ability and capability. The Leopards were a more expensive choice than the competing M-60's, the Collins class cost a stack more than purchasing Off the shelf from a european shipyard etc.
Yes, and what better way to reduce life costs by having the support capability in-country? There are still engineering firms in Australia, and in aggregate they are capable of producing, or expanding capability to produce virtually every piece of equipment and spare part ADF needs...if they had some sense of the long-term government support for such participation. However, that support just has not been there, the talk of which originally got me started in deeper understanding of the defence issues in Australia back in the 1970s. Lots of nice policy, ministerial speeches at conferences and conventions, an obligatory White Paper Defence Industry participation chapter, but no real support that a company could rely on past the next election. Politicians work on 3-4 year terms, business on at least 7 years, the forces on 20-30 years. Can you see a problem?
What's your point here? Can you tell me why it is wrong to purchase quality equipment from an ally that we know will be interoperable? Why do you believe we need to emulate the USMC closely? As far as I can tell the USMC lacks AWACS, has bugger all fixed wing airlift just for starters. The USMC makes up its deficiencies by being able to integrate with the USN, USAF and Army. If the USMC made up the sole defence capability of the USA it would look very different. Why should our forces be configured for amphibious assault? That doesn't sit well with the political aims of governments various over the past 50 years - way too agressive and quite limited in capabilty.
Marc 1, anywhere, ANYWHERE the ADF goes for deployment is going to be aggressive! We are a continental nation. Whatever our limited capability, it will always be better used in the offensive operations rather than waiting on the beaches of Northern Territory or Queensland. This means offensive naval operations, and invariably they will include a need to conduct land operations also.
My point is that the USMC is a part of the US Navy. This may irritate Army and RAAF services, but the reality is that Australia by virtue of its geography is a maritime nation, and its primary method of defence, and influence in the region, until some spectacular technological breakthrough in power systems, is going to be naval, and that is the RAN. We do not need 13 reserve infantry battalions because these can not be effectively deployed overseas, and if it comes to them being required to fight on Australian soil, it will have been too late to fight at all. Better coastal surveillance and mobile anti-shipping missile platforms would probably do far more damage than any Army troops. Australia, from a military strategy point of view, is doubly cursed with a long shoreline and a small population. In this position it has no other option but to be aggressive by taking the initiative in any conflict that may affect its sovereignty.
Name one single competing airframe that will do what the osprey does. The US is large enough that it can fund these niche capabilites - incidentally, the USMC (remember the mob you worship) will be the biggest users of these "expenxive and bad" machines. You are correct, we could make an expensive and capable tactical airlift aircraft. Problem is that is no guarantee it would sell. Arguably our Bushmaster offers as much protection as the much vaunted MRAP's, yet whereas the MRAP's are considered top heavy and ill suited to Afghanistan (necessitating the development of the MRAP lite), the Bushmaster is right at home there as well as on the streets of Iraq. Despite the Bushie being what looked like a shoe in for the MRAP contract, the US chose parochially, and on the basis of cost (which has probably proven to be more expensive as they have had to order the lIte too). So despite making a state of the art vehicle, the Bushmaster is despite a few Pommy and Dutch orders not as yet an export success. So much for your theory of make a world beater and the orders will roll in. They may, but there are no guarantees.
I don't worship the USMC, but simply use it as a model. I can just as well use the Spanish Navy, but as you mention there are elements of the overall US forces structure outside of the USMC capability which the ADF would need, and the Spanish do not offer either. One of these is the naval AEW platform. Wedgetail will fill that niche, or rather close the gap.
Yes, well, there is not much I can add to what you said, but the ultimate aim of domestic defence production capability is to provide a support base to the ADF and not to make it big in the global defence markets. Ultimately its an investment in Australia's secure future, and not a proof that defence markets are competitive (a given).
Wrong. Qantas outsource deep maintenance on some airframes overseas. No, I've never said the C-17 is more complex than a 747 - in fact I've never mentioned either aircraft. There is a massive difference between doing deeper level maintenance and building our own aircraft. Even I can service and change the clutch on a car. Buggered If I have the knowledge or the skill to make a car from scratch though.
Ok, fair point, but deeper maintenance is hopefully not a constant feature of sustaining combat operations capability.
So tour suggestion is to keep growing wheat, cattle and mining? There are Australians who do like to put cars together from scratch, and I think the Government should assist them in every way because every other government in the region does. Ultimately this is highly beneficial to Australia and its capability to defend itself and its interests.
Err, pot calling the kettle black here. Read more carefully what I said - the payload has dropped from 40 tonnes to 32 tonnes due to the airframe being overweight. This is very significant because quite a few of the nations planning on purchasing A400's have armoured vehicles in design to take advantage of the 40 tonne payload capability - that has suddenly been reduced by 8 tonnes!
Ok, but this does not concern ADF's warfighting capability.
I don't understand what point you are making here. Did you realise that for the past 30 years M113A1's have been being stripped down to the bare shell and the vehicle goes through a rebuild process that basically 'zero times' the machine at Bandiana. This deep rebuild process happens at set intervals on all hulls. Despite this experience we have with the M113 and variants, and the collective experience of countries around the world upgrading their M113's we had enough problems just with a basic upgrade of the propulsion system and turret. And you want us to make a MICV from scratch ( using second hand bits from M113's) err, yeah that sounds cheap.
I do know about the periodic rebuilds, but that's easier in engineering terms except where parts no longer available from manufacturer have to be reverse-engineered. However, this is how one learns, but doing something different. So what if the prototype MICV would have had other greater problems? If nothing else, it would give ADF personnel a far greater ability to evaluate the eventual M113 replacements. The opportunity though is to design and develop a vehicle that uniquely suits the needs of ADF tactically, operationally and strategically in terms of force structure, logistic sustainment, training integration, etc. All engineering problems have solutions, and they are only encountered when the projects are attempted.
Because it's not so simple, and therefore not cheap. With the Collins class there was no existing design that satisfied our need for near nuclear boat size and endurance, in a conventional hull. So we didn't have much choice but to take the risk to extensively modify an existing design. Whereas to replace the Caribou, the only real exact replacement is only another Caribou (Viking aircraft in Canada can produce newies), but do we need an exact copy? Have our needs changed? Are ther not existing aircraft out there where someone else has taken the risk and worn the development cost that would satidfy the requirements? Yep, CN 295, CN235, C27J, possibly even V-22 Osprey etc. Why build our own?
Do you want cheap, or Australian? What would be the increase in cost of making a competitor to the C27J in Australia? Cheap means that eventually you are looking for an ADF with everything made in China? Is that what you want?
AFAIC Ospreys need to fly a bit more before I would consider getting into one.
No. As we have a small defence force and speaking as an ex servie, we need the best that's available. We cannot aford to lose equipment or personnel - something that the diggers I'm sure would be grateful to know. There are some pieces of equipment that are in my mind 'stopgap' measures, M113AS3 for exampleis ok to deploy in the SP region on peacekeeping tasks, and to keep the necessary skillsets in driving/operating/maintaining tracked battle taxi's whilst Land 400 gets us a proper MICV. I'm sure the heads of army would prefer CV90's but we only have a finite budget, something you fail to understand.
I know we have a finite budget. My problem is how it is being spent...or mis-spent. The same Spanish I mentioned before have had the Pizarro ICV (Austrian Ulan) since the early 1990s. Between the two countries they are only manufacturing 900 vehicles, and since the LAND 400 is intended (as I understand) to replace the M113s, ASLAVs and some Bushmasters, we are talking about at lest 600 vehicles for Australia alone. Surely not a small production run by any measure of today. I note that the Spanish started small making wheeled APCs in the 1980s, but proved capable enough to be bought by IVECO.
And yet you still advocate we make far more complicated and technical equipment from scratch?
No, I suggest we use existing engineering knowledge and innovate based on that. That's not "from scratch". A group of final year uni students from engineering departments can make prototypes given budgets, but I'm sure experienced commercial engineers will do better.
Ananda
April 29th, 2009, 01:28 AM
Lets say that Indonesia has a change of government, and that new administration decides to reinvade Timor-Leste.
The same ex Kopassus Commander at time of East Timor Crisis Prabowo (ex Soeharto Son In Law)..Now considered as one of best challangers to the current populars incumbent president. Such so that many of political adversaries of current president (SBY) are wiling to bury their own hatches to each other and backing Prabowo..just to have a chances in rivalling the popular incumbent.
All poll still show SBY still the most popular ones..and he's the president that many international community hopping Indonesian would retain in the office for next 5 years.
However Prabowo runnning on very nationalistic paltform, including getting much higher deffence budgets. Just show pottential flares in this regions still there.:)
Feanor
April 29th, 2009, 02:33 AM
Marc 1, we may differ in this because I doubt very much that China will be fielding even a 4th generation fighter in 20 years time. I do expect the Chinese to field a far larger air force in 20 years time that will seek to apply mass where quality is lacking. The Chinese are very poor on innovation. Anything they field will likely be 'borrowed' technology.
Rubbish. China already fields early 4th gen fighters. J-10, Su-27SK, Su-30MKK?
One glaing problem in the ADF is the lack of a viable F-111 replacement. No one except the Russians makes long range maritime strike jet any more because Europeans have much smaller areas to control, and Americans operate from mobile platforms we don't have. This RAAF requirement is a unique one, restricted to just a few global powers, none of which produce this type of aircraft.
Actually, the Backfire is out of production, as is the Tu-142, and the maritime Su-34 variant is likely to be quiet a whiles away. So literally nobody makes the plane you're asking for. Are you suggesting that Australia develop a long range maritime strike fighter from scratch?
The same Spanish I mentioned before have had the Pizarro ICV (Austrian Ulan) since the early 1990s. Between the two countries they are only manufacturing 900 vehicles, and since the LAND 400 is intended (as I understand) to replace the M113s, ASLAVs and some Bushmasters, we are talking about at lest 600 vehicles for Australia alone. Surely not a small production run by any measure of today. I note that the Spanish started small making wheeled APCs in the 1980s, but proved capable enough to be bought by IVECO.
Actually 600 and 900 are tiny production runs. The BMP-3 for example (which has yet to see induction in large numbers for our armed forces) has already well over a thousand orders (close 1500) and is nowhere near the end of the production run. They're only now starting to receive some major domestic orders.
The production run for the Bradley is in the thousands. You're envisioning a project for a full IFV with a production run of arond 600? Why not just buy an existing platform, which will cost less per unit, and cost nothing in development costs?
EDIT: Just a heads up, from what I found the Bushmaster currently has 737 delivered to the ADF, 15 Fire King firefighting variants, 58 ordered by the Netherlands and 24 for the UK. That makes for a total of 834 with potential additional orders from Spain. I.e. even with some modest export success, the Bushmaster has not managed to make it big time in the international market. You propose a larger and riskier investment, in something radically new and unlikely to receive a domestic order even as large as the Bushmasters?
Marc 1
April 29th, 2009, 08:41 AM
Future Tank, there is nothing I would like to see more than a decent weapons manufacturing industry, designing and building world class designs for our own forces and exported to the world.
Two things conspire against that though, the fact that programs not one tenth as complicated as the ones you propose are running behind schedule, massively over budget or even cancelled at massive cost. Remember we exist in a democracy where the government has to be accountable for the decisions it makes. Given recent procurement disasters, the press would be all over any government that announced something this ambitious - particularly these days in an era of ballooning deficits (although, ironically a decision to bolster our defence force by building indigenously could maybe be seen as a viable stimulus project).
The second reason is simply cost and our defence budget. If 11 Seasprites were to cost over a billion dollars (and that was an existing airframe), what would the from scratch development of a state of the art airlifter cost?
swerve
April 29th, 2009, 08:55 AM
I note that the Spanish started small making wheeled APCs in the 1980s, but proved capable enough to be bought by IVECO.
No, I suggest we use existing engineering knowledge and innovate based on that. That's not "from scratch". A group of final year uni students from engineering departments can make prototypes given budgets, but I'm sure experienced commercial engineers will do better.
The Spanish automotive industry is several times the size of Australias. It's bigger than the UKs. That is the basis on which Spains move into AFV production was built, as with Spanish warship production, which is based on a substantial civilian industry. And even so, like the industries of Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands & Belgium, it's no longer independent.
You are advocating Australia builds capabilities across the spectrum, not just in a few niches. Unless you propose militarising the economy, Soviet-style, that isn't attainable. You can't argue niche by niche, you have to consider what resources are available, & divide them between all your proposed capabilities. I believe you will run out of resources (engineering skills, investment funds - whatever you care to consider) long before you run out of weapons developments which would need them.
Aussie Digger
April 29th, 2009, 08:56 AM
Do go on, but about threats. All of the above are capabilities, and I'm sure the Minister was referring to threats that need to be considered by Australia.
Definition of a threat is intent + capability. Intent is easily changed, capability is not.
In-service capabilities ARE a massive component of ANY threat.
Oh, 1.5 is it? That's as in six INFANTRY COMPANIES?
Army hasn't maintained 4x rifle coy's per battalion for a LONG time and even then you ARE forgetting Support and Admin Coy's, which each regular battalion maintains...
But please continue "enlightening" us...
Timor - Op Astute: 2x rifle companies, plus an Admin Coy - 5RAR.
Afghanistan Op Slipper: 1x Rifle Coy from 7RAR, 1x Commando Coy from 4RAR (Cdo).
Solomans: Op Anode: 1x rifle coy from 5/7 - 8/7 Royal Victoria Regt.
Iraq: Op Kruger: 1x Rifle Coy minus from 5RAR.
Hence we have 1RAR, 2RAR, 3RAR, 6RAR and the first Coy of 8/9RAR with NO rifle Coy Groups deployed whatsoever.
7RAR has only 1 Coy group deployed.
4RAR has only 1 out of 3 Commando Coy's deployed.
Artillery has a troop of 14x diggers seconded to the British Arm and a Coy group formed from 16 AD Regt.
Want to count them out on your fingers, again and see if we could deploy more than Timor levels?
Available for what? The RAN/RAAF combined could not lift one extra battalion above those available now, and certainly not with their complement of Bushmasters without leasing a civilian Ro-Ro vessel.
They are running the in-battalion IET courses because of the reduction in the Singleton course length, what two years ago? (I forget)
No. They are running IET courses in the battalions, because Singleton's capacity is maxed out, course in course out. If you actually spoke with real soldiers, you would HEAR the stories of bottlenecks in the training program, digs WAITING to get on courses.
So far 3, 5/7 and 1RAR have run their own IET courses, because Singleton based courses are FULL of new infantry recruits.
As for RAAF/RAN lift, I'm not quite sure what you are comparing their lift levels too? Timor or when?
Certainly ADF lift capacity has improved enormously since 2000....
What if East Timor turned into an Australian Northern Ireland? Would Bushmaster still be an outstanding vehicle? And lets face it, Australians were only involved in protecting their own training and local activities and not so much combat in Iraq. In Afghanistan the ADF has just been lucky. However, the intensity is really only just now starting to pick up there.
What if. Try looking at the underlying causes of such conflict before making such ridiculous statements. As for Bushmaster, it WAS deployed to Timor and once again, performed superbly.
Oh I don't know. With the new order there will be as many Bushmasters in the Army and the RAAF as the total M113 fleet, including storage, the best of which were used for the AS3/4 upgrade. What do you reckon is supplementing what?
You don't know what you are talking about quite clearly. The original HNA plan was for Bushmaster to supplement M113AS3/4 in 5/7RAR.
Then ELF came along and delinked 5/7 into the 2 battalions. In addition to this, an additional 81x M113AS3/4's have been ordered, as you no doubt know, however the Bushmaster is not being employed within these battalions now. Soley M113AS3/4.
The Bushmaster is being issued to 1 Brigade units that would traditionally be equipped with nothing better than B vehicles, along with the originally planned for "motorised brigade" 7 Brigade and the aforementioned B Sqn 3/4 Cav.
I think you just put your words into my mouth. What I said is that we should not put infantry into a vehicle for which "The original concept was that the vehicle would be used solely for transportation, bringing the troops forward under armor and then having them dismount for combat; the M113 would then retreat to the rear."
We don't and nor do we operate our M113s in this fashion. One might as well employ them from soft skin trucks if this is going to be your conops...
This is disingenuous. In bot the US and British armies the upgraded APCs serve in solely support roles not frontline infantry combat vehicles. AFAIK the Australian AS3/4 upgrade has not received anything like the armour package of the Israeli version.
The M113AS3/4 is being built to a cost capped budget. However it's specification is akin to an interim status with respect to the deployability of the vehicles.
Armour upgrades, plus additional belly armour and " anti-RPG mesh screens" are intended for the vehicles, should a deployment to an AO such as Afghanistan be contemplated.
DMO has confirmed that such options have been scoped and engineering work done on them. What remains absent is the funding, as with ASLAVs, before Iraq, to actually buy the kit.
The vehicles would much more closely match the protection offered by the Israeli packages, under such circumstances.
Ah, so you think that all those countries with infantry trained for dedicated operations from amphibious ships are wasting their time?
Not at all. However they don't try and achieve all these capabilities with a regular force of only 8 infantry battalions and an amphibious force of 3 ships in total...
What Sea Lion, Army's amphibious doctrine and other activities are attempting to do is develop the basis from which an amphibious force could develop and subsequently operate.
Army and RAN proved they could deploy a mechanised unit by amphibious means on operations during Interfet itself, with 5/7RAR.
Amphibious operations are at the end of the day, are simply an insertion method. Your arguments about "lack of air cover" etc apply equally to the land force under ANY type of deployment.
And the East Timor border is 172km long. That leaves a 72km gap in air defence...
What? Can we only deploy one vessel?
FYI, ESSM has a range in excess of 50k's.
SM-2 Block IIIA (what the FFG's will have - AWD will have an improved variant) has a publicly declared range in excess of 185k's.
Have you ever seen the air defence version?
Yes.
I have not, but knew the Rapiers were the trailer part. In any case, its off-road capability does not compare with the rest of the fleet of vehicles, and neither does its survivability in a conventional conflict that may call for AD.
So what? Do you think that SAM missiles are EVER fired from tracked vehicles bouncing around off -road at high speed?
In any case, the Land Rover AD variant is an interim vehicle, the same as the Perentie 6x6 vehicle was for the infantry battalions at Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera.
It provides excellent deployability, excellent mobility, for it's needs, which are NOT close combat with an entrenched enemy force.
I have no doubt the "protected vehicle" acquired under LAND 125 will replace the 16 AD vehicle fleet in due course.
I said they are not fired from M113, because that is not, as far as I know, the practice in the ADF, although it is elsewhere. It should really be fired from an M113/Bushmaster turret if it is to fit into the Army's doctrine and force structure of the mechanised/motorised infantry battalion. Currently its a toss up which is the weakest link in the Army, the AD or the towed artillery.
Replacement and supplementing of both capabilities is long overdue. It seems offensive artillery in the Army is close to finally being brought to a modern standard, here's hoping Government sees fit to fund a similarly capable project for AD under the White Paper.
Most of the combat operations are performed by the SO troops, not the infantry.
Obviously you have not heard proposals on acquiring 120mm mortars and where to get personnel to serve them....
No I haven't. Please enlighten me...
What I have heard about, in relation to Army mortar projects, is in relation to the ARES Artillery units, they are NOT equipped with 120mm mortars.
They are equipped with 81mm mortars, the same as issued to the infantry battalions (F2 81mm mortar).
A proposal for 120mm mortars in the last 10 years for Army was the "motorised 120mm mortar" project, however that was dropped in 2004 in favour of a new tank capability.
The only other "new" mortar project for Army is it's "Long Ranged Mortar" project, MINCS(l) AMP 48.36 which again, was not a 120mm based solution, but rather a replacement 81mm solution.
So, you can see, I try and keep up with Army, but I don't quite manage everything...
How is this relevant to ADF?
Well let's see. You have criticised ADF for not being able to deploy a Tiger helo to Afghanistan.
France, which has purchased MORE Tiger helos than us, has trained MORE pilots and has been developing the Tiger for LONGER than us, cannot yet provide a deployable Tiger capability.
Yeah, how is this relevant?
Ah, perhaps because the aircraft is NOT YET sufficiently mature, to deploy operationally?
Furthermore, it isn't simply a matter of helos and pilots/battle captains. You need more crews than helos (which we don't currently have) to deploy, you need the maintainers, you need spares, you need the time to develop your operational tactics and conduct collective, as opposed to individual training activities.
1 Aviation Regt is currently introducing a brand new helo which has not yet achieved IOC in Australia, or indeed in ANY other Country.
We need time to train pilots/battle captains/maintainers in how to operate the things, yes, but they then need to consolidate the capability, undertake mission rehearsal exercises etc. They need to build up a capability to employ the helo within the existing combined arms team formations we currently undertake and actually practice deploying the helo, as a capability (ie: a package of helos, plus supporting elements to conduct operations - say from Darwin to Shoalwater bay, for 4x helos and support)
It is here where you begin to learn what the problems are going to be. How many sorties can the aircraft generate, with the level of support available? Is the level of support we THINK is going to suffice, going to be enough? How can we best employ the Tiger?
All of this takes years. Just training enough pilots is only the beginning of the capability and we haven't even reached that point yet.
Well, if I'm impatient to see them in action, I can only imagine how the serving personnel must feel....
Agreed, but the fact is, our program is actually ahead of the French and German projects in some aspects. We have had to slow our program down somewhat because of this.
Type certification for the aircraft can't happen in Australia, until it's completed in France and there have been training delays on top of this, because the contractor hasn't delivered what was promised in terms of simulator capability etc.
Trainer shmainer, its an air force jet aircraft. Isn't that why they are painted in low vis scheme and not some gaudy RAAF red? They are low maintenance and shorter take off aircraft, and there are no targets that need advance targeting capability (though can be fitted), and even some rocket and gun pods will do...good fun :) Easier to ship to Afghanistan also. Not sure how the F-18 fits into a C-17. Americans used a C-5 Galaxy to deliver the initial batch F/A-18s.
Anyway, RAAF thinks its a two-seat advanced trainer/light attack fighter, and is armed with 30 mm Aden cannon, Sidewinder missiles, and light bombs. I bet it can also fire rockets. Love those 2.75" rockets :)
1. RAAF doesn't maintain a 2.75 inch rocket capability.
2. Australian RoE's will never authorise the use of a combat aircraft without a targetting pod capability.
3. EVERY target in Afghanistan is requiring precision guided munitions. Abe can no doubt chip in hear, if he is so inclined, but there is a SIGNIFICANT requirement for combat aircraft to employ munitions within "dangerous" (to blue forces) ranges in Afghanistan.
4. RAAF does NOT think it is a light attack fighter. It's 30mm cannon is only employed for gunnery training and it's "light bombs" are BDU-33's, which don't even possess an explosive charge, just a marking charge. If you want a little puff of smoke employed onto enemy forces, than this is the right aircraft, I guess....
The Hawks are not designed to train F/A-18 pilots, but pilots that will LATER train on F/A-18 after their initial flight training. The idea is that after Hawk they can say they can fly a jet. By that stage maybe Australia can sell Afghanistan some of its F/A-18 Hornets as it starts to receive F-35s? Mind you there will be so many F-16s and F-18s for sale soon that I think I will be able to afford one to fly to the corner store for milk and eggs :)
No, the Hawks are used to ONLY train pilots who will fly F/A-18s. They WERE used to train pilots who USED to go on to fly F/A-18s and F-111s, but the last F-111 course flew in 2007 and the Hawks are now soley used for would-be F/A-18 pilots, 76 and 79 Sqn instructors and the odd maritime and GBAD defence training.
The cockpit of the Mk 127 has been designed to replicate the F/A-18 Hornet cockpit as closely as possible. What does that tell you?
Australia's Hornets airframes will be entirely knackered by the time we are finished with them. FLEI is the measurement of the fatigue time left in the airframe and there is little left now. By 2018 there will be bugger all left...
Some spare parts, engines etc will be all that is useful in them. The airframes themselves will be shot ducks...
Yep, I'm all for it...lets go....:) Oh, er, hmmmm, wait....not sure that's going to be in the White Paper...but we can hope :(
I don't live by the Internet alone either. DMO HAVE confirmed that options to further upgrade the M113 HAVE been studied. If they are going to be deployed, they will be enhanced...
What link? I do not live by the Internet alone. That's when the next US election is due, and Democrats are known as much for getting into wars as for getting out of them. The "significant ramping up" is, at a guess, so that in three years time Obama can declare a significant withdrawal (see Bush's preparation for the last US election with Iraq), hopefully after he has declared Bin Ladin dead by any means short of nuclear weapons. Either that, or he will announce general conscription and a campaign to occupy Pakistan (just kidding :) ), because short of that Afghanistan's security can not be ensured for all the money in China, and everyone knows it.
The USA is pumping an extra 4x Brigades into Afghanistan at present.
That doesn't point to a nation on the verge of withdrawing...
FutureTank
April 29th, 2009, 06:15 PM
The Spanish automotive industry is several times the size of Australias. It's bigger than the UKs. That is the basis on which Spains move into AFV production was built, as with Spanish warship production, which is based on a substantial civilian industry. And even so, like the industries of Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands & Belgium, it's no longer independent.
You are advocating Australia builds capabilities across the spectrum, not just in a few niches. Unless you propose militarising the economy, Soviet-style, that isn't attainable. You can't argue niche by niche, you have to consider what resources are available, & divide them between all your proposed capabilities. I believe you will run out of resources (engineering skills, investment funds - whatever you care to consider) long before you run out of weapons developments which would need them.
Building armoured vehicles in a low-rate production scenario does not require either a highly developed general automotive industry, nor a militarised one.
FutureTank
April 29th, 2009, 07:11 PM
Err.... good one. Do you even understand that warfare is divided into different clasifications depending on the type of conflict expected. There is a world of difference between forces configured to fight a high intensity conflict such as the classical Russian forces streaming through the Fulda gap into Germany, and a few paddies taking pot shots with semi or even full automativc weapons and the odd explosive device.
And what do you understand Marc 1? Do you know the origin of the term "Low Intensity Warfare"? It was introduced in the USA as a budgetary requirement so conventional forces allocation will not have funds syphoned off to SOF units. So SOFs have their own allocations, because they also said that some equipment are secret and can not be disclosed except to closed hearing of the Select Arms Committee due to threat to national security.
Low intensity warfare is where the observed enemy activity is reduced in density due to a variety of reasons, not the least political, or terrain, or....(continue with long list). As we can see in Afghanistan an estimated 10,000 Taliban fighters, essentially a light infantry division, is causing a lot of worry to NATO, an organisation set up to oppose the Soviet Army. This is not "low intensity warfare", but higher difficulty target acquisition warfare, that's all. The bullets are same. The tactics are same. You know it....patrolling is same regardless of it being Mao Mao, or Viet Cong, or Soviet Army, or IRA, or illegal Mexican border runners, etc. Its the same in the arid terrain of Israel, in the jungle of East Timor, in the fields of Ireland, in the mountains of Kashmir, in the cities of Iraq, etc.
At section and platoon level in any case. And when the target is found, guess what, it gets very intense for a while.
The LIC is NEVER applied to MOST of the Australian troops that are deployed now, which are the SAS, the Incidence Response and the Commando regiments. Taking out an NVA division commander is only different to taking out a Taliban province commander in the type of terrain the op happens in. The op is always intense. Conducting an ambush on a weapons caravan is always intense. Attempting to take Taliban prisoner in a surprise raid is always intensive.
The Bushmaster has had IED's detonated underneath them on many occasions in Afghanistan and Iraq yet I believe not one occupant has lost their life in one. Given the level of threat, what more do you want?
So you are saying that the ADF will never be called upon to engage in conventional warfare? So I guess the Abrams crews will only be issued with the HE ammunition?
Most regional armies have equipped their infantry with vehicles that mount a variety of auto-cannons and ATGWs that can punch holes through both sides of the Bushmaster, and the M113 for that matter, though not the AS3/4 (perhaps) . This includes the Indonesian Army's BMP-2s, 3s and AMX-10Ps. I don't know if the upgraded ADF M113s are to be issued with the SLAP rounds for their .50 cal HMGs, but they would be useful.
Aussie Digger
April 29th, 2009, 07:47 PM
Most regional armies have equipped their infantry with vehicles that mount a variety of auto-cannons and ATGWs that can punch holes through both sides of the Bushmaster, and the M113 for that matter, though not the AS3/4 (perhaps) . This includes the Indonesian Army's BMP-2s, 3s and AMX-10Ps. I don't know if the upgraded ADF M113s are to be issued with the SLAP rounds for their .50 cal HMGs, but they would be useful.
The "Quick Change Barrel" variant of the M2 12.7mm machine guns we operate has been equipped with an undisclosed "improved range" of ammunition.
Make of this what you will... :)
Marc 1
April 29th, 2009, 08:56 PM
And what do you understand Marc 1? Do you know the origin of the term "Low Intensity Warfare"? It was introduced in the USA as a budgetary requirement so conventional forces allocation will not have funds syphoned off to SOF units. So SOFs have their own allocations, because they also said that some equipment are secret and can not be disclosed except to closed hearing of the Select Arms Committee due to threat to national security.
Low intensity warfare is where the observed enemy activity is reduced in density due to a variety of reasons, not the least political, or terrain, or....(continue with long list). As we can see in Afghanistan an estimated 10,000 Taliban fighters, essentially a light infantry division, is causing a lot of worry to NATO, an organisation set up to oppose the Soviet Army. This is not "low intensity warfare", but higher difficulty target acquisition warfare, that's all. The bullets are same. The tactics are same. You know it....patrolling is same regardless of it being Mao Mao, or Viet Cong, or Soviet Army, or IRA, or illegal Mexican border runners, etc. Its the same in the arid terrain of Israel, in the jungle of East Timor, in the fields of Ireland, in the mountains of Kashmir, in the cities of Iraq, etc.
At section and platoon level in any case. And when the target is found, guess what, it gets very intense for a while.
The LIC is NEVER applied to MOST of the Australian troops that are deployed now, which are the SAS, the Incidence Response and the Commando regiments. Taking out an NVA division commander is only different to taking out a Taliban province commander in the type of terrain the op happens in. The op is always intense. Conducting an ambush on a weapons caravan is always intense. Attempting to take Taliban prisoner in a surprise raid is always intensive.
So you are saying that the ADF will never be called upon to engage in conventional warfare? So I guess the Abrams crews will only be issued with the HE ammunition?
Most regional armies have equipped their infantry with vehicles that mount a variety of auto-cannons and ATGWs that can punch holes through both sides of the Bushmaster, and the M113 for that matter, though not the AS3/4 (perhaps) . This includes the Indonesian Army's BMP-2s, 3s and AMX-10Ps. I don't know if the upgraded ADF M113s are to be issued with the SLAP rounds for their .50 cal HMGs, but they would be useful.
No, what I am saying is that you can employ some of our vehicles in Afghanistan because this is not considered a high intensity conflict. The armour the Bushmaster is equipped with can no doubt be penetrated by BMP 2's, AMX 10's etc, but tell me, how many MICV's do the taleban operate? The greatest threat to the Bushie is an RPG or IED. These weapons are characteristic of a low intensity conflict. Our diggers do not face sustained artillery bombardment from 130mm guns, or have to face taleban MBT's. It would not surprise me at all that the Leo 2's in country with other forces have bugger all APDS rounds, mostly they would have HESH, HE, or canister rounds (if any of these were available). Again the loadout would fit the type of target and conflict. I'm damned sure the exchanges that occur on a battlefield level are lethal and intense to the participants. But so is a shootout between the Chicago PD SWAT team and a drug gang in a crackhouse in say downtown Chicargo - that does not make Chicago a High Intensity conflict.
Its also crap to say that the tactics are the same. In a high intensity scenario, such as the fabled soviets through the Fulda gap, do you seriously expect light skinned patrol vehicles to be utilised as one of the main means of inflicting casualties on an enemy? This war has all the hallmarks of LIC, no defined front line, an enemy that can blend in with the population. The enemy will concentrate, strike then withdraw rather than try and engage in a protracted battle (they have tried that a number of times and have come off second best.) To the best of my knowledge, there is no such classification as "higher Difficult Target Acquisition Warfare". What do you base your military knowledge on? Where were you trained?
FutureTank
April 29th, 2009, 11:28 PM
Definition of a threat is intent + capability. Intent is easily changed, capability is not.
In-service capabilities ARE a massive component of ANY threat.
Yes, but that is not what you said. Identified threats are rarely a part of Minister's public speech. You listed capabilities.
Army hasn't maintained 4x rifle coy's per battalion for a LONG time and even then you ARE forgetting Support and Admin Coy's, which each regular battalion maintains...
If you look at various deployments, you will more often see references to something called "Company Group" not "Infantry Company". This means that we are counting differently. You count the Companies by their deployed COs, and I count them "by barrels". Of course the CSS personnel are also armed.
But please continue "enlightening" us...
Timor - Op Astute: 2x rifle companies, plus an Admin Coy - 5RAR.
Afghanistan Op Slipper: 1x Rifle Coy from 7RAR, 1x Commando Coy from 4RAR (Cdo).
Solomans: Op Anode: 1x rifle coy from 5/7 - 8/7 Royal Victoria Regt.
Iraq: Op Kruger: 1x Rifle Coy minus from 5RAR.
Hence we have 1RAR, 2RAR, 3RAR, 6RAR and the first Coy of 8/9RAR with NO rifle Coy Groups deployed whatsoever.
7RAR has only 1 Coy group deployed.
4RAR has only 1 out of 3 Commando Coy's deployed.
Artillery has a troop of 14x diggers seconded to the British Arm and a Coy group formed from 16 AD Regt.
Want to count them out on your fingers, again and see if we could deploy more than Timor levels?
See above. The usual practice, with notable few exceptions, has been to deploy a two-platoon company group with attached sections from battalion's support (couple of GPMGs) and admin companies. For example I think East Timor was the first time since Vietnam when the battalion mortars were taken along as part of the Support Company. In a sense the ADF battalions are four-company battalions, with the support company usually serving as infantrymen.
No. They are running IET courses in the battalions, because Singleton's capacity is maxed out, course in course out. If you actually spoke with real soldiers, you would HEAR the stories of bottlenecks in the training program, digs WAITING to get on courses.
So far 3, 5/7 and 1RAR have run their own IET courses, because Singleton based courses are FULL of new infantry recruits.
I wasn't aware that regular Army battalions are inducting school leavers. This is supposed to be a plus in the ADF capability for conducting a war?
As for RAAF/RAN lift, I'm not quite sure what you are comparing their lift levels too? Timor or when?
Certainly ADF lift capacity has improved enormously since 2000....
Has it? You mean the C-17s. However, how many regional possible combat areas can take a C-17?
As I see is a capability for conducting war by the ADF in our region requires an ability to lift at least one Infantry Brigade (+), not the 1st.
What if. Try looking at the underlying causes of such conflict before making such ridiculous statements. As for Bushmaster, it WAS deployed to Timor and once again, performed superbly.
Causes change.
In East Timor the Bushmasters stayed on the roads. The roads in East Timor were apparently as bad as the terrain in the areas where they were tested in Australia. The Bushmaster is the ADF's version of the British Army's Saxon.
You don't know what you are talking about quite clearly. The original HNA plan was for Bushmaster to supplement M113AS3/4 in 5/7RAR.
You always assume to know what I don't know. The reality is though that the vast majority of armoured vehicles that will be used in future by the Infantry Corps of the ADF will be the Bushmasters.
Then ELF came along and delinked 5/7 into the 2 battalions. In addition to this, an additional 81x M113AS3/4's have been ordered, as you no doubt know, however the Bushmaster is not being employed within these battalions now. Soley M113AS3/4.
The Bushmaster is being issued to 1 Brigade units that would traditionally be equipped with nothing better than B vehicles, along with the originally planned for "motorised brigade" 7 Brigade and the aforementioned B Sqn 3/4 Cav.
Yes, and? I don't know how the 81x M113AS3/4's are to be used (maybe delivered in the Bulldog-type upgrade?), but nothing had changed in therms of the "motorised brigade" concept since the Bushmaster is a truck with minimal armour by infantry combat vehicle standards. Its better than nothing, but its not something to go to a real war in.
We don't and nor do we operate our M113s in this fashion. One might as well employ them from soft skin trucks if this is going to be your conops...
Didn't say ADF operated M113s as designed. I'm just saying that that is what the design philosophy was. Its about time the infantry had a vehicle it didn't have to adopt its doctrine to.
The M113AS3/4 is being built to a cost capped budget. However it's specification is akin to an interim status with respect to the deployability of the vehicles.
Armour upgrades, plus additional belly armour and " anti-RPG mesh screens" are intended for the vehicles, should a deployment to an AO such as Afghanistan be contemplated.
DMO has confirmed that such options have been scoped and engineering work done on them. What remains absent is the funding, as with ASLAVs, before Iraq, to actually buy the kit.
The vehicles would much more closely match the protection offered by the Israeli packages, under such circumstances.
I think we both know that the M113 should have been replaced in the 1990s. now we are getting 81 more of the "interim" vehicles until when? 2015-20?
For a Ministry that is always talking about the future, we sure are short of capabilities that would have been apparent in the last budget.
Not at all. However they don't try and achieve all these capabilities with a regular force of only 8 infantry battalions and an amphibious force of 3 ships in total...
What Sea Lion, Army's amphibious doctrine and other activities are attempting to do is develop the basis from which an amphibious force could develop and subsequently operate.
Army and RAN proved they could deploy a mechanised unit by amphibious means on operations during Interfet itself, with 5/7RAR.
Amphibious operations are at the end of the day, are simply an insertion method. Your arguments about "lack of air cover" etc apply equally to the land force under ANY type of deployment.
The only problem is that amphibious insertion is the only method available to the ADF where there are not commercial port facilities available. In a war situation these facilities are likely to be protected by the opponent, and how many are there in the region? This is besides the very predictable point of arrival that puts the TF at risk en-route. And yet the ADF has never had this capability, and INTERFET deployment represents the entire extent of such capabilities, and that only with the offloading area being secured by previously air delivered 3RAR troops.
What? Can we only deploy one vessel?
FYI, ESSM has a range in excess of 50k's.
SM-2 Block IIIA (what the FFG's will have - AWD will have an improved variant) has a publicly declared range in excess of 185k's.
No, I allowed two vessels deployed on either coast.
"will have"...
So what? Do you think that SAM missiles are EVER fired from tracked vehicles bouncing around off -road at high speed?
No, but they are not fired from vehicles that are limited to roads in a combined arms force.
In any case, the Land Rover AD variant is an interim vehicle, the same as the Perentie 6x6 vehicle was for the infantry battalions at Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera.
Interim....thats like M113AS3/4s....
Remember the last Leopard 1 interim upgrade and how long it took to get Abrams after it?
It provides excellent deployability, excellent mobility, for it's needs, which are NOT close combat with an entrenched enemy force.
I have no doubt the "protected vehicle" acquired under LAND 125 will replace the 16 AD vehicle fleet in due course.
If it comes to using AD, it is likely going to be something other than "LIC" environment, so either the ADF will be requiring excellent mobility, or the enemy forces. In either case I would not want supporting AD on Perentie.
Replacement and supplementing of both capabilities is long overdue. It seems offensive artillery in the Army is close to finally being brought to a modern standard, here's hoping Government sees fit to fund a similarly capable project for AD under the White Paper.
Amen. It seems to me that at least the 1st Brigade should be composed of vehicles with same protection and mobility capabilities across combat and combat support arms and services. This to me means at least a Troop of tracked self propelled and armoured AD platforms.
No I haven't. Please enlighten me...
What I have heard about, in relation to Army mortar projects, is in relation to the ARES Artillery units, they are NOT equipped with 120mm mortars.
They are equipped with 81mm mortars, the same as issued to the infantry battalions (F2 81mm mortar).
A proposal for 120mm mortars in the last 10 years for Army was the "motorised 120mm mortar" project, however that was dropped in 2004 in favour of a new tank capability.
The only other "new" mortar project for Army is it's "Long Ranged Mortar" project, MINCS(l) AMP 48.36 which again, was not a 120mm based solution, but rather a replacement 81mm solution.
So, you can see, I try and keep up with Army, but I don't quite manage everything...
The suggestion is to use 120mm mortars in the reserve brigades in place of the artillery units. These are judged to be more deployable, and require fewer personnel as there is a considerable shortage in gunners across the Army.
Well let's see. You have criticised ADF for not being able to deploy a Tiger helo to Afghanistan.
France, which has purchased MORE Tiger helos than us, has trained MORE pilots and has been developing the Tiger for LONGER than us, cannot yet provide a deployable Tiger capability.
Yeah, how is this relevant?
Ah, perhaps because the aircraft is NOT YET sufficiently mature, to deploy operationally?
Furthermore, it isn't simply a matter of helos and pilots/battle captains. You need more crews than helos (which we don't currently have) to deploy, you need the maintainers, you need spares, you need the time to develop your operational tactics and conduct collective, as opposed to individual training activities.
1 Aviation Regt is currently introducing a brand new helo which has not yet achieved IOC in Australia, or indeed in ANY other Country.
We need time to train pilots/battle captains/maintainers in how to operate the things, yes, but they then need to consolidate the capability, undertake mission rehearsal exercises etc. They need to build up a capability to employ the helo within the existing combined arms team formations we currently undertake and actually practice deploying the helo, as a capability (ie: a package of helos, plus supporting elements to conduct operations - say from Darwin to Shoalwater bay, for 4x helos and support)
It is here where you begin to learn what the problems are going to be. How many sorties can the aircraft generate, with the level of support available? Is the level of support we THINK is going to suffice, going to be enough? How can we best employ the Tiger?
All of this takes years. Just training enough pilots is only the beginning of the capability and we haven't even reached that point yet.
AD, we are at war. It has been years. You think there should be some urgency imparted into the training and acceptance process?
I said 8 pilots and support crews, so at least two helicopters can be operated during the hours of darkness in support of ADF personnel in Afghanistan.
I don't care what France does with their helicopters.
Agreed, but the fact is, our program is actually ahead of the French and German projects in some aspects. We have had to slow our program down somewhat because of this.
Type certification for the aircraft can't happen in Australia, until it's completed in France and there have been training delays on top of this, because the contractor hasn't delivered what was promised in terms of simulator capability etc.
And this is the point I have been making all along. The capability to go to war goes beyond having a loaded weapon. We can't actually use the weapons we bought because of external factors. This is not satisfactory.
1. RAAF doesn't maintain a 2.75 inch rocket capability.
2. Australian RoE's will never authorise the use of a combat aircraft without a targetting pod capability.
3. EVERY target in Afghanistan is requiring precision guided munitions. Abe can no doubt chip in hear, if he is so inclined, but there is a SIGNIFICANT requirement for combat aircraft to employ munitions within "dangerous" (to blue forces) ranges in Afghanistan.
4. RAAF does NOT think it is a light attack fighter. It's 30mm cannon is only employed for gunnery training and it's "light bombs" are BDU-33's, which don't even possess an explosive charge, just a marking charge. If you want a little puff of smoke employed onto enemy forces, than this is the right aircraft, I guess....
Maybe it should maintain that rocket 'capability'
I'm fairly confident that a targeting pod can be used on a Hawk. Alternatively the pilots can learn how to fire unguided rockets with some precision :) Its one of those combat pilot skill sets thingy....
What, the RAAF requests the Army personnel to stand back a few kilometres because they are not used to firing weapons at empty ranges? Give me a break. They are listed as light attack on an RAAF site. Lots of air forces, including the RAF used and continue use them in this role. Weapons are used as required, not as designed. IMHO Hawks happen to be more suitable for use in Afghanistan than the F/A-18s.
No, the Hawks are used to ONLY train pilots who will fly F/A-18s. They WERE used to train pilots who USED to go on to fly F/A-18s and F-111s, but the last F-111 course flew in 2007 and the Hawks are now soley used for would-be F/A-18 pilots, 76 and 79 Sqn instructors and the odd maritime and GBAD defence training.
The cockpit of the Mk 127 has been designed to replicate the F/A-18 Hornet cockpit as closely as possible. What does that tell you?
It tells me that you can't l;earn to fly an F/A-18 until you actually fly in one. This is why there are 18 F/A-18Bs in the RAAF.
Australia's Hornets airframes will be entirely knackered by the time we are finished with them. FLEI is the measurement of the fatigue time left in the airframe and there is little left now. By 2018 there will be bugger all left...
Some spare parts, engines etc will be all that is useful in them. The airframes themselves will be shot ducks...
Wonderful news!!!! That means that Boeing can keep that support line going for a while longer.
I don't live by the Internet alone either. DMO HAVE confirmed that options to further upgrade the M113 HAVE been studied. If they are going to be deployed, they will be enhanced... If, but the hope is that not.
The USA is pumping an extra 4x Brigades into Afghanistan at present.
That doesn't point to a nation on the verge of withdrawing...
Are you referring to the recent announcement for 17,000 troops? That's two brigades, one Marines and one Stryker, the rest being support personnel of various descriptions. There is a 'desire' by the USMC to deploy a division of 20,000 to Afghanistan, but that is yet to be concluded as a measure.
I think one brigade from 10th Mountain Division was scheduled to rotate and another, aviation, was approved before Obama was elected.
However, that is not really an issue. Even if there were four NEW brigades being deployed, it signals only one thing to me, and that is a desire to end the war in Afghanistan as soon as possible. AFAIC ASAP does not mean in three years. What is more I see more US and NATO combat troops being sent to Afghanistan as the US withdraws from Iraq because quite simply the Pakistan border has to be closed before the Afghan Government and its security forces can come to grips with internal issues. What happens after that, I am not brave enough to forecast. It largely depends on whether Pakistan slides into an Islamic state or not.
FutureTank
April 29th, 2009, 11:43 PM
Err.... good one. Do you even understand that warfare is divided into different clasifications depending on the type of conflict expected. There is a world of difference between forces configured to fight a high intensity conflict such as the classical Russian forces streaming through the Fulda gap into Germany, and a few paddies taking pot shots with semi or even full automativc weapons and the odd explosive device.
The Bushmaster has had IED's detonated underneath them on many occasions in Afghanistan and Iraq yet I believe not one occupant has lost their life in one. Given the level of threat, what more do you want?
Does the ADF have a capability for a high intensity conflict?
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 12:01 AM
No, what I am saying is that you can employ some of our vehicles in Afghanistan because this is not considered a high intensity conflict. The armour the Bushmaster is equipped with can no doubt be penetrated by BMP 2's, AMX 10's etc, but tell me, how many MICV's do the taleban operate? The greatest threat to the Bushie is an RPG or IED. These weapons are characteristic of a low intensity conflict. Our diggers do not face sustained artillery bombardment from 130mm guns, or have to face taleban MBT's. It would not surprise me at all that the Leo 2's in country with other forces have bugger all APDS rounds, mostly they would have HESH, HE, or canister rounds (if any of these were available). Again the loadout would fit the type of target and conflict. I'm damned sure the exchanges that occur on a battlefield level are lethal and intense to the participants. But so is a shootout between the Chicago PD SWAT team and a drug gang in a crackhouse in say downtown Chicargo - that does not make Chicago a High Intensity conflict.
Its also crap to say that the tactics are the same. In a high intensity scenario, such as the fabled soviets through the Fulda gap, do you seriously expect light skinned patrol vehicles to be utilised as one of the main means of inflicting casualties on an enemy? This war has all the hallmarks of LIC, no defined front line, an enemy that can blend in with the population. The enemy will concentrate, strike then withdraw rather than try and engage in a protracted battle (they have tried that a number of times and have come off second best.) To the best of my knowledge, there is no such classification as "higher Difficult Target Acquisition Warfare". What do you base your military knowledge on? Where were you trained?
And when was the "low intensity conflict" invented? :)
Are we going to wait until Taliban get hold of 23mm cannons with AP rounds? If Hamas can get hold of ATGWs, I'm sure Taliban can also. Can those be suppressed with a 7.62mm machine gun?
As I said before, if the ADF's ONLY capability is for a "low intensity conflict" well and good. However, it seems to me that other armed forces in the region have other ideas.
What is the basis of your military knowledge? Where you trained to think that low intensity conflicts go one until the good guys win? Eight years on, and NATO is worried about "not winning" in Afghanistan, so I think its fare to say that their military knowledge and training are no longer relevant, so why is mine? Which is not the subject of this thread.
National armed forces of a state such as Australia are supposed to have a range of capabilities if and when they are called up, including in a conflict with other states. Does the ADF possess such capabilities?
All we have established so far is that it will...in future. I have been looking at this "future" for 30 years, and all I see is no future.
Marc 1
April 30th, 2009, 12:07 AM
Does the ADF have a capability for a high intensity conflict?
If you are talking Fulda Gap level stuff, Not on our own. Our Abrams could help to supplement another nations forces, depending on the type of warfare towed artillery probably wouldn't cut it, if we are talking mechanised combined arms team nup, we lack MICV's, engineers under armour, SP artillery. Our army aviation assets are getting there too.
Medium intensity we would fare much better, but again we have capability holes. Its all a matter of spending - I'm sure Chief of Army would like to have a couple of regiments of tanks, state of the art SPG's regiments and 5 battalions of Mech inf in state of the art MICV's but the defence budget priority hasn't gone that way.
Wooki
April 30th, 2009, 12:43 AM
Building armoured vehicles in a low-rate production scenario does not require either a highly developed general automotive industry, nor a militarised one.
Correct; Because you are going to have to import all of your talent and create a new industry from scratch with a very small customer who (from an outsider's perspective) can't seem to see their way to supporting expanded production of the Bushmaster IMV.
I presume by Armored Vehicle production you mean a main battle tank, right?
There are people in Australia who could pull it off, but they all have well paid jobs working for somebody else, ergo: you are never going to be able to hire them all away to create the base low rate production team, you speak of.
Why? Because you can't guarantee them job security.
Why? Because your plan is to create a tank that your customer (presumably the Commonwealth of Australia) doesn't need (they have tanks already thanks very much).
The closest thing you could come to is actually creating a boutique shop that provides enhancements to armored vehicles, not unlike the Ruag model in Switzerland.
e.g. you would have to sell the Army on things like, I dunno: the idea of replacing their zeroed in small caliber 120mm gun with a bigger, better 55 caliber version like on the leo 2, and oh, you've figured out the extra weight problem that burns out the elevation mechanisms when you place the longer gun on the existing trunions. Things like that.
Now something that might appeal to the Australian Army is a smaller, easier to maintain and more efficient powerpack that could be used across multiple platforms; oh and its Army green too. But that makes you an engine manufacturer, so now you are competing with people like Caterpiller and shucks, the key guy from their military power-plants division doesn't want to leave his job to come to your company, because he knows his protege, Fat Freddy (whom he has been grooming for 5 years) will seriously kick your butt in any RFP put out by Defense, once you have convinced them that your engine idea is the way to go.
Why is Fat Freddy going to kick your butt? Because you don't have capacity. e.g. Navistar and Force protection making MRAPS and interestingly enough Navistar are full of Fat Freddys.
I hope that explains some of the minutiae that make your proposal unlikely. It's always those damned details, eh? Get you everytime.:D
cheers
w
Marc 1
April 30th, 2009, 12:47 AM
And when was the "low intensity conflict" invented? :)
Ask Sun Tzu - I think he established the principles.
[QUOTE=FutureTank;173532] Are we going to wait until Taliban get hold of 23mm cannons with AP rounds? If Hamas can get hold of ATGWs, I'm sure Taliban can also. Can those be suppressed with a 7.62mm machine gun?
Yes. ATGW's that the taleban is likely to use are normally SACLOS, you disrupt (supress) the firer and he cannot guide the missile. Any decent ATGW could go through a CV90 like butter - so it wouldn't really matter what you were in. 23mm AP rounds? Fit applique armour to the bushies/and or replace them with something more heavily armoured like a proper MICV. A COTS purchase could see MICV's introduced pretty damn quickly if need be. Flexibility is one of the (10?) Principles of War.
The weapons you are describing tend to be large and not well suited to the type of mobile warfare being conducted by the taleban. Chances are the UAV's, SF OP's or Choppers accompanying any deployment outside the wire would spot them before they had a chance to engage, or destroy them after they had fired. Threat eliminated albeit at the cost of own force casualties.
As I said before, if the ADF's ONLY capability is for a "low intensity conflict" well and good. However, it seems to me that other armed forces in the region have other ideas.
What is the basis of your military knowledge? Where you trained to think that low intensity conflicts go one until the good guys win? Eight years on, and NATO is worried about "not winning" in Afghanistan, so I think its fare to say that their military knowledge and training are no longer relevant, so why is mine? Which is not the subject of this thread.
No, your knowledge level isn't the subect of this thread, but my 18 months of training at RMC and 6 years in the ARA make me slightly more capable of judging the type of conflict Afghanistan is than whatever it was that you omitted to mention.
Low intensity conflicts have been won in the past (Malayan campaign) and can be won in the future. The problem is politicians lack the will to sustain the level of engagement to ensure this outcome. It has nothing to do with the military personnel. When GWB went into Iraq the second time the Joint Chiefs asked for half a million men which would have meant that essentially the entire military was committed on a war footing. Donald Rumsfeld over ruled them and went the 'economy' option which as was proven was fine to win the initial battle but insufficient to secure the peace. There was not sufficient troops on the ground to ensure the borders were secured, or to maintain internal control.
Afghanistan is winnable, but you'd need to see a commitment of at least 20 years, three times the deployed forces, and significant rebuilding of the country for this to happen. In this time the death toll will be huge, because of the number of 'targets' in country for the taleban to engage, and the allied forces need to change their modus operandi - out of the armoured vehicles and choppers and on foot among the population. BUT as the populations confidence grows that the allied forces are indeed there for the long term, the Afghani's will start to point out the enemy forces so they can be eliminated. At the moment, the locals dare not report what they see because if the NATO troops leave next week, they will be strung up by the taleban for betraying them.
The war is winnable, the politicians lose it, they forget the first principle of war: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.
National armed forces of a state such as Australia are supposed to have a range of capabilities if and when they are called up, including in a conflict with other states. Does the ADF possess such capabilities?
No/ depends on which state. We could repel an attack from Naru pretty well. That would be because our emphasis (political) was as a self defence force with the doctrine being shoot them down/torpedo them in the moat to our north. But, we have been trying to become a much more deployable balanced force in the years since, but neglect takes time to fix.
All we have established so far is that it will...in future. I have been looking at this "future" for 30 years, and all I see is no future.
I'm encouraged. The ADF's transformation under the Hardened Networked Army is happening - just not overnight.
Now, as I've answered you question on qualifications to speak on this subject, please do me the curtesy of answering my question.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 12:55 AM
Rubbish. China already fields early 4th gen fighters. J-10, Su-27SK, Su-30MKK?
Unlike you, I have not been lucky enough to have flown in them :)
The Su-27SK & Su-30MKK are export versions of the Russian aircraft, and even those we are not sure about. The J-10 is a mongrel, and Chinese excel in 'borrowing' from others, but in this case the sum of all parts may not equal to a 4th generation whole.
Actually, the Backfire is out of production, as is the Tu-142, and the maritime Su-34 variant is likely to be quiet a whiles away. So literally nobody makes the plane you're asking for. Are you suggesting that Australia develop a long range maritime strike fighter from scratch?
When you say "from scratch", does that mean a project manager walks into an office and scratches his head as he says " I wonder how many chairs and tables we'll need for this"?
First set up a research project within the DSTO. Then set up project university collaboration infrastructure. Then expand the research infrastructure to the design stage with industry participation. With a completed design, conduct development and testing within the RAAF facilities. Refine and complete design. Commence production. Doesn't matter if it takes two decades to build the first production aircraft as it did with the F-35. It doesn't matter if by that stage Australia will only be able to afford a single squadron, or even half a squadron. It will have been an investment in enriching Australia's collective aviation technology knowledge base contributing to hundreds of project managers, engineers, technicians, etc. It will have produced a capability that Australia needs given its strategic position on the globe. Just maybe it will have produced other innovations along the way that will find use in civil aviation to earn revenue for continuation of the project like the CSIRO mobile technology.
And its not that hard even with existing technology. Take an F-35, and redesign it with two engines, and you will get an F-22 make-do-with. Add larger engines and more on-board fuel, and you get a long range fighter/strike aircraft. Yes, I know its not that simple, but we have technology now that was not available in 1980s, or even 1990s. Computer modelling can, and has achieved spectacular progress in engineering design. And Australia doesn't have to do it alone. Partner with all the countries that have asked for and will not get the F-22. Partner with other countries that may want a long range maritime strike aircraft. Japan, Israel, even dare I say the USA? EU might be interested.
Actually 600 and 900 are tiny production runs. The BMP-3 for example (which has yet to see induction in large numbers for our armed forces) has already well over a thousand orders (close 1500) and is nowhere near the end of the production run. They're only now starting to receive some major domestic orders.
The production run for the Bradley is in the thousands. You're envisioning a project for a full IFV with a production run of arond 600? Why not just buy an existing platform, which will cost less per unit, and cost nothing in development costs?
But development is exactly what I want for Australia. Development is a cost, but also has significant benefits. The price we pay to others is for them sharing their products with us, but not their KNOWLEDGE! That, in the information age, is more expensive. And right now is the time to gain this knowledge because there are going to be significant changes in armoured vehicle designs as designers try to find alternatives to reliance on existing engine technologies.
EDIT: Just a heads up, from what I found the Bushmaster currently has 737 delivered to the ADF, 15 Fire King firefighting variants, 58 ordered by the Netherlands and 24 for the UK. That makes for a total of 834 with potential additional orders from Spain. I.e. even with some modest export success, the Bushmaster has not managed to make it big time in the international market. You propose a larger and riskier investment, in something radically new and unlikely to receive a domestic order even as large as the Bushmasters?
Which part of the liberal economic theory applies to national security?! Who says it has to be profitable? The Bradley has not been exported (yet) and will never be profitable given the amounts spent on its development alone. Marder was never exported either.
Had Australia started a project to design and build a replacement to the M113 when it was supposed to (1980s), low rate production would have replaced all of them by now, and then some. However, it is probably for the best that this was not done because factors that were not evident in AFV design are evident now.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 01:12 AM
Future Tank, there is nothing I would like to see more than a decent weapons manufacturing industry, designing and building world class designs for our own forces and exported to the world.
Two things conspire against that though, the fact that programs not one tenth as complicated as the ones you propose are running behind schedule, massively over budget or even cancelled at massive cost. Remember we exist in a democracy where the government has to be accountable for the decisions it makes. Given recent procurement disasters, the press would be all over any government that announced something this ambitious - particularly these days in an era of ballooning deficits (although, ironically a decision to bolster our defence force by building indigenously could maybe be seen as a viable stimulus project).
The second reason is simply cost and our defence budget. If 11 Seasprites were to cost over a billion dollars (and that was an existing airframe), what would the from scratch development of a state of the art airlifter cost?
And that is where I started. In the first place we have to sort out accountability in decision-making and project management within the Ministry.
People in high places have to understand that failure is not a way to transfer to another project with full superannuation retirement entitlement. A billion of wasted tax dollars is no different from where I'm sitting than a billion stolen from the Treasury. Instead of asking the ADF to find extra cash within its organisational budgets, look at all the crap going on in the Ministry.
And yes, a national armed force must have a range of capabilities, including fighting a war with other states. And, such a capability requires an underlying defence support industrial base. Given Australia can be blockaded from current suppliers, in theory, and who knows in 20 years time, it is essential that such a base exists domestically. You think its a problem that I want Australia to be a technologically advanced, industrially productive country? These are the benefits of defence industry.
If you are not sure, check out the economic history of the United States. It was a net industrial IMPORTER until 1941.
Japan went to war in 1933 after COPYING everything Europe produced for 60 years. In the news reels of the time it was not called just the Japanese Empire, but the Japanese industrial Empire.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 01:33 AM
The "Quick Change Barrel" variant of the M2 12.7mm machine guns we operate has been equipped with an undisclosed "improved range" of ammunition.
Make of this what you will... :)
I'd change the barrel to er...25mm :D
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 01:43 AM
If you are talking Fulda Gap level stuff, Not on our own. Our Abrams could help to supplement another nations forces, depending on the type of warfare towed artillery probably wouldn't cut it, if we are talking mechanised combined arms team nup, we lack MICV's, engineers under armour, SP artillery. Our army aviation assets are getting there too.
Medium intensity we would fare much better, but again we have capability holes. Its all a matter of spending - I'm sure Chief of Army would like to have a couple of regiments of tanks, state of the art SPG's regiments and 5 battalions of Mech inf in state of the art MICV's but the defence budget priority hasn't gone that way.
I'm not talking "Fulda Gap" scenario, but it seems to me the Australian Army should have a range of capabilities that extend to, and include conduct of combat in what amounts to armoured warfare. I'm using "armoured" here in the way it is used in the British Army to designate battalions mounted in Warrior ICVs. How this is done is academic because the choice to fight in in such a combat environment may not always be up to the Army to make.
I think it is cheaper to make than to buy in the long run, if only because one has greater budgetary control, and long term industrial support for the so equipped forces. Ultimately in all likelihood some systems for the Australian ICV would probably be bought elsewhere, but I'd want at least an 80% Australian built content of the finished product, and particularly the stuff that breaks the most, all of the chassis assemblies, the engine, all gunnery mechanicals, most of the optics.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 01:56 AM
The greatest threat to the Bushie is an RPG or IED. These weapons are characteristic of a low intensity conflict.
This war has all the hallmarks of LIC, no defined front line, an enemy that can blend in with the population.
Marc 1, the Bushmaster was not designed for "this war". I think the first production vehicle was accepted for testing by the Army in mid-90s, wasn't it? That's before 9/11. So what kind of war/doctrine was it designed for? Or was this based on input form the ADF's famed 12th Crystal Ball company? :rolleyes:
As AD pointed out, it was designed to supplement the M113s for use in Australia, and limited duties in peace-keeping operations. All of a sudden it had become the main type of armoured vehicle operated by the Australian Army. What, the old policy got lost in the Canberra archives? :confused:
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 02:26 AM
Correct; Because you are going to have to import all of your talent and create a new industry from scratch with a very small customer who (from an outsider's perspective) can't seem to see their way to supporting expanded production of the Bushmaster IMV.
I presume by Armored Vehicle production you mean a main battle tank, right?
There are people in Australia who could pull it off, but they all have well paid jobs working for somebody else, ergo: you are never going to be able to hire them all away to create the base low rate production team, you speak of.
Why? Because you can't guarantee them job security.
Why? Because your plan is to create a tank that your customer (presumably the Commonwealth of Australia) doesn't need (they have tanks already thanks very much).
The closest thing you could come to is actually creating a boutique shop that provides enhancements to armored vehicles, not unlike the Ruag model in Switzerland.
e.g. you would have to sell the Army on things like, I dunno: the idea of replacing their zeroed in small caliber 120mm gun with a bigger, better 55 caliber version like on the leo 2, and oh, you've figured out the extra weight problem that burns out the elevation mechanisms when you place the longer gun on the existing trunions. Things like that.
Now something that might appeal to the Australian Army is a smaller, easier to maintain and more efficient powerpack that could be used across multiple platforms; oh and its Army green too. But that makes you an engine manufacturer, so now you are competing with people like Caterpiller and shucks, the key guy from their military power-plants division doesn't want to leave his job to come to your company, because he knows his protege, Fat Freddy (whom he has been grooming for 5 years) will seriously kick your butt in any RFP put out by Defense, once you have convinced them that your engine idea is the way to go.
Why is Fat Freddy going to kick your butt? Because you don't have capacity. e.g. Navistar and Force protection making MRAPS and interestingly enough Navistar are full of Fat Freddys.
I hope that explains some of the minutiae that make your proposal unlikely. It's always those damned details, eh? Get you everytime.:D
cheers
w
But I wasn't talking about a tank....at least not a heavy tank like the Abrams
And there are a lot of people capable of contributing to such a project in Australia, so no imported talent would be required...nor do they have to quit their jobs :) (note, we are currently a net exporter of talent)
And given the design will be for a production of something the Army really wants rather than trying to find best match on the open market, there wouldn't be an RFP...
And the engine manufacturer can build engines that are also used in commercial vehicles like...trucks. There are trucks in Australia....about 400,000 of them, and about 30,000 of them are rated for 40t+, which is good enough for an AFV family suitable for the Army. How does a production facility for 30,000 engines sound? Low rate production also, initially. It can be linked to a national environmental standard requirement, so over time, say a decade, all commercial trucks would need to change their engine...to a domestic one :) Australians love to tinker with their engines, and none more than the truckies :)
And because it would be a low rate production, it will mean that by the time production is ended, its time to start first series of rebuilds/upgrades, just like the Sydney Harbour Bridge painting...so there is job security.
I hope that explains some of the minutiae that make your counter-proposal unlikely. It's always those damned details, eh? Get you every time. :D
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 03:30 AM
And when was the "low intensity conflict" invented? :)
Ask Sun Tzu - I think he established the principles.[/QUOTE]
Nope, the Pentagon established that type of conflict.
Yes. ATGW's that the taleban is likely to use are normally SACLOS, you disrupt (supress) the firer and he cannot guide the missile. Any decent ATGW could go through a CV90 like butter - so it wouldn't really matter what you were in. 23mm AP rounds? Fit applique armour to the bushies/and or replace them with something more heavily armoured like a proper MICV. A COTS purchase could see MICV's introduced pretty damn quickly if need be. Flexibility is one of the (10?) Principles of War.
Nope, I dare you to hit a firing position of an ATGW from a moving Bushmaster at 2,000m with a 7.62mm MG.
I don't know if they envisaged adding anything to the Bushmaster when it was being designed in the 90s. Still, everything is possible. This is engineering flexibility you are talking about, and not Principles of War, and engine, transmission and suspension load ratings are less flexible than an infantry platoon :)
The weapons you are describing tend to be large and not well suited to the type of mobile warfare being conducted by the taleban. Chances are the UAV's, SF OP's or Choppers accompanying any deployment outside the wire would spot them before they had a chance to engage, or destroy them after they had fired. Threat eliminated albeit at the cost of own force casualties.
They were used against the Soviet Army, and you only need one round, which is not impossible with today's commercially available optics. Spotting a well camouflaged sniper armed with a 23mm cannon is harder than one may imagine.
No, your knowledge level isn't the subect of this thread, but my 18 months of training at RMC and 6 years in the ARA make me slightly more capable of judging the type of conflict Afghanistan is than whatever it was that you omitted to mention.
I have never questioned anyone's knowledge level, only their ideas...which as you are probably aware can come from the most unlikely source.
Low intensity conflicts have been won in the past (Malayan campaign) and can be won in the future. The problem is politicians lack the will to sustain the level of engagement to ensure this outcome. It has nothing to do with the military personnel. When GWB went into Iraq the second time the Joint Chiefs asked for half a million men which would have meant that essentially the entire military was committed on a war footing. Donald Rumsfeld over ruled them and went the 'economy' option which as was proven was fine to win the initial battle but insufficient to secure the peace. There was not sufficient troops on the ground to ensure the borders were secured, or to maintain internal control.
Wars are a national engagement, not just that of its armed forces. This is why my argument is based as much on industrial policy as it is on a defence one. Such a policy is more likely to be supported in the long term by different parties, and therefore offers a greater measure of predictability and sustainability for defence planners also.
Afghanistan is winnable, but you'd need to see a commitment of at least 20 years, three times the deployed forces, and significant rebuilding of the country for this to happen. In this time the death toll will be huge, because of the number of 'targets' in country for the taleban to engage, and the allied forces need to change their modus operandi - out of the armoured vehicles and choppers and on foot among the population. BUT as the populations confidence grows that the allied forces are indeed there for the long term, the Afghani's will start to point out the enemy forces so they can be eliminated. At the moment, the locals dare not report what they see because if the NATO troops leave next week, they will be strung up by the taleban for betraying them.
The war is winnable, the politicians lose it, they forget the first principle of war: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.
Its not winnable. The aim is to destroy the Taliban, and with it Al Qaeda, but the Taliban represent the idea state in Islamic understanding, and Al Qaeda represent what a Muslim should do to free themselves of the Western influence.
20 years! In 20 years you will have the Afghanistan Liberation Organisation, and Bin Ladin will be its "Arafat".
And who will prevent Taliban from returning after the last NATO soldier departs? Eventually reindoctrination and corruption will set in. You are not dealing with a society that can be remoulded in the European-like state. It will take hundreds of years of violent interaction like the Turks before change comes.
No/ depends on which state. We could repel an attack from Naru pretty well. That would be because our emphasis (political) was as a self defence force with the doctrine being shoot them down/torpedo them in the moat to our north. But, we have been trying to become a much more deployable balanced force in the years since, but neglect takes time to fix.
Nauru is a bad example I think. Are they not sinking and will eventually require resettlement?
We should have always been thinking in terms of an interventionist, offensive force, but we were brought up to rely first on the British Empire, then on the USA. However, the offensive is the best defence, and the USA will not always be there for us. The British were not.
I'm encouraged. The ADF's transformation under the Hardened Networked Army is happening - just not overnight.
Next week? :)
Ok, next month, but only because I'm so patient ;)
swerve
April 30th, 2009, 06:37 AM
... but the Taliban represent the idea state in Islamic understanding, ...
Not so. The Taliban represent an extremist minority within Islam, & are heavily influenced by Pushtun tribal tradition. Ask the average Turkish Muslim what he or she thinks of the Taliban. Ask the Islamic schools of Qom, the religious centre of Iran. They'll throw up their hands in horror. Even the Iranians find the Taliban attitude to women primitive, & unjustifiable by Islamic teaching.
Wooki
April 30th, 2009, 07:06 AM
But I wasn't talking about a tank....at least not a heavy tank like the Abrams
And there are a lot of people capable of contributing to such a project in Australia, so no imported talent would be required...nor do they have to quit their jobs :) (note, we are currently a net exporter of talent)
And given the design will be for a production of something the Army really wants rather than trying to find best match on the open market, there wouldn't be an RFP...
And the engine manufacturer can build engines that are also used in commercial vehicles like...trucks. There are trucks in Australia....about 400,000 of them, and about 30,000 of them are rated for 40t+, which is good enough for an AFV family suitable for the Army. How does a production facility for 30,000 engines sound? Low rate production also, initially. It can be linked to a national environmental standard requirement, so over time, say a decade, all commercial trucks would need to change their engine...to a domestic one :) Australians love to tinker with their engines, and none more than the truckies :)
And because it would be a low rate production, it will mean that by the time production is ended, its time to start first series of rebuilds/upgrades, just like the Sydney Harbour Bridge painting...so there is job security.
I hope that explains some of the minutiae that make your counter-proposal unlikely. It's always those damned details, eh? Get you every time. :D
You're a troll as far as I can figure out. None of your arguments have any merit despite people patiently pointing out the obvious to you. Although Australia could be unkindly and loosely termed a socialist democracy, what you are suggesting is simply not possible without a massive government intervention and I don't think even Australia would go down that path.
Happy fantasizing.
cheers
w
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 07:08 AM
Not so. The Taliban represent an extremist minority within Islam, & are heavily influenced by Pushtun tribal tradition. Ask the average Turkish Muslim what he or she thinks of the Taliban. Ask the Islamic schools of Qom, the religious centre of Iran. They'll throw up their hands in horror. Even the Iranians find the Taliban attitude to women primitive, & unjustifiable by Islamic teaching.
Yeh, right. That's why they the Islamic World hurried to condemn them after the Taliban took over when the Soviets left.
The average Turkish Muslim is not an average Muslim, and many in the Muslim World will say that Turks are not even Muslims.
Iranians will say that because they are not supporting Taliban, the Saudis are.
Pushtun tribal tradition? At least so far they have not expressed the desire to claim right of return to Israel :)
The Taliban represented the ideal Islamic state, but the reason no one acknowledged this, is because every other Islamic state wanted to be seen as the model for an Islamic state. However, there is plenty of support for them in the Islamic World, and always will be. In any case, 40 million people can't be changed in a matter of a decade or even two. It takes generations.
The best NATO can do is to focus on getting Bin Ladin and his supporters, and leaving with as much pride intact as possible. Would also be good if they didn't rearm the Afghans.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 07:59 AM
You're a troll as far as I can figure out. None of your arguments have any merit despite people patiently pointing out the obvious to you. Although Australia could be unkindly and loosely termed a socialist democracy, what you are suggesting is simply not possible without a massive government intervention and I don't think even Australia would go down that path.
Happy fantasizing.
cheers
w
lol
Socialist democracy as seen from where, the USA? Stick around for the second Obama term :)
In terms of defence "massive government intervention" is how the ENTIRE Asian region works. That's from Mediterranean all the way to the Russian Far East, and from Siberia to the southern tip of Java. You are telling me I'm fantasizing!
IMHO there is a bit of MGI going on in the USA also :)
There is not a liberal democracy within a cooee of Australia even in the European (far more socialist) understanding of the word. The rules of the "game" in the region are different, and if Australia does not play by the rules, it will eventually find life very hard.
As for people patiently pointing how things can't be done, I think that's what challenges are made from, negativity of others.
No one said Australia can not build its own defence industrial base. What they said is that there are a few challenges. Like money. But there is money. There is always enough money. Just have to find it and harness it. Mix it with a bit of enthusiasm, and off you go. Lots of people told Bob Clifford he was nutz, and sneered at his lack of education. But guess who builds the fastest ships in the US Navy?
What's your suggestion, that Australia becomes a permanent dependency of the United States and lives off scraps of technology thrown to it for the odd jobs like in Switzerland? Did it ever occur to you I may think that I live in a pretty great country also? Anything can be done here. I have met some amazing people in my life here that can do anything. And, there are models elsewhere. It took American political pressure to stop Israelis making their own fighter. They did make their own tank, their own ICVs, own artillery, and they have what, a quarter of Australia's population, no natural resources by comparison, a third of Australia's GDP.
Australia is not ready for war, but it should be.
swerve
April 30th, 2009, 10:13 AM
Building armoured vehicles in a low-rate production scenario does not require either a highly developed general automotive industry, nor a militarised one.
Does this mean you have dropped all your other proposals, & are now advocating only that Australia build AFVs?
Errr - Australia is building AFVs. One type, optimised for Australian conditions - which conveniently suits it for some other places & hence makes it attractive to some foreign armies. I've not seen anyone here argue that such niche capabilities are beyond Australias reach. I certainly haven't. Indeed, I've explicitly stated that they are practical for Australia. What I, & others, have argued is that Australia can't afford the broad spectrum of military industries you originally proposed.
Do let us know whether you're still in favour of your original proposal.
Aussie Digger
April 30th, 2009, 10:55 AM
As AD pointed out, it was designed to supplement the M113s for use in Australia, and limited duties in peace-keeping operations. All of a sudden it had become the main type of armoured vehicle operated by the Australian Army. What, the old policy got lost in the Canberra archives? :confused:
Again, you are plainly wrong. It is NOT an armoured vehicle, as Army classifies such things, nor is it entirely a B vehicle. It is something else. An armoured B vehicle, if you will.
What it most definitely is not is an armoured fighting vehicle. It is designed to provide protected mobility for infantry and other units.
Prior to the introduction of the Bushmaster. Army used Land Rovers and Unimogs in the roll that Bushmasters are now used.
The mechanised infantry of 1 Brigade don't use it. They use M113's. Currently the A1, with a limited number of A3/4's and as the vehicles roll off the production line, they will increasingly use nothing other than the M113AS3/4's.
As for it's intended purpose, it was originally intended to provide 6 Brigade with protected mobility in DoA operations. 6 Brigade providing the "depth" for Australian Army operations, with 1 Brigade conducting the "higher intensity" ops with a medium combat weight capability, 3 Brigade providing rapid deployment capabilities and 6 Brigade to support these two brigades and provide a rapid deployment capability.
The capability to deploy "rapidly" must be seen in the context of EVERYTHING that a Brigade needs to move and exercises were conducted in the 90's to validate this concept. I remember well 6RAR deploying to Quilpie (1000k's north west of Brisbane) a while ago. With it's vehicles, it was proven to deploy to this location quicker than if RAAF had been involved with it's available airlift capability, plus the deployed elements could support themselves, in the field for 3 days at a time.
As to your domestic production ideas. HA! The largest defence company in Australia has had to have direct Government funding to build sufficient facilities to produce the M113AS3/4 at a reasonable rate.
It is not the case that it can't be done. I'm sure we could build an AFV production capacity. The issue is the cost effectiveness. We don't have an unlimited budget and the benefit you claim would cost our ability to buy to the specification that we need.
M113AS3/4 was chosen to support a particular desire for votes, hence why production was crammed into an unsuitable facility in Victoria and hence why facilities have since had to be opened up in SA. The plan was not achievable in the timeframe required, nor with the capital expenditure invested.
While the project will eventually deliver some capability, an off the shelf purchase of say, Bradley M2A2's, using the same funding would have created significantly GREATER capability for Army, that based on the M1A1 refurbishment and contract signature in 2002 (same year as M113-UP) would have seen the new IFV capability reach IOC in 2006 and FOC by now.
Bushmaster has had some minor success, mostly due to excellent timing, moreso than the sheer brilliance of the capability, but there is a plethora of armoured vehicle projects worldwide.
People rave about Bushmaster but forget it is simply a design from an Irish design house. We didn't do anything special here.
People criticise M113-UP and forget it is largely an off the sheld German upgrade package, designed by FFG. (The issues came about because we were trying to use a running gear package on a stretched and significantly heavier hull).
Trying to build new armoured vehicles from scratch? Ha! We would simply be a small player, spending our limited budget ina futile attempt at reinventing the wheel and unlikely to significantly improve on existing designs.
Aussie Digger
April 30th, 2009, 12:28 PM
Yes, but that is not what you said. Identified threats are rarely a part of Minister's public speech. You listed capabilities.
That's because a Minister has to be diplomatic in his speech. Defence Capability Plan priorities are matched closely against the capabilities that "threat countries" can or are likely to be able to deploy in the near future.
I wasn't aware that regular Army battalions are inducting school leavers. This is supposed to be a plus in the ADF capability for conducting a war?
What? Who said they were? I said "Infantry IET courses". If you don't know what IET stands for, I think you're time should be better spent elsewhere, because it would be patently obvious you have not a clue...
You always assume to know what I don't know. The reality is though that the vast majority of armoured vehicles that will be used in future by the Infantry Corps of the ADF will be the Bushmasters.
Rubbish.
1. Bushmaster is not issued to the infantry Corps at ALL, except in 6 and 8/9RAR. 1,2,3,4,5 and 7 RAR will NOT have the vehicle and neither will any Reserve infantry unit.
Yes, and? I don't know how the 81x M113AS3/4's are to be used (maybe delivered in the Bulldog-type upgrade?), but nothing had changed in therms of the "motorised brigade" concept since the Bushmaster is a truck with minimal armour by infantry combat vehicle standards. Its better than nothing, but its not something to go to a real war in.
I'm starting to agree with Wooki. One minute you're telling us that Afghanistan is a "real war" and the next you say the Bushmaster is not something to go to a real war in.
Make your mind up troll or get lost.
Didn't say ADF operated M113s as designed. I'm just saying that that is what the design philosophy was. Its about time the infantry had a vehicle it didn't have to adopt its doctrine to.
This is getting amusing. So if we were to choose a different vehicle with different capabilities, how is infantry going to be able to AVOID changing it's doctrine?
I think we both know that the M113 should have been replaced in the 1990s. now we are getting 81 more of the "interim" vehicles until when? 2015-20?
For a Ministry that is always talking about the future, we sure are short of capabilities that would have been apparent in the last budget.
I agree, but it wasn't.
Next!
The only problem is that amphibious insertion is the only method available to the ADF where there are not commercial port facilities available.
Er, except for those big things with large wingspans...
In a war situation these facilities are likely to be protected by the opponent, and how many are there in the region? This is besides the very predictable point of arrival that puts the TF at risk en-route. And yet the ADF has never had this capability, and INTERFET deployment represents the entire extent of such capabilities, and that only with the offloading area being secured by previously air delivered 3RAR troops.
Rubbish. Neither HMAS Kanimbla or Manoora were in-service when Interfet landed in Timor.
Nor were C-17's.
No, I allowed two vessels deployed on either coast.
"will have"...
ESSM - do have.
SM-2 - do have the missiles...
No, but they are not fired from vehicles that are limited to roads in a combined arms force.
I happen to know that Land Rovers are not confined to roads, I think I read somewhere that they do in fact have 4x4 capability...
Interim....thats like M113AS3/4s....
Remember the last Leopard 1 interim upgrade and how long it took to get Abrams after it?
Yep. The upgrade was cancelled in 2004 because Abrams was ordered to replace it...
Abrams were delivered in 2006 and IOC reached in 2007.
If it comes to using AD, it is likely going to be something other than "LIC" environment, so either the ADF will be requiring excellent mobility, or the enemy forces. In either case I would not want supporting AD on Perentie.
What are these mobile SAM firing platforms that can fire guided SAM's whilst actually moving?
The USA doesn't have one to the best of my knowledge.
The majority of SAM systems on the planet are handheld and the major systems require TEL's (transport erector launchers - Patriot, S-300 etc).
Btw I just checked a few SAM systems.
The USA uses:
1. Avenger.
2. SL-AMRAAM.
3. Patriot
4. THAAD.
Guess what the predominant feature of the vehicles on ALL these systems is?
What does that tell you about the relative importance of the vehicles?
Amen. It seems to me that at least the 1st Brigade should be composed of vehicles with same protection and mobility capabilities across combat and combat support arms and services. This to me means at least a Troop of tracked self propelled and armoured AD platforms.
Again, rubbish. Even the Israeli's don't subscribe to that and they face a FAR higher threat level than we do.
You cannot even imagine the cost of trying to fit out M1A1 levels of protection on 600 plus vehicles, can you?
The suggestion is to use 120mm mortars in the reserve brigades in place of the artillery units. These are judged to be more deployable, and require fewer personnel as there is a considerable shortage in gunners across the Army.
No-one in ADF has made this suggestion.
What has happened is that for the purpose of training efficiencies, 81mm mortars have been introduced into reserve artillery units. A gunner can be trained to use an artillery piece in a matter of a few weeks. What is important is the firing procedures, CP procedures and experience in firing fire support missions, not the particular piece which is used for low priority (in terms of deployment readiness) units.
Army experience has been that with existing levels of funding and access to training facilities, courses etc, concentrating on the core skills for these soldiers provides greater outcomes than attempting to "copy" the skills maintained by regular units on the more complex (both technically and in their employment) platforms.
The experience is the same in Armoured Corps. Obsolete M113AS1's, which aren't funded for replacement in Ares units anyway, have made way for Recon/Surveillance variants of Land Rovers.
The rationale being, that employing less sophisticated platforms allows the units to focus on individual and collective training activities, rather than on maintenance of the more complex equipment, much of which is obsolete anyway (M113AS1's and M2A2 105mm guns would be GREAT in a modern battle).
With Ares moving to an individual and sub-unit reinforcement basis, rather than a "base for expansion" basis, it is allowing Ares soldiers to obtain higher qualifications in their core skills, allowing greater opportunities to reinforce regular units deploying on operations, rather than continuing to provide no actual operational capability, but maintaining a charade of having "war time" equipment.
The answer of course is more money. But it isn't available and if it were, there are more important priorities for the deployed and regular force to fill than rounding out non-deployable Ares units.
AD, we are at war. It has been years. You think there should be some urgency imparted into the training and acceptance process?
Not really. How many soldiers have been killed due to a lack of offensive fire support on our operations?
How many mission failures have we had, for the same reason?
I said 8 pilots and support crews, so at least two helicopters can be operated during the hours of darkness in support of ADF personnel in Afghanistan.
ADF personnel are already supported by AH-64 Apache helos and more than 2... Our own would be nice of course, but is it truly essential to achieve our mission?
Seems to me our mission is already being substantially achieved, notwithstanding that we could and should do a whole lot more.
I don't care what France does with their helicopters.
What they do, IS directly relevant to us. An operational capability on a different (older) version of the helicopter in French service was reached yesterday. The initial capability. Not full capability.
Our version has NOT even reached this. As a particular instance of why we cannot deploy our helicopters, if you'd bother to do your research, you'd know that the 68mm rocket system we have bought with our helicopters, is still experiencing significant issues in relation to their backblast and the effect on the airframe from such.
Issues that require an engineering change to our helos.
Another issue is that the "operational" software load for our aircraft has not yet been completely developed. Whilst significant progress has been made, all the sensor and flight data, weapon and EW counter-measures systems need to be tested with each software load. Things are improving, but they aren't ready yet.
Army testified about this, in front of the Senate just a couple of weeks ago. It is these sorts of teething problems that mean our helos can't reach IOC and thus can't yet be deployed.
Does it mean the helos are no good and should be replaced? Nope, just that issues exist that have to be worked through.
And this is the point I have been making all along. The capability to go to war goes beyond having a loaded weapon. We can't actually use the weapons we bought because of external factors. This is not satisfactory.
That is reality. Go an order a new car. You don't always get it the same day you order it.
Go and build a new tank. The weapon systems needs to be fired in a large number of scenarios to verify it meets your requirements. Armour needs to be tested, mobility needs to be tested. Problems need to be addressed through engineering solutions.
Is that satisfactory? It is real life...
Maybe it should maintain that rocket 'capability'
Maybe it should operate a HARM anti-radiation missile capability. Maybe it should operate a tactical recon pod capability.
There are any number of capabilities RAAF could have. Unlike you, RAAF like the rest of ADF have to make a choice between priorities.
Where is the money coming from?
I'm fairly confident that a targeting pod can be used on a Hawk.
Really? Which one? RAAF currently operates 2 types and has another one on order.
The AN/AAS-38 Nitehawk targetting pod and the Litening AT targetting pod. The ATFLIR pod is on order.
Which of these has been integrated onto the Mk 127 Hawk?
Alternatively the pilots can learn how to fire unguided rockets with some precision :) Its one of those combat pilot skill sets thingy....
Know a bit about it do you? What procedures would you put in place to ensure these unguided rockets didn't cause a blue on blue?
Can you please explain the differences in minimum safe ranges between 2.75 inch rockets and precision guided 500lbs and larger bombs and how these apply to the fire support requirements for ground forces in Afghanistan?
No? Well perhaps you could try and find out some of these things before telling all what should and should not be done.
What, the RAAF requests the Army personnel to stand back a few kilometres because they are not used to firing weapons at empty ranges?
Give me a break.
Wake up to yourself. Ordnance has "minimum safe ranges". A weapon cannot be dropped within x amount of metres of a friendly force without affecting them. Perhaps you could learn what some of these are, before you presume to tell those who do this sort of thing for a living what they "should" be doing?
They are listed as light attack on an RAAF site.
Great. Really wonderful. Again, perhaps you could discuss the Australian rules of engagement for Afghanistan and whether unguided air launched weapons meets these requirements?
Lots of air forces, including the RAF used and continue use them in this role.
No they don't. Neither RAAF, RAF, USAF nor any other Hawk user has deployed them to Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else in recent years to conduct combat operations.
Weapons are used as required, not as designed. IMHO Hawks happen to be more suitable for use in Afghanistan than the F/A-18s.
Rubbish. Here's why the Hawk Mk 127's are unsuitable.
1. No radar capability.
2. No EO/IR capability.
3. No FLIR capability.
4. No laser target designation capability.
5. No EW self protection capability.
6. Inadequate weapons capability (no precision weapons, limited overall A2G weapons capability).
7. Inadequate communications capability.
8. Inadequate range and payload capability.
Why the Hornets are eminently suited to Afghanistan.
1. Radar capability.
2. EO/IR capability.
3. FLIR capability.
4. Laser target designation capability.
5. Adequate EW self protection capability for the theatre.
6. Adequate weapons capability (20mm, laser/GPS-INS precision weapons capability, extensive overall A2G weapons capability).
7. Adequate communications capability (including data-link systems for recon and real-time download to JTAC/Special Forces teams).
8. Adequate range and payload capability.
It tells me that you can't l;earn to fly an F/A-18 until you actually fly in one. This is why there are 18 F/A-18Bs in the RAAF.
So a cockpit based on the F/A-18's and RAAF's extensive investment in F/A-18 simulators achieves precisely nothing?
The B's have no other use eh?
StevoJH
April 30th, 2009, 05:14 PM
AD,
Arent the Reserve Cav units trading their Perenties in for Bushmasters? Because i'm fairly sure a Squadron from the Hunter River Lancers was in Iraq a while ago playing armoured transport to diplomats in their bushmasters not long ago.
The page for the /16th says they've got 15 Bushmasters in tamworth, not that i've ever seen them there except during country music week (they have some nice big sheds inside their fence). They were carting around random Country music singers in the during the cavalcade.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 06:56 PM
Does this mean you have dropped all your other proposals, & are now advocating only that Australia build AFVs?
Errr - Australia is building AFVs. One type, optimised for Australian conditions - which conveniently suits it for some other places & hence makes it attractive to some foreign armies. I've not seen anyone here argue that such niche capabilities are beyond Australias reach. I certainly haven't. Indeed, I've explicitly stated that they are practical for Australia. What I, & others, have argued is that Australia can't afford the broad spectrum of military industries you originally proposed.
Do let us know whether you're still in favour of your original proposal.
My original proposal?
My proposal has always been that Australian governments should have been looking at security as a much wider issue, and dealt with defence on the bases of an integrated capability rather than that of individual services.
Australia needs to be able to control the sea, and if required, strategic islands that will support control of sea, and trade routes.
We are in security terms not only required to assure territorial sovereignty of the waters, land mass and airspace, but also our links with the rest of the World.
Also, the ADF has to consider the future without United States as a viable ally in every scenario as happened with the British Empire.
The RAN has to plan for control-of-sea operations, not a 'presence'. The RAAF has to plan for operations from bases that lack landing strips, and are located well outside of the Australian airspace. The Army has to plan for conducting operations that are anything but low intensity. Because the service utility of defence platforms is extending to 30-40 years, the planning should also, and there is no suggestion that the World will remain unchanged in this period of time. If the economic capabilities of regional states such as China, India, South Korea and others were only being prophesied in 1979, they are a reality now, and Australia can not loose any more of its capacity for self-sufficiency, and indeed must aggressively seek to regain these industrial capabilities with full state support.
Spending additional money modifying, retrofitting and upgrading the bought platforms and systems, which over the past 30 years I have seen increase in final cost to as much as twice their original projected purchase price is ludicrous. These programs add little value to Australian technological knowledge base as the objectives of such projects is often to make old technology work as required, rather than creating new advanced capabilities that would give the ADF an edge in war.
Marc 1
April 30th, 2009, 08:23 PM
Ask Sun Tzu - I think he established the principles.
Nope, the Pentagon established that type of conflict..
Right, so according to you then if this is a construct of the pentagon in recent years what type of conflict was Malaya? Remember this type of warfare wasn't invented back in the 1950's. The hundreds killed must just have been a figment of my imagination as is the ASM I received for being deployed to Butterworth in the 80's.
The Pentagon may have appended the label to it, but this type of warfare has been going on for millenia. The place where we take our rubbish was renamed in the 1990's to a Refuse Processing Facility - doesn't change what it is or what it does - ask any local - it's the tip
Nope, I dare you to hit a firing position of an ATGW from a moving Bushmaster at 2,000m with a 7.62mm MG.
Note I said suppress - you do not need to hit. All you need to do is distract the firer or obscure his vision by the dust kicked up to have a chance of evading getting hit. It's better than doing nothing. A moder ATGW is going to make mincemeat anyway out of pretty much any armoured vehicle that is not equipped with ERA/bar armour. The key is to spot and destroy dismounted infantry with these weapons before they get a chance to get a shot off in this respect we have a significantly greater surveillance capability than the soviets in the 1980's
I don't know if they envisaged adding anything to the Bushmaster when it was being designed in the 90s. Still, everything is possible. This is engineering flexibility you are talking about, and not Principles of War, and engine, transmission and suspension load ratings are less flexible than an infantry platoon :)
Err, yes they did which is why the Dutch Bushies have the additional armour. Correct. An infantry platoon is far more flexible. But on foot they will cover no more than 3 km/h patrolling in open country, are exposed to mines and IED's, in temperatures sometimes into the high 40's or minus 10 degrees. They would also be prime targets for any taleban with a dragunov sniper weapon. Inside a bushie, they are protected from all of those threats, can chose when to advance/withdraw, and it is significantly more difficult to lug a 23mm HMG to effectively engage a bushie than a sniper rifle to engage a digger on foot. In open country diggers remain in the vehicles. In close country, they dismount usually and move dismounted. This is doctrine (or at least it was 16 years ago).
They were used against the Soviet Army, and you only need one round, which is not impossible with today's commercially available optics. Spotting a well camouflaged sniper armed with a 23mm cannon is harder than one may imagine.
OK, then you must have numerous instances where a sniper has snuck with his '23mm sniper weapon' into a hide and taken out armoured vehicles since 2001. The way warfare was conducted by the soviets has little relevance to the way warfare is being conducted today, so please provide evidence of this threat in recent times.
I have never questioned anyone's knowledge level, only their ideas...which as you are probably aware can come from the most unlikely source.
Thanks for your PM:rolleyes: on your qualifications, I was ...underwhelmed.
Wars are a national engagement, not just that of its armed forces. This is why my argument is based as much on industrial policy as it is on a defence one. Such a policy is more likely to be supported in the long term by different parties, and therefore offers a greater measure of predictability and sustainability for defence planners also.
Right, so we are at war are we? Under your ideas, there should have been a national callup, possibly a reintroduction of national service or conscription, we should be engaged in crash building projects of all types of armaments (a-la- WW2). If that's the case why have you not presented yourself at the nearest army recruiting office. Having been to one years ago, and my wife who is a serving member working in one last year, I can tell you are very friendly and more than happy to induct you into the services. Given your expertise, I would recommend Army -Infantry. Then you can explain to all those misguided officers who clearly don't know how to employ the weaponry they are given the benefit of your ideas.
Its not winnable. The aim is to destroy the Taliban, and with it Al Qaeda, but the Taliban represent the idea state in Islamic understanding, and Al Qaeda represent what a Muslim should do to free themselves of the Western influence.
What an interesting theory. I'm no guru on islamic matters, but my mate whom I trained with at Uni is Pakistani. He is back in Pakistan and we stay in touch irregularly. He an I have had long chats about the fact that most of the Islamic world consider the Taleban and their interpretation of the koran to be entirely wrong. He considers the taleban and sharia law as being a greater threat to Islam than america. But what would he know - he's only a Pakistani Muslim.
20 years! In 20 years you will have the Afghanistan Liberation Organisation, and Bin Ladin will be its "Arafat".
And who will prevent Taliban from returning after the last NATO soldier departs?
Ideally, the Afghan people. From what I've read they aren't that fussed by the taleban either, give them their own self determined rule and the confidence that NATO will be there for however long it takes, and you will see trust develop. With trust comes change. The Afghani's cannot trust any bugger because from the 1920's onward they have been occupied by every man and his dog. All have made promises, all have failed, or been kicked out. Incidentally, it may take 30 or 40 years, and I agree we will never see Afghanistan operating like a european democracy, but why should we want that? I believe the "lawyer jirga" (sp?) conducted established a rough set of rules as to the way the country was to be run and it didn't resemble the harsh taleban methodology or a european democracy.
I supported Gulf War 1 and its aims. But did not think that invading Afghanistan was smart. I did not think that Australia should be involved. I know it is militarily possible to win the war, but I also know that no government (even the communist soviet government as it was then) will stick it out long enough or make the necessary commitment (financial and lives) to make it work. Therefore combat was not the answer.
Nauru is a bad example I think. Are they not sinking and will eventually require resettlement?
No, they are not sinking. There are some island nations in the Pacific that are suffering from a rise in sea levels, I don't think any nation is 'sinking'
We should have always been thinking in terms of an interventionist, offensive force, but we were brought up to rely first on the British Empire, then on the USA. However, the offensive is the best defence, and the USA will not always be there for us. The British were not.
3 things here:
1. Who died and appointed us grand high invader and stabiliser of countries?
2. We are trying that interventionist /offensive idea you are talking about in Afghanistan - and according to you thats unwinable.
3. You seem to forget that you are talking political will here. We no longer believe in the red threat of communism sweeping down through asia for example, therefore our policy of forward defence has been null for decades. I agree that the island neighbours in our immediate region we should be able to assist if requested, but as to invading with this incredible amphibious assault force? That's not going to be acceptable at virtually any level short of one nation invading another. Fiji is a basket case at the moment - is your answer to invade and restore democracy?
Next week? :)
Ok, next month, but only because I'm so patient ;)
And tell me how much longer is it going to take to design all of these things you are talking about and build them from scratch? At a minimum 2-3 times longer.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 08:26 PM
Again, you are plainly wrong. It is NOT an armoured vehicle, as Army classifies such things, nor is it entirely a B vehicle. It is something else. An armoured B vehicle, if you will.
What it most definitely is not is an armoured fighting vehicle. It is designed to provide protected mobility for infantry and other units.
Prior to the introduction of the Bushmaster. Army used Land Rovers and Unimogs in the roll that Bushmasters are now used.
The mechanised infantry of 1 Brigade don't use it. They use M113's. Currently the A1, with a limited number of A3/4's and as the vehicles roll off the production line, they will increasingly use nothing other than the M113AS3/4's.
As for it's intended purpose, it was originally intended to provide 6 Brigade with protected mobility in DoA operations. 6 Brigade providing the "depth" for Australian Army operations, with 1 Brigade conducting the "higher intensity" ops with a medium combat weight capability, 3 Brigade providing rapid deployment capabilities and 6 Brigade to support these two brigades and provide a rapid deployment capability.
The capability to deploy "rapidly" must be seen in the context of EVERYTHING that a Brigade needs to move and exercises were conducted in the 90's to validate this concept. I remember well 6RAR deploying to Quilpie (1000k's north west of Brisbane) a while ago. With it's vehicles, it was proven to deploy to this location quicker than if RAAF had been involved with it's available airlift capability, plus the deployed elements could support themselves, in the field for 3 days at a time.
As to your domestic production ideas. HA! The largest defence company in Australia has had to have direct Government funding to build sufficient facilities to produce the M113AS3/4 at a reasonable rate.
It is not the case that it can't be done. I'm sure we could build an AFV production capacity. The issue is the cost effectiveness. We don't have an unlimited budget and the benefit you claim would cost our ability to buy to the specification that we need.
M113AS3/4 was chosen to support a particular desire for votes, hence why production was crammed into an unsuitable facility in Victoria and hence why facilities have since had to be opened up in SA. The plan was not achievable in the timeframe required, nor with the capital expenditure invested.
While the project will eventually deliver some capability, an off the shelf purchase of say, Bradley M2A2's, using the same funding would have created significantly GREATER capability for Army, that based on the M1A1 refurbishment and contract signature in 2002 (same year as M113-UP) would have seen the new IFV capability reach IOC in 2006 and FOC by now.
Bushmaster has had some minor success, mostly due to excellent timing, moreso than the sheer brilliance of the capability, but there is a plethora of armoured vehicle projects worldwide.
People rave about Bushmaster but forget it is simply a design from an Irish design house. We didn't do anything special here.
People criticise M113-UP and forget it is largely an off the sheld German upgrade package, designed by FFG. (The issues came about because we were trying to use a running gear package on a stretched and significantly heavier hull).
Trying to build new armoured vehicles from scratch? Ha! We would simply be a small player, spending our limited budget ina futile attempt at reinventing the wheel and unlikely to significantly improve on existing designs.
AD, lets not play with words. The Bushmaster is an armoured vehicle that troops use. Troops are expected to fight. It is therefore a fighting vehicle whether they, you or I like it or not. In this day and age we should not be expecting to encounter only IEDs or 7.62mm ball.
We lack the capabilities BECAUSE we spend the money on buying things. And why?
You say we should buy a Bradley. Its a dud. It took 20 years to design, and it was an old design in the 1980s. It is completely unsuitable for Australia. Australia will not learn anything from purchasing it, but will spend billions yet again refurbishing and upgrading. Can't we ever buy the clothes that fit for a change instead of wearing hand-me-downs?
I don't understand this "from scratch" concept. Much of the design and prototyping today is done using CAD/CAM technology. The Irish didn't need a production facility to design the Bushmaster. This has been true since the 1980s. That's how the Soviet engineers were able to design the BMP-3 engine. Are you telling me this capability does not exist in Australia, because if you do, I have seen it.
As for the production facilities, one hopes the collective Australian political and bureaucratic infrastructure has learned something from the Bushmaster/M113 experiences. It seems to me that there should exist an independent defence project (maybe any project) oversight structure that can take the government to court, and force senior bureaucrat firing and ministerial resignations, rather than just an annual audit process that has no ability to effect change in project management where mismanagement is apparent for any number of reasons, including political.
Why the ****** did we have to go to Ireland to design an armoured bus, and to Germany to design a turret? Are we a clever country, or is that just an urban myth? Someone somewhere in the Government stopped caring about this country. So what if the cost of a local design is 15% greater. Its not like the local designer was going to run off to Ireland with the money, so they decided to invest there anyway, is it? The extra cost of local production is usually spent locally. Money spent elsewhere rarely returns to Australia.
The worse thing about it is that we are often ending up with the wrong stuff.
Deploying 1,000km west of Brisbane was a waste of time. It only proved that the Army could find Quilpie on the map. How about 2500km north of Brisbane? Remember Lae? Australians fought there for a reason. "Lest we forget" does not mean just remembering to have a beer on ANZAC day. East Timor was a stretch, and a wake up call, but we are now a decade on. Has the ADF capability for deployments changed significantly? Yes, we can now deploy by C-17s much quicker, but the situation has changed. If there is a clash with Indonesian forces there, the transports will need escorts, so a naval approach would be much safer, and it won't be to Dili harbour either.
Can the ADF go 2714km NW of Darwin?
I would much prefer the system of designation used in the British Army of armoured, mechanised, light, air assault and territorial infantry battalions. The British Army functions on very similar premises to those of ADF if one considers it outside the NATO/EU participation. Wherever it goes outside of Europe, it goes by sea and air, a long distance, and aggressively. The ADF may not have to go as far as the Falklands, but can it go half way, a third? Will Bushmasters be useful when it gets there? Where these questions even asked in 1996?
Marc 1
April 30th, 2009, 08:51 PM
Marc 1, the Bushmaster was not designed for "this war". I think the first production vehicle was accepted for testing by the Army in mid-90s, wasn't it? That's before 9/11. So what kind of war/doctrine was it designed for? Or was this based on input form the ADF's famed 12th Crystal Ball company? :rolleyes:
You really do have no idea do you? The bushie was introduced to replace the IMV's (6x6 land rovers) that 6 brigade as a motorised brigade was using in the 90's. The rovers suffered in mobility, space, conditions the soldiers were carried in and protection.
I have never claimed the Bushmaster was designed for the current conflicts. Here's a newsflash, a military normally doesn't get enough notice of an impending conflict to specifically design, and bring into service weapon systems for each specific conflict. Very occasionally you will see an expedient measure introduced such as the MRAP's for the US (with all their attendent limitations) or more commonly upgrading of existing vehcles or systems.
What was it designed for? As a protected replacement for the rovers, as a battle taxi. Its not a MICV- it doesn't need to be, for the role it is employed it it works very well. Perhaps if we had a modern MICV we may have deployed that as well to the sandpit, but I think that the bushie would have better IED protection than any existing tracked MICV due to its V shaped hull and the fact that the further away the vehicle's hull is from the blast the less its effects. As IED's are a larger threat than being engaged by enemy heavy weapons and armoured vehicles, the bushie works well. The MICV would perhaps only be employed in certain set piece assaults (extremely rare in Afg, and so far none in our AO).
This will be my last on this issue. I and many other with so much more experience in operations, procurement and systems design and manufacture have given our opinions, but clearly we know nothing as your 'ideas' beat experience, commonsense and knowledge every time.
Feanor
April 30th, 2009, 09:09 PM
Does the ADF have a capability for a high intensity conflict?
Is it a doctrinal requirement?
Unlike you, I have not been lucky enough to have flown in them
The Su-27SK & Su-30MKK are export versions of the Russian aircraft, and even those we are not sure about. The J-10 is a mongrel, and Chinese excel in 'borrowing' from others, but in this case the sum of all parts may not equal to a 4th generation whole.
It has nothing to do with flying in the aircraft. Please stop making remarks that are inflammatory, or are easily perceived as such.
The Su-27 and derivatives of, are widely considered 4th generation aircraft. It's also typically recognized that the J-10 is a 4th generation (early) aircraft. This is pretty much in the category of common knowledge. However if you wish to dispute that, please tell me which criteria of a 4th generation aircraft do the Flanker derivatives, and J-10 not meet? Thrust to weight ratio? Modern aerodynamic design? Active radar guided BVRAAM? Advanced radars?
First set up a research project within the DSTO. Then set up project university collaboration infrastructure. Then expand the research infrastructure to the design stage with industry participation. With a completed design, conduct development and testing within the RAAF facilities. Refine and complete design. Commence production. Doesn't matter if it takes two decades to build the first production aircraft as it did with the F-35. It doesn't matter if by that stage Australia will only be able to afford a single squadron, or even half a squadron. It will have been an investment in enriching Australia's collective aviation technology knowledge base contributing to hundreds of project managers, engineers, technicians, etc. It will have produced a capability that Australia needs given its strategic position on the globe. Just maybe it will have produced other innovations along the way that will find use in civil aviation to earn revenue for continuation of the project like the CSIRO mobile technology
And will cost in the tens of billions. Once again how do you sell the public a need for a huge budget hike?
And its not that hard even with existing technology. Take an F-35, and redesign it with two engines, and you will get an F-22 make-do-with. Add larger engines and more on-board fuel, and you get a long range fighter/strike aircraft. Yes, I know its not that simple, but we have technology now that was not available in 1980s, or even 1990s. Computer modelling can, and has achieved spectacular progress in engineering design. And Australia doesn't have to do it alone. Partner with all the countries that have asked for and will not get the F-22. Partner with other countries that may want a long range maritime strike aircraft. Japan, Israel, even dare I say the USA? EU might be interested.
Please tell me, the question of licensing and property rights doesn't concern you when dealing with an F-35? And what generation do you intend your fighter to be by the time it's finished? Both Russia, the US, and a number of European countries have decided that developing their fighters from scratch isn't a good idea and instead decide to do it internationally with much help. They have a huge technology base, a huge production base, a large domestic market, and fairly likely foreign orders. But they can't afford to develop a speicalized maritime strike fighter, with the exception of Russia, but even then it's only a modification of the venerable Flanker, and the continuation of a Soviet-era project, quite different from developing what will need to be a 5th gen (which is the least that you need given your design time) aircraft with no research and technology base, and little previous experience in the area. Better yet where do you intend to find a market? The Su-34 maritime strike version (Su-32MF) already exists. It can be produced (if someone pays for it) serially, and comes from a proven and well established aviation company. It has yet to win any export orders. Yet you seem to be under the impression that the whole world is just waiting to jump on board with an Australian project, that lacks the necessary infrastructure, experience, and funding, to make it a success. :rolleyes: Please do some critical thinking. A cost-benefits analysis would also work well.
But development is exactly what I want for Australia. Development is a cost, but also has significant benefits. The price we pay to others is for them sharing their products with us, but not their KNOWLEDGE! That, in the information age, is more expensive. And right now is the time to gain this knowledge because there are going to be significant changes in armoured vehicle designs as designers try to find alternatives to reliance on existing engine technologies.
So you want to simultaneously spend tens of billions on a new maritime strike fighter, and on a new IFV? Again, where do you find these obscene piles of money? Please tell me, I could sure use some.
Which part of the liberal economic theory applies to national security?!
The part where you expect some company to do all this. Or do you propose a state-run effort?
Yes. ATGW's that the taleban is likely to use are normally SACLOS, you disrupt (supress) the firer and he cannot guide the missile.
Nope, I dare you to hit a firing position of an ATGW from a moving Bushmaster at 2,000m with a 7.62mm MG.
Please take the time to read what's presented to you. You don't need to hit the ATGW team, just force them to move, losing LOS.
What they said is that there are a few challenges. Like money. But there is money. There is always enough money. Just have to find it and harness it. Mix it with a bit of enthusiasm, and off you go.
Please tell me where I can get this money, that according to you is just harnessed. It would go a long ways towards paying for my college. :p:
Seriously, though where do you propose to get the money to purchase all these weapon systems once they are produced.
What are these mobile SAM firing platforms that can fire guided SAM's whilst actually moving?
They don't exist. The only system that claims the capability (to my knowledge) is the Pantsyr-1. And I'd be skeptical about their definition of "moving". Allegedly the Tunguska (direct predecessor) could fire the gun only, while moving. And both are short ranged SAM/SPAAG hybrids, intended not for independent use, but for use as part of a larger IADS.
Better yet what kind of air war doctrine is this part of, FutureTank? The USSR and now Russia spend a lot of time developing sophisticated and occasionally highly capable, GBAD to, in some ways, make up for a less capable air force. Australia invested in SH and JSF for a reason. ;)
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 10:37 PM
Right, so according to you then if this is a construct of the pentagon in recent years what type of conflict was Malaya? Remember this type of warfare wasn't invented back in the 1950's. The hundreds killed must just have been a figment of my imagination as is the ASM I received for being deployed to Butterworth in the 80's.
The Pentagon may have appended the label to it, but this type of warfare has been going on for millenia. The place where we take our rubbish was renamed in the 1990's to a Refuse Processing Facility - doesn't change what it is or what it does - ask any local - it's the tip
Note I said suppress - you do not need to hit. All you need to do is distract the firer or obscure his vision by the dust kicked up to have a chance of evading getting hit. It's better than doing nothing. A moder ATGW is going to make mincemeat anyway out of pretty much any armoured vehicle that is not equipped with ERA/bar armour. The key is to spot and destroy dismounted infantry with these weapons before they get a chance to get a shot off in this respect we have a significantly greater surveillance capability than the soviets in the 1980's
Err, yes they did which is why the Dutch Bushies have the additional armour. Correct. An infantry platoon is far more flexible. But on foot they will cover no more than 3 km/h patrolling in open country, are exposed to mines and IED's, in temperatures sometimes into the high 40's or minus 10 degrees. They would also be prime targets for any taleban with a dragunov sniper weapon. Inside a bushie, they are protected from all of those threats, can chose when to advance/withdraw, and it is significantly more difficult to lug a 23mm HMG to effectively engage a bushie than a sniper rifle to engage a digger on foot. In open country diggers remain in the vehicles. In close country, they dismount usually and move dismounted. This is doctrine (or at least it was 16 years ago).
OK, then you must have numerous instances where a sniper has snuck with his '23mm sniper weapon' into a hide and taken out armoured vehicles since 2001. The way warfare was conducted by the soviets has little relevance to the way warfare is being conducted today, so please provide evidence of this threat in recent times.
Thanks for your PM:rolleyes: on your qualifications, I was ...underwhelmed.
Right, so we are at war are we? Under your ideas, there should have been a national callup, possibly a reintroduction of national service or conscription, we should be engaged in crash building projects of all types of armaments (a-la- WW2). If that's the case why have you not presented yourself at the nearest army recruiting office. Having been to one years ago, and my wife who is a serving member working in one last year, I can tell you are very friendly and more than happy to induct you into the services. Given your expertise, I would recommend Army -Infantry. Then you can explain to all those misguided officers who clearly don't know how to employ the weaponry they are given the benefit of your ideas.
What an interesting theory. I'm no guru on islamic matters, but my mate whom I trained with at Uni is Pakistani. He is back in Pakistan and we stay in touch irregularly. He an I have had long chats about the fact that most of the Islamic world consider the Taleban and their interpretation of the koran to be entirely wrong. He considers the taleban and sharia law as being a greater threat to Islam than america. But what would he know - he's only a Pakistani Muslim.
[quote=FutureTank;173546]20 years! In 20 years you will have the Afghanistan Liberation Organisation, and Bin Ladin will be its "Arafat".
And who will prevent Taliban from returning after the last NATO soldier departs? [quote]
Ideally, the Afghan people. From what I've read they aren't that fussed by the taleban either, give them their own self determined rule and the confidence that NATO will be there for however long it takes, and you will see trust develop. With trust comes change. The Afghani's cannot trust any bugger because from the 1920's onward they have been occupied by every man and his dog. All have made promises, all have failed, or been kicked out. Incidentally, it may take 30 or 40 years, and I agree we will never see Afghanistan operating like a european democracy, but why should we want that? I believe the "lawyer jirga" (sp?) conducted established a rough set of rules as to the way the country was to be run and it didn't resemble the harsh taleban methodology or a european democracy.
I supported Gulf War 1 and its aims. But did not think that invading Afghanistan was smart. I did not think that Australia should be involved. I know it is militarily possible to win the war, but I also know that no government (even the communist soviet government as it was then) will stick it out long enough or make the necessary commitment (financial and lives) to make it work. Therefore combat was not the answer.
No, they are not sinking. There are some island nations in the Pacific that are suffering from a rise in sea levels, I don't think any nation is 'sinking'
3 things here:
1. Who died and appointed us grand high invader and stabiliser of countries?
2. We are trying that interventionist /offensive idea you are talking about in Afghanistan - and according to you thats unwinable.
3. You seem to forget that you are talking political will here. We no longer believe in the red threat of communism sweeping down through asia for example, therefore our policy of forward defence has been null for decades. I agree that the island neighbours in our immediate region we should be able to assist if requested, but as to invading with this incredible amphibious assault force? That's not going to be acceptable at virtually any level short of one nation invading another. Fiji is a basket case at the moment - is your answer to invade and restore democracy?
And tell me how much longer is it going to take to design all of these things you are talking about and build them from scratch? At a minimum 2-3 times longer.
I'm getting too busy again to continue with the subject, so will make this quick. In future I think its more productive to do, rather than to talk in a forum such as this.
Doesn't matter what you call it when the shooting starts. For the record, Australians went to a guerrilla war in Malaya.
If the war in Afghanistan keeps going, Australian troops will find that Taliban do not flinch so easily from bullets fired over a kilometre away. They had in the past, and will again lug heavy weapons around.
My qualifications mean nothing to me, why would they mean anything to you?
This is how training works in the Islamic World of a mujahid .
The group build a model of a Bushmaster. They select a firing position. Then they practice hitting it in the fuel tank with a weapon that is likely to leave them unhurt, so long range. When the firer can hit the fuel tank several times in a row, they set up a range where the target is moving slowly, maybe 5-10km/h pulled by a winch. The shooter starts his practice again. Then, they all go out and drag this canon out to where they think there is a patrol and wait...a day, a week, even a month. Then one of the party goes out and kidnaps a child somewhere, and when the patrol vehicle is coming, they send out this child in front of the vehicle. When the vehicle starts to slow down, the shooter fires just one shot, that hits the fuel tank. As the troops dismount, the ambush party attacks at close range. Then the weapon gets buried and camouflaged, and the entire group disperses to meet elsewhere a day, a week or a month later, and start on their way back to the weapon.
The best tactic agains this is what the Soviet Spetznaz did. On foot they would cover no more than 3 km/h patrolling in open country, exposed to mines and IED's, in temperatures sometimes into the high 40's or minus 10 degrees. They would make any mujahideen be prime targets for a dragunov armed sniper. The patrol's sniper would fire just once. And wait, tracking the mujahideen to fire again, an hour, a day, a week later...just once. The mujahid is not afraid to die, but he is afraid to die without firing back.
We are at war, and eventually you, and everyone in Australia, will get it....maybe a few years from now. Its early days yet.
I am too old, and have a physical disability to serve, but even so, I would serve in whatever role offered if that came to it.
A Pakistani Muslim that went to an Australian Uni! Do you not know anything about the Muslim World?
I'm sure you have read something on the history of Afghanistan, so will just suggest you reread that. There is no "Afghanistan". Its a convenient vacuum left by the British Empire between Sunni and Shi'a.
"Who died and appointed us grand high invader and stabiliser of countries?"
Its not that...we will have to take care of ourselves, that's all.
"We are trying that interventionist /offensive idea you are talking about in Afghanistan - and according to you that's unwinnable." - Afghanistan is not an "intervention", but the most expensive criminal chase in history.
"this incredible amphibious assault force" - this is a strategic force, not a whim-of-the-moment force. Is Fiji a strategic objective, and is its democracy strategically important to Australia? I'd say no. Fiji is a tribal society, and will never have democracy as long as its traditional social structures are intact.
The only things ever built from scratch were the wheel, the stone hammer and a self-bow.
"how much longer is it going to take to design all of these things" - its an ongoing activity, just like the economy.
If we can build an ICV in two decades we will have equalled the US effort with the Bradley. I think we can do better :)
I have decided to do, rather than talk, so will not participate in this forum actively since talking achieves nothing.
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 10:50 PM
You really do have no idea do you? The bushie was introduced to replace the IMV's (6x6 land rovers) that 6 brigade as a motorised brigade was using in the 90's. The rovers suffered in mobility, space, conditions the soldiers were carried in and protection.
And we need 700+ of them for the 6 Brigade, and the four companies deployed in the combat zones? Right...
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 11:00 PM
Is it a doctrinal requirement?
It has nothing to do with flying in the aircraft. Please stop making remarks that are inflammatory, or are easily perceived as such.
The Su-27 and derivatives of, are widely considered 4th generation aircraft. It's also typically recognized that the J-10 is a 4th generation (early) aircraft. This is pretty much in the category of common knowledge. However if you wish to dispute that, please tell me which criteria of a 4th generation aircraft do the Flanker derivatives, and J-10 not meet? Thrust to weight ratio? Modern aerodynamic design? Active radar guided BVRAAM? Advanced radars?
And will cost in the tens of billions. Once again how do you sell the public a need for a huge budget hike?
Please tell me, the question of licensing and property rights doesn't concern you when dealing with an F-35? And what generation do you intend your fighter to be by the time it's finished? Both Russia, the US, and a number of European countries have decided that developing their fighters from scratch isn't a good idea and instead decide to do it internationally with much help. They have a huge technology base, a huge production base, a large domestic market, and fairly likely foreign orders. But they can't afford to develop a speicalized maritime strike fighter, with the exception of Russia, but even then it's only a modification of the venerable Flanker, and the continuation of a Soviet-era project, quite different from developing what will need to be a 5th gen (which is the least that you need given your design time) aircraft with no research and technology base, and little previous experience in the area. Better yet where do you intend to find a market? The Su-34 maritime strike version (Su-32MF) already exists. It can be produced (if someone pays for it) serially, and comes from a proven and well established aviation company. It has yet to win any export orders. Yet you seem to be under the impression that the whole world is just waiting to jump on board with an Australian project, that lacks the necessary infrastructure, experience, and funding, to make it a success. :rolleyes: Please do some critical thinking. A cost-benefits analysis would also work well.
So you want to simultaneously spend tens of billions on a new maritime strike fighter, and on a new IFV? Again, where do you find these obscene piles of money? Please tell me, I could sure use some.
The part where you expect some company to do all this. Or do you propose a state-run effort?
Please take the time to read what's presented to you. You don't need to hit the ATGW team, just force them to move, losing LOS.
Please tell me where I can get this money, that according to you is just harnessed. It would go a long ways towards paying for my college. :p:
Seriously, though where do you propose to get the money to purchase all these weapon systems once they are produced.
They don't exist. The only system that claims the capability (to my knowledge) is the Pantsyr-1. And I'd be skeptical about their definition of "moving". Allegedly the Tunguska (direct predecessor) could fire the gun only, while moving. And both are short ranged SAM/SPAAG hybrids, intended not for independent use, but for use as part of a larger IADS.
Better yet what kind of air war doctrine is this part of, FutureTank? The USSR and now Russia spend a lot of time developing sophisticated and occasionally highly capable, GBAD to, in some ways, make up for a less capable air force. Australia invested in SH and JSF for a reason. ;)
I don't know what a 4th generation fighter aircraft is, and neither do you. Frankly I don't care. Air combat is greater than the sum of all those factors you listed, and the best aircraft is the one that gets to land rather than be collected by a garbage truck.
Until the J-10 flies in combat, we won't know.
You assume that every defence project has to cost billions, nay tens of billions of dollars. It need not. Change is coming Feanor :)
Sorry if you thought I made inflammatory remarks. I won't again...
Aussie Digger
April 30th, 2009, 11:06 PM
And we need 700+ of them for the 6 Brigade, and the four companies deployed in the combat zones? Right...
No. As has been pointed out to you multiple times already, we need 700+ for 7 Brigade, 6 Brigade hasn't existed for more than 10 years.
We need them for the combat support units of 1 Brigade, as the COMBAT UNITS are equipped with M113AS3/4 or will be by 2011.
We need Bushmasters for B Sqn 3/4 Cav and The Hunter Valley Lancer Regiment has a squadron of Bushmasters, they operate in support of the School of Infantry.
Starting to sink in yet?
Aussie Digger
April 30th, 2009, 11:20 PM
AD, lets not play with words. The Bushmaster is an armoured vehicle that troops use. Troops are expected to fight. It is therefore a fighting vehicle whether they, you or I like it or not. In this day and age we should not be expecting to encounter only IEDs or 7.62mm ball.
I suppose the quad-bikes used by 3RAR to haul around their mortars and Charlie G's are fighting vehicles then too?
You say we should buy a Bradley. Its a dud. It took 20 years to design, and it was an old design in the 1980s. It is completely unsuitable for Australia. Australia will not learn anything from purchasing it, but will spend billions yet again refurbishing and upgrading. Can't we ever buy the clothes that fit for a change instead of wearing hand-me-downs?
Why is it a dud? It carries the number of dismount troops in the back that we need. It has outstanding firepower and armour protection and has the mobility to keep up with Abrams, something you criticise the M113 for.
Will not learn anything from purchasing it? Ah, yes we will. We will learn what it is like to have a modern and capable infantry fighting vehicle in service. Something we cannot learn from attempting to design and produce ourselves, because we can't afford it.
In any case, I used Bradley as an example. I never said we SHOULD buy it, but I will now. We SHOULD have bought zero-lifed M2A2 Bradley's in 2002, off the shelf as part of the USA's own production line. They would be in-service now and only you would be whingeing about the lost "knowledge" opportunities.
Army would be quite happily developing a serious mechanised infantry capability.
Deploying 1,000km west of Brisbane was a waste of time. It only proved that the Army could find Quilpie on the map. How about 2500km north of Brisbane? Remember Lae? Australians fought there for a reason. "Lest we forget" does not mean just remembering to have a beer on ANZAC day. East Timor was a stretch, and a wake up call, but we are now a decade on. Has the ADF capability for deployments changed significantly? Yes, we can now deploy by C-17s much quicker, but the situation has changed. If there is a clash with Indonesian forces there, the transports will need escorts, so a naval approach would be much safer, and it won't be to Dili harbour either.
Can the ADF go 2714km NW of Darwin?
How far away is Iraq, again? What about Somalia? How far is Afghanistan for that matter? I'm pretty sure we deployed armour and infantry to all of those places...
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 11:36 PM
That's because a Minister has to be diplomatic in his speech. Defence Capability Plan priorities are matched closely against the capabilities that "threat countries" can or are likely to be able to deploy in the near future.
What? Who said they were? I said "Infantry IET courses". If you don't know what IET stands for, I think you're time should be better spent elsewhere, because it would be patently obvious you have not a clue...
Rubbish.
1. Bushmaster is not issued to the infantry Corps at ALL, except in 6 and 8/9RAR. 1,2,3,4,5 and 7 RAR will NOT have the vehicle and neither will any Reserve infantry unit.
I'm starting to agree with Wooki. One minute you're telling us that Afghanistan is a "real war" and the next you say the Bushmaster is not something to go to a real war in.
Make your mind up troll or get lost.
This is getting amusing. So if we were to choose a different vehicle with different capabilities, how is infantry going to be able to AVOID changing it's doctrine?
I agree, but it wasn't.
Next!
Er, except for those big things with large wingspans...
Rubbish. Neither HMAS Kanimbla or Manoora were in-service when Interfet landed in Timor.
Nor were C-17's.
ESSM - do have.
SM-2 - do have the missiles...
I happen to know that Land Rovers are not confined to roads, I think I read somewhere that they do in fact have 4x4 capability...
Yep. The upgrade was cancelled in 2004 because Abrams was ordered to replace it...
Abrams were delivered in 2006 and IOC reached in 2007.
What are these mobile SAM firing platforms that can fire guided SAM's whilst actually moving?
The USA doesn't have one to the best of my knowledge.
The majority of SAM systems on the planet are handheld and the major systems require TEL's (transport erector launchers - Patriot, S-300 etc).
Btw I just checked a few SAM systems.
The USA uses:
1. Avenger.
2. SL-AMRAAM.
3. Patriot
4. THAAD.
Guess what the predominant feature of the vehicles on ALL these systems is?
What does that tell you about the relative importance of the vehicles?
Again, rubbish. Even the Israeli's don't subscribe to that and they face a FAR higher threat level than we do.
You cannot even imagine the cost of trying to fit out M1A1 levels of protection on 600 plus vehicles, can you?
No-one in ADF has made this suggestion.
What has happened is that for the purpose of training efficiencies, 81mm mortars have been introduced into reserve artillery units. A gunner can be trained to use an artillery piece in a matter of a few weeks. What is important is the firing procedures, CP procedures and experience in firing fire support missions, not the particular piece which is used for low priority (in terms of deployment readiness) units.
Army experience has been that with existing levels of funding and access to training facilities, courses etc, concentrating on the core skills for these soldiers provides greater outcomes than attempting to "copy" the skills maintained by regular units on the more complex (both technically and in their employment) platforms.
The experience is the same in Armoured Corps. Obsolete M113AS1's, which aren't funded for replacement in Ares units anyway, have made way for Recon/Surveillance variants of Land Rovers.
The rationale being, that employing less sophisticated platforms allows the units to focus on individual and collective training activities, rather than on maintenance of the more complex equipment, much of which is obsolete anyway (M113AS1's and M2A2 105mm guns would be GREAT in a modern battle).
With Ares moving to an individual and sub-unit reinforcement basis, rather than a "base for expansion" basis, it is allowing Ares soldiers to obtain higher qualifications in their core skills, allowing greater opportunities to reinforce regular units deploying on operations, rather than continuing to provide no actual operational capability, but maintaining a charade of having "war time" equipment.
The answer of course is more money. But it isn't available and if it were, there are more important priorities for the deployed and regular force to fill than rounding out non-deployable Ares units.
Not really. How many soldiers have been killed due to a lack of offensive fire support on our operations?
How many mission failures have we had, for the same reason?
ADF personnel are already supported by AH-64 Apache helos and more than 2... Our own would be nice of course, but is it truly essential to achieve our mission?
Seems to me our mission is already being substantially achieved, notwithstanding that we could and should do a whole lot more.
What they do, IS directly relevant to us. An operational capability on a different (older) version of the helicopter in French service was reached yesterday. The initial capability. Not full capability.
Our version has NOT even reached this. As a particular instance of why we cannot deploy our helicopters, if you'd bother to do your research, you'd know that the 68mm rocket system we have bought with our helicopters, is still experiencing significant issues in relation to their backblast and the effect on the airframe from such.
Issues that require an engineering change to our helos.
Another issue is that the "operational" software load for our aircraft has not yet been completely developed. Whilst significant progress has been made, all the sensor and flight data, weapon and EW counter-measures systems need to be tested with each software load. Things are improving, but they aren't ready yet.
Army testified about this, in front of the Senate just a couple of weeks ago. It is these sorts of teething problems that mean our helos can't reach IOC and thus can't yet be deployed.
Does it mean the helos are no good and should be replaced? Nope, just that issues exist that have to be worked through.
That is reality. Go an order a new car. You don't always get it the same day you order it.
Go and build a new tank. The weapon systems needs to be fired in a large number of scenarios to verify it meets your requirements. Armour needs to be tested, mobility needs to be tested. Problems need to be addressed through engineering solutions.
Is that satisfactory? It is real life...
Maybe it should operate a HARM anti-radiation missile capability. Maybe it should operate a tactical recon pod capability.
There are any number of capabilities RAAF could have. Unlike you, RAAF like the rest of ADF have to make a choice between priorities.
Where is the money coming from?
Really? Which one? RAAF currently operates 2 types and has another one on order.
The AN/AAS-38 Nitehawk targetting pod and the Litening AT targetting pod. The ATFLIR pod is on order.
Know a bit about it do you? What procedures would you put in place to ensure these unguided rockets didn't cause a blue on blue?
Can you please explain the differences in minimum safe ranges between 2.75 inch rockets and precision guided 500lbs and larger bombs and how these apply to the fire support requirements for ground forces in Afghanistan?
No? Well perhaps you could try and find out some of these things before telling all what should and should not be done.
Wake up to yourself. Ordnance has "minimum safe ranges". A weapon cannot be dropped within x amount of metres of a friendly force without affecting them. Perhaps you could learn what some of these are, before you presume to tell those who do this sort of thing for a living what they "should" be doing?
Great. Really wonderful. Again, perhaps you could discuss the Australian rules of engagement for Afghanistan and whether unguided air launched weapons meets these requirements?
No they don't. Neither RAAF, RAF, USAF nor any other Hawk user has deployed them to Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else in recent years to conduct combat operations.
Rubbish. Here's why the Hawk Mk 127's are unsuitable.
1. No radar capability.
2. No EO/IR capability.
3. No FLIR capability.
4. No laser target designation capability.
5. No EW self protection capability.
6. Inadequate weapons capability (no precision weapons, limited overall A2G weapons capability).
7. Inadequate communications capability.
8. Inadequate range and payload capability.
Why the Hornets are eminently suited to Afghanistan.
1. Radar capability.
2. EO/IR capability.
3. FLIR capability.
4. Laser target designation capability.
5. Adequate EW self protection capability for the theatre.
6. Adequate weapons capability (20mm, laser/GPS-INS precision weapons capability, extensive overall A2G weapons capability).
7. Adequate communications capability (including data-link systems for recon and real-time download to JTAC/Special Forces teams).
8. Adequate range and payload capability.
So a cockpit based on the F/A-18's and RAAF's extensive investment in F/A-18 simulators achieves precisely nothing?
The B's have no other use eh?
AD, I'm not going to reply to most of this because predictably you had done your best to misinterpret, trivialise and twist what I said.
However, I am grateful for you explaining to me that neither the Army nor the RAAF any longer have the Second World War capability to conduct an airborne rocket firing at ground targets without deploying an advanced fighter-bomber like the F/A-18.
I'll make sure to write to the RAAF and ask them to amend their website.
I had not read that report on the Tiger.
Money well spent I say :onfloorl: maybe hey can do a fly-past for the welcome home parade c.2012?
For crying out loud, does ANYTHING we ever buy work as required on delivery?
Oh, I forget, Howard bought the M1s...took a lawyer to get something that works :)
Talking here is a waste of my time...
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 11:45 PM
No. As has been pointed out to you multiple times already, we need 700+ for 7 Brigade, 6 Brigade hasn't existed for more than 10 years.
We need them for the combat support units of 1 Brigade, as the COMBAT UNITS are equipped with M113AS3/4 or will be by 2011.
We need Bushmasters for B Sqn 3/4 Cav and The Hunter Valley Lancer Regiment has a squadron of Bushmasters, they operate in support of the School of Infantry.
Starting to sink in yet?
Yes, it has sunk in.
I'll look for news of the 7 Brigade being deployed to Afghanistan :)
Always good to know they found the right vehicles for the cavalry too :)
FutureTank
April 30th, 2009, 11:55 PM
I suppose the quad-bikes used by 3RAR to haul around their mortars and Charlie G's are fighting vehicles then too?
Why is it a dud? It carries the number of dismount troops in the back that we need. It has outstanding firepower and armour protection and has the mobility to keep up with Abrams, something you criticise the M113 for.
Will not learn anything from purchasing it? Ah, yes we will. We will learn what it is like to have a modern and capable infantry fighting vehicle in service. Something we cannot learn from attempting to design and produce ourselves, because we can't afford it.
In any case, I used Bradley as an example. I never said we SHOULD buy it, but I will now. We SHOULD have bought zero-lifed M2A2 Bradley's in 2002, off the shelf as part of the USA's own production line. They would be in-service now and only you would be whingeing about the lost "knowledge" opportunities.
Army would be quite happily developing a serious mechanised infantry capability.
How far away is Iraq, again? What about Somalia? How far is Afghanistan for that matter? I'm pretty sure we deployed armour and infantry to all of those places...
:onfloorl:
Ok, that does it for me.
Bye
vBulletin® v3.8.2, Copyright ©2000-2010, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.