Merkava 4

[totach]

Some pic taken last week









http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/

[totach]

http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/

[Feanor]

This is in the wrong forum. There is a pictures forum on this website, as well as a picture gallery to which you can upload images. This needs to be moved.

Now I notice you're new on here. Welcome to defencetalk. Please do read the rules, and enjoy your stay. An introductory thread in the Intros and Off-Topic forum would be very helpful.

[eckherl]

http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/

Nice pictures totach, did you serve on a Merkava series tank, also do you have any photos of a Mekava four with the loaders hatch.


Welcome aboard, it is nice to see folks for your neck of the woods join the forum.:)

[totach]

Nice pictures totach, did you serve on a Merkava series tank, also do you have any photos of a Mekava four with the loaders hatch.


Welcome aboard, it is nice to see folks for your neck of the woods join the forum.:)
HI

Thank you, I served on the Magach M60 in the 70
My son is on the Merkava today just become a tank commander last week

[totach]

This is in the wrong forum. There is a pictures forum on this website, as well as a picture gallery to which you can upload images. This needs to be moved.

Now I notice you're new on here. Welcome to defencetalk. Please do read the rules, and enjoy your stay. An introductory thread in the Intros and Off-Topic forum would be very helpful.

HI
Thank you I will read!

[Almaleki]

Admin: Text deleted. Grow up and/or learn to restrain yourself. Read the Forum Rules while you're away.

[Tavarisch]

Admin: Text deleted. Grow up and/or learn to restrain yourself. Read the Forum Rules while you're away.

Admin: Try not to respond to this kind of rubbish. Another has reported this and other inappropriate posts. This is what we would prefer members to do rather than give people like this ogygen.

[eckherl]

This is some of the very reasons why we cannot get some of our IDF friends onto this site and contribute information. I ask everyone to please keep the politics, gabs and hatred out of these discussions so that everyone can feeel at ease when posting, we are all equal as human beings regardless where we are from.

[OPSSG]

HI

Thank you, I served on the Magach M60 in the 70
My son is on the Merkava today just become a tank commander last week

Welcome to the forum and I really like your website. Thanks for the pictures.

IF the Arab countries unite for once, maybe they could.

You know I respect informed Malaysians and your country despite the difficult relationship that our countries have. It's just life and it should not affect our behaviour here. Please don't go for all that nationalistic UMNOputra BS and take sides because you will end up fighting with fellow forum participants.

totach was a former tankee and we could all learn a lot from him, as a human being and as a fellow forum participant with specialist tank knowledge.

The Merkava is a very interesting tank design, so I hope to learn more.

[totach]

IF the Arab countries unite for once, maybe they could.

Did you ever try to say write or think peace?

[totach]

In the time being more of the Merkava







http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/

[Firn]

Welcome to the forum and enjoy your stay. As far as I understood the friends who served in the IDF the Merkava was developed to create a tank which had (their) protection highest on the list.

[Abraham Gubler]

Boker tov! You can never have too much Merkava!

[Tavarisch]

Welcome to the forum and I really like your website. Thanks for the pictures.



You know I respect informed Malaysians and your country despite the difficult relationship that our countries have. It's just life and it should not affect our behaviour here. Please don't go for all that nationalistic UMNOputra BS and take sides because you will end up fighting with fellow forum participants.

totach was a former tankee and we could all learn a lot from him, as a human being and as a fellow forum participant with specialist tank knowledge.

The Merkava is a very interesting tank design, so I hope to learn more.

Hehe. To all of you out there, I am not all out for the destruction of Israel. I too wish to see all of the world united.

[totach]

me and my son now a Merkava commander









http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/

[Feanor]

I hope you don't mind if I upload these pictures you're posting to the defencetalk picture gallery, so they're easier to access. :)

Nice photos by the way.

EDIT: Uploaded here.

http://www.defencetalk.com/pictures/showgallery.php/cat/4048

I'm hoping you don't mind. Let me know if it's a problem.

[totach]

I hope you don't mind if I upload these pictures you're posting to the defencetalk picture gallery, so they're easier to access. :)

Nice photos by the way.

EDIT: Uploaded here.

http://www.defencetalk.com/pictures/showgallery.php/cat/4048

I'm hoping you don't mind. Let me know if it's a problem.

No problem
thanks for advise

[Templario]

The Merkava IV is one of my favourites tanks, with the Leopard 2E

[Almaleki]

Hey Totach ,, Could we chat sometime off - forum ...

[Pathfinder-X]

Shalom!

Merkava 4 didn't do so hot in 2006 against Hezbollah. However, I think the IDF high command severely underestimated the strength of the opposing forces and the number of ATGMs they were fielding. I'm interested to see what changes the Israelis made after that conflict, both to their tanks and their doctrine.

[Firn]

Well I discussed the matter before the issues were brought up, with a tanker who was half a year out of the army and his father who seemingly served during the "Peace for Galilee". It was pure coincidence as it the war had started days earlier and the son brought the issue up - his unit was mobilized. Anyway both the father and I were from different perspectives more cautious than the son. This was sadly redeemed to some point for different reasons.

If you have taken a look at the challenges of tank warfare in a terrain with steep hills, villages at the dominating crests and an well prepared enemy with many ATGM than one should not be too surprised by the overall difficulties.


Some reasons

(i) very difficult terrain, almost ideal for both AT-teams and IEDs
(ii) well prepared, hidden and fortified positions, often in villages
(iii) motivated defenders trained for the tasks
(iv) a decent communication network for the OPFOR
(v) partly restricitve ROE

were just part of the aspects which gave the Merkava 4 un bad rap.

There are some good papers out there which address the issue and go deeper.


Anyway I can imagine there were some specific changes on the tactical and operational level and in manyother areas, mainly training. Some of them could be observed in "Cast Lead".

[Abraham Gubler]

Shalom!

Merkava 4 didn't do so hot in 2006 against Hezbollah.

What was wrong with the Merkava's performance? There were many things wrong with the Israeli Army's performance - though they still captured the ground and caused massive attrition on their opponents. But what did the tank do wrong?

Would an M1A2 have been better? A T-90? The Sherman tank? No, they all would have performed worse.

[Almaleki]

What was wrong with the Merkava's performance? There were many things wrong with the Israeli Army's performance - though they still captured the ground and caused massive attrition on their opponents. But what did the tank do wrong?

Would an M1A2 have been better? A T-90? The Sherman tank? No, they all would have performed worse.

Admin. Response deleted. Post Reported by Senior Member.

Go back and read the rules about what is expected in here when posting a response. The text deleted was completely unacceptable. This is not a religious forum.

1st warning issued

[totac7]

walk around pic from Latrun during feb 09



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kbFHRoFKjM


http://idf-armor.blogspot.com/

[Feanor]

What was wrong with the Merkava's performance? There were many things wrong with the Israeli Army's performance - though they still captured the ground and caused massive attrition on their opponents. But what did the tank do wrong?

Would an M1A2 have been better? A T-90? The Sherman tank? No, they all would have performed worse.

Bullseye. Though I would wager a guess that a BMPT would have been slightly more suited for the role.

[Firn]

After reading some papers about the war in Lebanon 2006 it seems that things so basic as smokegrenades were missing. The crews seemed not well prepared, just as the IDF as a whole as well as the political leadership didn't perform too well according to Winograd report.

But this is a topic about the Merkava and I will add my humble opinion.


The Merkava is certainly a first-class MBT and up there with the Leopard II, the Abrams and the Challenger. The basic design is very sound, no wonder given the background of the designer and consultants, among them Israel Tal. The topography of the battlefields of Yom Kippur and the Six-Day war and the basic strategic realities of Israel (relative small population, high education, technological savy) base a premium at the survivability of the tankcrew. The layout of the Merkava and the quality and mass of the passive armor are of course very important factors but just parts of a larger whole. The capabilites of the gun, the qualities of the sight, the ergonomics are also facets. Tal's insistence on training for long-range shooting is an excellent example how to increase the effectivness of tanks and safeguarding thus their crews. Keeping the enemy at arms-lenght is in a modern tankbattle usually a great advantage for the better equipped and trained. Both the battlefields in the north and south offer relative little overhead protection and dense vegetation, making long range TA easier and such long shots possible. Modern technology has increasingly enabled the tankers to exploit such conditions.


I will continue later.

[justone]

IDF ARMOR (http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/)

Nice pictures! I have to give credit where credit is due. I've check out the Merkava 4. Its a good tank from the studies I done on it. The Israelis ready put there input into this tank. Do they train alot in the Merkava? Knowing the IDF they probably do. What I want to know if there was a confirmed hit on the Merkava in Lebanon in 2006 and what was the results?

[Firn]

Nice pictures! I have to give credit where credit is due. I've check out the Merkava 4. Its a good tank from the studies I done on it. The Israelis ready put there input into this tank. Do they train alot in the Merkava? Knowing the IDF they probably do. What I want to know if there was a confirmed hit on the Merkava in Lebanon in 2006 and what was the results?

Did you really "study" it? There are quite a few good papers and articles available about the 2006 Lebanon war and the part the Merkava played and suffered. Detailed and specific analyses about the effect of various AT-warheads on specifc locations are of course classified...

[justone]

Did you really "study" it? There are quite a few good papers and articles available about the 2006 Lebanon war and the part the Merkava played and suffered. Detailed and specific analyses about the effect of various AT-warheads on specifc locations are of course classified...

Well let me tell you something I study the tank. When it came to what happen to it in the 2006 Lebanon war I don't know "OKAY". I don't know too much about the 2006 Lebanon war. I know that the Party Of God did good against the IDF.

[Pathfinder-X]

What was wrong with the Merkava's performance? There were many things wrong with the Israeli Army's performance - though they still captured the ground and caused massive attrition on their opponents. But what did the tank do wrong?

Would an M1A2 have been better? A T-90? The Sherman tank? No, they all would have performed worse.
If Israel's goal was to simply cause more damage than they received, then sure I congratulate the Israelis on their minor success. However, given air dominance, numerical and equipment superiority, that was certainly no spectacular Israeli performance from any angle. On one hand, I am in no way implying the tank or the troops that manned them aren't capable. On the other hand, I'm not particularly impressed. While I admit I'm no expert on the IDF armor forces, news report such as this indicate that Isrealis are certainly making changes to their Merkavas.

New training aims to help tanks cope in hostile territory | Israel | Jerusalem Post (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1188392502053&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull)

Also claiming other tanks would have performed worse without taking difference between countries doctrines, tactics and equipments into consideration into consideration is a bit of a leap of faith isn't it?

[OPSSG]

If Israel's goal was to simply cause more damage than they received, then sure I congratulate the Israelis on their minor success. However, given air dominance, numerical and equipment superiority, that was certainly no spectacular Israeli performance from any angle. On one hand, I am in no way implying the tank or the troops that manned them aren't capable. On the other hand, I'm not particularly impressed. While I admit I'm no expert on the IDF armor forces, news report such as this indicate that Isrealis are certainly making changes to their Merkavas.

New training aims to help tanks cope in hostile territory | Israel | Jerusalem Post (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1188392502053&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull)

Also claiming other tanks would have performed worse without taking difference between countries doctrines, tactics and equipments into consideration into consideration is a bit of a leap of faith isn't it?

Thanks for the link. :)

Your reply uses the straw man argument of divergent tank tactics for different countries in an attempt to disagree with Abe's point of view. On the other hand, Abe's point was that Merkava, the tank, in terms of it's design, did not perform badly. The real issue, if I understand him correctly, was the limitations of the 2006 Israeli tactics. The Israelis have learnt from their past mistakes and these tactical limitations were not repeated in the recent Gaza operations.

Would you care to address his point (as I'm not sure what you are getting at)? Maybe I'm just a 'blur blob' and didn't really understand your point. Please explain a little more to your slightly confused (or blur) forum post reader. IMHO, currently both of you are talking at cross purposes (unless that is your intention). :D

[Feanor]

The Merkava is a product of a certain doctrine and certain requirements. I think what's being suggested is that if indeed Israel had a different (more suitable doctrine) it would also have a different tank.

[Abraham Gubler]

The Merkava is a product of a certain doctrine and certain requirements. I think what's being suggested is that if indeed Israel had a different (more suitable doctrine) it would also have a different tank.

If it is then its wrong. The Merkava is not produced to some kind of radical tank doctrine that differs to the rest of the world. The Israelis don't operate that way. They operate pretty much the same as everyone else - that is they use tanks for rapid maneuver in a hostile environment combined with accurate and sustained direct fires to achieve shock effect on the enemy.

The only thing that differs in the doctrinal development of the Merkava compared to that of the M1, Challenger, Leopard 2, T-72, T-80, etc is that the military officers writing the requirements had a lot more experience of sustained tank combat.

Which is why the Israelis seemed to focus on some divergent areas that weren't as popular with other contemporary tanks. Things like suspension movement and transmission torque as being more important contributions to mobility than pure power to weight ratios. Protection from mines and flank attacks. Easy and non-exposed access to reloading the main gun magazine. High levels of main gun depression. Compartmentalization of the hydraulic system from the crew compartment. Positioning of various equipment so as to protect the crew from penetrating fires.

As to the use of the Merkava in Lebanon in '06. The point I tried to make above was that the Merkava was far more customized to this kind of battle against small teams of ATGM snipers than any other tank in the world. The Leopard 2, M1A2, T-90, etc all would have suffered far worse due to their lack of anti-infantry weapons and protective features that the Markava has.

As to differences in tactics one could apply the same argument - that the Israelis with years of counter insurgency experience in Lebanon using armour would have been better than say the French Army which lacked that experience. However since the original point was about the actual tank rather the army being deficient I didn't draw that bow.

[Pathfinder-X]

Thanks for the link. :)

Your reply uses the straw man argument of divergent tank tactics for different countries in an attempt to disagree with Abe's point of view. On the other hand, Abe's point was that Merkava, the tank, in terms of it's design, did not perform badly. The real issue, if I understand him correctly, was the limitations of the 2006 Israeli tactics. The Israelis have learnt from their past mistakes and these tactical limitations were not repeated in the recent Gaza operations.

Would you care to address his point (as I'm not sure what you are getting at)? Maybe I'm just a 'blur blob' and didn't really understand your point. Please explain a little more to your slightly confused (or blur) forum post reader. IMHO, currently both of you are talking at cross purposes (unless that is your intention). :D
His argument was the Merkava performed fine during the conflict, citing greater damages dealt to Hezbollah. I made the point that Israelis had air dominance, artillery and armor support as well as numerical superiority during the conflict. Given their advantages, IDF's performance was less than impressive, and large chunk of casualties sustained were tank crews. Perhaps my first post that Merkava did not perform so hot gave the wrong impression that I thought the tank itself was sub-par. My comment was directed at the IDF armor forces as a whole in 2006.

[Firn]

Once of the most disturbant blunders was the lack of smoke grenades - IIRC a great deal of tanks, if not the majority was not equipped with them and the crews had not trained with them. A rather tragic incident, given that a creating a smokescreen is a SOP in an ambush. The ATGM teams fired often from very long range 2-3km and used a lot of missiles against a single tank. In both circumstances a screen of smoke would have reduced the vulnerability of the tank to a large degree. And while it would have shielded the tank the thermal sights could have allowed the tankers to return the compliment with interest.

[Verstandwaffe]

Mod edit: Text deleted.
Please read and abide by the forum rules (http://defencetalk.com/forums/rules.php) in future posts. Defamatory and/or inflammatory posts and comments are against the forum rules, whether the comments are directed at other members, armed forces or nations.
-Preceptor

[Abraham Gubler]

Mod edit: Text deleted.
-Preceptor

No the only irony is how wrong your statement is that is supposed to support a political opinion. The war in Lebanon in 2006 did not include any "defenceless Palestinians" it was between well armed Shia Lebanese religious extremists and well armed Israelis. You could apply the same definition to the 2009 Gaza war except replace 'Shia Lebanese religious extremists' with 'Sunni Palestinian religious extremists '.

As to the Merkava being armed with a German gun that's not quite so. Merkava Mk 1s and 2s are armed with an Israeli built gun based on a highly modified version of a design originally developed by the British in the 1950s. The Merkava Mk 2s and 4s are armed with an Israeli designed and built gun based on a German designed ammunition and barrel standard. Calling that German is like saying every communications system using wireless Wi-Fi technology is Australian (as its based on a CSIRO patent).

Since the post is clearly designed to be politically inflammatory - there is a place for that opinion and it is not here - it has been reported to the moderators.

[Abraham Gubler]

My comment was directed at the IDF armor forces as a whole in 2006.

But how can you make that call? Are you comparing the performance of the IDF armour in '06 against an insurgent force defending territory armed with ATGMs as a primary weapon with another armoured force against insurgent forces armed with ATGMs as their primary weapons? If so what example?

Because I don't know of any other similar campaign... If you are comparing the results with a non insurgency based campaign like Operation Desert Storm or Israeli high intensity tank victories then you are wasting everyone's time.

There have been many cases of insurgents armed with ATGMs on a more limited scale taking on tanks used by other armies (Vietnam, Iraq and Lebanon in the 80s and 90s) and achieving highly effective results. The US experience of armour in Iraq after the initial campaign is very similar to the Israelis but with different tactical outcomes (due to being in an occupation state).

As pointed out by Firn there were clear deficiencies with the preparedness of the IDF armour, brought about by being involved in over five years of continuing police action against the Palestinians (a different scale of intensity compared to counter insurgency in South Lebanon). But these deficiencies do not explain away the apparent lack of performance as markedly as the new tactical situation.

There are clear deficiencies in the expectations of 'observers' and 'commentators' for how tanks are to perform in such a new battle environment. The dominance of contemporary western tanks against straw dog forces like the Iraqi army has skewered public perception of armoured warfare to expect zero casualties.

The reality is tanks suffer against any motivated enemy. But tank knockouts do not equate to armoured force defeat in conventional battles where if 10 out of 20 tanks make it into the enemies rear zone then a rout will ensue. In a counter insurgency (COIN) battle the objectives are a lot less clear cut and each knocked out tank becomes a liability as the tank/crew recovery system is a juicy target for insurgents.

Which is why tanks now deployed into COIN are being equipped with massive additional layers of protection. The full CR2 upgrade, M1 TUSK and the active protection systems for Merkava Mk 4 are examples of this. A lot of this extra armour weight would be ditched for a conventional fight as it affects mobility but in COIN.

Lessons are learnt. Which raises a point I made above. Which army would have done better than the Israelis in Lebanon in 2006? The Canadians, the French, the Koreans? I doubt anyone...

[Feanor]

Lessons are learnt. Which raises a point I made above. Which army would have done better than the Israelis in Lebanon in 2006? The Canadians, the French, the Koreans? I doubt anyone...

Russians. We would bomb everything flat into saw-dust, and then repeat if anything is still moving, a lá Second Chechen War. :D

But seriously, I agree. In my opinion Hezbollah has brought back the concept of irregular forces and gave it a new life in the modern world. I think that it's their ability to break up the overall war into a number of smaller engagements from tactically superior positions on their part that made it possible for them to inflict the damage that they were able to deal.

[Firn]

Russians. We would bomb everything flat into saw-dust, and then repeat if anything is still moving, a lá Second Chechen War. :D

But seriously, I agree. In my opinion Hezbollah has brought back the concept of irregular forces and gave it a new life in the modern world. I think that it's their ability to break up the overall war into a number of smaller engagements from tactically superior positions on their part that made it possible for them to inflict the damage that they were able to deal.


As a matter of fact the bombing everything into saw-dust became quickly part of the standart tactic of the particularly the Soviets when faced with determined defenders armed with well hidden guns and Panzerfausts in complex terrain. The "Fausters" took a immense toll on Soviet armor, even if the engineers lead the way in MOUT and infantry with submachineguns work very closely with the tanks and very heavy firepower from the ground and the air was both indirectly and directly available. But then again the defense is the stronger form in warfare.

The ATGMs of NATO caused also great concern in the WP countries. This threat caused both tactical and technological changes, but this should be discussed in other topics.

To some extent one could say that the tactical lessons of 2006 were both nothing new and truly new. Hezbollah took time-honored concepts and adopted them sometimes well and sometimes less so to specifc circumstances. That we are discussing here the performance of the Merkava shows that they got the AT-defense and public campaign partly right.


While I do think that armour will always have trouble in complex terrain there are some interesting technological developments. Combined with the right combined tactics and training integrated into a overall sensible strategy they might decrease the vulnerability of the AFV and increase the stakes for the AT-teams.

[Abraham Gubler]

To some extent one could say that the tactical lessons of 2006 were both nothing new and truly new. Hezbollah took time-honored concepts and adopted them sometimes well and sometimes less so to specifc circumstances. That we are discussing here the performance of the Merkava shows that they got the AT-defense and public campaign partly right.

I think this is hugely wrong and another case of searching for a historical analogy for no good purpose.

The Hezbollah did not invent the ATGM or the use of them in small teams and in concentrated bombardments. But they were the first insurgent force to use ATGMs in this kind of scale. The difference between fighting an insurgent force and a conventional force is hugely significant.

For a conventional conflict a forward screen of ATGMs can just be suppressed and driven through by the tanks. Sure they suffer a few losses but they motor on and soon find themselves in the supply lines of those ATGM teams and cut them off. But insurgents don't have supply lines or fronts in the conventional sense and are ready to live of the land. So you can't defeat them with maneuver in a physical sense. Also after being suppressed they just displace and because of the non linear nature of the campaign always have a new target.

Also the 2006 Lebanon campaign was not an urban campaign. While there were some vicious fights over a couple of villages it was in effect a hilly, rural counter insurgency campaign.

[Wooki]

In terms of COIN warfare, the 2006 Lebanon conflict reinforced that tanks are viable and ironically enough (after examination of the conflict) it ensured the survival of the Merkava.

All this despite an educated enemy exploiting the Merkava's perceived weaknesses.

As to the references that the M1A2 would have performed worse then the Merkava? Who knows? It comes down to Situation Awareness and design differences. As I recall at the time; the Merkava being taken out from the rear was cited by those in the pentagon as validation (vindication) for the rear-engined configuration of the M1A2 as being superior to the Merkava in a COIN environment.

It really is 6 of one and a half dozen of the other as both designs priority is crew survivability and both achieve the objective through different survivability suite philosophies.

What is outstanding about the Merkava (and should be copied by a nation wishing to develop its own armor platform) is that is was designed from the outset for large growth potential and that has been the main indicator to come out of 2006 that the Merkava is a great tank. Post conflict it has been (or is being ) adapted with relatively little cost in time , manpower and dollars to the program as a whole.

The worst thing that Israel could do today is cancel production of the platform (IMHO).

cheers

w

[Firn]

I think this is hugely wrong and another case of searching for a historical analogy for no good purpose.

For a conventional conflict a forward screen of ATGMs can just be suppressed and driven through by the tanks. Sure they suffer a few losses but they motor on and soon find themselves in the supply lines of those ATGM teams and cut them off. But insurgents don't have supply lines or fronts in the conventional sense and are ready to live of the land. So you can't defeat them with maneuver in a physical sense. Also after being suppressed they just displace and because of the non linear nature of the campaign always have a new target.

Also the 2006 Lebanon campaign was not an urban campaign. While there were some vicious fights over a couple of villages it was in effect a hilly, rural counter insurgency campaign.

Well I think I have to disagree and state once again that the historical analogies show some very important concepts and allow as to compare the specific tactics in this specific campaign. What I pointed out is that we can see that determined infantry in complex terrain (urban, mountains, swamps, thick forests, villages) with suited AT-weapons pose a serious threat to tanks, even if well supported by infantry and artillery.

On a tactical level "conventional" and "unconventional" ATGM-teams are used in delaying actions and ambushes, and it is actually hard to argue that Hezbollah was especially innovative in this regard. Surprising was mostly that they had all this ATGMs and used them in a sensible way often togheter with mines, mortars and machineguns.


Anyway there are two large technological growth areas which might considerably increase the survivability, SA and ADS which are both linked.

(i) Situational Awerness has witnessed an exponentional growth, allowing to far faster TA, making it more dangerous for OPFOR to engage the tank.

(ii) Active defense suites incorporating hard and soft-kill systems are making huge strides, increasing greatly the difficulties to defeat a tank.

I'm pretty much convinced that the Merkava will have a place on the battlefield for a long time to come..

[Saxon-Thor_74]

IDF ARMOR (http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/)

The Merkevah is a very interesting piece of equipment. Anyone know how well the Mk IV armor stood up to the 2nd generation anti-tank RPG in southern Lebanon '06? Also, the chain curtains that hang on the aft of the turret: are those designed to detonate the RPG round before it makes contact with the adjoining of the turret and body? Or is it visual obfuscation to confound high caliber API rounds (.50 calibre, 20mm)???? Thanks.

[Saxon-Thor_74]

Well I think I have to disagree and state once again that the historical analogies show some very important concepts and allow as to compare the specific tactics in this specific campaign. What I pointed out is that we can see that determined infantry in complex terrain (urban, mountains, swamps, thick forests, villages) with suited AT-weapons pose a serious threat to tanks, even if well supported by infantry and artillery.

On a tactical level "conventional" and "unconventional" ATGM-teams are used in delaying actions and ambushes, and it is actually hard to argue that Hezbollah was especially innovative in this regard. Surprising was mostly that they had all this ATGMs and used them in a sensible way often togheter with mines, mortars and machineguns.




Anyway there are two large technological growth areas which might considerably increase the survivability, SA and ADS which are both linked.

(i) Situational Awerness has witnessed an exponentional growth, allowing to far faster TA, making it more dangerous for OPFOR to engage the tank.

(ii) Active defense suites incorporating hard and soft-kill systems are making huge strides, increasing greatly the difficulties to defeat a tank.

I'm pretty much convinced that the Merkava will have a place on the battlefield for a long time to come..

Wow, very interesting thread. Highly knowledgeable posters indeed!! If I may offer an amateur contribution, the tank will always be best suited for open plains, maneuver battles, no? The fact that the tank will always be vulnerable to ATGM, in complex terrain, will probably be in perpetuity until a specific purpose platform is developed to counter the threat. This will lead to other, mutually exclusive vulnerabilities IMHO.

The greatest problem for the IDF revolves around political considerations vis-a-vis world opinion. If the IDF were free to launch a campaign that would have truly been able to deal a long lasting, impacting blow to Hezbillah (sp?), they would have encircled the lower half of the country and cut off Syrian logistical support and a hammer/anvil operation would have ensued. Alas, domestic and international outcry prevents IDF strategists from using their assets to maximum effect. Lets not forget all the M-1's that were obliterated in Iraq due to roadside bombs (essentially, ATGM). A highly motivated, fanatically suicidal unconventional force is hard to deal with in any circumstance given the right equipment, terrain, and advantages. I think the full advantages of the Mk IV Merkevah vs. contemporary adversaries will be hard to appreciably deduce until the IDF engages on a full scale level (a la '67, '72). Regardless, it's hard discount the conceptually innovative technological designs that went into its development despite any political motivations one might have to disregard the IDF, or its incursion into S. Lebanon '06.

[totac7]

Wow, very interesting thread. Highly knowledgeable posters indeed!! If I may offer an amateur contribution, the tank will always be best suited for open plains, maneuver battles, no? The fact that the tank will always be vulnerable to ATGM, in complex terrain, will probably be in perpetuity until a specific purpose platform is developed to counter the threat. This will lead to other, mutually exclusive vulnerabilities IMHO.

The greatest problem for the IDF revolves around political considerations vis-a-vis world opinion. If the IDF were free to launch a campaign that would have truly been able to deal a long lasting, impacting blow to Hezbillah (sp?), they would have encircled the lower half of the country and cut off Syrian logistical support and a hammer/anvil operation would have ensued. Alas, domestic and international outcry prevents IDF strategists from using their assets to maximum effect. Lets not forget all the M-1's that were obliterated in Iraq due to roadside bombs (essentially, ATGM). A highly motivated, fanatically suicidal unconventional force is hard to deal with in any circumstance given the right equipment, terrain, and advantages. I think the full advantages of the Mk IV Merkevah vs. contemporary adversaries will be hard to appreciably deduce until the IDF engages on a full scale level (a la '67, '72). Regardless, it's hard discount the conceptually innovative technological designs that went into its development despite any political motivations one might have to disregard the IDF, or its incursion into S. Lebanon '06.

Israel’s objectives were not met. Hezbollah’s military capability was temporarily diminished but not destroyed, and its political stock rose in the eyes of Lebanese, including in the eyes of Christians who had previously opposed Hezbollah. Syria and Iran have reportedly restocked Hezbollah’s arsenal of missiles. Hezbollah’s boycott of the Lebanese government, which is Western-backed, has created a political stalemate, but also strengthened Hezbollah’s hand as a force in Lebanon’s future.

The 2006 Lebanon War, in sum, killed many, destroyed much, but advanced neither Israel’s objectives nor Lebanon’s. Only Hezbollah seemed to emerge from the conflict stronger than before it began, even though Lebanese army troops are now deployed in south Lebanon. With tensions still high between Israel, Syria and Hezbollah, the immediate future is uncertain. Within Lebanon, where presidential elections are slated for the latter part of 2007, the future is even more uncertain as murmurs of civil war, should the election fail to break the current stalemate, have been echoing in most ears



IDF ARMOR (http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/)

[totac7]

A nice pic from "cast lead" op. 2009

[Saxon-Thor_74]

A nice pic from "cast lead" op. 2009

Totac, what is all that apparatus on the back of the turret? Sandbags? Beautiful tank though.

[totac7]

Totac, what is all that apparatus on the back of the turret? Sandbags? Beautiful tank though.

It is the personal gear of the crew






IDF ARMOR (http://www.idf-armor.blogspot.com/)

[Firn]

First hard-kill system in the field:


Merkava with Throphy operational (http://switch248-01.castup.net/cunet/gm.asp?ai=248&ar=8roni_daniel_vtr_n20090603_v1&ak=null&ndth=1&th=1&thsize=428X321&thindex=0)

The Lebanon War certainly played its part, according to the graphic. And no, I don't speak hebrew.