What strategy can we use to win in Afganistan?

[WarGod]

Now that we are builiding up troops in Afganistan the war is going to turn bloody this spring and summer. It looks like we are repeating the same mistakes we made in Vietnam. What strategy can we use to defeat the taliban and al qaida? Also how many troops do you guys think we will have in Afganistan in two to three years? Do you guys also think if thing turn bad in Pakistan we would have to send troops in there? Pakistan has a strong military but they are unwilling to fight the taliban, so how can we win this war? Is Afganistan Vietnam and Pakistan is cambodia with nukes?

[wtsimpson7]

What I believe we need to do is 3 important things. 1st, we need to do counterinsurgency right. Clear insurgents out, keep that area protected, and build the infrastructure/local relations. Next, we might need to talk to the Taliban. It doesn't hurt to have communication with the enemy. Finally; pressure Pakistan. They will be a huge advantage once we truly win them over. If we can do this, we might be able to win!!! (about how many troops we need, that might depend on Iraq's needs, etc. Since I.D.K 'bout that, I would leave that up to you guys.)

[PatriotTurk]

It's impossible to win Guerilla troops with standard army. We have too much skill about that in our warfare in Southeastern Anatolia.

1. You should create militia troops with high training. (Like commado etc.)

2. You must reduce your troops in Afghanistan.

3. And you must establish high relationship with local people, not Taliban. (Respect their culture etc.)

If you do these factours. You'll win.

[MrQuintus]

1: Put FOBs every 4km along the entire Afghan border, starting with the Afghan pakistan border, about 1000 in all.

2. destroy every opium field

that would make a nice start

[PatriotTurk]

1: Put FOBs every 4km along the entire Afghan border, starting with the Afghan pakistan border, about 1000 in all.

2. destroy every opium field

that would make a nice start



Everyone and everywhere? This takes a very long time.. Maybe 5-10 year.

[Feanor]

Everyone and everywhere? This takes a very long time.. Maybe 5-10 year.

Hardly. Given the financing the whole thing could be prepared and executed in a couple of months.

[PatriotTurk]

Hardly. Given the financing the whole thing could be prepared and executed in a couple of months.

Couple of months?? Why you didnt do this? Too many months has passed. :)

[Marc 1]

1: Put FOBs every 4km along the entire Afghan border, starting with the Afghan pakistan border, about 1000 in all.

2. destroy every opium field

that would make a nice start

Destroy the opium fields and yes the talibs have lost their source of revenue, but so have the local farmers. All the local farmers see is a coalition soldier destroying his business in a place that does not have any form of social security (i.e. a deth sentence for his family). Do you think that will help?

If you intend doing that you need to make it worthwhile to grow another crop, that the talibs won't be able to sell at a profit. eg wheat that the coalition offers $1000 a tonne for. Totally unrealistic in market terms, but if that's what you need to do to keep the population happy and starve the talibs of funding...

[STURM]

Amidst all the talk of a new strategy, sanctuaries in Pakistan and extra troops for Afghanistan, an important point to consider is that a large number of the Pashtun population [not all of whom share the same religous views of the Taliban or have ties with Al Qaida] see the Taliban as a legitimate ressistance movement against a foreign occupation. At the moment the Talibs dominate large areas of the countryside and retain the support of a large part of the population, irrespective of how many are killed by coalition troops.

MrQuintus..., even assuming enough troops could be found to man the 1000 FOBs you mentioned, what effect would it have on on winning hearts and minds or the insurgency campaign against the Talibs. Instead of being seen, mixing with the population and dominating the countryside, troops would be confined to these FOBs and would serve no useful purpose.

For those interested in Afghanistan, I strongly recommend Ahmad Rashid's '' Descent Into Chaos'' and ''Taliban''.

[Kilo 2-3]

1. Continue the drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Decpatiation strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda destabilizes their ability to act cohesively in the region. This gives coalition troops the chance to take more effective action against insurgents in the area.

2. Get the Department of Agriculture busy. Find some kind of cash crop which will grow well in Afghanistan, but without the social problems drugs like opium create.

Some have proposed soybeans as a possible solution. They have less dollar value than poppies, but they do provide protein and they are a step in the right direction
For Afghans, a soy solution takes root - Los Angeles Times (http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/21/local/me-soy21)

3. Partner with Pakistan. They don't want the Taliban any more than we do, and driving them out of or hampering their presence in Pakistan will deprive them of a key base of operations

4. Build schools. People like Greg Mortensen have enjoyed success in this area, and it's greatly reduced the Taliban's sympathetic base in the population. having an educated population is going to be key if Afghanistan wants to grow economically and politically in the future.

5. Win over the people. Guys in full battle rattle aren't going to do this, it's going to take vets, agricultural specialists, and medics to help the people and gain their trust.

This is also going to require the coalition military to step up their efforts to protect the people. That means following the current ROEs, as restrictive as they are, to avoid civilian casualties, and to make an effective effort to protect the people.

6. Reduce troop footprint. Rumbling around in tanks lets you control the roads, but not the whole country. Ultra-mobile, unconventional or QRF forces need to be deployed to take the country and fight the Taliban in their own backyard.

It's what SOG did in 'Nam and Laos and it worked to a degree...now all we need are some Montagnards.

7. Get the Afghans up to speed. Tribal differences make things hard. Afghan isn't one homogenized group, it's a bunch of Pashtun tribal units and they are rivals. This hampers the efforts of the local Army and the ANP, and only in the Commando units have the tribal barriers been fully addressed and solved.

The average ANP soldier isn't ready to replace the average US Army soldier, they need intensive training, and they need something to be proud of.

It will be difficult, but it's what has to be done.

[chris]

Win in Afganistan? As in installing a stable and democratic government and leave that place?

My best guess is that you need the same steps you will need to take, to enforce and maintain a complete weapon's ban to the population of Texas.

Disclaimer. This is not about a pro gun or not discussion . I sincerely think that victory in Afghanistan is like asking Texans to live under a weapons ban. You will need to take the same approach.

So, I'm asking you. What strategy can we use to enforce a weapon's ban in Texas?

PS. Again, I'm not saying that we should enforce a weapon's ban in Texas. If we had too, how would we do it?

[STURM]

1. Continue the drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. .

One of the problems with the drone attacks in Pakistan is that is has led to some degree of resentment by Pakistanis who feel that it infringes on Pakistani sovereignty. Another problem is though Pakistani cooperation is crucial to success in Afghanistan, the current government is deeply unpopular amongst many Pakistanis who view their government as having as sold itself off to the U.S.

They don't want the Taliban any more than we do, and driving them out of or hampering their presence in Pakistan will deprive them of a key base of operations

On the contrary, there are many 'jihadist' elements in the Pakistan military and public who are pro Taliban. That ones of the reasons the U'S. is so worried about the Pakistani nukes in event of Pakistan falling totally into the hands of the jihadists.

Tribal differences make things hard. Afghan isn't one homogenized group, it's a bunch of Pashtun tribal units and they are rivals.

What about the Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkmens? Despite reduced Northern participation in the Kazai government, many Pashtuns still see Kazai's government as one that is dominated by non-Pashtuns and one that is nothing but a puppet pulled by U.S. strings.

[Feanor]

Well when the Pashtuns form the basis of the resistance, it's hard to position the current government otherwise. NATO did cooperate with the Norther Alliance in it's time, and the Northern alliance consisted of *drumroll* non-Pashtuns. ;)

[STURM]

Does anyone know what the ethnic composition of the ANA is? Has the Kazai government managed to attract non- Pashtun volunteers?

[Kilo 2-3]

Does anyone know what the ethnic composition of the ANA is? Has the Kazai government managed to attract non- Pashtun volunteers?

It seems to be a mix, but I'm not sure of the ratios of Pashtun to other tribes.

There was an ANA commando unit that was in the news about a year as sort of the poster-child for successfult tribal integration in one elite Afghan Army unit.

The Herald-Sun - Afghan commandos look beyond the tribe (http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/3590352/article-Afghan-commandos-look-beyond-the-tribe)

[OPSSG]

Guys, I would like to recommend that you read what four articles on two areas, the ANA and the ANP, which set the background for Stratfor's 'The Meaning of Marjah (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100216_meaning_marjah)'. The Stratfor article is written by Kamran Bokhari, Peter Zeihan and Nathan Hughes and a portion of it is quoted below. I have put in bold and in blue some text for emphasis:

...As the Obama administration’s strategy has begun to take shape, it has started thinking about endgames. A decades-long occupation and pacification of Afghanistan is simply not in the cards. A withdrawal is, but only a withdrawal where the security free-for-all that allowed al Qaeda to thrive will not return. And this is where Marjah comes in.

Denying the Taliban control of poppy farming communities like Marjah and the key population centers along the Helmand River Valley — and areas like them around the country — is the first goal of the American strategy. The fewer key population centers the Taliban can count on, the more dispersed — and militarily inefficient — their forces will be. This will hardly destroy the Taliban, but destruction isn’t the goal. The Taliban are not simply a militant Islamist force. At times they are a flag of convenience for businessmen or thugs; they can even be, simply, the least-bad alternative for villagers desperate for basic security and civil services. In many parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban are not only pervasive but also the sole option for governance and civil authority.

So destruction of what is in essence part of the local cultural and political fabric is not an American goal. Instead, the goal is to prevent the Taliban from mounting large-scale operations that could overwhelm any particular location. Remember, the Americans do not wish to pacify Afghanistan; the Americans wish to leave Afghanistan in a form that will not cause the United States severe problems down the road. In effect, achieving the first goal simply aims to shape the ground for a shot at achieving the second.

That second goal is to establish a domestic authority that can stand up to the Taliban in the long run. Most of the surge of forces into Afghanistan is not designed to battle the Taliban now but to secure the population and train the Afghan security forces to battle the Taliban later. To do this, the Taliban must be weak enough in a formal military sense to be unable to launch massive or coordinated attacks. Capturing key population centers along the Helmand River Valley is the first step in a strategy designed to create the breathing room necessary to create a replacement force, preferably a replacement force that provides Afghans with a viable alternative to the Taliban.

That is no small task. In recent years, in places where the official government has been corrupt, inept or defunct, the Taliban have in many cases stepped in to provide basic governance and civil authority. And this is why even the Americans are publicly flirting with holding talks with certain factions of the Taliban in hopes that at least some of the fighters can be dissuaded from battling the Americans (assisting with the first goal) and perhaps even joining the nascent Afghan government (assisting with the second).

The bottom line is that this battle does not mark the turning of the tide of the war. Instead, it is part of the application of a new strategy that accurately takes into account Afghanistan’s geography and all the weaknesses and challenges that geography poses. Marjah marks the first time the United States has applied a plan not to hold the line, but actually to reshape the country...

Two areas of concern - the ANA and the ANP - the problems and recommendations:

(i) Col (Rtd) Jeff Haynes* writes on 'Reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA) (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200911.haynes.reformingafghannationalarmy.html)' in November 2009. NPS also has a 'Summary on the ANA (http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/ANA_Summary_Web.pdf)'. This piece is longer but necessary to set the stage to critique the ANA. which provides the background for Jeff Haynes.

(ii) Robert A. Wehrle writing for Washington Times on February 21, 2010 says that 'Afghan mess bigger than we thought (http://washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/21/afghan-mess-bigger-than-we-thought//print/)'. This article is mercifully short and concise on the conceptual problems with the current approach, in particular, the weak link called the ANP. There's also a companion piece called 'Reforming the ANP (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200909.rusi.reformingafghanpolice.html)', which is longer and more detailed than the piece by Robert A. Wehrle.

In reality all these articles quoted above are external view points and I find that we are really lacking articles written by the Afghans themselves. Therefore I've included a link to an article (to a 17 page pdf) (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/09spring/jalali.pdf) written by Ali A. Jalali. He was the Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005. His expressed view sees the situation as more complex and has a focus beyond the immediate problems of the ANA and ANP.

--------------------------------
*Note: Jeff Haynes recently retired as a Colonel from the United States Marine Corps after 24 years of service. During 2008, he commanded Regional Corps Advisory Command-Central where he advised the Afghan National Army’s 201st Corps Commanding General and staff. Concurrently, Colonel Haynes commanded 23 Embedded Training Teams consisting of over 600 advisors and support personnel from all US services and 5 contributing nations distributed throughout central and eastern Afghanistan.

[AfghanAmbush]

I don't have time right now to explain every detail of this war but here is some insight.

The only way to beat the insurgency in Afghanistan is to stay there for about five more years but i don't think thats going to happen and at the end of the day the insurgents still have power. The Taliban are simply going to outlast the forces. For all of you who think that Opium brings them most of their money, your wrong. The insurgency does get some money off it but not at the extent that most people think, at one point the taliban almost eradicated opium from Afghanistan. The western intelligence and DEA have good control of the drug trade. The Taliban will not be bribed and part of the population support them, with resources and men (mostly pashtuns) but also some in the north. I've spoken with people recently from Kabul, they tell me that the U.S is not helping at all and even people in Kabul distrust the Americans. They do like the Germans, Japanese and the Indians who actually help the population and do it for free. You have to understand that the ISI is also connected to the Taliban, hence the recent attack that targets the guest houses (mostly Indians). The recent capture of the taliban commander is also not that surprising for most there because he was actually taking to the government (peace talks) and he might have had a little to much power. My guess is that the ISI gave him up before he did talk to the west or became too powerful. This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.

[Kilo 2-3]

I don't have time right now to explain every detail of this war but here is some insight.

The only way to beat the insurgency in Afghanistan is to stay there for about five more years but i don't think thats going to happen and at the end of the day the insurgents still have power. The Taliban are simply going to outlast the forces. For all of you who think that Opium brings them most of their money, your wrong. The insurgency does get some money off it but not at the extent that most people think, at one point the taliban almost eradicated opium from Afghanistan. The western intelligence and DEA have good control of the drug trade. The Taliban will not be bribed and part of the population support them, with resources and men (mostly pashtuns) but also some in the north. I've spoken with people recently from Kabul, they tell me that the U.S is not helping at all and even people in Kabul distrust the Americans. They do like the Germans, Japanese and the Indians who actually help the population and do it for free. You have to understand that the ISI is also connected to the Taliban, hence the recent attack that targets the guest houses (mostly Indians). The recent capture of the taliban commander is also not that surprising for most there because he was actually taking to the government (peace talks) and he might have had a little to much power. My guess is that the ISI gave him up before he did talk to the west or became too powerful. This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.

AfghanAmbush, I'm sure you could speak on this more accurately than myself, but isn't opium, even without Taliban links, harmful to the long-term stability of Afghanistan both regionally and nationally?

I say that because opium, while it does generate a livelihood for farmers, also creates severe addictions to the drug, resulting in severe poverty and destitution which could hold Afghanistan back or could become a factor in provoking rebellion or dissent several years down the road.

[Feanor]

Most of Afghan's opium gets exported. Not much of it actually stays in Afghan. I wouldn't be surprised if statistics for opium usage hadn't climbed all that much in the recent decade.

[STURM]

This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.

Have any official figures been released about the number of Afghan civilians killed by mistake since 2001 by coalition airstrikes/artillery?

Some Afghanistan videos:

YouTube- Conversations With History - Ahmed Rashid

YouTube- **** Ahmad Rashid Exclusive; "Taliban Willing To Talk"

YouTube- Interview with Peter Jouvenal

YouTube- Riz Khan - General Stanley McChrystal - 9 Dec 09 - Part 1

YouTube- Massoud's Last Stand - Afghanistan

[AfghanAmbush]

AfghanAmbush, I'm sure you could speak on this more accurately than myself, but isn't opium, even without Taliban links, harmful to the long-term stability of Afghanistan both regionally and nationally?

I say that because opium, while it does generate a livelihood for farmers, also creates severe addictions to the drug, resulting in severe poverty and destitution which could hold Afghanistan back or could become a factor in provoking rebellion or dissent several years down the road.

Of course, the Taliban did a better job at limiting the opium trade then the western forces. Some ways of reducing the illegal drug trade would be building pharmaceutical companies and giving the farmers a source to sell it to instead of the dealers etc.. Making medical use of opium would be helpful specially with the support and allied countries.

[Kilo 2-3]

Of course, the Taliban did a better job at limiting the opium trade then the western forces. Some ways of reducing the illegal drug trade would be building pharmaceutical companies and giving the farmers a source to sell it to instead of the dealers etc.. Making medical use of opium would be helpful specially with the support and allied countries.

True, true. But adding middlemen would add to the cost of the opium and give the Afghan gov't yet another thing to try to regulate. I think that doing this would just create a black market, result in price hikes, and make the lot of the addicts even worse, not to mention the fact that it could give the Taliban an opportunity to exploit.

[Feanor]

It's a matter of combining the administrative controls, with stronger law enforcement.

[umair655]

I think US is not going to win in Afghanistan ever, reason they cannot never win the heart of local people. Many of the local people are converting to insurgents after each NATO strike killing their loved ones. So it will be not wrong if I say US army is fighting the Afghan Nation not any regular army, as an army can defeat any army but can't defeat the a nation. So I think better for US is to leave Afghanistan asap and take testifications from the local afghan people or taliban they willl not allow Alqaeda again to use their ground to attack US, remember alqaeda is US ememy not Taliban.

[Kilo 2-3]

I think US is not going to win in Afghanistan ever, reason they cannot never win the heart of local people. Many of the local people are converting to insurgents after each NATO strike killing their loved ones. So it will be not wrong if I say US army is fighting the Afghan Nation not any regular army, as an army can defeat any army but can't defeat the a nation. So I think better for US is to leave Afghanistan asap and take testifications from the local afghan people or taliban they willl not allow Alqaeda again to use their ground to attack US, remember alqaeda is US ememy not Taliban.

That's one of the reasons US, etc. military leaders are working so hard to partner with and co-operate with local leaders and governments. They recognize that they have to create a framework which can make the Afghans self-governing and prevent the Taliban from exploiting an unstable gov't or poor balance of power.

Pulling out right now, quite simply is not an option. The vast majority of the ANP and the Afghan Army are not ready for individual, unsupervised combat operations. If NATO forces pull out now, the whole house of cars will come down and the country will descend into tribal violence, and the Taliban will simply seize control again, leaving the country in an even worse position than it was in 2001-2002.

"Testifications?" Without enforcement, people aren't going to keep a promise to keep the Taliban and Al-Qaeda out. Such an idea represents a stunning amount of naivete. Al-Qaeda is going to exploit any and every US failure, especially a defeat in Afghanistan. There's a lot more at stake here than just a bunch of mountains and poppy fields.

If we thought Iraq was bad, just wait and see what happens if we leave Afghanistan prematurely. It'd simply be Vietnam all over again, and it would destroy the last shards of US credibility on the world stage.

[umair655]

We all know that attacks on the US were not planned in Afghanistan, but in other parts of the world.

When in 2001/02 Taliban asked US to provide proofs to them against Alqaeda so that they can sewed, US attacked them.

You cannot defeat people who have slammed two Super Powers in last century, I think US is going to complete the hatrick for them.

Wait and See The game of desctruction of the US army and economy.

[umair655]

We all know that attacks on the US were not planned in Afghanistan, but in other parts of the world.

When in 2001/02 Taliban asked US to provide proofs to them against Alqaeda so that they can sewed, US attacked them.

You cannot defeat people who have slammed two Super Powers in last century, I think US is going to complete the hatrick for them.

Wait and See The game of desctruction of the US army and economy.

[STURM]

We all know that attacks on the US were not planned in Afghanistan, but in other parts of the world. .

No, it was mostly planned by Al Qaeda cells based in Europe and the U.S. The Al Aqeda leadership was based in Afghanistan. So what's the point you're trying make :( ?

You cannot defeat people who have slammed two Super Powers in last century, I think US is going to complete the hatrick for them.

Wait and See The game of desctruction of the US army and economy.

I think ''slammed'' is a bit too strong a word to use. Let's keep in mind that the various Afghan groups received a lot of aid from the U.S. and Saudi, plus other nations, during the struggle against the Soviets. Involvement in Afghanistan took a heavy toll on the Soviet economy and the after effects of the war contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system, but U.S. and coalition failure in Afghanistan will not lead to the ''destruction of the U.S. army and economy'' though it will have other effects.

One of the many problems facing the coalition is that the Taliban is seen as a legitimite ressistance movement against foreign occupation by a sizeable amount of the population, not all of whom subscribe to Al Qaeda ideology or the brand of Islam practised by the Taliban. And not all of whom are against ''western values'', ''the American way of life'' and democracy, as so oftened mentioned even today by many news reports. The coalition however appears to have a sound long term strategy in place to deal with all or most of the problems faced, so lets wait see before drawing any conclusions.

As Kilo 2-3 said earlier - ''That's one of the reasons US, etc. military leaders are working so hard to partner with and co-operate with local leaders and governments. They recognize that they have to create a framework which can make the Afghans self-governing and prevent the Taliban from exploiting an unstable gov't or poor balance of power.''

[umair655]

No, it was mostly planned by Al Qaeda cells based in Europe and the U.S. The Al Aqeda leadership was based in Afghanistan. So what's the point you're trying make :( ?



I think ''slammed'' is a bit too strong a word to use. Let's keep in mind that the various Afghan groups received a lot of aid from the U.S. and Saudi, plus other nations, during the struggle against the Soviets.

One of the many problems facing the coalition is that the Taliban is seen as a legitimite ressistance movement against foreign occupation by a sizeable amount of the population, not all of whom subscribe to Al Qaeda ideology or the brand of Islam practised by the Taliban. And not all of whom are against ''western values'', ''the American way of life'' and democracy, as so oftened mentioned even today by many news reports. The coalition however appears to have a sound long term strategy in place to deal with all or most of the problems faced, so lets wait see before drawing any conclusions.

As Kilo 2-3 said earlier - ''That's one of the reasons US, etc. military leaders are working so hard to partner with and co-operate with local leaders and governments. They recognize that they have to create a framework which can make the Afghans self-governing and prevent the Taliban from exploiting an unstable gov't or poor balance of power.''

Well I think the US and the coalition have to talk with them eventually so why they do it sooner then later, talk to them US cannot make an army with non-pashtuns, and have them defeat Taliban. Eventually US have to leave.

Lets see what happens.

[Feanor]

We all know that attacks on the US were not planned in Afghanistan, but in other parts of the world.

When in 2001/02 Taliban asked US to provide proofs to them against Alqaeda so that they can sewed, US attacked them.

You cannot defeat people who have slammed two Super Powers in last century, I think US is going to complete the hatrick for them.

Wait and See The game of desctruction of the US army and economy.

Silly. Afghanistan got demolished by the Soviets. The damage to Afghan was so bad, it was called migratory genocide. The only reason the Mujahadeen existed as long as they did, is because of enormous US aid, and Pakistani complicity in providing the resistance with bases and a safe haven. In the end, had the USSR not had too many internal problems to deal with, it could have put an end to the insurgency.

The situation is even more favorable for the US today. In fact the only reason the US wouldn't be able to stabilize Afghanistan is if the political will is absent to commit the necessary resources.

[umair655]

Silly. Afghanistan got demolished by the Soviets. The damage to Afghan was so bad, it was called migratory genocide. The only reason the Mujahadeen existed as long as they did, is because of enormous US aid, and Pakistani complicity in providing the resistance with bases and a safe haven. In the end, had the USSR not had too many internal problems to deal with, it could have put an end to the insurgency.

The situation is even more favorable for the US today. In fact the only reason the US wouldn't be able to stabilize Afghanistan is if the political will is absent to commit the necessary resources.
I wanted to laugh, what were the cause of internal problems a long term war have inflicted disaster to the USSR's econmoy, and I think currently US is even in much bad condition then USSR was in, the war is more expensive to them then it was for the USSR.

The insurgents are much more trained then they were before and backed by CHINA RUSSIA and IRAN.

You cannot fight them they have the perfect gorilla warfare, I can bet you $1 M dollar US cannot beat them if US could they would have done it in last 8-9 years.

[umair655]

Silly. Afghanistan got demolished by the Soviets. The damage to Afghan was so bad, it was called migratory genocide. The only reason the Mujahadeen existed as long as they did, is because of enormous US aid, and Pakistani complicity in providing the resistance with bases and a safe haven. In the end, had the USSR not had too many internal problems to deal with, it could have put an end to the insurgency.

The situation is even more favorable for the US today. In fact the only reason the US wouldn't be able to stabilize Afghanistan is if the political will is absent to commit the necessary resources.
I wanted to laugh, what were the cause of internal problems a long term war have inflicted disaster to the USSR's econmoy, and I think currently US is even in much bad condition then USSR was in, the war is more expensive to them then it was for the USSR.

The insurgents are much more trained then they were before and backed by CHINA RUSSIA and IRAN.

You cannot fight them they have the perfect gorilla warfare environment, I can bet you $1 M dollar US cannot beat them if US could they would have done it in last 8-9 years.

[umair655]

Silly. Afghanistan got demolished by the Soviets. The damage to Afghan was so bad, it was called migratory genocide. The only reason the Mujahadeen existed as long as they did, is because of enormous US aid, and Pakistani complicity in providing the resistance with bases and a safe haven. In the end, had the USSR not had too many internal problems to deal with, it could have put an end to the insurgency.

The situation is even more favorable for the US today. In fact the only reason the US wouldn't be able to stabilize Afghanistan is if the political will is absent to commit the necessary resources.

and FYI - the us aided the mujahideens till 88 the talibs emerged in early nighties there are many other countries financing them till now, dont get the impression the US can defeat them but will get defeated, they lost 9 years and can even do that if they lose 90 more years.

[Kilo 2-3]

Well I think the US and the coalition have to talk with them eventually so why they do it sooner then later, talk to them US cannot make an army with non-pashtuns, and have them defeat Taliban. Eventually US have to leave.

Lets see what happens.

For the US to talk to the Taliban right now would give the world the appearance that the US is losing the will to fight and is willing to make concessions to the Taliban. It would void all our rhetoric up to this point, strengthen the Taliban's will to fights, and make the loyal Afghans feel like we're going to throw them to the wolves.

If the US is going to negotiate with the Taliban, especially its more radical elements, then it has to be from a position of overhwelming strength. Quite honestly, the US and NATO aren't in that position right now.

Now, if the Afghans wan to try and make reconciliations with the more moderate Taliban, that's fine, but even then, they need to move forward with caution. (By the way, there was a big tribal conference a while back in which some Afghan leaders did just that, or at least proposed doing it.)

[Feanor]

I wanted to laugh, what were the cause of internal problems a long term war have inflicted disaster to the USSR's econmoy, and I think currently US is even in much bad condition then USSR was in, the war is more expensive to them then it was for the USSR.

The insurgents are much more trained then they were before and backed by CHINA RUSSIA and IRAN.

You cannot fight them they have the perfect gorilla warfare, I can bet you $1 M dollar US cannot beat them if US could they would have done it in last 8-9 years.

You do have evidence I suppose, for the alleged support. Especially Russian and Chinese. Right? Please post it here. ;)

[stoker]

For the US to talk to the Taliban right now would give the world the appearance that the US is losing the will to fight and is willing to make concessions to the Taliban. It would void all our rhetoric up to this point, strengthen the Taliban's will to fights, and make the loyal Afghans feel like we're going to throw them to the wolves.

If the US is going to negotiate with the Taliban, especially its more radical elements, then it has to be from a position of overhwelming strength. Quite honestly, the US and NATO aren't in that position right now.

Now, if the Afghans wan to try and make reconciliations with the more moderate Taliban, that's fine, but even then, they need to move forward with caution. (By the way, there was a big tribal conference a while back in which some Afghan leaders did just that, or at least proposed doing it.)

I certainly agree that there is no need for the US to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. There is no doubt however that behind the door negotiations are going on in Saudi Arabia between the Taliban and Afghan Government /Coalition negotiators.

Contrary to some people on this Forum I have NO doubt the the US/Nato? Allies are winning this war against the Taliban.

We just have to look at the situation that the Taliban are in, in Pakistan and in Afghanistan they are coping a hiding.

In Pakistan the US/CIA 'drones' have cause major losses of experienced senior Taliban leaders, the Taliban are going to have major problems replacing them.
The Pakistan Armed Forces are winning their fight against the Taliban/ Insurgents in the FATA,
The Taliban has lost basically all their support from the Pakistani people because of their brutal attacks that have killed innocent Pakistani civilians.
The ISI, the progenitors of the early 'Taliban' have seen the writing on the wall that states ,the Taliban are losing this war, we better get on side with the winners, they have been instrumantal in providing intelligence for strikes against Taliban leaders, and have help in the capture of top Taliban leaders.

In Afghanistan, the 30,000+ surge has given the Allies the surge they need, they are hitting the Taliban hard, and the Taliban is not only losing the war badly, they have no means to come back in a position of military strength to beat back the Afghan/Allies forces.
General McChrystals tactics to minimise civilian deaths, although it puts our troops at greater risk, is succeding, Afghan troops are out in the front lines earning the trust of Afghan civilians, and as areas are cleared of insurgents and IED's, the troops will be replaced with the Afghan Police force and local civilian Government.
As long as the needed infrastructure is delivered to these areas, and they are protected against the Taliban criminals, the locals will be quite happy to live in peace and harmony.
As the opium fields are eradicated a majors source of money for the local Taliban/criminals will be removed.
The destruction of the Taliban's logistical network will be a major problem for the Taliban, they certainly don't have the means to quickly replace their losses, and this will mean mounting major attacks on the Afghan/Allies will be problamatic.

I have no respect for Obama, but his stated deadline of 2011 is definitely a pretty acurate assessment, I have no doubt that within 12 months the US/Nato/Allies?Afghan forces will have basically abolished the Taliban, although Afghanistan will take up to 4 - 5 years to be stabilised and the endemic corruption controled.

But at the end of the day the Taliban are already beaten, and they know it.

[STURM]

The Pakistan Armed Forces are winning their fight against the Taliban/ Insurgents in the FATA, The Taliban has lost basically all their support from the Pakistani people because of their brutal attacks that have killed innocent Pakistani civilians.

The move against the Taliban in FATA by the Pakistan army at the behest of the U.S. was deeply unpopular by a large segment of the Pakistani army [many of whom have Taliban sympathies] and by the Pakistani population who feel their government has sold itself to Uncle Sam and turned the Pakistani army into an army for hire.

As the opium fields are eradicated a major source of money for the local Taliban/criminals will be removed.

As the opium fields are eradicated, it is the locals who will face a loss of revenue and the means to feed themselves, long before the ''Taliban/criminals''.

Some of the opium fields are also controlled by warlords who are opposed to the Taliban and who are supported by the U.S. On paper these warlords swear allegeince to Karzai but in reality iut's a bit different. The good news is the warlords are not so dependent on opium as the Taliban are as the warlords get revenue from supplying materials/services to the coalition and smuggling.

But at the end of the day the Taliban are already beaten, and they know it.

I think it's a bit early days to form that conclusion.

Given the present situation, I thinks it's very ironic that when the Taliban first came to power, many countries including the U.S., saw the Taliban as a movement that could finally bring law and order to Afghanistan. As part of the lobbying efforts by a U.S. oil company who wanted to lay an oil pipeline across Afghanistan, a Taliban delegation even visited the U.S. and was met by junior State Department people.

Another country who provided cash and political support to the Taliban over the years, was Uncle Sam's ''close friend'' in the Midle East, Saudi Arabia. On the hand, Iran the ''bad boy'' of the Middle East was and remains very anti-Taliban and with India and Russia, provided support to the Northern Alliance.

umair655...... China, Russia and India do not support the Taliban.

[OPSSG]

I'm not American and I've not been to Afghanistan. Hence I'm not going to talk with authority on this topic, unlike umair655, who is so sure he is right and who is also actively misrepresenting coalition efforts there. However, I do make an attempt to read up every now and then on the developments there.

I certainly agree that there is no need for the US to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban.

It also depends on who you define to be the Afghan Taliban.

There are Afghan tribes who have supplied fighters and there are documented instances where US forces do negotiate and assist tribal elders from these tribes to marginalize the influence of the more hardcore in these tribes. Where the US is successful in winning over tribal elders and able to strengthen the bargaining power of those Afghans who are willing to work with the US, the result is a dramatic reduction in violence and attacks against US troops. For more info, see this latest pdf article (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/377-springer.pdf) by Maj. Nathan Springer - well worth the effort to have a read.

The carrot is developmental work - the problem is credibility, time and reach to the rural areas.

There is no doubt however that behind the door negotiations are going on in Saudi Arabia between the Taliban and Afghan Government /Coalition negotiators.

Do you have a source on this? I'm quite interested in any news/reports on a Saudi role.

Contrary to some people on this Forum I have NO doubt the the US/Nato? Allies are winning this war against the Taliban.

If the coalition is able to find the enemy, the local Taliban are always defeated in force on force battles. The problem is identifying and finding those that need to be killed via kinetic activities. Maj. Nathan Springer's article quoted above talks about that in more detail.

We just have to look at the situation that the Taliban are in, in Pakistan and in Afghanistan they are coping a hiding.

Yes. From what I read, that is often the case. According to the LWJ, since 2004, the US has conducted covert air strikes in Pakistan. The LWJ have charted the numbers here (http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php), if you are interested. In 2008, 36 strikes were conducted by the US and in 2009, 53 US strikes were conducted, which shows the escalation.

In Pakistan the US/CIA 'drones' have cause major losses of experienced senior Taliban leaders, the Taliban are going to have major problems replacing them.

The Pakistan Armed Forces are winning their fight against the Taliban/ Insurgents in the FATA... The Taliban has lost basically all their support from the Pakistani people because of their brutal attacks that have killed innocent Pakistani civilians.

The ISI, the progenitors of the early 'Taliban' have seen the writing on the wall that states ,the Taliban are losing this war, we better get on side with the winners, they have been instrumental in providing intelligence for strikes against Taliban leaders, and have help in the capture of top Taliban leaders.

We'll need to see how things develop but it looks promising, thus far.

There are number of surveys being conducted over time - and the Taliban only enjoy single digit support from the Afghans responding to the surveys - I don't have the link handy (I'll post the link if I can find it again) but it's something like 6-8%. From what I understand, the 'Taliban' have a brutal ideology and are keen to take the Afghanistan back into the stone age. The fact that the 'Taliban' kill more Afghans than the coalition via their IEDs and their human shield tactics (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8519507.stm) means that they are even more unpopular than the coalition forces or the ANA.

In Afghanistan, the 30,000+ surge has given the Allies the surge they need, they are hitting the Taliban hard, and the Taliban is not only losing the war badly, they have no means to come back in a position of military strength to beat back the Afghan/Allies forces. General McChrystals tactics to minimise civilian deaths, although it puts our troops at greater risk, is succeeding, Afghan troops are out in the front lines earning the trust of Afghan civilians, and as areas are cleared of insurgents and IED's, the troops will be replaced with the Afghan Police force and local civilian Government.

There is a plan in place and the coalition are in the execute phase of the plan. I'm not sure about 'no means' but I believe that the Taliban have more constrains than commonly spoken of. So I would not say no chance, rather, the chance of the Taliban coming back to power is very slim indeed.

My concern is that poverty and ignorance and wonderful conditions to enable the recruitment of fresh cannon fodder. Afghanistan has a young population so, there is a big potential pool of Taliban recruits and the coalition plan has not been to kill their way out of the insurgency (the way the Sri Lankan government has done with the Tamil Tigers).

As the opium fields are eradicated a majors source of money for the local Taliban/criminals will be removed. The destruction of the Taliban's logistical network will be a major problem for the Taliban, they certainly don't have the means to quickly replace their losses, and this will mean mounting major attacks on the Afghan/Allies will be problematic.

Attacking sources of Taliban funding will help decrease their capability and influence.

Cheers.;)

[STURM]

Do you have a source on this? I'm quite interested in any news/reports on a Saudi role.

It was mentioned in the Ahmad Rashid interview, in the link I provided.
It would make sense as the Saudis way before 9/11 were closely linked to the Taliban and in league with the Pakistanis provided cash payouts to support Taliban efforts to defeat the Northern Alliance.. As both subscribe to wahhabism and donations from wealthy Saudis sustain the madrassahs in Pakistan, the Saudis probably still have influence with the Talibs. According to Steve Coll's book, at one point prior to 9/11, the Taliban even offered to hand OBL to the Saudis.

[OPSSG]

It was mentioned in the Ahmad Rashid interview, in the link I provided.
It would make sense as the Saudis way before 9/11 were closely linked to the Taliban and in league with the Pakistanis provided cash payouts to support the Taliban efforts to defeat the Northern Alliance.. As both subscribe to wahhabism, the Saudis probably still have influence with the Talibs.

Sorry brain fart. Intended to ask for 'another source on the current Saudi role' on this rather than 'a source on the Saudi role', which was already kindly provided by you. It's just my natural curiosity on how the link or line of influence works and to see if there are more perspectives on the nature of that influence.

This angle on how the Saudis can contribute needs to be understood and if valuable, pursued.

[STURM]

Sorry brain fart. Intended to ask for 'another source on the current Saudi role' on this rather than 'a source on the Saudi role', which was already kindly provided by you. It's just my natural curiosity on how the link or line of influence works and to see if there are more perspectives on the nature of that influence.

This angle on how the Saudis can contribute needs to be understood and if valuable, pursued.

No worries. I was only tying to be helpful and no way intended to contradict you ;) Like you, I've never been to Afghanistan. The only sources I have are from books/magazines and from relatives in India who were originally from Afghanistan.

My sympthaties are for the Afghan civilians who are struggling to make ends meet and hopefully be able to live with their families in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. Most U.S./coalition soldiers who get killed at least are mentioned by name in the press but the not the Afghan farmer who gets blown up with his family as a result of a targeting error, bad intel or simply for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. I'm am very annoyed however, about the role the Saudis have played in the past in stoking the flames of wahhabism and contributing to the current mess in Afghanistan.

[AfghanAmbush]

Lets have a intelligent discussions here guys, keep your egos out of it and use logic and reason. I'll be posting more on this subject soon, bit busy with school right now. Here is a link for those who think the U.S shouldn't negotiate with them, this is why you should be informed before posting. They tried talking to them but it failed, some of the reasons were that AQ is mixed within, Taliban don't want the foreigners and the ISI wants to be included in the talks (hence: capture of Mullah Berader)

BBC News - US commander signals peace talks with Taliban (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8478076.stm)

[OPSSG]

Fundamentally, Afghanistan relies quite a bit on external aid, which also happens to be given by richer countries, many who are contributing troops for the coalition. In 2007 (http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079190.html), a company from China won the bid for copper rights Afghanistan (with deposits worth US$88 billion (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3941656.ece)) and their investment is contributing to the coffers of the Afghan government - and this Chinese investment alone provides 45% of state budget and will also provide many jobs. This in turn partially funds the ANA and ANP aiding the Afghan government's fight against Taliban forces. Therefore it is in China's interest to see the current Afghan government succeed, as this will protect China's investment there. This also aligns China's interest with coalition aims. IMO, I've provided a bit of evidence to show that it is wrong for umair655 to suggest that China supports the Taliban.

My sympathies are for the Afghan civilians who are struggling to make ends meet and hopefully be able to live with their families in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

According to UNICEF statistics (http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html), the average life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44 years and the adult literacy rate is on 28%. The country, if we can call it that, is ranked NUMBER 1 in for under-5 infant mortality rate. It would be fair to say that the suffering of the Afghan people is immense. The Taliban and their brutish ways are not the way forward. When the Taliban were in power, in the past, they attempted to take their people back to the stone age - killing all those who opposed them. IMO, the Taliban have in the past and are currently inflicting far more suffering and death on their own countrymen than the coalition forces.

[stoker]

Fundamentally, Afghanistan relies quite a bit on external aid, which also happens to be given by richer countries, many who are contributing troops for the coalition. In 2007 (http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079190.html), a company from China won the bid for copper rights Afghanistan (with deposits worth US$88 billion (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3941656.ece)) and their investment is contributing to the coffers of the Afghan government - and this Chinese investment alone provides 45% of state budget and will also provide many jobs. This in turn partially funds the ANA and ANP aiding the Afghan government's fight against Taliban forces. Therefore it is in China's interest to see the current Afghan government succeed, as this will protect China's investment there. This also aligns China's interest with coalition aims. IMO, I've provided a bit of evidence to show that it is wrong for umair655 to suggest that China supports the Taliban.



According to UNICEF statistics (http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html), the average life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44 years and the adult literacy rate is on 28%. The country, if we can call it that, is ranked NUMBER 1 in for under-5 infant mortality rate. It would be fair to say that the suffering of the Afghan people is immense. The Taliban and their brutish ways are not the way forward. When the Taliban were in power, in the past, they attempted to take their people back to the stone age - killing all those who opposed them. IMO, the Taliban have in the past and are currently inflicting far more suffering and death on their own countrymen than the coalition forces.

The U.N. mission in Afghanistan said 2,412 civilians were killed in 2009 — a 14 percent increase over the 2,118 who died in 2008. Another 3,566 civilians were wounded.

Nearly 70 percent of the killings, or 1,630, were blamed on insurgents while 25 percent, or 596, were attributed to pro-government forces, the report said. The remaining 135 deaths could not be attributed to either side but were civilians caught in the crossfire or killed by unexploded ordnance.

The Taliban are very media savvy, and any US/Nato military caused Afghan civilian deaths are well exploited, however their own atrocities against Afghan civilians, and destruction of local infrastructure ( such as schools ) must engender much hatred against them.

The Taliban are basically Pushtan Afghans, they comprise of roughly 40% of the population, the President also is a Pushtan, and so were the last lot of the royal family, so basically not only are the Taliban 'on a misssion from Allah' they also believe they have a right to rule.

I imagine many of the other Afghan don't take kindly to this.

But at the end of the day the US/Nato/Afghan army can win all the fights, but, to win the War they will have to win the trust of the Afghan population.

They will have to provide security and safety, build local infrastructure and provide jobs for young afghans, and most important in rural areas good roads and water/ electricity supplies. AND eliminate/control government corruption. LOL

After that it will be a easy, peace will reign and we can all go home.

[Herodotus]

The U.N. mission in Afghanistan said 2,412 civilians were killed in 2009 — a 14 percent increase over the 2,118 who died in 2008. Another 3,566 civilians were wounded.

Nearly 70 percent of the killings, or 1,630, were blamed on insurgents while 25 percent, or 596, were attributed to pro-government forces, the report said. The remaining 135 deaths could not be attributed to either side but were civilians caught in the crossfire or killed by unexploded ordnance.

The Taliban are very media savvy, and any US/Nato military caused Afghan civilian deaths are well exploited, however their own atrocities against Afghan civilians, and destruction of local infrastructure ( such as schools ) must engender much hatred against them.

The Taliban are basically Pushtan Afghans, they comprise of roughly 40% of the population, the President also is a Pushtan, and so were the last lot of the royal family, so basically not only are the Taliban 'on a misssion from Allah' they also believe they have a right to rule.

I imagine many of the other Afghan don't take kindly to this.

But at the end of the day the US/Nato/Afghan army can win all the fights, but, to win the War they will have to win the trust of the Afghan population.

They will have to provide security and safety, build local infrastructure and provide jobs for young afghans, and most important in rural areas good roads and water/ electricity supplies. AND eliminate/control government corruption. LOL

After that it will be a easy, peace will reign and we can all go home.

I find it highly unlikely that peace will reign or "we can all go home" in Afghanistan, even if your mostly improbable scenarios come to fruition. Afghanistan is what Buzan, (within Regional Security Complex Theory) defines as an insulator. A state that is situated between different regional security complexes, but not specifically in any of them. It straddles the South Asia Regional Security Complex, the Middle East Complex, and the (former) Soviet Region, not to mention the East Asia Security Complex is nearby.

What that means is that Afghanistan sits at the nexus of Russia, (1), China, (2), India, (3), Iran (1a), Pakistan, (2b), -three Great Powers and two regional powers together with the United States, which has a vested interest in the region, (or at least forced its way into the region, thus entitling it to interests). This is why Afghanistan is important, not necessarily because terrorism has, and may in the future, spawn from there (terrorism is an asymmetrical threat that does not kill many people...historically), but because of its geography.

Thus even if the Taliban surrender tomorrow, and bin Laden comes out of his cave and surrenders and denounces jihad, and even if democracy springs up and the University of Kabul becomes the Asian equivalent of Harvard and opium farmers become landed gentry, there will probably always be a need to keep a presence in Afghanistan by at least one of these powers due to the convergence of interests there. And if there is one state with a "presence", there's bound to be others. So don't count on the US leaving anytime in the next few years or so.;)

[OPSSG]

@Herodotus,

^You have shared an interesting perspective that takes into account the geopolitical context of the conflict. Need to mull over your post a bit. :D

BTW, are you saying the the US will never pull out or that as a Superpower, they would want to continue to be involved in some shape, manner or form? Please explain, I'm all ears.

[agc33e]

For afganistan or for irak it might help:
-many many soldiers for making a true frontier between countries and frontiers in a perimeter round each city, then many many soldiers for inspecting all cities deeply, fire weapons are forbiden, and each city is fully inspectionated, you need so many solciers from all the world to inspect all the houses, the ceilings, the drains, etc, no fire weapons no dinamite, to get dinamite to the cities they to get into the country first, and after get it into the frontier of the city..
-a good propaganda, in arab, talking about the rights gained, talking that god, allah,is with us, with the international coalition.
-a good system for rebuilding the country, a type of self feed (in foods) comunities that each town can have an autonomous wellness, with enough landi for crops, water for the fields, so they can work in the fields and have all the food ensured, give a present to them in shape of tv better comms for the country, better electricity etc...i can say more complete things.

-for the explosives in the roads, isnt there enought technology to scan the inmediate land and detect explosive materials hidden?

Cheers.

[STURM]

IWhat that means is that Afghanistan sits at the nexus of Russia, (1), China, (2), India, (3), Iran (1a), Pakistan, (2b), -three Great Powers and two regional powers together with the United States, which has a vested interest in the region, (or at least forced its way into the region, thus entitling it to interests). This is why Afghanistan is important, not necessarily because terrorism has, and may in the future, spawn from there (terrorism is an asymmetrical threat that does not kill many people...historically), but because of its geography

Its been said before, Afghanistan's greatest curse is its geography. What's happening now in Afghanistan and in other parts of Central Asia has been described as the new Great Game as the current situation has many parallels to the first Great Game, involving Tarist Russia and Great Britain.

[Feanor]

Central Asia in particular, with China, Russia, and the US. Esp. the endless rotation of removal, and re-admittance of NATO bases into those countries. But it certainly applies to Afghanistan. And Russia certainly maintains a close by presence, in Tadjikistan. So while not directly involved, there are assets devoted to limiting spill over effects.

[Herodotus]

@Herodotus,

^You have shared an interesting perspective that takes into account the geopolitical context of the conflict. Need to mull over your post a bit. :D

BTW, are you saying the the US will never pull out or that as a Superpower, they would want to continue to be involved in some shape, manner or form? Please explain, I'm all ears.

I would be surprised if the US did not at least keep some physical presence beyond a diplomatic one in that country-intel assets at least, or an air base, or Special Forces, etc . Because if they don't another country probably will. The opportunity is too great to pass on. The size of the presence may be dependent on the level of violence, and how much the local government protests, and how much domestic opposition there is, but I fully expect a decades-long commitment.

[Herodotus]

Its been said before, Afghanistan's greatest curse is its geography. What's happening now in Afghanistan and in other parts of Central Asia has been described as the new Great Game as the current situation has many parallels to the first Great Game, involving Tarist Russia and Great Britain.

No doubt, except this time there are more players involved and more variables are included: nuclear weapons, oil, power positioning, etc.

[Ray17]

The strategy to win in Afghanistan is to 'seal' the frontier with Pakistan by physically deploying troops. So long as the Taliban can carry out forays or send reinforcement from Pakistan, there can be no win. Yet, it is also necessary to remember that there can be no airtight sealing and the Taliban from Pakistan will continue to filter in, but the numbers would be much less.

Thereafter, it is essential to have troops who will eliminate the Taliban who have 'filtered in' as also those who are operating in the countryside.

Lastly, there has to be troops who will sanitise the urban areas.

A huge task and a lot of troops would be required.

JMT

[Kilo 2-3]

The strategy to win in Afghanistan is to 'seal' the frontier with Pakistan by physically deploying troops. So long as the Taliban can carry out forays or send reinforcement from Pakistan, there can be no win. Yet, it is also necessary to remember that there can be no airtight sealing and the Taliban from Pakistan will continue to filter in, but the numbers would be much less.

Thereafter, it is essential to have troops who will eliminate the Taliban who have 'filtered in' as also those who are operating in the countryside.

Lastly, there has to be troops who will sanitise the urban areas.

A huge task and a lot of troops would be required.

JMT

Hell of a lot easier said than done. That is one of the most porous borders in the region in the world for a very very good reason. Its rugged, remote, mountainous, and hard to travel in.

As Eisenhower said, "farming looks mighty easy when you're two thousand miles away from the cornfield and your pencil is your plow."

Plugging the border with conventional troops isn't an option. You have to have an FOB on every mountain, you'd have to supply the FOBs, etc. etc. Use roving special forces teams, OPs, QRFs and UAVs to patrol the border and respond with overwhelming force to overwhelm any Taliban forces they spot crossing the border.

[STURM]

Because if they don't another country probably will. The opportunity is too great to pass on.

That country could well end up being India, with U.S. approval. As long as the Kashmir problem and other issues with Pakistan remain unresolved, India will countinue to expand it's influence in Afghanistan. One of the reasons, prior to 9/11 the Pakistanis were against Ahmad Shah Massoud was because he received aid from India.

[Ray17]

Hell of a lot easier said than done. That is one of the most porous borders in the region in the world for a very very good reason. Its rugged, remote, mountainous, and hard to travel in.

As Eisenhower said, "farming looks mighty easy when you're two thousand miles away from the cornfield and your pencil is your plow."

Plugging the border with conventional troops isn't an option. You have to have an FOB on every mountain, you'd have to supply the FOBs, etc. etc. Use roving special forces teams, OPs, QRFs and UAVs to patrol the border and respond with overwhelming force to overwhelm any Taliban forces they spot crossing the border.


Currently, India is doing just that in Kashmir and with far less technology than the ISAF or having the advantage that the US has wherein, the US can at will extend the operations beyond the Durand Line and take on the Taliban on Pakistani soil. Also the US will not have the disadvantage that India has wherein owing to political reasons, India does not use the Airforce (except transporter), missiles, Combat UAVs, artillery or armour etc to take on the terrorists in Kashmir

While terrorism in Kashmir continues, yet it has been to a great extent brought under control.

India has forces on border manning posts that are tactically sited running all the way from the Chamb in the South and northward to Punch, on the Pir Panjal mountains to Uri and onto Tangdhar and then easterly to Gurez and thereafter to Kargil, Leh and Siachen. To do this, has four Divisions and a Brigade. The rural areas are manned by Army Rashtriya Rifles and paramilitary (BSF). Towns are guarded by police forces.

I am sure the US and ISAF with better technology, weapons, surveillance means, air, helicopters, gunship, artillery, armour, Special Ops troops and so on, can control terrorism. However, the moot point is that troops unless in abundance will find it difficult and that is what is the real chink in the armour.

The US has controlled terrorism in Iraq, and even though remnants of terrorism are making things difficult at time, the situation is better and the Iraqi government functioning.

[Ray17]

That country could well end up being India, with U.S. approval. As long as the Kashmir problem and other issues with Pakistan remain unresolved, India will countinue to expand it's influence in Afghanistan. One of the reasons, prior to 9/11 the Pakistanis were against Ahmad Shah Massoud was because he received aid from India.

AFGHANISTAN: INDIA'S CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR "THE DAY AFTER" (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3576.html)

This paper indicates India's options.

[Feanor]

Currently, India is doing just that in Kashmir and with far less technology than the ISAF or having the advantage that the US has wherein, the US can at will extend the operations beyond the Durand Line and take on the Taliban on Pakistani soil. Also the US will not have the disadvantage that India has wherein owing to political reasons, India does not use the Airforce (except transporter), missiles, Combat UAVs, artillery or armour etc to take on the terrorists in Kashmir

While terrorism in Kashmir continues, yet it has been to a great extent brought under control.

India has forces on border manning posts that are tactically sited running all the way from the Chamb in the South and northward to Punch, on the Pir Panjal mountains to Uri and onto Tangdhar and then easterly to Gurez and thereafter to Kargil, Leh and Siachen. To do this, has four Divisions and a Brigade. The rural areas are manned by Army Rashtriya Rifles and paramilitary (BSF). Towns are guarded by police forces.

I am sure the US and ISAF with better technology, weapons, surveillance means, air, helicopters, gunship, artillery, armour, Special Ops troops and so on, can control terrorism. However, the moot point is that troops unless in abundance will find it difficult and that is what is the real chink in the armour.

The US has controlled terrorism in Iraq, and even though remnants of terrorism are making things difficult at time, the situation is better and the Iraqi government functioning.

I completely agree. One of the simplest ways of dealing with the problem is simply by putting enough boots on the ground to put an end to Taliban's ability to operate.

[Ray17]

I believe Afghanistan has a 2500 km border with Pakistan.

That will mean an immense amount of troops manning posts.

One wonders if it is feasible.

However, all efforts must be made to contain the international threat of terrorism.

I accept that it is easier said than done!

[STURM]

I completely agree. One of the simplest ways of dealing with the problem is simply by putting enough boots on the ground to put an end to Taliban's ability to operate.

Equally important as putting enough boots on the ground are the long term social and economic programmes run by the coalition aimed at winning support and having a government in Kabul that is acceptable to all the ethnic groups. As long as part of the population continue to support the Talibs and have the mindset that they are fighting a foreign occupation, IMO pouring more troops in is not the only answer. Other problems apart form the safe haven in Pakistan and the support from the 'jihadist' elements in the Pakistani military, is the financial aid reaching the Taliban from wealthy individuals and organisations in the Middle East and elsewhere.

[Kilo 2-3]

Equally important as putting enough boots on the ground are the long term social and economic programmes run by the coalition aimed at winning support and having a government in Kabul that is acceptable to all the ethnic groups. As long as part of the population continue to support the Talibs and have the mindset that they are fighting a foreign occupation, IMO pouring more troops in is not the only answer. Other problems apart form the safe haven in Pakistan and the support from the 'jihadist' elements in the Pakistani military, is the financial aid reaching the Taliban from wealthy individuals and organisations in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Great stuff Feanor, Ray, Sturm, Herodotus. You've all got excellent points.

I'm in total agreement that having "boots on the ground" is key and that technology can only supplement, rather than supplant that. There's not much point in having a force multiplier if you don't have a meaningful force to multiply.

The challenge is to have an effective military force in-country, decapitate, disintegrate and defeat the Taliban, and provide for Afghanistan's future economic, political, and social stability. All this without neglecting the crucial civil and tribal aspects and understanding and adapting to the interactions between the social, military, and politic aspects of the War.

[OPSSG]

I believe Afghanistan has a 2500 km border with Pakistan.

That will mean an immense amount of troops manning posts.

One wonders if it is feasible.

However, all efforts must be made to contain the international threat of terrorism.

I accept that it is easier said than done!

Have you guys seen this article: "A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/09winter/goode.pdf)" by Steven Goode? While there might be concerns about his approach, do take a look at the table on page number 52 where he sets out the different counter insurgencies and some of the relevant numbers.

I don't have the answers but there's some people who are thinking about issues arising from the same question:- How many troops is enough?

[Herodotus]

Have you guys seen this article: "A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/09winter/goode.pdf)" by Steven Goode? While there might be concerns about his approach, do take a look at the table on page number 52 where he sets out the different counter insurgencies and some of the relevant numbers.

I don't have the answers but there's some people who are thinking about issues arising from the same question:- How many troops is enough?

That's a good article. A few years ago during the height of the Iraq War, I worked for a think tank that was contracted to CAA to look at insurgency/counterinsurgency warfare. I utilized some of those historical cases, not all of them since the cases were specific to having a foreign interlocutor. I wonder if he used any of my data.

Anyway, when it comes to COIN strategy and determining tie-down ratios one should be wary of the cases being used. There is too much deference given to the Malaya Emergency (since it was successful, it is well sourced, and there was a perfect peak and decline to the violence) and even Ireland. The MRLA was a pathetic insurgency; they didn't have any stand-off weapons (maybe two mortars and no rockets)...all small arms. Plus it was isolated to a minority of a minority population and did not receive much outside funding..

The conventional wisdom is the more COIN forces used the less the violence becomes. Generally this is the case though not a perfect correlation in my view, since it discounts additional variables (e.g. the effectiveness of the insurgency, outside support, etc.) In Ireland the force ratios were something on the order of 35 to 1 in favor of the British, and it still took roughly 30 years to kill the insurgency, so who knows what will happen in Afghanistan.

[OPSSG]

@Herodotus, thanks for sharing. The above is an interesting post.

On a side note:

Is it just me or is there a lack of information on ANA's artillery in sources on their order of battle (click to see LWJ's complied 'order of battle (http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/ANSF%20OOBpage4-ANA.pdf)')? This to my eye seems to be a glaring omission for the king of the battlefield (there's some basic info there but it seems to be written an after thought).

If anyone has information on ANA artillery, be it just the organic 81mm platoon (that each Kandak should have) or artillery battalions that should be part of any of the 7 ANA Corp commands, please post such news in this thread.

IMHO, the ANA needs to have both mortar fire controllers (MFCs) from the organic mortar platoon to accompany their rifle companies as they fight and also forward observers (FOs) in their artillery organization that joins the Kandaks for their missions. From the news releases I've seen, it seems as if the ANA only has infantry units and no supporting arms capabilities. The US military should have broadly similar roles but the titles may differ or have evolved due to the current joint fires emphasis.

Herodotus, you may already know this but I'll just say it here so that we can be on the same page. FOs are trained artillery officers and they are attached sent from an artillery battalion to an infantry unit to support their maneuvers. Typically, the FOs from an artillery unit come to an infantry battalion as a team (to call for fire support) with their boss, who is usually called a FSO (or fire support officer). Conceptually, the FSO assists the CO of an infantry battalion with fire support planning. I'm sure a US or Indian forum member can provide the correct terminology/titles for American or Indian equivalents, if they are different.

Thus far, I don't see any news on the ANA setting up their own artillery school or artillery units acting in support of the Kandaks. I would suspect the coalition would not want to trust ANA artillery at this stage but the ISAF would need to lay the ground work now. If the ANA do not master the use of artillery, they are going to be in big trouble when the bulk of coalition forces eventually leave. Thus far, there does not seem to be any focus on helping the ANA develop their capabilities for indirect fire support.

[STURM]

There is too much deference given to the Malaya Emergency (since it was successful, it is well sourced, and there was a perfect peak and decline to the violence) and even Ireland. The MRLA was a pathetic insurgency; they didn't have any stand-off weapons (maybe two mortars and no rockets)...all small arms. Plus it was isolated to a minority of a minority population and did not receive much outside funding..

The Malayan Emergency certainly has had too much deference placed on it but I think its got more to do with the fact that it stands out as a near perfect example of how to conduct a counter insurgency campaign, rather than its successful outcome.There were other counter insurgency campaigns that were won militarily but ended up being political failures. Had the Malayan campaign been mishandled from the start it could easily have gone out of control, despite the lack of material support from Communist China and the lack of widespread local support for the MRLA. One of the key lessons learnt from the Malaya experience, apart from over reliance on fire power, was that to defeat a counter insurgency you also need to build a nation. Though the situation in Afghanistan is most certainly more complex and challenging than Malaya, I believe many of the lessons learnt in Malaya still apply in Afghanistan.

The MRLA or ''communist terrorists'' as they were later called by the government started off with Japanese and Allied WW2 surplus but later managed to get hold off small numbers of RPG-2s, M-16s and AK-47s smuggled in via the northern border. Apart from the odd RCL or mortar [which damaged a Caribou in an attack on Sungei Besi], they never had anything heavier. IMO another bonus for the government was that the top cadre of the MRLA were more intellectuals and idealists rather than guerilla fighters.
In the late 60s and early 70's, Malaysian troops in the field discovered that tactics employed by the VC in South Vietnam were had been passed on to the MRLA. Another successful counter insurgency campaign that has received much less coverage than Malaya, was the Confrontation. Does anyone have any good online sources on the Philippine campaign against the Huks?

http://www.psywar.org/malaya.php

http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/june_2006/6_06_2.html

[Ray17]

There are two different nomenclatures for indirect fire controllers/

Mor

MFC = Mortar Fire Controller. They direct fire in an attack.
Mor OP = Mortar Observation Post. In defence.

Artillery

FOO = Forward Observation Officer (in attack)
Arty OP in defence.

The FOO or Arty Op is with the Company.
The Battery Commander is with the CO.

Today's insurgency/ terrorism cannot be equated with the Malaysian insurgency. The insurgents and terrorists have sophisticated weapons and are better trained under foreign military advisor and training staff (Taliban footages would indicate the same).

They are funded and supported by foreign govt and have safe sanctuary to R&R and regroup.

[STURM]

Today's insurgency/ terrorism cannot be equated with the Malaysian insurgency. The insurgents and terrorists have sophisticated weapons and are better trained under foreign military advisor and training staff (Taliban footages would indicate the same).

They are funded and supported by foreign govt and have safe sanctuary to R&R and regroup.

And unlike the Taliban, the MRLA didn't enjoy the same level of support from the local population. The MRLA enjoyed some level of support from portions of the local community in Southern Thailand but never from the Thai government. As a whole the situation in Afghanistan certainly cannot be equated with Malaya, being much more complex and on a much larger scale. Having said that, I believe however that the Malayan Emergency was important in the sense that many fundamental lessons in counter insurgency, many of which still hold true, were learnt.

Ray17, have there been any reports of ISI or Pakistani army officers still being in the field advising the Talibs? According to either Steven Coll's or Ahmad Rashid's book, even after 9/11 when Pakistan had become a partner in the ''War On Terror'', there were still Pakistani advisors in the field.

[Feanor]

It's not a matter of equating them, it's a matter of a certain type of warfare, certain types of operations. Even if the level of the insurgencies is incomparable, the principles of COIN operations, corrected for local conditions/insurgency strength/your force org should still hold true.

[OPSSG]

Read this dispatch from Michael Yon called 'The Bridge (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/385-yon.pdf)', which deals with the issue of who is in-charge of the Tarnak bridge. The Canadian press are of course not happy, as can be seen from this report (http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Military+rebuffs+blogger+call+Canadian+general+fir ed/2636068/story.html) because of finger pointing.

The purpose of posting this story is to demonstrate that in coalition, there will be problems. Even if all forces in the same area of operations (AO) are from one country, there will be boundary issues for the different commanders in charge on that AO. To me, that issue is not that something went wrong and someone died. Rather, how does the coalition resolve ambiguity over who owns the ground after an incident? If the ambiguity is not resolved after an incident, then, IMO, the problem will probably never get resolved. And boundary problems are but just one aspect of warfare.

[Herodotus]

The Malayan Emergency certainly has had too much deference placed on it but I think its got more to do with the fact that it stands out as a near perfect example of how to conduct a counter insurgency campaign, rather than its successful outcome

One correlates to the other, and I did mention that it had a perfect peak and decline to the violence/KIAs.

.There were other counter insurgency campaigns that were won militarily but ended up being political failures

That isn't necessarily the case...a military victory should be a political victory as well...Clausewitz correlates this. If you mean tactical victories...sure Algeria, Vietnam, the Counterinsurgency killed more bad guys but they are still considered defeats.

.Had the Malayan campaign been mishandled from the start it could easily have gone out of control, despite the lack of material support from Communist China and the lack of widespread local support for the MRLA.

Well, it was mishandled at the start which is why COIN ops still took 12 years. The Briggs Plan wasn't put into place until 1950 and the violence did not peak until '52, or '53.

One of the key lessons learnt from the Malaya experience, apart from over reliance on fire power, was that to defeat a counter insurgency you also need to build a nation. Though the situation in Afghanistan is most certainly more complex and challenging than Malaya, I believe many of the lessons learnt in Malaya still apply in Afghanistan.

Well, the British also promised Malaya its independence and thus a withdrawal of British troops. Also, certain aspects of that COIN ops probably are not repeatable in the current Afghan conflict (e.g. forced removal of citizens).

[Ray17]

Ray17, have there been any reports of ISI or Pakistani army officers still being in the field advising the Talibs? According to either Steven Coll's or Ahmad Rashid's book, even after 9/11 when Pakistan had become a partner in the ''War On Terror'', there were still Pakistani advisors in the field.

The Taliban are considered as 'strategic assets' by the ISI. They can be used to further Pakistan's policy without any blame coming on the Army or the Pakistan govt.

Media report and even the US have stated that while on one side the Pak Army is fighting the Taliban, the ISI is protecting the Taliban.

I am not too sure, but I saw a news report emanating from Pakistan on the internet, where the journalist wondered where are those who were captured during the SWAT operation by the Pakistan Army and how come some who were said to have been killed are still roaming alive

[Ray17]

Here is an article by a Pakistani TV journalist.

Taliban -- Asset Or Enemy? (http://www.pashtunpost.com/news.php?news=255)

[mysterious]

Here is an article by a Pakistani TV journalist.

Taliban -- Asset Or Enemy? (http://www.pashtunpost.com/news.php?news=255)

That is a highly over-simplified assessment by the writer. I would urge you to refrain from posting articles from sources that pander to certain ethnic & religious affiliations. The writer puts all regional and international actors along with the Taliban & Al-Qaeda in one big pot and ends up with a foul tasting broth.

The Taliban are considered as 'strategic assets' by the ISI. They can be used to further Pakistan's policy without any blame coming on the Army or the Pakistan govt.

Media report and even the US have stated that while on one side the Pak Army is fighting the Taliban, the ISI is protecting the Taliban.

Differentiation is paramount here. Pakistan Army & ISI are taking out the Pakistani Taliban since they are a threat to Pakistan's security interests. Afghan Taliban do not have anything against Pakistan; hence they are not treated in the same manner.

I am not too sure, but I saw a news report emanating from Pakistan on the internet, where the journalist wondered where are those who were captured during the SWAT operation by the Pakistan Army and how come some who were said to have been killed are still roaming alive

Hundreds of mid-level commanders of Pakistani Taliban have been paraded for the media already. And as we are all aware, both Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud have perished in drone strikes. Meanwhile, in the past three weeks, Pakistan has also arrested some of the big-fish of the Afghan Taliban network.

From what I know, these arrested Afghan Taliban leaders were pursuing talks with Karzai regime via Saudi and indirect Western contacts with the concerned parties trying to side-track Pakistani interests in any forth-coming solution. Hence, the Pakistanis moved in and detained them so as to retain bargaining chips in any solution that comes about.

It is very clear and obvious, there will be NO settlement to the Afghan issue until or unless Pakistan is taken onboard as the key player and its security interests addressed. All strategies that seek to minimize Pakistan's role in Afghanistan are doomed from the get-go.

[Ray17]

[QUOTE=mysterious;192464]That is a highly over-simplified assessment by the writer. I would urge you to refrain from posting articles from sources that pander to certain ethnic & religious affiliations. The writer puts all regional and international actors along with the Taliban & Al-Qaeda in one big pot and ends up with a foul tasting broth.

I appended that to indicate the mindset prevailing in Pakistan so that one does not base one's views on merely what we think is the mindset prevailing based on our reports. That report of this journalist is a mild one. Read the vernacular media and you ears will burn with the bile being spewed and the vernacular media is the true Pakistan! It is my personal opinion that unless one knows what moves the people, one cannot formulate a plan to achieve one’s aim.

It is a common adage in most armies - Know your Enemy. And you cannot know your enemy without knowing how he ticks.

Sun Tsu said
It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles.

Thus, in my wisdom, faulted that it may appear to you, I appended it. We have to know the mindset so that we can cut our coat as per the cloth!

To believe that Pakistan is doing a whole lot against the Taliban, let us ponder a wee bit.
Pakistan could crush the Baluchi rebellion which was equally bad as the Pakistani Taliban, therefore, why are they floundering in FATA and NWFP that too when the US drones are picking up the most dreaded of their militants? Could Pakistan not do it when they are but home grown and known ‘enemies’?

No matter what the international media would want one to believe, it is obvious that unless the Pakistani population is with the war on terror, which they are not, there is no solution and the Govt of Pak can only mouth pious platitudes.


Differentiation is paramount here. Pakistan Army & ISI are taking out the Pakistani Taliban since they are a threat to Pakistan's security interests. Afghan Taliban do not have anything against Pakistan; hence they are not treated in the same manner.

Hundreds of mid-level commanders of Pakistani Taliban have been paraded for the media already. And as we are all aware, both Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud have perished in drone strikes. Meanwhile, in the past three weeks, Pakistan has also arrested some of the big-fish of the Afghan Taliban network.

From what I know, these arrested Afghan Taliban leaders were pursuing talks with Karzai regime via Saudi and indirect Western contacts with the concerned parties trying to side-track Pakistani interests in any forth-coming solution. Hence, the Pakistanis moved in and detained them so as to retain bargaining chips in any solution that comes about. .

That is your belief and that is what the international media would want one to believe so that it is a sop to all the sad happening taking place in an endless void that is not bringing the desired result and think all is well!.

The US drones are the most effective ones which have really eliminated the leaders and not the Pakistanis, who are supposed to have the boots on ground and the intelligence inputs. Why did they fail and the US succeeded who have no equations with the locals overtly?

One can always arrest people and parade them as various top leaders. Read the vernacular media and check what they have to say.

It is very clear and obvious, there will be NO settlement to the Afghan issue until or unless Pakistan is taken onboard as the key player and its security interests addressed. All strategies that seek to minimize Pakistan's role in Afghanistan are doomed from the get-go.

Pakistan has to be on board since the supply route goes through Pakistan or else as Armstrong said, they would be history!

[STURM]

Differentiation is paramount here. Pakistan Army & ISI are taking out the Pakistani Taliban since they are a threat to Pakistan's security interests. Afghan Taliban do not have anything against Pakistan; hence they are not treated in the same manner.


The Pakistani Taliban, who subcribe to the same ideology and share the same goals of the Afghan Taliban have been a threat to Pakistan for quite a while. The key question IMO is whether the Pakistan government went into the tribal areas because it was really in Pakistan's interest or because it was due to pressure from Uncle Sam?

If the Pakistan government was really serious in taking out the local Taliban why hasn't it rooted out the jihadist elements in the military? Despite the Pakistani Taliban being a serious threat to the lnstability of Pakistan, why does the Pakistan government continue to turn a blind eye to militant activities in Pakistan which include active recruiting and fundraising, not to mention the thousands of madrassahs which continue to churn out volunteers for 'jihad'? Pakistan's major problem is on one hand it has to please Uncle Sam who provides financial aid and some level of protection against India, but on the other hand, it has elements in its military and population who openly sympthatise with the aims of the Afghan Taliban.

[STURM]

Well, it was mishandled at the start which is why COIN ops still took 12 years. The Briggs Plan wasn't put into place until 1950 and the violence did not peak until '52, or '53.

The fact that the Emergency was only officially declared over in 1960 was I believe due to a number of factors and not due to mishandling during the start of the Emergency.Indeed it was mishandled from the start. But then again, most governments faced with an insurgency threat, tend to start off underestimating the nature of the threat and the counter measures needed. IMO the difference in Malaya was that the British were relatively fast in formulating their ''hearts and minds'' programmes by winning over the Chinese population and having a clear chain of command under civilian control with various intel bodies complemeting one another and operating in unison. A major advantage the Brits in Malaya had over the Coalition in Afghanistan was a much better understanding of the local culture, customs and mindset. In pre-independance Malaya, it was common even for junior level British district officers to speak the Malay language and also in many cases Chinese.

Well, the British also promised Malaya its independence and thus a withdrawal of British troops.

A major advantage for the Brits was that the presence of British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya was not unwelcomed by the majority of the local population, who were in no hurry to see a speedy withdrawal of these troops. The timetable for British troop withdrawal from Malaya was dictated by results in the field against the MRLA and internal British politics, not by the need to sooth any fears amongst the Malayan population.

[Ray17]

The Pakistani Taliban, who subcribe to the same ideology and share the same goals of the Afghan Taliban have been a threat to Pakistan for quite a while. The key question IMO is whether the Pakistan government went into the tribal areas because it was really in Pakistan's interest or because it was due to pressure from Uncle Sam?

If the Pakistan government was really serious in taking out the local Taliban why hasn't it rooted out the jihadist elements in the military? Despite the Pakistani Taliban being a serious threat to the lnstability of Pakistan, why does the Pakistan government continue to turn a blind eye to militant activities in Pakistan which include active recruiting and fundraising, not to mention the thousands of madrassahs which continue to churn out volunteers for 'jihad'? Pakistan's major problem is on one hand it has to please Uncle Sam who provides financial aid and some level of protection against India, but on the other hand, it has elements in its military and population who openly sympthatise with the aims of the Afghan Taliban.

Well analysed and well said.

That is the crux of the issue.

We have to look at the overall picture and not the cosmetic!

The mindset!!

[OPSSG]

I like the framework provided by Herodotus, therefore, I'm quoting him here before sharing my thoughts.

...Afghanistan is what Buzan, (within Regional Security Complex Theory) defines as an insulator. A state that is situated between different regional security complexes, but not specifically in any of them. It straddles the South Asia Regional Security Complex, the Middle East Complex, and the (former) Soviet Region, not to mention the East Asia Security Complex is nearby.

What that means is that Afghanistan sits at the nexus of Russia, (1), China, (2), India, (3), Iran (1a), Pakistan, (2b), -three Great Powers and two regional powers together with the United States, which has a vested interest in the region, (or at least forced its way into the region, thus entitling it to interests). This is why Afghanistan is important, not necessarily because terrorism has, and may in the future, spawn from there (terrorism is an asymmetrical threat that does not kill many people...historically), but because of its geography...

1. If we want to continue to engage in an exchange of ideas, we need to recognise that Pakistan, China and India all have legitimate geopolitical interests in Afghanistan and that the interests of these three immediate regional states interact with other interested parties - like the Americans, the Russians and the Iranians and of course the other ISAF contributor countries and aid donors like Japan (who promised in Nov 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8351739.stm), US$5b in aid over the next 5 years - Japan's MFA (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/assist0901.pdf) states that they have already given US$1.8b from Sept 2001 to Nov 2009). If we frame the problem in Afghanistan as just fighting the Taliban, it may result in a failure to understand the local political dynamics in relation to competing land use. These local political concerns may be part of ethnic or even tribal rivalries which in turn interact with the actions of external actors. And I'm fully confident that the choices that the various Afghan tribes will make are a matter of local strategic calculation rather than out-right defeat of the Taliban - as long as we understand this, the ability of external actors to further destabilise the situation in Afghanistan will be constrained.

2. How these geo-political interests play-out may be subject to different characterisat- ions. Speaking generally, we need to recognise that perspectives of people of different nationalities may differ and that there could be historical and/or cultural reasons why the difference exists.

3. At this point, I would encourage fellow forum participants to avoid the use of emotion laden characterisation of people not of your nationality. Please avoid baiting other members, rather let us discuss concerns. These concerns would include the use of conventional, irregular, criminal and terrorist capabilities, which are employed asymmetrically by the Taliban to counter ISAF capabilities deployed in Afghanistan. Remember that there are non-state actors who would benefit from the suffering of the Afghan people - beyond the Taliban, these would include also foreign fighters and criminal elements.

4. No intelligence service is omniscient, though some are clearly capable and resourced to act in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Intelligence services monitoring the situation would include the CIA and even they have suffered some losses from possible trade-craft lapses. Evidently, the CIA had tapped the expertise of their Middle-Eastern friends. IMO, any attempt to characterise the capabilities of the intelligence and security services of a specific country as omniscient would be inaccurate (click here for US ISR advances (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/win09/brown.html)).

5. Since there are competing geo-political interests, it is only natural for the various security agencies to watch each other with care. This is not unexpected, given the regional rivalries and complexities of current ground situation there. How competing interests interact in Afghanistan may also be of benefit of non-state actors - so remember that mutual distrust may manifest itself in ways that helps the Taliban. IMHO, we need to find another way forward. I do not pretend to know the best way forward but I know that hating and mutual distrust is not the most productive way forward. There are legitimate concerns and they can be discussed. I would just ask that everyone remember that there are more perspectives than our own and it would be good if we can learn from one another. :D

6. Interestingly and against a backdrop of mounting violence, 70% of the Afghan population believe their country is heading in the right direction, up from 40% in 2009, according to a poll for the BBC, ABC News and the German broadcaster, ARD (BBC link here (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8448930.stm) - click here to see 2010 poll data (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf)). And if you look at the answers to Q17, only 3% strongly fighters from the Taliban and a further 7% somewhat support fighters from the Taliban. In other words, the Taliban only enjoy a total of not more than 10% support (sightly up from 2009 figures of 8%), so for me there is still reason for optimism.

[mysterious]

I appended that to indicate the mindset prevailing in Pakistan so that one does not base one's views on merely what we think is the mindset prevailing based on our reports. That report of this journalist is a mild one. Read the vernacular media and you ears will burn with the bile being spewed and the vernacular media is the true Pakistan! It is my personal opinion that unless one knows what moves the people, one cannot formulate a plan to achieve one’s aim.

Again, that is your assumption that the vernacular media is full of bile. Ofcourse there are those who write bile but the majority of vernacular media in Pakistan actually consists of mostly sane heads - now that may not necessarily mean that they have to 'agree' with your western mindset to appear 'sane'.

It is a common adage in most armies - Know your Enemy. And you cannot know your enemy without knowing how he ticks.

Sun Tsu said
It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles.

Thus, in my wisdom, faulted that it may appear to you, I appended it. We have to know the mindset so that we can cut our coat as per the cloth!

yada yada yada.. this is not a Strategy 101 lecture.

To believe that Pakistan is doing a whole lot against the Taliban, let us ponder a wee bit. Pakistan could crush the Baluchi rebellion which was equally bad as the Pakistani Taliban, therefore, why are they floundering in FATA and NWFP that too when the US drones are picking up the most dreaded of their militants? Could Pakistan not do it when they are but home grown and known ‘enemies’?

The US drones are the most effective ones which have really eliminated the leaders and not the Pakistanis, who are supposed to have the boots on ground and the intelligence inputs. Why did they fail and the US succeeded who have no equations with the locals overtly?

U.S drones target attacks after Pakistani human-Intel on the ground pinpoints 'em out; intel that is relayed to the Americans by Pakistanis - who, if given the drone technology - would be thrilled to take out the militant leaders themselves. U.S succeeded? U.S got lucky with the whole drone strategy; they gave it a shot when they were out of options and it produced some results, hence it was adopted as a full-fledged strategy. Let us not forget the fact that, ever since the serious COIN Ops by Pakistan Army began in Swat & now South Waziristan [with serious amount of commitment and boots on the ground, they have had 100x more success than what ISAF or the U.S have achieved in Afghanistan in more than 8yrs. No wonder American military officials were lining up to visit Swat before launching their major Op against Taliban in Marjah on the Afghan side; they wanted to replicate Pakistan's success in Swat.

No matter what the international media would want one to believe, it is obvious that unless the Pakistani population is with the war on terror, which they are not, there is no solution and the Govt of Pak can only mouth pious platitudes.

That is a highly ignorant claim. Given the fact that I just spent 6months in Pakistan interacting with people and reading daily print-media and watching T.V talk shows on local politics; I can easily claim the Pakistani population is standing together with their government against the militants which is why the Army has been able to go in and clean up SWAT & South Waziristan.

Pakistan has to be on board since the supply route goes through Pakistan or else as Armstrong said, they would be history!

Pakistan has to be on-board for Afghanistan's sakes and the Western alliance's face-saving in Afghanistan. Pakistan is not going anywhere. The ones to be condemned in history will be those Western boys & girls naive enough to lay down their lives for a war with no clear objective if no solution to the Afghan debacle is attained - something that requires Pakistan's approval.

[mysterious]

The Pakistani Taliban, who subcribe to the same ideology and share the same goals of the Afghan Taliban have been a threat to Pakistan for quite a while. The key question IMO is whether the Pakistan government went into the tribal areas because it was really in Pakistan's interest or because it was due to pressure from Uncle Sam?

Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban have two different goals. While the Afghan Taliban want to expel Western forces out of Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban are made up of rival gangs of thugs who temporarily bonded together and in-so-doing, have solicited the help of Al-Qaeda, which has long stated its goal of over-throwing Pakistan's Western leaning successive governments [whether military or civilian].

Ofcourse it took some American prodding to nudge Pakistan towards action but you'd be mistaken to believe that Pakistan went in to tribal areas to take on the Afghan Taliban - a key demand made by Uncle Sam. That is NOT the case, as can be seen by the frustration expressed by countless high-ranking American officials from time to time. Pakistan Army has been clearly engaging Pakistani Taliban and crushing them.

Afghan Taliban remain an asset for Pakistan and finally the U.S is wrapping its head around the fact that there is NO way out of Afghanistan unless Pakistan is taken onboard & discussions held with the Taliban and they are made partners in terms of power-sharing - since Afghanistan is NOT Iraq where the U.S simply let most Baathists flee to Syria & set about to re-organize the political spectrum with friendlies only. Tajiks & Uzbeks cannot be allowed to rule Afghanistan without any Pashtun representation- and that comes from the Taliban.

If the Pakistan government was really serious in taking out the local Taliban why hasn't it rooted out the jihadist elements in the military? Despite the Pakistani Taliban being a serious threat to the lnstability of Pakistan, why does the Pakistan government continue to turn a blind eye to militant activities in Pakistan which include active recruiting and fundraising, not to mention the thousands of madrassahs which continue to churn out volunteers for 'jihad'?

I would appreciate if you can space out your posts. Pakistan's government is serious about the local Taliban; infact the entire Pakistani society is. I was in Pakistan for 6months just recently and you'd be amazed at how much awareness campaigns are running across country. For example: citizen-watch programs are being constituted in areas they did not exist and revived in areas where they were in use before.

Jihadist elements in the military have been consistently sidelined, fast-tracked to retirement or even simply court-martialled since Musharraf's time. The practice continues till today. Ofcourse, nothing is fool-proof. Some residual elements will take time to get rid of.

And your statement regarding 'madrassahs churning out thousands of volunteers for jihad' is the same stereotype hyperbole that a Western-oriented mindset is still afflicted with on a daily basis. According to PEW Research Centre, Pakistani madrassahs attract only less than 3% of all school-going children and out of those madrassahs, less than 1% have any sort of extremist leanings, let alone the ones that actually churn out 'militants' which are a handful at most. The 'madrassah myth' is cliche now and very much tossed out of the equation by the academia. So dont bother.

Pakistan's major problem is on one hand it has to please Uncle Sam who provides financial aid and some level of protection against India, but on the other hand, it has elements in its military and population who openly sympthatise with the aims of the Afghan Taliban.

Ahem! Uncle Sam doesn't provide any protection against India. Pakistan Army and its nukes do. Pakistan is not about pleasing the U.S, its more about not having many options since the global financial crisis hit the country hard & the problems compounded with the Western debacle in Afghanistan next door, consequences of which, Pakistan has to deal with.

Sympathy is not enough to run a country's overt and/or covert foreign policy objectives. Afghan Taliban are an Ace in Pakistan's deck of cards. U.S, ISAF, India, Karzai have none left. Fact of the matter is - it may be hard for you and other Westerners to swallow but without Pakistan - you cannot succeed in Afghanistan. And that is a very simple fact.

[STURM]

Ahem! Uncle Sam doesn't provide any protection against India. Pakistan Army and its nukes do. Pakistan is not about pleasing the U.S, its more about not having many options since the global financial crisis hit the country hard & the problems compounded with the Western debacle in Afghanistan next door, consequences of which, Pakistan has to deal with.

"Protection' certainly was the wrong word to use and it's was my mistake. When I used the word ''protecton'', I meant it more in the diplomatic and poltical sense rather than literally.

Pakistan's government is serious about the local Taliban, infact the entire Pakistani society is

All due respect but are you sure that ''the entire Pakistan society'' is serious about the local Taliban or supported the move by the army to go into SWAT and Waziristan?


Fact of the matter is - it may be hard for you and other Westerners to swallow but without Pakistan - you cannot succeed in Afghanistan. And that is a very simple fact.

I have always mantained that Pakistan is very big a part of the problem and most of my posts in this thread would reflect that.

[mysterious]

Currently, India is doing just that in Kashmir and with far less technology than the ISAF or having the advantage that the US has wherein, the US can at will extend the operations beyond the Durand Line and take on the Taliban on Pakistani soil. Also the US will not have the disadvantage that India has wherein owing to political reasons, India does not use the Airforce (except transporter), missiles, Combat UAVs, artillery or armour etc to take on the terrorists in Kashmir

While terrorism in Kashmir continues, yet it has been to a great extent brought under control.

India has forces on border manning posts that are tactically sited running all the way from the Chamb in the South and northward to Punch, on the Pir Panjal mountains to Uri and onto Tangdhar and then easterly to Gurez and thereafter to Kargil, Leh and Siachen. To do this, has four Divisions and a Brigade. The rural areas are manned by Army Rashtriya Rifles and paramilitary (BSF). Towns are guarded by police forces.

I am sure the US and ISAF with better technology, weapons, surveillance means, air, helicopters, gunship, artillery, armour, Special Ops troops and so on, can control terrorism. However, the moot point is that troops unless in abundance will find it difficult and that is what is the real chink in the armour.

The US has controlled terrorism in Iraq, and even though remnants of terrorism are making things difficult at time, the situation is better and the Iraqi government functioning.

Ray, please spare us your 'analysis' with tongue-in-cheek comments on Kashmir. Half the Indians are ignorant about what really is happening in Kashmir. If you want to draw parallels, Kashmir has more in common with Gaza & West-Bank than with Pak-Afghan border.

Uncle Sam doesn't like to see & cannot politically handle more body bags coming home wrapped up in the American flag, thats why the Durand Line is respected & treated as a red line as far as boots on the ground are concerned. Ofcourse Indians cannot be expected to understand such sensitivities considering their actions in Kashmir.

And lets leave the definition of terrorism to the academia.

[mysterious]

I have always mantained that Pakistan is a part of the problem and most of my posts in this thread would give support that.

And that is where you are flat wrong. Pakistan is part of the solution. Short-sighted Western policies and antics have been the problem, which is why the Afghan war has dragged on for this long. What the Americans realize today, had they done it 5yrs ago, things would've been much different.

[WebMaster]

I have always mantained that Pakistan is a part of the problem and most of my posts in this thread would give support that.

With over 80,000 troops deployed, thousands of people died of terrorist attacks INSIDE Pakistan in 2009 and continue to die on daily basis (just two more today in Lahore), yet some lie to the world that Pakistan is part of the problem? Which other country has 80,000 troops on the ground fighting these scumbags? Not even NATO, considering size of the alliance, can muster up that many troops when US is desperate for more troops!

WITH Pakistan's help, we have caught hundreds, it not thousands, of Taliban and Al-Qaeda LEADERSHIP. Many lower rank goons were killed as well. Pakistan has launched over 3 operations INSIDE its territory against TTP and other entities that are responsible for suicide attacks and bombings on civilians. Yet, we have some who lie to the world that Pakistan is the problem. It boggles my mind, sorry.

Guys, lets stick to the facts here and support our theories or "facts" with some form of media coverage, preferably, something respected and known.

Thank you.

[STURM]

Yet, we have some who lie to the world that Pakistan is the problem. It boggles my mind, sorry.

Guys, lets stick to the facts here and support our theories or "facts" with some form of media coverage, preferably, something respected and known.

Thank you.

No one, is disputing the fact that Pakistan is suffering from the effects of terrorism or that Pakistani is playing a huge and positive role in the 'War onTerror''. Everyone here is aware that the Pakistani military is heavily engaged in eradicating the threat and as a result civillians are paying the ultimate price.

You mentioned about sticking to the facts.... Well the fact is that Pakistani support for theTaliban prior to 9//11 played a major role in the Taliban becoming a dominant force in Afghanistan. And according to some respected and known writers/journalists, elements in the Pakistani government and the military continued to provide support to the Taliban way after 9//11.

Please note that I'm not placing the blame solely on Pakistan for all the troubles effecting Afghanistan..

[WebMaster]

No one, is disputing the fact that Pakistan is suffering from the effects of terrorism or that Pakistani is playing a huge and positive role in the 'War onTerror''. Everyone here is aware that the Pakistani military is heavily engaged in eradicating the threat and as a result civillians are paying the ultimate price.

You mentioned about sticking to the facts.... Well the fact is that Pakistani support for theTaliban prior to 9//11 played a major role in the Taliban becoming a dominant force in Afghanistan. And according to some respected and known writers/journalists, elements in the Pakistani government and the military continued to provide support to the Taliban way after 9//11.

Please note that I'm not placing the blame solely on Pakistan for all the troubles effecting Afghanistan..

Pakistan isn't the issue but since we are at it, lets just get it over with.

What was Afghanistan like before Taliban and after Soviets left? What was Afghanistan and Afghan-Pakistan border like during Taliban rule? Before anything else, national security of Pakistan comes first so if I were responsible for that, I would make sure western border is as secure as possible because Pakistan's main threat is from the eastern border. What happens inside Afghanistan isn't my concern, as a person responsible for nations national security, I need to make sure it does not carry over across the border. Thats what the Pakistani intelligence did, they supported a group of people who brought peace within Afghanistan and in-turn, the region. Otherwise, we would have been fighting a different kind of war today. A war that would have resulted in thousands of Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras dead and millions of refugees in guess what? Pakistan.

If we can support dictators of middle east to ensure our national security (oil) and India for its national security can ally a communist country for over 40 years, why can't Pakistan ensure its national security by supporting a party that brought peace in Afghanistan, regardless of what they do within their borders.

Today you have drug problem in Afghanistan, there are warlords and war criminals who are ruling parts of Afghanistan who should be shot dead for their crimes against people of Afghanistan. There is a big difference between Pakistani Taliban and those inside Afghanistan. They have never collaborated, however, TTP has tried to associate themselves with Afghan Taliban but their barbaric tactics, their statements say otherwise. Have you ever noticed why NATO/ISAF/US are trying to TALK to the Afghan taliban while they continue drone attacks on TTP? That says alot about their differences and how ISAF sees them! Even the security forces recognize the difference while we have some who continue to shove theories and made up stories to the rest of the world.

Pakistan has done enough in war against terror and continues to do so, more than any other country. I think, we, here in the US should be grateful of that. We have cheerleaders who got on this anti-terrorism band wagon but have not done a thing to help with forces on the ground or through other means. When it comes to paying the ultimate price, we did and so are the Pakistanis - so other nations (cheerleaders) with 20 embassies and countless agents in Afghanistan acting like they are doing something should shut up and not hinder progress by supporting Takfiri groups inside Pakistan and use Afghanistan as launching pad for efforts against Pakistanis.

The strategy makers and those who understand the dynamics of the region as well as the situation need to keep sensitivities of Pakistan in mind, otherwise Afghanistan will never be stable.

[Herodotus]

The fact that the Emergency was only officially declared over in 1960 was I believe due to a number of factors and not due to mishandling during the start of the Emergency.Indeed it was mishandled from the start.

If it was not mishandled in 1948 the insurgency may not have lasted until 1960...check the data there was still violence into 1960. In fact, Chin Peng did not officially surrender until 1989.

But then again, most governments faced with an insurgency threat, tend to start off underestimating the nature of the threat and the counter measures needed. IMO the difference in Malaya was that the British were relatively fast in formulating their ''hearts and minds'' programmes by winning over the Chinese population and having a clear chain of command under civilian control with various intel bodies complemeting one another and operating in unison. A major advantage the Brits in Malaya had over the Coalition in Afghanistan was a much better understanding of the local culture, customs and mindset. In pre-independance Malaya, it was common even for junior level British district officers to speak the Malay language and also in many cases Chinese.

That and the fact that the majority population-Malaya-did not join the insurgency, and the British were not always soft in their COIN application-forced removals of the Chinese population.



A major advantage for the Brits was that the presence of British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya was not unwelcomed by the majority of the local population, who were in no hurry to see a speedy withdrawal of these troops. The timetable for British troop withdrawal from Malaya was dictated by results in the field against the MRLA and internal British politics, not by the need to sooth any fears amongst the Malayan population.

The Gurkhas were not considered colonialists though, and well you should know when the British actually set their policy. Its application was designed, at least in part, to prevent the Malayans from joining the insurgency.

Just so you know I'm not talking out of my butt, here are some references:

The Malayan emergency and Indonesian confrontation : the commonwealth’s wars 1948-1966 / Robert Jackson. Barnsley, England : Pen & Sword Aviation, 2008.

Hearts and minds in guerilla warfare : the Malayan emergency, 1948-1960 / Richard Stubbs. Singapore : Eastern Universities Press, 2004.

Dialogues with Chin Peng : new light on the Malayan Communist Party : dialogues and papers originating from a workshop with Chin Peng held at the Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, Australian National University, Canberra, 22-23 February 1999. Singapore : National University of Singapore, [c2004]

The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60: the domino that stood / Donald Mackay: 1st English ed. London; Washington [D.C.] : Brassey’s, 1997.

Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960 (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975).

Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; the Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, Studies in international security 10 (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966).

[agc33e]

Continuing with my previous post:
-i see that borders between countries are very difficult to control, but borders for each town or city it is much simpler, two weak points, one the entry of people, we can use the airport scanners to inspect well, avoiding explosive belts etc, second the entry of vehicles, we can have official vehicles which take you out and in of the city, and you can have your car parked out the border, if you want to enter it in, to use it inside the city border you must wait for an inspection and keep parked inside the city if you want.
-other things are the routes for going out and entering to the cities or bases, we can monitore them with cameras, using as first vehicle of the row a drone for the mines, and with the frequency inhibitors..

The basis of the terrorism is the rencor, the rage from an unhappy people, with a maxima expression of the suicide, "i get rid of my life, but i kill some people" (the ones that do it voluntarily), so if we are in xxi century and we are very clever with technology and luxury for some but in terms of social system, economical system we are still inside the mess of the no-control economy. So maybe militar people could introduce a way of sustainable growth, based on self-town-city production of the basics, food, textiles, if there is poor people, very unhappy people, it will create more suicide bombings...if you are happy planting your fruits, and coming back at midday home and have a pleasurous afternoong and evening, this type of facts are stronger than any rage against "occidental" societies or jihad matters.

Cheers.

[STURM]

If it was not mishandled in 1948 the insurgency may not have lasted until 1960...check the data there was still violence into 1960. In fact, Chin Peng did not officially surrender until 1989.

I fully agree, like most counter insurgencies, it was mishandled from the start. I was wrong, stating in an earlier post that it was never mishandled. Again I could be wrong here but I believe the Brits were relatively quick in formulating a sound response and strategy. Either way, success was bound to take time, it was never expected that the campaign to defeat the MRLA would be short. Part of the problem apart from the 600km border with Thailand is that Peninsular Malaysia is roughly the size of England and hunting down small groups of MRLA in the jungle was no easy task.

The original intent was to declare the Emergency over at least 2 years before 1960 but the Malayan government at the advice of the Brits waited till 1960. There was violence up to the 80's, but the key difference is the MRLA in the 70s and 80's never posed the level of threat they did in the 50's.

Just so you know I'm not talking out of my butt,

Herodotus, there's no need for references. I never thought for a minute that you were ''talking out of your butt'' :). As you mentioned previously, you used to work for a think-tank.