The turret-mounted mortar on AFV as direct/indirect fire support unit

[Firn]

The 120mm mortar delivers a HE payload similar to a 155mm howitzer and can reach out to roughly 9km with standard rounds out of a 3m barrel. Engaging the enemy in in deep plunging fire he greatly reduces the dead space available to the enemy. He can illuminate the sky and lay smokescreens . Smart rounds as the Strix and the SMART can engage armored threats from afar with indirect fire.

Breach-loaded mortars in turrets can fire over 10 rounds a minute and may also be used as direct fire support units. The specific situation (OPFOR, environment, need) and the capabilities of the AFV (armor, sights, training) will dictate if it will be used in this role.

The compact NEMO

The heavy AMOS

What place will such AFV have in the full spectrum of military operations?

[Firn]

The NLOS-Mortar (NLOS-M) is the organic indirect fire support component of the FCS(BCT) SoS, also with a high level of commonality with other MGV variants. Like the NLOS-C, the NLOS-M will transform mortars’ traditional role on the battlefield by providing deadly, accurate and responsive short- to mid-range fire support critical to Soldiers in the close fight. Very similar to NLOS-C, NLOS-Muses automation to index, present and fire rounds with minimal manual touching or adjusting by the crew. Above all, the crew performs its fire mission under the protection of armored vehicles.

About the FCS-Mortar (http://asc.army.mil/docs/pubs/alt/2008/2_AprMayJun/articles/42_Future_Combat_Systems_(FCS)_Creates_Cannon_and_ Mortar_Synergy_200804.pdf). Seems like the Us army has drawn the same conlusion as the developers in Sweden/Finland. This type of AFV should be extremely flexible and effective, especially in MOUT operations. While they don't not have the huge weight of the soviet 160mm and 240mm mortars per shot, they have a far far faster ROF, greater accuracy and a broader spectrum of far more advanced rounds. The soviets knew a great deal about the capabilites of heavy mortars (WWII, Afghanistan) in rural and urban operations. Germany fielded a mobile mortar carrier based on the M113, perhaps after the experiences with many types of mortars in WWII.

[Waylander]

IMHO these systems can be extremely usefull.

Mortars should be added to any fighting bn and the nature of mechanized forces dictates that this fire support should be able to go where the rest of the task force goes.
While being mechanized one can use a heavy 120mm mortar because weight of the system and ammo isn't that much of a factor anymore.
Giving this system fast autoloading and direct fire capabilities is just a natural step.

These new system are alot more capable than the older ones (like the mentioned 120mm tampella on MTW).
I also especially like the direct fire capability.
Gives your troops a very nice HE thrower which should for reducing enemy fortifications.
And while this can also be done to some extent by the MBTs and IFVs of the task force the added self defense capability should not be underestimated.

I think there are not many people in the military community don't see the benefits of such a system.
But as always the price is the problem. An AMOS vehicle is much more expensive than just using a M113, put a hole into the top and use a standard 120mm tampella out of its back.
And one should not forget that such a self propelled modern system also negates the ability to use the mortar also like a normal dismounted one.

[Firn]

Well I was a light infantry guy so I'm out of my lane when it comes to armoured doctrine. But I guess that such AFV would be an interesting "rich men's" artillery for IDF and DF support at a relative low organisational level. While it would be certainly wise to employ them carefully and well to the rear in high-intensity combat they should be able prove their mettle against most threads with decent passive protection, an active protection system and the addition of HEAT-MP rounds. A remote-controlled weapon station (GMG, .50, GPMG) with a well-rounded sensor package could provide the so valuable hunter-killer ability in direct fire fights. Pricey but worth it IMHO.

Gives your troops a very nice HE thrower which should for reducing enemy fortifications.
And while this can also be done to some extent by the MBTs and IFVs of the task force the added self defense capability should not be underestimated.

Mortar rounds pack almost as much HE as a 155m and are rather compact, allowing for a lot of ammunition. They are unable to come anywhere near the pentration power of a modern artillery and tank rounds but then again that's what you have the heavy tanks and artillery for. And in low-intensity operations low penetration power of the mortars (perhaps in with a DIME round) may even be often an advantage.


The AMOS is certainly able to rain down an amazing number of rounds in a very short time (26 in a minute, 8-10 simultaniously on target - MRSI) but it is IMHO a bit topheavy for light/medium AFV. A Boxer, CV90 or a Puma would be great platforms for it. The lighter AFV should use a turret with a single tube.

The trailed 120mm mortar retains anyway its great importance...

[Waylander]

Well I was a light infantry guy so I'm out of my lane when it comes to armoured doctrine. But I guess that such AFV would be an interesting "rich men's" artillery for IDF and DF support at a relative low organisational level. While it would be certainly wise to employ them carefully and well to the rear in high-intensity combat they should be able prove their mettle against most threads with decent passive protection, an active protection system and the addition of HEAT-MP rounds. A remote-controlled weapon station (GMG, .50, GPMG) with a well-rounded sensor package could provide the so valuable hunter-killer ability in direct fire fights. Pricey but worth it IMHO.


I am totally d'accord with you that such a system is defenitely adding alot of usefull capabilities. As I said before such mortars should be incorporated at Bn level. Why the Bundeswehr eliminated the mortar units of the PzGren Bns is totally beyond me and I hope they correct this better sooner than later.

As for protection and self defense.
I would also use an IFV chassis (CV90, Ulan, Puma,...) but I wouldn't think that a well-rounded sensor package with hunter-killer capabilities is needed. More something like what the PzH2000 fields for direct fire engagements.
An independent commanders sight with TI and a LRF and not something like the FCS of an IFV or MBT.
I am also not sure if HEAT round is needed.
Everything up to an IFV should be really impressed by a normal HE and a modern MBT is not impressed by a HEAT.

Mortar rounds pack almost as much HE as a 155m and are rather compact, allowing for a lot of ammunition. They are unable to come anywhere near the pentration power of a modern artillery and tank rounds but then again that's what you have the heavy tanks and artillery for. And in low-intensity operations low penetration power of the mortars (perhaps in with a DIME round) may even be often an advantage.


The AMOS is certainly able to rain down an amazing number of rounds in a very short time (26 in a minute, 8-10 simultaniously on target - MRSI) but it is IMHO a bit topheavy for light/medium AFV. A Boxer, CV90 or a Puma would be great platforms for it. The lighter AFV should use a turret with a single tube.

The trailed 120mm mortar retains anyway its great importance...
6 Hours Ago 02:18 PM

My comment about MBTs and IFVs also fullfilling the role as a HE thrower aimed more at them being much more often close to where the direct fire support is needed.
Such a mortar system could defenitely be usefull when used as a direct fire support platform but most of the time one is going to use the MBT or IFV which is close by or a (guided) mortar or artillery strike instead of getting a mortar unit up front which also might have much better things to do than act as a direct fire support platform.

I would go for the two barrel/IFV chassis combination as support for mechanized formations. These units already field the IFV, making logistics easy. And the heavy chassis would be able to support the AMOS system while giving good protection.
When doing it one can do it right from the beginning and get the best out of the system.

For light units I would not use such a system at all.
The planned Wiesel II mortar carrier for example is better suited to support light/airborn/airmobile/mountain infantry as it can go were a bigger mortar system cannot go while having a smaller logistical footprint.
And these units rely much more on being able to also use the mortars in a dismounted role.

[Firn]

I would also use an IFV chassis (CV90, Ulan, Puma,...) but I wouldn't think that a well-rounded sensor package with hunter-killer capabilities is needed. More something like what the PzH2000 fields for direct fire engagements.
An independent commanders sight with TI and a LRF and not something like the FCS of an IFV or MBT.
I am also not sure if HEAT round is needed.
Everything up to an IFV should be really impressed by a normal HE and a modern MBT is not impressed by a HEAT.

You clearly have far more knowledge in this area. The HEAT should be unnecessary. I thought that a hunter-killer package similar to the IFV Puma/CV90 would make sense. They would operate alongside or close to the IFV and tanks and be have a far higher chance of enemy contact than a PzH/SPG as you also have stated. Thus a RWS with seperate sights as part of a hunter side of the sensor/FCS package seems reasonable to me.

The Wiesel II seems to be a brilliant idea for mountain infantry. Few people outside the mountains understand that such a small vehicle is perfect for the often quite small field tracks/streets. It is not much wider than an old Panda 4x4 and quite light and should be able to navigate very well in the Alps or similar mountains. The plunging heavy mortar fire should be golden with all those steep slopes, deep vallies, high peaks and the resulting robust reverse slope defense. Direct fire by other AFV against it is rather unlikely in such an environment but IDF very much so and with the new PGM or smart mortar rounds quite deadly.

[Waylander]

I wouldn't expect such a vehicle to operate directly together with the other AFVs of a mechanized unit.

It's main job is still to be a traditional mortar fire support unit albeit with alot more firepower than the manually operated mortars of the past.
It can be called forward if it is thought necessary to get a HE thrower to the frontline.

But in the end most of the time it is going to operate some distance behind the combat units (at least the ones which are up front and in contact) just like a fire support unit is supposed to operate.

It offers more flexibility in it's ability to use the mortars in a direct fire mode but it's enhanced indirect fire capabilities are much more important.

But you are right that it should operate closer to the front than a SPH. That's the nature of Bn integrated mortar units due to their lower range and them being attached directly to a task force. Therefore the direct fire capability enhances the survivability of such a system in situations were a M113 mortar carrier (Or a similar vehicle) would just be a sitting duck.

[kato]

Why the Bundeswehr eliminated the mortar units of the PzGren Bns is totally beyond me and I hope they correct this better sooner than later.
Keeping the PzMrsKp in the PzGrenBtl would have added some 500-700 extra men on the Bundeswehr payroll, apart from keeping the bogged-down, maintenance-heavy M113 in service longer. :rolleyes:

(remember, we're trying to get below 250k soldiers, every bit counts :D)

[Waylander]

Arrrrr, right.

I forgot the cold logic of our overlords...

Heck, even forcing the PzGren Bns to transport their tampellas with Wolfs would have been better than eliminating them fully.

But what are mortars for anyway? Who needs them?
Oh wait, our QRF for A-stan which consists of PzGrens... :D

[DavidDCM]

I see the advantage of a turret-solution mortar like AMOS more in the fact that it can be very fast in and out of it's firing position and thus keep pace with an advancing armored force, avoid counter-artillery fire, but at the same time being able to defend themselves to a certain extent.

Due to their relative short range and the high speed with which modern armor units operate the mortars will be forced to follow suit behind the main combat units, with possibly lots of position changing, and that's where the direct-fire is a desirable thing to have against unsuspected enemy units that suddenly appear.

But like SPH's, this ability should never be exploited as a main role on the battle field. They are an emergency and self-defence asset only. Agree to waylander, if you have MBT's at the front anyway than there's no reason to call the mortar carriers forward for a direct fire mission.

[kato]

This idea of AMOS in a direct-fire role always reminds me of this oooold artwork (http://www.dia.mil/history/art/images/tank.jpg) and just how ... wrong the idea seems when looking at it.

[Abraham Gubler]

The non-linear nature of contemporary warfare is such that the traditional concept of employment of close IDF support (ie 120mm mortars) is rapidly fading away. Low force desnisities, networked SA and distrubuited operations mean that combat teams will won't be lined up side by side at the forward edge of the battle but operating deep in the heart of enemy territory in a huge mass of fast moving raid after raid.

So turreted 120mm mortars provide a huge advantage over traditional muzzle loaded mortars in that they can fire quickly from the move and provide full protection to their operators. The direct fire capability is I think highly overated. A 120mm mortar bomb is a terrible direct fire application against anything other than infantry and light structures. Certainly taking the mortar out of the IDF network where it can keep providing plunging fires and rapid smoke fires to trundle forward to shoot at something when you can have high velocity direct fire weapons doing it is a waste of capability.

[Abraham Gubler]

This idea of AMOS in a direct-fire role always reminds me of this oooold artwork (http://www.dia.mil/history/art/images/tank.jpg) and just how ... wrong the idea seems when looking at it.

There's nothing wrong with the use of high velocity artillery like 122mm guns to direct fire shoot in an attack. Especially in the Soviet system where the IDF for such an attack would be provided by a huge mass of Army and Frontal artillery leaving the Regimental and Divisional guns redundant. So use them for direct fires where without the need for plotting and bringing into line the guns can respond much quicker.

[kato]

There's nothing wrong with the use of high velocity artillery like 122mm guns to direct fire shoot in an attack.
I said reminds me of it. As in imagine a similar scene with say CV9030s instead of BMP-1s and AMOS on a similar hull instead of 2S1.

[Waylander]

Not that a NATO or Swedish army usually enjoys nearly as much artillery support like the Sovjets would have brought to bear on their enemies.

I can understand why a sovjet bn commander thinks that the support given to him by the 3rd shock army is enough steel rain and uses his attached fire support units for direct fire support.
I would't be so sure about it if I would be part of I.GE Corps.
Especially not when the 3rd is in front of me...

[Firn]

FM 90-10-1, 8-30

120-mm Mortar. The 120-mm mortar is large enough to have a major
effect on common urban targets. It can penetrate deep into a building,
causing extensive damage because of its explosive power. A minimum of 18
inches of packed earth or sand is needed to stop the fragments from a
120-mm HE round that impacts 10 feet away. The effect from a direct hit
from a 120-mm round is equivalent to almost 10 pounds of TNT, which can
crush fortifications built with commonly available materials. The 120-mm
mortar round can create a large but shallow crater in a road surface, which
is not deep or steep-sided enough to block vehicular movement. However,
craters could be deep enough to damage or destroy storm drain systems,
water and gas pipes, and electrical or phone cables.

Having just seen the "light" 60 in live training i can only read and guess how powerful and useful the 120mm would be. Given the heavy payload of HE it seems to be a perfect complement to the DF assets and the field manual points out the extensive damage it can cause in the IDF role. Given the high payload of HE it should also be nasty against the vast majority of buildings and AFV with DF. With the high elevation it has very little dead space compared to tanks. All in all a very effective complement in a MOUT. In the chaotic situations of war the abilities of this new turreted mortars should be very valuable as has been pointed out, if only in selfdefense.

With the IFV and MBT to handle the "close-combat" the MFV (Mortar fighting vehicles) are of course first of all there to provide their unique IDF support. This is were they really shine.

BTW: I think that the author just wanted to paint other AFV than tanks in a dramatic fashion. :p:

[kato]

The artwork is a DIA painting.
"The Agency commissioned these works of military art to illustrate publications and support official briefings. DIA analysts and artists worked closely to achieve an accurate portrayal of the military system being illustrated."
The specific artwork is "Soviet Artillery Supporting River Crossing" by Richard J. Terry, 1982, and is meant to show off the capability of the 2S1 (then newly deployed to Europe) in "keeping pace with tank and motorized rifle units".

[Abraham Gubler]

Having just seen the "light" 60 in live training i can only read and guess how powerful and useful the 120mm would be. Given the heavy payload of HE it seems to be a perfect complement to the DF assets and the field manual points out the extensive damage it can cause in the IDF role. Given the high payload of HE it should also be nasty against the vast majority of buildings and AFV with DF. With the high elevation it has very little dead space compared to tanks. All in all a very effective complement in a MOUT. In the chaotic situations of war the abilities of this new turreted mortars should be very valuable as has been pointed out, if only in selfdefense.

On paper... But the reality is a little bit different. The 120mm mortar lacks two essential qualities to be a good direct fire weapon. Including in high angle direct fires against the upper stories of tall buildings in urban environments.

These two qualities are a hard shell exterior and velocity. It needs neither for its designed for plunging fires role where the angle of fall enables it to defeat most structural protection. However against a rebar concrete wall or structure the 120mm HE mortar would will just "bounce" off or more accurately point detonate on the outer surface and expend all its explosive energy on the outside. Will break many windows but not enter the structure and defeat the enemy inside.

Also because of its low velocity it has very high time of flights which make direct fires against anything over a few hundred metres away really a practice of indirect fire against a target in sight. Which means high dispersion, low accuracy and results achieved through battery fire or expensive guided munitions (PGMM).

BTW: I think that the author just wanted to paint other AFV than tanks in a dramatic fashion. :p:

No it was a specific part of the Soviet's artillery tactics. They training their Regimental and Divisional guns extensively in direct fire. Unlike Western armies that are extremely sensitive to losing an artillery gun the Russians/Soviets were never afraid to lose a gun or two in direct fire battles as long as it tore the arm of the enemy.

[Firn]

Note that I pointed out that this type of mortar is a excellent complement to other DF assets able to hold it's own against almost all threads in a MOUT environment where the engagement ranges for DF are typically low.

While there isn't much info on how the AMOS achieves it's long ranges of 12-13km it is safe to say that it is able to shoot it's bombs with high charges and the long barrel north of 400m/s. This is roughly 200-300m/s slower than a light 105mm howitzer (a world behind a tankgun) and should certainly more than enough for the selfdefense/DF support in MOUT in almost instances with good accuracy and low dispersion when the need arises.

The vast majority of buildingwalls in a typical European city is certainly not able to withstand a 120 HE and if we take the experience in the cited FM it will penetrate deep into a building even with it's relative soft mantle. Hardened bunkers, strong concrete walls and fortified positions are of course left to the plentiful MBTs in the front, CAS or SP artillery guns

Soviet doctrine was heavily influenced by the experiences in WWII and with the plenty of SP guns with comparable large calibers available to the Red Army they made ruthless sound use of it. As waylander pointed out the PzH2000 was provided with the ability to be used decently for DF when needed, even if it should operate 10-15km behind the frontline.

[Tony Williams]

I think that there are two separate issues here.

In a high-tech hot war, against an opponent with artillery-locating radar, the high burst rate of fire of AMOS could be very useful, allowing the vehicle to get a lot of rounds in the air before running from the inevitable counterbattery fire.

However, a turreted manually-loaded mortar could also be a useful general purpose LAFV weapon in more limited warfare such as Iraq. Compared with a high-velocity direct-fire gun, you get (for the same weight) a bigger and more effective HE shell, a much higher angle of fire (useful for engaging snipers in high buildings as well as dropping bombs on targets concealed from line-of-sight view), more compact ammo for a bigger supply, a wider choice of natures (smoke and flares as well as HE), and a shorter barrel (better in urban areas). Guided gun-fired missiles like LAHAT might be usable against certain targets, so could the anti-armour STRIX guided bomb. And several different GPS/laser-guided mortar bombs are being developed. All in all, it could be an extremely useful system. And you really don't need the space-eating complications of automatic loading (which would in any case complicate switching the ammunition natures).

Several years ago BAE showed a couple of vehicles at DSEi fitted with their manually-loaded, turreted, breech-loading mortar, a Warrior MICV and an 8x8 Piranha III. I took the following photos of them (the final one shows the Piranha interior):

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/PICT0278.jpg

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/PICT0218.jpg

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/PICT0217.jpg

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/PICT0216.jpg

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk)

[Firn]

However, a turreted manually-loaded mortar could also be a useful general purpose LAFV weapon in more limited warfare such as Iraq. Compared with a high-velocity direct-fire gun, you get (for the same weight) a bigger and more effective HE shell, a much higher angle of fire (useful for engaging snipers in high buildings as well as dropping bombs on targets concealed from line-of-sight view), more compact ammo for a bigger supply, a wider choice of natures (smoke and flares as well as HE), and a shorter barrel (better in urban areas). Guided gun-fired missiles like LAHAT might be usable against certain targets, so could the anti-armour STRIX guided bomb. And several different GPS/laser-guided mortar bombs are being developed. All in all, it could be an extremely useful system. And you really don't need the space-eating complications of automatic loading (which would in any case complicate switching the ammunition natures).

I think you summed it up very nicely.

A improved LAHAT (perhaps with the features of the Spike) with a long range due to dual-propulsion could be a neat addition, especially in a high-intensity conflict. It gives the mortar unit the ability to launch a low-observable projectile as the guided flight path makes an exact target location by firefinders impossible. Helicopters and (very) slow fixed-wing aircraft might also be engaged. The only problem might be that complex systems like AMOS might not be able to fire them :vamp

[Firn]

I gave lately a look at the Finnish indirect fire support "environment" to detect what arguments support the purchase of the 24 AMOS Patria MFV.

First of all mortars are traditionally well regarded by the Finns who relied on a great part on their mortars to compensate for their gross weakness in Artillery. This mirrors somewhat the German experience in the later years who were increasingly used their cheaply and easily produced and yet effective Mortars and Nebelwerfer as their main indirect fire support.

They have still a rather huge amount of artillery, enough to outfit the current Dutch armed forces 30 times over :)

Note - this is NOT a joke. It is simply the reality as surprising it sounds.

Most of them are old, towed and of soviet origin but should still pack a mighty punch. Some more modern FA of finnish origin is also available. There is a btl of fairly modern, only 20 years old soviet SPH with a 152mm howitzer. Four reserve btl have the even older 122 2S1 SPH.

While I don't have any insight into the mind of the responsibles I guess that the 24 Patria AMOS MFV will form two heavy mortar companies with two batteries. They will be a kind of SPM with a rather short range but a very high amount of fire coupled with a wide arrange of ammo among them things like Strix. Guess that they will replace the old SPH in the active role.

To offset the loss in range and the limited role of the mortars in CB the MLRS seem like the perfect solution and are perhaps one factor in the decision to buy the AMOS SPM. I bet the Dutch government was happy to have no longer the hassle to operate this nasty and brute machines of war. :)

The Jaeger brigade of the Northern Command operate a 120mm mortar from a Bandvagn-alike vehicle, interesting. It always surprises me how often one thinks this would be a creative and intelligent thing and then discovers that somebody else did it before. An excellent and cost-effective choice.


All in all an interesting solution for a specific situation and in times of war they can rely on the reserves and their large amounts of howitzers to help out.

[Firn]

There seems also be alot going on when it comes to mortar rounds

- XM984: Extended range (Rocket assisted) and DPICM
- Thermobaric warhead

But things were also cancelled;

- PGMM: Laser-guided mortar rounds with various warheads

Old goodies:

- Strix: IR guided mortar round
- all the usual stuff (Illumination, HE, smoke, etc)

[Waylander]

As you mention smoke.
Does anybody knows if there are IR-smoke rounds for mortars in use with a country out there?

[Wooki]

On paper... But the reality is a little bit different. The 120mm mortar lacks two essential qualities to be a good direct fire weapon. Including in high angle direct fires against the upper stories of tall buildings in urban environments.

These two qualities are a hard shell exterior and velocity. It needs neither for its designed for plunging fires role where the angle of fall enables it to defeat most structural protection. However against a rebar concrete wall or structure the 120mm HE mortar would will just "bounce" off or more accurately point detonate on the outer surface and expend all its explosive energy on the outside. Will break many windows but not enter the structure and defeat the enemy inside.

Also because of its low velocity it has very high time of flights which make direct fires against anything over a few hundred metres away really a practice of indirect fire against a target in sight. Which means high dispersion, low accuracy and results achieved through battery fire or expensive guided munitions (PGMM).



No it was a specific part of the Soviet's artillery tactics. They training their Regimental and Divisional guns extensively in direct fire. Unlike Western armies that are extremely sensitive to losing an artillery gun the Russians/Soviets were never afraid to lose a gun or two in direct fire battles as long as it tore the arm of the enemy.
Good points but if you modify existing 120mm tank munitions, then you are good to go. e.g. MPAT with a velocity of around 900m/s.

We looked at this about 5 years ago and the modification to the whole range of munitions except the APFSDS was relatively easy to do.

You do need to make a new line, and AMOS is not up to snuff. A better breach loader would need to be made IMHO. But the difficulties in creating a direct fire system are not as great as one would think at first pass.

The most useful application is the AC130 and being able to fire guided munitions from that platform without resorting to something like BAT. Straight away you are going to have to mod the munition so that it doesn't slide out of the tube when loaded and from there the thought process continues towards existing tank munitions and so on.

cheers


w

[Firn]

As you mention smoke.
Does anybody knows if there are IR-smoke rounds for mortars in use with a country out there?

Rheinmetall (http://www.rheinmetall-detec.com/index.php?fid=3816&lang=2&pdb=1) makes one. Perfect for against an enemy with IR sensor. Still against insurgents as the Taliban a normal smoke round is of course far better - it makes a one-way mirror and allows the friendlies to use their big toys.

It seems also that there is a tendency to give the mortars overall greater penetration power:



This innovative ammunition family, teamed with a newly developed propellant system, is characterized by long range and high precision. Optimized for semi-hard targets, the HE round features significantly improved fragmentation and – equipped with a suitable fuse – is capable of penetrating reinforced concrete in accordance with STANAG 4536. The explosive filling is insensitive and exceeds the requirements set out in STANAG 4170.

Overall I have a hard time to understand why the penetration power of an lobbed round is intrinsically higher than the one off an direct one.

Usually we will use the more direct fire as an option for relative close ranges, let us say 50-400m. To achieve a relative flat ballisic curve and short flight time we will use a high charge to get more than 400 m/s. Let as assume that the target has a walls an floors of the same construction and thickness. It is easy to see that the longer the range and the slower the round the greater the chance of a deflection and the higher the relative thickness of the wall. In other words the shorter the range and the higher the speed the relatively thinner gets the wall unitil the right angle is achieved.

As Abraham pointed out the thin outer case is not well suited for direct penetration, because it maximises the HE load. But this is a deliberate (and good) design choice. A heavy "Bunkerfaust" or a hardened (even perhaps subcaliber) round with a delayed explosion could solve a lot of this problems. The first round would also be an interesting option against medium and light AFV, should the dire need arise.

Bunkerfaust


So to penetrate a strong wall it is best to hit it with an vector as close as possible to the right angle in both dimensions. To penetrate the typically flat roof of a bunker it also shot be hit as close to the right angle as possible. This time the second dimension is largely irrelevant which makes things generally easier.

A "Bunkerfaust" mortar round would achieve the maximal performance even with just enough speed fired from a very high angle (70-80°) to hit the target. A classic mortar round however set to explode delayed profits greatly from increased speed coupled with a high trajectory. But there is of course a practical limit to it due to the possible angle of fire and the overall range. The higher the charge, the higher the speed, the higher the altitude and the longer the range reached. The quality of the casing is however also very imporant. Only a relative hard case will to profit from the high speed achieved by the high charge.

Not that even the the fastest hardened round comes even remotely close to such momentum and payload.

Bunker buster


So a sufficiently hard standard round penetrates hardened roofs best with a plunging fire from a round shot as high as possible. Even with an elevation of 85° degrees this makes it best against targets at medium an long distances.

On the other hand a sufficiently hard standard round penetrates hardened walls best with the flattest possible trajectory. Against a target at even level this means the higher the charge and the higher the speed and the shorter the distance the better.

Thanks to smaller deacceleration by drag (and gravitation) the hardened round will thus penetrate walls at close distance better than equally thick roofs at medium-long distances. :)


Hm this let me think about the usefullness of a "hardened" mulit-fuze mortar round. Rheinmetall seems to have addressed this issue at least partly. I really wonder how such a round would compare to a "Bunkerfaust" one against hardened walls. Against very hard ones it seems that the second one has the advantage. But against relative weak walls the first one should be better. Anyway a interesting topic. Mortars seem to become more and more useful.

Of course the power of the 155mm howitzer remains unmatched in direct fire:


c. ) Target Effects. 155-mm direct fire has a devastating effect against masonry construction and field fortifications. Smaller artillery pieces (105-mm) are normally towed and, therefore, are difficult to employ in the direct-fire mode. Their target effects are much less destructive than the larger caliber weapons.

(1) 155-mm howitzers. The 155-mm self-propelled howitzer offers its crew mobility and limited protection in urban areas. It is effective due to its rate of fire and penetration. HE rounds can penetrate up to 38 inches of brick and nonreinforced concrete. Projectiles can penetrate up to 28 inches of reinforced concrete with considerable damage beyond the wall. HE rounds fuzed with concrete-piercing fuzes provide an excellent means of penetrating strong reinforced concrete structures. One round can penetrate up to 46 inches. Five rounds are needed to create a 1.5-meter breach in a 1-meter thick wall. About 10 rounds are needed to create such a breach in a wall 1.5 meters thick. Superquick fuzing causes the rubble to be blown into the building, whereas delay fuzing tends to blow the rubble outward into the street.

The effectivness of weapons (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/ch7.htm) in Urban combat..

But the 120mm isn't shabby either - well, maybe to the OPFOR

(3) 120-mm Mortar. The 120-mm mortar is large enough to have a major effect on common urban targets. It can penetrate deep into a building, causing extensive damage because of its explosive power. A minimum of 18 inches of packed earth or sand is needed to stop the fragments from a 120-mm HE round impacting 10 feet away. The effect of a direct hit from a 120-mm round is equivalent to almost 10 pounds of TNT, which can crush fortifications built with commonly available materials. The 120-mm mortar round can create a large but shallow crater in a road surface, but it is not deep or steep-sided enough to block vehicular movement. However, craters could be deep enough to damage or destroy storm drain systems, water and gas pipes, and electrical or phone cables.

Note that this refers to indirect fire with "soft" rounds and fuzes - the effects are far greater with hardened ones. Even more so with direct fire, as we have learned.



Ah, the vanity of destruction...

[Firn]

Because it is for quite some time my last day here I will quickly write up some other thoughts.


Guided mortar rounds


There are basically five sensors/systems used to guide a projectile into a target which can also be combined and fuzed. I will devide them further according the their nature.


a) Radar:

(i) projectile active; observer TA; fire-and-forget
(ii) projectile passive, observer TA + active
(iii) pojectile passive, target active; mostly fire-and-forget
(iv) a combination


b) Infrared:

(i) projectile passive; observer TA; fire-and-forget


c) Laser

(i) projectile passive, observer TA + active
(ii) projectile passive, target active; (largely theoretic)
(iii) projectile active (LADAR), observer TA + partly active
(iv) a combination


d) Manual guidance

(i) projectile passive, observer TA + active


e) GPS

(i) projectile passive, observer TA + for moving targets active


f) INS

(i) projectile passive, observer TA + for moving targets active



Legend:

TA= Target Aquisition
Observer= The observer/shooter. Can be one or two entities
active= An external operator/ A human must be mostly active during the process.



Overview


Here is a five year old overview (http://defense-update.com/features/du-1-04/mortar-munitions.htm).

Generally there is the tendency to fuze two or more sensors to enhance the capabilities of the ammunition. Especially the combination of the qualities of the GPS (and partly INS) with one sensor of a group consisting of Laser, Radar or IR sensors, both active and passive seems sensible. The manual guidance with an Man-in-the-Loop capability is far harder to achieve than in ATGM as a spooling fibre-optical cable is at least for breech-loaded ones usually not suitable. For front-loaded mortars it might still be practical. A radio transmission between the MitL and the projectile can be disturbed rather easily.



Two interesting concepts


a) The Strix:

It has a IR passive guidance, which make it a fire-and-forget round after the launch and basic data. Perfectly suited to destroy mobile AFV with the help of a passive forward observer. Should be also well suited fin combination with a fire finder to Counter-battery work against camouflaged "hot" tubes and guns. A integrated GPS would speed the process up and increase the utiliy against scooting shooters.


b) The Fireball

It combines GPS and semi-active laser guidance which make it very flexible, especially with an proper FO which also can paint the target.

It allows a quick launch into a basket from which the FO can help indirectly guide it very precisely into the target. This process enables the FO to greatly reduces his "active" painting with good coordination In long-range shots possibly from 30-40 seconds or more to roughly five or even less. This also makes it in combination with an FO well suited even for dangerous mobile targets.

The GPS provides also a backup for bad weather and a lack of an FO or a "painter". It is still able to do help with CB work at long ranges - especially with bomblets - and to engage static or supressed targets under all condition with good accuracy.


Some further ideas and thoughts


a) Situational Awerness and Quick Reactions

Fit every MFV with a sniper detection system like the Boomerang or muzzle flash detector. Add a seperate periscope/light RWS with an MG or HMG for the commander with good optics and IR. The seperate wide-view optic is imporant to allow an assistent gunner to get SA and search for the targets

Every shot taken at the MFV will get automatically geolocalized with the help of the GPS. Feed the information into the BMS (Battle management system) and into the sighting systems of the RWS and the commander. This helps to get the eyes on the sources of fire really quick.

A highly sensible "sniper location system" which relies on the acoustic signatures should also be able to detect other sounds. The humming of a tank engine, the quick moving rotor of an helicopter or the rattle of the tracks on hard ground should all be sensed by it when the MFV stands still. The directional microphones should get at the least a rough bearing on it and enable the user to rapidly investigate likely point of origine. This could help a lot to get helicopters down from the sky, as such a system could pinpoint with far greater ease than most sound emitters. This would be the time to throw a LAHAT in the mortar or to activate the RBS 70. Then scan the suspect segment of sky a keep the laser brush ready to paint the target.


b) Hunter-Killer or RWS-Mortar

The MFV should be equipped with the a high quality RWS atop of the turret with two main configurations, GMG or HMG. It should have excellent optics (IR and day) with good optical zoom (4-16), Laser range finder and the ability to geolocate the target and mark it at night with IR and a laser beam.

With a ballistic computer providing an accurate firing solution, possibly even while driving already the first round should be spot on. This way you will be able to acquire, identify and engage the target speedily, call in arty and air really fast and easily mark the target for CAS or fire support at night. The direct laser painting allows for great precision against directly visible and moving targets with mortar rounds like the Fireball.


(i) The GMG RWS is ideal for quick and deadly suppression. Plenty of different rounds available for that one, so something for all the tastes. It has also some indirect capability too. It might be a bit over the top in combination with a 120mm mortar, so a HMG or MG might be the better choice.

(ii) The HMG version is the "sniper" and can reach out a long way. It has the same "basic" package. A interesting addition might be here not an ATGM but the BOLIDE of the RBS-70. It is a Mach 2 laser beam riding SAM which could be guided by the already mostly existing hardware and some (complicated) software updates. Alternatively - and perhaps far better - the whole manpad kit could be used as the sensor suite for the RWS.

Of course this SAM works bests as integrated node of a larger AD network. However it should already be alone a great danger to any CAS support in the vicinity. An alternative would be both the Stinger and the Mistral. But in the current environment it is an unnecessary addition


Overall the "hunter-killer" capability of the hunting RWS with some teeth and the killing twin-mortar. The networked sensor and FCS should enable to get rounds very fast downrange following external or internal input, indirect or direct fire.


c) Protecting this golden goose

Look into an active defense suite, like the AMAP-T, as it may be just a matter of time unitil the MFV has a nasty encounter with a modern AT missile or round. It seems to be likely and sensible addition of almost any AFV. It may also increase SA by helping to detect the source of the incoming fire. In this context a smoke launcher unit could be useful. Perhaps a softkill system also might be of interest, but is also pricey.



d) So a great variety of rounds with many good uses

Strix (even better with GPS), Fireball, GPS-guided rounds and unguided ones, canister with various payloads and unitary warhead, Rocket Assisted and not, full-spectrum smoke and only normal one, IR illuminations and perhaps chemical... the present list is very long and the future on will be even longer. And that makes it such a great and versatile weapons system.


Conclusion

As one can see a lot of pricey, yet intersting upgrades and rounds are around. Some are overall very cost-effective, some only in certain situations, some perhaps not enough.





Ah, the vanity of destruction...

[Tony Williams]

HESH has a good reputation for demolishing walls and is used for that purpose, fired at quite low velocities, from Canadian 105mm and British 120mm tank guns in the Middle East. I also note that the new US Stryker MGS 105mm gun will have a modernised HEP (US for HESH) as one of the natures. As far as I know no-one has made a HESH mortar round, but I don't see why it shouldn't be possible, and effective.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk)

[Waylander]

Wasn't the rifling on a rifled gun considerable helpfull when one wants to employ a HESH round?
IIRC the spin of the round helps the squash warhead to perform.
That's the reason why there is no HESH for smoothbore guns.

As mortars are usually also smoothbore I would think one would run into the same problems.

[Tony Williams]

Wasn't the rifling on a rifled gun considerable helpfull when one wants to employ a HESH round?
IIRC the spin of the round helps the squash warhead to perform.
I have heard that mentioned on discussion forums, but never seen any evidence for it.

In WW2 the RAF did develop some small squash-head anti-tank bombs to be dropped from fighter-bombers, which suggests they didn't regard that as a problem at that time (the project was dropped, but for other reasons).

My understanding as to why you find HESH only in rifled guns is that it is used as a long-range general-purpose round, effective against homogenous armour, bunkers, etc well beyond accurate APFSDS range. That's the way the BA uses in it Challengers, which scored the world's longest anti-tank kill with HESH.

The problem with full-calibre, low-velocity fin-stabilised ammo is that while OK at 1,000m or so (for anti-tank HEAT, for instance) it is much less so at longer ranges. Fin-stabilisation is inherently less accurate than spin-stabilisation, and with a shell lobbed high into the air, and plenty of time for any crosswinds to act on those fins, it becomes increasingly inaccurate (relative to rifled shells) as the range extends.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk)

[Firn]

I just googled to get some information about HESH in Afghanistan and found some excellent material. To paraphrase Clausewitz, it helps too keep the flowers of theory close to experience, their porper soil.



Canadian Armor in Afghanistan (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_03_e.pdf)




Since May 2007, the tank squadron has fought almost constantly alongside Canadian and Afghan infantry in close combat with the Taliban. Supported by the artillery, combat engineers, attack aviation and fast air, mechanized combat teams from the 2 RCR BG have achieved decisive victories against insurgents in the Howz-e- Madad, Nalgham and Sangsar areas of Zhari District, where vineyards and imposing compounds render wheeled vehicle movement particularly difficult. Leopard tank crews have used extensively the 105 mm High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round to eliminate insurgents attempting to attack dismounted soldiers. More importantly, tank rollers and ploughs have continued to mitigate risk to coalition soldiers by clearing routes of pressure-plate detonated IEDs, while providing intimate support and a breaching capability to dismounted infantry companies. A testament to the tremendous contribution tanks are making to counter-insurgency operations and their high demand throughout the Canadian AO, A Squadron has routinely been split into troop-sized elements or less and attached to each of the infantry companies. This decentralized employment of armour and extremely high temperatures has strained the sustainment concept and serviceability of the tanks, while dispersing the breaching assets integral to the sub-unit. The impact of this squadron has been felt as far west as the Helmand border, and north towards Ghorak and Shah Wali Kot.


More on the utility of a big gun with the proper arguments sticking out of a highly mobile and armored AFV aka MBT right where it needs to be.




Rather, our enemy finds sanctuary in grape-drying huts and compounds with concrete-like walls measuring over a meter in thickness. Prior to the deployment of the Leopard tank, massive volumes of 25 mm fire from the LAVs achieved limited results against these structures, often requiring the BG to resort to the use of aerial bombardment or risk the deployment of dismounted soldiers forward to affect a breach with anti-tank weapons or demolitions. One 105 mm HESH round from the Leopard C2 can punch a hole in excess of five by five meters through a grape-drying hut or compound wall, penetrating structures with reduced collateral damage to surrounding infrastructure and less risk to our dismounted soldiers.


The whole paper is IMHO excellent and especially of interest for old and young tankers alike. Another great take on the many issues of combined arms in Afghanistan is the following one. It also deserves a close look.



Lessons learned form the use of Tanks in ROTO 2 (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_2/CAJ_Vol11.2_05_e.pdf)





When channelled in defiles and surrounded by walls or marijuana fields three metres high, the tanks lose their ability to fire at a distance and to move the turret. Just sweeping arcs of fire without destroying all the walls is the greatest challenge for the crews. We simply used the Stab Elevation Override to allow the gunner to observe, but generally speaking, the Stab stays off and the tank commander aims the gun between the walls and the dwellings. We have noted that sweeping the arcs, even if the gunner can see nothing, frightens the insurgents and discourages them from firing on us. With the Leopard 2, we used the tank commander’s periscope to observe when necessary. Since the barrel is approximately two metres longer than that of the Leopard C2, it was practically impossible to have the gunner constantly sweep the arcs. In some areas, the tanks are used more like bunkers for the dismounted troops than for their firepower. Nevertheless, in the event of contact, we did not hesitate to make room and expand our arcs of fire. In order to address the risks caused by lack of space, the crews had mounted their C8s on the turret (one pointing forward and one pointing backwards), with the tank commander’s 9-mm on the hatch and they had two hand grenades ready for throwing. In spite of everything, the best defence for the tanks in closed terrain remains the presence of infantry on the ground and a LAV III behind them.


Just some of many interesting points.




For the troop, all our engagements have been at distances of between 75 and 600 m. We have had some engagements at over 1000 m, but they occurred while the tanks were in firing position at the forward observation base (FOB) or when we were conducting observation in support of the infantry coys....

However, when we advance in complex terrain, the Taliban hide at between 75 and 300 m and most of the time they fired at us before we were able to observe them. We could see them because of the smoke or flash from their weapons. They observed our guns and waited until we aim them in another direction to fire. The advent of the Leopard 2 and its independent periscope greatly enhanced our detection capability and reduced the number of hits on the tank. We also received the canister shell at the end of our tour. Although we did not have a chance to try it in combat, we already know that it will discourage any attempt to hit us on the flanks at close range. Sometimes the insurgents launched a rocket from between two marijuana plants and disappeared. With a canister shell, we will be able to respond by firing in the direction from which the round came and kill or wound the hidden RPG crew. Following range trials, we have established that the lethal distance is approximately 400 m. The 120 mm HEAT rounds have produced excellent results in comparison to the 105 mm HESH round.


I only took out part of the things relevant to the topic and our discussion. The two papers indicate just how effective a well an Armored Mortar Fighting Vehicle (AMFV) with the right tools and equipment would be.



New rounds for the AMFV:


a) HEAT-MP

While enemy AFV are of no concern in Afghanistan and never should be the engaged without dire need directly by the MFV such a round would be overall a fine addition. It should endanger head-on any AFV short of an MBT and be a great and affordable allrounder. If the smaller, far lighter and slower warhead of the RPG-29 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RPG-29) can cause concern, the 120mm mortar HEAT-MP should too...


b) HESH

A great wallbuster with little fragmentation flying sideways and back towards the AFV and friendlies. The slower spin of a 120mm mortar round fired out of a smoothbore barrel might influence (among other variables as speed) the "squashing" but it should at the very least be in the vicinity of the 105mm HESH, and "5x5m holes" sound right to. A perfect match with the AMFV, IMHO


c) Canister

Seems that the Canadians and Danes are eager on them and thing them perfectly suited for the environment. A Tank gun can launch them with far greater speed (> 800 m/s, my poor guess) and it seems to be that the lethal distance is (at least) around 400m. "Beehive rounds" accelerated by the106mm M40s of the Ontos reached roughly 500 m/s making them even with the thin armor very effective as support weapons.



The 20" wide tracks of the 9-ton Ontos (http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-armour/allied/ontos.htm) would allow it to go on the soft soils surrounding the rice paddies of Vietnam. They both served as bunker busters. Both vehicles lessened the infantry's causalities by being close to the fight; and could be quickly deployed to overcome an enemy's fixed positions.

The Ontos carried the beehive round that sent out a hundred darts per firing to clean out a jungle of its enemy. There was no other weapon that could clear a jungle for a depth of a ¼ mile (400m) like the 106mm recoilless rifle using the beehive round.

The small darts or pellets loose speed very fast. With a muzzle velocitiy of roughly 350 m/s the AMFV should thus be with the type of canister tested by the Canadian at least be lethal to 250m. This round should give the AFV a lethal area suppression weapon with a focused cone of lethality unable to endanger enemies or civilians behind "Afghan concrete"




Thoughts


Overall the more I learn the more I like the concept of the AMFV, especially in a combined arms team. Beside the invaluable ability to deliver quickly devastating plunging fire with so many round-fuzes (bomblets AB, HE PD or delayed one....) combinations and the ability to use all the neat guided precision rounds (Strix, FireBall..) it can be deadly precise and effective up close with the right rounds.

This "Assault mortar" with great SA (see my posts above) it can (and will) also be in a close firefight and will thus be able to play through the whole spectrum of firepower. At usual distances 75-600 every round in their arsenal can be very very accurate (high charge, "direct" fire) or very accurate (low charge, plunging fire). When not in a close firefight it can lend with staple rounds a helping hand of devastating power easily to seven klicks.

MBTs are still better to lead the rest on dangerous paths but such AMFV should be just like IFV close at hand.




P.S: A very good observation



A strong case can be made that Canadian tanks have actually reduced collateral damage in the Canadian AO. We know through experience that the more combat power we commit to a mission, the less kinetic that operation is likely to become.

This fits actually perfectly my interpretation of many an conflict. It is a great fallacy bring up the decreased willigness of insurgents or others in a great direct confrontations and conclude that "conventional force" and "firepower" is something somewhat somehow futile in such a war. It is a bit like asking a guy with a assault rifle to bring his knife to a gunfight and to ditch his rifle, because he has the advantage :rolleyes:

[Waylander]

@Tony

In the past I didn't understand why there are only HESH rounds for rifled guns. Somebody explained it that way to me and it sounded as plausible as any answer I ever got.
But your example sounds convincing.

But in the end the question remains why there are no HESH rounds for smoothbore tank guns.
I think that modern programmable HE rounds make HESH rounds less important but in the past this was not the case.

@Firn
I read these articles before and they are very informative and show very well how valuable heavy AFVs can be in the different theaters of todays wars which don't resemble the fight for the fulda gap but nevertheless see the need for modern MBTs.

[Firn]

Comments


@ Waylander

Yes, the tanks were found to be useful in a lot of circumstances and were put to work in a lot of ways. The articles touched many very important aspects, among them vehicle recovery, movement in IED country, the importance of tank implements (dozer blades, ploughs...) on true MBTs, combined arms in different COIN operations.

One might add that the author of the second article was trained on the Leo II in Germany ;)


But in the end the question remains why there are no HESH rounds for smoothbore tank guns.I think that modern programmable HE rounds make HESH rounds less important but in the past this was not the case.

The second article states that: "The 120 mm HEAT rounds have produced excellent results in comparison to the 105 mm HESH round."



Additional thoughts

A stabilized RWS with great optics (IR and visible light) atop of a turret seems to make great sense. Good magnifications seem to be a great asset. iseems A coaxial high quality 20-60x glass ( proven for spotting scopes) coupled with fine camera (possible electronic zoom) would be an amazing tool for TA and identification, both for the main gun and the RWS.

A stabilized panormic sight above the RWS would seems to make sense too. SA seems to be the key to turn the tables fast. A SDS (Sniper Detection systems) acoustic, optical or fused would greatly help with observation and TA, I wonder when they will make it on the MBT.

All in all a mortar capable of MRSI could do truly nasty things in the "killing hunter - scouting killer" configuration. A mix of 2-3 rounds arriving at the same time on different paths on chosen locations should be nasty. A "toubletab" of HESH or HESH-HE/HEAT would wreak havoc in most buildings. One to open a door in the thick outher wall and frag the area behind, the second to penetrate deeply and wreak havoc inside with a delayed explosion. There seem to be many good (bad) ways to use such a mortar.

Also it seems that the classic 4-men crew seems to be helpful in such complex situations, as so much is going on and SA is extremely important. Reading this papers you get the feeling that out there anywhere, anytime anybody has to keep watching. In the detached overwatch a combination of binos and sights puts every set of eyes to good use...


P.S: For dangerous combat operations in a cluttered and complex environment a "medium-heavy" armored troop consisting of 3 different types of AFV with a shared platform should be a powerful and sustainable combination. For example a CV90 troop built by 2 IFV (CV9030), 1 LBT (CV90120) and one MFV (CV90AMOS or NEMO) and equipped with light pioneer implements would be very versatile and powerful.

The 1 LBT would be replaced by a pair of ture MBT for high-intensity warfare. It would be supported by an armored troop with the same members. Overall I would think that the 1 LBT is a not so cost-effective solution when so many countires have good MBT. Most of them should be eqipped with pioneer implements. A "pioneer MBT" should also work at least in pairs to allow for a fast vehicle recovery.

P.P.S: A similar concept of a mixed group of 4-5 AFV (MBTs, BMPs, BTRs, ..) providing support (fire support, transport, overwatch...) was called bronegruppa. Perhaps my proposal is somehow related to and influenced by the prior reading of the book some years ago.

[Firn]

Additional readings



Firepower in limited war (http://books.google.de/books?id=lDs7r30V1xIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Firepower+limited+war#PPP9,M1)

A good read to place part of the topic in a broader context, by the 44th Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Major General Scales.



Bear went over the mountain (http://books.google.de/books?id=yOtThPNqKP8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=Bear+went+over+the+mountain#PPP4,M1)

The strategy and tactics employed by the insurgents and Counter-insurgents in the Soviet-Afghan war are still a worthwhile and telling read. A commented look from both sides is given by this classic.


Lessons in Mountain warfare (http://www.adl.gatech.edu/research/brmsrr/2008/SRRV7No1_MountainWarfare_Rahul.pdf)

A tentative list of lessons learned, taken from the book above. Not a bad quick primer, but can of course not capture the richness of the book.


High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil conflict and the future (http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/theses/Acosta03.pdf)

This paper is very interesting because it partly mirrored my own feelings when I read it and was helpful to think about my ex-trade in a broader way. It also convinced me even more of the necessity of heavy precise firepower in mountain warfare:


German Mountain Warfare - a WWII manual (http://soldatinidicarta.altervista.org/German%20Mountain%20Warfare%20-%20Special%20Series%20No.21.pdf)

The German view of Mountain warfare, 1944. I read it a long while ago, but still remember how the importance of well-coordinated precise and heavy firepower delivered by mortars and artillery was outlined. Fits well my very limited experience. Further it is interesting that during the war they heavily increased the oveall firepower and made it mortar platoons organic at the company level. All in all for all who don't know the difficulties of mountain warfare a still very relevant text.


The deadly Tulip (http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A448280&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

An analysis of the biggest mortar in town, lobbing 130kg heavy bombs where the commander needs them. The orignal Soviet "laser guided bomb".

[Tony Williams]

@Tony
But in the end the question remains why there are no HESH rounds for smoothbore tank guns.

I suspect it may be that the during the Cold War, tanks were primarily seen as tank destroyers rather than general-purpose fighting vehicles. Anti-armour performance was given priority over all else - otherwise smoothbore guns would never have been adopted at all, since rifled guns give better accuracy with a wider range of projectiles. It so happens that smoothbores work best with two different natures: APFSDS and HEAT. In both cases, rapid projectile spin is actually a nuisance - it disturbs the accuracy of APFSDS and disrupts the jet formation of HEAT. So smoothbore + APFSDS + HEAT = the best anti-armour combination.

Bearing in mind that tanks can't carry many rounds of big ammo, the number of types needs to be limited. And with HEAT on board, the case for HESH (or in fact conventional HE) was small. Things are changing now, of course.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk)

[Tony Williams]

The second article states that: "The 120 mm HEAT rounds have produced excellent results in comparison to the 105 mm HESH round."

That's very strange. I have in front of me an article in Jane's International Defence Review concerning a presentation to a conference on the Canadian armour experience in Afghanistan, which includes the following:

"...the 105mm HESH round being rated as better than the 120mm HEAT for wall-breaching."

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk)

[Firn]

Comments




That's very strange. I have in front of me an article in Jane's International Defence Review concerning a presentation to a conference on the Canadian armour experience in Afghanistan, which includes the following:

"...the 105mm HESH round being rated as better than the 120mm HEAT for wall-breaching."

I quoted the article directly. Anyway it could be just reflect the feel on the ground that the 120mm HEAT of the Leo II did the job good enough in comparision to the 105mm HESH of the Leo I. The HESH/HEP has - when available - always been the choice for demolitions and wall-breaching. There is certainly some logic behind that. A good example is the M728 CEV with the 165mm gun (http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jah/jah_0513.html). The design of an effective HESH seems to be overall a near perfect fit for a 120mm turreted mortar. The smoothbore barrel and the low velocity would allow for a very thin skin and thus a high relative amount of HE - in the best tradition of mortar bombs. This should also help to keep fragmentation on wrong side rather low.



Additional thoughts on the MFV:


A coaxial HMG like the .50 would complement the main armament of an MFV just as well as the one of a MBT. This gives the vehicle an important tool to engage with the main sight and FCS fleeting targets in situation where a 120mm round would not fit the ROE or tactical situation. With greatly differing characteristics the should form a symbiosis.

A relative light and compact mortarturret would also make a stabilzed RWS with a GMG and/or an MG a more attractive options for lighter platforms. It would also be easier to protect and armor.

[Waylander]

I suspect it may be that the during the Cold War, tanks were primarily seen as tank destroyers rather than general-purpose fighting vehicles. Anti-armour performance was given priority over all else - otherwise smoothbore guns would never have been adopted at all, since rifled guns give better accuracy with a wider range of projectiles. It so happens that smoothbores work best with two different natures: APFSDS and HEAT. In both cases, rapid projectile spin is actually a nuisance - it disturbs the accuracy of APFSDS and disrupts the jet formation of HEAT. So smoothbore + APFSDS + HEAT = the best anti-armour combination.

Bearing in mind that tanks can't carry many rounds of big ammo, the number of types needs to be limited. And with HEAT on board, the case for HESH (or in fact conventional HE) was small. Things are changing now, of course.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website (http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk)

Yeah, the focus was defenitely more on tank on tank warfare but in the end at least the US has used their tanks often enough for other thinks than pure tank plinking on the past 50 years.
And as I understand they were very fond of their HEP and WP rounds during these instances.
For an army like the german one such a focus during the cold war is way more understandable than for the US Army.
But hey, the US don't field a proper 120mm HE or HEP till these days and they are in Iraq since 2003...

@Firn
Your idea of a mixed unit of different CV90s is defenitely interesting but IMHO is only really feasible if the enemy is ill equipped with AT-weapons (like most of the fighters in A-stan and Iraq or the Hamas in Gaza) but would be of more limited use against opponents with access to heavy AT-weaponry. Active and passive protection systems need to be implemented to reduce casualties (Which is very important in anything but an all out war) otherwise the CV90 family, even in it's Mrk. III incarnation, might be a little bit too lightly armored to go in the infight.

[Firn]

@Firn
Your idea of a mixed unit of different CV90s is defenitely interesting but IMHO is only really feasible if the enemy is ill equipped with AT-weapons (like most of the fighters in A-stan and Iraq or the Hamas in Gaza) but would be of more limited use against opponents with access to heavy AT-weaponry. Active and passive protection systems need to be implemented to reduce casualties (Which is very important in anything but an all out war) otherwise the CV90 family, even in it's Mrk. III incarnation, might be a little bit too lightly armored to go in the infight.

MBTs cause a great strain on the support in many aspects. This is especially true when you want to disperse them as much as possible, because they are so effective. But the maintenance poses rather strict limits to a too wide dispersal. While 2 tanks make mostly from a tactical POV (mutal support, redundancy, vehicle recovery, different pioneer implements) the support forces a concentration of roughly half the squadron - 6 tanks IIRC in one base.

But this leaves in this case most of the Canadian infantry units with their LAV III without a heavily armored vehicle with a great SA and a big gun. The easiest path would be to deploy another, well supporte unit of MBTs. This unit is expensive to maintain and support and might not fit the area of operation. A LAV III with a gun might be a very good solution and the Stryker MGS proved its worth in Iraq (also with canister rounds) but it is a vehicle with a much more narrow focus. Especially for smaller militaries a MBT is overall the much better choice which complements the other assets better.

A MFV on the platform of the mechanized/armored infantry would act as an almost full-spectrum fire support asset in combination with the specific IFV and other vehicles. MBTs can be attached when needed and if supportable. Close enemy fighters can be canistered. Dug in ones killed by lobbing airbursting HE. Ones hiding behind a wall or in a compound eliminated by HESH or/and HEAT. In short the technology and creativity of humankind enable all kind of deadly attacks.

There might be one light (LAV III, Stryker) and one heavy (Puma-class, MBT-platform) MFV. Both behave differently and according to the specifc METT-TC. Thus the combinations and procedures between the various AFV will of course vary widly. In some situation a light MFV might be used as the tip of the speer, in some others the heavy MFV might hang well back behind MBTs.



The 120 mm M1028

Here (http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jah/jah_5345.html) are further informations on it, here (http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1988/AUG_1988/AUG_1988_PAGES_6_9.pdf) some about the Beehive.


The vanity of destruction...

[Waylander]

I totally agree that a MBT class vehicle causes more maintenance requirements than a wheeled class of vehicle like for example all the incanrnations of the Piranha family of vehicles.

This difference is not nearly as big when one looks at the maintenance requirements of a modern tracked IFV and a MBT. There the difference actually is quite small.

So I would adopt two families of vehicles. One being a lighter wheeled vehicle (Like the Piranha III or IV) and one a heavy IFV or even a MBT as a base for different kinds of vehicles (Puma as a minimum or Merkava Mk.IV/Namer).

This would give an army the ability to deploy all the needed assets without causing too much strain on the logistical chain as there are basically just two families of vehicles. According to the area of operations and the mission the army could deploy the ideal mix of heavy and light vehicles.

But in the end such an approach is only possible for bigger (richer) armies out there while the small ones have to work with what they have.
And a MBT with attachable MOUT packages beats every opponent in it's versatility when one just has the money and manpower for one vehicle of this class.

[Firn]

I totally agree that a MBT class vehicle causes more maintenance requirements than a wheeled class of vehicle like for example all the incanrnations of the Piranha family of vehicles.

This difference is not nearly as big when one looks at the maintenance requirements of a modern tracked IFV and a MBT. There the difference actually is quite small.

While I'm out of my line here it depends where and in which numbers the AFV are operated. The large fleet of the LAV III has not only intrinsically a smaller infootprint but the various elements also reach faster the critical mass (6-8) which makes the maintenance even in medium bases efficient. A tracked IFV might have only a slightly smaller footprint per platform than a MBT, but once again the critical mass is more easily achieved.



So I would adopt two families of vehicles. One being a lighter wheeled vehicle (Like the Piranha III or IV) and one a heavy IFV or even a MBT as a base for different kinds of vehicles (Puma as a minimum or Merkava Mk.IV/Namer).

This would give an army the ability to deploy all the needed assets without causing too much strain on the logistical chain as there are basically just two families of vehicles. According to the area of operations and the mission the army could deploy the ideal mix of heavy and light vehicles.

Yes. Let us say we have a LAV III with a NEMO mortar (with a coaxial HMG) and a light RWS. 3 or better 4 men crew it. It exceeds the capabilities of the LAV Mortar carrier in many an aspect and overlaps and partly exceeds the capabilies of the LAV Mounted Gun System (or Stryker 105 mm). For a light, highly dispersed force it is an invaluable asset in COIN, but it can also give heavier forces heavy, rapid and mobile area and point/HVT firesupport.

In COIN it might be part of the bronagruppa which we also see nowadays in Afghanistan and in intimated contact with the insurgents, shooting often canister, HESH, Illumination and HEAT. In a high-intensity operation it would all but used to support with the various HE, Cluster, FireBall, Strix etc and the occasional Smoke, Illumination, HESH, HEAT or canister. Roughly the same goes for a heavier vehicle So it is a very flexible asset

But in the end such an approach is only possible for bigger (richer) armies out there while the small ones have to work with what they have.
And a MBT with attachable MOUT packages beats every opponent in it's versatility when one just has the money and manpower for one vehicle of this class.

Very small armies like the Sovenian might also discard MBT completely to focus on one or two wheeled AFV (Pandur and AMV) using them for a great deal of tasks (APC, IFV, MFV, Ambulance etc). But of course the MBT is in many aspects a class of its own and irreplacable for many situations.

[Waylander]

While I'm out of my line here it depends where and in which numbers the AFV are operated. The large fleet of the LAV III has not only intrinsically a smaller infootprint but the various elements also reach faster the critical mass (6-8) which makes the maintenance even in medium bases efficient. A tracked IFV might have only a slightly smaller footprint per platform than a MBT, but once again the critical mass is more easily achieved.

While I agree that in theaters like Iraq or A-stan lighter wheeled vehicles naturally form the bulk of the vehicles I don't agree with your idea of tracked IFVs achieving critical mass much faster.
A tracked IFV is as complicated to transport as a MBT. It either goes by ship and train or one needs a heavy transport plane.
And modern IFVs tend to be nearly as expensive as MBTs these days.

Because of that I want I also would want to have a whole family of heavy tracked vehicles be it for IFVs, MBTs, or heavy fire support vehicles.
The mentioned Merkava and Namer vehicles are an example. With these vehicles using a common chassis it is also not really important how you mix up your heavy assets in theater as the critical mass is not linked to MBT or IFV but to light and wheeled or heavy and tracked.

Very small armies like the Sovenian might also discard MBT completely to focus on one or two wheeled AFV (Pandur and AMV) using them for a great deal of tasks (APC, IFV, MFV, Ambulance etc). But of course the MBT is in many aspects a class of its own and irreplacable for many situations.

That is IMHO only possible if one totally relies on other for the defense of the homecountry. Not an option for most countries out there and IMHO not a wise one for the countries which are already on this path.

[Firn]

While I agree that in theaters like Iraq or A-stan lighter wheeled vehicles naturally form the bulk of the vehicles I don't agree with your idea of tracked IFVs achieving critical mass much faster.
A tracked IFV is as complicated to transport as a MBT. It either goes by ship and train or one needs a heavy transport plane.
And modern IFVs tend to be nearly as expensive as MBTs these days.

Because of that I want I also would want to have a whole family of heavy tracked vehicles be it for IFVs, MBTs, or heavy fire support vehicles.
The mentioned Merkava and Namer vehicles are an example. With these vehicles using a common chassis it is also not really important how you mix up your heavy assets in theater as the critical mass is not linked to MBT or IFV but to light and wheeled or heavy and tracked.
.

When I said "critical mass" for maintenance/support I meant that the tracked platform of the IFV will usually be present in larger numbers (and in different moduls) in the theater of operation than the platform used by the MBT. Among other things this makes it easier or more efficient to maintain.

A heavy platform as the IFV Puma offers a great chassis for a heavy MFV for a wide number of reasons. But using the Leopard chassis could also make sense. It largely depends how well the whole asset fits into the whole system aka armed forces. From an Israeli point of view a heavy MFV on the base of the Merkava would be most likely the best solution.



MFV in (training) action


AMOS

The AMOS (http://www.baesystems.com/BAEProd/groups/public/documents/bae_publication/bae_pdf_landa_amosbrochure.pdf), a little brochure with some nice pictures. It looks out of place on the old Sisu Pasi, but seems to "fit" the CV90 well.


AMOS II



That is IMHO only possible if one totally relies on other for the defense of the homecountry. Not an option for most countries out there and IMHO not a wise one for the countries which are already on this path.

As said above, in the case of Slovenia it can make very good sense, as their ressources are very much limited. For a larger military the MBT is usually more important. A military of a country like Germany and France could be able to operate MFVs/Mortar carriers in various forms (heavy MFV (Leopard or Puma), medium MFV (Boxer), light MFV (Wiesel 2).


NEMO


AMV with NEMO and Tank gun

A much more sensible choice for a light MFV and chassis like the LAV III and AMV.


Wiesel 2 LePzMrs

An excellent choice for mountain, marine and para units.



.... I will give also an overview over the RWS, an integral part of a MFV

[Firn]

The brave new world of the RWS


The market seems to have exploded in recent years, with a many variants, a lot of capabilites and a myriad combinations. Read first the concepts and the discussion LAV III: RWS or turret (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php?topic=57654.0) by professionals which were partly on the ground.





a) Situational Awerness and Quick Reactions

Fit every MFV with a sniper detection system like the Boomerang or muzzle flash detector. Add a seperate periscope/light RWS with an MG or HMG for the commander with good optics and IR. The seperate wide-view optic is imporant to allow an assistent gunner to get SA and search for the targets

Every shot taken at the MFV will get automatically geolocalized with the help of the GPS. Feed the information into the BMS (Battle management system) and into the sighting systems of the RWS and the commander. This helps to get the eyes on the sources of fire really quick.

A highly sensible "sniper location system" which relies on the acoustic signatures should also be able to detect other sounds. The humming of a tank engine, the quick moving rotor of an helicopter or the rattle of the tracks on hard ground should all be sensed by it when the MFV stands still. The directional microphones should get at the least a rough bearing on it and enable the user to rapidly investigate likely point of origine. This could help a lot to get helicopters down from the sky, as such a system could pinpoint with far greater ease than most sound emitters. This would be the time to throw a LAHAT in the mortar or to activate the RBS 70. Then scan the suspect segment of sky a keep the laser brush ready to paint the target.


b) Hunter-Killer or RWS-Mortar

The MFV should be equipped with the a high quality RWS atop of the turret with two main configurations, GMG or HMG. It should have excellent optics (IR and day) with good optical zoom (4-16), Laser range finder and the ability to geolocate the target and mark it at night with IR and a laser beam.

With a ballistic computer providing an accurate firing solution, possibly even while driving already the first round should be spot on. This way you will be able to acquire, identify and engage the target speedily, call in arty and air really fast and easily mark the target for CAS or fire support at night. The direct laser painting allows for great precision against directly visible and moving targets with mortar rounds like the Fireball.

(i) The GMG RWS is ideal for quick and deadly suppression. Plenty of different rounds available for that one, so something for all the tastes. It has also some indirect capability too. It might be a bit over the top in combination with a 120mm mortar, so a HMG or MG might be the better choice.

(ii) The HMG version is the "sniper" and can reach out a long way. It has the same "basic" package. A interesting addition might be here not an ATGM but the BOLIDE of the RBS-70. It is a Mach 2 laser beam riding SAM which could be guided by the already mostly existing hardware and some (complicated) software updates. Alternatively - and perhaps far better - the whole manpad kit could be used as the sensor suite for the RWS.

Of course this SAM works bests as integrated node of a larger AD network. However it should already be alone a great danger to any CAS support in the vicinity. An alternative would be both the Stinger and the Mistral. But in the current environment it is an unnecessary addition


Overall the "hunter-killer" capability of the hunting RWS with some teeth and the killing twin-mortar. The networked sensor and FCS should enable to get rounds very fast downrange following external or internal input, indirect or direct fire.


c) Protecting this golden goose

Look into an active defense suite, like the AMAP-T, as it may be just a matter of time unitil the MFV has a nasty encounter with a modern AT missile or round. It seems to be likely and sensible addition of almost any AFV. It may also increase SA by helping to detect the source of the incoming fire. In this context a smoke launcher unit could be useful. Perhaps a softkill system also might be of interest, but is also pricey.




Overview of the modern RWS


Capabilities sometimes already are:

• Detached Line of Sight (DLOS) enables the gunner to keep his sights on target, independent of ballistic solution for the weapon/ammo in use.
• Fully stabilized system provides unmatched observation and engagement capabilities.
• Thermal Imager with dual field of view, autofocus and e-zoom.
• Color Daylight camera allows a wide field of view up to 45 degrees while observing, and more than 30 times optical magnified close-up view of the target area when identifying and engaging a long distance target.

I especially like the camera, sounds pretty close to what I imagined above.


Links and Links

Lemur (http://www.bofors.se/bae/products/Lemur.pdf)

Lemur


Qimek (http://oc.intercollab.net/pdf/qimek.pdf)


Samson (http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/5/965.pdf)


M151 (http://www.kongsberg.com/en/KPS/Products/~/media/KDS/Files/Products/Remote%20Weapon%20Station/Data%20Sheets/PROTECTOR%20M151.ashx)

SeaProtector


Amorak (http://www.rheinmetall.ca/servlet/file?id=51)


OWS 25R (http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/0/540.pdf)


CROWS (http://www.kongsberg.com/en/KPS/Products/~/media/KDS/Files/Products/Remote%20Weapon%20Station/Data%20Sheets/PROTECTOR%20CROWS.ashx)

CROWS


Arrows (http://www.fnherstal.com/index.php?id=317&backPID=316&productID=111&pid_product=303&pidList=316&categorySelector=20&detail=)



Options consist of things like:

- Stabilisation for firing on the move
- Ballistic protection Level 1 STANAG 4569
- Laser range finder and ballistic computer for hit probability improvement
- Cooled Thermal camera
- Sight system with cleaning and de-icing / de-fogging
- Remote operation - system can be controlled from sheltered location, up to 30m from vehicle
- Networkable system linked through vehicle comms
- Links ans cases collector
- Smoke Grenade Launchers
- Interface with LASER Warning Receiver or Small Arms Detection and Localisation System


The last one is also very interesting because it already seemed to me wise to spend (conservatively) 50000 € to greatly increase the SA and responsivness of a million € AFV and the rest of the network. Some background:


Locating Shots by Sound (http://www.sea-acustica.es/WEB_ICA_07/fchrs/papers/phy-05-003.pdf)

Boomerang

Another video which shows a bit the idea:

SLS

[Firn]

A question which might shed further light on the utility of such a MFV. What are the usual combat ranges of tanks in recent exercises? What are were they, are they in recent wars and conflicts? In WWII?

[Waylander]

In Desert Storm they plinkered tanks up to 4 klicks away with long range engagements being more likely but Eckherl should be able to get deeper into this conflict.

During Iraqi Freedom the fighting distances were much smaller with the second brigade of the 3rd ID having a tank fight inside a town (something with M...) where their gunbarrels nearly touched the enemy T-72s and BMPs.

During my training experiences in the north german plain we seldomely had engagements at more than 1km with some training days seeing no engagement at more than 1 klick at all.
And the north german plain is said to be one of the better tanking areas in europe.

[Firn]

The Soviet Tanker Experience, Source (http://www.iremember.ru/content/view/384/76/lang,en/)

I focused on encounters with Tanks, AT-guns and "fausters".


Fights in MOUT:




We suffered heavy losses in Berlin, primarily from the “fausters” [Panzerfaust-armed infantry – Transl.]. Our combat formation during the city battles was as follows – first the sappers, then the tanks, then SMG infantry behind the tanks. The sappers defused mines, while the tanks shot up the buildings from which the Germans were firing with HE shells, and the infantry mopped up. But the “fausters” hid a lot, waiting for a chance to ambush a tank.


The German artillery was second to the “fausters” but still bothersome. The Germans had converted every sewer manhole into a gun pit and mined the streets around them. So it was difficult to move forward, the attack progressed very slowly. Think about it – we were fighting in Berlin from April 21 to May 5. That’s when we had the idea to rig up nets out of bedsprings on our tanks. I held a meeting of the brigade technical chiefs, and that’s where the suggestion was brought up, seeing as there were a lot of bedsprings around.

Did you lock your hatches during combat in built-up areas?

- We absolutely locked our hatches from the inside. In my own experience, when we burst into Vienna, they were throwing grenades at us from the upper floors of buildings. I ordered all the tanks to be parked under the archways of buildings and bridges. From time to time I had to pull my tank out into the open to extend a whip antenna and send and receive communications from my higher commander. On one occasion, a radio operator and driver-mechanic were doing something inside their tank and left the hatch open. Someone dropped a grenade through the hatch from above. It struck the back of the radio operator and detonated. Both were killed. Thus we most certainly locked our hatches when we were in built-up areas.

- The primary defeating mechanism of HEAT (hollow-charge) ammunition, of which the panzerfaust was one type, is the high pressure in the tank, which disables the crew. If the hatches were kept slightly open, would this not provide some degree of protection? A special order was issued before our forces entered Germany.

- This is true, but just the same we kept our hatches locked. It might have been different in other units. The panzerfaust gunners most often fired at the engine compartment. If they were able to set the tank on fire, like it or not the crew had to get out. And then the Germans shot at the crew with a machine gun.

My tank was hit on 19 April 1945 in Austria. A Tiger put a round straight through us. The projectile passed through the entire fighting compartment and then the engine compartment. There were three officers in the tank: I as the battalion commander, the company commander Sasha Ionov (whose own tank had already been hit), and the tank commander. Three officers, a driver-mechanic, and a radio operator.


Forests and difficult terrain:

The thick forest masked the Finnish emplacements. Something had to be done – headquarters ordered suppressive fire over open sights from all available weapons. We complied with the order, of course. The shells literally obliterated the woods, and then we saw the Finnish defenses. These were egg-shaped, and constructed in a checkerboard pattern. Just imagine – concrete, two-storied structures. We later determined that each floor had eighteen heavy machine-guns, and there was also an artillery position at the top of each emplacement. After the war I found out that the Finns had been constructing these positions for twenty seven years across the entire Karelian Isthmus. And back then, we couldn’t even approach them. The tanks would bury themselves in deep snow, or else be stymied by concrete-lined ditches or all the trees cut down by our shellfire.



Fights in intersected country:


Not every time, but it did happen. I don't remember the Henschel; perhaps there was such an airplane. Sometimes we were able to avoid bombs. You could see them coming at you, you know. We opened our hatches, stuck out our heads, and instructed our drivers over the intercom: "The bomb will fall in front of us". But in general there were cases when tanks were hit and set on fire. Losses from these attacks did not exceed 3-5 tanks in the battalion. It was more common for a single tank to be damaged or destroyed. We faced much greater danger from panzerfaust gunners in built-up areas.



The main source of tank losses was German artillery. Losses to aircraft were fairly small – maybe 10%. The tank could only be knocked out with a direct hit, otherwise the bomb fragments would just bounce off harmlessly. During the Kursk battles, 76% of our losses were due to enemy guns, the rest due to mines and aircraft. When we first ran into the “fausters” during the Visla-Oder offensive, they didn’t account for more than 10% of our losses.


We changed direction there and headed towards Dvinsk. We did not attack. It was very rare that we had to advance in a classical manner against organized defense lines. The Germans usually arranged some ambush, where they used “ArtStorms (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_StuG_III.html)", sort of self-propelled artillery equipped with 75 mm guns. They moved quietly, had low-profile construction and easily disguised, were extremely hard to detect. We advanced in a march column order, as an advance point, a few tanks in front, the others at some distance. If the Germans arranged an ambush that meant that advance point would be knocked out surely. Those alive would get out, remaining tanks would open fire. However where to shoot? God knows! Germans already disappeared. After some shooting, we would fold up into a march column again and be after them. Once caught up with the enemy we would annihilate them.

Once we came across such an ambush. Two tanks, which were ahead of us, were burnt, the third one was retreating firing back. They stuck a billet right under the turret bed and it caught fire. Meantime we turned away from the road, the engines died, ran out of fuel. That is why we heard people scream inside the burning machine.



Position that we held was not good, in a centre of a swampy depression covered with short shrubs and trees. There was a settlement about one kilometer ahead, and to the right there was a road leading to it. When I was watching the settlement I noticed a “Tiger” in between the dwellings and the plantings, however could not aim at it properly, the line of fire was obstructed by tree branches. I then approached my Platoon Leader Lieutenant Velikov, to try to swap the German of his tank. His tank stood somewhat at an angle to that village in an open spot. Velikov slept in a tank. I climbed up his turret, there was his tank-driver Sergeant Moiseenko there. We woke Velikov up. I said:
“Have a look over these houses, there is a “Tiger” there.”
“No, that can not be. It looks like a barn.”
“No, there is a square there, and something black in the middle.”
We looked up once again through binoculars, seemed like a tank. Decided to smack it with a shell.


As soon as Velikov started to turn the turret around I saw a flash and shouted to Sergeant:
“Jump off!”
I myself jumped off behind the tank, and Moiseenko fell off the other side facing the enemy. The billet hit the side of the tank, rebounded and took his scull off. The German second shot hit the ball machine-gun turret, and the third shell struck the turret itself, however did not breach the amour. Velikov jumped out of the tank:
“Need to withdraw, where is the driver?”
“Lies over there.”


He might have known the circumstances there however did not tell me anything. We went by a few kilometers, got up the next hillock, and suddenly I saw a tank across the road about 500 meters ahead, firing towards the woods, to our left. What the hell was that? I stopped. There was some dwelling on the right side of the road, behind which hid two or three other tanks. The one on the road, which was firing, caught fire as I was looking at it. I approached tanks behind the dwelling:

“What’s happening boys?”
They already had some men wounded, bandaged each other.
“There are some Tigers or self-propelled guns it appears.”
“And what is the tank burnt on the road?”
“Hell knows.”
I got back, climbed up the amour and looked around through the binos, saw these ArtStorms in the woods about 800 meters ahead. Ivatulin described later:
“They kept firing at our tank, and my Commander got up the turret and watched them through his binos!”
I needed to know the disposition though. They ceased fire. I felt that I had been taken to aim, but they hesitated to fire. What should I do?
“Zhdanov, as soon as Ivatulin takes off, you turn the gun around and fire. Ivatulin, you go around and hide behind this dwelling.”
We had hardly managed to turn around when they hit us in the side. Tank caught fire and we all jumped off into the right, farthest from the enemy ditch. Lost view of Zhdanov at this moment. Started looking for him, could not find in our ditch. Crawled over on the other side. Our tank in flames, shells are firing, however no detonation. Started searching the ditch and found Zhdanov dead, his clothes all burnt. We retreated and I reported to Battalion Commander that I lost the machine burnt and Zhdanov dead.


Captured Shipen, crossed a railway Memel-Tilsit and advanced towards Tilsit. On the 11th October I was wounded. On that day I was moving fourth as part of an advance unit. The Germans had a gun and something else in the ambush there. I saw the gun when I got out of the tank after it was hit in the right-hand side by a billet. At first I felt that something hit me in my hip and saw flames underneath. I got out and then knew I was wounded, some debris shot me in the hip and the anklebone. I ran off into the ditch on my right hand side. Together with me a gunner jumped out which I had in my crew in the place of a signalman-gunner, whom I did not have. The rest of the crew hid in a left-hand side ditch. I noticed the German trenches about 30 meters ahead of us.


I leaned out of the hatch. I noticed a German (Gerry) about 30 meters away from us holding a grenade launcher, popping out from behind a dwelling. I fired at him from my handgun, making sure he could not aim properly. He managed to make a shot, however the grenade blew off hitting the ditch parapet in front of the tank. I said to my crew:
“Get out, or else we’ll get burnt in here. All of us got out and scattered around quick. I had a warm German pants on me equipped with straps, which I wrapped around my waist. When I was getting out, I caught something on there and hung up on these straps, as a sausage.
“Well, I thought, I’m finished.”
Meantime the German jumped out from behind the house and ran towards our tank holding his grenade launcher, apparently thinking everybody scarpered. I got my handgun out and shot him.


Next to Topiau my tank got burnt off again. We needed to cross over a high embankment, which was in a line of fire. The Company Leader ahead, I was behind him. Behind me was Levin, Lyashenko followed him. Kept moving. I noticed that the canvass covering transmission on the first tank went off. At that time I had some water frozen into ice inside my periscope and could not use it. I did not have time to look after it then. We did not even have time to eat, just had some chocolate. I kneeled on my seat and stuck my head up trying to recognize where they shooting from. There was a usual winter weather: cloudy and still air looked hazy with some hoarfrost.

The Germans camouflaged in the woods and clearly saw us moving on the road against the sky background, they had all the options to pick and choose a target. I saw a black billet flashing by against white snow. I yelled to my driver:
“Get in the gear quick, we under fire.”
I looked back to see if Levin was hit by a billet and saw my own transmission in flames. I ordered my crew to jump out of the tank one by one. I knew that if we stop the road would be blocked. That is why I wanted to pull the tank down by the side of the embankment. I went on the side of the tank to show my driver what to do, but he could not understand me. We went up a little bit and he stopped the machine behind another smashed tank.

Most of the quotes are from a seemingly very lucky Soviet tanker...


General:

The Sherman had its weaknesses, the greatest of which was its high center of gravity. The tank frequently tipped over on its side, like a Matryoshka doll (a wooden stacking doll). But I am alive today thanks to this deficiency. We were fighting in Hungary in December 1944. I was leading the battalion and on a turn my driver-mechanic clipped a curb. My tank went over on its side. We were thrown around, of course, but we survived the experience. Meanwhile the other four of my tanks went ahead and drove into an ambush. They were all destroyed.


On the one hand this rubber-coated track was a big plus. In the first place, this track had a service life approximately twice that of steel track. I might be mistaken, but I believe that the service life of the T-34 track was 2500 kilometers. The service life of the Sherman track was in excess of 5000 kilometers. Secondly, The Sherman drove like a car on hard surfaces, and our T-34 made so much noise that only the devil knows how many kilometers away it could be heard. What was the bad side of the Sherman track? In my book, Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks, there is a chapter entitled "Barefooted". There I wrote about an incident that occurred in August 1944 in Romania, during the Jassy-Kishinev Operation. The heat was fearsome, somewhere around 30° C. We had driven approximately 100 km along a highway in a single day. The rubber linings on our support rollers got so hot that the rubber separated and peeled off in long pieces. Our corps paused not far from Bucharest. The rubber was flying around, the rollers had begun to jam up, the noise was terrible, and in the end we had been stopped. This was immediately reported to Moscow. Was this some kind of joke, an entire corps had halted?


I don't know why, but one shipment of tanks arrived with machine guns, and another without them. We used this machine gun against both aircraft and ground targets. We used it less frequently against air targets because the Germans were not fools. They bombed either from altitude or from a steep dive. The machine gun was good to 400-600 meters in the vertical. The Germans would drop their bombs from say, 800 meters or higher. He dropped his bomb and departed quickly. Try to shoot the bastard down! So yes, we used it, but it was not very effective. We even used our main gun against aircraft. We placed the tank on the upslope of a hill and fired. But our general impression of the machine gun was good. These machine guns were of great use to us in the war with Japan, against kamikazes. We fired them so much that they got red hot and began to cook off. To this day I have a piece of shrapnel in my head from an antiaircraft machine gun.


Notes

Note again that this are only the fights in which at least a German tank, AT-gun or "fauster" was present or mentioned. There were a good deal of instances when infantry without the means to defeat tanks were overrun. One knocked out German tank (Stug III) is found, but the situation in which it was defeated is not reported.


Conclusions

This stories have of course the survivor bias, as the men who told them went sometimes through a couple of tanks, were wounded and lost crewmembers. The longest shot comes from a tiger 1 klick away, the shortest from 10m. With the hatches close the SA was usually very limited so almost all crews drove with open ones as long as the tactical situation permitted. In MOUT for example they were mostly forced to close them due to the ambushes from very close distances.

The Germans seemed to have been very adept at ambushes and camouflaged their AFV and Gun positions very well, and shot usually when a hit was very likely. The Stug III and the AT-gun were very dangerous in almost all situations. In MOUT or thick vegetation Panzerfausts and also handgranades were most feared. The ranges in this cases were often very very short. Massed artillery was also be used against concentrated attacks and proved very effective.

Surprise seems truly to be beside numbers the only advantage of the attacking side. In such cases the shock of the sudden concentrated assault could wreak havo, see the example of the SP tanker in the German village. However the same attack against prepared defenders the day after would result in the destruction of all attacking AFV bar one.

[Firn]

SP Tankers


Our losses during a typical “special” operation ran at about 50%. In this particular case, however, we understood that we were about to be sent on a suicide mission. Why else would Leljushenko himself be trying so hard to raise our spirits…Anyway, after all the theater, they ordered us to take a small German village, saying that only our “all-terrain” assault guns could get to it through all the mud…


So here we were, sitting in our vehicles, waiting for the order to attack. There was a minefield between our positions and the village. They sent in 5 T-34 tanks with mine-clearing attachments ahead of us. The mine-clearing tanks are pretty slow, and the Germans immediately destroyed three of them…seeing this, we all rushed forward, hoping to get lucky…the minefield was made up of massive anti-tank mines, each with 100-200 kilograms of explosives. Any crew that drove over one of these went straight to heaven, their assault guns just disintegrated. A third of our assault guns blew up then and there…After fifteen minutes we reached the now-empty German village. Aside from those who died in the minefields, we had no losses. Most of the crews dismounted and began scavenging for “trophies”, but my guys stayed in the assault gun. I always thought it was a bad omen to take something that doesn’t belong to you. All of a sudden I saw a friend of mine named Topkasov carrying a new pair of leather boots, and instantly got the feeling that something bad was about to happen…

And then it did. A counterattack by German tanks! Topkasov’s assault gun was hit right in the fuel tank. You can imagine what happens when 200 liters of aviation gasoline light up, especially if the vehicle is carrying a full combat load of 80 shells…All that was left of my friend was one leg in a new leather boot…We managed to repel the German counterattack with great difficulties, but the regiment was bled dry in the process.

How did I manage to fire the gun? Before that first fight we did have some run-ins with the Germans, some long-range firing but nothing more substantial. During that time I rigged up an empty ammo crate to serve as a platform on which I could stand while firing the gun. The regiment’s commander later nicknamed me “gunner with a lectern”.

I got my second Medal of Valor – for destroying a German tank – in another battle later on. We were behind the Dniester River, when that bridgehead was already somewhat enlarged. The assault guns were standing in prepared positions, then the infantry told us that there are German tanks in such and such a place. We moved out, I let off a few shots and hit him in the side, I think. Then I heard shouts “he’s burning up!” It’s like this – you move out, then you start maneuvering. The assault gun commander moved us forward, I fired my shots and he immediately moved us back and to the side as he knew that the Germans would aim at the spot from which we had opened fire. In any case, I was credited with a kill – meanwhile, I’m still not really sure whether it was my target that was burning back there.


A.B.: How many shells did you fire?

I can’t say exactly. It’s like this – typically, you start by firing a few aiming shots with high explosive shells – once you’ve zeroed in on the target, then you hit it with an armor piercing round. You have to fire aiming shots first though. On the other hand, if you’re firing over open sights and can actually see the target in front of you, then you can use an armor piercing shell straight away. We were also issued specially made sub-caliber shells, 5 per combat load. I only ever got to fire one of those, for some reason they all had to be accounted for. Now regular high explosive or armor piercing rounds – they gave us lots of those.


The German attack was repelled in the end, but there was only one assault gun left out of the six that were there. When I got my commander to the medical station the sun began to rise, and our IL-2 Shturmoviks began to arrive. I decided I had to go back to my assault gun – I had no right to leave the frontline. I thought – if I were to go back to the rear areas, they’d ask me what was I doing there. So I went back to my assault gun.


My vehicle had completely fallen apart, I only remember the gearbox; it had been thrown clear and was burning with a blue flame. Our assault gun was on one side of the street, while right across from it stood a German tank. With a tanker half-fallen out of one of the hatches. My crew told me: we were standing right there, the German tank came up and got hit right in the side at point blank range, at most from 10 meters away. So that’s what happened in the Dniester bridgehead.


Then we saw a German village, and some defensive positions just behind it. There was infantry, of course, plus at least one gun battery and some mortars. And then…we managed to sneak right up to the German positions, then suddenly burst into them firing at point blank range. I could see the terrified faces of the enemy soldiers the moment before they were crushed by the tracks of my vehicle. The Germans ran. We really massacred them!..and then, the German artillery came alive all along the frontline. There was tremendous shelling, they were firing indiscriminately on us and on their own men. We barely managed to avoid the enemy fire – I drove into the village, rammed an iron gate with my assault gun and took cover in the courtyard of a stone house. Later on, with incredible difficulty we made it back to our lines, all under enemy fire. And the next day they told us – “yesterday’s mission was only partially fulfilled. We’re going to have to do another combat reconnaissance today!” I just sat down at the driver’s station and told the guys who were staying behind: “write to my mother about how her son had died…” The feeling was that we were doomed…the Germans were waiting for us.


The moment we moved out they destroyed one of the T-34s…I don’t know how, but we almost made it back to the village. At that point, we were the only ones left, every other machine that went in with us was already burning…About 100 meters away from the village, we were ordered back to the starting positions. The German fire was so dense that I could only think – enough, kill me already! The ground shook from explosions, and on the way back we were finally hit…The assault gun began to burn, but we had enough time to bail out and take cover in a nearby ditch…then I felt something hit me in the leg. Shrapnel…we wound up crawling the two kilometers back to our lines under incessant enemy fire.


Well, there was this episode in the beginning of 1945. We were supporting some infantry, shelling the Germans for about an hour. There was an escarpment about 150 meters to our right. Suddenly, we saw our infantry running from that direction. Tanks!..So we turned around to face the escarpment and waited. The first tank appeared – well, first his gun barrel, and only then the rest of him. I aimed the gun and took him out with a sub-caliber shell. There was just this sigh of relief…and then the second enemy tank crawled out into sight. It was a duel – who will manage to fire first? There was so much adrenaline in the bloodstream then…you can’t think of death, you don’t even have time to get scared. I just aimed and fired. Got him. And then the infantry finished off the enemy crews with a squad machine gun. After a fight like this, you’re just glad that you got lucky again…


G.K. – What is your view of the quality of German tankers?

V.V. – Their training was very thorough. The Germans were a very serious opponent. To be honest, their equipment was also a lot better. The German tank guns had a higher muzzle velocity and much better sights, which of course had very unfortunate consequences for us. But by the end of the war, the Germans didn’t really take risks very often. This one night we were parked in a column of march, in a single file, actually, with all the motors shut off. Suddenly, several German Panther tanks rushed past us at high speed. We never understood why they didn’t just shoot up our column at point blank range, we wouldn’t have had any time to turn our guns towards them…

V.V. – During the last year of the war, less than 25% of our crewmen survived. You see, assault guns – they’re really designed to provide artillery support for the infantry. And instead, we were often used in frontal assaults. A light assault gun just doesn’t have the armored protection, and its gun traverse is very limited. Plus, by the end of the war tanks as a whole became much more vulnerable. But – no-one ever spared us. Who has ever spared the common soldier?

The German Panzerfaust detachments were very active against us from February to April of 1945. These were mainly put together from German penal units and Vlasov’s men [Russian defectors who fought on the German side under General Andrei Vlasov, who had been captured in 1942 – Transl.]. One time, they destroyed an IS-2 tank standing a few dozen meters away right before my eyes. Our regiment was lucky enough to enter Berlin from the Potsdam side, and we never had to fight through the center of the city, where the Panzerfausters were just running wild…


Comment:

Look at the conclusions in the first post. The panzerfausts seems to have really made a big difference, especially in MOUT. I really wonder how nowadays things could turn out in MOUT against a determined with decent equipment.

[Firn]

The American experience


As every wartime material this has to be taken with a pinch of salt


German AT-tactics in North Africa (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/attactics/index.html)

German tanks and tactics (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/armoredforces/index.html)

Recent Developments in (Tank) Tactics, 1943 (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/recentdev/index.html)

Employing tanks with infantry (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/methods/index.html)

British Do's and Don'ts (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/dosdonts/index.html)

German tactics in Italy (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ge_arms/index.html)

British view on German Tank tactics (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/britishcomments/index.html)

AT-weapons (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/rocket/index.html)


Comments:

Once again most encounters were no mobile battles between tanks. The Germans usually tried to fight with all combined arms. Once again the AT-guns were the main tank killers, pushed agressively forward or very well camouflaged and dug in as far as the situation allowed. Even the 88 could only eliminate a tank out to 1200 m (according to one tank commander). In this case technology was the limitating factor.

The great allied superiority in firepower and the accumulated German experience and thinking led to an sophisticated use of terrain. Up to four slopes were incorporated in an elastic defense in depth which would allow camouflaged AT-guns to shot from close distances against skylined tanks driving over hills into unobserved terrain. They had to lead the assault as dispersed infantry defended the lightly held first slopes with delaying actions. It seems that they at the lastest in Italy they had elevated the defence to new mastery, if one can trust the enemy intelligence...

P.S: Lone Sentry: German Remote-Controlled Machine Gun for Assault Guns and Tank Destroyers (U.S. WWII Intelligence Bulletin, May 1945) (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/remotemg/index.html)

An interesting first "Hunter-Killer" RWS :)

[Firn]

Recent American experience, OIF



In Sadr city (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/COIN/repository/Sadr_City-Armor-Moore(Nov-Dec04).pdf)


Every wanted tanks (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1539.pdf)


The Battle of Fallujah (http://www.sa.rochester.edu/jur/issues/fall2007/chang.pdf)



Comments: Similarities and Differences in MOUT


Differences:


Most impressive are the different fates of the tip of the armored spearheads. The Soviet tankers and SP tankers seemed to have the loss of the first tanks in an enemy ambush practically for granted. In Iraq the American Armor seemed almost invulnerable. Only the rear and the rear flank seem to have suffered penetrations.


During MOUT soviet sappers lead the way, followed by tanks supported by SMG infantry. This was necessary as "The Germans had converted every sewer manhole into a gun pit and mined the streets around them. So it was difficult to move forward, the attack progressed very slowly." In Sadr "Mahdi army elements set many burning roadblocks that had
to be destroyed immediately." However once again it was tanks who led the way, even if RPG gunners used the thermal screen to ambush the tanks.


Panzerfaust operators would (and partly had) to seemingly very often fire from very close range and were greatly feared in the last years/last year of the war, especially in built-up areas. They caused massive losses of Soviet AFV. In Iraq the RPG gunners seem to have very little experience. Although the fought with courage their positions were not set up very well. Losses were very low for the Americans. This is of course part of a general trend, Soviet losses were appalling and the stories of the veterans underline it often. Overall the American also suffered very few losses.


Soviet tankers would close their hatches very often in MOUT even if it blinded them as German defensive fire as well as handgrenades were seemingly very deadly. In Iraq members of the tank crew and additional soldiers would fire from the top of the tank even if the Abrams offered far better SA than the T34. The Iraqi small arms fire was rather uneffective. Lesson: "During military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), tank units without infantry support need to fight open hatch."


In most MOUT in WWII overall progress was even with slow and very slow. Even if the commanders had great (Stalingrad) and huge (Berlin) firepower at their disposal. So while combat itself was very fast and fluid, operations were very timeconsuming. In OIF the Allies mostly advanced all in all very quickly.


Something in between

During MOUT the soviet tankers stated " Our regiment was lucky enough to enter Berlin from the Potsdam side, and we never had to fight through the center of the city, where the Panzerfausters were just running wild…" The tanks fired HE, "But the “fausters” hid a lot, waiting for a chance to ambush a tank." In Iraq "Tanks had shock effect. Some interviewees pointed out that “tanks got respect” and that many Iraqi fighters ran from them". On the other hand wounded where evacuated under great danger.



Similarities


AFVs running into undetected positions seems to have been the norm in both wars. In the case of the Abrams the armor was able to compensate for the poor SA. As said above the outcome was quite different though.


In Iraq "Reconnaissance by fire is very effective against strong dismounted opposition in urban terrain". Seems right out of the introduction of a Soviet MOUT book, with "destruction by fire" as step 2.


In WWII the machine guns of tanks were very important against enemy infantry. The tankers usually also had SMG, handgrenades and sometimes Panzerfausts. In Iraq "We killed a number of enemy on rooftops, but constantfire from our coax machine guns and .50-caliber machine gunskept them from putting together cohesive attacks from two- and three-story building rooftops" Note that this fire was partially delivered out of opern hatches.


Both in WWII and Iraq quick and heavy firepower was very important to suppress and kill the defenders. The gunners engaged targets with their main gun quickly.


HE was the ammunition of choice in MOUT and used to suppress and kill the enemies which had revealed their position. In Iraq " 120mm HEAT is better than .50-caliber for limiting collateraldamage HEAT causes a great deal more structural damage, but dissipates after one or two rooms, killing everybody at the point of impact. Using 120mm HEAT has more of a decisive tactical advantage and limits unnecessary deaths."


In both wars MOUT tactical Situations changed very quickly and demanded a lot of support and command and control. Communication was vital between firendly elements.



More to come...

I will later try to sum it up better and see how a HMFV aka MBT with a mortar would likely perform under the mentioned circumstances.

[Firn]

More links:


Field artillery and firepower in special operations (http://books.google.at/books?id=4M_Q6vWMshgC&pg=RA1-PA87&lpg=RA1-PA87&dq=Grozny+MOUT+artillery&source=bl&ots=5gyC4B_Cru&sig=hnQEfxBMgAQga5ulFyyf2WxVfc8&hl=de&ei=rskDSuOACITG-AbZjImCAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9#PRA1-PA83,M1)

By seemingly on of the biggest authorities on Artillery and firepower. The whole book seems to be worthwhile to read, but is rather huge.


Thesis about MOUT in Grozny (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/kelly00.pdf)



Grozny: Tactial Observations (http://www.scribd.com/doc/13646599/Tactical-Observations-From-the-Grozny-Combat-Experience)

The terrible thermobaric/fuel-air Shmel

Russian fuel weapons

Truly frightening weapons, fit for their terrible purpose, more informations here (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/fuelair/fuelair.htm).

Note that the writer seems do think that "Otto von Clausewitz" has written little about the "people's war (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/military-strategy-tactics/take-guerilla-warfare-admired-lenin-adopted-mao-9007/)" and "to use Clausewitzian principles belies the nature of urban combat". Other than these most easily rebuked misunderstandings about Carl von Clausewitz it is seems to be a good thesis. But then again it is hard to go against the mentor...

The USA follows suit

"Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence", Carl von Clausewitz.



After reading about MOUT in WWII it truly seems to be among the most terrible forms of warfare for the soldiers and especially the civilians. Grozny was hell too...

Berlin in Ruins

[Firn]

During my training experiences in the north german plain we seldomely had engagements at more than 1km with some training days seeing no engagement at more than 1 klick at all.

And the north german plain is said to be one of the better tanking areas in europe.

Thanks. Where did you train, perhaps I can googlemap it :)

What where the the shortest engagements? And broadly at which ranges happened the most?

[Waylander]

The biggest training areas where I trained where Bergen and Munster.

The shortest ranges where maybe at roughly 50m-100m.
That happens when one or both sides get lost on some forest trails right in the middle of a dense fog (not good even for modern thermals).
During such infights friendly fire also becomes a big problem...

Without digging deep in my AGDUS statistics I would give 400-800 meters as the ususal fighting distance.

[Firn]

The biggest training areas where I trained where Bergen and Munster.

The shortest ranges where maybe at roughly 50m-100m.
That happens when one or both sides get lost on some forest trails right in the middle of a dense fog (not good even for modern thermals).
During such infights friendly fire also becomes a big problem...

Without digging deep in my AGDUS statistics I would give 400-800 meters as the ususal fighting distance.

I will give the areas a look - so much open ground is almost scary for me, I'm somehow hardwired to fix axes and mountain peaks :)


A more serious question: It seems that the ambushes by the German rearguards with well camouflaged assault guns (often supported by scouts nearby) were mostly very deadly for advancing soviet tanks without previous infantry recce. At least the sovie ex-tanker describe it that way.

Most of the times areas with good protection or decent cover like small villages and forests with open ground ahead were choosen. After the ambush the Stugs (and the scouts and snipers) raced away, having completed their delaying action.


I face now a dilemma. On one hand the thermals offer better SA and a greater change, I presume to see a hidden tank. On the other hand a hidden, waylandering tank camouflaged in both spectrums will have an even greater chance to aquire the moving target. The great leaps in gun and ammunition as well as in the FCS and the sights allow MBTs now to engage tanks at ranges over 4 klicks. So all in all this should mean that the ambush is in a tank engagement deadlier than ever before, or did I miss something :D

[Firn]

The GMG doing well in Afghanistan (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/MoreGrenadeMachineGunsForFrontLineTroops.htm)



Colonel Peter Rafferty, who leads Defence Equipment & Support's Dismounted Close Combat project team, said:

"This contract completes our planned buy of the equipment, a large proportion of which has been delivered ahead of schedule to meet the urgent requirements of the men on the ground.

"Reports from the front line have been extremely favourable, with the weapon's effectiveness allowing infantry company commanders to engage and defeat the enemy at range, providing overmatch of the enemy and the ability to achieve mission success more rapidly.

"The grenade machine gun, whether mounted on vehicles or on a tripod, has given our troops a major boost in the firepower they can bring to bear on the enemy.

"It's extremely effective – especially when teamed up with the powerful 0.5in calibre machine gun – and does the job that was intended. It's so accurate that a well-trained user can put a grenade through the window of a building over a kilometre away."

Colonel Rafferty added:

"The grenade machine guns were needed both to support infantry in difficult terrain, and to completely dominate the battlefield when in open terrain.

"While this programme will deliver the system mainly for use in a tripod-mounted role from the ground, it can also be mounted on several in-service vehicles, including armoured Land Rovers and the Mastiff protected patrol vehicle."

So it truly seems that a mix of HMG and GMG is the way to go for light/medium RWS mounted on AFV including the MFV. One can also clearly see the trend towards high quality optical and thermal sights and laser rangefinders integrated with a FCS on crew served weapons. It simply seems to enable the user to get out so much more of the GMG.

[Tony Williams]

The GMG doing well in Afghanistan (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/MoreGrenadeMachineGunsForFrontLineTroops.htm)

So it truly seems that a mix of HMG and GMG is the way to go for light/medium RWS mounted on AFV including the MFV. One can also clearly see the trend towards high quality optical and thermal sights and laser rangefinders on crew served weapons. It simply seems to enable the user to get out so much more of the GMG.
Yes - I've seen presentations of these modern sighting systems and they transform the accuracy of these weapons. They mean that you can get the first round on target, so the enemy has no time to take cover.

[Firn]

Yes - I've seen presentations of these modern sighting systems and they transform the accuracy of these weapons. They mean that you can get the first round on target, so the enemy has no time to take cover.

I frankly never understood why the crew-served weapons where almost the last ones to get even a simple scope. It seems that a good mount and scope enables the old MG3 to reach out to an effective range of 2 klicks. Such an expensive and effective weapon like the GMG can be trasformed from a short to medium range suppression weapon to a seemingly very accurate 1 klick "sniper"...

Give the nearby spotter not only good binos but also a true spotting scope like this Swarovski (http://www.opticsplanet.net/swarovski-hd-ats80-hd-spotting-scope.html) . You can have a brilliant 20x or a still very crisp 60x magnification in one ocular. It will prove worthwhile.

[Waylander]

I will give the areas a look - so much open ground is almost scary for me, I'm somehow hardwired to fix axes and mountain peaks :)


A more serious question: It seems that the ambushes by the German rearguards with well camouflaged assault guns (often supported by scouts nearby) were mostly very deadly for advancing soviet tanks without previous infantry recce. At least the sovie ex-tanker describe it that way.

Most of the times areas with good protection or decent cover like small villages and forests with open ground ahead were choosen. After the ambush the Stugs (and the scouts and snipers) raced away, having completed their delaying action.


I face now a dilemma. On one hand the thermals offer better SA and a greater change, I presume to see a hidden tank. On the other hand a hidden, waylandering tank camouflaged in both spectrums will have an even greater chance to aquire the moving target. The great leaps in gun and ammunition as well as in the FCS and the sights allow MBTs now to engage tanks at ranges over 4 klicks. So all in all this should mean that the ambush is in a tank engagement deadlier than ever before, or did I miss something :D

Your forward elemts are pretty much toast if your recce assets don't warn you.
A tank in a well camouflaged position is really hard to spot even with modern TIs.

Let's for example take a NATO vs Sovjet type of scenario with the sovjets being in the attack.
When they haven't located you by other means the first units are going to stumble upon your screening units which are well hidden.
The screening units might very well plinker some enemy AFVs but the real question is if they think they located the main line of defense or not.
If yes they start to unload their wall of fire and are going to advance behind it. Hopefully right into the guns of the main line which waits in prepared positions.
If not they are going to eat the screening units and wait for the main line.
This is the critical point. They are for sure going to loose a number of units due to them getting plinkered by camouflaged tanks but if they maintain cohesion and direct their artillery and possible air support right on top of you they might very well be able to close the gap very fast.
This results you having to change position less organzied and faster than anticipated with the sovjets being nearer than one hoped.
All this negates alot of the advantages one gets from sitting in an ambush position and at least the next echelon is going to eat you alive.
Atrittion goes up much too fast.

But you are right when you think that these days ambushes can be even more deadly than before.
Due to main guns and ATGMs reaching out to 4klicks or more it is important for the attacker to stay out of LOS for as long as possible.
At least if one goes against a decent organized and equipped enemy in something like european terrain.
Driving like the water flows and trying to get as wide as possible during the attack are the keys. (And hope that your recce, artillery and air support have a good day....)

[Firn]

Your forward elemts are pretty much toast if your recce assets don't warn you.A tank in a well camouflaged position is really hard to spot even with modern TIs.

Let's for example take a NATO vs Sovjet type of scenario with the sovjets being in the attack.

When they haven't located you by other means the first units are going to stumble upon your screening units which are well hidden.
The screening units might very well plinker some enemy AFVs but the real question is if they think they located the main line of defense or not.
If yes they start to unload their wall of fire and are going to advance behind it. Hopefully right into the guns of the main line which waits in prepared positions. If not they are going to eat the screening units and wait for the main line.

This is the critical point. They are for sure going to loose a number of units due to them getting plinkered by camouflaged tanks but if they maintain cohesion and direct their artillery and possible air support right on top of you they might very well be able to close the gap very fast.
This results you having to change position less organzied and faster than anticipated with the sovjets being nearer than one hoped.
All this negates alot of the advantages one gets from sitting in an ambush position and at least the next echelon is going to eat you alive.
Atrittion goes up much too fast.



Thanks for your input.

while the technical side has changed alot I'm still surprised how many fundamentals have still remained the same.




Thoughts


On of the big, relative recent changes is that the fire support of the defending side is, with good interaction with the screen and recon elements able to reach out and destroy enemy advances far more efficiently than before. We already discussed the advantages of new smart ammunition of artillery and mortars as well as the far easier geolocating/targeting by recon elements and better integration of all assets before.

Among the most basic advantages of the defense is that it sees the attacker usually first, unless the latter can achieve tactical surprise. It is an almost tautologic assessment. This has also been the reason why the Abrams where in Iraq and the Leopards are in Afghanistan the tip of the spear, or why the Merkavas combined with engineers lead the way. The key difference was that in the latter case the OPFOR had ATGM which could be effectively employed .



The heavy mortar fighting vehicle



Thinking about the heavy MFV one can see that modern MBT like the Leopard II would be with an 120mm mortar instead of a 120mm gun an excellent asset. We have already seen that it outperforms an classic MBT in MOUT operatios in all but two areas.


Intrinsic disadvantages of the mortar-armed Leopard II

(i) direct fights against MBTs and perhaps other heavy AFV
(ii) penetration power against hard targets
(iii) greater direct reach with canister



Intrinsic advantages of the it

(i) Very high elevation of the mortar, roughly 85°
(ii) A lower depression is due to the reduced recoil also possible to achieve
(iii) The shorter barrel (3ms vs 5-6m) makes a turret sweep far easier
(iv) More ammunition can be stored
(v) Reduced blast, eases cooperation wiht the infantry but doesn't kill entrenched enemies as well with it.



To that come all the huge advantages of the indirect fire which is also close by and very responsive. We touched that already.

[Firn]

BTW: If an 105mm large warhead of an RPG-29 with a weight of 6kg can penetrate the frontal arc (most likely lower hull!) of a Challanger 2 MBT than a 120mm large and heavier HEAT warhead of a mortar should also be not underestimated...

By far not on par with the good old 120mm smoothbore tank gun, but a more than enough for most threats...

[Firn]

Tanks in the cities (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gott_tanks.pdf)

Supports very strongly the case for a heavy MCV or mortar-armed MBT - but then again this is no longer a surprise.

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About the indirect capabilites of the heavy mortars:

To compensate for the lack of smoke, the Israelis used mortars for suppressive fires. Mortars were favored for their psychological effect and high angle of fire that allowed their use in built-up areas. However, the 60mm and the 81mm weapons, common in infantry formations, could not penetrate the upper roofs of the modern buildings. Conversely, the heavier Soviet-made 120mm in the hands of the Syrians and Palestinians could penetrate Israeli-held buildings with ease.42

[Firn]

It is btw very interesting how much the Marines appreciated the tiny and badly armored Ontos in the jungle and the brutal street fighting mentioned in the article above. It seems that the nimble mobility combined with the rapidly available firepower in form of a mighty 6x105mm firestrike proved to be an excellent asset in the narrow streets where the enemy bravely resisted the Marines. The HE, WP and BH (beehive/canister) rounds all had their (gruesome) uses.

The ability to put down a devastating direct firestrike seems thus also be of great importance and would perhaps validate the use of a vehicle fitted with the AMOS.

[Firn]

Tanks and Bombers (http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/docs/AAJ_Summer06.pdf)


Ten tank myths

Based on a completely unscientifi c survey of Australian media reporting, academic and pseudo-academic writing about the tank purchase, it appears that the ten most widely held myths about the tank are these:

1. Tanks are old technology.
2. Tanks are primarily intended for killing other tanks.
3. Tanks are primarily intended for high-intensity warfare.
4. All tanks are basically the same.
5. Tanks are very expensive.
6. Attack helicopters have assumed the role of tanks in modern war.
7. Infantry bunker-busting weapons can do the job of the tank.
8. Tanks send an unacceptable political message.
9. Tanks are unsuited to the terrain of Australia and the Asia–Pacific.
10. Tanks are difficult to deploy outside Australia by ship or aircraft .


Since these myths are sometimes exploited in support of arguments about
Australian strategy and capability, each is worth exploring in detail.

A excellent analysis of the most common myths. For example about 1#.

A 2002 study by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation found that attacks on bunker systems in Vietnam by Australian infantry and artillery without tanks only succeeded in 65 per cent of cases and involved significant Australian casualties. When tanks were present, the success rate climbed to 95 per cent while the ratio of friendly to enemy casualties was six times lower than in attacks without tanks. The study’s authors concluded that ‘armour made a major contribution to the effectiveness of attacks, both in terms of lives saved and increased chance of success.

It is perhaps once again not surprising that a 120m mortar instead of an gun would have been in a great many cases at least been equally effective in the direct support role.

BTW: There are two articles form the 70ies about tanks and armoured warfare which are quite interesting at the end of the journal.

[IPA35]

What units would be equipped with these kind of vehicle mounted mortars (say AMOS)?

Independent mortar companies like the ones currently operating towed 120mm's or field artillery units?
Or as a part of a cavalry unit?

[Firn]

What units would be equipped with these kind of vehicle mounted mortars (say AMOS)?

Independent mortar companies like the ones currently operating towed 120mm's or field artillery units?
Or as a part of a cavalry unit?

It would depend of course a lot on the platform and the formation it operates in. For example a light Mortar carrier like the Wiesel 2 operates of course in the heavy company of a jaeger battalion.

On the other hand an AFV with the chassis of a Leopard and a well-armored mortar turret (AMOS, or another turret, perhaps closely based on the turret of the Leopard) would compose a heavy indirect/direct fire company in the Panzer battalions. Ideally the Panzergrenadier units would have such a MAFV on the chassis of the Puma, but an Mortar Leopard would also work quite well. From a pragmatic point of view a stronger artillery battalion would be the easier solution.

But overall I think that the 1.Panzer has all in all a sufficient amount of artillery and indirect fire support assets.

[Firn]

The 120 mm smoothbore mortar has got a lot of attention in reason times by the designers of guided projectile.

Raytheon markets now a new mortar round it codeveloped with IMI as the "Raytheon Company: Missile Systems DAGGER (http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/technology/dagger_05-09/video/index.html)". I'm not sure if it is the same round as the one presented here. (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1220353263631&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull)