The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

[Twister]

Just to gain experience and mind sharing.

As all of us know, Singapore nowadays can being consider the most modern army in South East Asia. With a stable economy and politics, add with good relation with most of NATO nation especially US, British & Israel.

However, with land area only about 800km2, urban terrain and population about 4 million, it's seem hard to defending this island from all direction.

The WW II has show the result when Japanese Empire Army success occupied the island and drive-out the strongest British Empire who defending the island.

[riksavage]

Singapore needs to focus on striking a strategic blow against any antagonists first. The largely urban environment means its very east for a well-equipped foe to damage critical economic assets early in the game. Singapore can’t afford to fight a decisive battle in its own backyard.

Also circumstances have changed since WWII, Britain was fighting a global conflict and made a conscious decision to focus on Germany, not Japan and subsequently starved the islands defence of fighters (500 hurricanes diverted to Stalin) and armour. Today Singapore has a well-equipped army dedicated to the defence of Singapore, however it can’t afford to fight costly street battles, the place would be devastated and civilian casualties would be unacceptable. If we are looking at a conflict with Malaysia then offence will be the best form of defence, take the battle to Jahor and strike hard towards KL using the existing MSR's.

[Todjaeger]

In my view, there is no 'best' strategy to defend Singapore, there are just too many factors and variables that need to be taken into account. There are a whole host of different strategies and tactics which can be employed to defend Singapore, which are very much dependent on the circumstances behind the conflict.

One thing which does not change for Singapore is the restriction on available land. Being a compact city-state, Singapore has no strategic depth and therefore cannot fight a fullscale engagement on Singaporean territory without suffering significant damage to infrastructure.

Therefore I have some questions about the attack to be defended against.
1. What is the make/Orbat of the attacking force (i.e. air, naval, ground...)
2. What are the circumstances? Is this the opening of a campaign? Part of a larger regional or world conflict?

3. How well is the attacking nation able to maintain the force for a campaign of a month, 3 months, a year, etc.

I specifically did not get into which nations would be attacking, as IMO that is of less importance than the question of what sort of equipment the attacking force would need. Also, by mentioning specific countries, some members could get distracted from a dispassionate discussion on technical capabilities.

-Cheers

[Ananda]

I have to agree with your second asessment.. Invading Singapore will only make sense if there's a scenario on using Singapore for controlling the rest of SEA...
Thus no matter the bravado between Singapore with Malaysia or Indonesia...those two countries need Singapore as much Singapore need those two neigbours...

In Sense in my opinion any Scenario in Invading Singapore...will Involve the two neighbours as conjacent targets..as much the area of strategic defense will be much more than just one Singapore Island.

[Feanor]

To invade it without local bases to support it, one would need a very formidable Navy. We can number off potential invaders on the fingers of one hand.

[Twister]

Therefore I have some questions about the attack to be defended against.
1. What is the make/Orbat of the attacking force (i.e. air, naval, ground...)
2. What are the circumstances? Is this the opening of a campaign? Part of a larger regional or world conflict?


1. Let says attack done thru east part of island, thru sea with at least on par with Singaporean Navy orbat but better compat support ship such as Oiler, supply and replenish ship.
2. Just put as world conflict between western oriented nation (led by NATO) against anti-western nation.


3. How well is the attacking nation able to maintain the force for a campaign of a month, 3 months, a year, etc.

3. Just put the campaign taken about a month, which can be justified as a time before major Singaporean alied reinforcement arrived.

4. The attack only involving Singapore alone, with Malaysian & Indonesian in neutural stand.

[Todjaeger]

1. Let says attack done thru east part of island, thru sea with at least on par with Singaporean Navy orbat but better compat support ship such as Oiler, supply and replenish ship.
2. Just put as world conflict between western oriented nation (led by NATO) against anti-western nation.

3. Just put the campaign taken about a month, which can be justified as a time before major Singaporean alied reinforcement arrived.

4. The attack only involving Singapore alone, with Malaysian & Indonesian in neutural stand.

Here are my thoughts with regards to the additional information, some of which was unclear or did not address what I was trying to find out. I will seek to clarify areas that need additional information and imput.

1. It seems as if the attacking force is going to be largely a sea/naval force. As such, once Singapore knew it was a/the target, it would come under attack from the Singaporean (sp?) Armed Forces. Given the strength available in the Air Force, even dispersed as it usually is around the world, and in the Navy, in order for an attack to be successful IMO the attacking naval force needs to be significantly more powerful. Something on the order of a USN CBG escorting a MAU. The only way around this large a force requirement IMV would be to somehow significantly reduce or eliminate the defenders, prior to their becoming aware of an impending attack.

2. Secondly, what I was trying to find out was what else was going on in the world... As a rule, the UN and member nations would not stand idly by as a major power launched an attack upon Singapore. There would be an international reaction partially just for reasons of sovereignty, economics, and partially due to Singapore having a strategic location. Also, Singapore is a member of the FPDA and as such, the UK, Australia and NZ could become involved if someone launched an attack upon Singapore. Therefore, unless the campaign against Singapore was one event in a larger conflict, a number of different powers could become involved against whoever the attacker was. With each additional power involved, the attacker faces increasing issues and difficulties in carrying out a successful attack.

3. The reason behind asking about the duration of the campaign is that can dictate both the intensity and level of forces required for the force. The faster the event needs to happen, the more overwhelming the attacking force needs to be...

At present, outside of a very detailed & successful intel & SOF op to learn of and reduce Singapore's defences prior to launching a conventional attack, there are few nations with sufficient power to successfully invade Singapore now. OTOH if the objective is just to damage infrastructure, etc then that is quite a bit easier.

-Cheers

[riksavage]

The question, which comes to my mind is why would you want to invade Singapore in the first place, is the risk worth the reward? No natural resources, tiny landmass with little opportunity for expansion. If a shooting war was inevitable between Singapore and a third party then it would make more sense to me to hit the economy and force the Singaporeans to mediate.

The economy is heavily dependent upon its port and attracting foreign investment (bio and high-tech). I would attempt to cause havoc by mining the approaches to the harbour using submarines, the mere threat alone would cause shipping companies to divert their cargo to nearby Malaysia for off-loading. After all both Malaysia and Singapore are both ISPS certified and openly compete for trade with the US / Europe as regional shipping hubs. I would also look at launching missile strikes against industrial areas and infrastructure to drive out foreign companies and investment. Even unsophisticated missiles cause problems, just look at the problem the Israeli's have with low-tech systems being fired into populated areas from neighbouring Gaza. This latter argument makes the assumption that the antagonist has access to Johor, which is unlikely unless Malaysia is the aggressor.

Another factor is since the US closed down it's bases in the Philippines it's moved a considerable number of Naval assets to Singapore, so a wide ranging attack would eventually incur the wrath of the US, particularly if its own civilians started suffering due to collateral damage.

So the best strategy for defending Singapore is to do what they are doing right now, keep tight with US, maintain a strong offensive strike capability, maintain a good domestic / foreign intelligence service and finally maintain strong diplomatic relationships with the regional powers (India and China) and close neighbours (Indonesia and Malaysia).

[nevidimka]

I think Ricksavage is right on spot.

A few questions, how far (km) is sumatera to Singapore? and secondly if Singapore is attacked, wouldnt that mean that Malaysia is forced to help Singapore ( not like they need any help) since they are both members of FPDA?

And also since ASEAN is a NAM territory, how can Singapore allow US to station its asset in Singapore? And what US assets are we talking about?

[OPSSG]

nevidimka, riksavage, Todjaeger, Feanor & Ananda good to see you around in DT.

Under US-Singapore MOU signed in Tokyo on 13 November 1990 (the terms of which remain undisclosed), specifically allows the USN to have a 'logistic presence' in Singapore. About 100 US Sailors (officer and enlisted) and 50 USN civilians work in seven activities in Singapore and these commands provide important support for the USN's 7th Fleet.

If you look at the MFA, DSTA and Mindef announcements from Singapore, the Changi Naval Base (CNB) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/singapore.htm) in Singapore was designed with the USN's detailed technical requirements in mind. Specifically, it allows US carriers, nuclear submarines and other US naval assets to dock there.

The level of access and security provided to the US is in-line with access rights granted to FPDA powers like the UK, Australia and NZ. The CNB is technically not a US base.

BTW, despite being a Singaporean, I will not be able to offer an opinion in a discussion on the best strategy to defending Singapore Island. My apologies in advance.

[sunshin3]

1. Let says attack done thru east part of island, thru sea with at least on par with Singaporean Navy orbat but better combat support ship such as Oiler, supply and replenish ship.

2. Just put as world conflict between western oriented nation (led by NATO) against anti-western nation.

3. Just put the campaign taken about a month, which can be justified as a time before major Singaporean alied reinforcement arrived.

4. The attack only involving Singapore alone, with Malaysian & Indonesian in neutral stand.

As Todjaeger suggested, we can discuss the capabilities of the naval force needed to invade Singapore Island. To begin this discussion, perhaps we should list out the forces in Singapore, so as to establish the type and capabilities of the navy invasion force.

From this list of the relevant capabilities of the RSAF and the RSN (to repel a naval invasion force) alone, it would become clear why Feanor said you can count the navies who can take on Singapore with one hand. This list below is not accurate and is compiled mainly from Wikipedia and various other sources. However, it would be sufficient to provide us with a basis to discuss.


1. RSAF's Naval Strike Capabilities

(i) Harpoon Capable Combat Aircraft
- 62 F-16C/Ds (with 24 F-15SGs on order)

(ii) Force Multipliers
-4 E-2C Hawkeye AWACs (with 4 G550 on order)
-4 KC-135R Tankers
-5 Fokker 50 MPA (Harpoon armed)
-1 converted C-130 for SIGINT

(iii) Attack Helicopters
- 20 AH-64D Apache Longbows

(iv) Air force Munitions
- AIM-9J/P/P-3/M/S Sidewinder
- AIM-7M Sparrow
- AIM-7P-5 Mk 58 Sparrow
- AGM-65G/A?/D? Maverick
- AGM-114K-3 Hellfire
- Hydra 70 rockets
- Mk-82/84 bombs incl with BSU-49/B retarding fins

(v) Integrated Air Defence Systems
- I-Hawk
- Rapier
- Igla
- Mistral
- Oerlikon Gun
- RBS-70

(vi) 4 Main Air Bases with 11 runways with hardened facilities
- Changi Air Base
- Paya Lebar Air Base
- Sembawang Air Base
- Tengah Air Base


2. RSN's Capabilities

(i) First Flotilla (RSN's strike arm)
-6 Formidable Class Frigates (organic seahawks on order)
-6 Victory Class Corvettes
-12 Fearless Class Patrol Vessels
-4 Sjoormen Submarines (also known as the Challenger class)
-2 Vastergotland Submarines, which are AIP equipped submarines (on order)

(ii) Naval Munitions
- Harpoon AGM-84D
- Black Shark Torpedoes, A244s Torpedoes, Type 617 Torpedoes, Type 43 Torpedoes
- Barak I
- Aster 15/30
- Mistral

(iii) 2 Main Naval Bases
- Changi Naval Base
- Tuas Naval Base


3. Singapore Army's Capabilities

3 Combined Arms Divisions, a rapid deployment Guards division, plus 1PDF and 2PDF (each PDF is a division sized force for Singapore Island Defence)

(i) Each of Singapore's 3 combined arms divisions is offensively orientated, with their own organic armour, artillery and mobile air defence elements. This includes Leopard 2A4 MBTs, AMX-13SM1 light tanks and amoured infantry (carried in either Bionix IIs or M113 Ultras). The Guards Division is heli-mobile.

(ii) These armoured elements are supported by the Super Rapid 120MM Mortar mounted on a Bronco, the 155mm/39 calibre Primus SPH, artillery hunting radar, Apache helicopters and UAVs. These support elements have the ability to direct precision fire (from artillery and the air force) and also the ability to gather intelligence (via UAVs and other ground based intelligence sensors) to enable integrated strike operations by both aircraft and artillery.
Main Combat weapons of the Singapore army:

- Leopard 2A4 (~132) (newly acquired)
- AMX-13SM1 Light Tanks (~350)
- AMX-10PAC90 and other variants (~44)
- M113-A2 ULTRA (Upgraded with 25mm Bushmaster or 40/50 OWS) (~700)
- M-728 CET (Combat Engineers' Tractors) (unknown number)
- M-60AVLB, Bionix AVLB (unknown number)
- Bionix II Versions (unknown number) (upgraded)
- Bronco ATTC Armoured Carrier (~600)
- HIMARS MLRS system (on order)
- FH-2000 155mm/52-calibre Howitzer (~54)
- Pegasus 155mm/39-calibre heli-portable Howitzer (unknown number)
- Primus 155mm/39-calibre Automated Self Propelled Howitzer (~54)
- 120mm Super-Rapid Mortar (unknown number)
- ARTHUR, AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars (unknown number)

- CIS-50 Heavy Machine Gun
- FN GPMG 7.62mm Machine Gun
- Ultimax 5.56mm Machine Gun
- M-203 40mm Grenade Launcher
- SAR-21 5.56mm Rifle
- CIS (Chartered Industries of Singapore) 40mm Automatic GL
- SPIKE ATGM
- MATADOR LAW
- 84mm Recoiless Guns


4. SIGINT & Electronic Warfare Capabilities

According to Desmond Ball, "some of Singapore's SIGINT capabilities... are amongst the most advanced... [including] HF DF/ocean surveillance information... and the most advanced electronic warfare capability in Southeast Asia."


5. So guys, how do you want to proceed from here?

[DavidDCM]

Just an additional info:
While Sumatra is too far away even for modern long range artillery to reach Singapore, there are many smaller, Indonesian islands between Sumatra and the peninsula which in fact are close enough. So if an aggressor would be able to get his artillery assets there this might be another theatre of combat.

[nevidimka]

Just an additional info:
While Sumatra is too far away even for modern long range artillery to reach Singapore, there are many smaller, Indonesian islands between Sumatra and the peninsula which in fact are close enough. So if an aggressor would be able to get his artillery assets there this might be another theatre of combat.

Is Sumatera too far for an Iskander?

[DavidDCM]

No, Sumatra is about 100 Km from Singapore at it's closest point. Tactical SSM can of course cover that distance, but I was talking more about "normal" artillery like SPH, howitzers and MLRS. Yes I know that there are experimental rounds that extend the range of even such systems to more than 100 Km, but only few of them are in service and most in-service systems not even scratch the 100 Km mark today. That's why, in my eyes, to bring a notable amount of indirect firepower to hit Singapore, an invader should chose one of the islands like Batam, which are less than 40 Km from Singapore, and I suppose much easier to conquer than Southern Malaysia (if the invader is neither Indonesia nor Malaysia).

[nevidimka]

IMO Indonesia can easily get SRBM's for cheap from CHina and can launch it directly at Singapore from Sumatera mainland.

[Lostfleet]

I don't know if this would be a good comparison but Iceland's invasion by the Soviets in Red Storm Rising could be relevant.

A massive suprise air attack destroying air force and command and control facilities with the invasion fleet consisting of a civilian fleet, approaching to the island unnoticed.

To repel or be prepared for such an attack, most of the military of Singapore should be widely dispersed around the island, hiding in James Bond stlye bunkers* so that they could not be located and destroyed in a pre-invasion attack.

A fast, well co-ordinated and a total suprise attack can make the island's invasion possible as the size of the island is rather small. Of course who would want to invade the islands would be another question.

* James Bond Style Bunker - Basically bunkers that are inside of dead volcanoes, mountains, hangars beneath football stadiums, tanks located between car garages anything your imagination captures.

[DavidDCM]

IMO Indonesia can easily get SRBM's for cheap from CHina and can launch it directly at Singapore from Sumatera mainland.

Yes, but our hypothetical invader in this scenario is not Indonesia nor is it Malaysia. And strategic missiles can cause devastation to the infrastructure but as strategic weapons are inable to give tactical indirect fire support to your groundforces unlike howitzers. Of course, as Singapore is so small, it's questionable if you should pound the city with artillery while your own infantry is already entering it.

[Todjaeger]

I don't know if this would be a good comparison but Iceland's invasion by the Soviets in Red Storm Rising could be relevant.

A massive suprise air attack destroying air force and command and control facilities with the invasion fleet consisting of a civilian fleet, approaching to the island unnoticed.

To repel or be prepared for such an attack, most of the military of Singapore should be widely dispersed around the island, hiding in James Bond stlye bunkers* so that they could not be located and destroyed in a pre-invasion attack.

A fast, well co-ordinated and a total suprise attack can make the island's invasion possible as the size of the island is rather small. Of course who would want to invade the islands would be another question.

* James Bond Style Bunker - Basically bunkers that are inside of dead volcanoes, mountains, hangars beneath football stadiums, tanks located between car garages anything your imagination captures.

I had thought of Red Storm Rising when I was originally composing some of my questions regarding the current scenario. The events in question in the book (the invasion of Iceland by the Soviets) occurred against the larger backdrop of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. Has this not been the case, additional NATO vessels and/or aircraft would have been available to deal with the initial landing force prior to actually seizing Iceland. IIRC, it was successfully attacked by 1 Harpoon AShM launched from a P-3 Orion, 1 Harpoon which failed to launch due to too many recent alerts for the ground crews, and the ship was then strafed with 20mm cannonfire by F-15 Eagles...

With regards to Singapore, a number of the forces are already dispersed outside of Singapore. IIRC there is an air force unit in France, as well as in Australia for training. Unless some hostile force was willing to get a number of the Great Powers involved, I do not see an attacker being able to dispatch all of Singapore's military in initial attack.

As for setting up firebases on some of the nearby islands... There are two problems I see there, with regards to the current scenario. The first and of lesser significance, is that in doing so, whichever attacking power does so will automatically be widening the scope of the conflict and Malaysia and/or Indonesia will no longer be neutral in the conflict. The second, and IMO more important problem the attacker will face, is being able to land and setup the firebase for use against Singapore, without it indicating that such an event is going to take place.

-Cheers

[DavidDCM]

I still think it'll hardly be possible to attack Singapore without getting Indonesia and Malaysia involved. The whole area is so geographically crammed that it appears hardly possible to get a major naval attack force into the area without entering home waters of those two nations.

[Twister]

I still think it'll hardly be possible to attack Singapore without getting Indonesia and Malaysia involved. The whole area is so geographically crammed that it appears hardly possible to get a major naval attack force into the area without entering home waters of those two nations.

Let just says that the same enemy just attack both Malaysia & Indonesia which Indonesia lost their control over the water territorial at the east & south (Riau Island) point of Singapore.

Both countries failed to help because need to defend themselves (Kuala Lumpur & Jakarta).

Even the enemy has control the Riau territorial water but fight still goes in the island.

[riksavage]

Realistically a conventional attack against Singapore is unrealistic unless we witness a WWIII scenario and the aim of the antagonist is to cripple support for the US fleet operating in the region. If anything I believe we are more likely to witness a terrorist campaign aimed at destabilizing the economy.

Extreme possible example as follows:

Scenario Background:

Malaysia suffers a breakdown in democracy resulting in a former military 'strongman' taking over following the introduction of martial law. This individual follows President Zia's of Pakistan's example and changes the constitution making the military and security infrastructure a defender of Islam and not a defender of a secular state. Extreme elements of the military and intelligence services (mirroring what happened with elements of the Pakistani ISI and military) begin to take a more radical view and start pushing for the reunification of all of Malaysia under Sharia Law (including Singapore). The new leader of Malaysia backs this argument through 'peaceful' means, however radical elements within his government start training insurgents in remote areas with the primary purpose of destabilizing the Singapore economy and to ferment distrust between the Malay, Indian and Chinese ethnic groups. Several remote armouries in Malaysia are raided with light and medium weapons/ammo being obtained by radical groups. Stand-off weapon technology / deployment methodology provided by rogue elements of the REAL IRA and Hamas.

Flashpoint:

Malay based extremists launch mortar and rocket attacks (based on IRA / Hamas technology / methodology) from JOHOR across the causeway against the Northern edge of the airport and industrial areas around Tuas. The Malaysian Government denies all knowledge of any insider support and condemns the attacks. The terrorist groups claim they are fighting for the freedom of ethnic Malay's and reunification of Malaysia under strict Sharia Law. Massive impact upon Singapore economy, airport shuts, foreign airlines threaten to stop flying in, evacuation of non dependent expat families begins.

Response:

Option A:

Singapore Government issues a strong warning to Malaysia to deal with the insurgents and begins planning for intelligence based covert operations in JOHOR to target suspected launch sites / groups. Uses international diplomacy to put pressure on the Malay Gov. Basically looks at undertaking a similar campaign to that advocated by the British/Irish Governments during the Troubles by identifying and neutralizing support / attacks mounted from Southern Ireland against the North, basically a low key counter insurgency campaign working with their Malay military / intelligence counterparts. Risk of such a low key response - drawn out campaign, which does not guarantee a total end to cross border strikes from week one, lack of trust - possible sympathizers working in the Malay intelligence service.

Option B:

Singapore mobilizes it's armed forces and begins striking back against launch sites using artillery, attack helicopters and CAS. Show of strength option. Risk of high level response - all out conventional war with Malaysia, alienation of Malay community and possible retaliating strikes against urban areas by the Malaysian armed forces.

What option would you go for and why?

[OPSSG]

I don't know if this would be a good comparison but Iceland's invasion by the Soviets in Red Storm Rising could be relevant.

A massive suprise air attack destroying air force and command and control facilities with the invasion fleet consisting of a civilian fleet, approaching to the island unnoticed.

To repel or be prepared for such an attack, most of the military of Singapore should be widely dispersed around the island, hiding in James Bond stlye bunkers* so that they could not be located and destroyed in a pre-invasion attack.

A fast, well co-ordinated and a total suprise attack can make the island's invasion possible as the size of the island is rather small. Of course who would want to invade the islands would be another question.

* James Bond Style Bunker - Basically bunkers that are inside of dead volcanoes, mountains, hangars beneath football stadiums, tanks located between car garages anything your imagination captures.

In page 58, of Tim Huxely's book (Defending the Lion City (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4760&page=2)), he said:

"For example, from the late 1970s MINDEF developed plans for contingencies which might have arisen from the presence of Soviet forces in Vietnam, such as Soviet air attacks in retaliation for any Singaporeans intervention in defence of Thailand, or in the event of a wider conflict between rival super-power-led coalitions."

This was a huge concern when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978. At that time, Singapore and Thailand were wondering if the Vietnamese would continue further south. Especially since the US had just left Vietnam a few years earlier. With the end of the cold war, this scenario, is not likely. In fact, Vietnam is now a full member of ASEAN.

While I'm not sure about Jame Bond Style Bunkers, DSTA announced that Singapore has underground ammunition facilities (http://www.dsta.gov.sg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1995&Itemid=401) and it is commonly known that Singapore air bases are 'hardened' and that certain underground MRT stations do double-up as bomb shelters. And each new HDB flat has bomb shelters (and this requirement is part of our building codes) and other bomb proof facilities provided in each neighbourhood, so in a way, Singapore is very 'fortress like' for a modern city.

4. SIGINT & Electronic Warfare Capabilities

According to Desmond Ball, "some of Singapore's SIGINT capabilities... are amongst the most advanced... [including] HF DF/ocean surveillance information... and the most advanced electronic warfare capability in Southeast Asia."

Just some stray thoughts...

As Sunshin3 noted on Singapore's SIGINT and Electronic Warfare Capabilities, would it be rather difficult to surprise Singapore? Do you have something else in mind?

Thus far, we are not clear on the strategic value of the capture of Singapore to the aggressor.

If the capture of Singapore is to put the aggressor in a position to control SLOCs, wouldn't the capture of any of the Indonesian Riau Islands (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riau_Islands) serve a similar purpose (with the plus that they are not as well defended and there is no chance that USN personnel would be hurt)? Why choose to fight Singapore (with 7 fighter squadrons) and Indonesia at the same time if you can just fight Indonesia (less than 2 operational fighter squadrons) to achieve a similar goal (in the first phase)?

[DavidDCM]

Thus far, we are not clear on the strategic value of the capture of Singapore to the aggressor.

If the capture of Singapore is to put the aggressor in a position to control SLOCs, wouldn't the capture of any of the Indonesian Riau Islands (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riau_Islands) serve a similar purpose (with the plus that they are not as well defended and there is no chance that USN personnel would be hurt)? Why choose to fight Singapore (with 7 fighter squadrons) and Indonesia at the same time if you can just fight Indonesia (less than 2 operational fighter squadrons) to achieve a similar goal (in the first phase)?

Probably because you couldn't avoid trouble with Singapore anyway. Singapore is highly dependant on free trade through the Straits of Malacca. If some outside nation would decide to block/control this seaway by occupying the Indonesian Riau Islands, Singapore would not just ignore that. So an attacker would have to deal with Singapore at some point of the operation anyway, it would be wise to conduct this toughest task in the beginning rather than engage Indonesia and wait for Singapore to kick in by themselves.

But I agree, control of the Strait of Malacca is basically the only thing that an external power might see as interesting in Singapore.

[Todjaeger]

Probably because you couldn't avoid trouble with Singapore anyway. Singapore is highly dependant on free trade through the Straits of Malacca. If some outside nation would decide to block/control this seaway by occupying the Indonesian Riau Islands, Singapore would not just ignore that. So an attacker would have to deal with Singapore at some point of the operation anyway, it would be wise to conduct this toughest task in the beginning rather than engage Indonesia and wait for Singapore to kick in by themselves.

But I agree, control of the Strait of Malacca is basically the only thing that an external power might see as interesting in Singapore.

I have to agree with this, though with a slight modification. What I could see happening is a nation wishing to control the Malacca Straits seizing a nearby area/island with deepwater ports, and then launching standoff strikes at Singapore to reduce or eliminate Singapore's ability to contest control of the Straits. I do not think it would be worthwhile for a hostile force to attempt to capture Singapore itself. The land of Singapore itself has strategic value due to location, but there are a number of other nearby islands that have similar value, which would likely be far easier to seize and establish control over.

-Cheers

[nevidimka]

Realistically a conventional attack against Singapore is unrealistic unless we witness a WWIII scenario and the aim of the antagonist is to cripple support for the US fleet operating in the region. If anything I believe we are more likely to witness a terrorist campaign aimed at destabilizing the economy.

Extreme possible example as follows:

Scenario Background:

Malaysia suffers a breakdown in democracy resulting in a former military 'strongman' taking over following the introduction of martial law. This individual follows President Zia's of Pakistan's example and changes the constitution making the military and security infrastructure a defender of Islam and not a defender of a secular state. Extreme elements of the military and intelligence services (mirroring what happened with elements of the Pakistani ISI and military) begin to take a more radical view and start pushing for the reunification of all of Malaysia under Sharia Law (including Singapore). The new leader of Malaysia backs this argument through 'peaceful' means, however radical elements within his government start training insurgents in remote areas with the primary purpose of destabilizing the Singapore economy and to ferment distrust between the Malay, Indian and Chinese ethnic groups. Several remote armouries in Malaysia are raided with light and medium weapons/ammo being obtained by radical groups. Stand-off weapon technology / deployment methodology provided by rogue elements of the REAL IRA and Hamas.

Flashpoint:

Malay based extremists launch mortar and rocket attacks (based on IRA / Hamas technology / methodology) from JOHOR across the causeway against the Northern edge of the airport and industrial areas around Tuas. The Malaysian Government denies all knowledge of any insider support and condemns the attacks. The terrorist groups claim they are fighting for the freedom of ethnic Malay's and reunification of Malaysia under strict Sharia Law. Massive impact upon Singapore economy, airport shuts, foreign airlines threaten to stop flying in, evacuation of non dependent expat families begins.

Response:

Option A:

Singapore Government issues a strong warning to Malaysia to deal with the insurgents and begins planning for intelligence based covert operations in JOHOR to target suspected launch sites / groups. Uses international diplomacy to put pressure on the Malay Gov. Basically looks at undertaking a similar campaign to that advocated by the British/Irish Governments during the Troubles by identifying and neutralizing support / attacks mounted from Southern Ireland against the North, basically a low key counter insurgency campaign working with their Malay military / intelligence counterparts. Risk of such a low key response - drawn out campaign, which does not guarantee a total end to cross border strikes from week one, lack of trust - possible sympathizers working in the Malay intelligence service.

Option B:

Singapore mobilizes it's armed forces and begins striking back against launch sites using artillery, attack helicopters and CAS. Show of strength option. Risk of high level response - all out conventional war with Malaysia, alienation of Malay community and possible retaliating strikes against urban areas by the Malaysian armed forces.

What option would you go for and why?

This is beyond absurd. It looks like your aching for a war with anyone. It makes me wonder if you'd be happy if Singapore is in the middle of Arab Mideast, so that you can have all your "action".

If anything I think Singapore should fear indonesia more, as it is becoming more radical by the day and its economy in a bad shape. A bad economy with growing radical Islamization of Indonesia is not a good thing. Suharto did a good job with an Iron fist, but I'm not sure about the current gov. But the current gov has shown to be incapable of arresting the situation during the economic crisis of 1998 with the mobs attack on minority populations.

[Schumacher]

......
What option would you go for and why?

Option B without a doubt. Let's leave out the country names since the option would be the same for any small nations heavily reliant on foreign trade/investments. Such nations simply can't afford drawn out conflicts even low level ones.
This is especially true if the small nation has existing superiority in conventional forces. You use this advantage to hit them hard & early, NOT wait years for the conflict to degrade your economy which will inevitably lead to degradation of the advantage in forces by which time you will become a sitting duck.
Too bad if it escalates the situation with the big neighbors, see above, better to fight now when your superiority is still intact than later. Engage them if unavoidable, after all, they allowed attacks to be launched against you from their territories.
This way, the big neighbors will hopefully be severely wounded as well so they can't as easily take advantage of your own weakened state near the end of the conflict.

[Lostfleet]

I had thought of Red Storm Rising when I was originally composing some of my questions regarding the current scenario. The events in question in the book (the invasion of Iceland by the Soviets) occurred against the larger backdrop of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. Has this not been the case, additional NATO vessels and/or aircraft would have been available to deal with the initial landing force prior to actually seizing Iceland. IIRC, it was successfully attacked by 1 Harpoon AShM launched from a P-3 Orion, 1 Harpoon which failed to launch due to too many recent alerts for the ground crews, and the ship was then strafed with 20mm cannonfire by F-15 Eagles...

With regards to Singapore, a number of the forces are already dispersed outside of Singapore. IIRC there is an air force unit in France, as well as in Australia for training. Unless some hostile force was willing to get a number of the Great Powers involved, I do not see an attacker being able to dispatch all of Singapore's military in initial attack.



-Cheers

In the Red Storm Rising, the war has already started so there were armed patrol aircraft around, in Singapore case I think with a smart pre-location of civilian cargo ships around the island ( there are hundreds of them going through there) a suprise landing could be achieved. Of course if the suprise is blown than you will have a lot of sitting ducks to hunt for the Singapore Air Force.

[British Post]

In the Red Storm Rising, the war has already started so there were armed patrol aircraft around, in Singapore case I think with a smart pre-location of civilian cargo ships around the island ( there are hundreds of them going through there) a suprise landing could be achieved. Of course if the suprise is blown than you will have a lot of sitting ducks to hunt for the Singapore Air Force.

Right! But you forget that the Air Force alone cannot defend all of singapore, it should be more of a maritime thing since Singapore is an island (though this goes without saying). So why not have fleet of battleships waiting for the enemy?

[OPSSG]

Right! But you forget that the Air Force alone cannot defend all of singapore, it should be more of a maritime thing since Singapore is an island (though this goes without saying). So why not have fleet of battleships waiting for the enemy?

I hope you enjoy posting at DT. If you don't mind, I'll just share a few thoughts:

(1) Objectively, the RSAF (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Singapore_Air_Force) considers itself a 'small but capable air force' (small being a relative concept). However, please keep in mind the RSAF has 7 squadrons of fighters (the majority of which are block 52 or 52+ F-16s (http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avf163.html)) and multiple force multipliers (like harpoon (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/agm-84.htm) armed MPAs, tankers and CAEWs (http://www.iai.co.il/sip_storage/files/7/35467.pdf)). Please take a look at Sunshin3's (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=8563) post earlier in this thread and the thread on the RSAF (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4117&page=16), for the relevant information. Not many navies can defend against an air force training regularly to operate in 50 or more aircraft strike packages. So an invasion fleet needs its own airwing and it would need to overcome the strike packages arriving in waves.

(2) Most battleships are now an 'extinct' or a mothballed species. Many modern blue water navies operate guided missile destroyers (or frigates) and submarines. Even fewer navies operate aircraft carriers. Please note that the RSN (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Singapore_Navy) operates the 'Formidable (http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/formidable/)' class of frigates (see link for further details) (http://peacethoughstrength.blogspot.com/2008_09_01_archive.html) and also the Challenger class submarines (http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/mokhzani/mokhzani%20-%20singapore-s%20submarine%20fleet.pdf). The RSN (please read the Navy League of Australia article) (http://navyleag.customer.netspace.net.au/fc_07ros.htm) would also operate under air cover provided by the RSAF.

(3) For the scenario painted (without aircraft carriers) any invasion fleet is doomed to fail, unless total surprise is achieved, which is not easy to do.

(4) While you are correct that the RSAF alone does not defend Singapore alone, you need to look at the army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Army) and RSN too. So comparing or counting platforms (like the number of frigates and submarines) can be misleading.

You may need to read (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4760&page=2) a bit more on naval tactics (http://www.battle-fleet.com/pw/his/Naval%20Navy%20Tactics%20ASW%20AAW.htm) and think a bit more about what Todjaeger and others have said in comments in this thread. Not bad for a first try. :)

Do a little more work on your conceptual understanding, it will make your posts more interesting. I come here to learn from others too. I also ask questions when I don't understand certain technologies or things.

[wesuper]

FYI

did you knows the closest INDONESIAN iland from singapore is BATAM just about 15 KM from them

[DavidDCM]

Yes, we actually had that on page 1.

[OPSSG]

did you knows the closest INDONESIAN island from singapore is BATAM just about 15 KM from them

@wesuper, yes, I am aware and thanks for your input. :)

We also have at least 2 Malaysians and 2 Indonesians (including you) in this thread discussing the best strategy to defend Singapore. I would welcome and encourage your thoughts on the scenario proposed. Fyi, the thread starter, Twister, had asked us to consider the following scenario:

Let just says that the same enemy just attack both Malaysia & Indonesia which Indonesia lost their control over the water territorial at the east & south (Riau Island) point of Singapore.

Both countries failed to help because need to defend themselves (Kuala Lumpur & Jakarta).

Even the enemy has control the Riau territorial water but fight still goes in the island.

So it is in that context that I made my comments for the benefit of British Post who is a bit younger... It is not my intention to be offensive (in case I come across as offensive or proud). We are here to learn from each other.

Peace my friend. :D

[nevidimka]

Th best scenario of defending Singapore is to set up a firewall. For example if Singapore is a Server, you'd set up firewall's to defend it. :D

So IMO, SIngapore's defence should start outside singapore at sea. Build a network of ships/submarines that will detect any incoming threat air/sea and neutralise it. That means ships loaded with AA/ASh/ASu capability.

Towards the north it would be practically usefull to have good relations with Malaysia to not engage in war with them, and have some form of military agreement with them , in which case FPDA comes in.

So I'd suggest Singapore to invest heavily on Navy, Ships/Subs.

[wertyisme]

Hello, first time poster here. Just found the forum. :)

Anyway, IMO if there's an actual invasion of Singapore itself as in Twister's scenario, the only way to defend Singapore would be costly street to street urban battles. But before that the direction of the attack has to be considered: where and how is the enemy going to invade or deploy on the island itself?

a) an amphibious assault on the west/east coasts of singapore (from the south) would be quite impossible considering the small front with which to land troops and the fact that the northern coast is too easily protected (we could rebuild fort siloso:D) with mines and what not. Furthermore the northern coasts are chockful of merchant shipping, such that attempting to approach from the south in force would be much too difficult. AND Singapore has no beaches large enough. That rules out amphibious assaults. (what country would have sufficient capability anyway? USA?)

b) assaults from the north through Tuas and Woodlands (Northwest and North) would be the most probable scenario, since its been tried-and-tested in WW2 (terrain dictated those routes anyway). The cross-straits bridges are also essential to bringing in armor assets to support any offensive, most likely following the Japanese route of going down towards the city center on the southern end of the island.

c) assaults from the north east, over pulau ubin and tekong. Very likely as well, since even small dinghys and patrol boats can cross that narrow strech of water between the islands with great ease.

d) from above, airborne-style. Very likely. Would make for effective disruptions. But highly dangerous, since any male older than 18 in Singapore is a potential combatant, and it would be difficult to coordinate landings as there aren't many places in Singapore sufficiently large to drop any unit larger than a company.

Invasions would most likely follow B and C for the reasons stated above. But once on the island proper defense would likely degenerate into a series of street battles and sniping actions since most of Singapore is built up with lots and lots of apartment buildings (imagine sniping positions from the 10th floor of an HDB flat). Possibly a Stalingrad style hardpoint defense that would force bloody house to house clearing on the part of the invaders until the SAF can mount an effective counterstrike.

The only other parts of the island that are not urban are the military live fire areas in the North West (where any response is likely to be organised from and the area is likely to be defended heavily with tanks and fortifications) and the Central areas of Singapore with the reservoirs and jungles and hills, but its gonna be weird. Imagine trekking up a hill within a jungle only to emerged on the opposing side 3 hours later with an expressway and blocks of flats staring at you. Maybe position the artillery on those areas and set up chokepoints on major expressways?

the air force is most likely going to fly interdiction against incoming bombers rather than close ground support since the SAF isn't going to be keen on smashing the infrastructure.

hmmm there's nothing else really. a defense of the island is going to be rather straightforward since the operation areas are going to be really cramp. did i miss anything?

[Crunchy]

If any agressor reachs Singapore than probably SG's allies have already give up/betrayed Singapore or ASEAN has either fell apart or be beaten by the agressor. Then it doesn't matter much how good the Singaporeans fight.

[OPSSG]

If any agressor reachs Singapore than probably SG's allies have already give up/betrayed Singapore or ASEAN has either fell apart or be beaten by the agressor. Then it doesn't matter much how good the Singaporeans fight.

Crunchy, you have met the minimum threshold in DT rules in your above response (i.e. it is not a one liner).

Would you care to explain how you came to this conclusion? Have you read the thread (all the pages)?:D

[the road runner]

Hello, first time poster here. Just found the forum. :)

Anyway, IMO if there's an actual invasion of Singapore itself as in Twister's scenario, the only way to defend Singapore would be costly street to street urban battles. But before that the direction of the attack has to be considered: where and how is the enemy going to invade or deploy on the island itself?

a) an amphibious assault on the west/east coasts of singapore (from the south) would be quite impossible considering the small front with which to land troops and the fact that the northern coast is too easily protected (we could rebuild fort siloso:D) with mines and what not. Furthermore the northern coasts are chockful of merchant shipping, such that attempting to approach from the south in force would be much too difficult. AND Singapore has no beaches large enough. That rules out amphibious assaults. (what country would have sufficient capability anyway? USA?)

b) assaults from the north through Tuas and Woodlands (Northwest and North) would be the most probable scenario, since its been tried-and-tested in WW2 (terrain dictated those routes anyway). The cross-straits bridges are also essential to bringing in armor assets to support any offensive, most likely following the Japanese route of going down towards the city center on the southern end of the island.

c) assaults from the north east, over pulau ubin and tekong. Very likely as well, since even small dinghys and patrol boats can cross that narrow strech of water between the islands with great ease.

d) from above, airborne-style. Very likely. Would make for effective disruptions. But highly dangerous, since any male older than 18 in Singapore is a potential combatant, and it would be difficult to coordinate landings as there aren't many places in Singapore sufficiently large to drop any unit larger than a company.

Invasions would most likely follow B and C for the reasons stated above. But once on the island proper defense would likely degenerate into a series of street battles and sniping actions since most of Singapore is built up with lots and lots of apartment buildings (imagine sniping positions from the 10th floor of an HDB flat). Possibly a Stalingrad style hardpoint defense that would force bloody house to house clearing on the part of the invaders until the SAF can mount an effective counterstrike.

The only other parts of the island that are not urban are the military live fire areas in the North West (where any response is likely to be organised from and the area is likely to be defended heavily with tanks and fortifications) and the Central areas of Singapore with the reservoirs and jungles and hills, but its gonna be weird. Imagine trekking up a hill within a jungle only to emerged on the opposing side 3 hours later with an expressway and blocks of flats staring at you. Maybe position the artillery on those areas and set up chokepoints on major expressways?

the air force is most likely going to fly interdiction against incoming bombers rather than close ground support since the SAF isn't going to be keen on smashing the infrastructure.

hmmm there's nothing else really. a defense of the island is going to be rather straightforward since the operation areas are going to be really cramp. did i miss anything?

Welcome to the forum:p:

I have been watching this topic and I think attacking Singapore would be very foolish and difficult.Only the USA would have this capability.

wertyisme i will try and put a few questions to your scenario

points a/b/c) What would the Singapore Navy/Air force be doing when this amphibious landing in trying to close the gap around the straights of Singapore? The Singapore navy and air force would be sinking ships :D

Also remember that Singapore Army has Leo2 tanks, light units(like airborne/snipers) do not fair to well against tanks.I think Singapore Army would have the advantage against any lightly armed troops.

The world community would not just watch this unfold.The USA would send a carrier battle group to assist.

Australia would be sending subs,frigates,F-111,F-18 basically anything that Singapore needed to help defend its land/sea and air space.

once again welcome to the forum

[Red]

I have been watching this topic and I think attacking Singapore would be very foolish and difficult.Only the USA would have this capability.

Any attacker would have to come to terms with the RSAF which has 24 F15SG(possibly more orders in the very near future), 70+ F16s Blk 52/ 52 plus, 45-50 F5Es(upgraded to shoot amraams) which are backed by E-2C AEW Hawkeyes which will be replaced by Phalcon Gulfstreams AEW & C this year.There are also around 40 Super-Skyhawks in active storage reserve.

SAF utilizes a host of radars such as the FPS-117(upgraded)(>450km), Giraffe AMB(100km), P-stars, etc(not exactly following SAF`s ground radar developments). RSAF utilizes a variety of UAVs for surveillance and detection; Hermes 450s, Searcher 2s, etc. The military also leverages on a wide array of civilian radars as Singapore is an aviation and maritime hub in the region.

Singapore`s layered air defence includes the recently and locally upgraded I-hawks(40km) which can now engage multiple targets simultaneously and upgraded Rapiers(8-10km range)(reportedly replaced by Israeli Spyders(15km range)) and a host of shorter range vshorads. I-hawks would possibly be replaced by Patriots/Meads in the near future and possibly Israeli Arrow 3s to counter ABM threats.

Singapore has 6 frigates and 18 corvette class vessels. The 6 Formidable class frigates and 6 Victory class heavy corvettes are armed with 75mm Super rapid cannons, Harpoons SSMs, torpedoes, Aster15s/30s anti-air missiles, Baraks anti-air missiles, etc. The 12 Fearless class corvettes(called Patrol Vessels by the RSN) are armed with 75mm Super Rapid cannons, torpedoes, Mistrals anti-air missiles, Israeli Gabriels SSMs, etc. The latter can be equipped with Harpoons as well and it is no secret that it will be so in exigencies.

The RSN operates 4 submarine with 2 more submarines arriving next year. The latter two comes equipped with AIP. In addition, the navy operates Fokker-50 MPAs armed with harpoons and torpedoes.

The RSN also operates fleets of unmanned surface vessels(usvs) such as the Protectors and Spartans. Protectors are armed with mini-typhoon cannons while the Spartans can be armed likewise with the addition of Spike missiles or configured as anti-submarine usvs with torpedoes and/or sonars. These USVs will be deadly in a littoral fight where they can shoot and scoot fast, dodging enemy sensors(they are very small being at around 7-11 metres) and weapons.

Only the US has the capability to end the RSN and RSAF with her carrier battle groups currently.

After that, you`ll need to land your forces and fight through around 73,000 active and professional forces and another 350,000 conscript reserves(ala Israel) on recall every year. These forces are supplemented by around 200,000 more para-military units from the Civil Defence forces and Kins. Then again, every male >18 years of age in Singapore is going to be a combatant and trained as such. There should be should enough rifles to go around. That`s around 1.7 million currently.

The army is very networked and has the ability to respond fast to changing situations and new threats.

The army operates >132 Leopard 2 main battle tanks which are about to be locally upgraded to the equivalent 2A6 standard minus the L55 gun, 100-120 Centurian main battle tanks(upgraded with new armour and 105mm gun), 350 AMX-13 SM1 locally upgraded light tanks(still in operation though some have been retired), Bionix 2 IFVs with 30 mm cannons, Bionix 1 IFVs with 25mm cannons plus other varients, Broncos and older but upgraded M113s, etc. Add the possible and imminent purchase of ST`s Terrex(Singapore`s Strykers). If I can recall, ISIS Military Balance 2007 puts Singapore`s armored IFV/APC strength at around >1600. There are also 20 Apache Longbow attack helicopters operated by the RSAF.

Artillery includes 155mm 52 cal FH2000 howitzers, 155mm 39 cal FH88 howitzers, 155mm 39 cal Pegasus howitzers(heli transportable), 155mm 39 cal Primus SPHs and the HIMARs MLRS system(to be inducted this year). With regards to the Himars, Singapore has officially purchased the unitary GMLRs rockets with a range of 85km. Himars could also be equipped with Israeli Extra precision rockets with a range in excess of 130km. Singapore is unlikely to declare the latter purchase however(if any). No news on the purchase of ATACMs yet.

[Red]

Do not forget to add this into the equation. Singapore has a military agreement/treaty with the US on basing facilities and equipment. It has been significantly expanded over the years. Recently, it has been suggested that US LCS modules should be based in Singapore as well. COMLOG WESTPAC is based in Singapore after having moved from Subic Bay.

Unlike the Phillipines where the US owns the latter bases, US warships and planes are in constant transit through Singapore owned naval bases and air-bases. Also, Changi naval base is the only naval base in South East Asia where US Nuclear carriers can berth. Needless to say, the latter is intentional for future exigencies. US navy ships are routinely repaired and serviced in Singapore ports. Same with USAF aircrafts. More than 100 key US navy warships call on Singapore naval bases and ports yearly; including Nuclear Carriers.

There are reports online where it is reported that the US is seeking to lease and operate dry docks for her carriers in Singapore.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/images/singapore-basina.jpg

Any attack on Singaporean bases could inadvertently attack US forces here. That would be a really bad mistake. Singapore bases are also used by allies UK, New Zealand and Australia. Recently, Singapore and Australia signed a new memorandum to deepen the already tight defence pact between the two countries and share facilities and equipment(?).

Singapore has refused the US`s offer for an upgrade in diplomatic treaty status to "major Non-NATO ally" unlike Thailand; prefering to be allied unofficially with the US while maintaining good relations with her Muslim dominated neighbours and China.

Nevertheless, Singapore`s military has a high a degree of access to top notch US equipment and this has translated into purchases such as the only foreign AESA equipped F15SGs, Apache helicopters, E-2C Hawkeyes(one of the few foreign countries allowed to purchase the latter), Himars, C-17s(a sales team came over), Amraam C-7s, JSOWs, Phalcon radars, etc. Singapore`s DSTA also works closely with the US`s Darpa on some interesting projects. Interestingly, her access is higher than some major Non-Nato US allies and this is probably due to the value both countries have placed in this close relationship.

[Crunchy]

Crunchy, you have met the minimum threshold in DT rules in your above response (i.e. it is not a one liner).

Would you care to explain how you came to this conclusion? Have you read the thread (all the pages)?:D

:D There are discussions to expand the ASEAN treaties towards a defence pact.

:rolleyes: I'm just looking from the political level: Any conflict involving SG would involve major powers, aka possibility of escalation towards WW3

[OPSSG]

:D There are discussions to expand the ASEAN treaties towards a defence pact.

:rolleyes: I'm just looking from the political level: Any conflict involving SG would involve major powers, aka possibility of escalation towards WW3

Where are your thoughts from a military stand point? I'll be interested to know.

Are you sure of how ASEAN works (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN) and the ASEAN way? Looking at the various players, your statement on a defence pact is unlikely. Do you understand the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm) in Southeast Asia?

Don't mind me but DT does not do purely political discussions. :D

[StingrayOZ]

ASEAN as a defence group seems very unlikely. But in terms of standardising equipment and muntions, coms etc that is possible.

However, there are other defence agreements between relivant members in Asia. I am sure that any invasion of singapore would involve immediate intervention by the US and the British and Australia with the support of other nations nearby (unless they are the aggressor). However the response would be limited by what resources are avalible and how quickly they could get there. If there was general regional instability, the response would be much more limited.

I can't see such an operation happening alone, it would be done to take advantage of a particular situation involving other states and turmoil.

[the road runner]

Red great post about Singapore defence equipment.
One point i noticed from your post........Singapore Army has 132 Leo 2 tanks?
I was not aware they had that many Leo 2 MBT?Dont they have approx.60 odd MBT:unknown

[Red]

Red great post about Singapore defence equipment.
One point i noticed from your post........Singapore Army has 132 Leo 2 tanks?
I was not aware they had that many Leo 2 MBT?Dont they have approx.60 odd MBT:unknown

I merely elaborated a bit on what is already known. You can read up on Singapore`s Leos over here;

http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=8344

Cheers

[Crunchy]

Where are your thoughts from a military stand point? I'll be interested to know.

Are you sure of how ASEAN works (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN) and the ASEAN way? Looking at the various players, your statement on a defence pact is unlikely. Do you understand the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm) in Southeast Asia?

Don't mind me but DT does not do purely political discussions. :D

ASEAN Defence Coop (OK I reduce my expectation.) -> Some stupid comments by some PLA top brass can speed things up very quickly. :D

As we all know SG's doctrin is an preemptive strike, so wouldn't an pre empitive strike by SG on - example: agressor naval fleet - give the agressor the reason it needs to strike SG? (Assuming the agressor has got several naval task forces.) So SG's modern forces may have exhausted its arsenal & munitions. We all know that SG cannot substain a prolonged conflict. What now? :confused:

The whole scenario is so absurd. :D

[OPSSG]

ASEAN Defence Coop (OK I reduce my expectation.) -> Some stupid comments by some PLA top brass can speed things up very quickly. :D

Our total defence spending in ASEAN is so low that quite a few countries cannot defend themselves against external aggression without extensive external help.

No matter what PLA says, ASEAN is not able to compete in defence spending.

Even if we could agree to a unified force structure and that every country in ASEAN raises its defence spending to Singapore spending levels, we still cannot compete. They are a major regional military power and we are not. :D

China's problem is their ability to project their forces.

As we all know SG's doctrin is an preemptive strike, so wouldn't an pre-emptive strike by SG on - example: agressor naval fleet - give the aggressor the reason it needs to strike SG? (Assuming the aggressor has got several naval task forces.) So SG's modern forces may have exhausted its arsenal & munitions. We all know that SG cannot sustain a prolonged conflict. What now? :confused:

You must ask yourself: How is Singapore's defence going to be conducted?

If a US/PLA general was asked to defend Singapore, within Singapore, the general will probably tell you that it cannot be done. Hence the need to fight outside of Singapore (also called a pre- emptive strike in certain circumstances), as defender confined to only within Singapore is at a tactical disadvantage.

In geographic terms, the defence of Malaysia-Singapore is indivisible. If a hostile aggressor invades West Malaysia, Singapore cannot standby the side, as we will be drawn into the conflict. For that matter Australia will also be alarmed.

Singapore's force structure is capable of a pre-emptive strike. However, with a conscript army and our strong reliance on mobilization to stand-up our army means that we are not willing to get into any fight unless our survival is threatened.

If you read the RSAF thread (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4117&page=16), I posted information on supplementary orders over and above our F-15SG purchases. Please note a single order is over S$1 billion. How much more bombs and bullets would you suggest we buy? What is spending enough to be prepared? And what is enough?

We not poor but we do not have limitless pockets. Keep in mind, we have a population of only 4 million.

The whole scenario is so absurd. :D

Ah... but then why plan to defend Singapore at all?

p.s. Welcome to DT! :)

[Red]

The so-called pre-emptive strike doctrine is just one of the strategies available to Singapore. The Singaporean government is not a bunch of robots. They will not simply attack a potential aggressor when they are other viable alternatives. And it also depends on who the aggressor is.

I doubt munitions will be an issue. Singapore produces the majority of them in house; more so than any other country in Asean. Singapore is already nearly self sufficient for her water needs. However, food will be a factor. But the same goes for most other countries where food is imported. Not many countries are self sufficient when it comes to food; including many Asean countries. The government does stock-pile food in preparation of exigencies so there should be enough for everyone for an extended period of time. I think they are the only ones who do it consistently and persistently in the region. So much so that if there is a rush for food, Singapore would probably be the last one to be affected drastically.

As such, the attacker must be prepared to lay siege on Singapore from air and sea. Otherwise, Singapore will have not just have water but sufficient quantities of food as well. And unless you have a capable navy/airforce and carrier battle groups the US have to squash the RSAF and RSN, it will be hard. None of the Asean countries have such a capability currently.

In reality, Singapore is the 3rd largest oil refinery centre in the world and half of the world`s oil passes through Singapore and practically 75% of East Asian oil. Shut down Singapore and you`ll see the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese, etc joining the party as well. Not to mention the largest/busiest container port in the world and a major financial centre/node in the global financial trading system.

As such, there is a confluence of reasons owing to Singapore`s own modest but considerable military capabilities, geographical location, economic and financial reasons which make an invasion unlikely. It is simply not worth the mess that comes with such an action.

[Red]

In geographic terms, the defence of Malaysia-Singapore is indivisible. If a hostile aggressor invades West Malaysia, Singapore cannot standby the side, as we will be drawn into the conflict. For that matter Australia will also be alarmed.

That is an interesting point. If conflict erupts between Thailand(a longtime Singapore ally as well) and Malaysia, would Singapore act? I think we would. But there are different actions that we could take. It does not have to be military. We are not obliged to defend the Malaysian government or her people. And I think they know that very well.

[OPSSG]

That is an interesting point. If conflict erupts between Thailand(a longtime Singapore ally as well) and Malaysia, would Singapore act? I think we would. But there are different actions that we could take. It does not have to be military. We are not obliged to defend the Malaysian government or her people. And I think they know that very well.

Thanks for the succinct clarification on my post. And that is why I chose not to say 'defend' or 'fight' and said 'drawn into'. I didn't want to say too much on this point (simply because I wanted to be succinct), save that, we have certain common interests with our neighbours. :)

In fact, as WWII has shown, a good defence plan for Malaya (against the then external Japanese invasion from the north) from should start at the appropriate geographical choke point in Thai territory (see Appendix 2 for Map of the opening blows in the Pointer Monograph on page 64). The Imperial Japanese Army landed in Thai territory and proceed to march south. There is also a Pointer Monograph (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/monographs/mono6.html) on the mistakes in the Malayan Campaign, including a chapter on operational art shortcomings by LTC (NS) Singh and I quote A/P Farrell from the Monograph below:

"The only conceivable scenario in which the 21st century SAF will be fighting on its own is the direct defence of Singapore itself in circumstances where Singapore’s allies are unwilling, or unable, to assist its defence. SAF operations in Cambodia and East Timor were part of larger multi-national efforts and we must assume this will remain the more likely scenario for a long time to come.

The defence and fall of Malaya and Singapore provide a stark if general warning in this respect. Defeat was probably unavoidable for the British Empire in Malaya after the fall of France in 1940, certainly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. But disaster, the rapid and humiliating collapse of the defence on the mainland, need not have happened.

One important reason why it did was the failure of the defenders, especially Malaya Command, to manage the inherent problems of fighting as a coalition. The frustration and pressure of retreat and defeat naturally magnified those problems. Inter- operability in all respects, including moral and psychological, spells the difference between victory and defeat in coalition operations. The SAF must learn to work effectively with foreign partners, just as they must learn to work with it. Finger pointing based on national differences, once started, can be impossible to stop."

I am sure you are aware of Dr. Ong's book "Operation Matador World War II Britain's attempt to foil the Japanese invasion of Malaya and Singapore", which is a background read.

I like this newish Pointer Monograph on the topic. Concise and contains lessons learned.

[Crunchy]

@ OPSSG:
You got the money. We got the men. How about some exchange? :D

With the US Arms Embargo on Vietnam lifted, I think there can be much more coop between our Armed Forces/def industry. Give us some insight into Western systems and you can get more into Russian systems.

dreaming *RTAF's Gripen & RMAF's MiG-29N/Su-30 & SG's F15SG & TNI AU's Su-30 & VPAF's Su-30 flying together.*
*USAF's F22 comes along* dreams ends :rolleyes:

[OPSSG]

dreaming *RTAF's Gripen & RMAF's MiG-29N/Su-30 & SG's F15SG & TNI AU's Su-30 & VPAF's Su-30 flying together.*
*USAF's F22 comes along* dreams ends :rolleyes:

At Cope Tiger (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2003/dec/15dec03_nr2.html) a trilateral exercise between US, Thai and Singapore, the air forces of the 3 countries play together. The RSAF also goes to Pitch Black (http://www.defence.gov.au/pitchblack08/index.htm) to play with with RMAF and RAAF. :D

Slowly... our ASEAN air forces are learning to get along (to do things together) and to play along.

@ OPSSG:
You got the money. We got the men. How about some exchange? :D

Traditionally, you buy arms and weapons for your own men. :D

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated that small countries need their own armies (that are capable enough to deter invasion) or a lot of external support or both.

[SGMilitary]

I would view that the SAF/Mindef defence planners had done their job

rather well.

Singapore need to develop her capability in long range precision strike.

This is forward defence capability.

We need more F-15SG, more stealth frigates and I'm really hoping that

SAF will procure Aster 30 SAMP/T land based system.

Any comments?

[Ananda]

"The only conceivable scenario in which the 21st century SAF will be fighting on its own is the direct defence of Singapore itself in circumstances where Singapore’s allies are unwilling, or unable, to assist its defence"..

That's nice quote OPSSG...
I also believe that it can also include the whole south east asia...

Look...many reasons can be stated on why Asean being created..but one of the big reason is to 'constraint' my own Indonesia..so the situation when Soekarno in power will not happen again...

But lets back to the present or near future situation in South East Asia...
Lets see if somehow a new Soekarno emerging in Indonesia....let's assume somehow this guy within ten short years realising all Soekarno Dreams (nuclear weapon, huge submarines and fighters fleet,etc,etc)....Can we realistically assume no big powers will encircle Indonesia if this new soekarno suddely emerge and begin to venture old soekarno policies..??:)

The situation this first decade of 21st century certaintly different with what happen in the early 60's...Long Soeharto Era and the relatively weak Government that coming after him (which we call in here the "Reformasi Order")....has make sure that not only our military does not possesed regional superiority as in Soekarno era (off course not included British forces stationed at Malaya and Singapore at that time)....but we don't even have REGIONAL PARITY anymore with some of our neighbours...

Thus again it show...nobody in the region has power to intimidate each other....
Which in the end go back to outside regional threat....and which again will come to a question.. "Thus anybody in SEA can have long term defence on their own..('against outside SEA threat')...??"

If outside help is being ommitted....even if all SEA Forces united...at most it can only hold for 1 month...before retreating on Guerilla Warfare....
Larger country like Indonesia, Vietnam,Thailand, or even Malaysia...can do that only on the count of larger geographically and demographically....but can that happen to Singapore...???

Realistically...can you made Fortress Singapore holding over one month on your own against outside MAJOR Forces..???

None of us in SEA have strong INDEPENDENT Military Industries...whatever Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand...produce locally...all basically depends to the outside sources....

Which all again show under realistic scenario...not one of SEA countries can invade each other...thus potential threat will come from outside SEA...which if that happen not one of us will be abble to hold indefinetely...without outside SEA help...:)

[Tavarisch]

"The only conceivable scenario in which the 21st century SAF will be fighting on its own is the direct defence of Singapore itself in circumstances where Singapore’s allies are unwilling, or unable, to assist its defence"..

That's nice quote OPSSG...
I also believe that it can also include the whole south east asia...

Look...many reasons can be stated on why Asean being created..but one of the big reason is to 'constraint' my own Indonesia..so the situation when Soekarno in power will not happen again...

But lets back to the present or near future situation in South East Asia...
Lets see if somehow a new Soekarno emerging in Indonesia....let's assume somehow this guy within ten short years realising all Soekarno Dreams (nuclear weapon, huge submarines and fighters fleet,etc,etc)....Can we realistically assume no big powers will encircle Indonesia if this new soekarno suddely emerge and begin to venture old soekarno policies..??:)

The situation this first decade of 21st century certaintly different with what happen in the early 60's...Long Soeharto Era and the relatively weak Government that coming after him (which we call in here the "Reformasi Order")....has make sure that not only our military does not possesed regional superiority as in Soekarno era (off course not included British forces stationed at Malaya and Singapore at that time)....but we don't even have REGIONAL PARITY anymore with some of our neighbours...

Thus again it show...nobody in the region has power to intimidate each other....
Which in the end go back to outside regional threat....and which again will come to a question.. "Thus anybody in SEA can have long term defence on their own..('against outside SEA threat')...??"

If outside help is being ommitted....even if all SEA Forces united...at most it can only hold for 1 month...before retreating on Guerilla Warfare....
Larger country like Indonesia, Vietnam,Thailand, or even Malaysia...can do that only on the count of larger geographically and demographically....but can that happen to Singapore...???

Realistically...can you made Fortress Singapore holding over one month on your own against outside MAJOR Forces..???

None of us in SEA have strong INDEPENDENT Military Industries...whatever Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand...produce locally...all basically depends to the outside sources....

Which all again show under realistic scenario...not one of SEA countries can invade each other...thus potential threat will come from outside SEA...which if that happen not one of us will be abble to hold indefinetely...without outside SEA help...:)


Let's remember that we are all former colonies. Assuming that we had been able to thwart off the Portugese in the 1500s, the Malaccan Sultanate might've expanded to comprise most of the Malayan Archipelago. We could've been a major power here in the East. We used to make loads out of trading with the West. If we had been a major power, we could've made our own tanks, planes and ships. We could've been the one exploiting the West of their resources.

However, do onto others what you want others to do onto you. Exploitation is bad, no matter who does it to who.

And, no we could last longer than one month. We can't fight conventional battles, so we won't. We'll use our muddy terrain to our advantage. Any tank above the weight of 45 tonnes is gonna get bogged down in the mud, making them excellent targets. We have jungles, lots of them. (Sorry about Singapore though) We don't have to fight the way Westerners do. Our defense may as well be guerilla warfare. You are totally underestimating our united capabilities. The US will be COMPELLED to help us out. Singapore is one of their interests, the loss of Singapore means the loss of a gateway to SEA and an entry port. And, despite whatever some people say, some humans do learn from mistakes. IF we were to be desperate enough to defend only Singapore, it would be in the form of aerial precision strikes supported by the Navy. Singaporean Subs will sink supply convoys. Our collective Air forces will conduct air-raids on enemy landing areas. We will ensure that our common enemy doesn't get a chance to even be within 10 km of our respective coasts. WE WILL NEVER revert to STATIC defense.

We will hunt our enemies out and destroy them. :)

A foreign power not from SEA will find it hard to attack our collective defense. It's not the same as Central Europe, the Middle East and the Winter Plains of Siberia.

Anyway, I don't see a reason for them to do so. If there were power struggles unfavorable to them, all they have to do is send in their spies and stage a coup like the CIA does all the time.

[Red]

@ OPSSG:
You got the money. We got the men. How about some exchange? :D

With the US Arms Embargo on Vietnam lifted, I think there can be much more coop between our Armed Forces/def industry. Give us some insight into Western systems and you can get more into Russian systems.

dreaming *RTAF's Gripen & RMAF's MiG-29N/Su-30 & SG's F15SG & TNI AU's Su-30 & VPAF's Su-30 flying together.*
*USAF's F22 comes along* dreams ends :rolleyes:

I think we already got most of what we wanted intelligence-wise. :D There are rather established yet covert links. I cant remember the book I read. Ill try and look it up again.
Vietnam is important. And I think there have been efforts to get her involved in the scheme of things(intricate power play) in the region. As of late, Vietnamese military officials have been meeting thier Singaporean counterparts on a number of occasions. There is even a military forum between the two countries set up. Relations are getting closer and there is a reason why.

[Red]

Let's remember that we are all former colonies. Assuming that we had been able to thwart off the Portugese in the 1500s, the Malaccan Sultanate might've expanded to comprise most of the Malayan Archipelago. We could've been a major power here in the East. We used to make loads out of trading with the West. If we had been a major power, we could've made our own tanks, planes and ships. We could've been the one exploiting the West of their resources.

I think the Malacan Sultanate pales in comparison with other established contemporary powers worldwide. If the Chinese had expanded all the way south, the Sultanate would have been just another province. I feel they simply started off too late to make a difference. The only reason she lasted that long is because the region was not deemed important then or just out of the way as far as where the action was in those days.

The academically ideal solution would be for Singapore to fight on Malaysia`s side if Malaysia is attacked. But realistically, this would arguably not happen all the time. If the US is to invade or attack Malaysia(say, she goes rogue with an ultra-islamist government), which side would you think Singapore will be on? Or for that matter; Australia and New Zealand.

Earlier, I brought on the example of Thailand, a US ally and Singapore`s as well. If a conflict is to erupt between Malaysia and Thailand, my opinion is that Singapore would not automatically fight on Malaysia`s side. It might not be in Singapore`s interests to do so. Or that the net result would be favourable to Singapore. Same with other countries; including the US.

It would be misleading to say that the US will be compelled to help Malaysia all the time. Of course, there will be scenarios whereby the US will find it necessary to help out as well. Ananda furnished a scenario where a resurgent Indonesia decides to take bites out of her neighbours(sorry, i didnt read the whole post). I think you will find every other country in the region ganging up just to deal with this threat.

Wast Malaysia is largely urbanised. There will be places for tanks to play and get hurt. Control of West Malaysia`s urban areas will be a huge blow to the Malaysian economy; which will take many years to recover. While West Malaysia is certainly bigger than Singapore, she is hardly big in the larger scheme of things. You can drive halfway through the peninsula in less than a day.

[Red]

Anyway, I don't see a reason for them to do so. If there were power struggles unfavorable to them, all they have to do is send in their spies and stage a coup like the CIA does all the time.

I think you have got a good point here. IMHO, Malaysia`s greatest weakness is her shady and grimy political leadership and heirachy. External powers could manipulate national decisions via proxies; wittingly or otherwise.

[OPSSG]

@SGMilitary, Ananda, Tavarisch & Red,

Nice posts. I am glad we are getting along and thinking the unthinkable, which is could war start in Southeast Asia and how it would start.

We are currently living in peace and I hope it would continue. There are 2 classes of threats:

(i) internally driven (from within ASEAN); and
(ii) externally driven (external to the ASEAN members).

Collectively, ASEAN membership enables us to have a forum and manage the differences between ASEAN members. And we are also able to engage our external dialogue partners during our ASEAN summits.

Many people (externally), tend to view ASEAN as a talk shop. As far as I am concerned, as long as we are talking, it is much better than shooting.:D In this respect, the best defence of ASEAN is being conducted with our mouths rather than just guns.

I am also proud that the efforts of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and my country have managed to reduce incidents of piracy, though the Malacca Straits Patrols (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/mar/28mar08_nr.html) (there is RSIS Commentaries (http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0092009.pdf) on this topic) and collectively helped reduce insurance costs (via the removal of the war risk rider) to goods traveling though our region. We have much to be proud of (and you only need to look to the continent of Africa as contrast). Our interaction (via our navies and air forces) is increasing and we are learning to work together. An auspicious sign and start on working together. Let us see if we can expand our cooperation to other areas too.

If we have to face a conventional external threat, collectively, we are tougher than we look. We can always aspire to punch above our weight and increase the cost of external aggression (conceptually, we just need to make it very expensive, so as to deflect potential trouble out of the region). In Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Julian Corbett (a British historian), in writing in 1911, asserted that just because one nation has lost control of the sea, another nation has not necessarily gained it. A naval coalition or a “fleet in being”—a collection of ships that can quickly coalesce into a unified fleet when necessary. This fleet-in-being wouldn’t need to dominate or sink other fleets; it could be effective by seizing bases and policing choke points. Such a deceptively able fleet, Corbett argued, should pursue an “active and vigorous life” in the conduct of limited defense, by, for example, carrying out harassing operations.

However, we already face an external threat of imported ideologies and internally grown self radicalized terrorists. The recent events in Mumbai reminds us that a terrorist attack (the scourge of modern life) is always possible and I know that our respective governments are sharing intelligence and working on our respective abilities to respond. Intelligence sharing (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/feb/18feb09_nr.html) within ASEAN (and our external partners) is one of the little known secrets and a success story on mutual cooperation in combating piracy and terrorism. We must also not forget the external help to address these concerns and supplied by our external partners.

We have all started our independence in poverty and are moving towards prosperity (recession not withstanding). For a region of 500 million people, we should collectively aspire to live together and move together. We are after all neighbours.

[Ananda]

Guys...I believe this thread already developed from what's best for Singapore Defence to what's best for SEA Defence...

I think from what we can see, the defence of Singapore will in the end in someways will involve the others in SEA...and basically it's also shown the trend that with resurgance economics and strategic powers of India & China, SEA/Asean has no other choice to come out as one voice.

However I believe mutual trust still need a long way to go for unified SEA defence...
We know that the condition on 60's already change dramatically in the current time, and I believe internal SEA threat will not come from members states.

But if we go back to the defence, what I have mentioned in my privious post that by conventionall means, SEA defence (individually or unified) still can't cope with external major threats without having outside help (like US)...

Tavarisch says that we can always fight unconventionally, thus we can't underestimate the unified defence of SEA...however just like I've mentioned on my previous posts...not all of us can go with unconventionall/guerilla resistances...
Fortress Singapore have no choice to play with conventionall defence...once it's breach...she'll be lost since unlike the others that can retreat to the rural and jungles to make unconvcentionall resistance, that choices in my oppinion regretfully does not applicable to Singapore...

The biggest weakness in long term defence for SEA is that we donot have strong independent defence industries...
Individually we can't provide large enough market for strong local defence industries..but together we can...
But can it will be..???

With each states need different things and staretgically sources their equipments to different sources...SEA will always be defence buyers..and will not be strong defences manufacturer...
And anyones that defensively dependa to outside sources....will never provide long term defences capabilities on their own...

[OPSSG]

Guys...I believe this thread already developed from what's best for Singapore Defence to what's best for SEA Defence...

It is good to get along.

I think from what we can see, the defence of Singapore will in the end in someways will involve the others in SEA...and basically it's also shown the trend that with resurgence economics and strategic powers of India & China, SEA/Asean has no other choice to come out as one voice.

I don't think we can speak with one voice. And whose voice? The problems or solutions within ASEAN must take into the account the interests of Indonesia (and her role as leader). What is in the interest of Indonesia, is not always in the interest of the other ASEAN countries.

Just take the sand issue (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/world/asia/16singapore.html) between Indonesia and Singapore in 2007 to which the Indian Express describes as "Asian Unity, On a Bed of Sand (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/asian-unity-on-a-bed-of-sand/26084/)." And that is just one of many issues.

However I believe mutual trust still need a long way to go for unified SEA defence... We know that the condition on 60's already change dramatically in the current time, and I believe internal SEA threat will not come from members states.

We are working on resolving internal differences. Hopefully, we will be united against an external foe. However, our interests are not always the same. We should take the 'crawl, walk and run' approach to building capability and engaging in co-operation.

Some Crawl Steps Taken thus Far:

Step 1: Solve boundary disputes. Eg. RI and Singapore agree to a new boundary (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/03/ri-singapore-agree-new-boundary.html).

Step 2: Learn to train together to build trust. Exercises like Ex Semangat Bersatu (M'sia), Ex Salkar Indopura (I'sia), Ex Maju Bersama (Brunei) and Ex Kocha Singa (Thai) are just some of the Singapore army's bilateral exercises. These exercises build interoperability. Further, Singapore is also capable of providing some technology (http://www.dsta.gov.sg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2657&Itemid=401) to our ASEAN neighbours to enable our navies to train and inter-operate.

Step 3: Share intelligence (already covered in previous post).

But if we go back to the defence, what I have mentioned in my previous post that by conventional means, SEA defence (individually or unified) still can't cope with external major threats without having outside help (like US)...

You need to look at 2 main factors/concepts:

(i) the concept of 'local superiority' and the ability by ASEAN members to establish such local superiority; and

(ii) the ability of the the potential aggressor to project his forces.

When you consider these factors, it would be clear that ASEAN is no pushover. However, ASEAN cannot compete in a long term, full-on war by conventional means alone. Please read the earlier posts and reconsider some of your concepts (they are a bit lopsided :) ).

Tavarisch says that we can always fight unconventionally, thus we can't underestimate the unified defence of SEA...however just like I've mentioned on my previous posts...not all of us can go with unconventional/guerrilla resistances...

We'll need to see what sort of unconventional capabilities we collectively posses. Unconventional warfare is also available to conventional armies. Eg. The use of unconventional warfare is not uncommon in Afghanistan.

Fortress Singapore have no choice to play with conventional defence...once it's breach...she'll be lost since unlike the others that can retreat to the rural and jungles to make unconventional resistance, that choices in my opinion regretfully does not applicable to Singapore...

I will only say that conventional warfare is a tool in Singapore's war chest. We can employ some unconventional warfare tools too with our own special forces.

But I agree that we are only 1 city, so there is no retreat into the hinterland/jungle option. The last time Singapore was conquered in WWII (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/world_war2.html), the Imperial Japanese Army (http://www.s1942.org.sg/s1942/home/) murdered/massacred (http://www.s1942.org.sg/s1942/dir_defence7.htm) 25,000 to 50,000 Singaporean civilians during the occupation (depending on which estimate you believe). Of note is the particular bravery of the 1,400 soldiers of the Malay Regiment (http://www.newasia-singapore.com/places_to_go/world_war_ii_sites/reflections_at_bukit_chandu_20070601127.html) made their stand at Bukit Chandu, in Singapore against 13,000 advancing Imperial Japanese soldiers, choosing death over dishonour.

The biggest weakness in long term defence for SEA is that we donot have strong independent defence industries...

Individually we can't provide large enough market for strong local defence industries..but together we can...

But can it will be..???

In the relative scheme of things, ASEAN's defence market is small (so you must look beyond ASEAN as a market) but some countries are trying to develop some capabilities in our respective defence industries.

Thailand's move to buy an Endurance class vessel is a first step to buying within ASEAN.

With each states need different things and strategically sources their equipments to different sources...SEA will always be defence buyers..and will not be strong defences manufacturer...
And anyones that defensively depends to outside sources....will never provide long term defences capabilities on their own...

Yes, we are all not totally self sufficient, because trade is good for our export orientated economies.

[OPSSG]

Please see the RSN thread and the news report on "Stealth frigates display firepower (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?p=167430#post167430)". The RSN and the RSAF can just plug and play with other navies in ASEAN quickly, if necessary.

To meet the conventional threat presented by Singapore's forces, the aggressor will need to meet and exceed both the RSAF and the RSN operating in the 3 dimensions of: (i) air warfare, (ii) surface warfare, and (iii) underwater warfare dimensions of naval warfare before they can get to shore. At that stage our combined arms divisions (operating as task forces) and rapid deployment division will provide further meet and greet services.

Please also see report on Ex Malapura (http://english.sina.com/world/2008/1219/206024.html) held on Dec. 10 to 19, 2008.

[Tavarisch]

You know what we SEA countries should do? Make a gigantic Defense Corporation. Each of us will contribute to the development of our armies collectively. We could have our own standardized systems. We can then operate independently of the Westerners.

Essentially, all we have to do is, as Malays would say, "Gabung Tenaga". We should make a joint defense technology developer between us. This would greatly expand our defense market/industry. Instead of relying on one concept than the other, we could make our own. Instead of choosing between a T90 or a Leo 2A6, we could make our own unique tank. We will learn to stand on our two feet.

Of course, in some ways I do not think this would be in the best interests of foreign powers....

[Ananda]

I don't think we can speak with one voice. And whose voice? The problems or solutions within ASEAN must take into the account the interests of Indonesia (and her role as leader). What is in the interest of Indonesia, is not always in the interest of the other ASEAN countries.

Well as Indonesian I can say that's going to be a problem since internally we still can't show exactly what we wants. 50 years on doing what Soekarno or Soeharto wants, means this last 11 years we still groupling on as collectively what we wants...sigghh price of democracy..:onfloorl:

You need to look at 2 main factors/concepts:

(i) the concept of 'local superiority' and the ability by ASEAN members to establish such local superiority; and

(ii) the ability of the the potential aggressor to project his forces.

When you consider these factors, it would be clear that ASEAN is no pushover. However, ASEAN cannot compete in a long term, full-on war by conventional means alone. Please read the earlier posts and reconsider some of your concepts (they are a bit lopsided :) ).

Well perhaps I have mistated some of my thinking...however I believe that's about the same on what I mentioned.
If SEA/Asean have to fight conventionally than we do not have long term capabilities, thus resorting to unconventionall means.

I believe all my thingking derived from scenario on defending by self capabilities, without immediate outside help.
Again this a long shoot scenario because for considerable future we still can play between one major power against the other
Perhaps in this scenario I've assumed the potential major powers that wants to carve out SEA will have ability to project forces near simultanaously toward strategic target in SEA (like with what Japan do in WW 2)

In the relative scheme of things, ASEAN's defence market is small (so you must look beyond ASEAN as a market) but some countries are trying to develop some capabilities in our respective defence industries.

Thailand's move to buy an Endurance class vessel is a first step to buying within ASEAN.

Yes, we are all not totally self sufficient, because trade is good for our export orientated economies.[/QUOTE]

Well we're still since collonial era depends on export abilities...it's just that we're moving from raw materials to manufacturing products (although for Indonesia 60% still raw materials).

But that's in my mind what still happen with our defence capabilities...like in collonial era..all SEA still depends much on outside equipments with relatively small local equipments.
When Europe in war, those collonials states have major headheches on preparing defense with sourcing is drying out.
They have enough equipment...but only for short period of time...
Nobody underestimate SEA people on their defensive spirit...but again without significant local defense industry, we still going to be without long term capabilities.

I think we can agree that this 500 million people grouping needs to consolidate their acts soon. With China and India in our door step, either we hold or break to be considered seriously in the future.

[OPSSG]

@Ananda,

I love your post. Thank you for amending the formatting. I'm just going to respond to a small part of the post (mainly to clarify my point of view).

Well perhaps I have misstated some of my thinking...however I believe that's about the same on what I mentioned.

If SEA/Asean have to fight conventionally than we do not have long term capabilities, thus resorting to unconventional means.

I believe all my thinking derived from scenario on defending by self capabilities, without immediate outside help.

Please forgive me taking a restrictive approach to reading what you wrote, with a view to disagreeing. The intent to my disagreement is really to clarify what I mean.

I have always viewed all wars as 'hybrid' wars (with conventional and unconventional measures). Please watch this American video on a seminar called "How will we fight (http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20090212.howwillwefight.html)?". The dichotomy between conventionally and unconventionally warfare is fake and we don't think or operate that way - at the brigade / division levels. Only our traditional infantry battalions are designed to fight conventionally. When the infantry battalions are mechanized, then we will be able to operate more autonomously at lower command levels with the appropriate C4I support.

Please read a little more on hybrid warfare. :)

Again this a long shoot scenario because for considerable future we still can play between one major power against the other.

That would be an ideal situation and would also mean that no fighting is required.

We have armed forces to prepare for the worse (that we can imagine) and not the worse that can conceptually happen. The worse that can conceptually happen is a full scale nuclear strike / biological war on us. We in ASEAN have no defence capability against that.

Perhaps in this scenario I've assumed the potential major powers that wants to carve out SEA will have ability to project forces near simultaneously toward strategic target in SEA (like with what Japan do in WW 2)

That's always possible.

[Ananda]

Sorry...I know I've forgot something when I see the result.:)

[OPSSG]

Singapore is more proficient at irregular/hybrid warfare that any informed observer will give us credit for simply because we do not declassify what we can do. All good special forces do not talk about capability. A component our capability in this area, like Indonesia, is fully professional and not based on conscripts. These are expensive capabilities and they are properly resourced.

In fact, the elites from the TNI train on a regular basis with our elite services (many who are often SEAL/US Ranger trained). So TNI itself knows that Singapore's elite forces are more than capable of hybrid warfare and our elites have the special tools/training.

Swarming also enabled by modern technology and I enclose a link to the New York Times called "The Coming Swarm (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html?_r=1)" by JOHN ARQUILLA who has done work in this area for RAND Corporation (a US think-tank). In many ways, the SAF intends to use swarming tactics against any aggressor. We have the precision technology and we have the will to develop the systems. This much is clear.

[OPSSG]

You know what we SEA countries should do? Make a gigantic Defense Corporation. Each of us will contribute to the development of our armies collectively. We could have our own standardized systems. We can then operate independently of the Westerners.

Essentially, all we have to do is, as Malays would say, "Gabung Tenaga". We should make a joint defense technology developer between us. This would greatly expand our defense market/industry. Instead of relying on one concept than the other, we could make our own. Instead of choosing between a T90 or a Leo 2A6, we could make our own unique tank. We will learn to stand on our two feet.

Of course, in some ways I do not think this would be in the best interests of foreign powers....

Singapore has a big defence company with US subsidiaries (and I'm not very happy with having only 1 supplier).

So I'm not sure if the region can ever work together like that realistically. The Europeans have done it but they have lots of problems on the work share and efficiency issues. :unknown

[Tavarisch]

Singapore has a big defence company with US subsidiaries (and I'm not very happy with having only 1 supplier).

So I'm not sure if the region can ever work together like that realistically. The Europeans have done it but they have lots of problems on the work share and efficiency issues. :unknown



You're not happy with having one defense company? Malaysia's defense industry is virtually non-existent.....
Most of the tax goes to duit kopi I guess. :)

The difference between us and the Europeans : We are more tolerant of each other. If we can further develop our tolerance, maybe we can establish our projected collective defense firm.

[Waylander]

The ASEAN nations are more tolerant to each other than the Europeans?

And I thought we have the free traveling, free work and a common currency together with an organisation which is decades ahead in regards to a real union compared to the ASEAN countries.

But I could be wrong... ;)

[OPSSG]

The ASEAN nations are more tolerant to each other than the Europeans?

:D Nice question. ;)

And I thought we have the free traveling, free work and a common currency together with an organisation which is decades ahead in regards to a real union compared to the ASEAN countries.

Thanks for pointing this out and good to see you in this thread. ;)

Our younger friend has an interesting perspective on the world. Hopefully he can change the world to be a better place when he grows up.

[OPSSG]

You're not happy with having one defense company? Malaysia's defense industry is virtually non-existent.....

I was just pointing out that there are problems with our strategy too...:D

IMHO, Malaysia is trying to develop a modest capability (which is good). The bigger the goal, the greater the scope for corruption. So start small and grow. Take for instance the Matador, it is 'invented' with the help of Germans. So always seek to learn from others.

Most of the tax goes to duit kopi I guess. :)

Corruption exists in all ASEAN countries (including Singapore (http://sg.news.yahoo.com/cna/20090219/tap-107-ex-cop-charged-accepting-bribes-231650b.html)). It's just the odds of getting caught are very different.

At least 1/3 of ASEAN countries would rank much higher in corruption levels than Malaysia (I have not named them out of courtesy).

I would not be so harsh on Malaysia and your very professional armed forces. Thankfully in the Malaysian thread, there are some very informed discussions ongoing that has enabled me to better understand Malaysia's past procurement decisions and choices. I think Malaysians tend to be harsher on Malaysia than outside observers. Please remember your opposition also has an agenda (against the ruling party and wants to fling mud, when they can).

I don't deny or defend corruption but we must be objective and try to seek out more facts to understand the reason why the acquisition was made. Not all criticism is valid, that was why I initially defended the PT-91M purchase (I am glad that there is more informed participation taking over in that thread).

[Tavarisch]

Just because you have common currency and free traveling doesn't mean you don't hate the other person. There are Frenchmen who still hate Englishmen for some old dispute made during the medieval Era.

There are also Englishmen and Frenchmen that hate Germans for World War 2. Then, there is also Yugoslavia.

[Red]

You're not happy with having one defense company? Malaysia's defense industry is virtually non-existent.....
Most of the tax goes to duit kopi I guess.

The domestic military market is not big. IMHO, it is still larger than Malaysia. But it is best to work with just one company where resources and efforts can be directed to produce quality goods. Singapore could have many smaller companies but at the very end, they(all) may not grow large enough to compete internationally as the gestation period within Singapore would be difficult with smaller orders infrequently. The worst thing that could happen is that Singapore is forced to buy from these smaller firms to keep them afloat;albeit with lower quality builds. Also, ST has grown so large domestically that it might no longer be meaningful for another firm to materialize. Especially since ST is owned by the Singapore government. They have been efficient and productive thus far. However, it will become a problem if inefficiency creeps in with just one major firm around. That might happen if the Singapore government becomes inefficient.

[Red]

The ASEAN nations are more tolerant to each other than the Europeans?

Asean is not Europe. Rivalries and suspicions are rife. If not for a couple of level headed regional leaders over the years, there might already have been a couple of little wars all over the place. There are a few developing countries, 1 1st world developed country and many third world countries. This is not Europe. To top of it all, they inducted(at the insistence of a certain doctor turned politician whom I loath) a country that has brought more problems to the group than anything else; Burma. It will be a long time before Asean reaches European levels of integration. However, it is nice to see the optimism in posts from prople like OPSG.

[Tavarisch]

The domestic military market is not big. IMHO, it is still larger than Malaysia. But it is best to work with just one company where resources and efforts can be directed to produce quality goods. Singapore could have many smaller companies but at the very end, they(all) may not grow large enough to compete internationally as the gestation period within Singapore would be difficult with smaller orders infrequently. The worst thing that could happen is that Singapore is forced to buy from these smaller firms to keep them afloat;albeit with lower quality builds. Also, ST has grown so large domestically that it might no longer be meaningful for another firm to materialize. Especially since ST is owned by the Singapore government. They have been efficient and productive thus far. However, it will become a problem if inefficiency creeps in with just one major firm around. That might happen if the Singapore government becomes inefficient.


So are you saying potential weapon engineers from Malaysia may have to work in Singapore? I do not like the sound of that notion........ It's bad as it is with all the other experts and professionals leaving the country for other opportunities.

[Crunchy]

First I suggest to change this thread's name to:
"Defending Singapore - ASEAN's perspective"

[Crunchy]

Indeed Burma is the black sheep among ASEAN.
With their size of land & population you cannot ignore them, but as long as they do not start some reforms (even small ones) there is no way for further integration.
The situation in Burma plays in the hand of many outsiders, who want to see ASEAN as weak union.. :(
Maybe situation will change after 2010. But I have a feeling that they are already a "province" of the PRC.

Our technological & industrial base is currently not large enough to create our own def industry.
But if member states would procure new systems together, we could put more pressure on the supplier('s nation) for:
-local assembling ( first step to independence)
-barter trade (some members are short on hard currency)
-offset
-relieve political pressure (from the supplier & buyer) -> less political dependence

I think we could start with small scale procurement of gear for SF. This would not catch much attention.

[Red]

So are you saying potential weapon engineers from Malaysia may have to work in Singapore? I do not like the sound of that notion........ It's bad as it is with all the other experts and professionals leaving the country for other opportunities.

Not too sure what exactly you are alluding to..? But yeah, I guess they are welcome to work in the republic if they can pass through extensive id checks.

Unless the Malaysian government can ensure that the brightest and best students get to the top of thier respective fields(including governance and politics), they would probably leave. I know I would. My two cents. I dont know much about it anyway.

[Waylander]

Just because you have common currency and free traveling doesn't mean you don't hate the other person. There are Frenchmen who still hate Englishmen for some old dispute made during the medieval Era.

There are also Englishmen and Frenchmen that hate Germans for World War 2. Then, there is also Yugoslavia.

Some people having a bias against each other is hardly an evidence of hate between our countries. And we are talking about a minority as little as it gets.

The current problems between the EU member countries are maybe as low as it is possible between different countries on this earth.
If they would be even lower we would have a united european country by now.

The amount of freedom, cooperation, free trade and peace enjoyed in the EU is lightyears ahead of every other organization on this planet.

I wouldn't even have interrupted this thread if you wouldn't have made that weird statement.
Stating that we in the EU hate each other and the ASEAN nations are much better in this regard is as wrong as one can be.
BTW, how often have you travelled through europe?

PS: Ex-Yugoslavia is not the EU. This is a totally different situation. And the by now handles this problem rather well I would think. Especially when one considers how the neighbours in other parts of this world sort out the problems of the black sheeps in their area.
The integration of many former WarPac countries is also an evidence for what the EU achieved.

[OPSSG]

@Waylander

Thank you for educating our younger thread participants. You input is always welcomed and you have not interrupted this thread.

In support of your post, I want to point out that:

(i) In 1991, Malaysia and Indonesia have conducted a joint military exercise, codenamed Malindo Darsasa 3AB. It involved an airborne assault by paratroopers in southern Johor. If the name of the airborne assault, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout'), as well as the choice of a drop zone just 18km from Singapore, were not sufficiently provocative, the scheduling of the airdrop on Aug 9th - Singapore's 26th National Day - most certainly was. The SAF's response was measured and we triggered an open mobilisation in response.

(ii) According to a senior Malaysian military officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 (slightly more than 10 years ago) as politicians on both sides of the Causeway argued over the status of a CIQ checkpoint. News articles from the period chronicle the public exchanges, but say nothing of the defence postures that the SAF and MAF adopted during this period.

For details, please read the full story by David Boey (http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080701-73867.html). Thankfully, Malaysia-Singapore relations are much improved since Dr. M left office. OTOH, Indonesia-Singapore relations are not doing as well given the Feb 2007 sand dispute (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/02/13/ri-dismisses-criticism-sand-export-ban.html) issue. However, we are trying to mend fences, having just solved a boundary dispute by negotiation in Feb 2009 (which the Jakarta Post acknowledges to be at the absolute disadvantage (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/09/mapping-a-good-fence-with-singapore.html) to Singapore). For more details, see my post #106 in the RSN thread (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=6411&page=8). So in short, there is much less trust in ASEAN compared to Europe.

Indeed Burma is the black sheep among ASEAN.
With their size of land & population you cannot ignore them, but as long as they do not start some reforms (even small ones) there is no way for further integration. The situation in Burma plays in the hand of many outsiders, who want to see ASEAN as weak union.. :(

Maybe situation will change after 2010. But I have a feeling that they are already a "province" of the PRC.

@Crunchy,

I am really pleased at how well the original ASEAN 6 are getting along with Vietnam in contrast to Myanmar. And Myanmar is really our black sheep.

Indeed Burma is the black sheep among ASEAN.
With their size of land & population you cannot ignore them, but as long as they do not start some reforms (even small ones) there is no way for further integration. The situation in Burma plays in the hand of many outsiders, who want to see ASEAN as weak union.. :(

Maybe situation will change after 2010. But I have a feeling that they are already a "province" of the PRC.

If we push Myanmar away, we will just push them into the open arms of China. OTOH, if we do nothing, Myanmar is like a stone tied around ASEAN's neck. So we have to decide what to do (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7900842.stm). ASEAN's problem is that we do not have a stick but also do not have enough carrots, let me explain:
(i) ASEAN members do not have the will to invade/fight with Myanmar so we do not have a stick.

(ii) The problem is that ASEAN itself does not have enough carrots (our ability to offer aid, trade and weapons) to get Myanmar to change.

Our technological & industrial base is currently not large enough to create our own def industry.
But if member states would procure new systems together, we could put more pressure on the supplier('s nation) for:
-local assembling ( first step to independence)
-barter trade (some members are short on hard currency)
-offset
-relieve political pressure (from the supplier & buyer) -> less political dependence

By local assembling, I think you mean licensed manufacturing and that is being done in Malaysia for items like the M4 and some other products. I'm not sure about other similar initiatives by other ASEAN countries.

However, if we talk about purchasing or manufacturing sophisticated engineering based systems, like naval ships, Brunei (http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/nakhoda/) and Malaysia (http://www.janes.com/news/defence/naval/jdw/jdw090113_1_n.shtml) have faced some problems. OTOH, Singapore is recognized as a smart buyer, integrator and user of weapons systems. Further, we have some capability to build/design our own weapons and weapons systems, including NATO standard ammunition.

The problem is that most of the weapons systems and ammunition that Singapore make are too expensive for other ASEAN members to buy. What some ASEAN countries want is for Singapore to 'sell' (not at a market rate) or give weapons (such as artillery guns and even rifles). Take for example, we have a problem with the Indonesian navy and they are not very nice even after we give things to them (to build relationship and as a reward).

I am not keen for ASEAN countries to engage in barter trade or offsets (http://www.janes.com/news/defence/air/jdi/jdi081209_1_n.shtml) to buy/sell weapons or ammunition. This sort of ideas will lead to even more corruption as it provides middlemen an opportunity to take a larger cut. Further, Singapore can sell our weapons for money (such as the Warthog (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/TheWarthogIsOnItsWay.htm) and our locally designed LPD (http://thaimilitary.wordpress.com/2008/11/14/rtn-signs-lpd-deal-with-st-marine/)), so why would we want to be paid by counter trade?

Further, there are mind-set differences between Vietnam and Singapore in defence matters. Singapore can make navy ships for Vietnam but Vietnam will not want to buy them. This is because Vietnam will not understand Singapore's western style navy, which is designed to be interoperable with the USN and RAN. The RSN values automation (Vietnam has more than enough people), electronic warfare (to jam missiles attacking us), advanced electronics and communications systems (to link our ships, submarines, UAVs, USVs, fighters and AWACs), whereas Vietnam just wants cheap and good ocean patrol vessels. We are also a heavy user of UAVs and USVs. Just like cars, why buy a Toyota Camry with an expensive hifi set (like a Singapore designed navy ship) when you can buy a motorbike.

Even our Victory Class corvettes that were commissioned in the 1990s (which we think is becoming out-dated) have too much expensive features for the Vietnam navy (weapons, sensors and electronics is where things get really expensive). In many ways, more important than price, it is a mind-set difference that prevents Vietnam's armed forces from inter operating with the SAF. We have a western mind-set and Vietnam has a Russian equipment mindset. It will take 10 to 20 years of development before your generals will believe that wars can be fought our way. Besides, your generals will tell our generals: What do you know? Singapore has never fought a war.

I want to be optimistic about prospects for security cooperation in ASEAN but I also have to be realistic about the scope of cooperation.

[OPSSG]

For those with a professional military background, please accept my apologies for stating the obvious and I stand ready to be corrected.

In the prior discussions, I note that there was some confusion in certain terms and these conceptual difficulties resulted in fellow forum participants becoming confused and I would like to make an attempt to provide some basic clarifications via answering 5 questions:

Basic Conceptual Terms Defined
(1) Strategy - The overall concept of using military power to achieve political and/or military ends

(2) Tactics*** - The art of winning battles and engagements (and this idea is always tied to a specific area of operations, usually at a lower level of command and against a specific enemy)

(3) Battle - A violent collision of forces at a specific time and place

(4) Concept of Operations - The planned positioning and movement of forces to gain an advantage over the aggressor

------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ***The following definition of tactics may also be used:
(i) The employment of units in combat (FM 3-0 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/index.html)).

(ii) It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. (FM 3-0 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/index.html) & FM 3-90 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90/ch1.htm)).

When I talk about military strategy, I mean the use of military power to achieve political and/or military ends. It is clear from the prior posts that Singapore has some military power. However, our ability to be seen in exercising this power is constrained by current geo-political reality.


Q1: Why is Singapore so reluctant to use military power as a strategy?

Ans: We use the SAF to achieve political ends but usually not to conduct war (because war in of itself is a blunt policy tool). The SAF is usually used by Singapore to win friends and influence other countries (and not to fight with them). An example of the SAF in non-combat roles is all the humanitarian relief deployments (eg. the Dec 2004 Tsunami) or peace support ops. And the SAF contributes to peace support ops too. If we can achieve the same political goal by negotiations or diplomatic efforts:- Why not? Further, the mere presence of the SAF deters potential aggressors from using force. So ironically, the presence of military power, may reduce the necessity of using military power.


Q2: Why does Singapore focus so much attention on air power?

Ans: Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, win air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our tactical advantage to enable us to establish local superiority in battles.


Q3: Why build the Singapore navy, when you have air power?

Ans: We are not self sufficient in food (over the long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open. Further, air power can have a multiplier effect on the RSN's capabilities and gives us a greater choice of tactics in any naval battle.


Q4: Singapore has a strong but small* air force (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2008/v34n3/feature1.html) and navy, why do you need an army?

Ans: Because without an army we cannot hold physical ground (we would have to give up the possibility of using forward defence as a potential tactic, if we cannot hold ground) and it would create a force imbalance, that can be easily overcome by a capable aggressor. Further, we are not a true island like NZ or the UK (where they are separated by miles and miles of water), as we are physically connected by 2 land bridges to Malaysia (and therefore physically connected to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia). In WWII, the causeway was demolished by the British but the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were able to cross it in a few hours and bring over their troops, tanks and supplies. So IMHO, a strong army component is essential in any land battle (keeping in mind that the IJA invaded Singapore by a land route). Our army components include recce elements (like LRRPS), armoured battle groups, infantry, artillery, combat engineers and so on.

Fortress Singapore have no choice to play with conventional defence...once it's breach...she'll be lost since unlike the others that can retreat to the rural and jungles to make unconventional resistance, that choices in my opinion regretfully does not applicable to Singapore...

Q5. What do you mean when you say that Singapore is capable of hybrid warfare?

Ans: Just as insurgent commandos can set off bombs at Orchard Road (http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_62_2004-12-17.html) and at the former Ambassador Hotel (http://www.totaldefence.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v01n09_history.html) (during the 'Konfrontasi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia%E2%80%93Malaysia_confrontation)'), conventional armies are capable of unconventional attacks. For example, Operation Rimau (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/world_war2/v08n10_history.html) carried by the Z Special Unit in WWII. Singapore's own SOF last saw action in the 1991, at the SQ117 hijack (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/maturing_saf/v03n03_history.html) and our NDU have undergone deployments in Iraqi waters for the last 5 years. So it is important to understand that the SAF (while it is not designed as a guerrilla warfare organisation) has well trained unconventional forces that will be employed as part of our concept of operations in any battle (which is often called hybrid warfare**). Please remember, that conceptually, the same or similar tactics are available to both the aggressor and the defender. Our investment in training, technology and organization are but tools in an attempt to stack odds in our favour. That is why we don't ever intend to fight fair or only conventionally. So please do not assume that the SAF will cede any area of specific competence to any potential aggressor (like unconventional warfare). While warfare is inherently unpredictable, our army is not small in numbers and our defence of Singapore will be considered, dynamic and robust. Let me end with a quote from Clausewitz (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?p=166183#post166183):
"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult... the difficulties accumulate... so that one always falls short of the intended goal... [and this] distinguishes real war from war on paper."

Footnotes:
*Small being a relative concept when compared to regional powers (the RSAF has the best trained and largest combat aircraft fleet amongst the ASEAN countries). The RSN has arguably the most capable naval fleet amongst the ASEAN countries (in terms of force balance).

**Hybrid warfare or swarming are only tactics. Our country's strategy is to live in peace with our neighbours and try to get along with the regional powers, if possible.

[cm07]

To be honest, ST (Singapore Technologies) sells plenty of firearms and munitions to neighbouring countries (with the exception of Malaysia). However, this is neither prolific nor prominent in order to avoid being implicated as co-murderers when the same weapons are used in human-rights sensitive conflicts.

With regards to how Singapore defends itself in a conflict - certainly plans are already in place for all three individual/combined scenarios : Land, Sea and/or Air.

Do note that Singapore has SIG/INT capabilities to monitor traffic up to 300Km away or more. Any plane and ship heading in the direction of Singapore will be queried and identified long before the actual arrival. Any object that fails to establish communications will be intercepted with armed/live war machines. (This has happened before and each time, the media will cover the incident quite closely for a day or two :D )

Attempts to inflitrate by land checkpoints will be dealt with the Immigration and their advance scanners. Unless the aggressor intends to sneak in armed troops, over a long peroid of time,in little boats as smugglers do with illegal immigrants(even then, there's the coast guard to avoid), there's little chance of an aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

Should any neighbouring country announce purchase or clear intent to purchase SRBMs or similar tactical missiles, Singapore will definitely acquire ABM systems that are comprehensive enough easily deal with such threats and at the same time (for convienience and cost effectiveness) handle cruise missiles / ICBMs.

The question still goes back to under what circumstances would such force be used publicly against Singapore.

[Crunchy]

Besides, your generals will tell our generals: What do you know? Singapore has never fought a war.

@ OPSSG: Thanks for your answer.

Quoted for truth: Vietnam is the only country in SEA, which has a "collective memory" for a full scale (defensive) war. :D

[OPSSG]

To be honest, ST (Singapore Technologies) sells plenty of firearms and munitions to neighbouring countries (with the exception of Malaysia). However, this is neither prolific nor prominent in order to avoid being implicated as co-murderers when the same weapons are used in human-rights sensitive conflicts.

For most parts of this thread, we are discussing the best strategy to defend Singapore from an external threat (originating from outside of ASEAN). There are 3 points to note in relation to Indonesia:

(i) Singapore seeks peace with Indonesia. To have peace with Indonesia, we must try to work with whoever is in power. IMO, the normalization of Indonesia-Singapore relations provided the benign regional threat environment that enabled Singapore's economic growth in 1970s and 1980s, when we were most vulnerable to external threats. In return, for this peace, we also have to accept that we cannot actively intervene in the domestic politics of Indonesia or act against their national interests (and to be consistent, we should also resist any Indonesian / Malaysian attempt to intervene in our domestic politics).

(ii) Developing an arms industry enhances Singapore defence posture and keeps our costs down. This means we have to accept that guns don't kill people, people kill people. Having an arms industry means we sell guns. In fact, US, Sweden, Russia, China, Pakistan, Korea and Israel all sell arms to some ASEAN countries. Some of these arms selling countries have little or no constraints on selling their arms (and likewise we cannot be expected to act very far outside of international arms selling norms). Therefore, I would not dare to take moral high ground on arms sales save to say that we will comply with relevant UN resolutions.

(iii) The strongest diplomatic message we have sent to a fellow ASEAN country thus far is to abstain from a UN vote, to indicate our disapproval.

With regards to how Singapore defends itself in a conflict - certainly plans are already in place for all three individual/combined scenarios : Land, Sea and/or Air.

Yes, certain types of drawer plans are standard. We should expect no less from the SAF.

In fact, the Australian military had conducted (with UK, US, Canadian and New Zealand participation) ‘Exercise Rainbow Serpent’, that simulated a peace enforcement exercise in a regional country that assisted them in planning for their INTERFET deployment in East Timor. The Aussies, as lead country, augmented by US naval power, showed their impressive military capabilities. Because of their ability to plan well and rapid deployment plan, the local militias were not able to effectively resist. In fact, their naval deployment had to contend with 'aggressive' patrols by Indonesian submarines. Therefore we have much to learn from our FPDA partner.

Do note that Singapore has SIG/INT capabilities to monitor traffic up to 300Km away or more. Any plane and ship heading in the direction of Singapore will be queried and identified long before the actual arrival. Any object that fails to establish communications will be intercepted with armed/live war machines. (This has happened before and each time, the media will cover the incident quite closely for a day or two :D )

It is much further than 300 km, even if our aircraft and other intelligence assets remain only in Singapore air-space. Thailand will also also be acquiring an AEW aircraft and we know that certain Malaysian navy ships have some intelligence gathering capability. I am not sure about other ASEAN countries.

Attempts to infiltrate by land checkpoints will be dealt with the Immigration and their advance scanners. Unless the aggressor intends to sneak in armed troops, over a long period of time,in little boats as smugglers do with illegal immigrants(even then, there's the coast guard to avoid), there's little chance of an aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

We try to watch our small border closely but illegal immigration is still present (at low levels) and if Mas Selamat can escape, we should not be too complacent. :D

However, I do agree that there's little chance of a large aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

[OPSSG]

I have copied and modified this post from another thread. What I say here is speculative but you decide if it makes sense. :D

IMHO, the issue is more complex. Indonesia has F-5Es, F-16A/Bs (http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article6.html) (which replaced their MiG-21s) and Su-30MKs. Why is it that they can operate their older F-5E squadron (http://www.nexus.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2006/jul/05jul06_nr.html) (and at the same time have difficulty operating their block 15 F-16s delivered in 1989)? Why was flying Indonesia's western fighter planes never a real problem under President Suharto's rule until 1999 (over the East Timor issues)?

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20081212.aspx)? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again (http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2008/2/17/indonesia-to-consider-buying-f-16-fighter-planes-from-us/) under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Please tell me again if Indonesia had purchased the required weapons for their Russian aircraft and explain why there are reported problems with their relatively new purchases (and lack of spare parts or avionics problems (http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2008/5/13/indonesian-su-27-dan-su-30-jet-fighters-have-avionic-problems/) is always an excuse)? Keeping in mind that Indonesia has some 'capability' to 'manufacture' other aircraft types?

Are their problems related to a lack of technical expertise, an embargo or a lack of planning (in stocking parts and reliance on outside help for engineering support (http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/information/details.php?type=news_copy&id=2487))?

IMO Indonesia could have been less affected by a US arms embargo!

Traditionally, whatever Suharto asked from Singapore, our government will give it to him (and we also deferred to Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN). They say jump, we say how high (but the key is that they did not ask for too much). If they wanted to borrow NVG or UAVs (to suppress their internal conflicts), we will lend it to them. If he wanted weapons, these would be sold at friendship prices or given to the TNI. If they need engineering support for their fighters (and we have no problems keeping our F-5s & F-16s flying) Singapore would have provided it in the past (on the idea that in general they do not harm our interests).

That relationship changed when Suharto fell from power. We become the little red dot to be kicked around for political expediency. They also decided to renegotiate all prior agreements (on the basis that Singapore got more out of it) and sought ways to make life difficult - like cutting off the sale and supply of sand and granite to Singapore and even arresting a Singaporean for alleged illegal acts in 2007. The relationship thus became conditional even though we stood down a portion of our defence to help Indonesia after the 24 Dec 2004 Tsunami. Everything (though only relevant equipment was selected) and everyone on alert during X'mas (RSN & RSAF troop lift and even an army division HQ, deployed, as a task force) was activated to help them and we deployed our first wave in 5 days not knowing if the insurgency was active after the Tsunami and we did not know if delivering the aid through TNI would make us legitimate targets for the rebels.

In return for the bad treatment, Singapore is also renegotiating our terms of engagement with the TNI, that is why I provided a link of the Indonesians seeking help from Turkey (but not getting it). Thanks to a passage of time (and their inability to keep planes flying) Indonesia is rediscovering the benefits of working with Singapore again and we use mostly western made equipment. :D

In contrast to our relationship with Indonesia, Singapore donated/transferred 3 F-16As and 4 F-16Bs (all Block 15) to Thailand in 2005 (as a reward for allowing us to use their airbase and other training arrangements). I am not saying that we could have donated the F-16s to Indonesia with the embargo in place, at the relevant time, but it signals our ability to give to friends. Hmm... we have 6 more retired/unused missile gunboats (Anyone else want to be our friends?)

Note: Why give away F-16A/Bs to the Thai military when we still use F-5s? It is a diplomatic Thai-Singapore signal that too many observers fail to see. And how did the Thai navy reward Singapore Inc. recently (before the military government stepped down)?

My point is embargo or not, if Indonesia did not harm Singapore's interests, their planes will still fly (if they asked). That is why I kept pointing out that there is lots of non-US expertise and sub-systems available for the F-16 platform. It is a safe choice (they just have to cultivate F-16 operators as friends).

[Tavarisch]

I have copied and modified this post from another thread. What I say here is speculative but you decide if it makes sense. :D

IMHO, the issue is more complex. Indonesia has F-5Es, F-16A/Bs (http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article6.html) (which replaced their MiG-21s) and Su-30MKs. Why is it that they can operate their older F-5E squadron (http://www.nexus.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2006/jul/05jul06_nr.html) (and at the same time have difficulty operating their block 15 F-16s delivered in 1989)? Why was flying Indonesia's western fighter planes never a real problem under President Suharto's rule until 1999 (over the East Timor issues)?

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20081212.aspx)? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again (http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2008/2/17/indonesia-to-consider-buying-f-16-fighter-planes-from-us/) under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Please tell me again if Indonesia had purchased the required weapons for their Russian aircraft and explain why there are reported problems with their relatively new purchases (and lack of spare parts or avionics problems (http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2008/5/13/indonesian-su-27-dan-su-30-jet-fighters-have-avionic-problems/) is always an excuse)? Keeping in mind that Indonesia has some 'capability' to 'manufacture' other aircraft types?

Are their problems related to a lack of technical expertise, an embargo or a lack of planning (in stocking parts and reliance on outside help for engineering support (http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/information/details.php?type=news_copy&id=2487))?



My point is embargo or not, if Indonesia did not harm Singapore's interests, their planes will still fly (if they asked). That is why I kept pointing out that there is lots of non-US expertise and sub-systems available for the F-16 platform. It is a safe choice (they just have to cultivate F-16 operators as friends).

It could be because Indonesia doesn't have the money to fly them or to get those sub-systems as you suggest.....

And let's not forget the rather heavy anti-US feeling over there, considering the fact that the majority of the population are Muslim.

However, the same Anti-US feeling here in Malaysia apparently didn't stop us from flying F/A-18s, so I don't really know.

[Ananda]

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20081212.aspx)? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again (http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2008/2/17/indonesia-to-consider-buying-f-16-fighter-planes-from-us/) under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Moneeyyy....:):)

A senior Venezuellan Airforce Officer was being asked (If I'm not mistaken on latest Air Defence Review) when they're coming to Brazil with 6 F-16 A (for inter Latin Amarican Exercise), why they still can fly those F-16 even with the on-going US embargo...??
He simply said...'when you have a lot of money..you can buy anything you want through the internet'...

Maybe he's being modest on the internet issues..however what he's said..when you got money...Embargo is not an issue...
Well look on Iran...30 years of embargo and their F-5, F-4 & F-14 are still flying well...

After Soeharto (and even today)...we still have big issue on the availability for financing our Military Expenditure...In paper we might be an approximately USD 500 bio Economy....but last year we can only provide USD 4 bio (0.8% of GDP) for overall our armed forces budget...

Also there's a strong speculation many people in current political circle wants to enlarge the effect on US Embargo..so providing enough reasoning to go outside US on getting new equipments....

Current replacement schedulle;
1 sq of OV-10 being proposed to be replaced by Super Tucano...
1 sq of Hawk MK 53 with....T-50/M439 (still watching if Singapore or UEA choose it)

1 sq of F-5..???? as I've mentioned on other thread...the Defence Ministry wants Rusian Stuff...the Airforce wants F-16 Block 52 (2 Sq for replacing F-5 and current F-16 A)...

Also a lot of speculation here on replacing F-5 and F-16 with 2 sq of ex Qatary Mirage 2000...if that happen and true..well Frenchie will have last laugh considering their stuff being throw back in the last end of the 80's for F-16...:onfloorl:

Indonesian procurement still show a lot of speculation...even in Soeharto era...(especially considering his family muddling through the process)...
One of the most infamous ones is the procurement of Hawk 100/200...the price of those planes that Indonesia has to paid close to the price of F-16 at that time..Everybody knows that the airforce wants more F-16..and no airforce sane mind wants to get Hawk 100/200 as the exchange...and mind you at that time the US still wlling to provide us with additional F-16..

How's this going to play at the end....well the interesting show's still not finish..;)

[OPSSG]

Realistically...can you made Fortress Singapore holding over one month on your own against outside MAJOR Forces..???

Technically, Singapore in WWII was never a fortress in the way of Fort Eben-Emael (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fort_Eben-Emael) (the strongest fortress in the world prior to the start of WWII), whose artillery pieces dominated several important bridges over the Albert Canal which German forces intended to use to advance into Belgium. However, the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael also demonstrated that:
(i) the era of static fixed defences had ended; and
(ii) commando raids and unconventional warfare are tools of conventional armies.
In a battle that took place between 10 -11 May 1940 airborne troops landing via the use of gliders and were able to disable the defences of the fortress. Simultaneously, the rest of the German assault force had landed near the three bridges over the Albert Canal and brought them under German control. German forces were then able to utilize the bridges to aid in the invasion of Belgium. There is a 5 part video series of this story. Fort Eben Emael-Part 1

Likewise, in World War II, the Japanese attacked Malaya and Pearl Harbor almost at the same time. In a similar act of tactical brilliance and excellent command of operational art by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), Malaya and Singapore both fell faster than the IJA had hoped. I also previously provided a link to a Pointer Monograph on this battle.

The net effect of these successes was to give rise to the idea of manoeuvre theory in land warfare that existed even prior to that period (as exemplified by the writings of by Basil Liddell-Hart and others). The concept of manoeuvre in warfare is, in its simplest form, to employ
movement to apply one’s own strength against enemy weakness while avoiding the reverse. There is an excellent 2008 edition of an Australian army publication that explains The Fundamentals of Land Warfare (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/PUBS/downloads/LWD_1_The_Fundamentals_of_Land_Warfare_Full.pdf). Their thinking represents the ‘world’s best practice’ in strategic thinking about land power. Please look at: (i) Chpt 2: Influences on land warfare; and
(ii) Chpt 4: Conduct of Land Warfare (which includes manoeuvre theory as a theoretical foundation to understand modern combined arms operations).
This is a good reference point of what we in ASEAN can learn from a nation with an advanced military doctrine. That is why I took a considered view that our defence of ASEAN against any external aggression must be dynamic, considered and utilizing all the tools are our disposal. If we ever need to engage in a collective defence, we must assume it is against a very capable opponent.

However, I would like to say that despite the claims by fellow forum participants of prevailing anti-US sentiments in their respective countries, I would say that this is:
(i) not an anti-US or anti-western scenario; and
(ii) ASEAN forces are so overmatched by US forces that it is pointless to consider it.
Rather, it is to contemplate an invasion by an external party (like the Imperial Japanese Army) but not against US led forces. It is also useful to note that the USN has a logistic presence in Singapore and therefore we welcome their presence in our Changi naval base.

Whichever forum member that want to contemplate an ASEAN fight against US led forces, please stand on your own. I do not want to be associated with such posts.

None of us in SEA have strong INDEPENDENT Military Industries...whatever Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand...produce locally...all basically depends to the outside sources....

Which all again show under realistic scenario...not one of SEA countries can invade each other...thus potential threat will come from outside SEA...which if that happen not one of us will be able to hold indefinitely...without outside SEA help...:)

In recent days (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/feb/26feb09_nr.html), ASEAN has started to reconsider what steps we can initiate to consider a security community. The ASEAN Defence Ministers discussed a broad range of security issues including adopting three papers, namely: (i) the "ADMM-Plus: Principles for Membership";
(ii) "The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief"; and
(iii) "ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security".
While the concept of a security community is not a defence pack, it is a start. In fact, Australia and the US have each brought forth their respective views on how to promote defence cooperation. In the case of Australia, we must keep in mind the existing FPDA.

[OPSSG]

And let's not forget the rather heavy anti-US feeling over there, considering the fact that the majority of the population are Muslim.

@Ananda

What do you think? Is there still rising anti-US sentiments after Clinton's visit or are things slowly getting better?

However, the same Anti-US feeling here in Malaysia apparently didn't stop us from flying F/A-18s, so I don't really know.

Agreed and it also did not stop Malaysia recently from accepting the US gift of coastal radars.

[Ananda]

@Ananda
What do you think? Is there still rising anti-US sentiments after Clinton's visit or are things slowly getting better?



Anti US....They're always anti US sentiment even in Soeharto era..
However Mc Donalds, Pizza Hut & KFC are the biggest fast food franchise in Indonesia...and keep going strong with other US franchise like Starbucks, Domino's Pizza etc,etc...:

Those people that burn US flag, and cry anti US in front of US embassy...will gladly throw their anti US banner....if the guys across the embassy fences shout 'there're oppening for US Visa'....:)

Face it...there are a lot of grieviences in the Moeslem world on US...but only one that really matter..."ISRAEL"...As long as that matter is not resolve...anti US sentiment will still creaping back...no matter who's in charge in Washington...

Hey...I'm a Moeslem...with a touch of US Education...I really HATE BUSH...but does'nt mean I'm anti US..:)
Those feeling are more in tune on what most of us feeling in here..we devinetely Anti BUSH...but not necceseraly anti US...

Just like wrote on previous post above...
We don't want to buy US equipments because, we don't trust US will not embargo us further in the future...and also their stuff is just too pricy...which we believe we can got value of money using Rusian or Frenchie stuffs..

However if the US can provide them cheaply..(like the coastal radars...and new upgrading for the Herkies...)..than we probably will take them...:)

[OPSSG]

I found a NBR Analysis (Vo. 14, No. 2, Aug 2003) titled: "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and Projection" by Sheldon W. Simon and I quote a small section of what he wrote and in particular, what he said about Singapore:

"Of America’s three closest Southeast Asian security partners, (Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines), only Singapore’s armed forces are sufficiently technologically proficient to interact with U.S. forces in a manner comparable to Japan, the ROK, and Australia...

Singapore’s defense concerns focus entirely on its own neighborhood. As a major international port and business center, maintaining freedom of the SLOCs and air routes is essential to the city-state’s prosperity. This core interest fits well with U.S. East Asian strategy... Moreover, Singapore is the only Southeast Asian military to have an active rapid deployment force, which operates in an integrated manner with the navy and air force...

While the city-state prefers U.S. defense technology because of its superiority and logistical advantages, Singapore also maintains a complex system of licensed production, assembly, and technology agreements with Britain, France, Italy, Israel, Thailand, Sweden, and Taiwan...

The United States has solidified its security ties to Singapore with a logistics facility, which provides a surge capacity during crises, and was used in Operation Enduring Freedom. Moreover, the new Changi Naval Base, with its deep-water capability, permits the berthing of U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Despite these close ties, Singapore is not completely satisfied with its U.S. defense relationship. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) desires full technology release on all systems it purchases. That is, Singapore wishes to have the right to modify U.S. technology to fit its own needs. Therefore, it is less concerned with maintaining interoperability with the United States
than with integrating U.S. equipment into Singapore’s own armed forces doctrine...

At bottom, Singapore believes defense to be essentially its own responsibility. What it wants from the United States, therefore, is increased technology transfer to enhance its independent military capability. Singapore is more enthusiastic about multilateral anti-terrorist cooperation, though even along this dimension the city - state seems more comfortable sharing intelligence with the United States than its neighbors...

Protecting the Strait of Malacca where 1,100 supertankers pass eastbound annually is of great concern to Singapore. A terrorist incident could disrupt traffic simply by causing insurance rates to skyrocket... Terrorist groups have engaged in piracy according to the Malaysian Institute for Maritime Affairs. The MILF and Abu Sayyaf from the Philippines have attacked vessels in the Sulu Sea; and although some anti-piracy cooperation occurs among the littoral states, obstacles remain... This is a particular problem when pirates flee into Indonesian waters among that country’s thousands of islands..."

As the Americans noted, Singapore believes defense is our own responsibility. While the SAF desires interoperability with other forces it is also designed to operate on it's own, if need be.

[OPSSG]

@ OPSSG: Thanks for your answer.

Quoted for truth: Vietnam is the only country in SEA, which has a "collective memory" for a full scale (defensive) war. :D

17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/136606/suspicions-linger-30-years-after-sino-vietnam-war) (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.

During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.

I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA (http://books.google.ca/books?id=svBt-hzD53AC&dq=History+of+the+modern+chinese+army+book&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0)) which I would like to share:
(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;

(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262 (http://books.google.ca/books?id=svBt-hzD53AC&pg=PA7&dq=History+of+the+modern+chinese+army+book&ei=EXSuSYC8D4S6kQSl9IiXBQ#PPA262,M1));

(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);

(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;

(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and

(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.
While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).

In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).

So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.

Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.

[Tavarisch]

17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/136606/suspicions-linger-30-years-after-sino-vietnam-war) (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.

During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.

I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA (http://books.google.ca/books?id=svBt-hzD53AC&dq=History+of+the+modern+chinese+army+book&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0)) which I would like to share:
(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;

(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262 (http://books.google.ca/books?id=svBt-hzD53AC&pg=PA7&dq=History+of+the+modern+chinese+army+book&ei=EXSuSYC8D4S6kQSl9IiXBQ#PPA262,M1));

(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);

(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;

(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and

(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.
While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).

In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).

So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.

Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.


Are you implying that there is a possibility that China wants to nab us?

In any case, a move like that would probably provoke Commonwealth intervention. (I hope so)

Anyway, I'm sure the US doesn't want to lose it's SEA assets, especially, to put in those capitalist terms, losing them to those "godless red heathens". We are investment money for the West. (SEA that is)

[shockwave11]

17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/136606/suspicions-linger-30-years-after-sino-vietnam-war) (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.

During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.

I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA (http://books.google.ca/books?id=svBt-hzD53AC&dq=History+of+the+modern+chinese+army+book&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0)) which I would like to share:
(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;

(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262 (http://books.google.ca/books?id=svBt-hzD53AC&pg=PA7&dq=History+of+the+modern+chinese+army+book&ei=EXSuSYC8D4S6kQSl9IiXBQ#PPA262,M1));

(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);

(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;

(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and

(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.
While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).

In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).

So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.

Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.


Well in my personal opinion you don't need to be worried about
PLA Because you are in a ASEAN country
in south Asia Singapore is strongest
Politely,economically,strategically

no need to be worried sir :)

[OPSSG]

Are you implying that there is a possibility that China wants to nab us?

You don't have to automatically assume that we should prepare for a bellicose China, as the sole possibility of an external threat. It was a historical fact that the Imperial Japanese Army invaded us and that there was a war between a current ASEAN member (Vietnam) and China in recent memory. IMHO, there is only a very, very slim chance that China might adopt an aggressive posture once again.

Even Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou is less concerned about a bellicose China and are planning to phase-out conscription (http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_347888.html) and move towards a fully professional force. This may indicate that the Taiwanese are now less worried about a China invasion threat (or it could be an internal vote getting issue for the KMT).

In any case, a move like that would probably provoke Commonwealth intervention. (I hope so)

Philippines and Thailand are official US allies, so they have uncle sam. The non-alligned countries in ASEAN (like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei) have more to worry about.

The Commonwealth is an association with a shared historical past but it is not structured for any form of military action. An agreement of relevance to Malaysia and Singapore (in relation to external threats or against Indonesia) is the FPDA with Australia, UK and NZ. Please bear in mind that in the past Malaysia under Dr. M had opted not to participate in certain FPDA exercises.

[OPSSG]

Anyway, I'm sure the US doesn't want to lose it's SEA assets, especially, to put in those capitalist terms, losing them to those "godless red heathens". We are investment money for the West. (SEA that is)

I think that it is in the interest of the US and China to work together but there is no guarantee that they will navigate the path smoothly or that all choices made will be rational (or in our national interest). Given Malaysia's track record of 'condemning' the US and that what leaders like Dr. M said on his blog (http://chedet.co.cc/chedetblog/2009/01/boycott.html) and I quote:
"I would like to have the Malaysian Armed Forces attack the United States and Israel but I don't think the Government and the MAF would agree with me..." (over the Palestinians in Gaza issue),
if I were a Malaysian I would not be so complacent (that the US will automatically come to your country's aid), especially if it is on an issue like an offshore drilling rights or EEZ issues. Keep in mind that China views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/09/pentagon-chinese-ships-ha_n_173056.html) whenever it suits China. The BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7933171.stm) and the Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/chinese-vessels-harassed-us-navy-ship-1640814.html) have reported on recent incidents. This is similar to the April 2001 incident, when a Chinese fighter jet collided in midair with a USN EP-3 and the 24 crew members were detained by the Chinese military for 11 days.

Please remember that US pull out after the Vietnam war demonstrated that ASEAN countries are a part of their interest but we are not their core interest (the US core interest is keeping the SLOCs open). Save for our geo-strategic position, our countries' respective national interests are not always part of their core interest. OTOH Singapore has tried to remain aligned with US interests and have offered the USN the use of our facilities.

Well in my personal opinion you don't need to be worried about
PLA Because you are in a ASEAN country
in south Asia Singapore is strongest
Politely,economically,strategically
no need to be worried sir :)

I am not worried. :D

However, I believe in taking the prudent precaution of keeping our military capability up to date and engaging China to ensure her peaceful rise.

[shockwave11]

I think that it is in the interest of the US and China to work together but there is no guarantee that they will navigate the path smoothly or that all choices made will be rational (or in our national interest). Given Malaysia's track record of 'condemning' the US and that what leaders like Dr. M said on his blog (http://chedet.co.cc/chedetblog/2009/01/boycott.html) and I quote:
"I would like to have the Malaysian Armed Forces attack the United States and Israel but I don't think the Government and the MAF would agree with me..." (over the Palestinians in Gaza issue),
if I were a Malaysian I would not be so complacent (that the US will automatically come to your country's aid), especially if it is on an issue like an offshore drilling rights or EEZ issues. Keep in mind that China views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/09/pentagon-chinese-ships-ha_n_173056.html) whenever it suits China. The BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7933171.stm) and the Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/chinese-vessels-harassed-us-navy-ship-1640814.html) have reported on recent incidents. This is similar to the April 2001 incident, when a Chinese fighter jet collided in midair with a USN EP-3 and the 24 crew members were detained by the Chinese military for 11 days.

Please remember that US pull out after the Vietnam war demonstrated that ASEAN countries are a part of their interest but we are not their core interest (the US core interest is keeping the SLOCs open). Save for our geo-strategic position, our countries' respective national interests are not always part of their core interest. OTOH Singapore has tried to remain aligned with US interests and have offered the USN the use of our facilities.



I am not worried. :D

However, I believe in taking the prudent precaution of keeping our military capability up to date and engaging China to ensure her peaceful rise.

Oh my god
CHINA is not a devil
And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power
it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars,misssiles,jet engines,sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power
and
if we are worried about nuclear war then USA is a big devil
ok yes
Singapore must have military power to tackle all other external powers

[OPSSG]

First of all, due to our small size, Singapore does not tackle external powers. Instead, we engage them in peaceful dialogue.

Oh my god CHINA is not a devil

No one is demonizing China. Likewise do not demonize other countries.

However, China can and have made things difficult for countries like Singapore, who are trying to engage China. In contrast to Mynmar, the PLA's response to the Wenchuan earthquake showed China's human face and the international community supported China's efforts. In fact, PLA's Deputy Chief of General Staff, LG Ma Xiaotian (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/mar/07mar09_nr.html) just concluded a three day visit (http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_347194.html) to Singapore, which follows from the 2008 dialogue initiatives (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2008/January/08jan08_news.html).

What China has done in relation to incidents with the USN is of your own country's making. No one in ASEAN is anti-China but China must behave herself. This incident brings to mind China's clumsy and assertive attempts to signal its intention to enforce its territorial claim near and around the Spratly Islands (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly.htm) in the 1980s. In 1988, China's navy sank three Vietnamese ships (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/97spring/dillon.htm) in the Spratly Islands region. In a refreshing change in tone, China in Nov 2002 signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm)" and the 2003 declaration of peace to promote the development of the resources in the disputed islands signed in the Philippines.

You need to grow up. My earlier post is mild and valid criticism of China's bad behaviour. If you cannot accept this criticism - it reflects more on your maturity than anything else. :rolleyes:

And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars, missiles, jet engines, sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power

You need to improve your English and you should be proud that China's PLA is modernizing. Hopefully, the PLA's modernization will not be used for aggression. How re-assured other countries feel in relation to China's rise depends on how China behaves.

[ReAl PrOeLiTeZ]

Oh my god
CHINA is not a devil
And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power
it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars,misssiles,jet engines,sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power
and
if we are worried about nuclear war then USA is a big devil
ok yes
Singapore must have military power to tackle all other external powers
nuclear power is no low tech or easy make. its extremely hard and high tech. missles arent that much of other western powers ones. electronic warefare isnt far off, their cyberwarefare is extremely impressive since theyve hacked into foreign military database on several ocassions already. the only weak point is engines. and equipping their large army. its easy to make a army modern if its small army, but china has a big army so it takes longer and more money for them to standardise through the military chain.

back to singapore, have good political dialogue is the only suggestion, they have very small military force, and their terroitory is small, so no where to manuver in war. so not much of military defence is available. so political dialogue is the way to go.

[FutureTank]

Just to gain experience and mind sharing.

As all of us know, Singapore nowadays can being consider the most modern army in South East Asia. With a stable economy and politics, add with good relation with most of NATO nation especially US, British & Israel.

However, with land area only about 800km2, urban terrain and population about 4 million, it's seem hard to defending this island from all direction.

The WW II has show the result when Japanese Empire Army success occupied the island and drive-out the strongest British Empire who defending the island.

To have a defence strategy, one has to also have a threat.

What is the threat to Singapore?

Why does it seem hard to defend Singapore? Its a very large fortress with a very big moat. The strategy would be one of a naval and air blockade, but I should think this would take longer than most regional neighbours could afford, or would be allowed to stage.

What would be the incentive for attacking Singapore? Its value is economic, and the destruction of this economic value in the ensuing combat would render any campaign against it, even if successful, meaningless.

Besides that Singapore is a global strategic economic hub. Disruption to its function would be felt all over the World, and reaction would be reciprocal, with or without diplomatic links between Singapore and other states.

The occupation of Singapore by the Japanese was part of a much wider regional strategy, and can not be used as an example to base considerations of Singapore's strategy as a city-state.