Clausewitz’s Definition War

[SABRE]

Following is my analysis & perception of Clausewitz's definition of War. I would have posted it on strategy or general discussion forum but I want to filter out people who know Clausewitz & don't want to make a mess out of it. This is just the short version. The longer version & discussion is not complete. I need a professional comments, input & advice. Also its been some time since someone posted something here.
----------------------------------------------------------------

CLAUSEWITZ’S WAR



What is war? To simply put the answer: It is an armed conflict; bloody & violent, where rationality is meaningless. For a layman this definition may be true & some military/defence strategist, even generals, may also lean towards this, but the reality of war is far different. Throughout the history (of war) historians, writers, politicians, generals, scholars & strategists have pondered the question of “what is war?” Only one man, Carl Von Clausewitz, in my opinion has come close to giving it the proper meaning. Clausewitz defines war as “… continuation of policy with other means.” Since the publication of Clausewitz’s book “On War” majority of the world’s military & defence academia or scholars & generals do agree to this definition; nevertheless the definition of war given by Clausewitz is continuously misinterpreted & the word War is continuously misunderstood. I do not claim to have the right grasp of Clausewitz; perhaps no one does other than the one Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini who rivaled Clausewitz in his own time but also understood him the most, nevertheless here is my understanding of Clausewitz’s definition.

War is continuation of policy with other means: This implies that the violence & bloodshed are the “other means” by which policy is carried out ‘further.’ This furthering of policy with unconventional methods is War. If we agree to this then we have deducted “violence & bloodshed” as means of war rather than war itself. Instead we can categorize these two means (violence & bloodshed) as “battle.” War can be collection of battles, as it has been in most of the cases, leading towards single or multiple policy-goals.

Policy is directed to & by three components of state: The political leadership, the Operational Forces (Armed Forces) & the population. Clausewitz sums up these 3 components as “trinity.” The inclusion of political leadership & population proves that war is not just about “battles.” With the concept of trinity (political leadership & the civilian population alongside the armed forces) Clausewitz has broken up the components of the policy [of state] not just into defence & security policy but also into external or foreign policy, domestic policy, & financial or economic policy. With the graduation of time the scope of policies expands & newer ones join them I.e. technological policies in the late 19th & 20th century played great role in the making of the WW-I & II. The aims, objectives or the final goal(s) of war are attached to these policies – meaning the aim of war can be to achieve internal political goal, International political goal, to gain financial or economic goal, & in ‘some’ case defence & security goals.

According to Clausewitz war is NOT necessarily violent & bloody (collection of battles) but it has to be – this was his personal opinion not a theory as many perceive it to be. In fact Clausewitz, to some extent, did agree that war can be won without resorting to the ‘force’ or ‘violence & bloodshed.’ Thus War is not necessarily violent & bloody. Take for example the Cold War. The two super powers, the USA & USSR, never directly engaged in “collection of battles” but that does not mean that they were not at war. On the contrary they were involved in the most dangerous war of all times as the goal was not single but were multiple (internal, external, economic, technological etc …) & were under the umbrella of “Nuclear & Conventional Force-Politics.” With all swords sharpened on both ends, the USA & its allies won the Cold War without resorting to any direct ‘collection of battles’ against the USSR. The means of war employed by the two sides were arms race, arms control, Nuclear Politics of Massive Retaliation, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) both of which translated into “Deterrence.” In other words the Cold War was fought not with ‘collections of battles’ but by threat of use of force involving every weapon at disposal (mainly the nuclear weapons) while making sure they were never used. The end of Cold War & fall of USSR proved the theory of Sun Tzu right that wars can be won without battles (an important theory which filters out battles from war).

The Cold War model also contradicts the statement that ‘nuclear weapons are not the weapons of war.’ They are nothing but weapons of war. The statement should be rephrased to ‘nuclear weapons are not the weapons of battle fields.’ We notice that 'nuclear deterrence' had become a means of war. Thus nuclear weapons were on continuous use during the Cold War.

According to Clausewitz “Strategy is the use of the engagement for the goal of the war.” The “engagement” may involve coercive diplomacy; economic, technological & military sanctions, threat of use of force & finally in the end ‘the use of force.’ As Clausewitz believed; War by its very nature possessed its own escalatory dynamic or there exist explosive forces within it. This means that only the failure on behalf of all other means of war (coercive diplomacy, sanctions, threats etc …) ‘escalate’ to the use of force & resort to ‘collections of battles.’ Thus; use of force, violence, bloodshed (collection of battles) as means of War are the last resort - unless a belligerent wants to skip the 'other means.'

Many consider war as ‘not the continuation of policy with other means’ & see it as irrational. It is not so. War is very much rational. It makes sure that use of force is the last measure or resort rather than the 1st step. It attempts to regulate the battles by directing them towards policy goals. Without war there would only be meaningless violence & bloodshed – a barbaric tradition.

To sum up the argument. What we have so far considered as War (i.e. Use of violence & bloodshed or collection of battles as I call it) is not war but means of war. War is much broader phenomena involving all segments of society & all components of the state, not just the operational forces (armed forces).


Ahmed Ali Shah (SABRE)

[AegisFC]

Excellent article, please post the completed one when you are finished.

[SABRE]

Excellent article, please post the completed one when you are finished.

Really? I feel like I am just rambling.

The complete article has just minor addition to theory, rest are examples from Napoleonic wars attempting to prove difference between wars & battles.

[Feanor]

If you don't mind my unprofessional critique, here's a few holes I think I can poke in it.

Take for example the Cold War. The two super powers, the USA & USSR, never directly engaged in “collection of battles”

Except the USSR and USA were not the only components. I would argue that the WarPac, Cuba, and a few other socialist countries during different times were simply extensions of the Soviet Empire in a larger sense. The same can be said of the USA. Not to mention that Soviet SAM operators certainly engaged American pilots over Vietnam, and Soviet and American pilots had dogfights over the Yalu river during the Korean war. So first off direct battles were fought. Second off, the USA and USSR were only the center pieces of a large multi-national coalition, and simply because the two never faced each other in all out war directly, doesn't mean the Cold War was fought without bloodshed and violence. On account of bloodshed, one only needs to remember all the American spy-planes shot down by the USSR.

The statement should be rephrased to ‘nuclear weapons are not the weapons of battle fields.’

I would disagree with that one. With the decrease in payload, and decrease in fallout, in the future small tactical nuclear weapons with minimal fallout could change that. Not to mention that simply because nuclear weapons were never used on the tactical level, does not mean they cannot or will not. They are weapons of battle fields, there has simply yet to be a conflict where they are employed. The argument is akin to saying that the S-300 is not a weapon of battle fields simply because it has never fired a shot in anger.

But of course I'm being nitpicky and hitting the details. Overall you hit the nail on the head. I'm looking forward to seeing the rest of this if you decide to post it.

[SABRE]

If you don't mind my unprofessional critique, here's a few holes I think I can poke in it.

Opinions are always welcome.

Except the USSR and USA were not the only components. I would argue that the WarPac, Cuba, and a few other socialist countries during different times were simply extensions of the Soviet Empire in a larger sense. The same can be said of the USA. Not to mention that Soviet SAM operators certainly engaged American pilots over Vietnam, and Soviet and American pilots had dogfights over the Yalu river during the Korean war. So first off direct battles were fought. Second off, the USA and USSR were only the center pieces of a large multi-national coalition, and simply because the two never faced each other in all out war directly, doesn't mean the Cold War was fought without bloodshed and violence. On account of bloodshed, one only needs to remember all the American spy-planes shot down by the USSR.

Well you are moving away from philosophical theme of the article to the practical theme. Shooting down of American spy plan, use of proxy states etc prove that USSR & USA were at "war." This is what I am trying to say. On the other hand these events are not battles. Battles as means of war involve mass level of violence & bloodshed (massive use of physical force).
The Americans & Soviets did fight over Korea but remember that US was representing UN & not itself. But ... the war was of US interest & policy goal rather then UN's. Thus I believe UN became a mean of war - the very war it was established to prevent.

Even if you don't agree with my Cold War example the intent of the article still remains different & so far persistent: that war is not just 'collection of battles' &/or 'war is not necessarily violent.' But your opinion is always welcome. If you agree to my perception of war may be you can help me find a better example?


I would disagree with that one. With the decrease in payload, and decrease in fallout, in the future small tactical nuclear weapons with minimal fallout could change that. Not to mention that simply because nuclear weapons were never used on the tactical level, does not mean they cannot or will not. They are weapons of battle fields, there has simply yet to be a conflict where they are employed. The argument is akin to saying that the S-300 is not a weapon of battle fields simply because it has never fired a shot in anger.

Again we are moving away from the philosophical theme. Nevertheless, this is my belief on your above comments. Smaller tactical nuclear weapons development on behalf of one country can trigger another Arms Race. If one has it & its enemy does not then the enemy's 'nuclear threshold' will diminish considerably, leaving the enemy with no choice but to use its larger nuclear weapons once its conventional force has been destroyed in small tactile nuclear attacks. With nuclear understanding as it persists (which might as both nuclear realists & romantics prefer to keep it as it is) the country possessing these small tactile nukes will automatically be deterred to use them against another nuclear state.

Use of smaller tactical nuclear weapons can also have negative impact on foreign policy. In addition; smaller tactical nukes may be treated just as we treat Chemical & Biological weapons. ChemBio weapons have great impact on human lives, especially on the soldiers who survive them. Similarly smaller tactical nuclear weapons usage may release cancerous rediations on the population of enemy which may not be the target.

As far as nuclear realism goes, nuclear weapons are weapons of negative peace, they are there to deter war or as I understand deter 'battles.' Even if we come to agree with what you said above about the Cold War, neither power resorted to using the nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis was not so much about the nuclear threat to US from USSR. Kennedy brothers themselves agreed it had more to do with political prestige then the fear of nuclear war. Though Soviets would have had 'launch & strike time' advantage the Americans still presisted their "assured 2nd strike capability' & thus USSR was kept in deterrence even though their nuclear weapons had geographically come very close to the East Coast of USA. Deterrene Prevailed. (Open for disagreement)



But of course I'm being nitpicky and hitting the details. Overall you hit the nail on the head. I'm looking forward to seeing the rest of this if you decide to post it.

I will as soon as I am done but I am engaged in couple of other important things right now which are delaying my work.

The idea of putting this rough article here is to get input from others so it could help expand the article, give other (& better) ideas, opinions (whether +ve or -ve), guidance, etc ... so what ever you say is welcomed.

[Feanor]

The reason I moved away from the philosophical theme and talked about you concrete examples is that your general conclusions and larger themes should come out of the concrete examples from real life. If the examples themselves are inaccurate or misinterpreted, then the conclusions are similarly wrong (in my belief). However overall I would rather agree with your thesis.

On the other hand these events are not battles. Battles as means of war involve mass level of violence & bloodshed (massive use of physical force).
The Americans & Soviets did fight over Korea but remember that US was representing UN & not itself. But ... the war was of US interest & policy goal rather then UN's. Thus I believe UN became a mean of war - the very war it was established to prevent.

Was that not a massive battle with violence and bloodshed? And you ignored my point about the USA and USSR only being part of essentially a larger mutli-national coalition, so within that context the Vietnam and Korean wars represent a use of massive violence and bloodshed by one side against the other. Respectfully, I think that the Cold War was very much a hot war, with the two sides avoiding an all out attack on each other in Europe and with strategic weapons because they were afraid of reprisals.

Again we are moving away from the philosophical theme. Nevertheless, this is my belief on your above comments. Smaller tactical nuclear weapons development on behalf of one country can trigger another Arms Race. If one has it & its enemy does not then the enemy's 'nuclear threshold' will diminish considerably, leaving the enemy with no choice but to use its larger nuclear weapons once its conventional force has been destroyed in small tactile nuclear attacks. With nuclear understanding as it persists (which might as both nuclear realists & romantics prefer to keep it as it is) the country possessing these small tactile nukes will automatically be deterred to use them against another nuclear state.

What about the use of small tactical nukes again non-nuclear states? If the device is clean and low-yield enough to avoid major contamination, then it could even be kept secret. But again my point is that you are only looking at strategic nuclear weapons, when you say they are not a battle field weapon. Tactical weapons very much are. There has just not been a situation yet where they have been used.

[SABRE]

The reason I moved away from the philosophical theme and talked about you concrete examples is that your general conclusions and larger themes should come out of the concrete examples from real life. If the examples themselves are inaccurate or misinterpreted, then the conclusions are similarly wrong (in my belief). However overall I would rather agree with your thesis.

I understand.


Was that not a massive battle with violence and bloodshed?
And you ignored my point about the USA and USSR only being part of essentially a larger mutli-national coalition, so within that context the Vietnam and Korean wars represent a use of massive violence and bloodshed by one side against the other. Respectfully, I think that the Cold War was very much a hot war, with the two sides avoiding an all out attack on each other in Europe and with strategic weapons because they were afraid of reprisals.

I feel we are walking towards the same place but via different roads. & I did not ignore the points. I used the word proxies but thanks for bringing the coalition out. I was having a discussion on this with AegisFC & I categorized proxies & alliances (coalitions) as means of war. Sometimes alliances/coalitions are formed for deterrence primarily. i.e. NATO, SEATO, CENTO & may be even Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.

In Vietnam the Soviet policy goal was to establish Vietnam as a communist state & their policy was to support them against the USA. Therefore, Vietnam becomes a sort of tool in the hands of Soviets (though Vietgong actually fought for its own interest & goal) & thus means of war for USSR against USA. Afghanistan similarly became means of war for US against USSR in 1980s. Both USA & USSR were 'continuing their policy with other means' including the promotion of violence & bloodshed but via 3rd party (if we view these wars in US-USSR context only) rather then directly resorting to war against each other.

The Korean War depends on how we take it. Technically both states did resort to the violence against each ‘directly’ but USA will always persist it was doing the job for UN. Korean War is perhaps the only war where the two powers clashed 'directly.' But that was the call of their interest & policy goals. Violence & bloodshed was chosen as means of war since both parties felt immidiate need for their response & involvement. Had the Cold War theories been developed before 1949-1950 I think neither party would have jumped directly into it. & the results came out almost 50-50 (Communist DPRK & Capitalist South Korea). Both achieved their goals one way or another that is why the war did not take more then a year.

Korea also became means of war for both powers to convey the extent to which they were willing to go to assert themselves & achieve their goals.


What about the use of small tactical nukes again non-nuclear states? If the device is clean and low-yield enough to avoid major contamination, then it could even be kept secret. But again my point is that you are only looking at strategic nuclear weapons, when you say they are not a battle field weapon. Tactical weapons very much are. There has just not been a situation yet where they have been used.

There have not been use of any major nuclear weapon either ( Hiroshima & Nagasaki being exception but they were merely demonstration). I still don't believe that tactical weapons would be welcomed & keeping the use secret can also be very difficult in this age. Unless nukes are used they will always be treated on the strategic level. So far no one practically knows how to coup with them on tactical level.

What I believe on the other hand is that; where nuclear weapons (WMD level) brought a revolution in War fighting, smaller tactical nuclear weapons may bring a quick evolution in the war fighting (though nukes have entered into their 7th decade).

[Feanor]

There have not been use of any major nuclear weapon either ( Hiroshima & Nagasaki being exception but they were merely demonstration). I still don't believe that tactical weapons would be welcomed & keeping the use secret can also be very difficult in this age. Unless nukes are used they will always be treated on the strategic level. So far no one practically knows how to coup with them on tactical level.

What I believe on the other hand is that; where nuclear weapons (WMD level) brought a revolution in War fighting, smaller tactical nuclear weapons may bring a quick evolution in the war fighting (though nukes have entered into their 7th decade).

I suppose the answer is that time will tell.

I feel we are walking towards the same place but via different roads. & I did not ignore the points. I used the word proxies but thanks for bringing the coalition out. I was having a discussion on this with AegisFC & I categorized proxies & alliances (coalitions) as means of war. Sometimes alliances/coalitions are formed for deterrence primarily. i.e. NATO, SEATO, CENTO & may be even Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.


I think it's not right to consider them third parties. I think that we need to consider them as an extension of the USA, or rather Western alliance as a single entity, and vice versa as an extension of the Soviet alliance. And in that regard I would consider battles fought by proxies to be in principle no different from battles fought by the USA or USSR proper, from a military context, though for the purposes of international diplomacy use of proxies allowed the two sides to dodge escalation to some extent.

EDIT: I think there is room to argue for a qualitative and quantitative difference between battles fought by proxies and the states proper, but not for a principal distinction between the two.

[SABRE]

I suppose the answer is that time will tell.

Precisely.

I think it's not right to consider them third parties. I think that we need to consider them as an extension of the USA, or rather Western alliance as a single entity, and vice versa as an extension of the Soviet alliance. And in that regard I would consider battles fought by proxies to be in principle no different from battles fought by the USA or USSR proper, from a military context, though for the purposes of international diplomacy use of proxies allowed the two sides to dodge escalation to some extent.

I will agree to West to be taken as a single entity, while US being its defacto but accepted leader.

Well the battles fought by proxies, especially Vietnam, Korea & Afghanistan (be it state or non-state actors in these countries) are of very significant. In fact Afghanistan is one reason for the collapse of USSR. My argument is that they became means of war for USA &/or USSR to continue their policy of containment. Remember the intention of article is not to discuss Cold War but to define 'War.' Intention is to tell that battles (physical force, violence & bloodshed) are mere means by which war is carried out, they are not war itself. War can be fought & won without resorting to force. May be I can use the following statement to support Cold War example?: USSR collapsed without any use of physical force on its geographic territory. War was carried out against USSR by the use of technological race (military as well as industrial), arms race, arms control, space race, alliance makings, proxy conflicts, etc ... as means of war.

EDIT: I think there is room to argue for a qualitative and quantitative difference between battles fought by proxies and the states proper, but not for a principal distinction between the two.

It would be completely different discussion from the article but may be we can have a separate thread for it?

[Feanor]

I will agree to West to be taken as a single entity, while US being its defacto but accepted leader.

But not WarPac? It had a far more centralized command system, and far more rigid adherence to the Soviet Union's instructions then the west did to the US.

Well the battles fought by proxies, especially Vietnam, Korea & Afghanistan (be it state or non-state actors in these countries) are of very significant. In fact Afghanistan is one reason for the collapse of USSR.

I disagree on the Afghan war being of any major significance to the collapse of the USSR.

My argument is that they became means of war for USA &/or USSR to continue their policy of containment. Remember the intention of article is not to discuss Cold War but to define 'War.' Intention is to tell that battles (physical force, violence & bloodshed) are mere means by which war is carried out, they are not war itself.

I agree with you thesis, I've already stated that, I just think you need better support for it.

War can be fought & won without resorting to force. May be I can use the following statement to support Cold War example?: USSR collapsed without any use of physical force on its geographic territory. War was carried out against USSR by the use of technological race (military as well as industrial), arms race, arms control, space race, alliance makings, proxy conflicts, etc ... as means of war.

I think that you can make that statement, but if we take the USSR and it's allies, as well as the USA and it's allies, to be single entities, then that statement loses all relevance, as the DRA would essentially be considered a part of the Soviet Bloc, and thus an armed attack against it would not be principally different from an attack on the USSR itself. It would cause a qualitatively and quantitatively different response, but in principal is the same action only in a different place, and on a different scale. It's a battle waged by one side of the war against the other side. I understand that this is somewhat outside of the scope of the article, but it would feel like cheating if you bypassed that hole in your reasoning. I think a better example of a war fought without actual battles would be something like the pressure being put on North Korea in the years following the collapse of the USSR, the end result of which was the nuclear disarmament. Then again I think you need to redefine war. The problem with the definition that Clausewitz presents, is that it's limited in the sense that it assumes there is a set of accepted policy means, and war is simply continuation of policy by means outside the accepted set of policy means. For the definition to have any meaning within a concrete context you need to define what policy means are acceptable, and what means qualify as "other" means thus making the action in question actually be a war even if no battles are fought. I think this unclarity is where the problem stems from. So you either need to give a set of policy means that are considered normal, with all other means then falling under the category of war making, or change the definition all together. Without one of those two things, it becomes very hard to distinguish battles from wars.

Let me put it another way. What makes an arms race as a policy means something that is "other"? One could make the claim that an arms race is not a continuation of policy by other means, but simply a normal means for achieving a political end. Sorry if I'm starting to ramble, I'm just trying to pin down the one thing about your argument that's giving me this sense of something being out of place. (I get that feeling wherever I see a logical loophole in someones argument)

It would be completely different discussion from the article but may be we can have a separate thread for it?

It would be an interesting one. Is a war fought through proxies principally distinguished from wars fought by a countries own military, or is the distinction only a qualitative and quantitative one. Do you want to have it in this forum? In fact given our Cold War argument here I think it would be more proper to argue within the context of the Cold War, simultaneously on whether the defeat in a proxy war can lead to the defeat of a super power in general (like you are claiming about Afghan, because if so then the only place I see where a principal distinction could be drawn disappears).

EDIT: I was reading over your earlier posts one more time to see if there was something I missed, and there was. Here it is:

Battles as means of war involve mass level of violence & bloodshed (massive use of physical force).

I disagree. I think a battle is any use of violence and bloodshed between two armed sides. Scale is irrelevant, as it is again a quantitative and qualitative difference, but not a principal differences. Two dozens African tribesmen throwing spears at each other, with maybe only 2-3 killed or wounded from both sides, is as much a battle as Stalingrad. As such a duel between a single spy plane, and several Soviet SAMs is also a battle. That's another spot that needs to be ironed out. The definition of battle.

Sorry if I'm coming across as combative, as (I'll be honest) I do enjoy a good argument as an opportunity to learn (especially if I'm wrong). Awaiting your reply.

[SABRE]

Feanor (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/member.php?u=18624); might we wait & continue the discussion when I am done with the complete article? Plus I am in an emergency now days so I am slow to reply.

Again your arguments & opinions are welcome.

[Feanor]

Feanor (http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/member.php?u=18624); might we wait & continue the discussion when I am done with the complete article? Plus I am in an emergency now days so I am slow to reply.

Again your arguments & opinions are welcome.

All right. I hope your emergency doesn't cause you any problems. I'll look forward to seeing the finished article.

[SABRE]

Policy is directed to & by three components of state: The political leadership, the Operational Forces (Armed Forces) & the population. Clausewitz sums up these 3 components as “trinity.”

I have restarted my work on Clausewitz's definition on war and was reading some of the material earlier today that made me realize a mistake I made here (I think its a mistake since its theory and hypothesis and different people make different interpretations).

My new perception (based on new understanding of Clausewitz) is that the "Policy" is only (and should always be) directed by the political authority with population and military having very limited or no control over it whatsoever. Instead this policy is to be implemented on the population and military - of your own and that of the enemy's. According to Clausewitz the operational forces must obey the political authority's orders, they must not overthrow either the policy or the political authority.

Of course policy for home and enemy is different when it comes to war. At home political leadership has to adopt a policy to motivate the forces, build the state and nation (geography, infrastructure and people), while for the enemy the basic policy should be inflict such a damage that he gives in to your demands.

[tatra]

Following is my analysis & perception of Clausewitz's definition of War. I would have posted it on strategy or general discussion forum but I want to filter out people who know Clausewitz & don't want to make a mess out of it. This is just the short version. The longer version & discussion is not complete. I need a professional comments, input & advice. Also its been some time since someone posted something here.
-- snip ---
To sum up the argument. What we have so far considered as War (i.e. Use of violence & bloodshed or collection of battles as I call it) is not war but means of war. War is much broader phenomena involving all segments of society & all components of the state, not just the operational forces (armed forces).


Ahmed Ali Shah (SABRE)

Sabre, just a quick remark:

You are discussing the definition of War. However, what is not clear (at least from the above) is why you are concerned with this definition. In other words, what is the purpose of your analysis and what is the research question you are attempting to answer? Why are you (and why should we) be looking at this definition? Is there a problem with Clausewitz's definition and, if yes, what is it in your opinion? IMHO, it would greatly improve your article if you clarify that to the reader.

[SABRE]

Above is just an interpretation of Clausewitz's definition of War. & its been long since I abandoned the work on it.

[tatra]

Above is just an interpretation of Clausewitz's definition of War. & its been long since I abandoned the work on it.

Still, I'm curious as to why you were looking into it :private

[SABRE]

Still, I'm curious as to why you were looking into it :private

ah ... because I was (& still am ... in a way) a defence & strategic studies student. Also because I agree with Clausewitz' definition of war. Wanted to share my view.

And when I started with this I was going to give a report and presentation on this in a seminar but decided it was too complicated.