JSF in trouble again

[RonnyMarl]

News media here are reporting that the JSF is in trouble again. On the radio today, I heard that the cockpit design was so bad that it had to be done again. TV news tonight says that internal (Defence) documents show there is a problem with the cockpit display and with the software development and apparently the Minister for Defence, Brenden Nelson, is heading to the USA for discussions. Anyone heard anything about this?

If it is the case, what are the cost and schedule implications? Will this plane ever fly? The prototype looked apretty cool aircraft on the TV.

Could all be just media speculation, after all the TV news said it was a $16b development project.

[Magoo]

News media here are reporting that the JSF is in trouble again. On the radio today, I heard that the cockpit design was so bad that it had to be done again. TV news tonight says that internal (Defence) documents show there is a problem with the cockpit display and with the software development and apparently the Minister for Defence, Brenden Nelson, is heading to the USA for discussions. Anyone heard anything about this?

It's all crap. So much so in fact that Defence went to the almost unprecedented step of issuing its own release today...

http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=5764

If it is the case, what are the cost and schedule implications? Will this plane ever fly? The prototype looked apretty cool aircraft on the TV.

It's due to fly in October.

Could all be just media speculation, after all the TV news said it was a $16b development project.

More like a slow news day for a tabloid disguised as a broadsheet!

Magoo

[RonnyMarl]

And that press release sounds like a lot of crap to me.

Part of the debate on the JSF has been the transfer of technology. A huge part of that technology would be the transfer software ( the UK have made a big deal of that). To say that we have someone from DSTO over there monitoring the software development is fine but how much access does that person have to the code? Given that there is still debate on technology transfer, I can't image that it is a great deal of access.

I've been involved with Defence projects that have developed software. One in particular was very simple in terms of what it had to deliver in comparison to the JSF but still had over a million lines of code. As simple as the outcomes were in comparison, it took years to develop and further years to get the bugs out. I'm sure that they are leveraging of the F-22 software, but the project I was involved in was leveraging off another project.

I can't comment on the cockpit display - it is not an area I have any experience in. All I can say is that the whole press release looks like smoke amd mirrors to me. It says a lot but in the end doesn't say much at all quoting "2005" all the time. Guess what - this is 2006.

[Occum]

See -

http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/14885178.htm

The JSF Program is now entering that phase of its life where Congressional oversight will dominate and for some time. It is time to start cashing in the 'cash cow' ticket. This will likely be done through cuts in numbers.

As for whether the Defence media release if crap or not, the claim that the PO has good access and is getting good data is not supported by what is in the December 2005 report by DSTO wherein they say the lack of solid information and data is a risk, in itself.

However, standby for a PR blitz on all of this 'cause that's all they have - to coin a phrase that is now oftentimes used in relation to seniors officials in defence - sophistry and spin. The folks at the working level, like within DSTO and the squadrons know but.

[rjmaz1]

The article has no credibility what so ever.

They are clutching at straws and the main reason it came up was in the argument that we should buy the F-22. Some people are trying to gather as much dirt as possible on the JSF to make Australia order the F-22 instead.

Either way the JSF is still awesome.

I'd prefer Australia to purchase the F-22 though as it has a much longer supersonic range, allowing it to cover nearly twice as much territory in the same amount of time.

[Occum]

The article has no credibility what so ever.


Either way the JSF is still awesome.

I'd prefer Australia to purchase the F-22 though as it has a much longer supersonic range, allowing it to cover nearly twice as much territory in the same amount of time.


Which article are you referring to - the one in the Australian on the DSTO reports or the one about the US Senate vote?


Don't forget, the JSF has yet to fly and be flight tested.


A good point about F-22 coverage and I agree but for all the other reasons as well, including cost, capability and risk. Also, on the point of coverage, don't forget the radar and the greater power aperture! Can't change the laws of physics though some 'generals' in the department and on this newsgroup think they can.

;)

[alexsa]

A brief look at history may be useful at this time.

In 1964 Australia signed a contract for 24 F111. delivery was due to start late 1967. The outcome was much different as fatigue issues in the complex (and dare I say it cutting edge airfarme) pushed the delivery back to starting in 1973 (6 years late) after considerable cost blow out and the lease of an interim aircraft. Nobody would argue (including Kopp and Goon) taht we made the right choice in persisting wiht such a troublesome unproven aircraft.

Funny this has a very familiar ring to it sounding much like the debate going on with the JSF (noting that both the F-111 and F-35 were born from a desire for a joint airframe for the USAF and USN). At the time many were in favour of scrapping the F-111 deal alltogether becasue it seemed a step too far. Currently, as a result of a congress decision, the JSF has just been pushed back 1 year but it seems to have great potential for the role it is intended. The F-111 went back 6 years an proved to be a fantasitic platform.

Suggestion; how about a balanced discussion on the the capabilities of the aircraft and the alternaitive available. From what I have read we should consider the following:

1. The F22 has not been offered to Australia as far as anybody can say.
2. The F22 does not have the multirole capability of the JSF without additional cost.
3. The official word is the the JSF will still cost a great deal less than F22. If this changes then I guess DMO will look carefully at the next decision point.
4. The JSF is a quatum leap over anything else operated in the region in so far as stealth and NCW is concerned (lets face it the Su30 has the RCS of a barn). If we don't get the JSF and the F-22 is not offered and/or proves to be too bloody expensive (noting the need to upgrade for NCW and strike) what are we going to choose (please nobody say evolved F-111, remember the barn size RCS of the Su30, well the f-111 if of the ilk.)
5. The JSF give the ADF the option (however unlikely) of operating a close to common air frame at sea on the LPD's and on land.

On this basis DMO must continue to evaluate this aircraft with a view to purchase. Should it become apparent that it is not going to perform or it will cost a great deal more than expected then revaluation should be considred. In the current sitaation the carry on seems premature.

Personnaly I like the idea of a F-22/F-35 mix but Iam realistic enough to realise the cost and capability issue are very likley to preclude this.

[Occum]

Personnaly I like the idea of a F-22/F-35 mix but Iam realistic enough to realise the cost and capability issue are very likley to preclude this.

The weakness in this force structure is tanking. Without tanking neither the F/A-18 Classic nor the JSF can get to Lombok.

A single point of failure in a force structure is not a good idea.

[alexsa]

The weakness in this force structure is tanking. Without tanking neither the F/A-18 Classic nor the JSF can get to Lombok.

A single point of failure in a force structure is not a good idea.

Can the F-22? The F-111 has fantasitic range but no stealth and can only rely on terrain for protection when over land (noting much of the mission is over sea).

The combination of JSSM and JSF appear to give a pretty good reach. The A330 will extend that.

[Cootamundra]

The weakness in this force structure is tanking. Without tanking neither the F/A-18 Classic nor the JSF can get to Lombok.

A single point of failure in a force structure is not a good idea.

Who needs to get to Lombok! Nothing I've seen indicates that we have to worry about that in the short to medium term. However if in the medium term we did have to hit targets to our north then we will have the JSF operational with tanking support and new stand-off weapons. Recently the JASSM has been touted as being upgraded to even greater stand-off ranges which if they eventuate will result in the ADF ending up with similar range capabilities to the current F-111 fleet (without tanking). PLUS we get all of the other benefits of having a real 5thGen aircraft (NCW + stealth as mentioned ad naseum) as opposed to a re-hashed 3rd or 4th Gen aircraft. People get stuck on the red circles around a map of Northern Aus, PNG/Indo - I would argue that we should not be overly concerned about range alone.

[Occum]

JASSM-ER won't enable what you are hoping. Take a look at the Defence endorsed maps in the ASPI Paper entitled 'The Big Deal'. They are not quite right but close enough for government work.

But why not F-22s to do exactly the same thing, only much better.

See -
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123022371

[Occum]

Who needs to get to Lombok! Nothing I've seen indicates that we have to worry about that in the short to medium term.

What gets bought through the NACC Project has got to last Australia some 30 to 40 years. Why not buy the best, particularly when it will be cheaper (both unit price and fleet price) and is far less risky?

[Cootamundra]

JASSM-ER won't enable what you are hoping. Take a look at the Defence endorsed maps in the ASPI Paper entitled 'The Big Deal'. They are not quite right but close enough for government work.

But why not F-22s to do exactly the same thing, only much better.

See -
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123022371

For a few reasons;
1. As of right now the F-22 has not been offered to anyone outside of the USAF
2. The F-22 whilst being the pre-eminent air-superiority fighter is not going to the 'able' multi-role aircraft that many seem to believe (my opinion only of course) but one that seems to be held by the planners in the USAF and USN who are looking at the F-35 as their bomb truck/mud mover.
3. The cost - even with your high-range estimates for the JSF and assuming that the ADF is way off target with their platform cost estimates the JSF is not going to cost as much as the Raptor. You've pointed out before how nice it would be and how cheap it would be if orders for the Raptor went up into the 1000+ airframes - I agree wouldn't it be nice! But that all assumes the US will sell Raptors via FMS AND that allies will actually buy them. None of this is actually true today.

What makes you say that JASSM won't be able to add range to the strike capability of the JSF? I suggest you take a look at this and have a think about it.

Source: JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - MAY 31, 2006 "JASSM-ER test flight proves a success"

"Lockheed Martin completed a successful test flight of an extended-range variant of its AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) on 18 May"...."The new variant has a range of about 950 km, a greater fuel capacity and is fitted with a more powerful engine, larger wings and tail. JASSM has a range of about 300 km."

Also, I've notice that whilst making some pretty good points and certainly arguing fervently why won't you accept that the ADF brass/DMO/DSTO/DefMin might actually be on the right track?

[alexsa]

JASSM-ER won't enable what you are hoping. Take a look at the Defence endorsed maps in the ASPI Paper entitled 'The Big Deal'. They are not quite right but close enough for government work.

But why not F-22s to do exactly the same thing, only much better.

See -
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123022371

Nice article but it still relates to the air dominace role not strike. No argument, the F22 can do that better than any other aircraft, but still need changes to be an ISR asset comparable to what is intended in the JSF as far as I have read. To bring this to reality as I noted before:

1. The F22 has not been offered to Australia as far as anybody can say.
2. The F22 does not have the multirole capability of the JSF without additional cost.
3. The official word is the the JSF will still cost a great deal less than F22. If this changes then I guess DMO will look carefully at the next decision point.
4. The JSF is a quatum leap over anything else operated in the region in so far as stealth and NCW is concerned (lets face it the Su30 has the RCS of a barn). If we don't get the JSF and the F-22 is not offered and/or proves to be too bloody expensive (noting the need to upgrade for NCW and strike) what are we going to choose.
5. The JSF give the ADF the option (however unlikely) of operating a close to common air frame at sea on the LPD's and on land.

However the counter argument I see from much of the discussion is that we should:

1. Go for the F-22 whihc is not currnetly on offer and is not a true multi role strike aircraft at this stage and/or
2. Evolve the F-111. This should give those S-300's, that Mr Kopp is so concnered about, some great target practice.
3. pay off the other two services to pay for it. Mind you Carlo Kopp did state at one stage that the only purpose for land and sea forces was to provide targetting for aircraft.

I think the current debate is very poorly balanced.

[Magoo]

The weakness in this force structure is tanking. Without tanking neither the F/A-18 Classic nor the JSF can get to Lombok.

You wouldn't buy an F-22 because it has greater range than the F-35. Besides, the F-35 reportedly has greater internal fuel capacity (~19.5k lbs vs ~18k lbs) and (granted, on paper) has a greater combat radius than the F-22 with internal stores. So, whether they're going to Lombok, Jakarta or Beijing, the JSF and the F-22 will have similar range issues.

Where I agree with Kopp and Goon is the fact that five tankers will not be enough for Australia to maintain high intensity operations in a full-blown regional conflict. Whether that is politically or strategically likely or not, I think at least three or four more MRTTs would be a prudent investment in an AIR5402 'Tranche 2' buy, to give us a true operational capability rather than the limited support capability at best offered by just five aircraft. Five aircraft is fine for dragging a six-ship across the Pacific to Red Flag, or a squadron to Curtin for an exercise, but when you take reserve aircraft into account, at least eight to ten makes much more sense.

Now that Airbus has committed to an A330F launch (or at least, it will at Farnborough), we can also get the cargo door and floor fitted at the same time without being the lead customer and assuming the associated risk. Perhaps more funding can be diverted from Mr Costello's huge surplus to fund the estimated $1bn required, and a 'left field' initiative involving reserve crewing options in conjunction with Qantas can be devised!

But, I digress. During a chat with a senior RAAF official last week, I put it to him that perhaps, in an effort to eliminate risk to the RAAF surrounding both the Hornet centre-barrel replacement (AIR5376, Phase 3.2) AND the JSF programs, that the RAAF should consider acquiring 40-50 Block 2 Super Hornets or F-15SGs (or whatever the latest equivalent would be) from 2008, not as interim aircraft, but as a 20-year proposition. The new aircraft could be 'flogged' for 20 years, with the current 'classic' Hornets being gradually wound down from 2012 as their centre-barrels time expire.

We could then tap into the JSF program (which I still believe is the right aircraft for us) as a later customer and still as a partner in the 2016-18 timeframe, to the tune of 50-60 Block 3 airframes. The per unit acquisition cost will be coming down to somewhere near the mean NRFAC price by then, estimated to be around US$80m in 2012 dollars, and hopefully any development bugs will also have been sorted.

Some very rough costings would see:


50 F/A-18Fs @ ~A$120m each = A$6bn
60 JSFs @ ~A$120m = $7.2bn
= ~A$13.2bn (est.)
less >A$1bn (est.) for Hornet centre-barrels
less >A$1bn (est.) for Pig ops in 2011 & 12
= A$11.2bn (est.)Although there are numerous short term non-recurring costs and personnel issues associated with standing up a new type (and the Super Hornet is a completely new type compared to our 'classics'), this represents a potential real saving over the A$15.5bn currently budgeted for AIR6000, whilst also removing three large elements of risk surrounding the HUG program, keeping the Pigs an extra two years, and buying early JSFs. At the same time, we could still remain partners in the JSF program, and hopefully maintain the Australian industry participation in the program (although this is likely to drop if we only buy 60 jets compared to the currently planned 100).

Such a buy would also stagger the life-of-type (i.e. replacement) of these aircraft, with the Super Hornets from the late 2020s, and the JSFs 10-15 years later, instead of the current budget nightmare we have of having to replace 100+ combat aircraft at once!

His answer was interesting to say the least. Thoughts???

Magoo

[Whiskyjack]

But, I digress. During a chat with a senior RAAF official last week, I put it to him that perhaps, in an effort to eliminate risk to the RAAF surrounding both the Hornet centre-barrel replacement (AIR5376, Phase 3.2) AND the JSF programs, that the RAAF should consider acquiring 40-50 Block 2 Super Hornets or F-15SGs (or whatever the latest equivalent would be) from 2008, not as interim aircraft, but as a 20-year proposition. The new aircraft could be 'flogged' for 20 years, with the current 'classic' Hornets being gradually wound down from 2012 as their centre-barrels time expire.

We could then tap into the JSF program (which I still believe is the right aircraft for us) as a later customer and still as a partner in the 2016-18 timeframe, to the tune of 50-60 Block 3 airframes. The per unit acquisition cost will be coming down to somewhere near the mean NRFAC price by then, estimated to be around US$80m in 2012 dollars, and hopefully any development bugs will also have been sorted.

Some very rough costings would see:


50 F/A-18Fs @ ~A$120m each = A$6bn
60 JSFs @ ~A$120m = $7.2bn
= ~A$13.2bn (est.)
less >A$1bn (est.) for Hornet centre-barrels
less >A$1bn (est.) for Pig ops in 2011 & 12
= A$11.2bn (est.)Although there are numerous short term non-recurring costs and personnel issues associated with standing up a new type (and the Super Hornet is a completely new type compared to our 'classics'), this represents a potential real saving over the A$15.5bn currently budgeted for AIR6000, whilst also removing three large elements of risk surrounding the HUG program, keeping the Pigs an extra two years, and buying early JSFs. At the same time, we could still remain partners in the JSF program, and hopefully maintain the Australian industry participation in the program (although this is likely to drop if we only buy 60 jets compared to the currently planned 100).

Such a buy would also stagger the life-of-type (i.e. replacement) of these aircraft, with the Super Hornets from the late 2020s, and the JSFs 10-15 years later, instead of the current budget nightmare we have of having to replace 100+ combat aircraft at once!

His answer was interesting to say the least. Thoughts???

Magoo

I believe that to be a sensible option, works on paper, would be interesting to see the reaction you got from the RAAF officer.

I note, and I am not suggesting that this is the case with the RAAF, that sometimes a branch of the service will get fixated on a shiny new toy, much like a kid in the toy store, and the new toy will do everything and be the answer to everything. Very dangerous especially if they use there standing as 'experts' in the field to convince the politicians.

[Aussie Digger]

But, I digress. During a chat with a senior RAAF official last week, I put it to him that perhaps, in an effort to eliminate risk to the RAAF surrounding both the Hornet centre-barrel replacement (AIR5376, Phase 3.2) AND the JSF programs, that the RAAF should consider acquiring 40-50 Block 2 Super Hornets or F-15SGs (or whatever the latest equivalent would be) from 2008, not as interim aircraft, but as a 20-year proposition. The new aircraft could be 'flogged' for 20 years, with the current 'classic' Hornets being gradually wound down from 2012 as their centre-barrels time expire.

We could then tap into the JSF program (which I still believe is the right aircraft for us) as a later customer and still as a partner in the 2016-18 timeframe, to the tune of 50-60 Block 3 airframes. The per unit acquisition cost will be coming down to somewhere near the mean NRFAC price by then, estimated to be around US$80m in 2012 dollars, and hopefully any development bugs will also have been sorted.

Some very rough costings would see:


50 F/A-18Fs @ ~A$120m each = A$6bn
60 JSFs @ ~A$120m = $7.2bn
= ~A$13.2bn (est.)
less >A$1bn (est.) for Hornet centre-barrels
less >A$1bn (est.) for Pig ops in 2011 & 12
= A$11.2bn (est.)Although there are numerous short term non-recurring costs and personnel issues associated with standing up a new type (and the Super Hornet is a completely new type compared to our 'classics'), this represents a potential real saving over the A$15.5bn currently budgeted for AIR6000, whilst also removing three large elements of risk surrounding the HUG program, keeping the Pigs an extra two years, and buying early JSFs. At the same time, we could still remain partners in the JSF program, and hopefully maintain the Australian industry participation in the program (although this is likely to drop if we only buy 60 jets compared to the currently planned 100).

Such a buy would also stagger the life-of-type (i.e. replacement) of these aircraft, with the Super Hornets from the late 2020s, and the JSFs 10-15 years later, instead of the current budget nightmare we have of having to replace 100+ combat aircraft at once!

His answer was interesting to say the least. Thoughts???

Magoo

I like it. I'm a big fan of swapping out the Pigs and a Sqn or 2 of the oldest legacy Hornets for SH's. I think F-15 might be a step too far, but SH shouldn't be too much of a drama, whilst still maintaining an air combat aircraft that is more capable than our HUG BUGS.

Your costings look about right and though I think JSF is the right "long term" combat aircraft for RAAF, I don't see any great need to rush into the capability from the very start of the project, so long as our current fighters are viable, both structurally and capability wise for a while longer, which new build SH's certainly would be.

I DO think that RAAF should always maintain a minimum of 4 fighter/strike Sqn's though, giving us 3x Sqn's to provide "homeland defence" and 1x Sqn to provide a deployment option, so an eventual SH replacement would have to be programed.

Possibly by 2020-2025 a stealthy UCAV based solution would be a viable strike option and could provide RAAF with a good capability enhancement.

Interesting to see if RAAF pursue this idea, and secondly whether they can strongly convince their political masters to take the "hit" that would come from the decision politically, given the interest shown in JSF to date.

Reports from Boeing indicate that they could supply RAAF with SH in 2-3 years if ordered...

[alexsa]

Umm, what was his response if I may be so bold as to ask?

I don't disagree on a few extra tankers and I remember hearing something about 5 QANTAS 330-200 being offered.

In respect of your proposal I would prefer to F-15 but realise the Super hornet is a better matach for us.

[Magoo]

Umm, what was his response if I may be so bold as to ask?

Sorry, it was over a beer, and therefore shall forever remain off the record until he tells me otherwise.

Magoo

[Aussie Digger]

Sorry, it was over a beer, and therefore shall forever remain off the record until he tells me otherwise.

Magoo

Been hanging out at (Admin: reference deleted) again eh???

[Magoo]

Been hanging out at (Admin: reference deleted) again eh???

No actually, Canberra this time!

[gf0012-aust]

Thoughts???

Magoo

well, I have been a consistent believer in having a mixed pointy fleet for a number of reasons. I think everyone knows why, so I won't pollute the thread with a re-visit.

I'd have to say that I'm more partial to the F-15SG than a Superhornet though. Thats primarily due to issues of organic persistence through range benefit etc.....

and I was dragged kicking and screaming into the circle of believers as far as single engine jets are concerned. As much as the F-16 holds the record for safety/hours on single engines - I'm still partial to twins if we intend flying over the wet bits.

apparently I've got nothing to worry about though - so I'm happy to listen to wiser heads... ;)

[Magoo]

I'd have to say that I'm more partial to the F-15SG than a Superhornet though. Thats primarily due to issues of organic persistence through range benefit etc.....

The reason why I used the Super Hornet as an example is because it's basically on 'off-the-shelf' design in its current Block 2 form, would also be more easily integrated into a network, and also uses many weapons and systems common to our current fleet. From a range/performance point of view, the F-15 would probably have the legs, so to speak, however it is unlikely we would order the aircraft in the same spec as the Singaporeans or Koreans, so it would therefore require some customising for our use!

and I was dragged kicking and screaming into the circle of believers as far as single engine jets are concerned. As much as the F-16 holds the record for safety/hours on single engines - I'm still partial to twins if we intend flying over the wet bits.

Certainly the single vs twin curve has narrowed in recent years, although the F-16 isn't known as the 'lawn dart' for nothing! I don't think single engined reliability and attrition rates will be a major factor in future combat aircraft purchases, except for carrier-borne fighters perhaps.

Magoo

[RonnyMarl]

This thread is starting to look very much like another thread - JSF v Raptor.

The question I asked was - is there a problem with the JSF and if so, what are the cost and schedule implications. Magoo came back and pointed us at a AS DOD site media release which decride what the media was saying. I get very sceptical when DOD appears to be proactive - the media release was made on the same day as the media was reporting problems! Did they have some knowledge of what was about to be released in the media before it was released? I have been involved with Defence for too many years to believe that they can react so quickly. The media release would have had to have been released at a very high level (given the cost of this project).

On the other subject of JSF v Raptor, I did read today that it is 50% available for overseas sale. The lower house of Congress has passed it but it still has to go to the Senate. If I can re-find the links I will post them in the other thread - RAAF Stopgap Plan....

[Big-E]

On the other subject of JSF v Raptor, I did read today that it is 50% available for overseas sale.

More like 33.3%, there is an executive.:o

[Occum]

Also, I've notice that whilst making some pretty good points and certainly arguing fervently why won't you accept that the ADF brass/DMO/DSTO/DefMin might actually be on the right track?


The other points in your post are worthy of a response and, time permitting, will try to get to them. As well, there are a number of things happening that will go some way to answering them.

However, your last is a very good question and deserves a properly considered response.

The simple answer is in two parts. The first is that the numbers just don't stack up - either in terms of capability, cost or risk. What senior Departmental officials are telling the Government, the Parliament and the people of Australia is simply not supported by fact or even informed common sense.

The second part is, basically, national pride in our Defence Forces (the ADF and the hard working people in the Department who support them) and a desire for what is best for Australia and future generations of Australians. This is a common aim amongst those of us who have joined or who support the Group.

The more complex answer goes beyond the scope of a posting on a forum like this. However, the following three points are at its centre.

1. The collective you mention, namely, "ADF brass/DMO/DSTO/DefMin" should be split into two groups - the senior officials (or the bosses) and the workers/do-ers. Since the late 1990s, when the negatives of the consequential deskilling from the downsizing of Defence started to take effect, there has been a marked change, particularly within the Department (in Canberra) and, more particularly, at the senior leadership level, both in uniform and civilian. Prior to this change, the bosses used to listen to and take heed of the workers. This is not the case today, as many in our Group can attest.

2. The second point may be found in a paper entitled "The Root Cause of What Ails Defence, Today', authored by Mr Peter Goon but widely peer reviewed within the Group as well as by domain experts in organisational psychology and management. If you are interested, this paper may be found at -

http://www.ausairpower.net/apa-analyses.html

3. Most, if not all the major processes in the Department today, including the decision making process, are open looped and without accountabilities. The most recent example is Wedgetail with the interesting observation that it did not have to be this way. Those who established the project did an outstanding job, had a good handle on the risks, and had put in place the means for addressing the challenges and ways of turning risks into opportunities. But, following source selection and the resulting 12 month hiatus, changes to the project's management and planned oversight processes back in 2001/02 pretty much assured this would happen and in the way it is now evolving. Well one might ask why the bosses within the Department somehow think that 'bad news' improves with age?

Despite the negative comments this post will no doubt attract, I hope this helps you better understand the reasons behind the position that many are now taking.


:)

[Cootamundra]

Despite the negative comments this post will no doubt attract, I hope this helps you better understand the reasons behind the position that many are now taking.:)

Certainly it helps me with understanding your position and your willingness to stick to the same position. And for that I say 'thanks'!

At the end of the day one of the reasons why this baord works so well is that we tend to have well informed (at least as well informed as you can get in a public forum) discussions around very relevant topics. I appreciate your point of view whilst reserving the right to continue to disagree with both yours and your 'groups' position.

I'll look forward to your response to my list of 'reasons why not F-22'

Cheers

[Cootamundra]

Some very rough costings would see:

50 F/A-18Fs @ ~A$120m each = A$6bn
60 JSFs @ ~A$120m = $7.2bn
= ~A$13.2bn (est.)
less >A$1bn (est.) for Hornet centre-barrels
less >A$1bn (est.) for Pig ops in 2011 & 12
= A$11.2bn (est.)Magoo

Magoo I agree with your proposed structure and note that if the ADF were to adjust the program in such a way we would go a LONG way to mitigating much of the risks that have been outlined on this thread and other JSF threads. I also like the idea that with a staged obsolescence we would be setting the RAAF up nicely to reap the future UCAV developments without us having to wear too much of the financial/technological risk. I also agree with gf about preferring the F-15 but in the interest of lowering program risk accept that the Super Hornet would be the better (read that as simpler) bet.

[Magoo]

Magoo I agree with your proposed structure and note that if the ADF were to adjust the program in such a way we would go a LONG way to mitigating much of the risks that have been outlined on this thread and other JSF threads. I also like the idea that with a staged obsolescence we would be setting the RAAF up nicely to reap the future UCAV developments without us having to wear too much of the financial/technological risk. I also agree with gf about preferring the F-15 but in the interest of lowering program risk accept that the Super Hornet would be the better (read that as simpler) bet.

Thanks for the backup.

Interestingly, a contact of mine tells me the F-15E has a bigger RCS than an F-111 clean and with an equivalent external stores load, while the SH's APG-79 is a better performing radar than the F-15E/K/SG's APG-63(v)2. The SH's systems are also baselined to be network-enabled (is that the right term???:rolleyes: ) whereas the F-15E's kit would require much work to get to an equivalent level.

Magoo

[gf0012-aust]

The simple answer is in two parts. The first is that the numbers just don't stack up - either in terms of capability, cost or risk. What senior Departmental officials are telling the Government, the Parliament and the people of Australia is simply not supported by fact or even informed common sense.

If the numbers are not stacking up, if the Department is misinforming the Govt of the day, then its encumbent on the Opposition to put forward a coherent case whereby the Govt is presented with an "on notice" opportunity.

Lab are not so bereft of corporate knowledge that they're unaware of how the game is played if they seek to do it properly. The fact that their ShadMin failed to listen to his own DLO (and have gone through a succession of ex-Mil DLO's) is probably one of the reasons why they lack credibility and traction on this issue.

When the volume and style of Press Releases generated from his office have obviously changed in the last 6 months, then its blatantly apparent that he's been fed and that he actually doesn't understand some of what he promotes. (irrespective of any platform idealogical views that kick in)

eg, I know for a fact that navy have briefed ShadMin on specific issues - and with the full knowledge of PM&C and the "Dream Team", and yet he has then still carried on as though he's been left out of the knowledge loop. Its somewhat not surprising then when his credibility is called into question on other issues.

ergo - using ShadMin as a vehicle of influence to try and get the JSF binned puts you on a hiding to nowhere real fast.

The second part is, basically, national pride in our Defence Forces (the ADF and the hard working people in the Department who support them) and a desire for what is best for Australia and future generations of Australians. This is a common aim amongst those of us who have joined or who support the Group.

Having been in Govt at the time that the press was having a field day with the Collins Class, albeit highly coloured and somewhat cavalier in truth as well - then I'm not sure why anyone would try and persist with an appeal to the public domain for change. Some of the stuff presented by the press (and still presented by the press) about the Collins is absolute nonsense - and yet even though there are a few who know its untrue - the damage has been permanent (in some areas). A recent stellar example is the sideshow that Bracks put on about Victorian capability re the ANZACs vis a vis South Australia and the Collins (and thus QA issues for the AWD). I sent him a polite spray and pointed out where he'd been spectacularly untruthful and where he had the gall to present it as fact. Surprisingly (jk), the vendors and some of the suppliers were feeding the State Govt and their tame press to distort facts and thus appear innocent of culpability. For a recent example of vendor insincerity and negligence, then go no further than Forgacs, or the work done on the ANZACs or on HMAS Sydney.

Industry in Australia is credible? I gather that you haven't sat in on any of the early AIDN events when JSF offshore manuf was being discussed and everyone held hands and touted their capability in front of reps from US Dept Commerce, Boeing and DARPA. I've never heard such self serving tripe in one room anywhere.

Just because someone isn't in "the Group" doesn't mean that they are not working to improve processes and change. At present it seems that the elements outside of the "Group" are actually having greater success in scoring work and generating attention. (eg Charles Rutter's Qld model). perhaps thats because they're better at "politicking"

The more complex answer goes beyond the scope of a posting on a forum like this. However, the following three points are at its centre.

1. The collective you mention, namely, "ADF brass/DMO/DSTO/DefMin" should be split into two groups - the senior officials (or the bosses) and the workers/do-ers. Since the late 1990s, when the negatives of the consequential deskilling from the downsizing of Defence started to take effect, there has been a marked change, particularly within the Department (in Canberra) and, more particularly, at the senior leadership level, both in uniform and civilian. Prior to this change, the bosses used to listen to and take heed of the workers. This is not the case today, as many in our Group can attest.

Blaming the outsourcing model per se has partial relevance - but its more of an issue that the outsourcing model as defined and pushed by Govt was completely inapprop as well. Its also an issue of change management. The two primary features of Defence industry have been compromised from within.

I sat in on the panel that was tasked to determine the benefits of outsourcing within ADF. We argued at the time that less than 8% of international models demonstrated success in outsourcing and that it should be carefully approached on that basis if at all. In fact the only stellar example of outsourcing successfully working was an element within the USN. We tried to bring in that model. US Dept of Commerce and the USN were more than willing to help set up a structure - but it failed due to a lack of comprehension on the part of the Tier 2's in Australia who were more focussed on hammering the primes. (The self induced cancer of the SME's)

Federally, the only difference between Lab and Lib was that Lab wanted a 5 year transition - and Libs wanted a 2 year transition. Outsourcing, be it Garrison Support or be it ADF recruitment has been an unmitigated stuff up - but buried as a success. Its been buried by Govt - not by the uniforms or long term suits in the Def Executive. Every reccomendation we made re the outsourcing model was ignored. One only has to look at GS and Rec to see whats happened in the last 9 years - thats not something thats been white-anted from within - thats been an external governance policy issue driven savagely by PM&C and whatever relevant coterie of other super departments that the boss calls on.

Despite the negative comments this post will no doubt attract, I hope this helps you better understand the reasons behind the position that many are now taking.

The problem I have is that you appear selective in your criticism, and that it smacks of the oft expressed internal "mafia" or who are held responsible as soon as interest groups don't get their own pet projects across the line.

To whit. I've had dealings with Peter Goon from the early foundation days of the DTC. Personally I like him - he's a personable bloke and is passionate about what he believes in, - but at the political level I don't think he's done himself (and issues he promotes), any favours with this Fed Govt. I know of people within the DTC and AIDN who actively worked against him because of idealogical and operation style differences - and I know that there are others who loathe him with a passion both personally and operationally. Schitt happens. You work with what you've got. Sometimes you're damned by association.

Its a damocles sword.

[swerve]

Thanks for the backup.

Interestingly, a contact of mine tells me the F-15E has a bigger RCS than an F-111 clean and with an equivalent external stores load, while the SH's APG-79 is a better performing radar than the F-15E/K/SG's APG-63(v)2. The SH's systems are also baselined to be network-enabled (is that the right term???:rolleyes: ) whereas the F-15E's kit would require much work to get to an equivalent level.

Magoo

I think a comparison should be between the APG-79 & APG-63(V)3. the (v)2 is now out of the picture for the USAF F-15 upgrade, IIRC.

BTW, the F-15Ks are being delivered with the APG-63(v)1, but may be upgraded to AESA. I believe Singapore is getting the (v)3, not (v)2.

[Magoo]

I think a comparison should be between the APG-79 & APG-63(V)3. the (v)2 is now out of the picture for the USAF F-15 upgrade, IIRC.

BTW, the F-15Ks are being delivered with the APG-63(v)1, but may be upgraded to AESA. I believe Singapore is getting the (v)3, not (v)2.

You're right, good pickup. The (v)1 was the original upgrade for the F-15C and is for the F-15K (similar to the APG-65 to APG-73 upgrade), the (v)2 is the first AESA upgrade/retrofit, and (v)3 is for the SGs and will be retrofitted to F-15Es. It uses some elements from the APG-79 which makes it lighter, more reliable, and easier to service.

Cheers

Magoo