Australian M1A1 Abrams technology

[FutureTank]

There is mob, who run around the battlefield who have the moniker downunder of "Ginger-Beers". They also go by the initials RAE. One of their most famous units has a red rooster for its symbol. They like to build bridges, dig holes and blow things up for amusement and the infantry take advantage of their good nature. :rolleyes:

I know the sappers took a Bailey bridge to East Timor, but this is not a tactical bridging equipment, is it?
I suppose they can dozer the banks in a hurry...

[Waylander]

I have a question.

Am I right that the Aussie M1A1 AIM version has no independent commanders sight/periscope and so has no hunter/killer capabilities?

[rickshaw]

I know the sappers took a Bailey bridge to East Timor, but this is not a tactical bridging equipment, is it?


I severely doubt they took a Bailey Bridge anywhere as they have used Bailey Bridges for about 20 years. Fairy Light Bridges can be utilised as a tactical bridging equipment if necessary. A span can be erected and pushed into place.

Infantry would usually cross by boat and establish a bridgehead first, then the Ginger-Beers would span the gap. Afterall, its not the infantry themselves that need to cross the gap but rather their support vehicles.


I suppose they can dozer the banks in a hurry...

If they need to, yes, they can. Thats another option.

[rickshaw]

I have a question.

Am I right that the Aussie M1A1 AIM version has no independent commanders sight/periscope and so has no hunter/killer capabilities?

Does it really need it? Afterall, there are no MBTs in our region.

[Waylander]

And independent commanders sight with zoom and TI which can be operated under armor is always quite usefull not just against enemy tanks.
Makes obersvation especially at night and over bigger distances much easier.

[FutureTank]

I severely doubt they took a Bailey Bridge anywhere as they have used Bailey Bridges for about 20 years. Fairy Light Bridges can be utilised as a tactical bridging equipment if necessary.

Wasn' tthere a story some years ago about Australians building a bridge in East Timore? I think I saw it in the papaers and the picture looked like a Bailey bridge. Maybe they took one out of storage and donated it?

[rickshaw]

Wasn' tthere a story some years ago about Australians building a bridge in East Timore? I think I saw it in the papaers and the picture looked like a Bailey bridge. Maybe they took one out of storage and donated it?

I doubt we even still have any "in storage". Fairy Light Bridging equipment looks superficially similar to the untrained eye as the old Bailey stuff. Baileys were made from steel and timber. FLB is made from aluminium (and steel). I often wish there was a good definitive history of military bridging equipment but there isn't (excuse me, I need to find my anorak ;) ).

[Aussie Digger]

Someone told me he went over 40km/h at Shoalhaven in late 80s and got severely reprimanded by RSM later who was apparently watching from another vehicle about 500m away. No injuries, but it was a bumpy ride.

BTW, does anyone know if we ever had M113 AVLB variant? (Even a borrowed one in Vietnam)

Anything much over 35-40k's an hour is unsustainable for any length of time in an M113A1. The danger of "throwing a track" is too great. At least with the old "single pin" tracks we had at 2/14. The newer double pins are probably more resilient, but they're not really built for speed and they can't travel fast even on metalled roads.

Trying to drive at 67kph off road is lunacy. The chances of hitting a depression or a tree stump you can't see as it's covered by grass will ruin anyone's day, helmet or not...

As to Army's bridging capability, it's been enhanced in recent years and furrther phases of Land 139 will enhance this.

photo's of recent bridging acquisitions can be seen here:

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1107/topstories/story06.htm

New bridging "boat" capabilities are outlined here (though no photo's):

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1073/topstories/story08.htm

and here:

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1095/topstories/story09.htm

[old faithful]

Ive heard of drivers in 5/7 wearing mouth guards!

[FutureTank]

Anything much over 35-40k's an hour is unsustainable for any length of time in an M113A1. The danger of "throwing a track" is too great. At least with the old "single pin" tracks we had at 2/14. The newer double pins are probably more resilient, but they're not really built for speed and they can't travel fast even on metalled roads.

Trying to drive at 67kph off road is lunacy. The chances of hitting a depression or a tree stump you can't see as it's covered by grass will ruin anyone's day, helmet or not...

As to Army's bridging capability, it's been enhanced in recent years and furrther phases of Land 139 will enhance this.

photo's of recent bridging acquisitions can be seen here:

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1107/topstories/story06.htm

New bridging "boat" capabilities are outlined here (though no photo's):

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1073/topstories/story08.htm

and here:

http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1095/topstories/story09.htm

Thank you muchly AD. So it is like a Bailey.
Sappers are getting some good equippment :)

[FutureTank]

Anything much over 35-40k's an hour is unsustainable for any length of time in an M113A1. The danger of "throwing a track" is too great. At least with the old "single pin" tracks we had at 2/14. The newer double pins are probably more resilient, but they're not really built for speed and they can't travel fast even on metalled roads.

Trying to drive at 67kph off road is lunacy. The chances of hitting a depression or a tree stump you can't see as it's covered by grass will ruin anyone's day, helmet or not...

My understanding is that you would not want to be driving on road at over 60km/h either. There have been several accidents with BFVs in Iraq due to unsafe driving/speeding.
Besides that, its hard to react to/survey the roadway at those speeds for ambushes and mines.

Then there is fuel economy and surface damage if the surface is not metalled.

[Aussie Digger]

My understanding is that you would not want to be driving on road at over 60km/h either. There have been several accidents with BFVs in Iraq due to unsafe driving/speeding.
Besides that, its hard to react to/survey the roadway at those speeds for ambushes and mines.

Then there is fuel economy and surface damage if the surface is not metalled.

IN actual fact ASLAV and Bushmasters in Iraq are REQUIRED to travel on metalled roads in excess of 60kph, as a tactical measure to reduce the chance of ambush.

It's a bit hard to mine a "metalled" road, I'd imagine, though those of us who are more engineer inclined amongst us, might be able to correct me there. IED's of course, planted BESIDE the road are a huge threat and again speed can only help avoid such items. I would be rather upset if a troop commander ordered ME to travel SLOWLY through such an environment... :confused:

Of course the M113A1's as presently configured are in no state to be deployed to Iraq, an M113A3/4 might have been considered for deployment, given the greater protection levels they will have over any other "light vehicle" in current Australian service, but of course Tenix has done such a masterful upgrade job on them to date, that this point is in fact moot...

[FutureTank]

IN actual fact ASLAV and Bushmasters in Iraq are REQUIRED to travel on metalled roads in excess of 60kph, as a tactical measure to reduce the chance of ambush...

I was assuming a tracked vehicle, not a wheeled one.
Still, I imagine with civilian traffic around it may be difficult to maintain 60km/h speeds even with ASLAVs and Bushmasters?

[eckherl]

Do M1 capabilities change in any way how Australian infantry operate with tanks, and if so, how does it impact on the vehicles used by the infantry and other Arms and Services?

You are going to need a better infantry battle taxi as far as speed, the U.S is back at placing phones on the back of tanks again for better communication between infantry squads and tanks, this will work out great for defensive battle positions, I am not a big fan on taking heavy armor to a urbanized setting without major ground pounder support, this should also help out in that category. this will be very interesting on how close your infantry wants to get to the back of the tank with how hot the exhaust is, it will bubble paint and spider web wind shields on cars. I have heard some folks ask the question on why infantry cannot ride on a M1 series tank, here is the major reasons why. 1. engine deck gets way too hot. 2. turret movement is very quick and violent. 3. they would not be able to ride on top of the turret because of the blow off panels, plus no cover.

[gf0012-aust]

I was assuming a tracked vehicle, not a wheeled one.

Still, I imagine with civilian traffic around it may be difficult to maintain 60km/h speeds even with ASLAVs and Bushmasters?

Cut and paste from another forum I posted this on:

the whole tracks vs tyred argument is rather academic - and its really a requirements issue and is certainly one influenced by doctrine. each have their benefits.

anyway - an australian perspective on ASLAVs (which are closely related to Strykers) The issue of why we travel at speed is important within the body of this interview.

Interview with WO2 Graham McBean, re ASLAV performance in Iraq.

July 25, 2005

ASLAV crew from 2/14 Light Horse, recently returned from service in Security Detachment VI Bravo in Baghdad, Iraq

CPL Andrew Cameron

Basically, it’s got wide view capabilities, high speed, good armour and its got firepower – overall a really good vehicle.

It is very aggressive and you can use it in urban terrain or in more open desert terrain as well that goes with the firepower you can use it at short range of long range so it really suited our needs in BD.

M113 excellent vehicle as well in own right. Same again the ASLAV has its own place as well. I don’t think you can pick because they both have their own place. However for the job that we did overseas the ASLAV was the perfect vehicle.

The US was using Bradleys [M2A3 Bradley IFV] and they are a tracked vehicle I believe the ASLAV was a lot better and better suited to needs than the Bradley.

QUESTION: Example?

The speed and the maneuverability. We can travel up to 110km/hr in convoy and still have a lot of maneuverability because it is wheeled and you can steer a lot smoother and a lot safer. Whereas the tracked vehicle isn’t as fast and they are a lot noisier as well. We weren’t doing a lot of reconnaissance that required us to be quiet but it was a lot quieter.

One of the runs we did out on the Red Zone where traffic was quite thick we had extra things put on the vehicle with lights and sirens and extremely loud sirens similar to the police sirens and with the speed of the vehicle and the other things included the traffic would just peel away and we would punch straight through and no-one would get in our way.

Also if required if traffic couldn’t get out of the way we could quite easily just jump the gutter and get out of the road and we could jump back and forth reasonably large gutters without any dramas.

With tracks you are going to do some extra damage and we are not there to destroy the infra so the wheels did provide extra protection.

TPR Tim Cooper

The vehicle held up really well. Servicing was a breeze and it was easy to service in country. There were no major faults other than general wear and tear on the vehicle. You only needed to do daily maintenance because the vehicle was so reliable.

The vehicle doesn’t have any major dramas with the engine cooling. One thought I had before going over was how would the vehicle op in such a hot climate and constant running and id had no issues at all maintaining a good operating temperature.

At times out in the Red Zone the vehicle was quite maneuverable. The traffic would be chockers and back to back. With the EWS which are the lights and sirens you would give them warning and if they can’t move which in some instance they couldn’t just due to the infrastructure and traffic we could just jump the traffic and move on.

You might have just enough room for the vehicle to move through and just because it was a wheeled vehicle it was very easy to turn and move through and the steering capability of them is unreal.

The M113 was good because you can turn on the spot but just the speed of the ASLAV meant you could maneuver into somewhere and exit – it was outstanding.

It is good to have all the necessary backup with the maintenance. As a driver you get through a lot of knowledge in training and pick up from people who have worked on them on the vehicle little things that can make it easier. Your general training and experience with the vehicle the maintenance you can fix most things and you get in and help the RAEME do any major tasks.

In convoy the US might be doing between 40 and 60km/hr and we were between 80-100km/hr and it was just a good feeling and just our general training and TTPs makes you feel safe.

Before we went back to Australia a Bradley crew come down with their vehicle and we spoke to them about what we liked and disliked about each vehicle they had a look through the ASLAV and they rate it, they really do. They jumped in and had a play, they love the speed. The Bradley has the similar firepower to the ASLAV and they love the fact the ASLAV has the speed to go with it.

QUESTION: Can you think back to a time where you saw the US operating and thought I’m glad I’ve got this.

CPL Andrew Cameron

Almost every day.

We would overtake them on a run say from the Green Zone to the airport and they might have had a convoy of about 10 Hummers that were up-armoured but their armour still isn’t as heavy as ours and they might be traveling 40-60km/hr but we could just fly past them going 110/hr and they might even have a couple of armoured vehicle escorting like the Bradley or Abrams tank. Even then we felt safer than they were due to the speed that we were traveling.

Our basic TTPs which is constant scanning whereas the Americans sit back and look fwd, they don’t scan or anything.

I didn’t get any direct comments from the Americans. There were a couple of SAF talking about their TTPs around traffic and they said they needed to act like the Australians and be more aggressive in the traffic and jumping gutters to get them through.

QUESTION: What about the sighting systems?

CPL Andrew Cameron

They have almost similar firepower and almost the same turret on the Bradley but I jumped in one and the sights were shocking compared to our sights. I couldn’t believe they used them.

I jumped in the Bradley turret and they have got basically a thermal sight which the gunner uses and I think they had a day sight which the commander can use. The thermal sight I turned it on and I couldn’t make anything out through it. The ASLAV has a Delco target acquisition system it’s the new sight that we use on the Phase 3 ASLAVs that is excellent. I just could not believe how bad the Bradley sight was compared to the ASLAV sight.

As well as that the gunner has two sights that he can use and the commander had three sights that can be used: thermal, day sight for the gunner and the commander has a slave thermal from the gunner’s sight, his individual day sight and an image intensifying sight as well. So if one system goes down there are always backups where the Bradley was limited.

I just want to mention the new weapon system we have on the Type 2s which we are trialing overseas. It is called the RWS the remote weapon station and basically it is the same system off the American Striker which is a very similar vehicle to the ASLAV. Basically, the .50cal, it is a mount that can fit a .50 cal or a MK19 automatic grenade launcher and its sighting system is a thermal and a day sight, it is basically a day camera and that’s excellent as well. It enables 20 x magnifications on your day sight and I believe 7.5 on thermal.

That’s excellent because with the old mount the commander used to have to stand up almost to waist height to use the weapon system whereas now all that needs to be exposed is the head just for situational awareness and when using the weapon system he can be totally closed down because he has a small tv screen in front of him and basically a thumb controller to control the weapon system which has 360 arc whereas the old one was very limited in its arc.

That is something I don’t believe the Army has purchased yet as they are just trailing it over in Iraq but it would be an excellent improvement for the vehicle. It is also extremely accurate whereas the old mount which is just a pintle mount is so inaccurate you wouldn’t think about using it in an urban environment until it was your last resort.


Further dribble by me re a Sparks/Meyers comment on tracked vehicles:

6 and 8 wheeled vehicles are certainly driveable if they've had a station blown off - and even if they've had 2 stations adjacent they are still highly likely to be drivable. The design is balanced to take such things into consideration. Even the latter (post korean war typically) 4wd's are designed to be able to still be driven if they lose a quadrant. To argue that they can't is somewhat disingenuous if not outright untruthful and mischievous. Some of the tests done for the australian 4 wheel Bushmaster include drivability tests with one wheel completely removed

and wholeheartedly agree on runflats. on the ASLAVs they are certainly able to drive away quickly even if they are only left with rims due to shrapnel shredding. on an 8 wheeler like the ASLAV or stryker, even if they were to lose two adjacent wheel stations on one side they would still be able to drive off. The vehicles are balanced to be able to do so.

Part of the proximity and penetration tests conducted on armoured wheeled vehicles specifically tests platforms under these compromised conditions.

[Waylander]

Yeah. Light wheeled units are good for operarions like in Iraq.
But of you have to go cross country with your IFVs and operate together with your tanks you have a problem.
You would talk more about the armor and cross country perfomance if you would face real threats like other IFVs.
I totally agree that vehicles like the Piranha design are good for Iraqi and UN oversea style missions but if you go again hayve forces you have some things to think about.

[NZLAV]

Put a Javelin in the back and it's a wicked vehilce (LAVIII's). It's fast, well armed for its role and is versitile. How would an NZLAV with a Javelin squad in the back compare to say a Bradley or warrior?

[FutureTank]

Per gf0012-aust's post, its an excellent example of how designs must reflect user needs not engineering or doctrine theory.

However the Bradley was designed for a very different type of operation, and the example with bad sights may have been delivered as far back as 20 years ago (if the unit was Guard rather then Active).

The ability to manoeuvre is important, but ASLAV (with 275 hp) is about 13 ton compared to M2's (with 600 hp) 30 ton! Fair is fair, but basic breaking and stopping become much more difficult with extra 17 ton on your back :) The M2 is only able to do 66km/h so can't get 110 out of it if you tried ;)

It seem to compare ASLAV to Bradley is not fair, and Stryker is more of the match. However Australia has no Stryker equivalent.

I for one was very surprised when the LAV was selected for the Cavalry because most armies were abandoning wheeled vehicles in the recon role.

Success of the MOWAG is somewhat bewildering.

[Mick73]

Future Tank
Which armies have abandoned wheeled vehicles in the recon role?
I for one think the ASLAV series have been a great sucess and the Cav and Inf units that have used them and they probably would agree on that. For our enviroment and deployment requirments they do what we need them to do. The debate of which is better "track vs wheeled" will go on for many year to come. The fact remains that the ASLAV is a good vehicle and its served our needs well.
For LAND 400 it would be worth looking at the LAV IV or III for a replacement for the M113AS4 series. Our Mech forces are probably never going to need to go up against heavy armour or ATGM's to a level that we need a Heavy IFV. What we need is fast, easy to maintain and light IFV, be it wheeled or tracked that can cross rivers and move well on our terrain. Having the M1 as mobile fire support for these formations, not the other way around. We don't and never will have the manpower or supply to maintain a heavy armour brigade.
The problem we will have is large AO's with few assets to sercure them.
With the combination of the M1's, ASLAV's, ARH's and UAV's (which I believe all of our Bde's need at Bde level), would make good use of what we have now and in years to come. In a COIN enviroment, speed and vision is better than armour and firepower for vehicles on the ground. In a dream world we could and would love to have a range of vehicles for many different task but we don't.
The dream team:
M1A2's plus all variants for 1 Armd (3 Sqn's)
CV9040's for 2 Cav and 3 Cav (its the dream team remember)
CV9040's plus all variants for 5 and 7 RAR plus 8/9 RAR (its the dream team remember)
Tiger ARH for 161 and 162 Recce Sqn's
AH-64D's 163 Recce Sqn (its the dream team remember)
SPH's for 3 Bty's
Question is would we need all of this? Answer No!
What we need is a Armoured fleet that we can and will use, that provides protection from mines and Lt AT weapons for our most costly asset... the soldier.

[FutureTank]

Future Tank
Which armies have abandoned wheeled vehicles in the recon role?
.....The fact remains that the ASLAV is a good vehicle and its served our needs well.
For LAND 400 it would be worth looking at the LAV IV or III for a replacement for the M113AS4 series. Our Mech forces are probably never going to need to go up against heavy armour or ATGM's to a level that we need a Heavy IFV. What we need is fast, easy to maintain and light IFV, be it wheeled or tracked that can cross rivers and move well on our terrain. The dream team:
M1A2's plus all variants for 1 Armd (3 Sqn's)
CV9040's for 2 Cav and 3 Cav (its the dream team remember)
CV9040's plus all variants for 5 and 7 RAR plus 8/9 RAR (its the dream team remember)
Tiger ARH for 161 and 162 Recce Sqn's
AH-64D's 163 Recce Sqn (its the dream team remember)
SPH's for 3 Bty's
What we need is a Armoured fleet that we can and will use, that provides protection from mines and Lt AT weapons for our most costly asset... the soldier.

Firstly, what I said was that I was surprised at LAV selection AT THE TIME, because wheeled recon vehicles were being abandoned AT THE TIME.

Wheeled vehicles have problems with ground pressure, and this can't be changed. They will not have the capability to negotiate some terrains, particularly when soil type is subjected to inundation, or some of the sandy desert terrains. However these are far and between so far as ADF probable AOs are concerned. They are MUCH better on fuel economy on harder surfaces.

If Australia is unwilling to take on domestic IFV design and production, and if there are no ideas that would contribute to advancing IFV design over the 1950s cross of APC and light tank, then alsmost any current crop of overseas built IFV will do.

ADF deploys inbattalion battlegroups. The reality is that regimental associatio is a legacy org which does not function on deployment, so I think the whole force structure needs to be rethought.
I would suggest that in terms of actual field command Corps elements need to be permananetly assigned to battalions.
I'm not suggesting regiments be disbanded of course, but since an entire helicopter squadron is unlikely to be deployed, it seems to me the helicopters should be assigned to battalions by flights.
UAVs likewise should work at battalion level with recon troops. Same goes for tanks. I just can't see three squadrons of M1s deploying as one regiment.

Waylander suggested that Puma is a great improvement on the Marder, so I would expect it to be a strong competitor for the LAND 400. On the other hand US has the FCS program going, and UK has a similar project (although I think it is likely to culminate with a much improved version of Warrior).

SP artillery is a bit problematic. On the one hand it is a crucial part of a force structure on the modern battlefield. On the other hand the systems are as hard to deploy as the M1 tanks, and requires higher levels of logistic support. This becomes problematic when one considers ADF's modest sealift capability.
I actually think that we need to consider light artillery systems on the LAND 400 platform (or FSV role at least) integrated at battalion level.

How many L400 vehicles will ADF get for the 1.5bn budget? If there is no design and development in Australia, and the unit price is kept at about AU$3m, then about 500 vehicles. This seems unlikely given the nearly AU$11.5m price tag for the Puma (based on reported Eu3bm for 410 vehicles reports), which would only allow for about 130 vehicles. ADF reported need is for at least (about) 475 vehicles to AT LEAST replace the M113AS3/4s and ASLAVs.
In US the cost progression had been from the US$80,000 for M113 to US$1.947 for M2/3 Bradley (FY1984), a more then 100% increase over a generation (20 years), so I can't expect anything with a price tag of less then US$5m from US (and $7m is more likely).

This was my argument for domestic design and production using a mixture of COTS/MOTS systems to suplement systems that require specific defence application. As I see it this is the only way to ensure lower unit costs.

[eckherl]

Yeah. Light wheeled units are good for operarions like in Iraq.
But of you have to go cross country with your IFVs and operate together with your tanks you have a problem.
You would talk more about the armor and cross country perfomance if you would face real threats like other IFVs.
I totally agree that vehicles like the Piranha design are good for Iraqi and UN oversea style missions but if you go again hayve forces you have some things to think about.

Yep - this is one of the reasons that the Russians went with Bmp`s to replace the BTR series, also we have had some issues with the Strykers not being able to negotiate some of the terrian in Iraq, this could have deadly results on the battlefield if you have to turn around so to speak because you cannot get thru a certain area. (Choke point)

[Waylander]

The problem is that you have to do more basic development than established producers.
So the development process should be more expensive and take more time than for example for an established company.
So an self developed vehicle is likely to be more expensive and later ready than a vehicle with similar capabilities bought off the shelf.

[FutureTank]

The problem is that you have to do more basic development than established producers.
So the development process should be more expensive and take more time than for example for an established company.
So an self developed vehicle is likely to be more expensive and later ready than a vehicle with similar capabilities bought off the shelf.

I can't agree, if only because of German expereince!

The SdKfz251 in WW2 used the MOTS approach, as did many other infantry and support vehicles. The earlier German tanks relied on tractor manufacturing industry for this approach. Same for USSR.

I think with Cold War over, AFV engineers will be forced to rediscover more cooperative designs if they are to achieve scales and sales :)

[Waylander]

I do not talk especially german experience.
I do talk of basic economical facts.
There are companies out there who have experience, test data, etc.
Every developed first world country should be able to cope with them but first they have to solve the gap and this takes time and money.

Nothing more, nothing less.

[rickshaw]

Firstly, what I said was that I was surprised at LAV selection AT THE TIME, because wheeled recon vehicles were being abandoned AT THE TIME.


Were they? According to whom? At the same time as the LAV was being adopted, you had the Luchs, various Panhard and AMX-10RCs being adopted, the Fox CVRT(W), the South Africans the Rooikat and so on. Some nations were, to wit the US Army with the M3 and the Russians with their BMP-R. I'd actually suggest it was pretty much a mixed bag, with some armies giving up on wheels, some going back to them AT THE TIME, Futuretank. You really should stop making sweeping statements, particularly ones based upon such a subjective viewpoint.


Wheeled vehicles have problems with ground pressure, and this can't be changed. They will not have the capability to negotiate some terrains, particularly when soil type is subjected to inundation, or some of the sandy desert terrains. However these are far and between so far as ADF probable AOs are concerned. They are MUCH better on fuel economy on harder surfaces.


Wheeled vehicles can have tyre inflations changed to largely overcome those problems. While they can't negotiated all terrains they can and do come very close to the ability of tracked vehicles and of course confer higher speeds, lower fuel consumption and greater strategic mobility on the vehicles.


If Australia is unwilling to take on domestic IFV design and production, and if there are no ideas that would contribute to advancing IFV design over the 1950s cross of APC and light tank, then alsmost any current crop of overseas built IFV will do.

ADF deploys inbattalion battlegroups. The reality is that regimental associatio is a legacy org which does not function on deployment, so I think the whole force structure needs to be rethought.


The ADF hasn't, since the Boer war, used regimental organisations for deployment of its infantry units.

[FutureTank]

Were they? According to whom? At the same time as the LAV was being adopted, you had the Luchs, various Panhard and AMX-10RCs being adopted, the Fox CVRT(W), the South Africans the Rooikat and so on. Some nations were, to wit the US Army with the M3 and the Russians with their BMP-R. I'd actually suggest it was pretty much a mixed bag, with some armies giving up on wheels, some going back to them AT THE TIME, Futuretank. You really should stop making sweeping statements, particularly ones based upon such a subjective viewpoint.

All the models you listed were designed and put into production in mid to late 70s. ASLAV (not even ASLAV then) was first acquired in 1990.

I have my subjective views and you have yours :) Being objective all the time requires having someone else's views.

Wheeled vehicles can have tyre inflations changed to largely overcome those problems. While they can't negotiated all terrains they can and do come very close to the ability of tracked vehicles and of course confer higher speeds, lower fuel consumption and greater strategic mobility on the vehicles.

Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.

The ADF hasn't, since the Boer war, used regimental organisations for deployment of its infantry units.

Did I say organisation?
The suggestion was, if you read more carefully, that ALTHOUGH the PREDOMINANT Corps (Infantry) deploys in BATTALION battlegroups, other Arms and Services do not maintain their regimental ASSOCIATION (within the battlegroup), such as the Armour, helicopters, signals, arty, supply, etc. None of these supporting arms and services ever deploy as regiments, so why have them as such. When is the 2nd Cav ever going to deploy as a regiment?
Keep the regimental associations as administrative/legacy orgs, but the constituent parts shoudl go to battlegroups on permanent basis.

Not sure why you need to be so aggressive in a forum Rickshaw. :confused:

[gf0012-aust]

Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.

??? M113 cannot compete with an ASLAV at road speeds - look at what the SECDET blokes are saying - and they have real world "I'm getting shot at" experience.

BTW, modern wheeled vehicles (for the last 20+ years) have been able to inflate and deflate tyres from within.

Look at the way we operate with an emphasis on recce - tyred vehicles walk all over tracks for noise mitigation, speed and agility.

Please show links on where ASLAVS and their kin requirenew sets after deflated runs.

Any info you have would be interesting as it certainly contradicts the exhaustive testing done in Oz (and I would hazard a guess all of our principal allies and warfighting partners) prior to selection.

[FutureTank]

??? M113 cannot compete with an ASLAV at road speeds - look at what the SECDET blokes are saying - and they have real world "I'm getting shot at" experience.

I was refering to off-road speed (per previous posts) with tyres deflated to suit certaint soil conditions. Commonly wheeled vehicles slow down to 30-40km/h.

[gf0012-aust]

I was refering to off-road speed (per previous posts) with tyres deflated to suit certaint soil conditions. Commonly wheeled vehicles slow down to 30-40km/h.

Any vehicle that is compromised in a convoy and that can't drive off at speed will trigger "circling the wagons" - be it tyred or tracked.

the fact that tyred vehicles were given an absolute workout in Oz and were directly compared against tracks, seems to me to suggest that Army were far more confident of value across a broader set of selection matrices.

Some of the stuff you're suggesting seems to me to be similar to the arguments of Sparks/Meyers and co - who have been a little cavalier with their data.

[Aussie Digger]

All the models you listed were designed and put into production in mid to late 70s. ASLAV (not even ASLAV then) was first acquired in 1990.

ASLAV may have been acquired by AUSTRALIA in the early 90's but the design had been in-service with the USMC and others for 5-10 years before Australia chose it. The first ASLAV's we required were in fact USMC LAV-25 variants.

I have my subjective views and you have yours :) Being objective all the time requires having someone else's views.

Being objective doesn't require ANYONE's views, or to put it another way, requires EVERYONE's views.

Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.

What does this mean exactly? What speed? Over what environment? ASLAV's have an internal tyre inflation/deflation system. They can raise and lower their tyre pressures as required. One thing they are not however, is as quick over "difficult" ground, which is why IMHO wheel armoured vehicles will never entirely replace tracked vehicles.

Did I say organisation?
The suggestion was, if you read more carefully, that ALTHOUGH the PREDOMINANT Corps (Infantry) deploys in BATTALION battlegroups, other Arms and Services do not maintain their regimental ASSOCIATION (within the battlegroup), such as the Armour, helicopters, signals, arty, supply, etc. None of these supporting arms and services ever deploy as regiments, so why have them as such. When is the 2nd Cav ever going to deploy as a regiment?
Keep the regimental associations as administrative/legacy orgs, but the constituent parts shoudl go to battlegroups on permanent basis.

Not sure why you need to be so aggressive in a forum Rickshaw. :confused:

The problem with this is you are only giving consideration to deployed forces. Australian forces' primary responsibility are DoA operations. Should Army ever be required to undertake these operations they will fight as per their "paper" structure.

Australia forces on operations deploy taskforces not "battalion battlegroups". They form battlegroups for training and operational purposes, but I fail to see the benefit of "permanently" grouping these forces together.

The predominant training conducted by Army is the Corps specific training necessary to generate the necessary capability each Corps is required to provide. Joint training is vitally important and the ability to generate combined arms forces is essential to modern combat, but the basis for this is each unit comprising such achieving mastery of it's own particular role.

This along with efficiency's gained from grouping limited numbers of assets in combined accomodation (ie: ARH tigers and M1A1 tanks based together in regimental sized formations) is the reason it's done. With such small forces, I can't see any benefit in making what we have even smaller by spreading it out more.

I CAN see that it would cost a lot more.

You are also taking a narrow view of the predominantly "limited" deployments we are currently undertake.

Remember Army's strategic guidance under White Paper 2000. It is REQUIRED to maintain the ability to deploy a brigade sized formation (ie: Internet sized force) AND a battalion group to different theatres simultaneously. IF such a scenario occurred, then 2 Cav (along with the rest of 1 Brigade) may indeed deploy as an entire Regiment.

[FutureTank]

Any vehicle that is compromised in a convoy and that can't drive off at speed will trigger "circling the wagons" - be it tyred or tracked.

the fact that tyred vehicles were given an absolute workout in Oz and were directly compared against tracks, seems to me to suggest that Army were far more confident of value across a broader set of selection matrices.

Some of the stuff you're suggesting seems to me to be similar to the arguments of Sparks/Meyers and co - who have been a little cavalier with their data.

gf, I was not talking about convoy ops.
I had seen data from several wheeled LAV-like types that suggest deflated tyre 'optimum' speed of around 30km/h, and I can find it for you again.

I'm aware of the 'Gavin' sites of course. What I said however has nothing to do with either their arguments or data. I was told that early Australian experience with LAVs led to ADF having to replace some wheel assamblies and increase stock in tyres. However my understanding is that this was due to operationg over unusual soil conditions (no further info I'm afraid).

[rickshaw]

All the models you listed were designed and put into production in mid to late 70s. ASLAV (not even ASLAV then) was first acquired in 1990.


The Mowag Piranha design had been around for at least 10-15 years before that, FT. The US Marines had adopted it at least five years earlier. The US Army had attempted to adopt it but hadn't really been interested in it and botched the effort - perhaps deliberately. The Canadians had adopted it even earlier than the US Marines (and they'd got it from the Canadians).


I have my subjective views and you have yours :) Being objective all the time requires having someone else's views.


I'd suggest your views tend to be very subjective.


Absolutely. With tyre deflation the ASLAV comes close to the M113 in speed, and requires a new set of tyres after the expereince.


Does it? The South Africans after they adopted the Rooikat reported that the maintenance problems associated with tyres was about on par with tracked vehicles and the conditions in the RSA are similar to Oz.


Did I say organisation?
The suggestion was, if you read more carefully, that ALTHOUGH the PREDOMINANT Corps (Infantry) deploys in BATTALION battlegroups, other Arms and Services do not maintain their regimental ASSOCIATION (within the battlegroup), such as the Armour, helicopters, signals, arty, supply, etc. None of these supporting arms and services ever deploy as regiments, so why have them as such. When is the 2nd Cav ever going to deploy as a regiment?


I think you are confusing Regiment and Corps. Units are not broken up because it increases the administration burden for specialised units. Therefore they tend to deploy as units, not as parts there of.


Keep the regimental associations as administrative/legacy orgs, but the constituent parts shoudl go to battlegroups on permanent basis.


Doesn't work because infantry units do not understand the administrative needs of specialised units and specialised units do not understand the administrative needs of infantry.


Not sure why you need to be so aggressive in a forum Rickshaw. :confused:

I am not being aggressive. You want to see me being aggressive? :flame

[FutureTank]

ASLAV may have been acquired by AUSTRALIA in the early 90's but the design had been in-service with the USMC and others for 5-10 years before Australia chose it. The first ASLAV's we required were in fact USMC LAV-25 variants.

Yes, which is why I said that I was surprised. By the time USMC got them, they were virtually the last to do so.

Being objective doesn't require ANYONE's views, or to put it another way, requires EVERYONE's views.

Well, somone has to be right. Sometimes one has to take a subjective view of something YOU believe in even if objective arguument suggests otherwise.

What does this mean exactly? What speed? Over what environment? ASLAV's have an internal tyre inflation/deflation system. They can raise and lower their tyre pressures as required. One thing they are not however, is as quick over "difficult" ground, which is why IMHO wheel armoured vehicles will never entirely replace tracked vehicles.

Yes, I know all this. I also know that there was work done on the ASLAV wheels. I think the problem was tyre overheating?

The problem with this is you are only giving consideration to deployed forces. Australian forces' primary responsibility are DoA operations. Should Army ever be required to undertake these operations they will fight as per their "paper" structure.
Under what circumstances?

Australia forces on operations deploy taskforces not "battalion battlegroups". They form battlegroups for training and operational purposes, but I fail to see the benefit of "permanently" grouping these forces together.
Ok, 'taskforce' refers to the command of the mission, and can be any size from company to brigade. However it is 'likely' (I would say preferable) that whole battalion is deployed as the core taskforce combat component.

The predominant training conducted by Army is the Corps specific training necessary to generate the necessary capability each Corps is required to provide. Joint training is vitally important and the ability to generate combined arms forces is essential to modern combat, but the basis for this is each unit comprising such achieving mastery of it's own particular role.
Corps training is done all over the place. Joint trainign can only be done with a specific unit training area. The ADF commonly moves individuals and small groups around to train in Corps skills. Shifting whole units is what increases costs.

This along with efficiency's gained from grouping limited numbers of assets in combined accomodation (ie: ARH tigers and M1A1 tanks based together in regimental sized formations) is the reason it's done. With such small forces, I can't see any benefit in making what we have even smaller by spreading it out more.
When tank aquadrons were sent to Vietnam, they brought all required service personnel and equipment with them. There was no way out of that.
All I'm saying is that given we are at war, and are likely to remain in a state of war for some time, ADF should accep tthe realities of wartime posture and structure its assets accordingly. Unfortunatelly in some ways it will cost more.
Now consider what mayham happens if and when a battalion-sized taskforce should be required to deploy. All kinds of people are pulled out of their jobs and moved to the battalion in question. Equipment is coming from all over the place because Army usually doesn't (sadly) have the 'paper strength'. This is also cost. Of course lately quite a bit has been spent on Defence so maybe I'm wrong and all is well (at least with 1 Brigade).

I CAN see that it would cost a lot more.
Yes, so can I.

You are also taking a narrow view of the predominantly "limited" deployments we are currently undertake.

Remember Army's strategic guidance under White Paper 2000. It is REQUIRED to maintain the ability to deploy a brigade sized formation (ie: Internet sized force) AND a battalion group to different theatres simultaneously. IF such a scenario occurred, then 2 Cav (along with the rest of 1 Brigade) may indeed deploy as an entire Regiment.
Yes, but I'm asking how realistic this is?
In 2000 the US DoD was postulating having a capability to fight TWO Major Theatre Wars simoltaneously. How realistic was that?
You know as well as I do that the ability to deploy a brigade in one theatre and a battalionsized taskforce in another would strain ADF to the last man. If this scenario happened, we would be in a WW2-type environment (Japanese in Port Moresby), and not current deployments.

[FutureTank]

The Mowag Piranha design had been around for at least 10-15 years before that, FT. The US Marines had adopted it at least five years earlier. The US Army had attempted to adopt it but hadn't really been interested in it and botched the effort - perhaps deliberately. The Canadians had adopted it even earlier than the US Marines (and they'd got it from the Canadians).
So do the math.

I think you are confusing Regiment and Corps. Units are not broken up because it increases the administration burden for specialised units. Therefore they tend to deploy as units, not as parts there of.
Specialised units (squadrons, battalions, troops) are broken up or form detachments to support core combat force usually based on infantry battalion.

Doesn't work because infantry units do not understand the administrative needs of specialised units and specialised units do not understand the administrative needs of infantry.
Yes, that's what they have administrative staff for (attached to taskforce HQ)

If you have excess aggression I suggest going for a run or maybe signing on as a contractor in Iraq to work it off.
Here I think even if you don;t agree with somone, and do think they are subjective, and maube even haven't got a brain at all in your opinion, you need the skill to say so in a civil way.
Then again I am neither a moderator, not your parent, so you can disregard whatever I say altogether, and trust me, it won't bother me a bit.
:flame is probably going to be taken care of by moderators anyway, who are usually :sniper :D

[Aussie Digger]

Ok, 'taskforce' refers to the command of the mission, and can be any size from company to brigade. However it is 'likely' (I would say preferable) that whole battalion is deployed as the core taskforce combat component.

Taskforce literally means a force deployed to conduct a particular task. The command element is irrelevant. DJFHQ controls ALL operations OS, whether they be a platoon or brigade level formation. The "core" component will be whatever is considered sufficient to achieve the task at hand. A battalion as the "set" standard is a poor option, if a platoon is sufficient (ie: Tonga recently).

Where a battalion is required to deploy most often it is a single battalion group from the "same" battalion that is deployed. The only time it's NOT AFAIK, is in a situation where (due to our low numbers of battalions) soldiers from a particular battalion are required to deploy to more than 1 theatre (ie: 6RAR is currently deployed to Timor AND Afghanistan).


Corps training is done all over the place. Joint trainign can only be done with a specific unit training area. The ADF commonly moves individuals and small groups around to train in Corps skills. Shifting whole units is what increases costs.

As to your "Joint training can only be done with a specific unit training area" I'm sorry but this is straight out wrong. What sort of training are you referring to? I've done a platoon level attack on the main oval at Gallipoli barracks Enoggera with a combined arms team formed from 2/14LHR and 25/49RQR!!! Corps specific training CAN be done almost anywhere IMHO (obviously with some limitations on the TYPE of training, ie: live firing etc), not the other way around. Simon9 can probably tell you about Charlie Coy 9RQR and the "Corps" specific training it conducts (or at least used to) in the back streets of Loganlea on the Southside of Brisbane!!! The "Joint training", you refer to is similar except perhaps when it's conducted on a large scale. Most "joint training" occurs during CPX's anyway.

When tank aquadrons were sent to Vietnam, they brought all required service personnel and equipment with them. There was no way out of that.

Yes. So? They sent a particular force for a particular threat level and one designed to achieve a certain level of capability. Are you trying to suggest 1 Armd would have been more effective in Vietnam if it had been embedded with battalions all along? There is such a thing required as "concentration of force" in military operations you know...

All I'm saying is that given we are at war, and are likely to remain in a state of war for some time, ADF should accep tthe realities of wartime posture and structure its assets accordingly. Unfortunatelly in some ways it will cost more.
Now consider what mayham happens if and when a battalion-sized taskforce should be required to deploy. All kinds of people are pulled out of their jobs and moved to the battalion in question. Equipment is coming from all over the place because Army usually doesn't (sadly) have the 'paper strength'. This is also cost. Of course lately quite a bit has been spent on Defence so maybe I'm wrong and all is well (at least with 1 Brigade).

"We are at war". I'd argue against that proposition merely because we are not ACTUALLY conducting combat operations. We are conducting low level "peace keeping" operations in Solomans and Timor. We are conducting "engineering" operations in Afghanistan, with Infantry and Cavalry peforming only security tasks for the "Ginger Beers" and in Iraq we have infantry/Cavalry performing security and training functions. None of the forces is actively engaged with an enemy force. Any contacts that occur are merely self defence.

This may be war to some, but it's a bit less than that to me. What America IS doing is war. Low level, perhaps but still "war". We are not.

We also have not deployed MBT's in ANY theatre since Vietnam. By this rationale obviously MBT's have no place IN our force structure, since we should only be creating formations that are likely to deploy on operations, based on current scenarios. If that were the case, we could leave artillery and armed recon helicopters out too...



Yes, but I'm asking how realistic this is?
In 2000 the US DoD was postulating having a capability to fight TWO Major Theatre Wars simoltaneously. How realistic was that?
You know as well as I do that the ability to deploy a brigade in one theatre and a battalionsized taskforce in another would strain ADF to the last man. If this scenario happened, we would be in a WW2-type environment (Japanese in Port Moresby), and not current deployments.

Hmm.

Interfet was a brigade sized force we deployed less than 8 years ago (is it THAT long already, sheesh :shudder) and NO elements of 6RAR OR 1RAR deployed during Interfet. Neither did ANY of 4RAR (Cmdo) except for a few CPP staff. Whilst it was a BIG deployment and stripped us of most of our assets, 3x battalions remained un-deployed, 1 Armoured Regt remained undeployed a sqn of 2 Cav Regt remained undeployed, a squadron of Blackhawks, SAS, ALL the Chinooks etc, etc remained un-deployed. It would have been difficult, but we COULD have deployed a battalion elsewhere even then. We'd have probably needed help to support them (we needed help in INTERFET as well though) but we had the manpower to do it. Things are better now, for 1 thing ALL regular infantry battalions are at "high readiness" now. With the arrival of our C-17's and Kanimbla and Manoora our lift capacity now is much greater than it was then (or will be in 12 months or so) and our support capacity has been bolstered.

The additional battalions will only improve this capability.

A brigade sized force and a battalion group in the Australian context means 4 battalions, max deployed at any one time. We have nothing like this many deployed at present and while I agree Interfet massively strained our support capabilities and "equipment levels", it opened the "eyes" of the ADF and Government (to a degree) and many of the problems we had then, would not be so large today.

Apart from capability deficiences (which are ADF wide) I am not aware of any of the currently deployed forces "stripping" other units of capability. ASLAV's and Bushmasters have been enhanced, other capabilities (Javelin, "Scan Eagle" Mk 11 sniper rifles etc) have been acquired rapidly and soldiers have been moved around, but that is a issue with manning and funding levels, not a force structure issue, in of itself....

[Aussie Digger]

Specialised units (squadrons, battalions, troops) are broken up or form detachments to support core combat force usually based on infantry battalion.

No they don't. They deploy as fully formed sub-units with the appropiate levels of command for the size of the formation.

You may be interested to know that 1 of the goals of HNA is to form 9 "deployable" battlegroups along with 9 "battlegroup" command elements.

The command elements will reside in ALL on-line units, irregardless of Corps. Command of the battlegroup will go to whichever Corps is taking the lead role for the deployment.

Just as the Cav based battlegroup in Iraq is lead by a Cav Commander, the Engineering based taskforce in Afghanistan is commanded by a Gingerbeers commander, and the infantry based forces in Timor and Solomans are led by, you guessed it, infantry...

There's even a possibility that "Aviation Corps" could command a battlegroup one day, unlikely though it may seem. Theoretically under HNA however they could.

[rickshaw]

So do the math.


I did. More armies appeared to be adopting wheeled vehicles "AT THE TIME" than abandoning them in favour of tracks. FT.


Specialised units (squadrons, battalions, troops) are broken up or form detachments to support core combat force usually based on infantry battalion.


Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Depends upon the situation. More often than not, "penny-packetism" is not a good idea, particularly WRT to Armour, while with Aviation, it prevents the best use of resources.


Yes, that's what they have administrative staff for (attached to taskforce HQ)


The more you dilute units, the more admin staff you require.


If you have excess aggression I suggest going for a run or maybe signing on as a contractor in Iraq to work it off.


Your view that I am aggressive is very subjective, FT. ;)


Here I think even if you don;t agree with somone, and do think they are subjective, and maube even haven't got a brain at all in your opinion, you need the skill to say so in a civil way.


I have been. I could have called you a bloody fool but I've refrained from doing so because, as I said once before, you amuse me, FT. I see a lot of youthful enthusiasm, some knowledge but little commonsense or experience.


Then again I am neither a moderator, not your parent, so you can disregard whatever I say altogether, and trust me, it won't bother me a bit.


Oh, I find it interesting.


:flame is probably going to be taken care of by moderators anyway, who are usually :sniper :D

Sure.

[FutureTank]

Taskforce literally means a force deployed to conduct a particular task. The command element is irrelevant. DJFHQ controls ALL operations OS, whether they be a platoon or brigade level formation. The "core" component will be whatever is considered sufficient to achieve the task at hand. A battalion as the "set" standard is a poor option, if a platoon is sufficient (ie: Tonga recently).

Where a battalion is required to deploy most often it is a single battalion group from the "same" battalion that is deployed. The only time it's NOT AFAIK, is in a situation where (due to our low numbers of battalions) soldiers from a particular battalion are required to deploy to more than 1 theatre (ie: 6RAR is currently deployed to Timor AND Afghanistan).

As to your "Joint training can only be done with a specific unit training area" I'm sorry but this is straight out wrong. What sort of training are you referring to? I've done a platoon level attack on the main oval at Gallipoli barracks Enoggera with a combined arms team formed from 2/14LHR and 25/49RQR!!! Corps specific training CAN be done almost anywhere IMHO (obviously with some limitations on the TYPE of training, ie: live firing etc), not the other way around. Simon9 can probably tell you about Charlie Coy 9RQR and the "Corps" specific training it conducts (or at least used to) in the back streets of Loganlea on the Southside of Brisbane!!! The "Joint training", you refer to is similar except perhaps when it's conducted on a large scale. Most "joint training" occurs during CPX's anyway.

They sent a particular force for a particular threat level and one designed to achieve a certain level of capability. Are you trying to suggest 1 Armd would have been more effective in Vietnam if it had been embedded with battalions all along? There is such a thing required as "concentration of force" in military operations you know...

"We are at war". I'd argue against that proposition merely because we are not ACTUALLY conducting combat operations. We are conducting low level "peace keeping" operations in Solomans and Timor. We are conducting "engineering" operations in Afghanistan, with Infantry and Cavalry peforming only security tasks for the "Ginger Beers" and in Iraq we have infantry/Cavalry performing security and training functions. None of the forces is actively engaged with an enemy force. Any contacts that occur are merely self defence.

This may be war to some, but it's a bit less than that to me. What America IS doing is war. Low level, perhaps but still "war". We are not.

We also have not deployed MBT's in ANY theatre since Vietnam. By this rationale obviously MBT's have no place IN our force structure, since we should only be creating formations that are likely to deploy on operations, based on current scenarios. If that were the case, we could leave artillery and armed recon helicopters out too...

Interfet was a brigade sized force we deployed less than 8 years ago (is it THAT long already, sheesh :shudder) and NO elements of 6RAR OR 1RAR deployed during Interfet. Neither did ANY of 4RAR (Cmdo) except for a few CPP staff. Whilst it was a BIG deployment and stripped us of most of our assets, 3x battalions remained un-deployed, 1 Armoured Regt remained undeployed a sqn of 2 Cav Regt remained undeployed, a squadron of Blackhawks, SAS, ALL the Chinooks etc, etc remained un-deployed. It would have been difficult, but we COULD have deployed a battalion elsewhere even then. We'd have probably needed help to support them (we needed help in INTERFET as well though) but we had the manpower to do it. Things are better now, for 1 thing ALL regular infantry battalions are at "high readiness" now. With the arrival of our C-17's and Kanimbla and Manoora our lift capacity now is much greater than it was then (or will be in 12 months or so) and our support capacity has been bolstered.

The additional battalions will only improve this capability.

A brigade sized force and a battalion group in the Australian context means 4 battalions, max deployed at any one time. We have nothing like this many deployed at present and while I agree Interfet massively strained our support capabilities and "equipment levels", it opened the "eyes" of the ADF and Government (to a degree) and many of the problems we had then, would not be so large today.

Apart from capability deficiences (which are ADF wide) I am not aware of any of the currently deployed forces "stripping" other units of capability. ASLAV's and Bushmasters have been enhanced, other capabilities (Javelin, "Scan Eagle" Mk 11 sniper rifles etc) have been acquired rapidly and soldiers have been moved around, but that is a issue with manning and funding levels, not a force structure issue, in of itself....

Ok, one can't really cal it a 'war' when the only 'action' Australian troops have seen is manning security in green zone and escorting civilians around.
However I would suggest that after US withdraws from Iraq, and they will, Australia's association will be remembered.

And this brings us back to East Timor.
What if the Indonesians decided to fight? All the units you listed were Australia's strategic reserve.

So what do Australian Army units train for? Of course training IS carried out at all different levels. However outside of the Pacific islands, anywhere ADF goes it would have to be a battalion based taskforce (even if incomplete). Quite frankly I don't understand why companies from different battalions would be used in same operation unless it is to get operation credits for the unit (which has always been the battalion in ADF and not the company).

Probably because funding has been better during Liberal government, and because ADF has not seen operations that called for actual combat (other then for SAS), it has not become apparent how low readiness the Army is. Speaking to Vietnam veterans I found out that all manner of equipment was gathered from all over the place to equip the first taskforce that went to Vietnam. Individuals were pulled out of their units and transfered to those being deployed for any number of reasons (fitness, admin, discharge, etc.)

If East Timor was an 'expereince', then I hope we won't have another like it.
Current Australian deployments are what I call 'friendly support' rather then active participation such as in Vietnam.

Its interesting how Australian commitment to opposing forces that would endanger our way of life has declined over time.
In WW1, only a decade after Federation, we sent six divisions with all the support to Europe.
In WW2 only three divisions were available, and these had to return to defend Australia against the Japanese.
In Korea a brigade was sent (eventually).
Malaysian deployment had somewhat more then a battalion, but somewhat less then a brigade.
We only deployed a reinforced battalion to Vietnam (with overlaps) with a swag of 'units', platoons and detachments.
Since then it had been companies (single companies) with the exception of East Timor (for obvious reasons).
The World may be becoming more peacefull which is why less Australians have been going to war, but then again, we maybe in for a shock.

[FutureTank]

I did. More armies appeared to be adopting wheeled vehicles "AT THE TIME" than abandoning them in favour of tracks. FT.

By the time Australia adopted the LAV, it had been a late adoption of a US vehicle, itself a late adoption of the European 1970s initiative.
As it happens, it coincided witht he post-Cold War adoption of new wheeled designs largely as an illustration that with a conflrontation with ex-USSR over, budgets could be cut, and the way they were cut with respect to AFVs was to put them on wheels.
Let's face it. Im major equipment purchases Australian Army has been consistently a generation behind for much of the late 20th century.

Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Depends upon the situation. More often than not, "penny-packetism" is not a good idea, particularly WRT to Armour, while with Aviation, it prevents the best use of resources.
Yes, but look at the OOB for Vietnam (only because it is more readily available). A plethora of platoons, 'units' and detachments for what was for most of the time a single infantry battalion.

The more you dilute units, the more admin staff you require.
Yes you do. So we agree on something.

I have been. I could have called you a bloody fool but I've refrained from doing so because, as I said once before, you amuse me, FT. I see a lot of youthful enthusiasm, some knowledge but little commonsense or experience.
Well, some people who feel insecure choose to become aggressive and abusive rather then identify their source of insecurity, and you display this even if you don't see it (an indication of the behaviour).
If you believe in something, enthusiasm is the way to show you are passionate on the subject, nothing wrong there.
True, I may lack in expereince, which is why I usually ask those that have, and always prepared to listen (and have been proven wrong before).

Do you mind telling me when I displayed a lack of common sense?

[Whiskyjack]

If East Timor was an 'expereince', then I hope we won't have another like it.
Current Australian deployments are what I call 'friendly support' rather then active participation such as in Vietnam.

Its interesting how Australian commitment to opposing forces that would endanger our way of life has declined over time.
In WW1, only a decade after Federation, we sent six divisions with all the support to Europe.
In WW2 only three divisions were available, and these had to return to defend Australia against the Japanese.
In Korea a brigade was sent (eventually).
Malaysian deployment had somewhat more then a battalion, but somewhat less then a brigade.
We only deployed a reinforced battalion to Vietnam (with overlaps) with a swag of 'units', platoons and detachments.
Since then it had been companies (single companies) with the exception of East Timor (for obvious reasons).
The World may be becoming more peacefull which is why less Australians have been going to war, but then again, we maybe in for a shock.

By the end of WWII the Australian Army had 6 Divisions in the Field. Also My understanding was that the Australian Army had a brigade deployed, which included some NZ elements.

Also I would make the following statement regarding Australia's recent deployments. They have been in support of Multinational/Coalition operations. At no stage has Australia faced a situation that is reminiscent to what it faced in 1942, with a hostile conventional force on it's doorstep.

The current stage is IMHO set more around politics than national survival. There is an enemy to be fought, and while it has the ability to hurt Australia, in terms of terrorism, it does not warrant a massive build up either.

[rickshaw]

By the time Australia adopted the LAV, it had been a late adoption of a US vehicle, itself a late adoption of the European 1970s initiative.
As it happens, it coincided witht he post-Cold War adoption of new wheeled designs largely as an illustration that with a conflrontation with ex-USSR over, budgets could be cut, and the way they were cut with respect to AFVs was to put them on wheels.
Let's face it. Im major equipment purchases Australian Army has been consistently a generation behind for much of the late 20th century.


Personally, I don't see a problem with that. You make sure that you don't end up with all the problems associated with early adoption of potentially revolutionary technology, your doctrine is well prepared by seeing what mistakes others have made when they adopted it and above all, you're invariably at least one generation in front of your regional competitors.


Yes, but look at the OOB for Vietnam (only because it is more readily available). A plethora of platoons, 'units' and detachments for what was for most of the time a single infantry battalion.


Errr, depends upon which period you're talking about. After the first year, there were two and then three battalions deployed in a brigade sized Taskforce (which was at the time the official redesignation of the brigade formation BTW). Until 1969 when they started to drawdown the Taskforce, it then went down from three to two to one and associated units were withdrawn as well. I am unsure where you get this idea there was only ever one battalion in South Vietnam but I can assure you there was more than that.


Yes you do. So we agree on something.


So, the way to avoid that problem is, what exactly? :rolleyes:


Well, some people who feel insecure choose to become aggressive and abusive rather then identify their source of insecurity, and you display this even if you don't see it (an indication of the behaviour).


I am far from insecure and I haven't been particularly abusive, FT. If you wish to engage in pop-psychology, perhaps you should look up the word "projecting"?


If you believe in something, enthusiasm is the way to show you are passionate on the subject, nothing wrong there.


I didn't suggest there was. Enthusiasm though, can sometimes blind you to the faults in your own argument, FT. Doesn't mean you should avoid it, just temper it with a bit of sense, thats all.


True, I may lack in expereince, which is why I usually ask those that have, and always prepared to listen (and have been proven wrong before).


Good way to learn, keep it up.


Do you mind telling me when I displayed a lack of common sense?

When your thesis has obviously been shot down in flames you keep proposing it and trying to circumvent reality in order to make it work.

[FutureTank]

By the end of WWII the Australian Army had 6 Divisions in the Field. Also My understanding was that the Australian Army had a brigade deployed, which included some NZ elements.

Also I would make the following statement regarding Australia's recent deployments. They have been in support of Multinational/Coalition operations. At no stage has Australia faced a situation that is reminiscent to what it faced in 1942, with a hostile conventional force on it's doorstep.

The current stage is IMHO set more around politics than national survival. There is an enemy to be fought, and while it has the ability to hurt Australia, in terms of terrorism, it does not warrant a massive build up either.

By end of WW2 there were six divisions available for field service by 1945. This is not to say that there were six divisions in the field, just like there were 12 divisions (and more) 'on paper' available in 1939 in Australia, including two armoured divisions. However, point taken.
Yes, in Korea the Australian brigade had a NZ battalion. However it was still an Australian commanded brigade.

'Terrorism' has become a euphimism for talking about decades long evolution of political ideology in the Islamic world against the West (and Israel is just a most obvious example of this).

Many (most?) Australians in general are largely ignorant of the views being promoted in many Islamic countries and cultures, and would be apalled if they knew of them. What the recently embarassed Sydney Islamic 'teacher' had been saying in his madrassa and on Egyptian TV is common fare in Islamic media, including Indonesia.

However I think the Australian governenmet is not so anaware as the rest of the population. Why else would they launch one of the most ambitious Defence financing programs in post-WW2 history? Surely we don't need M1 tanks for counter-'terrorism' operations?

The truth is that the region is very volatile (not having a history for stability), and although I do sincerely hope that democracy prevails, in talking to people from various countries in the region, that is not how they see their own countries 'operating'.

It is based on this that I think the future is less 'bright' then many paint it, and hence the ADF should (and does) prepare for larger operations, further from home.

[FutureTank]

Personally, I don't see a problem with that. You make sure that you don't end up with all the problems associated with early adoption of potentially revolutionary technology, your doctrine is well prepared by seeing what mistakes others have made when they adopted it and above all, you're invariably at least one generation in front of your regional competitors.
There is only one thing wrong with this, and that is that Australia is always the follower rather then the leader in developing technologies. OK, not always as many different technologies Australia DOES lead in (or at least on par with World leaders), but in the matter of AFVs, we CAN be leaders because we do have a significant talent in automotive and mechanical design in general. Yes, it is expensive and hard to be a leader, but there are rewards also.

Errr, depends upon which period you're talking about. After the first year, there were two and then three battalions deployed in a brigade sized Taskforce (which was at the time the official redesignation of the brigade formation BTW). Until 1969 when they started to drawdown the Taskforce, it then went down from three to two to one and associated units were withdrawn as well. I am unsure where you get this idea there was only ever one battalion in South Vietnam but I can assure you there was more than that.

No, the deployments always overlapped, but with one exception (Apr-Jul 66) there were only two battalions in SV, one preparing to leave and the other one taking over the AO.

So, the way to avoid that problem is, what exactly? :rolleyes:

As I suggested, IF all these secondments, detachments, independent platoons, etc. are going to be required by battalion when if goes overseas, why not integrate them into the battalion structure? This is how USMC does it because they DO expect to be deploying in non-Army like operations. Current brigade structure is very much on the NATO conventional forces model, which is fine if we expect to be conducting that sort of operations, but all indications are that we are not. In any case, if a brigade composed of such battalions does deploy as a whole, it will only find itself with more staff then it would require in conventional deployment, and this is a good thing. Administrative needs of the Australian Takforce in SV grew beyond expectations from day one, and required more staff then most Australian commanders in Canberra imagined. I doubt this will change. East Timor is a good indication with the number of civil relations, transition activities, supervised intitatives, etc. that had nothing to do with combat readiness requiring ADF members to be detached again and again.

I didn't suggest there was. Enthusiasm though, can sometimes blind you to the faults in your own argument, FT. Doesn't mean you should avoid it, just temper it with a bit of sense, thats all.
Ok.
But still, where did I show lack of common sense? Are you refering to the Leo turret transplant? It was a spurr-of-the-monent idea, but not so crazy considering it had been done before. It just didn't fit in with my own ides on LAND 400 on closer assessment.

When your thesis has obviously been shot down in flames you keep proposing it and trying to circumvent reality in order to make it work.
Ok, next time I'll just give up the first time I'm told it can't be done and keep quiet :cheers

Not...
I may be wrong sometimes, maybe every time, but I won't learn much by being a 'shrinking violet'.

[Whiskyjack]

By end of WW2 there were six divisions available for field service by 1945. This is not to say that there were six divisions in the field, just like there were 12 divisions (and more) 'on paper' available in 1939 in Australia, including two armoured divisions. However, point taken.

I think from memory that Australia has 6 Divisions on operations at wars end, I remember reading that at wars end all 6 divisions were in 'contact with the enemy' of course that enemy had been bypassed for all of a year. From memory it was the Aus CinC orders of the day. I have a feeling that there may have been more formations on active service earlier in the war '43-44 than at the end due to man power shortage. I know that is the case for NZ.



Yes, in Korea the Australian brigade had a NZ battalion. However it was still an Australian commanded brigade.

I think you are confused with Vietnam, in Koea NZ had an Arty regiment and no infanty, in Vietnam there was an Arty Battery and 2 rifle companies.


'Terrorism' has become a euphimism for talking about decades long evolution of political ideology in the Islamic world against the West (and Israel is just a most obvious example of this).

Many (most?) Australians in general are largely ignorant of the views being promoted in many Islamic countries and cultures, and would be apalled if they knew of them. What the recently embarassed Sydney Islamic 'teacher' had been saying in his madrassa and on Egyptian TV is common fare in Islamic media, including Indonesia.

However I think the Australian governenmet is not so anaware as the rest of the population. Why else would they launch one of the most ambitious Defence financing programs in post-WW2 history? Surely we don't need M1 tanks for counter-'terrorism' operations?

The truth is that the region is very volatile (not having a history for stability), and although I do sincerely hope that democracy prevails, in talking to people from various countries in the region, that is not how they see their own countries 'operating'.

It is based on this that I think the future is less 'bright' then many paint it, and hence the ADF should (and does) prepare for larger operations, further from home .

I think you are overstating the build up of the ADF to some extent. Yes they are being re-equipped, and there is some expansion of capabilities. But in general it is replacing new equipment for old, which is normal. The reason it costs so much now is a mixture of underspending in previous years (post cold war) and block obsolescence of platforms. This is actually pretty common across the militaries of the West.

[FutureTank]

I think from memory that Australia has 6 Divisions on operations at wars end, I remember reading that at wars end all 6 divisions were in 'contact with the enemy' of course that enemy had been bypassed for all of a year. From memory it was the Aus CinC orders of the day. I have a feeling that there may have been more formations on active service earlier in the war '43-44 than at the end due to man power shortage. I know that is the case for NZ.

Ok, you could be right, although the measure of 'contact' may be a bit stretching it.

I think you are confused with Vietnam, in Koea NZ had an Arty regiment and no infanty, in Vietnam there was an Arty Battery and 2 rifle companies.

Yes, sorry, the Royal Australian regiment (3 battalions) was in the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Korea.

I think you are overstating the build up of the ADF to some extent. Yes they are being re-equipped, and there is some expansion of capabilities. But in general it is replacing new equipment for old, which is normal. The reason it costs so much now is a mixture of underspending in previous years (post cold war) and block obsolescence of platforms. This is actually pretty common across the militaries of the West.

What of the recruiting drive to bring the Army in particular to larger number of battalions (and to fill out the existing battalions)?
Even if equipment becomes obsolete, one does not just replace it for replacement sake, but looks at the need for the capability in view of threat projections. It seems to me the ADF does not see these projections as being significantly reduced compared to those of the late 80s.
I hope you are right though.

[Whiskyjack]

What of the recruiting drive to bring the Army in particular to larger number of battalions (and to fill out the existing battalions)?
Even if equipment becomes obsolete, one does not just replace it for replacement sake, but looks at the need for the capability in view of threat projections. It seems to me the ADF does not see these projections as being significantly reduced compared to those of the late 80s.
I hope you are right though.

An increase for sure, but look at the budget 1.9-2% of GDP is not a 'war time' or even threat figure it is more situation normal.

Also taking into account the recent announced increase in the US Army and USMC the US will have 1.5 million regulars accross all 4 services, Australia will have 60k, Australia is 1/15th the population of the US. 1/15th of 1.5 Million is 100,000.

Also IMHO the US is not on a war footing, and is still smaller than it was in the late '80s.

Australia is better preparing itself to contribute to coalition operations IMO.

I guess I see it more as preparing to fight at a level it chooses to contribute to rather than fighting an all out conflict that forces it to take 'emergency' measures. This is also true of most of the other Western countries.

But that is just my opinion! :)

[rickshaw]

There is only one thing wrong with this, and that is that Australia is always the follower rather then the leader in developing technologies. OK, not always as many different technologies Australia DOES lead in (or at least on par with World leaders), but in the matter of AFVs, we CAN be leaders because we do have a significant talent in automotive and mechanical design in general. Yes, it is expensive and hard to be a leader, but there are rewards also.


We could be, no doubt about it. The question is do we need to be? Just as in WWII, when we produced the Sentinel, we are faced with hard choices, FT. We can build tanks or we can build other things. Our pockets aren't limitless, we do not have the resouces for both AFV development and production or ship production or etc., etc. We must make choices. Unfortunately AFV production is seen very much as a long way down the list of what is both economic and "sexy".


No, the deployments always overlapped, but with one exception (Apr-Jul 66) there were only two battalions in SV, one preparing to leave and the other one taking over the AO.


Yet in 67-69, we had three battalions in country. Further you've just admitted that you were mistaken in your claim that we only had one.


As I suggested, IF all these secondments, detachments, independent platoons, etc. are going to be required by battalion when if goes overseas, why not integrate them into the battalion structure? This is how USMC does it because they DO expect to be deploying in non-Army like operations. Current brigade structure is very much on the NATO conventional forces model, which is fine if we expect to be conducting that sort of operations, but all indications are that we are not. In any case, if a brigade composed of such battalions does deploy as a whole, it will only find itself with more staff then it would require in conventional deployment, and this is a good thing. Administrative needs of the Australian Takforce in SV grew beyond expectations from day one, and required more staff then most Australian commanders in Canberra imagined. I doubt this will change. East Timor is a good indication with the number of civil relations, transition activities, supervised intitatives, etc. that had nothing to do with combat readiness requiring ADF members to be detached again and again.


The USMC is a unique institution and there has been talk for about the last 10 years that the Oz Army should become the Australian Army Marine Corps - not necessarily through copying what the USMC is or even does but how it is employed. In the UK, there has been a dissolution of the Corps structure down to now basically a "Shooters" and a "Non-Shooters" Corps It isn't without merit but it isn't going to happen any time soon downunder. The entrenched Corps loyalities and inter-Corps rivalries are still too strong. Nor do I necessarily think its a great idea who's time has come. I for one would be very saddened to see the rich Corps' history dissolved.


Ok.
But still, where did I show lack of common sense? Are you refering to the Leo turret transplant? It was a spurr-of-the-monent idea, but not so crazy considering it had been done before. It just didn't fit in with my own ides on LAND 400 on closer assessment.


No, there are several other points, such as this continued pursuit of AFV design and production downunder. Its just not going to happen.


Ok, next time I'll just give up the first time I'm told it can't be done and keep quiet :cheers

Not...
I may be wrong sometimes, maybe every time, but I won't learn much by being a 'shrinking violet'.

There is a fineline between "shrinking violet" and "bloody fool", FT. Perhaps you need to look which side your feet are on?

[Mick73]

Ft the overlapping of Bn in Vietnam were most likely the Advance Parties and Rear Parties. My Dad spoke of his time there and when he arrived in Nov of 67 there were elements of (I think) 6 Bns in Sth Vn. There were three Bns of the Regt in Vietnam in 67-68 because all of the Reg from 8RAR were sent to Woodside SA to make up the 3rd Bn for the TF (Surprise it was 3RAR) which deployed it main body by mid Nov of 67. It replaced I believe 5RAR. So in 65 you had 1RAR attached to the 173rd Airbourne Bde and then the TF was reaised to 2 Bns then in 67 it went to 3 Bns. I'm sure you can find the info on which Bns were deployed and when somewhere but the fact is we did have 3 Bns deployed by Nov67.

Now how is that M1A1 technology going?...Wil it go back on thread??

[FutureTank]

An increase for sure, but look at the budget 1.9-2% of GDP is not a 'war time' or even threat figure it is more situation normal.

Also taking into account the recent announced increase in the US Army and USMC the US will have 1.5 million regulars accross all 4 services, Australia will have 60k, Australia is 1/15th the population of the US. 1/15th of 1.5 Million is 100,000.

Also IMHO the US is not on a war footing, and is still smaller than it was in the late '80s.

Australia is better preparing itself to contribute to coalition operations IMO.

I guess I see it more as preparing to fight at a level it chooses to contribute to rather than fighting an all out conflict that forces it to take 'emergency' measures. This is also true of most of the other Western countries.

But that is just my opinion! :)

I pretty much agree with your opinion though not your statistics :)
Size of budget and national population in not way reflect personnel needs of the national defence forces.
For example we could significantly increase out border surveillance resources, and probably the strategic airlift component should be much larger considering Australia's position on the globe. However neither budget nor Australian population would suffice since we would need to build up the skilled personnel as well as the expereince of operating the aircraft gradually (such as the C-17s), so having the money for it doesn't help.

Same with the US. What does 1.5m regulars mean? A single B-2 flight with 9 pilots require 24 support personnel. and this is just an example of a regular COMBAT unit. It gets worse with all sorts of support, research and training commands as you know. The projected 47 Army brigades are only going to be about 200,000 in actual strength (IMHO). I estimate they need almost as many support personnel to keep then operational, and that again to provide Army infrastructure. For Australia this means that from 27,000 (desired) only 9,000 are actual combat troops.
I'm prepared to be told I'm wrong :(

[FutureTank]

We could be, no doubt about it. The question is do we need to be? Just as in WWII, when we produced the Sentinel, we are faced with hard choices, FT. We can build tanks or we can build other things. Our pockets aren't limitless, we do not have the resouces for both AFV development and production or ship production or etc., etc. We must make choices. Unfortunately AFV production is seen very much as a long way down the list of what is both economic and "sexy".

Yes, unfortunately, because in most cases the people on the 'sharp' end of any conflict (outside of SAS), are the infantry. The Australian Infantry Corps have a proven record of doing the impossible, and I think they deserve the best tools to give them every opportunity to do the best job they are expected to perform in. It's something every professional would take for granted. Not 'sexy' at all.

[FutureTank]

Yet in 67-69, we had three battalions in country. Further you've just admitted that you were mistaken in your claim that we only had one.

No, the 5 RAR and 6 RAR arrived in April 66 and left in July 67. Until July 66 the 1 RAR was still in Vietnam, and 2 and 7 RAR arrived in March/April 67 to replace them. You could say that at one time over a couple of summer months there were four Australian battalions incountry, but in fact this was a transfer of responsibilities as I understand it.

Also it seems that a good portion of the two battalions provided security for Australian combat support units and bases.
So in terms of offencive combat operations command it was a one battalion deployment.

[FutureTank]

The USMC is a unique institution and there has been talk for about the last 10 years that the Oz Army should become the Australian Army Marine Corps - not necessarily through copying what the USMC is or even does but how it is employed. In the UK, there has been a dissolution of the Corps structure down to now basically a "Shooters" and a "Non-Shooters" Corps It isn't without merit but it isn't going to happen any time soon downunder. The entrenched Corps loyalities and inter-Corps rivalries are still too strong. Nor do I necessarily think its a great idea who's time has come. I for one would be very saddened to see the rich Corps' history dissolved.

When did I suggest disollution of the various Corps!!!:shudder
All I'm saying is, keep the battalions, regiments, Corps, the history and ethos, but change the structure and operational doctrine. The realities are that of all the developed countires in the World, Australia's Army most resembles in it's modus operandi the USMC, so why not take the advantage of its expereince?
With the new LPDs for the RAN, I think any deployed taskforce built around an infantry battalion will 'naturaly' resemble an MAU (except a lack of fixed wing aircraft :()

[FutureTank]

No, there are several other points, such as this continued pursuit of AFV design and production downunder. Its just not going to happen.

So it seems according to everyone here :(
History repeats itself since the first 'tank' was a model sent to the UK government from South Australia, and it changed the way battles are conducted.
See here (appologies for those that have seen already) http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/comment/DeMole/designnotpassedon.htm

[FutureTank]

There is a fineline between "shrinking violet" and "bloody fool", FT. Perhaps you need to look which side your feet are on?

Under some circumstances I prefer to be a "bloody fool". I'd be in good company :)

[FutureTank]

Now how is that M1A1 technology going?...Wil it go back on thread??

Yep, so does anyone know anything more on the Mid Range Munition Chemical Energy (MRM-CE) guided projectile with digital semi active laser sensor tested from the M1 SEP late last year?

[rickshaw]

When did I suggest disollution of the various Corps!!!:shudder


Effectively that is what you are proposing, I believe.


All I'm saying is, keep the battalions, regiments, Corps, the history and ethos, but change the structure and operational doctrine. The realities are that of all the developed countires in the World, Australia's Army most resembles in it's modus operandi the USMC, so why not take the advantage of its expereince?


You cannot do one without doing the other, FT. The core of the infantryman's life is literally "the battalion". If you listen to them talk for five minutes, you will find that out. Suddenly you want to bring into their cosy little family all these non-infantry types and dilute its esprit de' corps.

Nor have you answered the obvious question about how you would administer all these diverse subunits and their needs within a battalion structure, away from their specialised workshop facilities. What you're proposing will have long term ramifications and drive up costs. You don't appear to have considered that.

Nor have you answered the problem of "penny-packetism" which is the enemy of armour's proper deployment en-masse'


With the new LPDs for the RAN, I think any deployed taskforce built around an infantry battalion will 'naturaly' resemble an MAU (except a lack of fixed wing aircraft :()

Of course it will. Expeditionary forces tend to resemble each other if they are combined arms because they fulfill a similar function.

[FutureTank]

Effectively that is what you are proposing, I believe.

No, the units do not terminate their identities, particularly the infantry battalions. Only the personnel that would be operationally attached to battalions would 'live' with the battalions (though retaining unit and Corps affilitations). This only reflects their deployment status.

You cannot do one without doing the other, FT. The core of the infantryman's life is literally "the battalion". If you listen to them talk for five minutes, you will find that out. Suddenly you want to bring into their cosy little family all these non-infantry types and dilute its esprit de' corps.
Not at all, and quite the opposite. As a matter of fact I had listened to more then a few infantrymen, in one cese for 3 hours straight (5 RAR), and I only knew his first name!
The infantry can not function without the non-infantry 'types', and these in turn have noone to support without the infantry. I'm not suggesting they even have to parade together, but it seems to me the relationships already exist at brigade level now, so why not go one better and integrate at battalion level?

Nor have you answered the obvious question about how you would administer all these diverse subunits and their needs within a battalion structure, away from their specialised workshop facilities. What you're proposing will have long term ramifications and drive up costs. You don't appear to have considered that.

On deployment all these costs eventuate anyway, with all the individuals and their equipment and the mobile part of the workshops DO need to integrate. Administration is not so difficult given that all the staff already exist within the brigade HQs.
What costs would be incurred? All brigades have permanent assigned subunits anyway. I may be missing something, so if you have examples, plese give them. In the ccase of M1s for example, the squadrons have their own service workshops I believe, or has it gone back to regimental service troop?
Nor have you answered the problem of "penny-packetism" which is the enemy of armour's proper deployment en-masse'

Of course it will. Expeditionary forces tend to resemble each other if they are combined arms because they fulfill a similar function.

Yes, so why not embrace this? I can see battalions rotating through afloat deployments anyway just as they do now when they train with the RAN.

[Waylander]

The problem with fitting many small units together is maintenance, support, etc.
For example your idea of splitting the Tiger squadrons and attach lonely flights to the units they have to support.

This means you have to have the support facilities and staff needed for operating Tigers at every barrack they are stationed at.

You are also much more flexible when it comes to personal and equipment exchange when you operate at bn level. I think you would be surprised how much equipment and personal is rotated from one company to another when for example one mech inf company deploys to a training area.

[Smythstar]

$$$

Would it have cost any extra to have the Europack Diesels?

I read MTU have a v12 1500 hp diesel 35% smaller than the Europack or can make a v16 the same size with 2000 hp!

It sort of worries me that in the rush to jump on the American bandwagon we have compromised our own interests somewhat, for example if we are after an infantry tank with a phone on the back could it be a worry that the gas turbines 1000 degree exhaust is feet away let alone the massive target it presents to a TI or the fact its the only engine of its type in the whole army with additional maintenance costs as well as three times the fuel costs etc etc.

Anyway i have no fear that eventually we will sort it all out after a little cash down the drain and all will be good again, at least we have the biggest baddest chunk of ceramic on the block.

[alexsa]

. The Ghan railway isn't designed to carry them - the axle loadings on the flatbed railtrucks are too high. The same for the road bridges in the NT - as it is, civvie road-trains have to be uncoupled to cross many of the roadbridges in the NT. How are you going to get a tank across? Swim it, when the rivers are in flood? :rolleyes:

.

You sure about this. The axle laod for the North south rail link is a 21 tonnes for the worst stretch. this should not be confused wiht the flat bed carrying capicity or any rail cars carrying capacity as the bogey arrangment has a lot to do with it. The flat beds are designed to take multi stack TEU loads which would exceed the mass of a single M1A1.

The track also support ore cars each of which again exceeds the mass of an M1A1.

The track has areay been used to moved armour to an from Darwin with mulitple light armoured vehicles on each flat bed.

[FutureTank]

The problem with fitting many small units together is maintenance, support, etc.
For example your idea of splitting the Tiger squadrons and attach lonely flights to the units they have to support.

This means you have to have the support facilities and staff needed for operating Tigers at every barrack they are stationed at.

You are also much more flexible when it comes to personal and equipment exchange when you operate at bn level. I think you would be surprised how much equipment and personal is rotated from one company to another when for example one mech inf company deploys to a training area.

The Tigers have a single deep service facility, but routine maintenance is performed at troop level, and the LPDs would probably only carry a troop of Tigers at a time at most.

[rickshaw]

No, the units do not terminate their identities, particularly the infantry battalions. Only the personnel that would be operationally attached to battalions would 'live' with the battalions (though retaining unit and Corps affilitations). This only reflects their deployment status.


I can just imagine the competing lines of authority and command. Its bad enough when units are attached, if they were permamently domiciled, it would be a nightmare.


Not at all, and quite the opposite. As a matter of fact I had listened to more then a few infantrymen, in one cese for 3 hours straight (5 RAR), and I only knew his first name!
The infantry can not function without the non-infantry 'types', and these in turn have noone to support without the infantry. I'm not suggesting they even have to parade together, but it seems to me the relationships already exist at brigade level now, so why not go one better and integrate at battalion level?


Because the battalion commander does not have a brigade sized staff, perhaps?


On deployment all these costs eventuate anyway, with all the individuals and their equipment and the mobile part of the workshops DO need to integrate. Administration is not so difficult given that all the staff already exist within the brigade HQs.
What costs would be incurred? All brigades have permanent assigned subunits anyway. I may be missing something, so if you have examples, plese give them. In the ccase of M1s for example, the squadrons have their own service workshops I believe, or has it gone back to regimental service troop?


Deployments are (relaitvely) short-lived. The only thing that goes with a unit are first-line maintenance facilities. Second-line is held at a higher formation (usually Brigade) and then third-line higher still. You'd have to not only attach your specialised unit, you'd have to attach a specialised unit to provide that second-line capability. The costs are growing, each time you realise and you have to start asking for what benefit.

Look, Brigades have worked for over 80 years, since WWI for a reason - because they work. Battalions don't have the time, resources and staff to administer more than a battalion. QED.


Yes, so why not embrace this? I can see battalions rotating through afloat deployments anyway just as they do now when they train with the RAN.

I don't see our battalions doing a Tarawa, whereas the Marines do. If we had the resources and the will, there may be a point but we lack both and no matter how much you wish the reverse was true, you've been unable to convince me thus far.

[FutureTank]

I can just imagine the competing lines of authority and command. Its bad enough when units are attached, if they were permamently domiciled, it would be a nightmare.

Because the battalion commander does not have a brigade sized staff, perhaps?

Deployments are (relaitvely) short-lived. The only thing that goes with a unit are first-line maintenance facilities. Second-line is held at a higher formation (usually Brigade) and then third-line higher still. You'd have to not only attach your specialised unit, you'd have to attach a specialised unit to provide that second-line capability. The costs are growing, each time you realise and you have to start asking for what benefit.

Look, Brigades have worked for over 80 years, since WWI for a reason - because they work. Battalions don't have the time, resources and staff to administer more than a battalion. QED.

I don't see our battalions doing a Tarawa, whereas the Marines do. If we had the resources and the will, there may be a point but we lack both and no matter how much you wish the reverse was true, you've been unable to convince me thus far.

Ok, maybe you are right. I had a closer look at my files, and it appears that in my estimate to achieve this on Army-wide bais you's need close to an additional battalion of admin personnel (about 550 on my count)

What about doing this for a single 'high readiness' battalion (on rotation basis)? I know there is a company available, but not sure wha tthe arrangement is for attaching specialists to it for operations.

[Tasman]

What about doing this for a single 'high readiness' battalion (on rotation basis)? I know there is a company available, but not sure wha tthe arrangement is for attaching specialists to it for operations.

I think this would be worth considering. It could be a useful exercise for all of the units involved. In effect it would give the army experience putting a deployable force together. Helos, armour and other assets would have major maintenance carried out at their core or regimental workshop facilities. Apart from during major maintenance, specialist assets could remain at the location of the high readiness unit, with only the personnel rotating. I guess it would still be more costly than the present setup but it would provide a group that could perhaps be deployed more rapidly than is presently the case. Having said that I have to say I've been impressed with the speed in which the ADF has been able to put balanced combat groups together during recent operational deployments.

We would need to know how much extra cost would be involved. Apart from costs are there any other negative aspects to this sort of arrangement?

[rickshaw]

I think this would be worth considering. It could be a useful exercise for all of the units involved. In effect it would give the army experience putting a deployable force together. Helos, armour and other assets would have major maintenance carried out at their core or regimental workshop facilities. Apart from during major maintenance, specialist assets could remain at the location of the high readiness unit, with only the personnel rotating. I guess it would still be more costly than the present setup but it would provide a group that could perhaps be deployed more rapidly than is presently the case. Having said that I have to say I've been impressed with the speed in which the ADF has been able to put balanced combat groups together during recent operational deployments.

We would need to know how much extra cost would be involved. Apart from costs are there any other negative aspects to this sort of arrangement?

We already have one which is part of the ODF, oops showing me age again, RDF.

Everybody appears to forget the RDF's existence, for some reason.

[Tasman]

We already have one which is part of the ODF, oops showing me age again, RDF.

Everybody appears to forget the RDF's existence, for some reason.

Whoops!

Thanks for that info rickshaw. I didn't realise that the RDF included its own armour, helos, artillery, etc. I thought it was a basic light infantry unit.

Cheers

[FutureTank]

We already have one which is part of the ODF, oops showing me age again, RDF.

Everybody appears to forget the RDF's existence, for some reason.

I understand this is currently maintained at a company strength.
This is not my idea btw, nor is it new. I recall seeing something like that proposal from a RAN site a couple of years ago when purchase of LPD was first proposed.

[FutureTank]

We already have one which is part of the ODF, oops showing me age again, RDF.

Everybody appears to forget the RDF's existence, for some reason.

What is it's current structure?

[Tasman]

We already have one which is part of the ODF, oops showing me age again, RDF.

Everybody appears to forget the RDF's existence, for some reason.

Worth re reading AD's Post 336. In it he said:

You may be interested to know that 1 of the goals of HNA is to form 9 "deployable" battlegroups along with 9 "battlegroup" command elements.

The command elements will reside in ALL on-line units, irregardless of Corps. Command of the battlegroup will go to whichever Corps is taking the lead role for the deployment.

Just as the Cav based battlegroup in Iraq is lead by a Cav Commander, the Engineering based taskforce in Afghanistan is commanded by a Gingerbeers commander, and the infantry based forces in Timor and Solomans are led by, you guessed it, infantry...

There's even a possibility that "Aviation Corps" could command a battlegroup one day, unlikely though it may seem. Theoretically under HNA however they could.

I just had another look at the Army link re the HNA :

It states:


Army will continue to organise in unit structures in barracks but will ensure that those units can quickly transition to form combined arms battlegroups for training and operations. In this way, a battlegroup can be idealy structured for a particular operation and can be easily modified in theatre as the situation requires.

HNA organisations have been developed so nine units headquarters are capable of deploying as battlegroup headquarters which are all capable of commanding combat teams from any other unit. To do this, battlegroups and headquarters have been constructed with robust command and control structures and first line logistics.

For example, 2nd Cavaly Regiment may deploy as a battlegroup headquarters with a tank combat team provided by 1 Armoured Regiment, an ARH combat team from 1 Avn Regiment and a mechanised combat team from 5/7 RAR.

http://www.army.gov.au/HNA/default2.htm

It seems that the battlegroup organisation given in the example pretty well provides what FT is suggesting. All that would be needed would be for one to be set up on a rotational basis, with its attached units, along the lines of the example given, to act as the RDF. Perhaps though this is larger than is needed for the RDF if it is only a company based group at present.

It seems to me that if the battlegroups can be brought together quickly the army already has the capacity it needs to meet operational commitments and respond to emergencies, or at least it will have when the HNA becomes a reality!

Cheers

[Aussie Digger]

Worth re reading AD's Post 336. In it he said:


I just had another look at the Army link re the HNA :

It states:


http://www.army.gov.au/HNA/default2.htm

It seems that the battlegroup organisation given in the example pretty well provides what FT is suggesting. All that would be needed would be for one to be set up on a rotational basis, with its attached units, along the lines of the example given, to act as the RDF. Perhaps though this is larger than is needed for the RDF if it is only a company based group at present.

It seems to me that if the battlegroups can be brought together quickly the army already has the capacity it needs to meet operational commitments and respond to emergencies, or at least it will have when the HNA becomes a reality!

Cheers

It's already done, and this "new structure" is nothing more than what 1 Brigade has operated for years with "Battlegroup Tiger" and "Battlegroup Leopard". Not even additional capabilities, as most of the HNA "capabilities" have already been implemented or close to doing so.

The point is that it is cheaper to group capabilities together and provides a better basis for "large scale" warfare. It allows for concentration of specialist elements, such as "trade qualified" persons , which is THE biggest recruiting problem for ADF, not just Army. The idea that dozens, if not hundreds of extra mechanics, fitters etc can be found to support the dispersed units, is not supported by a simple look at the realities of defence recruiting.

On top of this, the current Orbat has yet to be proven NOT to work efficiently, whereas this type of structure was considered EXTENSIVELY under A21. If FT cares to recall 6RAR had it's own integral M198 artillery battery, LAV-25 equipped troop and appropriate supporting elements. It was decided after several years of study, that this formation was not of significant benefit to Army, over and above our existing structure.

What was that old saying about, if it ain't broke?

Now getting my "mod" hat on, let's get back to the thread topic. M1A1 technologies. If anyone wishes to continue this discussion, please start a new thread, in accordance with the DT rules. 1st Warning.

[Smythstar]

Does anyone with details of the tank deal know if the Euro-pack Diesel option would have cost any more?
Since the horse has already bolted perhaps we could modify them later, MTU also make a 1500 Hp V12 engine 35% smaller than the europack or a 2000 Hp V16 the same size.

If we ever decide to go with a hunter killer commanders sight perhaps we could incorporate this with an RWS towards the rear of the turret like the urban warfare Leo 2.

This is a thing called a Lemur mounted on a CV9040 sort of like what I mean.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwJwOKbGML8&mode=related&search=

[old faithful]

Just had an interesting conversation with Darwins Crane Guru. The heaviest lift he has witnessed in Darwin was 700 tons. The most challengeing was 400ton of equipment, to be moved by road, through darwin to Wickem point LNG project. Traffic lights were removed and back roads taken. We have the capacity to lift loads as high as 1200 tons, right here in Darwin. So moving 60 ton MBT,s is hardly a problem. Either lifting them or moving them by road, as i mentioned before, the rumors are all about getting extra funding for the NT roads from the Federal Govt. Cheers.

[alexsa]

Just had an interesting conversation with Darwins Crane Guru. The heaviest lift he has witnessed in Darwin was 700 tons. The most challengeing was 400ton of equipment, to be moved by road, through darwin to Wickem point LNG project. Traffic lights were removed and back roads taken. We have the capacity to lift loads as high as 1200 tons, right here in Darwin. So moving 60 ton MBT,s is hardly a problem. Either lifting them or moving them by road, as i mentioned before, the rumors are all about getting extra funding for the NT roads from the Federal Govt. Cheers.

100% correct. In addiiton there are a number of mobile wheeled 100 tonne units deployed to Darwin (as opposed to crawlers). Given the rail system can take the M1A1 getting them off the flat does is not really a problem.

[Aussie Digger]

To those who still think Australia would have been better off with a Leo 2 purchase rather than the M1A1, here are the details of the Canadian purchase of Leo II's...

Backgrounder

Renewing the Canadian Forces' Tank Capability

BG–07.012 - April 12, 2007
THE REQUIREMENT

The heavily protected direct fire capability of a main battle tank is an invaluable tool in the arsenal of any military. The intensity of recent conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East has shown western militaries that tanks provide protection that cannot be matched by more lightly armoured wheeled vehicles.
Simply put, tanks save lives, providing soldiers with a high level of protection. In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s use of lethal and readily available anti-armour weapons, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), is a clear threat. Canada’s Leopard 1 tanks have provided close direct fire support and mitigated the threat of IEDs, as well as landmines. The tanks have also provided the Canadian Forces (CF) with the capability to travel to locations that would otherwise be inaccessible to wheeled light armoured vehicles, including Taliban defensive positions.
Renewing Canada’s tank capability will enable the CF to meet current operational needs in the short and long term. Canada’s 30-year old Leopard 1 tanks are due for replacement, and Leopard 2 tanks offer more protection against IEDs and landmines; and are technologically more advanced than their predecessor. Furthermore, by 2012 there will no longer be logistics support and spare parts for the turrets of Leopard 1s, resulting in complete obsolescence by 2015.
THE PROCESS

A number of options for renewing the tank capability were considered, ranging from refurbishment to surplus to new.
Refurbishing the tanks is not an option as the 30-year old Leopard 1 turrets will be obsolete in 2015. It is also unsuited to operations in hot climates. Acquiring new tanks off a production line was also examined, but delivery would not occur for a few years and the individual tank cost is approximately three times as expensive as procuring and upgrading the same capability that exists on the surplus market.
When examining the surplus tank option, Canada approached six allied nations to enquire about availability. Formal proposals from three nations were thoroughly evaluated by Public Works and Government Services Canada and the Department of National Defence (DND) in terms of price, upgrade costs, delivery schedule, operational performance, survivability and through-life operating and maintenance costs. Based on this evaluation, the decision was taken to acquire up to 100 surplus Leopard 2 tanks from the Netherlands and negotiate a short-term loan arrangement with Germany to borrow 20 combat-ready Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks to address immediate operational requirements. This decision represented the most balanced and affordable approach for both short-and long-term requirements.
Canada is negotiating government-to-government agreements for both borrowing and acquiring the Leopard 2 tanks. The total project cost of the loaned tanks, the acquisition of 100 surplus tanks from the Netherlands, the requisite upgrades and enhancements to this new Leopard 2 fleet, and an initial acquisition of spare parts is $650 million, which will be funded from existing departmental allocations.
DEPLOYING COMBAT-READY TANKS

The tanks being loaned from Germany are fully operational, and will be deployed to Afghanistan in conjunction with the next rotation of personnel this summer.
These tanks are able to operate in intense heat as their electric turret systems and more powerful engines generate significantly less heat when operating than the hydraulic systems of Canada’s 30-year-old Leopard 1 fleet. They will also be fitted with climate control systems once in theatre.
ACQUIRING A PROVEN, MODERN MAIN BATTLE TANK

The surplus, modern Leopard 2 tanks being acquired from the Netherlands represent a unique opportunity to acquire proven, effective main battle tanks at a fraction of the cost of a similar, new tank. These tanks have been well maintained and stored in climate-controlled facilities. Due diligence has shown that these tanks will serve Canada effectively, well into the future. In addition, surplus Leopard 2 tanks have been acquired by a number of nations in recent years and have been put into operational service very successfully. This is a proven capability. Their advanced features include significantly increased personnel protection against explosive devices and landmines, an ability to travel considerably faster in difficult terrain, more powerful engines, and stronger firing capabilities.
CANADA’S NEW LEOPARD 2 FLEET

The acquisition of 100 tanks represents the minimum fleet size to support a deployed tank squadron. These 100 vehicles would be broken down into operational and supporting squadrons as follows:
For deployed operations, the Canadian Forces need two combat-ready squadrons of approximately 20 tanks each: one for deployment and a second for rotation into theatre to allow for depot repair and overhaul of the first.
An additional two squadrons of 20 tanks each are required for collective and individual training in Canada.
Individual tank training would be conducted by the squadron based at the Combat Training Centre at CFB Gagetown in New Brunswick
The squadron based at CFB Wainwright at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre would conduct collective unit training to prepare for deployments.
The final 20 vehicles will consist of key support vehicles such as armoured recovery vehicles, armoured bridge-laying vehicles and armoured engineering vehicles (i.e. dozer, plough, excavator).BENEFITS FOR CANADIANS

This acquisition represents a significant opportunity for Canadian industry. Once negotiations are complete, the Dutch Leopard 2 tanks will be transported to Canada where they will receive the necessary upgrades to final Canadian Forces standards.
In the coming months, the Government of Canada will conduct one or more fair, open and competitive processes for the long-term in-service support of this fleet.
The Canadian Industrial Benefits policy will apply as appropriate. In this context, it may apply to future support, repair or upgrade contracts. The Canadian Industrial Benefits policy is the Government of Canada’s way of leveraging benefits to the Canadian economy as a result of our defence procurements.
THE FUTURE

The Canadian Forces have always planned to retain a direct-fire capability and recent conflicts have confirmed the importance of retaining a tracked tank capability. The Leopard 2 main battle tanks will bring strength, added protection and the ability to access difficult terrain that a wheeled vehicle cannot provide.
This acquisition is a further demonstration of Canada’s New Government’s commitment to renew and transform the Canadian Forces, providing them the equipment they need to do the demanding jobs we as Canadians ask them to do.

$120m MORE to acquire roughly the same amount of "operational" tanks, of arguably a lower specification than Australia received with it's "AIM SA" standard tanks.

Seems we didn't get quite so "hosed" as many would like to think...

[Waylander]

But the Canadians have much more training vehicles which can easily be used to form overstrength squadrons if the situation requires it.
They also get their bridgelaying equipment which is very important in my eyes and would have been also a good purchase for Australia, especially with all this talking about the Abrams being not able to use some bridges in Australia and without them beeing able to deep forge.

The AIMs defenitely have an advantage when it comes to battlefield management systems when the Canadians decide not to go with the system offered by Rheinmetall.
On the other hand due to its decision not to use DU ammo the Leos offer better firepower.

I agree that it is a closer run than many expected because people tend to look at the really cheap basic A4s offered by some countries and tend to forget that for example a new Leopard 2E costs more than 7 million (including support, spare parts, training,...).

In the end the Leopard 2A6(M) is a better tank than the M1A1 AIM used by you WHEN fitted with a battlefield managment system.
- Better firepower
- Hunter/killer capabilities (including an extra TI)
- deep forging capability
- not that tail heavy due to the more classical but equally powerfull engine
- improved mine/IED protection when using the M version

[Aussie Digger]

But the Canadians have much more training vehicles which can easily be used to form overstrength squadrons if the situation requires it.
They also get their bridgelaying equipment which is very important in my eyes and would have been also a good purchase for Australia, especially with all this talking about the Abrams being not able to use some bridges in Australia and without them beeing able to deep forge.

The AIMs defenitely have an advantage when it comes to battlefield management systems when the Canadians decide not to go with the system offered by Rheinmetall.
On the other hand due to its decision not to use DU ammo the Leos offer better firepower.

I agree that it is a closer run than many expected because people tend to look at the really cheap basic A4s offered by some countries and tend to forget that for example a new Leopard 2E costs more than 7 million (including support, spare parts, training,...).

In the end the Leopard 2A6(M) is a better tank than the M1A1 AIM used by you WHEN fitted with a battlefield managment system.
- Better firepower
- Hunter/killer capabilities (including an extra TI)
- deep forging capability
- not that tail heavy due to the more classical but equally powerfull engine
- improved mine/IED protection when using the M version

I'm not so much disparaging the Leo II as those who think Australia completely missed the mark acquiring the M1A1. It was done for excellent reasons and will prove to be a very capable tank for Australia.

They also think we somehow got swindled. At least it's reassuring to see we're not the ONLY ones if this is the case...

[Smythstar]

The Ghans going to be Panzer city soon, as well as the Canadians the Danes are sending a quantity of LeoIIA5s to Helmand.

At last the Germans will get to try out their tank in low level battle conditions.

I initially thought we should have gone LeoII untill I realised we could quite easily put standard Diesel engines in the Abrams, I read somewhere that an Abrams with the more fuel efficient Diesel powerpack of 1500hp (some say nearer to 1800hp) using the same fuel load as the Gas Turbine equiped model (ie just using the existing fuel tanks) would have a road range of around 750 kilometers!
This and the fact that all ammo in the Abrams is in armoured blow off panel equiped boxes at the rear of the turret and none in the hull makes it much more of a winner than I previously thought.
I think we need more though, even if half of them are put away in war storage and they all need a diesel power pack.

If L55, RWS or hunter killer thermals sights are needed im sure they could be fitted but the fundamentals are right even if its a bit heavy but so is the LeoII.

Danish LeoII off to Helmand

[Waylander]

As I stated before.
Leos are also not cheap. Not if you want a top machine. If you are ok with surplus A4 than you can get them very cheap and they have the best bang for the bucks at the moment.
But if you want a truly modern Leo with all the gadgets of the Leopard IIA6EX you are not getting away very cheap.
This is what many people forget.
I stated the things which I don't like at the M1A1 AIMs the Aussies got (No hunter/killer, the turbine, no deep forging capability and no bridgelayers and a less powerfull gun due to non-DU ammo) but it is not a bad decision.
A comparable fleet of Leo II with all the nice toys would have been only marginal cheaper (Or maybe even more expensive) and the Aussies tend to work together with the Yanks making it a good decision for oversea deployments.

[eckherl]

As I stated before.
Leos are also not cheap. Not if you want a top machine. If you are ok with surplus A4 than you can get them very cheap and they have the best bang for the bucks at the moment.
But if you want a truly modern Leo with all the gadgets of the Leopard IIA6EX you are not getting away very cheap.
This is what many people forget.
I stated the things which I don't like at the M1A1 AIMs the Aussies got (No hunter/killer, the turbine, no deep forging capability and no bridgelayers and a less powerfull gun due to non-DU ammo) but it is not a bad decision.
A comparable fleet of Leo II with all the nice toys would have been only marginal cheaper (Or maybe even more expensive) and the Aussies tend to work together with the Yanks making it a good decision for oversea deployments.

If Australia ever decides that they need a little more non DU velocity/power they can always upgrade to the L-55.

[Waylander]

Maybe this is not that easy. I heard about problems with integrating the L/55 into the Abrams because it then tends to bee too nose heavy.
Are these rumours correct?

[eckherl]

Maybe this is not that easy. I heard about problems with integrating the L/55 into the Abrams because it then tends to bee too nose heavy.
Are these rumours correct?

I have been informed that they had to fine tune the gun trunnions and inertia valves and it shouldn`t be a issue, Challenger 2s still slated for this upgrade correct?:)

[Waylander]

As long as I know the program is still in the pipe and nothing changed. :)

[Grand Danois]

The Ghans going to be Panzer city soon, as well as the Canadians the Danes are sending a quantity of LeoIIA5s to Helmand.

At last the Germans will get to try out their tank in low level battle conditions.

I initially thought we should have gone LeoII untill I realised we could quite easily put standard Diesel engines in the Abrams, I read somewhere that an Abrams with the more fuel efficient Diesel powerpack of 1500hp (some say nearer to 1800hp) using the same fuel load as the Gas Turbine equiped model (ie just using the existing fuel tanks) would have a road range of around 750 kilometers!
This and the fact that all ammo in the Abrams is in armoured blow off panel equiped boxes at the rear of the turret and none in the hull makes it much more of a winner than I previously thought.
I think we need more though, even if half of them are put away in war storage and they all need a diesel power pack.

If L55, RWS or hunter killer thermals sights are needed im sure they could be fitted but the fundamentals are right even if its a bit heavy but so is the LeoII.

Danish LeoII off to Helmand

Uh. Those Danish Leo 2's haven't been deployed yet. They are currently standing by as rapid reaction reinforcements for contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A qualified guess would be to expect them deployed to Afghanistan in August as the contingent adds c. 200 troops to its numbers.

The tank unit would consist of 4 leo2A5DK plus an APC and a recovery vehicle. 34 soldiers are assigned to the unit.

[MARKMILES77]

No problems with this programme!

ABC News

Abrams tanks ready for action



The Australian Defence Force has declared the first American-supplied M1A1 Abrams tanks ready for battle.

Army chief Lieutenant General Peter Leahy will attend the Abrams Tank Squadron readiness parade this morning at the Robertson Barracks outside of Darwin.

Commanding Officer of the 1st Armoured Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Hayward says crews have undergone intense training to reach this stage.

"We've sent about 200 soldiers over to the United States over the last two years," he said.

"They've trained with the Americans. They've operated the tank in the US and they've brought those skills back to Australia.

"We've practiced at Mount Bundy training area and they've taken to the tanks very well."

Colonel Hayward says today's parade is also a farewell for the 30-year-old Leopard Tank Squadron.

"It's served us particularly well. It's like saying farewell to an old friend and it will be missed, but certainly what's replacing it is absolutely outstanding," he said.

[StingrayOZ]

Does anyone know what they are doing with the old Leopards?

NZ? Private sales? Storing them?

[Waylander]

I would wonder if you could do anything else than scrapping them.
The prices for metals are quiet good these days and the market for old Leo 1s is nearly dead with all the old Euro ones floating around.

[robsta83]

I wouldn't be surprised if they put a few holes in some. It's not every day you can use tanks for target practice.

[Aussie Digger]

I wouldn't be surprised if they put a few holes in some. It's not every day you can use tanks for target practice.

They've got an old Centurion on the range at Singelton where grunts learn to shoot the 84mm Carl Gustav (and probably Javelin now) so I don't see why a couple of Leopards couldn't be used at Mt Bundy for some training activities.

Hook a few up as a "giant" remote control vehicle for the first shot or 2 would be a valuable training aid to I'd imagine...

[Simon9]

They've got an old Centurion on the range at Singelton where grunts learn to shoot the 84mm Carl Gustav (and probably Javelin now) so I don't see why a couple of Leopards couldn't be used at Mt Bundy for some training activities.

Hook a few up as a "giant" remote control vehicle for the first shot or 2 would be a valuable training aid to I'd imagine...

That old Centurion is looking like rusted Swiss cheese now from all the HEAT hits. It could probably do with replacement by a Leopard as well. ;)

I doubt it's got too many Javelin holes in it though - you don't have to fire the Javelin live to qualify on it, you can just use the simulator (2/14's is 9RQR's old Pipes and Drums hut at Enoggera!), so I doubt many Javelins head down-range each year. :)

I for one am very sad to see the Leopards go. They may be largely obsolete but they're a beautiful tank. Wonder if the Abrams will get the same paint job?

[Aussie Digger]

That old Centurion is looking like rusted Swiss cheese now from all the HEAT hits. It could probably do with replacement by a Leopard as well. ;)

I doubt it's got too many Javelin holes in it though - you don't have to fire the Javelin live to qualify on it, you can just use the simulator (2/14's is 9RQR's old Pipes and Drums hut at Enoggera!), so I doubt many Javelins head down-range each year. :)

I for one am very sad to see the Leopards go. They may be largely obsolete but they're a beautiful tank. Wonder if the Abrams will get the same paint job?

True, I think Javelin's are only live fired during "fire power" demo's or whenever they can scab some rounds off the Americans... :D

I saw that old Centurion years ago. It had a heap of "holes" in it back then. I doubt it's even recognisable AS a Centurion these days...

It certainly IS a shame they are getting rid of the Leopards. There is a whole list of armoured engineering vehicles that we are SUPPOSED to have in our Orbat but of course never have. They are even tendering to buy a new armoured "route clearing" vehicle. Something the Leopard could do well enough I'd suggest, with minimal modifications.

But anyway, they seem dead keen on getting rid of them, so that's what WILL happen...

[Waylander]

That's something I find really interesting but never came to my mind before.

Were do you get your hard targets from?
I think that this old centurion is not the only hard target on your ranges but unlike european countries or the US you don't have luxury of huge amounts of hard targets ranging from WWII to cold war equipment.

Do you buy them? Or dou you get them for free, maybe from the US or UK.

[sunderer]

saw a doco this morning while pulling a sickie on megafactories and it featured the rebuild facility for the M1 in the US and most of the tanks going through at the time of filming were ours as they had kangaroos on the turrets. The opposition should watch it they really are like new vehicles very comprehensive rebuild.

[Aussie Digger]

That's something I find really interesting but never came to my mind before.

Were do you get your hard targets from?
I think that this old centurion is not the only hard target on your ranges but unlike european countries or the US you don't have luxury of huge amounts of hard targets ranging from WWII to cold war equipment.

Do you buy them? Or dou you get them for free, maybe from the US or UK.

Actually we keep quite a bit of our former inventory in warstock. Quite a number of Centurions and M113's have been placed in same. I'd be surprised if quite a few Leopards won't be there too.

Out of 91 gun tanks actually purchased, only 60 odd were ever issued to 1 Armd Regt and the School of Armour. Where are the rest???

[Waylander]

Sold at your local black market? :D

Ok centurion sounds like a reasonable hard target for bigger calibres while M113s are more for smaller calibres or LAW like weapons.

Has anybody an idea of how often hard targets are used instead of classical paper/wooden/whatever targets in Australia?

And another question.

Are training rounds used by Abrams or live ammunition. Most of our ranges for example are restricted to training rounds while on swiss ranges live rounds are normal due to the surrounding mountains.
With so many free land I would think that it is easy to find unrestricted ranges in Australia.

[icelord]

Actually we keep quite a bit of our former inventory in warstock. Quite a number of Centurions and M113's have been placed in same. I'd be surprised if quite a few Leopards won't be there too.

Out of 91 gun tanks actually purchased, only 60 odd were ever issued to 1 Armd Regt and the School of Armour. Where are the rest???

Black ops. Definately to a shadow and covert division of the Army. They will all be painted black and supported by black trucks and black humvees, its just the way it goes.
Or like waylander said, blackmarket. Ever wonder how you can awlays see governments spending on new equipment, over and over? simple, sell the excess to someone else and buy different toy for photo op.:rolleyes:

[Todjaeger]

Black ops. Definately to a shadow and covert division of the Army. They will all be painted black and supported by black trucks and black humvees, its just the way it goes.
Or like waylander said, blackmarket. Ever wonder how you can awlays see governments spending on new equipment, over and over? simple, sell the excess to someone else and buy different toy for photo op.:rolleyes:

Nah, I think they were just mislabeled and misshelved. Try checking behind the Vegemite... :D

Seriously though, it sounds like the ADF might be engaging in something like stocking a 50% surplus of equipment for deployable units. If that is the case, (or had been the case) that would allow a degree of flexibility in the event there is an outbreak of war. Given the cost and high tech of current mil equipment, as well as the increase in destructive capability of modern weaponry, units can be decimated before replacements can be acquired. If the vehicles, etc are already in warstock inventory, then additional or replacement units can be raised that much sooner.

It then becomes a question of balance, like whether it is better to spend AU$X for a 2 sqd unit with possible replacements in warstock, or just have a 3sqd unit available for deployment...

-Cheers

[Aussie Digger]

Black ops. Definately to a shadow and covert division of the Army. They will all be painted black and supported by black trucks and black humvees, its just the way it goes.
Or like waylander said, blackmarket. Ever wonder how you can awlays see governments spending on new equipment, over and over? simple, sell the excess to someone else and buy different toy for photo op.:rolleyes:

How many M113's have we sold overseas?

How many Centurions did we sell overseas?

How many M2A2 and "Pack" 105mm Howitzers have we sold overseas?

Both have been replaced within various units with different "toys" over the years.

It is not a conspiracy theory. Australia DOES maintain a warstock of military equipment.

If you require further proof, consider the fact that over 75,000 F-88 Steyr rifles have been produced at Lithgow. How many personnel in ADF again?

Where are the rest I wonder?

[Mick73]

How many M113's have we sold overseas?

How many Centurions did we sell overseas?

How many M2A2 and "Pack" 105mm Howitzers have we sold overseas?

Both have been replaced within various units with different "toys" over the years.

It is not a conspiracy theory. Australia DOES maintain a warstock of military equipment.

If you require further proof, consider the fact that over 75,000 F-88 Steyr rifles have been produced at Lithgow. How many personnel in ADF again?

Where are the rest I wonder?

I believe they are in blokes jack trunks or at the bottom of rivers!
All jokes aside. There is heaps of gear in warstocks! You here of the ADF scrapping some of it from time to time!

[AGRA]

The comparison between the Leopard 2A6 and M1A1 AIM is not exactly accurate or fair. Firstly the Australian Army clearly identified in the Land 907 Operational Concept Document that they were looking for a “Tier II” tank capability. A “Tier I” capability was defined as a tank with a hunter-killer sighting system like the M1A2 SEP and Leopard 2A6. The actual shortlist taken to Government for the ‘second pass’ decision was the M1A1 AIM up against the RUAG Panzer 87 WE (Swiss Leopard 2 upgrade). The M1A1 AIM won out despite having higher operating costs (a loss of 20% in track km and main gun firings on the fixed operating budget compared to the Panzer 87 WE) because of superior protection and Network Centric Warfighting (NCW) capability.

Secondly its wrong in an Australia or outside of Western Europe context to give much credence to the Leopard 2’s deep fording capability (something that the Leopard 1 has as well so Australian Army is very familiar with it). The lack of rock bottom river beds and high level surveying data of river beds outside of the old NATO versus Warsaw pact Central Front scenario make using this capability outside of West Germany extremely difficult. Bridge weight limits as a problem for MLC60/70 MBT mobility are overstated. Most highway bridges in Australia are designed for Gross Vehicle Weights (GVW) as high as 120 tonnes so can take an MBT and a Heavy Tank Transporter (HTT). Other bridges tend to be only MLC20/30 GVW and easily avoidable with Engineer bridging capability (if extant).

The M1A1 AIM actually has far superior traditional protection to any version of the Leopard 2 (including upgrades). Thanks to its full compartmentalising of ammunition away from the crew. Also the benefits of the TUSK upgrade can be provided to the M1A1 AIM improving side, rear and bottom protection. Top armour could be added just like with the Leopard 2A6 for bomblet protection. Since bomblet protection will be added to the Army’s new self-propelled 155mm artillery hopefully it will go on the M1A1. The M1A1 AIM also has an under armour commander’s machinegun, something the Leopard 2 doesn’t (the Swiss Panzer 87 WE does) which provides considerable additional protection to the guy who has to provide top cover against insurgents.

While the M1A1’s gas turbine cops a lot of flak and burns more fuel to be significantly costlier it does have some advantages. It is much quieter making the tank stealthier (noise is a significant factor in detecting tanks), starts up quicker and easier and requires less maintenance. That being said the new MTU Europaks are formidable engines. But for 1970 technology the AGT-1500 ain’t that bad.

When one considers that the cost difference in operating a full regiment of M1A1 AIMS (and all supporting training) compared to Panzer 87 WEs is only AUD 6 million a year (0.03% of our annual defence budget) with its superior protection and NCW it’s a much better option.

PS Australia does not warstock that much stuff anymore. Most of it get’s scrapped. The L5 105mm pack howitzers were scrapped. Also any vehicle placed as a target on a range has to be environmentally cleared which means removing all fluids any harmful materials, tested so it won’t start fires if hit, etc, etc. Except for places like JCTC its really not worth the trouble. Better just to shoot at purpose designed targets.

There was some talk that the Leopard AS1s would be supplied to Afghanistan but Defence has formally denied this. They will probably end up as scrap.

Armoured engineering vehicles: Armoured Mine Clearers (AMC), Armoured Vehicle Specialist Engineers (AVSE) and Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLB) will emerge in the next DCP 08-18 in Land 907 Phase 2 and Land 144 Phase 2 and will be M1 hull based and acquired from the USG by FMS.

[AGRA]

Are training rounds used by Abrams or live ammunition. Most of our ranges for example are restricted to training rounds while on swiss ranges live rounds are normal due to the surrounding mountains.
With so many free land I would think that it is easy to find unrestricted ranges in Australia.

We shoot a lot of live ammunition. With only 51 tanks in operational service at any one time (1 Armd Regt and School of Armour) the Leopard AS1s fired 7,400 105mm rounds per annum. M1A1s will fire less (unless called upon to deply in which case pre-deployment training will use a lot more ammo) but will have more extensive use of 12.7mm sub cal firings.

There are pictures you can download of both tanks on the Mt Bundy (near Darwin) range together. Its very flat (unlike Switzerland) and very big...