Stealth capabilities of F-35

[Moroz.ru]

Australia Voices Concerns About Latest Setback to U.S. Stealth Fighter


By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, SYDNEY

Australia expressed concern March 14 at news that the new generation U.S. warplane that was to be a cornerstone of Australia’s future air force will not have the stealth capabilities initially promised.

But Defense Minister Brendan Nelson said Canberra still intended to spend up to 15 billion dollars ($11 billion U.S.) on the new warplanes, the biggest military purchase in Australia’s history.

Nelson said he was taking “very seriously” news that the U.S. Defense Department had downgraded the stealth capability of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), meaning the planes would be less able to evade radar detection and enemy attack than earlier believed.

The downgrade, revealed on a Defense Department website and confirmed by Nelson on March 14, lowered the radio frequency signature of the fighter jet from “extremely low observable” to “very low observable”.

The setback is only the latest in a string of problems for the $240 billion (U.S.) JSF project, which both Australia and Britain have been counting on to provide their next generation of warplanes.

Australia, a key U.S. military ally, plans to buy up to 100 of the F-35s from around 2015 to replace its aging fleet of U.S.-made F-111 strike bombers and F/A-18 fighter bombers.

But some defense analysts have expressed concerns about the performance capabilities and cost of the new planes.
Peter Goon, a former air force flight test engineer, told The Sydney Morning Herald newspaper the change in the JSF’s stealth rating would mean the difference between the warplane appearing as a “marble and a beach ball” on enemy radar.

Nelson said he had met with representatives of both the U.S. Defense Department and the JSF manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, about the latest problem.

”We are examining in quite a lot of detail precisely what that might mean, not only for U.S. but indeed for the U.S. and the other partners that are involved in the process of developing and then acquiring the Joint Strike Fighter,” he said.

”We have got a lot hinging on this in terms of retirement of our F-111s, the upgrade of our F/A-18s and also in what we do with a variety of our other airframes including the P-3Cs.

”We are taking it very seriously but I think at this stage it is certainly not cause for U.S. to abandon the project.”

Dennis Jensen, a government Member of Parliament and former defense analyst, recently said he did not think the Joint Strike Fighter would be a match for the Russian-built Sukhoi family of strike jets that are or will be operated by air forces in Asia, including China, Indonesia, Malaysia and India.

Copy&paste from http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/article_005200.php

[gf0012-aust]

This is actually a bit of a beat up by the local press, and by an individual who has his own military company with a vested interest in not seeing the F-35 get selected.

The RCS has not been re-evaluated because its less - its been re-benchmarked against the comparative RCS of the F-22. In real terms, that means that it actually has an improvment on a means basis

Its a bit difficult to add public detail here, but the long and the short of it is that RAAF are not as concerned as the article implies.

[Totoro]

This isn't really about stealth of f-35 but i didn't wanna start a new thread for the sake of just one question being answered. So please if anyone can help - i'd b grateful. You, gf0012 have proven to be knowledgeable, do you happen to know the answer to my question?

In all the promo materials and articles i've found everyone is talking how multipurpose f-35 is, how it can carry two 2000 lbs weapons alongside two amraams for self defence - all interally. But what about pure air superiority missions? I haven't found any data on how many AA missiles can f-35 carry interally. I would assume that the bomb rack can carry an AA missile as well, making f-35 able to carry four amraams internally. But can anyone confirm that? Also, is it true that sidewinders can't be carried interally??? That sounds like lunacy to me, but i have read some articles saying so. It must be some mistake as i see little logic to that, especially with LOAL capability of aim9x.

Also, what about underwing payload? How many a2a missiles can be carried externally? two on wingtips, i've read, plus one more pylon per wing. Is that true, that there's just one more pylon? That also sounds very silly, perhaps its not true. I would think, though, that even with one pylon per wing it could feature a twin rack for two amraams per pylon, just like with the f-22.

[Aussie Digger]

This isn't really about stealth of f-35 but i didn't wanna start a new thread for the sake of just one question being answered. So please if anyone can help - i'd b grateful. You, gf0012 have proven to be knowledgeable, do you happen to know the answer to my question?

In all the promo materials and articles i've found everyone is talking how multipurpose f-35 is, how it can carry two 2000 lbs weapons alongside two amraams for self defence - all interally. But what about pure air superiority missions? I haven't found any data on how many AA missiles can f-35 carry interally. I would assume that the bomb rack can carry an AA missile as well, making f-35 able to carry four amraams internally. But can anyone confirm that? Also, is it true that sidewinders can't be carried interally??? That sounds like lunacy to me, but i have read some articles saying so. It must be some mistake as i see little logic to that, especially with LOAL capability of aim9x.

Also, what about underwing payload? How many a2a missiles can be carried externally? two on wingtips, i've read, plus one more pylon per wing. Is that true, that there's just one more pylon? That also sounds very silly, perhaps its not true. I would think, though, that even with one pylon per wing it could feature a twin rack for two amraams per pylon, just like with the f-22.

The F-35 (all variants) will have one pylon per internal bomb bay (2 bomb bays exist on each F-35) and one rail for a WVRAAM will be fitted on each bomb bay door. This means on pure A2A missions, any F-35 can carry a minimum of 2x BVR and 2x WVR A2A missiles or 4x WVR A2A missiles internally.

I believe (though I can't produce a picture) that dual rail A2A missile launchers have been "ground fitted" inside the bomb bay of the F-35, meaning that an F-35 could theoretically carry up to 4x BVR and 2x WVR A2A missiles or some other combination of BVR and WVR missiles for a maximum of 6 internal missiles.

In addition to this, the F-35A/B will have a minimum of 4x external pylons on the wings (2x on each). The F-35C is rumoured to carry 3x pylons per wing, due to it's larger surface area. It is also rumoured that each F-35 will also be capable of mounting 3x pylons on the fuselage of the aircraft, ala the F/A-18 series (one centreline and 1 each on the port and starboard sides).

If the rumours are true, the F-35A/B will be capable of mounting 9x pylons and 2x rails and the F-35C 11x pylons and 2x rails, giving an excellent lift capacity for any variant, particularly in view of the most likely exclusive use of PGM's that F-35's will employ...

LM are also reputedly developing "stealthy" pylons that will allow greater use of externally carried munitions and fuel, sensors etc, so as to not to disturb the stealth characteristics, too greatly. It'll be interesting to see if this is achievable or worthwhile...

Hope this answers your questions somwhat, mate.

Cheers.

[Totoro]

Well, thank you for your effort. It is a little bit curious though, that no ROCK HARD info can be found on this topic online, unlike all the other US planes, including f22. Even with raptor, all the weapon payload combos have been made official years ago. Not so with f35... I would guess they're still trying out just how many can they fit inside, but isn't the design now completely frozen and low level production should start next year? Hopefully by then some official data will be issued.

[gf0012-aust]

Well, thank you for your effort. It is a little bit curious though, that no ROCK HARD info can be found on this topic online, unlike all the other US planes, including f22. Even with raptor, all the weapon payload combos have been made official years ago. Not so with f35... I would guess they're still trying out just how many can they fit inside, but isn't the design now completely frozen and low level production should start next year? Hopefully by then some official data will be issued.

I think the other thing that has to be considered is that the USAF is going through a miniaturised weapons development stage - so there a fair bit of technology that hasn't been cleared for use but is being profiled and tested. So its a bit hard for empirical load out figures to be given.

eg revised rotary dispensers may mean revised missile designs with conformal vanes etc.... Under normal weapons discharge you might be able to rack up a pair of missiles, by redesigning the rotary dispenser (a la F-22) its possible to lay up 3-4 missiles in the same space.

another issue is that IIRC conformal weapons pods are also under consideration.

[LancerMc]

Yes, currently the loading capabilities of the F-35 are limited in their scope. With the introduction of the SDM and 500lb JDAM the internal carriage capabilities of the F-35 are expanding. The F-22 will be able to eventually carry 12 SDM's, though the current rate is to have then fitted with 8. So the F-35 will more then likely be also able to carry a heft number of these muntions.

The F-35 will for sure have a wide variety of external weapons carriage capabilities. The stealth weapons pods and pylons are still in development, but as far as I have read they are at least another 5 years down the road.

I am suprised the U.S. Congress is going to buy some 400 JSF's before they even been tested. The rate Lockheed Martin is going who knows how quickly their going to get the project done? It never is smart to order something that hasn't matured yet.

It's besides the fact the U.S. is also turning its back on allies. I think sometimes our Congress forgets who are our allies. I understand some of the technology in the JSF is sensitive, but the UK and Australia are probably are most trusted allies currently. Congress should rethink their decisions, especially over the UK engine deal.

:nonsense

[Magoo]

Well, thank you for your effort. It is a little bit curious though, that no ROCK HARD info can be found on this topic online, unlike all the other US planes, including f22. Even with raptor, all the weapon payload combos have been made official years ago. Not so with f35... I would guess they're still trying out just how many can they fit inside, but isn't the design now completely frozen and low level production should start next year? Hopefully by then some official data will be issued.

No ROCK HARD info can be found because the aircraft's final design is yet to be frozen. Although the mould line and major structural designs have been completed, detail areas such as placement of many of the black boxes as well as external load outs are yet to be finalised and are unlikely to be for a couple of years yet.

Internally, the A and C model JSFs can carry four AMRAAMs and two AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs. The B model can carry two AMRAAMs and two AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs. Externally, AD is correct when he says the pylons should be able to carry two missiles each, and we'll probably see a pylon arrangement similar to that used on the F-15 where it will be able to carry an aux fuel tank AND two AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs on the inboard pylons using a dual shoulder rail arrangement. Plans for wingtip stations for all models were dropped in the weight loss campaign, but the larger span C model will possibly have three wing stations per wing.

Although a centreline station is planned, I'm not so sure about the other two fuselage shoulder stations AD speaks about. I think there's issues with landing gear doors and internal weapons bays, so it may not be feasible.

Magoo

[knightrider4]

I think the aircraft operating as a system of systems may well do the job for the RAAF. If one takes the view given by Housten that the 'sum of all parts is greater than' argument. As a standalone platform I think it is certainly is not an air dominant platform but networked as part of the overall ADF force it will eventually be one of the key ingrediants of the future networked force. As for it's stealth I believe its optimised for x-band stealth mostly in the forward sector, its no Raptor but its also a third of the cost.

[Supe]

I think the aircraft operating as a system of systems may well do the job for the RAAF. If one takes the view given by Housten that the 'sum of all parts is greater than' argument. As a standalone platform I think it is certainly is not an air dominant platform but networked as part of the overall ADF force it will eventually be one of the key ingrediants of the future networked force. As for it's stealth I believe its optimised for x-band stealth mostly in the forward sector, its no Raptor but its also a third of the cost.

Good post. But what happens when other nations in the region start to 'network' and synergise their systems? We shouldn't think the 'the sum of all parts' will forever be an edge we possess.

[knightrider4]

In my view the Raptor is out of the question, we will be struggling to get the top shelf F-35. So then it comes down to whether the RAAF believe that the F-35 will do the job better than the Typhoon which is the only viable alternative in my opinion. In reality with limited funds the RAAF want a true multi-role aircraft which if it delivers as promised the F-35 will be. There is really no alternative, there may of course be a mix of aircraft but I think the F-35 will always be either part of a mix or a standalone platform. This is just my view of course.

[chrisrobsoar]

This is actually a bit of a beat up by the local press, and by an individual who has his own military company with a vested interest in not seeing the F-35 get selected.

The RCS has not been re-evaluated because its less - its been re-benchmarked against the comparative RCS of the F-22. In real terms, that means that it actually has an improvment on a means basis

Its a bit difficult to add public detail here, but the long and the short of it is that RAAF are not as concerned as the article implies.

This topic also came up on another forum.


Dr Jensen, who has a doctorate in applied physics and used to work at the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.



I thought the name rang a bell; Dr Dennis Jensen is the federal member for Tangney. (Liberal Party, Born 28.2.1962, Johannesburg, South Africa ).

http://www.abc.net.au/stateline/wa/content/2005/s1390885.htm

http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/member.asp?id=DYN

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Jensen

This gentleman is a politician. I suggest that any comments he makes should be viewed in that context.

(We had dealings with him during his days with the DSTO when he was supposed to be a Scientist, but even then he was very much involved in local & national politics and sometimes forgot which hat he was supposed to be wearing).



Isn't the Liberal Party in Australia the conservative party? I thought they were pro-US so what is this political context you are talking about?


The Liberal Party is in government and I think that Dr Jensen has ambitions to advance his career, in particular to be the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence and ultimately to the be Minister for Defence. There have been reports in the press and “coded” replies from him to journalists questions, that Dr Jensen was not too please with the recent appointment of Dr Brendan, a medical doctor, the sub-plot is that Dr Jensen thinks he is better qualified. (He always thought he was better qualified that anyone else, to do anything).

Attacking JSF is an indirect attack on the current minister Dr Brendan Nelson MP.

http://www.brendannelson.com.au/

Just be aware that anything that Dr Jensen says is likely to have a spin to advance his ambition.

[gf0012-aust]

a brace of comments I posted on another forum:


...... ummm, the problem with quoting the article is that the principle individuals involved have vested interests. - and on top of that within the aviation and mil industry they have zero credibility.

eg the aviation engineer involved has is own company and he has been pushing for refurb work on the F-111's. he's persona non grata with the RAAF. his principle business partner wants the F-22 - and might I add, that both gents, including jensen do not have the clearances required to make sound assessments. they have no greater access to the classified data than 99% of people who grace these forums.

quoting this article willgive the anti-F35 brigade much joy - but the bottom line is that every comment I've seen to date has quoted it out of context and without reference to the circumstances involved.

......

Dennis Jensen.

Just to point out how attached to reality Jensen is - he's made a submission to the Assessment Committee that RAAF should buy F-22's. he obviously has no comprehension of threat risk and budget analysis.

Goon, bless his heart, reccommends that we continue to rebuild the F-111 (considering that he has an aviation re-engineering business, one suspects a conflict of commercial interest here. ;) and he wants the F-22 as well.

Such is the calibre of the people slamming the JSF. decision.

Legends in their own minds.

Jensen lost his clearances within 3 years of the finish of his ministerial career (and was never cleared for meaningful data anyway) His CSIRO role never involved him doing associative work on millitary projects. CSIRO has been involved with fluid mecahnics projects for UUV's - but nothing to do with aircraft - especially combat aircraft.

Goon has not worked on any high clearance projects for at least 4 years and is not cleared for any exchange data.

oh yeah baby, they're realllly credible.

.....

while it may be exciting for outsiders and anti-JSF punters to consider Dr Jensen as the new voice of reason to be quoted all over various military sites, eg as someone who was formally involved with defence issues in australia - the reality is that he is:

a self confessed Defence Analyst
he's actually never had any role within Defence decisions (unless you consider that his exposure to national transport systems is equivalent to a future jet fighter requirement)
his clearances were about as useful as someone in opposition - ie, its ok for him to sit in the tank for happy snaps for his children, but don't explain anything to him, and for gods sake don't connect the batteries in case he pushes the wrong button

.....
and finally the following question was asked:


" They say they contacted the US Defense Department directly about it."

I really really doubt it. Policy for any Dept is to assign the query to PR - and PR will not make empirical statements without clearing it first. In this case, it would be a stellar failure of process for US DoD not to flag it with ADF first. On top of that, a full copy of transcript would have gone to ADF.

The fact that SMH have made some very basic errors of fact wrt to the Australian individuals makes me seriously question the calibre and intent of their entire article. There are some glaring but fundamental errors in it which show a geared motive rather than straight forward and diligent research.

btw, I'm not a fan of a full RAAF force of JSF's - I'm of the view that we should mix and match the force for redundancy issues as well as disparate capability issues. But, I take serious objection to articles that are promoted as evidential fact of project failure because of some associated tardy news reporting.

AFAICS the "downgrading" is in relationship to a reassessment of the overall performance bar against the F-22. hence, F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 E/F have all been comparatively regraded as well - thats my understanding from someone within DSTO.

I should add that wrt to jensen, he has never had direct clearance to any procurement data as it is not in his brief, his only association with defence would be if he was working as a CSIRO scientist on associated defence projects.

considering that CSIRO don't have anything to do with aviation - let alone military projects under review - then I suspect that his actual military awareness is limited to the ballistic charcateristics of the tomato.

my 2c anyway, yaddah yaddah. ;)

qualifiers:

- do I think they contacted US DoD? - Yes.

- do I think they contacted the right people? - No.

- do I think they got the answer they printed in context? - No

- do I think they understood the answer given in context? - No

- were they focused on a scoop at the expense of journalistic due diligence? - hell yeah, the little article they printed is replete with errors.

[Cootamundra]

Couldn't agree more gf, the article even claims that a F-35 purchase would cost upwards of $30 billion when taking support and maint costs into consideration. The SMH has never had a single article supporting the new acquisition not to mention ANY article supporting any upgrade in the ADF. Rather, it prefers to print poorly researched articles stating various opinions on critical issues such as combat boot quality (please note sarcastic tone), the military justice system and our suppposed willingness to kiss Uncle Sam's backside. Further to that the paper seems to be fixated on bashing Howard, any ADF upgrade program and indeed any positive news that may come out of Afganistan or Iraq (admittedly there are not always that many). I'm a Sydney-sider but this paper has been getting progressively worse over the last few years, so much so that I'm cancelling my subscription. RAG is the only word I can think of to describe its content.
Cheers, Coota

[gf0012-aust]

surprise surprise - the SMH got it wrong - and you all heard it on here before this was sent to print from Lockmart.

my comments re accuracy of reporting from SMH are confirmed.

this is a classic example why people who quote press articles need to pause before getting excited.



JSF Stealth Won't Be Reduced: Program Officials
By MICHAEL FABEY


Foreign press reports that the Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) sold to Australia will be less stealthy than promised are wrong, prime contractor Lockheed Martin says.

The Sydney Morning Herald reported March 15 that the proposed Australian version of the JSF would have low observability instead of very low observability.

Lockheed JSF spokesman John Kent said there has been no downgrading of any of the aircraft's stealth for foreign or domestic sales.

It appears that there was just a misunderstanding of terms and definitions, Kent said.

He said the Australian press reports apparently misinterpreted what low observable would mean.

The planes will still have the same stealthy ability to avoid radar and other detection equipment as before, he said.

Australia is one of the partner countries expected to buy JSFs in the coming decade.

Another U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released this week says JSF officials have taken four “key actions” to speed up such technology transfers:


Lockheed developed an international industrial plan that identified the type of licenses needed to transfer certain of the technologies;
JSF program agencies now have dedicated staff for JSF technology licensing;
Lockheed and JSF program agencies have used exemptions in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to avoid delays;
Talks about releasing classified information or other technology are taking place early in the program.
Another GAO report released this week said the Pentagon plans to start low-rate initial production of the plane by 2013 without completing some performance tests.

[Moroz.ru]

Another GAO report released this week said the Pentagon plans to start low-rate initial production of the plane by 2013 without completing some performance tests. .
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon should slow funding of Lockheed Martin Corp.'s next-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the costliest international warplane project, until it is proven in flight tests, U.S. congressional investigators said Wednesday. ;)
http://business.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=400442006


There is a marketing rule: “A salesman have to tell to customers a truth and truth only, but part of truth could be hidden”. I suppose that in such giant deal (approximately a quarter of trillion USD) Lockheed Martin and all involved sides going to use all tools and consciously ore unconsciously they could hide a truth could be harm to their favorite creature and to their bank account. Any internet forums aren’t best place to realize are F22/35 a top gun ore money wasting. But nevertheless its interesting to know different (!) opinions about wonderwaffen gadgets

[Kurt Plummer]

AD,
>>
The F-35 (all variants) will have one pylon per internal bomb bay (2 bomb bays exist on each F-35) and one rail for a WVRAAM will be fitted on each bomb bay door. This means on pure A2A missions, any F-35 can carry a minimum of 2x BVR and 2x WVR A2A missiles or 4x WVR A2A missiles internally.
>>
Can you provide me some backing data on this loadout?
According to Sweetman's 'ultimate fighter' title here-
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0760317925/103-9077129-0095012?v=glance&n=283155
The F-35 primary JDAM well is not and -was never- intended to carry AAM. The combination of the flow fields and the depth of the well preventing clean ejection through the boundary layer.
My personal feeling is that the only way the F-35 will survive is in hunting packs, much like today's F-16s so that 2X4 gets you eight shots under a shooter-illuminator scheme that combines ERAAM level standoff (80% of Meteor) with digital tethers to keep the jets from having to MCG each round on a 'tuned analogue' type (sideband) channel step.
>>
I believe (though I can't produce a picture) that dual rail A2A missile launchers have been "ground fitted" inside the bomb bay of the F-35, meaning that an F-35 could theoretically carry up to 4x BVR and 2x WVR A2A missiles or some other combination of BVR and WVR missiles for a maximum of 6 internal missiles.
>>
I would like to see how they managed this. One of the elements which disqualified the YF-23 being the need to nest or 'stack' missiles, vertically, inside a weapons bay. It should also be noted that while the carriage box of a JDAM is 'railless' at some 25", a pair of AIM-120C will, in and of themselves, come up to 35.2" with a LAU-142 or similar rail required for each that is roughly as wide as the missile itself. Given the 'difficulties' they've had rerouting structural loads and finding useable volume for the after-X real warplane; (shrinking BOTH the B -and- the A/C weapons bays) I doubt seriously if there is space for a vertical system. Lastly, even if there was such space and (say) the pair rotated as it descended on some super long ram pistons, you would still have the problem of 'bumping' the other missile on the bay door.
>>
In addition to this, the F-35A/B will have a minimum of 4x external pylons on the wings (2x on each). The F-35C is rumoured to carry 3x pylons per wing, due to it's larger surface area. It is also rumoured that each F-35 will also be capable of mounting 3x pylons on the fuselage of the aircraft, ala the F/A-18 series (one centreline and 1 each on the port and starboard sides).
>>
I'm sure everyone here has seen this-
http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0163.shtml
But in point of truth it simply illustrates to 'knowns' in the military aviation community:
1. You cannot safely load a shoulderwing aircraft's wingtips. Neither Jammer nor Men can reach that high and given the utter worthlessness of I/SRM, it doesn't make sense to do so on a stealth jet with navalization (folding) factors.
2. The underwing stations, /in combination with/ the tip stations on the F-16 add a great deal of drag and cause the wings to flex and burble under opposed loads. This in fact required several rewrites of the flaperon rate coding systems as they buzzed under load and was one of the reasons for qualifying AMRAAM to the tips. Similar worries on the F/A-18E/F have effectively sterilized the outboard underwing pylon for a lot of loadouts and left the jet as a one-shot wonder with tiprails running the useless AIM-9X and a single AMRAAM under the fuselage. i.e. The spacing and toe-out issues of the 'added mission capability' third underwing pylon actually detracted from the jet's total utility in the end.
>>
If the rumours are true, the F-35A/B will be capable of mounting 9x pylons and 2x rails and the F-35C 11x pylons and 2x rails, giving an excellent lift capacity for any variant, particularly in view of the most likely exclusive use of PGM's that F-35's will employ...
>>
Which is laughable when you think about it. Day-1 OEF F-14 drivers were in the air for upwards of 10-12hrs. Despite having much greater 'wings forward, .75' range than the Bugly, they HAD to go with strike tanking S-3's over Pakistani airspace in a move which was nearly undefendable and would have capped the entire package if they were downed.
Similarly, in OIF, air assets time over the fence was on the order of 170-210 minutes compared to 90-120 for DS.
Yet for all this, the jets were STILL spending an average of 20 minutes in the target area. 40 once the Brits and USAF started working out of Kyrghzstan.
Given the F-35's T/Wr in mil is about the equivalent of an A-10, I /doubt seriously/ if 'rumors' of supersonic cruise will turn out to be true, especially with external weapons.
At the same time, PAUC on the jet is 104 million bucks and climbing.
What this means is four things:
1. Pilot fatigue will continue to be the driving factor over WHETHER a jet can find enough targets to drop all munitions.
2. Manning ratio won't mean diddly if a jet is still operating at 1.5 per day because, unlike an airliner which only makes money in flight. A warplane only does it's job at the basing point or the target end of the radius. And the F-35 will be no faster in transit than an F-teen.
3. Because _targeting_ (ISR/RISTA) is the basis by which all air asset employment efficiencies are generated on an aimpoint-per-day basis; ESPECIALLY if you stop playing Hap Arnold games with strategic interdiction of empty buildings and civil facilities (the economics game) you need a platform which can both stay on station AT radius. And one which is cheap enough to 'be everywhere' as a function of killing what it sees (every jet an aperture).
4. The F-35's _always acknowledged_ limitations in all aspect stealth and total dbsm LO capabilities will mean that, even on Day-1 missions where the targets are 'easy' because they are active illuminating/flying; the jet will need to use standoff exclusively. And standoff with GBU-39 is only 30nm with 1.6m penetration. And 50nm with airburst. Well within ASTER or S-300/400 range if you magnify the RCS or go for a sectored lookback (network IADS) system of engagement. OTOH, JASSM/JSOW-D underwing, drops your PGM totals and ups the cost to the point where it's questionable if the jet is any better than a Blk.50+/.60 F-16 (with hunchback CFT, you get the same count of heavyweight pylons).
A UCAV is thus better than a JSF because it can carry the same _internal load_ (X8 GBU-39) with the _same sensors required_ (EOTS + APG-81 or EOTS + XTRA) without the pilot fatigue factor as it sits for 2hrs at 1,100nm. Or 6-8 at 500nm. This is why J-UCAS is dead. Because the Air Farce knows that /loiter is everything/ in a modern ops environment. And that in turn is _death_ to an organization which 'only men can command men but a PFC can fly ten UCAVs'.
>>
LM are also reputedly developing "stealthy" pylons that will allow greater use of externally carried munitions and fuel, sensors etc, so as to not to disturb the stealth characteristics, too greatly. It'll be interesting to see if this is achievable or worthwhile...
>>
Encapsulation doesn't change drag issues or the 'MANPRINT' factors on fatigue (you fly a man more than 6-8hrs for more than 2-3 days, and you will bump your dumb-mistake attrition up by an order of magnitude).
And the change in VLO/LO thresholds reflects the rising competencies of digital signal processors and MSI/CEC type engagement networking. If you've read _The Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding_ it is stated several times within that context that USN systems can detect LO objects well enough to put weapons into firing parameters (particularly SM-6/ERAM using Mountain Top type ADSAM cueing).
Indeed, the F-117 was, for a long time, said to have the LO'est of all signatures at less than -35dbsm. Definitely lower than JSF and (initially) better than the F-22. Only the B-2 was stated to have better performance and that only as a function of deep RAS and possible active cancellation against low band stuff. Yet _The Pentagon Paradox_ specifically states that the F-117 was tracked by an E-2C at _150nm_. And a Royal Navy DDG at 80nm. He even states 'not for attribution' that the Iraqi's themselves were tracking the aircraft.
LO works. But only when it is backed with the overwhelming malevolence of Hard-SEAD. The difference being that the geographic area you have to defend against with a 60-80nm (supercruise) tossed GBU-39 is probably cubed over a 30nm subcruise release. And that itself is cubed over the 12-15nm of a conventional JDAM strike.
So that it is _better_ (less predictable) to be able to take out select defenses which 'have to be there' to defend a given high value target from CM and aeroballistics (The Iraqi ADC and 'AT&T' buildings) and then /flood/ the rest of the IADS with systems which may step on the occasional (mobile S2A) snake. But which generally chuck hand grenades into the nest of them to defeat the threat where it sits. Or at least force a scattering dispersal effect to ensure that ground forces can roll hot without large entanglements of CS/CSS supporting 'force security' numeric overmatches.

CONCLUSION:
Given the massive changes in interference drag and L@D inherent to 1,640lbs X2 (loaded BRU-61 with SDB) the JSF will likely be no better nor worse than a late F-16 when it comes to range performance and standoff in the majority of casepoints where we fight SSC/MRC type battles. NEITHER jet will be worth a dang 'the majority of the rest of the time' (70:30) in OOTW type confrontations such as we now face in Iraq where we cannot support the sortie count X for hours Y needed to give every footpatrol it's own overhead. Thus leaving the JSF to be the F-111 of it's era. A jet which is three-planes-one-name a _NIGHTMARE_ of economics (three development costs for increasingly 'distant cousined' design elements). And a jet which cannot be made to TAKEOFF AND LAND on a common basing mode. Which is where the U.S. 'system of systems' (roles and missions turf preserves) is truly costing us warfighter capabilities. In these factors (time on station and forces in theater), the notion of 'more boom' is not worth the bucks we pay for it. Indeed, it also argues against LO-for-export where the safety of a secret is the square of the number of people who have access to it's manufacturing and source codes (I believe that LO is probably 20-40% electronic and the physical signature is merely the threshold by which LO /can leveraged/ to VLO). Because if we can do a 4:1 increase over 'both pylons today I tell'ya!' aimpoints per day counts. Then the theater CINCs are /mad/ to insist on 'joint multiforce' capabilities which not only are perishable by diffusion. But are also such that the USAF can 'get buy' with 1,100. The Marines with 305. And the Navy with a mere 170 aircraft. NONE of which can land on each other's basing mode. ALL of which are greater than the 50-100 jets each regional nation is apt to supply 'more pylons' for. If they are not scared off altogether by the tarred-together nature of being part of an endeavor like Iraq.


KPl.

[Occum]

AD,

CONCLUSION:
Given the massive changes in interference drag and L@D inherent to 1,640lbs X2 (loaded BRU-61 with SDB) the JSF will likely be no better nor worse than a late F-16 when it comes to range performance and standoff in the majority of casepoints where we fight SSC/MRC type battles. NEITHER jet will be worth a dang 'the majority of the rest of the time' (70:30) in OOTW type confrontations such as we now face in Iraq where we cannot support the sortie count X for hours Y needed to give every footpatrol it's own overhead. Etc.

Cogent and pithy assessment, particularly if assuming you mean 'safety of a secret is the inverse square ....'.



:australia

[410Cougar]

To say it would be no better or no worse than a later generation Falcon is, in my opinion, a little off.

With stealth capabilities, STOVL capabilities and a fly by wire system that can do alot more than any Viper program will ever do based on the limited functionality of the airframe when compared with the JSF, I think you'll see why people will be choosing the JSF.

Don't get me wrong, I love the Viper, its a great plane, but how many of them can you fit on a carrier? How many can you place at forward operating areas unless you control the airbases??

Attila

[Kurt Plummer]

Occum,
You are correct, my bad.
410Cougar/Attila,
>>
To say it would be no better or no worse than a later generation Falcon is, in my opinion, a little off.
>>
There is a field of reasoning called the 'cybernetic paradigm' by which humans as both individuals and organizations tend to simplify complex subjects by pigeonholing them into fixed conditional responses. Thus if a fighter has to be replaced, it has to be replaced by a fighter. Rather than looking at the number of times and the manner of engagement by which real air combat has defined 'the fighter mission' and realizing that _for the price_ a /fighter/ is entirely compromised by it's design compared to the expectation. So as to redefine what that mission might better be tailored to.
JSF is now a 104 million dollar platform, largely because it is effectively three aircraft with one name and no true commonality of price. An F-16E is about 80 million dollars per airframe.
An A-45, _produced as a single variant_ would run about 25-30 million dollars per airframe.
A JSF with FQ-only LO and limited internal carriage roughly equivalent to an F-117 is NOT worth 80% of the price of an F-22. It's not worth TWO F-16Es. It's certainly not worth 3 and a half A-45.
Because hardly anybody goes up against 'fighters' /with fighters/.
And few if any can afford the numbers of S-300 or later SAM threats to make an /All LO/ force more credible than superior ISR and CM 'day 1 done, back to your regular programming' of conventional (signature) airpower dominance.
>>
With stealth capabilities,
>>
Let me be blunt: The world doesn't deserve LO if they cannot make it on their own. At the same time, we don't deserve to have to /pay for/ LO, only to have it whored to the rest of the world and thus rendered TECHINT espionage //worthless// by some dumb monkey who sells it to the first let alone highest bidder.
That said-
......SAM...EO
EWR.....JSF...EO....SAM
.....SAM.....EO
Imagine that a major surveillance radar with 'stealth defeating' low frequency capabilities (below 2GHz, nothing is invisible) about 60-100nm behind the fence runs you about 10 million bucks.
And a range tracking camera like these-
https://www.patrick.af.mil/heritage/6555th/6555ch3/images/czrcmy.jpg
https://www.patrick.af.mil/heritage/6555th/6555ch3/images/rotiz.jpg
Runs you about 3-4 million.
With the equivalent of ONE F-35 in sensor costs, I can leverage a SAM system to the point where 'somebody' in the above triple battery (or distributed TEL) network system can kill a JSF.
And because a modern Aster or S-400 launches with nary an uplink cue 'activity' alert and runs out to _a point in space_ whereby it's hi-PRF mode can lockup a target (as an alternative to an EO seeker of it's own) there is little or no warning much less chance to defeat the system. Because the F-35 has no ICMS and only a limited quantity of chaff.
And then we arrive at this-
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/laser-04r.html
Whereby RF stealth by 2015 (when M-THEL enters field trials, 3 years after service debut) is going to be functionally a second to second rather than minute to minute advantage. And multi-featured (tails and canopy and high rather than blended wings) 'fighter' shapes are not necessarily amenable to contemporary Optical LO (isoluminance is hard to do on a specularly non-contiguous shape with multiple shadow zones). If you are seen, by 2020 (when the F-35 will be a mere 7-8 years into service) you _will die_. In the blink of an eye.
Next, this-
http://dawnsearlylight.blogs.com/del/2005/03/_would_you_be_s.html
Whereby the reality is made UTTERLY CLEAR. That it's not 'all about' how humiliated we were by the InAF. But rather that -anyone- can lose, on an almost 50:50 basis, when they are forced to bring the fight close. While anyone with the ability to reach out beyond 40km _can win_, if they have the networked shooter-illuminator capability to make the missiles match to a radar /yet further back/.
>>
STOVL capabilities
>>
Ah yes, the 'variant' which is being developed so that the Marines no longer have to land on our carriers. And the Brits don't have to develop their own. The 'variant' which, if it follows standard procedure for the H-II, will result in all of 8 airframes on each 'mini' deck. The 'variant' which was anywhere from 3,400 to 3,700lbs overweight. And which, 2,500lbs and a year and a half later, they have 'reached operational compromises' (less gas, less bombs) to meet a revised spec.
Let me tell you something. STOVL doesn't work. If I have 120 Harriers in-theater and they have an effective (weaponed up for the day temps) radii of 250nm. And I have 400 F-16s in the theater, each with a radius of 500nm, I will be able to generate more sorties, putting more bombs on target, than the Harrier force does. Simply because I'm not FOL or Shipborne having to resupply 8,000lbs of gas and 4-6,000lbs of munitions for each jet, every mission. Now (for cost) multiply or divide those numbers by TWO. For the equivalent of the A-45 and F-35 respectively.
STOVL was always a fantasy. It required one to carry one's logistics and defenses away from the fortress airbase into the field and it never accounted for nukes, LDSD track-back or /decades/ worth of establishing where those FOLs were. For all that, it didn't have any better ability to stay close in contact with the enemy because NUMBERS OVERHEAD (2 minutes out CAS stack) beats 'bird in the bush' 15 minute behind-FLOT proximity. Especially if you are coming out of England or France and so have much more secure MOB basing and numbers.
>>
And a fly by wire system that can do alot more than any Viper program will ever do based on the limited functionality of the airframe when compared with the JSF, I think you'll see why people will be choosing the JSF.
>>
An F-35 is going to be carrying around almost 20,000lbs of gas and 5,000lbs of munitions in a 30,000lb airframe powered by a 27,000lbst engine. A 22,000lb F-16E with a 19,000lbst (36,000lbst) 132 or 232 engine, /even with/ CFT is going to have a superior T/Wr in both military and burner. If you make the fuel droppable in the form of 370/600 gallon tanks, things get even better. The F-16 is compatible with either AVEN or PBBN type 3D vectoring. The F-35, thanks to the engine mount and 'STOVL' (god bless'em because nobody else will) is not.
Even if there was something inherently 'wrong' with the F-16's _quadruplex digital FBW_; it would be cheaper to completely _strip_ the F-16 FLCS and develop an entirely new one than it would be to spend another 20+ years developing an unknown followon.
Because manned airpower doesn't have that long.
You want to see a picture of the 'ultimate maneuvering fighter'? Here it is-
http://www.deagel.com/img/lib/1h9600.jpg
http://www.deagel.com/img/lib/1h9599.jpg
Why?
1. Because it costs about 75,000 bucks. And so is cheap enough to dogpile a threat jet until it is out of energy, expendables, ideas and luck.
2. Powered by a small turbine, it can _reattack_ rather than make one pass hit-or-miss-ile type engagements.
3. It only weighs about 100lbs yet it can fly up to 250nm. Which means you can put out a fighter-sweep screen ahead of your jet and have your 'dogfight' with weapons that are nearly invisible to the human eye.
4. _It is designed to lose_. Wars are won, not by inflicting losses but being able to suffer more attrition and still carry on the fight. THIS is the true meaning of 'treasure for blood'. And by forgetting that in the pursuit of gold plate idealism and the export proliferation of LO as a fashion statement, we risk being beaten like T-34s beat Tigers. On sheer numbers.
>>
Don't get me wrong, I love the Viper, its a great plane, but how many of them can you fit on a carrier?
>>
The anchor sale for the JSF is the F-35A. The reason Congress is so dead set against a USAF effort to go from 1,763 jets to the 1,100 'they really want' is because, below 1,600 jets, the numbers do this: < on cost for quantities.
IF THE TOTAL FORCE is not carrier capable, then the /warfighter/ modality must be leveraged towards the highest percentage majority of whatever basing mode aircraft is available. 2,000 F-16s vs. 170 F-35Cs is not even close to comparable. But 1,500 A-45CNs 'all rounders' might be. And a fill force of 1,200 F-16E would be a wiser investment (if only for secondary market sales) than throwing money at CCIP for the aged Blk.25/30/40/50.
>>
How many can you place at forward operating areas unless you control the airbases??
>>
This I don't understand. If you are talking TBMD, you again have to acknowledge that the F-35 needs 20,000lbs of gas to go 700nm. The A-45 needs about 12 to go 1,100nm _with 2hrs of loiter at the pointy end_.
The F-35 (or F-16) will get there and back in a minimum 7hrs. The F-22 will get there and back in about 3.3. Since a fighter 'makes no money' in the ho-hum transit between target and base, ONLY achieving spec when it's dropping bombs or C-turn recocked for another mission, a smaller force of supercruising, 133 million dollar, platforms will hit more aimpoints per day _using fewer tankers_ than the 104 million dollar F-35 will.
The F-22 also has all-aspect LO. And it's supercruise means not only that it's a more fleeting seeker-cube target predictor. But that a GBU-39 launced from it will fly out 60-80nm rather than 25-30 (with penetration) or 50 (airburst). So that the aforementioned scenario of 'tip toeing through the snake den, always worried about the reptile behind you' _never happens_. Even against comparitively long ranged SAM network.
CONCLUSION:
The F-35 is Congressional Pork and Fighter Mafia wellfare dole. WE DON'T NEED a cockpit aviator to drop an IAM. And providing for it increases our yearly training costs to upwards of 8 billion dollars (20hrs per month per mission X 6,000+2,000 core force tactical aviators @ _O-1_ pay grades X 5,000 dollars per hour flight costs). This does not include munitions or deployments. Nor UPT and track pipes.
Comparitively, at 25 million each over a 1,500 airframe run, a UCAV force _which needs no training nor has a family to support_ would cost about about 37.5 billion dollars. Throw in another 30 billion dollars for R&D. And you come up with 8 years worth of pilot training costs to buy your entire inventory of 'one plane, one basing mode, one air force'.
And because each jet will have the ability to fly from a carrier or from land (forget STOVL); you can double the pay grades of the maintainers _at similar ops tempos_ and still ease the total deployment stress of the force overall.
Compare the above argument to the 257 billion dollar JSF. 67.5 vs. 257 = 3.8:1 cost trade. As our economy goes further down the sewer while the world gets rich NOT playing Global Cop. As oil reserves begin to run out. As DEWS and Hunting Weapons come online; the F-16E is the least evil. And the UCAV is the best choice. The JSF is not even in the running on a common-sense-derives-from-complex-understanding POV.


KPl.

[410Cougar]

Kurt, thanks for the lesson. :)

Out of your post, I just have one single question: why build it? What is the point of having the aircraft if there are, as you've described, so many other viable options which are even more cost effective than the program?

Oh, and with regards to the forward operating bases, I meant that due to its STOVL capability that you wouldn't need an entire airport to service the thing, rather only a smaller ramp and hangar.

Attila

[Kurt Plummer]

Attila,

There is no 'lesson' intended, we're all equals here, opinions like anatomy etc. etc.

>>
Out of your post, I just have one single question: why build it? What is the point of having the aircraft if there are, as you've described, so many other viable options which are even more cost effective than the program?
>>
Inbred Cultural Inertia. Whose symptomology takes many forms. In 'diagnosing the disease' one needs to define a methodologic approach to critiqueing the problem. I chose the cybernetic/cognitive vs. analytic paradigm as outlined in _Illusions Of Choice_. These two formats are the flip sides of a coin based on rationalizing a template to meet a complex scenario vs. empirically (scientific method) determining whether the perceptions of said scenario's existence are factual or assumptive based on historical precedent and interpretation of specific case points.
1. Roles and Missions are Turf Sensitive.
As a factor of airpower force structuring, is based on the assumption of existing mission roles to specific (usually unrelated) details of scenario application. In such an 'applied reasoning' system, compeitition between multiple service providers doesn't breed diversity of mission execution, it encourages competition of (singular) role function. Congress funds what is proven to be successful and success is copied right down to the point where it can no longer be (in basing mode in this case). Fighters are thus defined not by application to a service unique mission but rather what that service has to do to bring fighters FROM it's environment to one which is compatible with an existing one. If you predefine what the hole is, you can basically design a peg to fit and familiarity will contribute to acceptance. But what if the hole is not really there any more, do you drill it? Full scale, high intensity, (maximum perceived need to 'try every trick') warfare being such a /rare/ phenomena, it is no wonder that it is easier to guarantee the outcome of microwars by fixing the methodology you approach full scale ones based on conditional (fixed scenario based) execution. So long as you can sell 'your way' long enough, hard enough, without options or alternatives, the enemy will naturally end up accepting your approach, if only in designing a countermeasure that largely looks like the hole you want drilled. The better (analytic) approach is to say 'What is the mission? Can I reasonably -prove- that the mission still exists or that it ever did?' And THEN decide what system best meets the need. Preferrably as a function of a common-not-joint design which standardizes the details of capability while leaving the functional flexibility to be determined by the random-event factors.
2. Staticism through False Diversity.
Based on the complexity of the modelled vs. actual scenario and the difficulty you create in responding to simple problems with complex solutions as much as inaccurately modeled ones (as illustrated above).
Particularly where joint/multiforce employment scenarios are based on political wrangling rather than truly best-solution approaches to winning _a_ war. Where designing for fixed scenarios is further complicated by a need for 'jointness' (everybody gets a chunk of the glory pie), inventing something that does something better than the existing need-solution mix, can jeopardize operational justification across multiple air/land/sea mission boundaries. Obsolescing whole groups of force structure development. Endangering careers beyond your own uniform color.
Thus 'diversity' of mission systems is further proven to be a lie because there is no RIMA clause by which systems of systems must be proven in their complete whole vs. the need of the moment vs. the 'scenario' they were designed around _against a future resource vs. threat potential bias_ of retirement/replacement. If a nation weakens itself through complex systems design to the point where force structure cannot be maintained it loses diversity anyway.
Such complexity for it's own sake can /sometimes/ force an opponent into mirroring the entire synergy (or developing a countermeasure for it) that is a highly structured warfighter but it more often than not is just a furtherance of the 3-monkey ideal by which 'to each his own' is limited as much as assured by interservice rivalry and the need (through the JCS and service Secretaries) to cheerlead each other's systems through Congressional beggars table to a limited budgetary funnel that always turns traitorous (backstabbing) at the end.
Detachment from shared doctrinal development is thus as unhealthy for maintaining a SOA warfighter as apparent competition because it doesn't endorse merely staticism around one platform/mission but the way that approach is justified as a function of maintaining the total bulk (force structural inertia) of missions that interact with it. Particularly if (frequently) you _don't need_ a joint-service solution to mission execution as the size of your TF, the notion of treating each platform as a universal construct for cheaply fulfilling a given utility function becomes all the harder to accept. Because it implies that no service has it's own mission identity that all are subordinate to fluctuating political ideals that technology cannot find a solution for.
This handsoff agreed partisanship is further endorsed by the crummy nature of high level officer exchange and staff college intercourse on how each side really /does/ go about their mission. Ask an AF officer how much he liked his last Army tour. Heck ask him if he /knows someone/ who did a volunteer exchange with the grunts. Then ask him if he has the knowledge of theater target lists from the last war to prove an argument that interdiction (the AF's and to a large extent the Navy's chief role) works better.
3. R&D Doesn't Seek Solutions.
R&D is NOT about developing new weapons systems. It's about developing new R&D contracts. For a commercial weapons industry in which the successful production ratio is perhaps 1 in 20, another research contract or grant is where the money is because there is low physical investment in production real estate, sub contractor screening or materials lead iteming.
Of course technology /does/ move on. Through contracted civillian (university) as much as 'controlled' (in house labs) military development which is deliberately isolated from the operational community.
From within the R&D community perspective, you are even more insular from 'other ways of doing things' (even things which your own system is nominally a part of, like an airframe that can do CAS or INT missions) as an operational user interaction. Indeed, you aren't /paid/ to be aware of potential doctrinal effects of your system over somebody else' because both on a personal and professional (career) level, program survival is what ensures your position after years of system-specific knowledge attainment has aged you and while giving specific field knowledge which may or may not be up to date with what college grad-X is bringing with his masters. As such you also have little or no incentive to apply analytic reasoning to whether your 'your solution' is worth the cost. Even as your technical knowledge may have little or no application to a user service you don't see often know it's absolute value to them.
Failure to bring to fruition a system which you have poured your life into believing was necessary (no matter how shallow the knowledge base of that assumption) flushes the military industrial complex of skilled engineers looking for another lifestyle and further fails to instill the analytic lesson which is that paths started down without sound justification often close off for reasons beyond engineering redemption. As another bunch of inexperienced idiots replace the jaded betrayal to begin the cycle again.
And so sleeping dogs _lie_ and everybody is happy in a military hierarchy which is 'up or out' (promotion or dead-end pay grade) based on the money inherent to the R&D of another miracle solution to replace the last one which never reached production. As the force structure (doctrinal solution) as much as it's component systems grows stale in what may have been a false premise of mission need to begin with.
Of course, just occasionally, something does get fixed if it is sufficiently non-threatening (generalist peg pound-fits the existing hole). But even as the baselines for a given technology tend to age /greatly/ between generational replacements, so to does a system of creating a shadow realm of RFI/RFP developmental hackery create a budgetary logjam behind which key enablers also must be replaced and /their/ cost is such that the overall system of systems now becomes more expensive than can be supported for _existing_ doctrinal formula (X number of fighters requires Y number of tankers, ACP/BMC3/ISR, EA/SEAD). Usually with a repeal of confidence effect that the existing 'high tech' solution must be replaced with fill systems that are even more inappropriate to creating a balanced force.
Of course industry's excuse is that "Hey, we only build what they say they want." But once the spec is set, there is a HUGE weight of PAC type advocative influence brought to bear in Washington to push it through. And it isn't the military that funds it.
4. Subordinate Societal Orders.
As a function of insular self interest, Generals command Officers who lead Men. And despite being nominally subordinate to civillian rule of law, soldiers never take orders from them, only from the 'chain of command' inbetween. At the budgetary beggars table, manpower (all the money spent on housing families of men, their continued military education, career path advancement and eventual retirement) is thus the the sun towards which the operational side of the money tree ultimately grows most-green.
With standoff precision fires and large enough ('force protection' as an attritional hedge) units, there is little or no element of strategic thought in maneuver, you simply drive towards something the enemy cannot afford to lose until they try and stop you. And then you kill them with overwhelming firepower as they marshal for the engagement. Rendering all engagements 'CAS' of a kind.
Yet a PFC still salutes a lieutenant, not a SecDef. Until the day an IED makes it cheaper to replace the grunt with a robotic vehicle. And you can only afford the money to develop a complex-environment recognitive AI which navigates said UGV by removing the man from the cockpit of the comparitively -simplistic- (no bumps in the road, straightline navigation with a very restrictive threat:response list) of the most costly force modeal that there is.
Then there is friction. Because now you are not only removing mission identity from a given SERVICE. But you are threatening the very _hierarchial status quo_ by which the armed forces function as a highly internalized system of controlling pyschology.
If you threaten the top echelon by making it possible for an Army Corporal manning a Hunter drone to do as much good in his attached unit AOR as an AF Captain'd FLIGHT of F-16s will (money per drone over longer sortie lengths with more appropriate BUET vs. GBU-12 'CAS' ordnance) then you create a military in which the nature of the machine defines a minimum requirement of the man rather than demanding more of him to achieve the same capability.
And particularly given a typically top heavy staffing element in the peacetime military, that's another black mark against anybody from an independent technical or strategic (think tank) community coming up and saying "Look, we've got this idea, it does a better job than X-many of your existing men and it saves money too!" Because money ensures diversity of lesser solutions. And lesser solutions mean more men. And more men need more commanders.
Without endorsement by an active user command and/or the 5 Wall Asylum whispering in the ear of the JCS and Secretaries, programmatic choices will _never reach Congress_ to be shot down or selected. Inhibiting a governmental process by which military subordination to their nominally civillian order givers is assured by the TRUTH of what they put on the table. When you look at it from this standpoint, everybody in DARPA can Q up fiendishly superior killing devices to their hearts content. And if they don't support the systematic prejudices of the user community, they will never leave the lab. Until the waste vs. gain level gets so high that the lab, the military and the society around which a military system of 'protection' was originally built, collapses for want of alternatives.*
5. Hero Worship.
Nobody expects R2D2 to be a better pilot than Luke Skywalker. Thus nobody gives a damn when Darth Vader puts multiple kilowatts worth of laser energy through his dome. Yet the fact remains that there is absolutely no way on earth that a human could fly down the Death Star Trench at anything like modern fixed wing aircraft speeds 'evading turbolaser fire' without smacking a sidewall.
If R2 flew the ship, why did Luke put himself at risk making strategic decisions (laydown vs. dive bomb, long approach through trashfire vs. missiles away?) that /themselves/ were faulted in their approach by compression and friction of the tactical environment (and his place in it) such as to put the MISSION COMPLETION ITSELF at risk?
The answer is simple. Ego. We /dread/ being told that man's day as a warrior has long since past OVER the battlefield as much as on it, because, societally, they are all that is left to represent the ultimate freedom to do 'nothing particularly useful' on a day to day basis. While reserving unto themselves the right to practice the ultimate freedom of killing another man on the off chance of there being a war where they are needed.
And thus, like sports stars and movie actors pilots are heros. Not for what they do. But for what they -seem to- as the complete opposite of our own slogging work ethic.
It is terribly sad that people would rather chain themselves to an ever-burgeoning debt for the chance to see /someone else/ have a 'really good time' as a kind of vicarious "I can see me as him!" entertainment but that is what the technology of PGM sport wars not short wars has largely led us to do in a society where we don't conquer to own but for some 'moral purpose' which is not itself clear (if 9/11 was so awful that we could not bear to let it go unavenged, why are troops not in the White Mountains of AfG-Pak looking for Osama, /no matter what/ Musharref gibbers on about sovereignity of allied nations?).
This is of course further reinforced by the 'expert opinion' for which most make absolutely no critical-thought concession to job preservation bias. Pilots certainly enjoy what they do and 'as professionals in their field', everytime they tell someone that the day of UCAVs is 'at least another generation away' nobody questions the resultant (self fulfilling prophecy) huge waste of resources inherent to failing to proof the theorem with even a 60:40 split of inventory as a _a hybrid period mixed force concept_. No, it's all F-35's or nothing because 'the cheap fighter' only stays that way at 1,600 and above.
And the public and fiduciary authority buy it, literally, because, they want to believe it, secretly, the joy a pilot has is the excitement a civillian WANTS to believe in, 'if only' he hadn't been born who he is.
And thus the postulative argument that a UCAV, by being cheaper and removing the operational friction of a pilot-on-scene, could be the _more efficient killer_ never is factored in. Because humans would rather be inefficient knowing that they will win 'anyway' (numbers) than non-partisan observers to a warfighter that doesn't put their sense of self in the same jeopardized-thrill sense of vicarious participation.
Which means they will never understand that Jo Schmuck from the nearest Macdonalds Grill could fight an airwar better than any pilot ever could. With robotic airpower.
And this scenario is self perpetuating as much as extemporaneous in it's fait de' accompli nature because pilots 'grow old as much as up' to either become your friendly winged cattlecar driver. Or generals. And thus the false selfbelief deriving from their own time in the cockpit works to translate into the next generation which they will also support in trade for loyalty and respect of rank system. And again the Cybernetic paradigm reinforces what is, rather than exploring the validity of the perception that is it's need as an element to defining a replacement.
>>
Oh, and with regards to the forward operating bases, I meant that due to its STOVL capability that you wouldn't need an entire airport to service the thing, rather only a smaller ramp and hangar.
>>
In Chechnya, where things are completely bogged down because nobody wants to clean up the problem 'the old fashioned way' (Russia's Iraq); the Russians have gone to C2 suppression through a network of superb Radio DF units that recently assassinated a high ranking rebel personality by launching an SS-21 from over a hundred miles away, to land on the building he was placing a cellphone call to his son from. The days of V-2-hits-the-same-country or even SCUD-hits-the-same-city are LONG GONE sir. And with it the notion that STOVL is better either because it brings the fight closer to the enemy (the exact opposite of what you want, provided you have cheap sortie numbers as an alternative). Or makes it somehow 'harder to find' (follow the convoy of tractor-trailer rigs) in local airports.
Anything with 400-1,200ft of static target area is not worth trying to hide from threat survey, if only because of all the target discretes which MTI must come to it. Comparitively, you can suffer four THAAD/ERINT penetrations out of 20 missiles fired on a HAS farm and even 'double parked' in flow thru shelters, the 16 aircraft whose barns were not directly impacted will be perfectly safe. While the TELs which fired the shots _should be_ eating either Mach 8 ARRMD shots in return (each with four hunting weapons like LOCAAS or SMACM). Or flood-covered by airborned orbits of UCAV.
STOVL /might/ have an operational justification if it let us switch to a manned contingent of say 6-10 'patrol' (manned) aircraft and a packed'n'stacked drone force (shelved as much hangared) of say 40-60 GTW airframes. On a 20-40,000 ton SCS/CVL type SWATH. Cheaper, Further, Longer, Better. But even then, given the radius that the drone could achieve vs. the STOVL fuel penalty of the F-35B in particular. Added to the greater shot-count and speed-to-range viability of ADSAM (E-2 cues SM-6 ERAM onto targets buried in clutter under the local horizon or rising as TBMs from deep inshore over the far one...) concept as a superior replacement for the FADF mission.
It is questionable as to what exactly a STOVL airframe could do 'better', simply because it had a man in it.
Better, IMO, to concentrate STOVL efforts on USMC/USAr mission needs where it is pathetically clear that helicopters are too vulnerable to play an active role over a battlefield populated by MANPADS and Smart Mines. And too slow to serve as 'deep attack' assets moving from dispersed basing to areas of influence and overwatch as much as occupation. i.e. Key West _must_ die before STOVL can do anything good (and then only in OOTW/SSC conflicts where A2A/S2A threats are minimal to non-existent to begin with).


KPl.

[Kurt Plummer]

The Other Half...

REAL PROBLEMS:
1. Given generations of 'dogfight will never end' indoctrination, nobody accepts the notion that target ID of airborne as being so relatively simple as to make all 'advantaged' (fight to win, not to duel) encounters as being permanently beyond a 20km cutoff line of mandatory disengagement and separation. Thus it is hard for the collective 'mission perception' to understand the notion of a 'missileer' where the ability of LO and a _rearwards placed_ illuminator makes AAW more akin to a game of Battleship than conventional, linear, (Wall Of Eagles) engagement. One in which a commander may employ his 'fighter' groups (with 80-100km, digitally 2-way tethered LRAAM) in cellular clusters. And kill the threat as it passes /amongst them/ without ever running away. Because the shooter _makes no noise_. And the AEW&C is the targeting agency which places the missile into a seeker cube where the missile becomes the TVM-active 'dogfighter'.
2. Doctrine says you create a firepower:logistics construct sufficient to secure a force from all comers. You then design /doctrine/ around the linear distances you can supply that ground force in a given days maneuver necessary to maintain logistical contiguity. Yet in 1993-94, the USMC run an 'interesting concept' exercise based on the observed parameters of the Al Khafji encounter of 1991. Namely that a relatively small ground force, in spite of general failures of opplan coordination and execution at the field level, numerous activity alerts from manned airpower and ground sensors /before/ initiation of leapoff and terrible attrition once engaged enroute and at the objective, can achieve decisive maneuver (arrival with sufficient force to occupy) against a given point objective. The Marines further went on to prove that IF there are sufficient numbers of effective units and distance between them, the operational friction of the target acquisition:tasking:kill:turn cycle could be so overloaded as to significantly degrade the ability of airpower to prevent a more generalized interdiction of operational goals on a wider front.
Unfortunately, our enemies perceive this tactical behavior as well. And so created a 2003 approach whereby large units were hamstrung by attacks on unprotected CS/CSS. While a COE approach to _conserving_ guerilla forces means that we are now deep in an unreduced (morale as much as logistics) enemy encampment and our very respect for life prevents U.S. from the kinds of tactics which would enforce a fear of reprisal damper on a coup psychology.
3. One of the key differentiators between USAF style 'FSCL' (OAS/BAI) CAS and Marine MAGTF doctrine, as seen during 2003, was the DASC, BCL and SCAR. Whereby near direct, real time, control over targeting made the COE equivalent to fighting a dominant air to ground campaign MUCH simpler, much closer in and effectively gave the advancing columns the ability to bypass local forces (at least the regular ones) while replacing the fixing force (cav) security mission and pass through with airpower applied from directly overhead. The limitations were that many of the aircraft could not reach deep enough. And those which were present had to be divided between a two-spear tasking system of V-Corps and the 1 MEF, often with nearly random fuel:weapons profile performance for loiter and consequently highly inefficient use of refueler assets. Added to base-in exclusioning (the first effective use of political access denial) for some key assets this meant that aircraft had to fly farther over the fence, could only stay for short periods and achieved decisive application of fires only by pushing up tanker assets well forward. Against a Zero Air Threat condition.
4. While recent efforts to forcefeed data through the R-CDL have proven successful at the 'send' level; there is no guarantee that further dissemination through the Army bend in the pipe will work (Last I heard, the expanded SADL effort to include the Army Net function had been completely decoupled from the A-10C effort, leaving it a halfwitted digital FAC-A and a task-saturated, targeting pod limited, direct marker).
Nor is there any reason to believe that the drones themselves will be able to sustain .5gbps rates across a full spectrum of simultaneous channel soak by a large force. i.e. Without a _dedicated effort_ to create a netcentric tasking system without a massive hogsnose radar 'attached' to the individual platforms, we may well see a bottleneck on the SCAR end of linked microapertures mapping a battlefield which JSTARS either cannot see (spectrum vs. target type) or cannot react to quickly enough (overhead airpower cuing ground teams to MAKE the request in an operationally significant window) to itself be the capstone of a combined sensor/BMC2 activity.
Yet There Are Indications Of Solution.
ARGUMENT:
There was a time when NOBODY would have thought that the B-52 could do 'effective CAS'. Even though it was B-52s not F-4s which saved the Marines from another Dien Bien Phu'ing at Khe Sahn. Yet nobody 'seems to mind' (notice) that when an SOF team on horseback was being chased down by vehicle borne Taliban militia; their call to a BUFF put a full load of iron bombs on target to prevent the overrun condition. Similarly, when the Marine LAV scout team encountered elements of the 'Al Nida' tank division moving south, they pulled a classic 'fade from center' (even though the M242 /could/ engage T-55 and T-72 from the side) movement and called in Wicmid SFW. 8 tanks later and the will to fight left the enemy as those not dead decided to surrender to a force they couldn't see. Even two instances of (ground force) misscalled coordinates with resultant fratricide to the heavier JDAM have not changed the fact that /when it is the asset present/ the man on the ground not only WILL call it in. But _to him_ it is the same as calling in Artie or pressing the plunger on a Claymore. Utterly impersonal and without a decrease in effects for being so indirect. CAS being the /time/ not the distance by which he depends on a weapon splash (measured in DGPS inches).
At the same time, the notion that an S2A defense could not work in a manned environment without excessive fratricidal worries was, to an extent, proven true during OIF as there were at least 3 instances where 'fighters' got in the way of ERINT and _lost_. No ifs ands or buts with ZERO awareness on the flight crews part that they were about to die until they did. As a result of incredibly high Mach (5+) intercepts that closed from visual detection range to mechanical intercept with virtually no time to evade. Yet all things considered (sortie rates remained enormous and so the sort was always complex), those SAM sites were an acceptable hazard because they and only they could shield ground forces from WMD that TBM/CM flushed from hidden hides beyond the ability of Airpower to 'suppress' (1991 SCUD Alley as an exercise in sanitizing a void).
Where buildings are only likely to be full if they are civillian (infrastructural) and nobody can guarantee the location of all mass-casualty weapons INTERDICTION IS THEREFORE DEAD.
At the same time, as illustrated above small forces can sustain viable combat effectiveness in the face of 'overwhelming odds' IF they obey a strict code of COE or Contempt Of Engagement which is to say maneuver without deliberate contact. Creating an enticement of small force liability backed by overwhelming fires in a fashion which, together with mere presence on a given AA route, is 'intentful' enough to force a threat psychology of he counter attack. And annihilation at the 'man to man' level.
The real key being that any response (which MUST come or face overrun or cutoff/bypass and subsequent reduction as killbox freefire zones) is dealt with on the approach as much as contact. Most especially, it can do so if it has a dozen other clone forces also drawing out and dispersing the enemy main force grouping and -each of those- also has the cheapest _equivalent_ endurant bomb cabinet loitering overhead. With maximum payload for the minimum stress on an IFR supporting enabler.
Indeed, even if battle is accepted, the first mission of any ground force command is (and always has been) either a decisive fires onset of his own (disciplined fires and counter-shock mechanized maneuver/breakout beats back the ambush). Or filing a contact report and separation of forces to spatially delineate an FSCL as 'them from us'. And this is itself a failure of COE because it assumes that the ground forces commander has no means of erecting a sentry tower to predict the encounter as much as react to it. CAS, properly flown, moves the horizon line back far enough to change the entire paradigmatic metric of how ground wars are fought.
THE PROBLEM then is grouping these basic required capabilities as the dominant design drivers within a platform that unlike the AC-130 or BUFF is a 'squadron for every LID' main force element as a function of _doctrine_. Which is to say subordinating the service ethic to support of another service rather than 'diversity of roles' purely to sustain it's own existence (Armies have little need of fighters, nor do Navies with adequate Mountain Top type ADSAM).
A B-52 costs too much to own and use on a 20 orbits per day basis. They suck tankers dry in a single gas pass and while possessed of good legs, they cannot cover a wide enough area with limited orbits, avionics and defensive signature/protection to be effective as their own SCAR.
CONCLUSION:
What is needed is a CAS system that can at least nominally do the Day-1 standard of Interdiction (Transonic ingress and LO penetration of a contemporary RF based threat environment with every-fifth-goat-a-ram AAM loadouts to continue to intimidate desultory PDI/ADI fixed wing pursuit) sufficient to meet a percieved need to roll back defenses.
A platform which THEN switches to the secondary-as-prime mission of SCAR to define the battlefield and the high density as much as mixed payload weapons carriage to fight a 'closein' force-on-force campaign (whether U.S. forces or indigenous ones are present on the battlefield) purely on the basis of the OOB pitcture they develop, on the fly.
Where Friendly or Allied ground forces ARE present, they can further aid in the rapid definition and shaping of the battlefield through simplistic (blue tooth COTS) plugin data and video relay TO as much as from these cheap-endurant air assets (ROVER).
While a deeper effort is undertaken to assure U.S. overarching control of the platform through a secondary (national proprietary) system to make sure the C2 isn't hacked away from U.S. exclusive use. -overhead and pseudolite- BMC3 relay systems being the key to this, as well as cheap X/Ku band, high datarate, handoffs.
Even if initial bottlenecks in the data pipe occur at larger scales of integration, the combination of local control and fast handoff from (IAMs as Fire And Forget equivalents to AMRAAM) engagement to engagement should assure a literal TDM multishare across a wider battlefield with full infosec surety coming down to simply never letting a drone drop on our forces UNTIL a jam-free, high power, secondary LINK can confirm tasking request and allocation.
(i.e. two eyes on target as a function of two bandwidths of secure transmission).
Next, this airframe must STAY ON STATION at radii which put at least the low-tier ballistic and cruise systems out of radius for high value saturation attack on the basing mode. So that the enemy must pay into the IRBM level of systems capability that a limited (THAAD/ABL) missile defense can reasonably out-shoot on the 5,000 vs. 2 million dollar cost level from horizon clearance (400+km minimum) through midcourse (150-200km) prebussing phases.
At the same time, this system must itself be better able to generate this kind (loitering ISR + A2G multishot) without itself becoming so expensive as to make CM attack more effective as a single-target attack asset.
That this can happen AS A BOMBER without (being seen to be) defaulting on the 'first premise' of historical airpower doctrine defined by Air Superiority (Which, IMO, is rapidly receding in the face of _information superiority_ as the preeminent element of air campaigning) must be assured by developing _better bullet_ A2A ordnance which obviates the need to sprint to dominant intercept positioning with a missile or ray that can achieve the same function, more quickly.
The JSF seeks to combine all these capabilities into one airframe whose supersonic, multi-G, 'high performance' unrelated baseline capability destroys the min threshold performances and certainly cost-effectiveness of all the (more frequently used) submissions in pursuit of the role least performed.
And the reason for this 'fighter first' justification of uselessly (money thrown away for nothing) performance is because there is, gasp, somebodies baby onboard. A flying monkey who is himself a detractor to the ENDURANT as well as (by weight) CHEAP nature of a plateau mission capability.
If we saw airpower and indeed /warfare/ as we once did: a last-choice desperate act of national WILL to survive in which legions might bleed that the nation could live. Rather than PRIDE in a perfect record of no-skill victories in a conflict as sporting season type entertainment. We would realize that the combination of removing the center of ego (a pilot as a displacement of our own identity). And equipping the resultant robotic airframe as a universal weapons carrier that _could be lost_ without insult to a competitive warrior spirit. Would yield an exceptional airframe that didn't need to apologize for letting better bullets accomplish the fighter mission. While it's own superior presence (and smaller IAM) made the bombing one a synch.
If you realize that the MISSION EMPHASIS is a lie. Then you can more readily acknowledge that the F-35 itself is not a particularly capable fighter. And it cannot be an effective bomber. So it doesn't need to exist.
'Human Factors' being what they are (the ape longs to be an eagle), it will take the mass slaughter of Sky Knights to beam and hunting weapons before someone wakes up and says "Say, didn't we do the nobility vs. gun disqualification scenario back in the Middle Ages?"
And since the ROW is rapidly approaching the cultural and technical sophistication by which a breakaway from Sparta-for-Reputation's-Sake doctrine is itself 'for pride' assured; I can only assume that that will happen right soon. Certainly long before the JSF reaches even a third of it's design production so much as inventory life.

KPl.


*This is what happened to the all DARPA UDS (UCAV Demo System) exit to a potential UOS (UCAV Operational System).
In that the _original_ system was designed to do Day-1 SEAD with fancy ALR-7 receiver subsystem as a network HARM shooter and possible EA asset. With proof of concept and a production decision in 2006. A year after the original JSF decision. But the advent of IAMs (drop on coordinate without laser designation aimpoint recognition required) and the greatly superior drone configuration in terms of loiter and signature control meant that SEAD became DEAD. And that is the same as Day-1 Interdiction. So the mission profile had to be rapidly 'reconsidered' and the design was bloated up to a much larger ISR platform (much smaller inventory, no overall threat). Which took time and a new program manager. Even so, the F-35 SDD, plagued by weight problems from before the 2003 design hardening, was running a year or more late thanks to the STOVL issue. This meant that final production ramp 'decision' (foregone conclusion) would be 2008-2009 and IOC 2012-2013. Which reopened a window for the UCAV to replace everything. So the USAF took over on the misperception of making the UCAV an operational fasttrack aircraft under J-UCAS. Giving it back the weapons it needed yet further 'scaling up the spec' from the X-45B (which never flew) to the X-45C.
Which never would.
Since the USAF, as Congress' fair haired boy, is the chief high muckety on inventory economies of scale (i.e. they dictate doctrine by their purchasing power choices) the 'continuing operational pressures' of Iraq and the sudden drawdown of the F-22 to a token force means that they could dissolve the J-UCAS from BOTH the developmental -and- the operational side of the fence. Without ever comparing the F-35 and a 'we set the spec so we have to live with the outcome' A-45C.
In this you see the salamanderian 'closing of the loop' by which the armed forces are the only ones allowed to: 1. Say what the mission is. 2. Set the spec by which the spec is to be accomplished. 3. Decide whether the spec is being met. 4. Control the doctrine by which that system is employed in any mission so much as it's design one so as to create a historical precedent of it's 'success'. So as to rightfully tell the manufacturer that 'this is what they need to improve for the next generation'. Or else have nothing. All of which deliberate propogandism and misinformation is based on a cybernetic paradigm of matching the chaotic (mutative) environment of war against fixed standards of 'how it happens' rather than truly independent analysis of what works because it meets a real need.


KPl.