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Gollevainen
December 3rd, 2005, 09:06 AM
Part I
Early days

Introduction

Although Soviet Union had the second largest naval forces during the cold war, almost exceeding USN in some aspects, it always lacked behind the biggest western navies in one important field: Aircraft operations in offshore seas e.g. lacked potent Aircraft carriers until the very end. Admiral Kuznetsov (project 1143.5) was nearly entering service prior the soviet collapse.
This essay is meant to give bit more deeper insight to Soviet carrier development, its achievements and most importantly to trying to give answer to why these major aspects of modern naval warfare never gained the appreciation it certainly should have deserved in Soviet Union. In this essay, the main focus will be in the post-WWII era before the first aviation capable ship Moskva class (project 1123) and again in the late seventies and early eighties when the conventional operated aircraft carrier decisions where made.
As this essay was orginally posted by me in the sinodefencefroum.com so the later part of it is dedicated to compare Chinese aircraft carrier program to the Soviet one and trying to find out what is the best direction where China should go. I have sofar wrote two of the possible trhee or four parts and I try to update this one par with the orginal topic in the sinodefence..

The idea of sort of “re-opening” soviet carrier discussion couse the author has received major update on the matter, mainly due gaining access to numbers of Russian military magazines called “Morskaja Kollektija”. Also by almost a gift from various gods and goddesses, good collection of previously unknown (at least to the author) pictures and drawings of several soviet carrier designs fallen to authors hands. This led to more comprehensive understandment of previous material already existing in the author’s collection.

This essay will be in its most honest meaning, an effort to share this new knowledge to rest of the forum community. All fact-errors are mostly due the limits of authors Russian skills (none existing) and therefore the need to rely on available mechanical translation services, mostly Babel fish- internet translator provided by AltaVista. Any corrections or additional information is indeed greatly appreciated.

Note: This essay will be posted in three parts due the limitations of picture posting in our forum. Part I covers early days, pre- and post WWII era, Part II consecrates on project 1123 and 1143 and Finally part III focuses on the conventional carrier plans since 1960’s and onwards up to the Admiral kuznetsov Also it remains still unclear whether the part of Chinese and soviet carrier development comparison will be in the third part or form a part IV on it’s own. I post all sources in the along with the last part...but as for hand most of the pics can be aknowlidged to Edgar Guerrero...





It is common believe and missknowlidge that soviets weren’t interested of carriers until the building of Admiral kuznetsov. That somehow they were stucked to primitive and aging thinking in naval matters. It certainly wasn’t the case. It is somewhat ironical that the most sticking single factor of Soviet Union never had true fixed wing aviation onboard before its collapse isn’t too ageing thinking, but on the contrary too modern and unrealistic plans made by the government that followed Stalin after his death.
It was Stalin’s era when the most ambitious naval constructive plans were made, most notably the 1938-42 Five year plan which called for two carriers to be built for northern and pacific fleets, one for each. Although this was the first time when carrier plans were made this far, it was as early as 1925-26 when aircraft carriers were first toughed. After the Revolution Soviets gained most of the Tsarist Russian fleet, but many of the ships still building phase never entered soviet naval service. During those chaos-days, many ships were captured by Germans and Entente states. Some unfinished hulls were simply sold for scrapping.
This was the case whit Borodino class battle cruisers. These 30,000 ton, 228 meter length ships armed whit 12 356mm guns were being build in Baltic SY at Leningrad. Of the four ships, only Izmail was not sold to Germany for breaking up and there where serious thoughts of it being converted to aircraft carrier. These plans never got any further and the ship was broken up at Leningrad in 1931. Similar plans where also made about the fourth Gangut class battleship Frunze which unlike her three sisters never received moderninsation and was thus used as a floating barracks at Neva.
From objective point of view, these plans were unrealistic for the Soviet Union’s capabilities at the time, but serve as an example that carriers weren’t totally alien to soviet naval thinking. Things got much more serious as the whole soviet naval constructive plans evolved. Coming to the 30’s Soviet naval building was rapidly increasing. First monumental steps were the introducing Kirov (project 26) class cruisers in 1937 followed by the near sister class Maxim Gorky (project 26bis). The above mentioned 1938-42 five year plan called new battleships and battle cruisers to be build. Also 17 Chapaev (Project 68K) class light cruisers was to be build, but only five where eventually completed, and thus the sole survivors of the pre-war “large sea and oceanic fleet” plans. The two mentioned carriers served similar fate as the battleships; WWII just came at the wrong time.
Under this five year plan, two 13,000 ton carriers were to be build. Some preliminary sketches and studies were made as early as in 1936 by the TsKB-45, the main design bureau for large surface combatants at that time.
The TTZ was issued in 1938. The ships now under project 71 would have been displacement 10600 tons light, 11300 tons standard and 13150 tons full load. Length would have been 195 meters in waterline. Armament would have consisted 3 twin 130 mm B-24 guns, 8 single 100mm B-34 guns and four quadrupled 37mm 46-K AA guns. Aviation assets required 30 torpedo bombers and 15 fighters. Planes would have been stored in 148m x 18m x 6m hangar served by two lifts. Two pneumatic catapults with a length of 24 m each, which had to give the takeoff speed of 110 km/h to aircraft mass to 4 t was also planned. These ships were supposedly to be based on the Chapaev hulls and featured similar machinery. Funnels were to be faced downwards as in Japanese carrier Akagi. These ships were to be launched 1941 and 1942. When the war broke out nothing dramatical had been done to this project. TTZ was touched several times and event of the war was affecting the design by e.g. adding additional AA armament to the ships. Also one interesting notice must be said at this point. When Indonesia bought a Sverdlov (project 68bis, an post-war follower for the Chapaev class) in 1962, there were also talks about aircraft carrier being made from Sverdlov- class hulls. Nothing came out of this but it raises questions whether it would have resampled the project 71.

http://img473.imageshack.us/img473/7606/715xb1jg.jpg

linedrawing of the project 71


As the ship was based on the cruiser hull of project 68, it was very likely that soviets would have been able to launch the ship. They didn’t do it and in 1942 the carrier planning raised again and it was soon discovered that the project 71 was obsolete in many aspects. Some sort of redesign was made in the form of project 716, but little is know of this design. It was to have machinery and mechanical parts from the same time planned Project 69 Battle cruisers (Kronstad class). Displacement would have been 24050 tons standard and 30600 t Full loads. Length was to be 230 meters in water line. This design was given low priority and nothing of it was heard after the end of WWII.
New TTZ was launched in January 1943 and was led by doctor of naval sciences professor Vice Admiral L. g. Goncharov. Much more intense studies were made and results from those came the project 72. Overall dimensions the ship would have resembled British Illustrious class as the Project 72 would have been 224 meters length (tough some sources state 250 meters) and 28800 tons full load displacement. Armament was first toughted to be 8 dual 130 mm, but was later changed to 8 dual 85mm. Also 12 dual 37mm and 8 dual 23 mm AA guns where planned. These designs used data acquired form Germany just prior the war. Total of 60 aircraft were toughed stored in 130m x 20.5m hangar. Soviet delegations visited then still building carrier Craft Zeppelin and also other carrier experience around world was studied.

http://img473.imageshack.us/img473/5083/726rh4fu.jpg
Project 72 from the overview can be seen the similarity to Illustrious class

In 1945 a commission was formed to submit results of the redesign of all warship project based on the wartime experience. This also includes the carrier program. It remains bit uncertain whether the project 72 survived this or not. The commission suggested that specialist be send to aboard allied carriers to gain more experience. They even suggested that soviets should try to buy or lent an Essex class carrier from USA. Obviously these were quite unrealistic plans and nothing came up from them. Ultimately the commission proposed light, escort, fleet and heavy carriers; the difference between light and escort carriers would have been in terms of speed and armour.
In all thirty-three variants were developed, twenty-four for escort, three for light, four for fleet and two for heavy carriers. For example all escort carriers would have accommodated 24 fighters and 18 ASW aircrafts.
Probably one of those proposed projects where project 69AV, aircraft carrier based on the cancelled project 69 class battlecruiser (Kronstad) It may have been follow on design of the project 716 mentioned above. Standard displacement would have been 32000 t and 38680 tons for full load. Length was 240 meters and width 29.5 meters. 160m x 26m hangar served by three lift accommodated total of 76 aircrafts. This design was probably been one of the light carrier designs.

http://img473.imageshack.us/img473/3700/69av7ps5ko.jpg
Poject 69AV

There was also, probably one of the fleet carrier designs, called Kostromitinova. It measured 280 meters length in waterline with 40800 tons empty, 45300 standard and 51200 tons full load. 178m x 16m hangar supporting 66 fighters and 40 torpedo bombers. Armament was to be 8 dual 152mm, 4 triple (?) 100mm, 8 quad 37mm and 22 dual 23mm. Finally, the heavy carrier, which would have been 82370 tons displacement and 350 meters in length. Stalin approved Admiral Kuznetsovs suggestion that least two carriers should have been included for the Post-war fleet building-ups. Eventually Stalin came to different minds and no carriers were included in the 1946-55 shipbuilding programme.

http://img473.imageshack.us/img473/8638/kostromitinova1py2uc.jpg
Project Kosrtomitinova

The main defender of carriers in soviet leadership was Admiral N G Kuznetsov. Whereas Stalin had nearly obsessed need for Battleships and Batllecruisers being included in the soviet navy, Kuznetsov where much more aware of the rapid development in naval strategy. Kuzenetsov was a strong mined individual and was one of the few who actually dared to go against Stalin. He did share his bite on the Stalins sanctions and was priefly assigned to Pacific fleets commander. He returned to his orginal post of head of the soviet fleet in 1951.
Soviet carrier plans did not resume until Stalin’s death in 1953. Two pre-project designs where made in 1954. One by TsKB-17 and other by the navy’s internal design studies organisation TSNII-45. Each of these designs carried 40 aircrafts. TsKB-17 version would have displaced 30,555t, with speed of 34 knots. It was provably called project 85 which bears strong similarity to US Essex class (after SCB-27C) and French Foch class. TsNII-45 suggested 21,000t with speed of 32, 5 knots. These plans came their end in 1955 when Soviets new premier Khrushcev who fired Kuznetsov, officially because the disastrous sinking of the battleship Novorossiysk but more likely because Kuznetsov was strong supporter of large surface oriented fleet. Khrushcev had other plans. “Revolution in military affairs” descriped more specifically in the Part II, seized all soviet large surface ship development for a while including the ongoing carrier program. It remains unclear if these carrier plans would have survived if some other of the runners for Stalin’s throne would have exceeded better than Khruschev. That is for certain that the RMA thinking did more harm to soviet carrier plans than any other single factor. Although first soviet aircraft-carrying ships were approved by Krhuschev, they were in fact quite different than traditional carriers with completely different roles. All later soviet aviation ships were in event followers of this first major decision which is often judged to be crucial mistake.

http://img473.imageshack.us/img473/852/pr859qh5ij.jpg
Project 85, note the similarity with French Clemencea and Foch.




Gollevainen
December 3rd, 2005, 09:08 AM
Part II
(sorry for douple posting, but we are limited to have only five pics per post...)

Crawl, Walk, Run: Poject 1123 and 1143.



After Stalin’s deaht, Three mens fought for the “throne” Bulganov, Malenkov and Nikita Khrushcev. The later was the strongest and bcoming of 1956 he was de facto the new Premier of Soviet Union.
Many of us know the “secret speech” where Khrushchev Revealed Stalins crimes and thus taking a distance to his predeccor. Khrushchev did lots of other signifigant things wich eventually led to his demise in 1964. One of those was the “revolution in military affairs”, a doctrine that shaped the cold war soviet armed forces consederebly. The effects of it on soviet fleet were enourmos.
Althoug soviet nuclear capapility was gained during the late 40’s, Stalin clearly statet that it wasen’t to be effecting on any other military building at that time. After Stalin’s deaht, the new leadership annouced that they were uninteressed in any weapon save “nuclear missiles”. For navys point of view this ment that the new fleet would formed based on submarines and landbased aircrafts. Khrushchev tought the naval shipyards a “metaleaters” and despied the Stalins big (and tradditional) naval constructive plans. All the work on big surface combatants were halted and many projects were cancelled including the pr. 82R missile conversion from the battlecruiser design, Project 68bis class cruisers and project 56 class destroyers. All carrierplans were also dropped, althoug it was statet by Khrushchev that carriers would be neccereity to future fleet. But he also made clear that their perecence was far in future and no effort of design those were to be made at the time.
Navy representative’s tryed to cool down Khrushchev’s radical wiews and October 1955 a meet up between Khrushchev and soviet naval staff was held to make a blueprint of the future fleet. New desings emerged, like the project 61 (Kashin) escort ships (or destroyers, as they were the last EMs before the project 956) and project 156 (Petya) SKRs which wre the first soviet ships specially designed for ASW task. Also many existing desings were converded to missilecarrying ships like the project 56 class destroyers and project 183 class (Komar) FACs. Submarine force went thru even more radical changes but as this is an essey of aircraft carriers, we leave those plans to another thread. Little can always be said, like the fact that Khrushchev wanted only nuclearpowered submarines to be built, but lukily the naval staff convinced him that it would be unaffortable plan. Also all short-range subs were considered obsolet and thus the Romeo class production was stopped and all the tools were sold to China.
In the event of US Polaris and Regulus fitted submarines, soviets became even more concerned of the growing US naval superioty. To direct counter-effort, plans of small ASW helicopter carriers were made. Orginal plans called eight helicopters of which two would have to be continously airbrone. The TsKB-17 came up whit two possiple version, one with modified Sverldov class hull (The project 68 once again offers its hull to soviet carrier programe) and small carrier. Intially both versions were aproved but only the small carrier was pursuited further.
TsKB-17 came to conclusion that as the helicopters wouldn't be able to operate in bad weahter, comprehensive ASW suite and armament were to be fitted on the ships. This revisited design was aproved in 25th January 1960. As so usual to naval staffs around the world, the design must be kept as small as possiple. This ment that the displacement was to be 7000-8000 tons standart. The desing burey made several proposals varying from catamaran hull to Aluminium/mangnesium hulls. It was noticed that only using then radical gas turbines, the desing would fit the displacement limits whenusing a normal steel hull. A 8500 ton version with project 58s pressure fired steam turbines was approved in december 1960 but it was soon realised that the design was noway near ready for building.

http://img511.imageshack.us/img511/9650/1123011fu9ik.jpg
One of the earlyer concepts of Moskva class

Several proplems were encountered exspecially wiyh the mannig issues and the helicopter operations. Firts a 300-350 size crew were investigated and the habilitation facilityes were lowered from cruiser standart to destroyer standart. The naval staff reviewed the manning issue several times and finally a 541 men crew was pursued. Another problem was the aviation assets. Soviet Air force denied all technical support to the developing team and therefore OKB Kamov had to do all the research and designing for the helicopters on board. Also the air force announced that the Ka-25 chosen to be the main helicopter type wasn’t adequate for the intended task.
The helicopter-type issue was solved (no additional data of that arm struggle between the Navy and Air Force has been revealed) but the ships aviation facilities caused more problems. It was decided to increase the amount of helicopters onboard to 14 and this required total redesign of the project. The hangar had to be increased by 81 per cent and second hangar had to be fitted between the funnels. In 1962 the increased range of the Polaris system meant few additional changes but the first ship Moskva was laid down finally on 15th December 1962. The building period was considerably long and the ship wasn’t commissioned until 25th December 1967. Second ship Leningrad was laid down in 15th January 1965 and commissioned in 2nd June 1969. Both ships served their whole life in Black Sea fleet and were frequently assigned to the Mediterranean squadron. Moskva was decommissioned in 1996 and Leningrad in 1991.
The project 1123 was all but successful design. It was plagued by many mechanical problems and design errors. Most famous of these shortcomings are the machinery problems that caused trouble in all soviet carriers as they all shared the same pressure fired steam turbines. Moskva suffered serious fire in 1973 and had to be rebuilt twice. Leningrad also reportedly went thru minor fire during her service time. The hull design caused even more trouble. The hull was unusual Y-shape which soviets first time tried with Type 7U destroyer prototype in the 30’s. It made the ships pitching in heavy seas. Also the ships trimmed by the bow, implicating that the weight balance was wrongly designed (too much weight in the bow due the complex weapon systems.) The ships were claimed to make 33 knots and to search in 26 knots. In practice they could barely made 30 knots and it was dangerous to sustain that speed for any longer period. The highest search speed was 24 knots and this could be achieved only for periods of 2-3 hours.
The ships were fitted extensive amount of experimental and prototype weapons system. This also complicated the ships service life. The Shtorm (SA-N-3 Goblet) SAM system, RPK-1 (SUW-N-1) ASW missile system and the AK-725 57mm DP were all new developments fitted first time in these ship. The ships also introduced the first soviet VDS (Mare Tail). The design originally called dual SS-N-3 SSM launchers fitted alongside the superstructure, but were never fitted with these missiles.

http://img266.imageshack.us/img266/7923/1123095bz.jpg
Moskva

In event of these several shortcomings, soviets begun to develop a revisited design. Some sources say that special Anti-ship variant, but more accurate ones claim that the third ship, (1123.3) already named Kiev was to be more radical improved with bigger airgroup, better crew facilitates, improved seakeeping qualities and more extensive weaponry. In event this third ship evolved to the project 1143 class carriers.
The carrier door had been opened and soviets were now fielding aircrafts, tough in this time only helicopters in numbers over the seas. Quite dramatical turn was the first flight of OKB Yakolev’s Yak-36 V/STOL aircraft in 1966. It provided an intermediate solution to get fixed wing aircrafts to the sea far faster than conventional planes as they were in theory capable for operating from onboard the existing and soon-to-be commissioned project 1123 class. This V/STOL hype, that was affecting in other countries as well, most notably in Great Brittan, marked the whole soviet carrier program for that day to the end. The overall capabilities of V/STOL aircrafts were greatly colored to certain soviet leaders and believe in those was based on exaggerated performance and operational usefulness. Ironically the V/STOL planes which gave the soviets the first opportunity to get fixed wing aviation in to the seas was also the main reason why the true conventional powered aviation assets never got the change in VMF. (Voennyy morskoye flota; the soviet navy)
Some sources (older ones) state that The Project 1143 was designed to use only choppers in the first place and the addition of V/STOL planes was added later on. This wasn’t the case. It now appears that the Project 1123.3, third Moskva already then named Kiev, was designed from the outset to be able to use the new Yakolevs jump jet. The official development started in 1967 and main task was to correct the several mistakes made during the building of the earlier variants. The ships capability was increased. Armament called better Anti-ship weaponry and the P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren)missiles were first investigated. This meant bigger hull due the previous ships stability problems. The larger overall size also applied to the second demand, bigger aircrew, now made up from Ka-25 helicopters and Yak-36M V/STOL fighters. Total of 22 planes was first toughed. The crew facilities were doubled to order to have more endurance.
The design team came up with nine different plans, six of them in the lines whit the TTZ and three were innovative designs. These varied from only minor modifications to the earlier ships to nuclear powered carrier with 50 plane aircrew. Few versions were basically enlargened Moskavs with superstructure moved to the side and the flight deck extended forming sort of angled flight deck. Some of those had option for catapult and arrestor wires for MiG-23! Of all these, the variant with lengthened flight deck and side mounted superstructure was selected. Rest were considered too complicated and weren’t possible to fit them to the strict building timeline. 16th October 1968 the official redesigned TTZ of now renamed project 1143 was wielded. Some modifications was made, like the changing the short-range SSM armament to long range P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) system. Anti-aircraft armament was increased by replacing the 57mm DP with new six barrel gantlin-type AK-630 CIWS and adding two dual AK-276 76 mm DPs. These guns gained some opposition as it was tough that they were insufficient in anti-surface role for these ships. All other larger type of guns were still on the developing board but option for rearmament remained. New point defense missile system OSA-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) was also being fitted.

http://img476.imageshack.us/img476/3094/imagen0015lc6iq.jpg
one of the desings made up along with the earlyer TTZ

The original Yak-36 technology demonstration aircraft evolved to Yak-36M which was later renamed Yak-38. This aircraft was far bigger than the earlier aircraft; somewhat similar size as MiG-23 (this led to several proposals of kievs to be modernized to full conventional aircraft carriers) but not even close to the latter’s combat capabilities. The aircraft was tested onboard Moskva in November 1972. The aircraft was almost complete catastrophe as its accident-rate was unacceptable and this added to that fact that the plane combat capability was almost non-existing. The fact that the type remained in service for such a long period (from 1976 to 1991) was purely political. Getting aircrafts over the seas in the first place was far more important that actually having any useful aircraft.
The ships had 130m x 22.5 meter hangar which was in effect a Moskvas hangar lenghtened to the side of the superstructure. Total of 34 aircrafts were carried, 12 Yak-38 V/STOL planes and 22 helicopters; 19 Ka-25 Hormone-As ASW copters (later supstituded by Ka-27PL Helix) and 3 Ka-25 Hormone-B missile-ranging helicopters.
First ship, Kiev was laid down 27th July 1970, launched 26th December 1972 and commisioned 28th December 1975. Seccond unit, Minsk was laid down 28th 1972, launched 30th September 1975 and commisioned 27th September 1978. Minsk varied slightly form Kiev, mainly fielding new sonar suite (Horse Jaw and Horse Tail) and electronic warfare systems. Also it is reported that Minsk aviation facilityes were improved by changing the hangar placement of the aircrafts. Third ship, Novorossiysk was laid dow 30th September 1975, launched 26th December 1978 and commisioned 14th August 1982. It differenced from the others by having the new Klinok (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) VLS point defence SAM in place of the Osa-M. (The fourth unit, Baku is described in the part III). Kiev was assigned to Northern fleet and Minsk and Novorossiysk where assigned to Pacific Fleet. All three ships were stricken in 30th June 1993 and sold for breakers. (Kiev and Minsk ended up being amusement parks in China.)


http://img301.imageshack.us/img301/7793/novo110vy.jpg
Novorossiysk

It’s often critizied and wondered the exact role of these ships. The offical term TAKR (Taktycheskiy Avionosnyy Kreyser) Tactical Aviation cruiser was chosen for politacal reasons. The term “aircraft carrier” was considered monument of “imperialistic weapon of aggression” by soviet politicans and therefor the new soviet air capaple ships would be too selfironical to be described as such. Also the old treatyes concerning ships passing thru the Darandaelles in the Turkish straight prevented Aircraft carriers passing thru black sea. Hence the official desingnation. Those who critiziais these ships often forgots that they were in effect just follow-ons to Moskva class and thus just oversized ASW carriers with capapilitye to carry V/STOL planes. Althoug the ships were similar size to US Essex class, never should they be descibed as tru aircraft carriers as they never meant to be ones. At best they were a possipility and opportunity, a dream little closer to excecuting.

gf0012-aust
January 3rd, 2006, 02:04 AM
Thanks for the history lesson. I'd always assumed that the Russians were never serious about "proper" carriers until the closing stages of the Cold War. At that stage it was far too late anyway as Reagans 600 ship navy had all but crippled the capability of the russians to field an effective counter force.

Wild Weasel
January 10th, 2006, 12:40 PM
I was taught that it realy just boiled down to basic differences in US, and Soviet naval doctrine:
The USN's perspective was that of power projection and sea-superiority, through the use of conventional aircraft-launching super carriers as the centerpiece of a naval battle group.
The Soviet doctrine, was based on sea-denial. They focused on developing the most affordable, and effective means of countering the USN's carrier-based battle group power-projection structure.

The fact that aircraft carriers had been developed to such prominence following WWII was due to their overwhelming success in the WWII Pacific theater- particularly in their roles in the destruction of Axis battleships and aircraft carriers. That said, the primary reason that the US developed a carrier-based battle-group structure, was simply the fact that they could afford to build, defend, and support the giant ships. Carriers worked, and the US could afford them.

The Soviets were conflicted by this. One one hand, they realized the value and capability of large-deck fleet carriers, and could see it being put to good use by the USN. Naturally, the Soviets wanted to have such a capability for themselves, but due to their poor economic situation, was incapable of funding such enormous projects- to do so would have prevented other military needs from being met.
The Soviets also realized that building and operating carriers was incredibly expensive for the US, and the risk of losing such an asset had awesome implications.
But the Soviets were also aware that it was not necessary to build carriers to defeat carriers. One merely had to attack with enough volume to overwhelm the battle group's defenses. It wasn't even necessary to sink a carrier, ( though to do so would certainly have been preferrable. ) all they had to do was damage it's aircraft facilties enough to prevent it from being used as a aircraft carrier. Once a carrier is rendered useless as an aviation vessel, it becomes nothing more than a giant liability.

Thus, the Soviets focussed their attention on overwhelming the battle group's defences through the use of long-range surface, sub-furface, and air-launched anti-ship missiles, and torpedos. Most of these weapons could be equipped with nuclear warheads- which was thought to be an almost assured way of removing the threat of an entire carrier battle group in short order.

I realize that the cost of developing, equipping, and training the Soviet miltary with the types and numbers of weapons required to take out a US carrier battle group was tremendous indeed- but I'm sure that it was much less than the funds the USN required to build and operate more than a dozen super carriers, not to mention the infrastructure required to support and defend them.

So while the Kiev wasn't worth it's salt as a carrier, it still provided the Soviets with something they could proclaim to be an aircraft carrier- and politically, that was enough. It's real value came from it's SS-N-12 launchers, and it's secondary role as a high-endurance, heavily-defended ASW platform.

Interestingly, the Adm. Kuznetesov-class "fleet" carriers also included giant super-sonic vertical-launched "carrier-killer" ASM's in their design. The placement of the ASM VLS on this class would have actually prevented any flight operations from being carried out during their use.
I believe this to mean that Soviet naval doctrine, technology, and economic factors prevented the Kuznetsov from ever becoming a "real" fleet-carrier. At best, she was a propaganda show-boat, with a secondary role as a heavily armed and defended ASM-launching battle cruiser. As such, in reality she was never more than a high-value target for scores of Hornet-lauched Harpoon ASMs, and MK48 ADCAPs.

I often wonder what could have been if the Soviets ever progressed to coventional-aircraft launch capability, and navalized some of their more capable tactical fighters/and medium-bombers like the MiG-23, and Su-24.
I think that the Mig-29, and Su-27/33/34 concept would have provided the USSR/CIS navy with a capable multi-role air-wing- they just never developed a sufficiently-sized carrier design large enough to properly support them.

Gollevainen
January 10th, 2006, 04:36 PM
Interestingly, the Adm. Kuznetesov-class "fleet" carriers also included giant super-sonic vertical-launched "carrier-killer" ASM's in their design. The placement of the ASM VLS on this class would have actually prevented any flight operations from being carried out during their use.
I believe this to mean that Soviet naval doctrine, technology, and economic factors prevented the Kuznetsov from ever becoming a "real" fleet-carrier. At best, she was a propaganda show-boat, with a secondary role as a heavily armed and defended ASM-launching battle cruiser. As such, in reality she was never more than a high-value target for scores of Hornet-lauched Harpoon ASMs, and MK48 ADCAPs.

Well the Kuznetsov class as almoust all other soviet carriers were sum of too many compromizes. When looking to soviet carrier development, the role of the political desicions, often made basing on very unrealistic or othervice missinformed believes is evident. It was first the strong mined leaders (Stalin and Khrutsev) who prevented carriers to be ingluded becouse they didn't fit to their rather obscure ideas of naval warfare. Then when the first steps were made, it was the overestimation of V/STOL planes, mainly by the defenceminister Ustinov which ended the promising designs of project 1160 and 1153. I will tell more about this in the part three, when i finaly can finnish it...may take a while.

Awang se
April 4th, 2006, 02:59 AM
They say Kuznetsov will be use to give some air defence umbrella to the SSBN bastion. make sense though, since their Nuke are the only potent offensive weapon in their whole arsenals. considering the design, Kuznetsov can't be said to be impressive. there is no catapult so the SUs won't carry much of the bulky strike load. considering that, i guess the SUs will be use as a carrierborne air superiority fighter with yak-141 will carry the striker role. the carrier is jammed packed with ASM and SAM though. a peculiarities for a suppose carrier. i wonder if they meant for a ship to operate without escorts

gf0012-aust
April 4th, 2006, 03:27 AM
They say Kuznetsov will be use to give some air defence umbrella to the SSBN bastion. make sense though, since their Nuke are the only potent offensive weapon in their whole arsenals. considering the design, Kuznetsov can't be said to be impressive. there is no catapult so the SUs won't carry much of the bulky strike load. considering that, i guess the SUs will be use as a carrierborne air superiority fighter with yak-141 will carry the striker role. the carrier is jammed packed with ASM and SAM though. a peculiarities for a suppose carrier. i wonder if they meant for a ship to operate without escorts

That seems odd due to a number of reasons:

large capital aviation assets require escorts - and in a NATO type model that may include SSN subs riding shotgun to act as antisub sweepers in their own right
its anathema for subs to show their presence - apart from a CSF where they enjoy partial protection from local ASW assets, they don't like to be known to be present. Thus, having an aviation asset for support is contradictory to normal procedures - and serves to let everyone know that they're within protection radius of the aviation vessel.
SSBN's don't travel with skimmer escorts. Their survivability is based on stealth and unknown presence. at the most, they might have an SSN nearby in times of conflict to ride shotgun - but even then it would be unlikely unless someone was deciding to bait the AO.
Even though the Kuznetsov is not a traditional carrier per se, and more or less acts as an area defence weapon, she still requires the same degree of protection as a traditional carrier. she has less air presence, she has less air persistence (as she's not CATOBAR - and that causes limitations with her air wings) - and she's not a nuke - so she requires a close refueler if she ever commits to high tempo air support.Granted they are an impressive looking vessel, but when you measure up their absolute utility, IMV they are more of a handicap than a multiplier. They are not autonomous enough to survive in a complex environment without substantial protection.

The last thing I'd want to be is a sub driver with that asset in place supposedly giving me protection - you've automatically lost your highest ace by announcing its presence.

Awang se
April 23rd, 2006, 09:44 AM
i got your message there. may i ask, do you know that for certain or it's mostly your judgement? no offence.;)

my logic here is, most people know and russians know that their SSBN is not as capable as their western counterpart. and if i'm not mistaken, NATO have an underwater sensor network that can track most of this SSBNs as far as under the polar ice cap. what if the russian decide to station most of their SSBNs in one area where they can have land based air supports, and Kuznetsov will provide air support from the seaward direction, plus their guardian SSNs. what do you think?

gf0012-aust
April 23rd, 2006, 10:09 AM
i got your message there. may i ask, do you know that for certain or it's mostly your judgement? no offence.;)

well, its a bit of both. at some point in time the US and her allies had to plan a response to what the soviets were likely to do. we know what the soviet carriers deployed in concert with - and we knew their limitations.

but, are you talking about the air aviation comments or the submarine comments?

my logic here is, most people know and russians know that their SSBN is not as capable as their western counterpart. and if i'm not mistaken, NATO have an underwater sensor network that can track most of this SSBNs as far as under the polar ice cap.

SOSUS was able to track the Soviets from the time they left their northern bases, all the way through the Atlantic - incl the southern atlantic. Plus the USN was very strong in running ASW screens using dedicated ASW Carriers. The Vladivostok side was managed according to the season - and when it was known that the soviets had to break out from the ice. Two of the US def-professionals could provide some input here (if approp) One was on an ASW carrier and the other was in a nuke sub.

what if the russian decide to station most of their SSBNs in one area where they can have land based air supports, and Kuznetsov will provide air support from the seaward direction, plus their guardian SSNs. what do you think?

If you stay within landbased air then you progressively degrade the capacity to protect your skimmers the further out you go. You also limit the opportunity to be flexible with the carrier itself. A carrier that stays within the overlap of landbased air is a negative contributor to flexible options - in a real sense its a liability as it requires disproportionate protection.

Thats the fundamental difference with US Carriers, they're designed to be autonomous assets that project and compress enemy responses by the very fact that they enjoy flexibility and utility of their own response.

Any major capital asset that is restricted in its utility is a liability in the long term and just serves to make force compression by the enemy easier.

I should qualify that I'm looking at this from the perspective of a real blue water trans-oceanic capability - not from a littoral/green water restriction. But the construct is still the same. If you restrict freedom of movement because you're being governed by the vehicle of land based air - then you limit your tactical fluidity.

Maybe a good analogy is by looking at Bears and Elephants who will back into a corner so as to restrict the free ranging attacks by wolves and lions - they get to exercise better control within a specific arc of defence, but they also make themselves more vulnerable as it provides time for the rest of the attacking pack to gather and wear them down through attrition. Sooner or later, the bear or the elephant has to break out and make a fist of it.

Ths
November 25th, 2006, 01:51 PM
Thank You Gollevainen for an interesting essay, I can't wait for part 3.

Ths
November 25th, 2006, 11:57 PM
The Russian Fleet has always had severe disadvantages:

Baltic Fleet: Has the disadvantage of either being unable to fight at open ocean or unable to get out of port/the Baltic. The Baltic is very peculiar waters - peculiar in the sense that the shallows and the proximity to land is one big coastal defence zone. To reach the Atlantic the fleet will have to force the Danish Straits - notably the Great Belt - with vessel not particularly suited to shallow water, thus is forced to more or less run on rails at critical points. If the Danish Straits are forced the Baltic Fleet will have to face the Royal Navy and the Royal Norwegean Navy when they turn the Skaw. Then and only then will they have to face the USNavy. These are near impossible odds.

Black Sea Fleet, lets face it: It will remain in the Black Sea in wartime. It's use in the Soviet era was limited: The only Nato nation it would come to grips with would be the Turkish - the other nations were members of the WAPA. Thus the attempts to get bases in Egypt and Libya.

The Northern Fleet: Murmansk is ice free all year by a freak of nature, which is just about the only positive thing that can be said about that port and its surrounding waters.

Vladivostok is far removed from everything.

Few nations have been able to conquer the handicap of having their fleet split in 2. Germany has had the Baltic and the High Sea Fleet; but anything approaching command of the Sea? Never. The severe danger the German fleet constituted to the British during WW2 is similar to the paralysis the Royal Navy dealt the Germans with a handfull of submarines in the Baltic during WW1.
The USA has overcome these problems - with huge political and financial costs.

Consider then Russia having their fleet divided not in 2; but in 4 parts.
Add to this the extreemely poor accessabilty of their yards and near impossible supply and replenishment.

The numbers might suggest the Soviet Navy to have been comparable to the American; but that number decieve:

1. It does not count the:
a. British, Norwegean and Dutch opponents to the Northern Fleet.
b. British, German and Danish fleets in the Baltic - even if the East German and Polish were to be used as kamikazes.
c. Spanish, Italian and Greek fleets in the Mediterranian.
d. Japanese in the Pacific.

2. The Soviet Navy would have been pretty much a one shot Navy. The likelyhood of ships returning to base - with damage and out of supplies were remote. To think resupply to the oceanic fleet would have been unmolested presupposes a cooperative spirit from the enemy not seen in the history of war.

While the political and historical considerations of Gallevainen has indubitable merit, it is well worth while in my oppinion to find out what practical use the Soviet fleet could possibly have in wartime.
Here everything revolves around the SSBN's. As Gallevainen so clearly points out: Untill the US SSBN the Soviet carrier plans - remained just that - plans.
Seen in the light of SSBN's the Krustchevs adventure with Cuba takes on the colour of an attempt to give the USNavy some of the disadvantages of the Soviet Navy: Split the USNavy in two - in this he failed miserably as the taking of Guantanamo did not succeed - and would have brought all hell down on the Caribian Island - with the Russians unable to do anything about it - just as the USA could do nothing about the crushing of Hungary.
This gamble on Krustchevs part failed miserably - and probably led to Krustchevs downfall (that he in my view took Kennedy down with him is a different story).

From the evidence presented: The Fleet Krustchev was primarely ASW vessels protected by cruisers, as it was forseeable that the Nato fleets would do something about their subs being massacred.
In so far as the early Polaris subs were armed with a missile of such short range that the SSBN's would have to get very close to Soviet territory to launch their missiles at any worthwhile targets, the idea was excellent.
The only problem with the plan was, that is was as blatantly obvious to Nato as it was to the Russians that the USSR coastline was short - especially if it was in the neighbourhood of anything remotely valuable. Thus the SSBN's lost the advantage of the submarine: Stealth. The Soviets would have a pretty good idea of where to look for big subs.
The elementary fact put a huge premium on longer range of american missiles.

Thus - not entirely surprising - the range of US SLBM increased. This meant that the Soviet fleet was obsolete/inadquate before it was actually build. Krustchev thus not only lost on the Cuban account but also on his economically realistic navy.

The increased range meant both a larger area and greater ranges to be put under surveillance. Typically the Moskva-class spend their entire life in the Black Sea Fleet. The idea seems to have been that the fleet should have one in the Med at any one time - and in the Med the poor pitching qualities would not have been a decisive handicap.
This posed new problems. The Moskva-class would not be able to survive without air cover. Thus the big wheels of diplomacy - and an even bigger wallet - would have to be put in motion. The support to Egypt, Syria and Libya - even after two disastereous wars with Israel - had nothing to do with oil, and everyting to do with air- and navalbases to provide cover for the ASW fleet in the Med.
The Black Sea Fleet's problems could to some extend be catered for by a combination of Moskva-class, bribes and politics. This was not the case with the Northern Fleet.

At the outset the problems were not so great for the Northern Fleet, as the Barents Sea is not the best water for carrier operation - and this applied to the USNavy as well.
But missile ranges continued to grow and the distance from the motherland increased, thus some sort of aircraft would have to be carried for selfdefence to supplement the SAM's. The overselling of the VTOL planes, Gollevainen mentions, could be an act of desperation.

My interpretation of the Kuznetsov is not so much concerned with the hunting of the US SSBN's as with the Soviet realisation that the USA could track the Soviet SSBN's with apparent ease. The Soviet subs did tone down their noise signature; but it would have been naive to think the USNavy would not increase its tracking ability commensurably.
Thus the credibility of the Soviet investment in SSBN's was in serious doubt.
If the SSBN could not pass with stealth, they had to use force - and the only way was to get true carrier capability - how long a true Russian carrier would have survived in a war enviroment is a matter of conjecture, as it never worked properly - or to be blunt - at all.

Thus the story of the Soviet Navy is a continuation of the story of the Russian Navy:
A total waste of resources: Working desperately to plug the holes punched by the US and other Nato navies - only to find new leaks as soon as the original were shored up. And as a coup de grace: Finding the guns nailed.

As to the future: Considering that the Nato and especially the Americans have hardly been sitting on their hands since the break up of the Soviet Union the question is: Is there a future for the Russian Navy?

Pathfinder-X
December 4th, 2006, 06:53 AM
Based on the current trends, the Russian navy will continue to downsize while retiring some obsolete ships from service. If you noticed, their recent plans for new toys are mostly coastal defence vessels, suggesting a change in naval doctrine. At this point their navy is more of a political presence than a real contender.

From the bits and pieces that can be gathered from news reports, it seems like they are having trouble getting their ships out of port to be of any significant concern to NATO.

Ths
December 4th, 2006, 08:36 PM
Please correct me if I'm wrong:

Baltic Fleet: The RDaN sailing up the river with a minelayer on a cerimonial occation might be an indication that they will have a difficult time leaving port in wartime. I too have notices the emphasis on stealth corvettes.

The Black Sea Fleet - as far as I know - still has unresolved issues with the hosting nation of their main naval base. Furthermore the Moskva-class has been retired, which I understand 10 years ago was seen to be the flagship of that fleet.

White Sea and Pacific Fleet: Please inform: Does it have any capitals ships except cruiser(s) left. The dissolving of the US Atlantic Fleet would indicate an easier breathing in US naval circles - as far as the White Sea Fleet is concerned.

As I see it:
The days when the Russians thought of challinging the USNavy and the Royal Navy at high sea are over. The US, Britain and France are getting newer and better carriers and the Russian seem stuck with their white elephants. And they seem to know as the corvette programs indicate.
The small ships are no companions for a high seas fleet, corvettes in general have to little endurance - and if they are build for the Baltic Sea, they are not nice in the North Atlantic.

The real purpose a small unit programme can meet is the protection of the submarine force while it tries to break out of port - if it will ever return is an other matter - or even succeed in the light of the destroyers being build by the USA and Japan.