Alternatives to a Carrier Battle Group

[ajay_ijn]

Guys what do u think is an alternative to a CVBGs.I am talking about US CVBGs
Just imagine CVBGs are not availaible and u have to choose an Alternate Weapon.of course there is no perfect alternative to a CVBG thats why USN maintains so many CSFs.

I would choose SSGNs,about 12-15 of them each armed with a Advanced Missiles,but this is only possible in future.
The Missiles must be able to provide recon,maneuver battlefield and also must be able to carry Smaller warheads which will strike Hardened targets precisely.

Like Surface Warships, SSGNs need not worry about Air defence and also about ASW.

[kashifshahzad]

Mate you should explain it plz i cant understand some of the terms CVBGs CSFs SSGNs
ASW. plz let me know which thing you want to distroy or for which thing you say countries should have alternatives :(

[ajay_ijn]

Mate you should explain it plz i cant understand some of the terms CVBGs CSFs SSGNs
ASW. plz let me know which thing you want to distroy or for which thing you say countries should have alternative
Cmon u don't know what is ASW.
Anti-Submarine Warfare.
CVBG-Carrier Battle Group
SSGN-Cruise Missile Submarines.
CSF-Carrier Strike Force
plz let me know which thing you want to distroy or for which thing you say countries should have alternative
I don't want to destroy anything,I clearly mentioned that i am talking about US CVBGs

[gf0012-aust]

I would choose SSGNs,about 12-15 of them each armed with a Advanced Missiles,but this is only possible in future.

How does an SSGN fleet provide a credible counter to a CTF/CSF? It doesn't
It's mission is fundamentally to act as an underwater arsenal ship. beyond that it starts to act in the traditional underwater ISR role including Specops. It does not provide visible deterrence which is why CSF's, CTF's and SAG's were so effective as butt clinchers.

What "advanced" missile do you think needs to be on an SSGN that is not already on them?

You cannot have a fleet defined unless you have your doctrine defined. Otherwise it's just moving clumps of ships on water. Doctrine is defined by notional likely areas of contact or engagement. Fleet creation is defined by mission and tasking/doctrine/political extension.

The Missiles must be able to provide recon,maneuver battlefield and also must be able to carry Smaller warheads which will strike Hardened targets precisely.

The USN has already shown under Exercise Silent Hammer that they have a variety of warloads and mission flexibility with SSGN's.

Like Surface Warships, SSGNs need not worry about Air defence and also about ASW.

1) Huh??? what surface warfare vessel doesn't need to worry about air defence? why do you think fleets are provided with airwarfare vessels such as AEGIS/PAAMS?

2) SSGN's clearly have to worry about ASW - they're a submarine for goodness sake. In real terms in the USN they have more firepower than any other fleet asset outside of a full nuke delivery.

Cmon u don't know what is ....
SSGN-Cruise Missile Submarines.

Incorrect, the correct definition is
SSGN = Submarine Guided Missile Nuclear Powered.
Under the Int'l accepted naming conventions there is no combat prefix for cruise missile launchers. The definition was created as the USN developed a new internationally recognised class of vessel. There are no dedicated cruise missile launchers that have recognition under the int'l naming conventions.

A conventional sub fitting the guided missile definition would be an SSG.

SSGN's are dedicated to launching guided weapons - that is a little bit more than a sub that is tasked to launch cruise missiles as part of its mix.

[Awang se]

i think SSG is a poor man's way of power projection.

Despite any saying on contrary, i think submarines is still a credible threat to CVBG especially in a littoral area. Currently, US have no specialized subs to be use in the littoral waters, though i believe LA class can do the job well.

i wonder why US don't consider using a conventional sub. With the advancement in AIPs, the endurance of conventional sub is greatly increase. besides, US have naval bases all over the world besides the bases of it's allies. so endurance shouldn't be a problem with the US subs.

[gf0012-aust]

i think SSG is a poor man's way of power projection.

how is it a poor mans projection when the only country that has an SSGN fleet is the most powerful military force on the planet? Nobody else has SSGN's - period. The capacity to launch cruise missiles does not make a sub an SSGN

Despite any saying on contrary, i think submarines is still a credible threat to CVBG especially in a littoral area. Currently, US have no specialized subs to be use in the littoral waters, though i believe LA class can do the job well.

Nobody says to the contrary. The US doesn't expose CSF's and CTF's to the littorals without proper support - they don't need to. What recent military or pending military conflict requires CVN's to be deployed into the littorals in challenge of the threat?

i wonder why US don't consider using a conventional sub.

Because they train against conventionals actively every year. For the last 3 years they have been conducting 3-4 ASW fleet exercises per year against Sth American Forces. Then they practice in the Nthn Atlantic with STANAVFORLANT on an active basis. In the Pacific and Sth China areas they practice with RIMPAC. They conduct more conventional fleet exercises against conventionals than any conventional owner does by themselves. They train in the Aust SubWarfare area 3-4 times per year. They also now train against the leased Swedish Gotland. The intent is to also use the Canadians Upholders as aggressors. That was planned 3 years ago. They currently train against the Collins as aggressors. Why buy their own when they have full access to nearly every class of modern conventional sub amongst their allies and training partners?

With the advancement in AIPs, the endurance of conventional sub is greatly increase. besides, US have naval bases all over the world besides the bases of it's allies. so endurance shouldn't be a problem with the US subs.

Explain where conventionals need to be part of the current USN projection and capability strategy? They don't need them for their own build doctrine - they only need access to them for training purposes.

The USN is moving to USV's in the littorals. They've already embarked on the project to modify the Mk48 ADCAP with the RAN to act as a littorals specific torpedo. (Block 70).

USV's like Mantra will be configured to fire Mk50 sized weapons. More than enough to kill any other sub short of a Typhoon.

Besides - if the US wants to get into the conventionals business - then there are at least 2 ways to get in. Its not as if they are not placed to do it. There is already a move for US companies to start building conventionals to be sold to other navies if the USN doesn't want them.

Subs are built and designed against naval doctrine. It's not like they're rifles.

[EnigmaNZ]

SSGN = Submarine Guided Missile Nuclear Powered, isn't SS Ship Submerged ? (googled it hehe)

[gf0012-aust]

SSGN = Submarine Guided Missile Nuclear Powered, isn't SS Ship Submerged ? (googled it hehe)

I haven't seen the Submerged Ship definition used for about 20 years. It was originally that when the naming standards were created.

Both Janes and Bakers silence the "submergerd ship" nomenclature and substitute "submarine" instead. The S is almost redundant.

[EnigmaNZ]

i think SSG is a poor man's way of power projection.


how is it a poor mans projection when the only country that has an SSGN fleet is the most powerful military force on the planet?.

SSG was mentioned, not SSGN, perhaps Awang se was refering to minor navys that have guided missile, prosumably land attack, equipped conventional submarines.

[gf0012-aust]

SSG was mentioned, not SSGN, perhaps Awang se was refering to minor navys that have guided missile, prosumably land attack, equipped conventional submarines.

My apols Awang-se - misread by me.

To the topic.

An SSG is a loadout specific platform. To get it to deliver guided missiles means some drastic construction changes.

If you restrict cruise missile launches to tubes - then that means 4-6 launch options. It also means that the chance of reload in a hot environment is going to be interesting (not)

If you assume that it will follow the current SSG launch profile of using VLS or at a pinch ALS - then there are no conventionals able to fulfill that role. None are designed to do it. technically what conventional has the space to include VLS launchers? It narrows it down to 2 types. Collins and Oyashio. Both aren't about to sacrifice AIP space for VLS cannisters.

Ipso facto, all this means is that you have SSK's or SS's that will take on a role that enables them to fire cruise missiles in addition to torpedoes and/or mines.

IMV it's far from being a viable proposition for a conventional sub - even for the larger 3000 tonners like the Collins and Oyashios.

[EnigmaNZ]

I agree gf, if you have a SSK with 14 - 18 loadout, if you start mixing torps, harpoons (or similar) and a land attack missile, the SSK is going to be really taxed to do any task well. But it looks good to say "hey we have SSG's" There would have to be a good tactical reason to do so. I can see the point in the case of Israel, especially as they will be nuclear it seems, and 4 additional tubes were added to the new subs so as not to affect the normal loadout. But as most adverseries share your border, and most countries are large enough to hide mobile weapons effectively, its more economical to have the LACM mounted on land mobile platforms and hidden. A handful of LACM loaded out on a few subs really is just showmanship.
I see a good point to the USN's SSGN's. Scenerio 1, there is increasing tension between China and Taiwan (an example only) the US sends a CVBG to the area, this would be certain to inflame the situation. Scenerio 2, same situation, , the USN send in a SSGN, the situation turns sour, the US has 154 LACM available to launch close by, if the tension eases, the SSGN glides away unseen, with no lose of face for either party.

[gf0012-aust]

I see a good point to the USN's SSGN's. Scenerio 1, there is increasing tension between China and Taiwan (an example only) the US sends a CVBG to the area, this would be certain to inflame the situation. Scenerio 2, same situation, , the USN send in a SSGN, the situation turns sour, the US has 154 LACM available to launch close by, if the tension eases, the SSGN glides away unseen, with no lose of face for either party.

Exactly, and all these kids who think that the USN will up the ante by moving in a CTF have no idea.

The most powerful non nuke vessels in the USN are the SSGN's. The PLAN does not have the technical capability to counter them with subs.

The recently held Talisman exercise off of Nthn Queensland had a couple of SINKEX's. The PLAN and the Russians sent a couple of electrical sniffers to try and collect data about the exercise. One of the acoustic warfare officers described the PLAN subs as "being as quiet as a blender full of nails". At least the russians sent "fishing boats" (AGI's) and made no bones about the fact that they were there to try and collect data.

Fleet construction is determined by national strategic and political policy - you can't say "what do we get instead of a CSF/CBG?". Without understanding the mission and the need for a specific vessels capability - well it's like taking a Playboy magazine to a Catholic Convent - totally inappropriate and a waste of time.

[ajay_ijn]

How does an SSGN fleet provide a credible counter to a CTF/CSF? It doesn't
It's mission is fundamentally to act as an underwater arsenal ship. beyond that it starts to act in the traditional underwater ISR role including Specops. It does not provide visible deterrence which is why CSF's, CTF's and SAG's were so effective as butt clinchers.
GF I clearly mentioned that there is no perfect alternative to the carrier.
I want to discuss about the next best thing to the carrier that all.

[EnigmaNZ]

America went throught this debate after WW2. From what I recall, the thinking was that all future wars would be nuclear, and the airforce won over the navy as to who should carry nukes. Big carriers on the drawing board were canned.
"United States, a 65,000-ton attack aircraft carrier, was the Navy's first carrier of post-World War II concept and design. Intended to carry relatively large jet-propelled strategic bombers, she was laid down at Newport News, Virginia, on 18 April 1949. However, her construction was cancelled only five days later by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, in favor of building a large force of land-based B-36 bombers."
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-u/cva58.htm
Then along came the Korean war, it was conventional, and a long way from US bases. Suddenly the carriers took on a new importance, and have to this day. If the US gets long range hypersonic bombers in its mix, then maybe we will see a diminishing of the CTF / CVBG, but thats a long way off, and you can't beat a carrier to show the flag eh.

[gf0012-aust]

GF I clearly mentioned that there is no perfect alternative to the carrier. I want to discuss about the next best thing to the carrier that all.


Note my prev comment:


you can't say "what do we get instead of a CSF/CBG?". Without understanding the mission and the need for a specific vessels capability - .... it's like taking a Playboy magazine to a Catholic Convent - totally inappropriate and a waste of time.

that applies to any weapons solution that is being considered. You have to look at the country and then that countries threat matrix. It is different for each country.

determine the above - and then you can start naming "solutions"

[Aussie Digger]

For Navies that can't or aren't allowed to acquire a Carrier, I think anti-air warfare ships are the next best thing. A ship with a capable air surveillance radar systems, fire control systems and advanced air warfare, ASuW and ASW capabilities is a pretty tough combination to beat.

The RAN Air Warfare Destroyers coming into service from 2013 will be equipped with AEGIS, SM-2, ESSM, Harpoon II (or later H21 upgrade, ie: Harpoon II fitted with Link 16 data link) , Mk45 Mod 4 5 inch guns, Typhoon 25mm guns, 2x CIWS (probably a combo of missiles and guns), MU-90 torpedo's and a helicopter launched anti-ship/land attack missile (possibly a Penguin derivative or similar missile).

In addition to this the ships will also be equipped with which ever extended range guided munitions win the current US Navy program (to provide 100nm plus range precision guided munitions for surface combatants) for the 5 inch gun. These capabilities are already approved as the FIRM requirements for these ships and WILL be fitted to the intial baseline ships as they have already been approved by the Government.

The flexible options the RAN would also like will include SM-3 BMD missiles, SM-6 extended range SAM's and a long range land attack missile system (Tomahawk or a similar weapon to the proposed Naval JASSM or vertical launcher SLAM-ER variants).

AS can be seen the baseline capabilities for a future AWD (less than 10 years away) are of a VERY high level and outclass almost every type of major surface combatant in service today. If additional capabilities were fitted you'd have a potent warship that can fight and win in almost any operational environment and take part in warfare at every possible level. Such a capability is being sought by almost every major Western Navy, even those that can't afford an Aircraft carrier. An AWD seems to me to be to be 2nd only to Carriers in overall combat capability...

[ajay_ijn]

ow does an SSGN fleet provide a credible counter to a CTF/CSF? It doesn't
It's mission is fundamentally to act as an underwater arsenal ship. beyond that it starts to act in the traditional underwater ISR role including Specops. It does not provide visible deterrence which is why CSF's, CTF's and SAG's were soH effective as butt clinchers.

What "advanced" missile do you think needs to be on an SSGN that is not already on them?

You cannot have a fleet defined unless you have your doctrine defined. Otherwise it's just moving clumps of ships on water. Doctrine is defined by notional likely areas of contact or engagement. Fleet creation is defined by mission and tasking/doctrine/political extension.

[/color]


The USN has already shown under Exercise Silent Hammer that they have a variety of warloads and mission flexibility with SSGN's.



1) Huh??? what surface warfare vessel doesn't need to worry about air defence? why do you think fleets are provided with airwarfare vessels such as AEGIS/PAAMS?

2) SSGN's clearly have to worry about ASW - they're a submarine for goodness sake. In real terms in the USN they have more firepower than any other fleet asset outside of a full nuke delivery.

.

Sorry i wrote "like Surface Warships",I should have written "unlike surface Warships".

2) SSGN's clearly have to worry about ASW - they're a submarine for goodness sake. In real terms in the USN they have more firepower than any other fleet asset outside of a full nuke delivery.

They need to have good ASW.
Most of the third world navies do not have subs,even if they have they won't be effective,they can be sink by Attack Submarines easily.
Then I don't think it is seriously necessary for an SSGN to have good ASW Weapons.

Fleet construction is determined by national strategic and political policy - you can't say "what do we get instead of a CSF/CBG?". Without understanding the mission and the need for a specific vessels capability - well it's like taking a Playboy magazine to a Catholic Convent - totally inappropriate and a waste of time.
what do we get instead of a CSF/CBG
I think we can atleast discuss about alternatives instead of reaching the conclusion.

[ajay_ijn]

Fleet construction is determined by national strategic and political policy - you can't say "what do we get instead of a CSF/CBG?". Without understanding the mission and the need for a specific vessels capability - well it's like taking a Playboy magazine to a Catholic Convent - totally inappropriate and a waste of time.
GF,We wanted to discuss wiht respect to FirePower and Effectiveness in combat rather than with respect to Strategy or national defence policy.
We are just discussing,we are not going ask any Pentagon official to consider this alternative.

[crazypole]

Carriers are there to project power, so any alternative must also do this. In the present time to project power requires either air power or land forces, but the second would mean an invasion of some other sovereign state.

Missile armed ships or submarines do not project power. This means a choice between sending strategic bombers from home bases, which is possible, but difficult... and holding a number of overseas bases. This second option, even-though there are problems with having to establish these, is in my opinion the only way to be able to project power at a moments notice anywhere within whatever region the base has been established, in other words it is a static carrier group, having the same power but not the mobility
The problem with overseas bases is having to maintain them.

[gf0012-aust]

GF,We wanted to discuss wiht respect to FirePower and Effectiveness in combat rather than with respect to Strategy or national defence policy.
We are just discussing,we are not going ask any Pentagon official to consider this alternative.

have you actually understood anything of what I've written?? apparently not. It's an issue of logic - not a matter of discussing US politics.

You obviously fail to comprehend the model I am presenting - try again.

It's common sense to look at threat matrix to define response matrix. How else do you want to do it? Would you rather run a raffle and pick a page out of a Janes military handbook?

[gf0012-aust]

They need to have good ASW.
Most of the third world navies do not have subs,even if they have they won't be effective,they can be sink by Attack Submarines easily.
Then I don't think it is seriously necessary for an SSGN to have good ASW Weapons.

err, part of the ASW system is sensors as well as responders. of course its necessary to have capability - what the hell do you think is sitting in their armoury?

I think we can atleast discuss about alternatives instead of reaching the conclusion.

it was a rhetorical question. take the time to read the tone and intent of the response before answering.

[EnigmaNZ]

Hmm, first one has to define the tasks carried out by a CVBG, then come up with an alternative that can take on as many of those that are deemed to be of the highest priority. Its really going to depend on that. If you place the ability to place the maximum number of warheads on target from the smallest number of vessels, you can't beat the SSGN, but if you are willing to go for a greater mix of surface combatants, then the CG based BG. You have long range recon using unmanned drones and satelites, short to medium with ship based sensors and helicopters, antisubmarine warfare, area AD and antiship. Graduated response capabilty, and basing flexibilty. Afew years ago I would have gone for a battleship battle group, remove the rear turrent and install VLS into the rear deck, back in the 1980's there was a plan to remove the rear turrent and build a partial angled deck, and to operate Harriers and helos. Nothing came of it, was designated as a Sea Controll Ship. Looked really nice in the drawings.

[gf0012-aust]

Afew years ago I would have gone for a battleship battle group, remove the rear turrent and install VLS into the rear deck, back in the 1980's there was a plan to remove the rear turrent and build a partial angled deck, and to operate Harriers and helos. Nothing came of it, was designated as a Sea Controll Ship. Looked really nice in the drawings.

I've got a book detailing the mods to be made to the New Jersey to turn it into a helo-carrier. It's an interesting design, but operationally pretty useless. The poms worked out fairly quickly that small harrier capable "non carrier" platforms didn't add that much value to the mix.

Surface Action Groups (as led by the Battleship right up until Lebanon) lost their charisma once more accurate cruise missiles - and definitely once standoff precision missiles improved. The problem for the SAG is that it doesn't have organic air with look down capability to detect incoming cruise missiles that extra 150km further out.

When you add in the fact that an effective ASW screen really needs a combination of 3 discreet assets to effectively hound and prosecute, it leaves the BB looking a little vulnerable. In a peace time disposition, that would mean a third of the effective skimmer force is riding shotgun for subs - and no real effective organic air to watch out as a CAP.

Be that as it may, I have a soft spot for the US BB's, classic clipper design, nicely balanced. Anything that can throw a shell that weighs as much as a Volkswagen gets my attention. ;)

NGFS is better served by PGM's though.

[EnigmaNZ]

Here is a site detailing the conversion.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/bb-61-av.htm

[EnigmaNZ]

Hmm, drooling at the thought of that book gf ;) I have a hanking for battleships as well.
Interesting site for those into Battleships, compare your favourite.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm
Ever wonder "what if" the plans for various warships that were cancelled by the end of the war would have been like.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/furashita/furamain.htm
Btw gf, love the new Aussie cruiser, saw it on this site :D
http://www.kitsune.addr.com/Rifts/Rifts-Earth-Vehicles/Australian_Devonshire_Missile_Cruiser.htm

[Pendekar]

can't they just rig the guns to fire an extended range guided munitions? a 155mm extended range artillery munitions can hit a target almost a hundred km away, imagine how far extended range 16 inch shell can go. besides that, there's plenty of room in the battleships so there's room to install additional weapons (SAMs, Cruise Missiles, ASM, Helos).I really hope in the future, i would see the revival of the Battleships bristling with mother guns.

I'm a fan of japanese battleship Yamato
.

[gf0012-aust]

Btw gf, love the new Aussie cruiser, saw it on this site :D
http://www.kitsune.addr.com/Rifts/Rifts-Earth-Vehicles/Australian_Devonshire_Missile_Cruiser.htm

Yep, pity he left out some of the good stuff we have. eg:

Metalstorm CIWS
CEA Phased Array Radar package
Nulka
Hypersonic SAM

Considering the fact that 2 of them exist and are in use, and that the other two are in various staged of development but have working technology demonstraters - then I think he "detuned" the ship. ;)

[Aussie Digger]

I thought the range of those guns was a little bit short-legged myself. The Mk 45 Mod 4 5 inch gun that is to be used on the RAN's upcoming Air Warfare Destroyers will have an extended range guided munition that is rated as possessing a 100 nautical mile range (ie: 180k's)...

[highsea]

There is an ongoing debate over reactivating two of the BB's with extended range 16" shells. The first essay here outlines the postition of the USNFSA, and the second is a response from Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton. June 6, 2005

Battleships fit for duty

By Dennis Reilly

The 2006 National Defense Authorization Act would strike the battleships USS Iowa and Wisconsin from the Navy register and turn them into museums. This sounds attractive, but it would in fact erect monuments to folly, placing the lives of thousands of our Marines at risk. It would void the previous law, PL104-106, that instructed the Navy to keep two Iowa-class battleships readily available until the Navy certifies to Congress that it has fire-support capability that equals or exceeds that of the Iowa-class battleships. The Navy is unable to do this. Instead, it has taken steps detrimental to reactivation of these ships.

Why this reaction? Simply put, there has been a failure of strategic insight on the part of leadership. A July 2002 meeting between then Navy Secretary Gordon England -- now up for confirmation as deputy secretary of defense -- and the U.S. Naval Surface Fire Support Association focused on reactivating the battleships to provide the fire support that was then and is now missing. Mr. England stated that there was no need for that kind of firepower, as the only remaining threat was terrorism. When I brought up North Korea, China, Iran, and the impending war with Iraq, the Secretary replied: "We do not regard such scenarios as realistic." Iraq is now history. Fortunately we did not have to fight our way ashore.

The world, however, remains a dangerous place, and the threat of terrorism is still but one head on the hydra. While North Korea continues to churn out nuclear weapons, some 12,000 well-dug-in artillery tubes along the DMZ hold Seoul hostage with the threat of overnight obliteration. China's rapidly escalating military capabilities, alliances and thinly veiled threats are alarming. China clearly feels free to choose the time and means -- including force -- to resolve the Taiwan issue. How events will unfold in these places and in others, such as Iran, is anyone's guess. But one thing is sure. Should there be conflict in these areas, the Marines will be involved, and it will not be an antiterrorist action.

Based on its vision, the Navy has focused on the development of a destroyer, the DD(X), equipped with two long range guns. No doubt this would be useful in breaking up terrorist camps scattered about the Pacific littorals, but it is not the gun you would want to bring to a major conflict. The small mass delivered to target makes these rounds ineffective against hardened positions. The cost per round forces the Navy to admit that high-volume fire is unaffordable. Lacking armor, the ship is highly vulnerable, despite its low-radar cross section. The cost -- Congress demands a cap of $1.7 billion per ship -- is out of proportion to its usefulness.

What can a supposedly antiquated battleship bring to the fight? During the Vietnam War, the New Jersey was on station for 6 months. It wreaked havoc on the DMZ and in the North, including destruction of the deeply buried North Vietnamese Army (NVA) command headquarters. Had this ship been deployed throughout that war, a fair fraction of the 2,000 aviators killed, missing in action or captured as prisoners of war would have been spared. No statistic conveys the impact of the New Jersey's assault on the NVA better than the fact that North Vietnam demanded the withdrawal of the ship -- not the B-52s -- before it would continue with the Paris peace talks.

Technology now allows battleships to do far better. GPS guidance will ensure one-shot, one-kill of hard targets such as the North Korean gun emplacements and Chinese missile batteries. Shells weighing 525 pounds can reach as far as 115 miles in a life-saving time of only 3 minutes. Over the longer term, the battleship's potential is truly revolutionary. Studies show that its massive firepower could be projected to at least 460 miles. With enhanced firepower and the ability to steam between Inchon and the Formosan Straits in less than a day and a half, two modernized battleships would have a chilling deterrent effect on aggressive designs by either the Chinese or the North Koreans.

The Navy has misled Congress regarding the battleship's firepower, costs, survivability -- the Nevada survived two atom bombs -- and condition of equipment. The reality is that these ships could meet Marine Corps fire-support requirements in the near future. Nothing else can. Cost effective? Each battleship, with a reactivation and modernization cost of only $1.5 billion, has firepower equivalent to two aircraft carriers using only one-eighththemanpower. Moreover, the battleships' response is all-weather, is generally faster and is impervious to air defenses.

As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously said, you go to war with the army you have. If in the future our brave Marines are getting butchered because of insufficient fire support, "the Army we have" then will be a result of the actions taken today. What should be done? Reactivate the battleships now. Would you rather have a museum or a live Marine?

Dennis Reilly, a physicist, serves as science advisor to the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association.

http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050605-105946-6398r.htm




This is Admiral Hamilton's response:


June 13, 2005

Building a new Navy

By Charles S. Hamilton

Passionate advocates of returning our Nation's two battleships to service maintain that these two ships could be brought back into service quickly, safely and economically to meet Marine Corps requirements for long-range, precise firepower ashore.

The battleships and the Sailors who manned them served our Nation with pride and distinction through some of the darkest days of the Republic. We must continue to honor that service and recognize their achievements, but we should not confuse our fondness for those ships with an assumption of their appropriateness for the task at hand.

If reactivated, the battleships would not be able to fire munitions "as far as 115 miles in a life-saving time of only three minutes." Such munitions just do not exist, nor could they be quickly developed, tested and fielded within the next few years. The current range of an unguided 16-inch round is only 20 nautical miles ? half the distance the Navy has fired the latest generations of smart rounds for our new naval guns. The notion that super long-range 16-inch gun rounds are within our grasp is illusory.

And given today's battlefields, particularly the densely populated urban jungles in which our Marines and Soldiers currently fight, it would be folly to assume that a battlefield commander would employ a high-yield "dumb" weapon at long ranges without the utmost confidence that it would not inflict massive collateral damage. Without that confidence, such a weapon would have dubious utility. Developing a hardened guidance and control system that could withstand the punishing muzzle energy of the 16-inch guns, if at all possible, would not be a simple or cheap two-to-three-year effort.

The Navy's solution is the next-generation destroyer, DD(X), with its two fully automated 155mm guns capable of firing 10 Global Positioning System-guided rounds per minute up to 83 nautical miles from an expandable 920-round magazine. To provide sustained fire for major combat operations, DD(X) can employ imaginative new feature called an unlimited magazine. Because of DD(X)'s design, with its two forward-mounted guns and expansive flight deck aft, the ship can simultaneously conduct fire missions while being resupplied. Pre-loaded pallets are brought aboard and quickly placed directly into the fully automated magazine, much like a clip is used to reload a semi-automatic handgun or rifle. At no point do sailors have to labor with loading or assembling the ammunition, which increases the firing rate, reloading time and safety to the crew.

DD(X) will use a devastating new tactic called "multiple simultaneously round impact" in which the ship fires six to eight rounds at different trajectories depending on the range of the target. Each round steers to precise aim points, landing in a particular pattern at the same time in a no-notice, lethal salvo that catches targets unaware and unprepared from the very first shot. Hostile forces will no longer be able to hunker down in bunkers or flee an area during the time it currently takes our spotters find the proper range, adjust their shots and fire for effect. DD(X) will deliver this powerful firepower at more than four times the range and with more than 20 times the accuracy of a battleship.

The Navy's current strategy will outfit its current world-class ships with the best weapons possible and develop a long-term solution, DD(X). This approach is designed to spread capability throughout the Fleet, rather than concentrate it in two ships that cannot be everywhere at once. Given the current resource-constrained wartime budget, spending the billions of dollars to reactivate the battleships, develop advanced munitions, and pay the very high costs to operate them would come at the expense of other vital programs.

The mighty ships of the Iowa Class served this nation well in the 20th century. It is now time to build the ships that will do so in the 21st.

Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton is the Navy's Program Executive Officer for Ships.

http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20050612-095954-8831r.htm




What I thought was most interesting was the "multiple simultaneously round impact" tactic. 8 x 155mm at once would be a serious hit to anyone unfortunate enough to be on the receiving end.

As much as I love the Iowa's, the cost of updating and reactivation, developing new rounds, etc, just doesn't seem to be in the cards.

[gf0012-aust]

What I thought was most interesting was the "multiple simultaneously round impact" tactic. 8 x 155mm at once would be a serious hit to anyone unfortunate enough to be on the receiving end.

That sounds like a variation on the "portable MIRV" concept. ;)


As much as I love the Iowa's, the cost of updating and reactivation, developing new rounds, etc, just doesn't seem to be in the cards.

I can't see it happening. Carlton Meyers has been running a little support group to reactivate them but I can't see it happening due to numbers of reasons.

1) Cost of crewing. Even if they went to COTs in the engine room, they still coundn't lower the manning levels to a point that is attractive. The USN is trying to revise manning opportunities to similar vessel ratios in the RAN (we typically have 20-30% less people on similar sized vessels) and are struggling.

2) Primary mission. Rounds on target from an unprotected position (cost efficiency reasons) If you can't deliver weight on target from a relatively autonomous position (ie standalone and without the need for CAP or a SAG support element), then you're rapidly hitting the cost inefficiency curve.

3) IIRC the tests they did showed that they got more weight on target en-masse with 8" shells than 16" shells (Lebanon). If an arsenal vessel response is needed, then VLS stacks in other vessels are more useful.

A Tico is more lethal than an Iowa. It can stand off, protect itself, have a 1/5th of the crew and still be able to support the fleet. The question is, (and lets just use manning levels as opposed to overall capability), do you want 5 x Tico's or ABII's or an Iowa? ;)

[Aussie Digger]

The multiple simultaneous round impact tactic is one that is also being used by Artillery forces around the world. Rapidly loaded SPG's in particular are capable of this type of fire, though probably not to the same effect that an automatic naval gun could manage.

You have to wonder about some American's. The US Marine Corps alone has more firepower than just about any other land force on Earth. It's already acquiring new capabilities such as XM777 155mm Howitzers, HIMARS artillery rocket systems, new 120mm towed and self propelled mortars, a vast range of new direct fire weapons, plus upgraded weapons for it's F/A-18 and AV-2B Harrier fleets (which by themselves they are one of the most powerful "air forces" on the planet) AND the F-35 JSF replacement program for those fleets and still they complain that they don't have enough firepower...

How much is "enough"? When the USMC combines with the US Navy's offensive firepower and the USAF's it has far greater firepower than any potential adversary force. Most land commanders would "kill" to have the fire support available to them that the USMC can muster. The USMC should concentrate more on the skill of it's soldiers, than it's firepower IMHO...