Proposed doctrine

[We7det_el_qetal]

The battlefield is composed of open desert mainly ( like most of the middle east ), the proposed doctrine is:

1- Using a layered air-defense, S-400 and S-300 for long range coverage, BUK-M2 for middle range engagements and TOR-M1 for point defense.

2- Instead of using the brigade as the lowest manouver component which is self supporting ( like BCT proposed by the pentagon ), i propose to use the reinforced company as the basic fighting unit, the ground forces role would change from that of engagement of enemy ground forces to ambushing his logistic convoies and acting as forward observers for guided artillery like the Krasnopol-M and SMERCH MLRS employing MOTIV-3M top attack munitions, and for ranges beyond 70 Km and up to 280 Km Iskander-E TBM could be used tipped with cluster heads containing MOTIV-3M munitions in the same fashion that was employed in 1969 by the USSR in the 9M21-OF missiles, thus the friendly ground forces would never actualy engage the enemy but attack his logistics and his ground combat elements would be engaged by artillery using UAV for observation and correction.

3- each company would deploy 1 PL-9D SAM system for protection supported with 6 IGLA systems for very SHORAD.

4- SOF would be used to penetrate deep behind enemy lines to provide intelligence on the where abouts of the enemies stageing areas, his supply depots, and his nodes of command, to be targeted by MRBM in the area of 1500 Km.

[Aussie Digger]

The term "doctrine" is perhaps not appropriate here. Perhaps you should consider the term "force structure" for this post. You have listed (again) a series of individual platforms, that you seem to like. Doctrine is a series of documents on how you plan to fight and contains strategic and tactical assessments, Legislative and regulatory authority for your defence forces and can be summed up like this:

"Military 'doctrine' is based on a comprehensive assessment of the status of the military-political situation; on a strategic forecast of its development; on a scientifically substantiated determination of current and future missions, objective requirements and real capabilities; and on conclusions from a systemic analysis of the content and nature of modern wars and armed conflicts and of the domestic and foreign experience of military organizational development and military art."

Force structure is designed from your doctrine, your economic realities (ie: funding levels) and the capabilities required to defend yourself and, yes, political realities.

Your force structure is decidely unbalanced. IMHO. 6 Igla SAM's and 1 PL-9D SAM to provide air defence for EACH company? That is simply ludicrous. no Country on Earth could afford that even if they bought nothing else!!! You view these weapon systems as omipotent and I can't understand why. Do you forget or were you ever aware of the expense of modern military hardware? Even Russian and Chinese equipment? The initial acquisition costs are enormous. The logistical support costs and acquiring sufficient warstock to make a weapon system (particularly the extremely advanced weapon systems you want for your force) useful is much much greater. You should spend some time at http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4568405.1092028767.QRcJX8Oa9 dUAABm2XOM&modele=jdc_34 some time and you'll see for yourself just how much military capability costs...

If your ground forces don't fight against your enemies ground forces what's going to protect your artillery assets? For one thing your total reliance on artillery to attack enemy forces will achieve only 2 things. 1, you WILL be subjected to massive counter battery fire, as the enemy will not have to use HIS artillery on YOUR ground forces. 2. your artillery will be destroyed or captured by enemy troops as artillery on it's own can never win a battle. It is a fire support capability. Not a predominant fighting capability. Infantry is the primary fighting element on ANY battlefield.

You don't seem to get that no, single land force capability is sufficient to win a batttle. Combined arms teams are the way to win in battle, not a massive preponderance of one particular capability. If you are obviously strong in any one area, any potential enemy will develop the capability to nullify or destroy that capability. Military commanders are not stupid, despite what you may think of them, and will certainly find a way around your "invincible" SAM shield and artillery strength...

Why do you think that no military has adopted such a structure. It is not because until now, everyone's intelligence has been lacking, it's because it wouldn't work!!!

[We7det_el_qetal]

I assure u buddy that i've created all the documents that could be called doctrine, but they're in hard copy format besides they're too long to present here on one go,

what i presented here is somewhat a very brief summary of what i have in mind

[We7det_el_qetal]

Actually i offered a combined force, but rather different than the common concept of such a force,
1- u have to know where my artillery is to engage it, obviously modern artillery systems offer very very little time for counter-battery work, my uncle is an officer in the rocket artillery corps of the egyptian armed forces :), and has first hand knowledge on both the M270 and SMERCH systems.

2- artillery will have escorts ofcourse, with the primary task of fighting a rear guard action in order to give the MLRS time to escape.

I opened that thread so people could offer suggestions for me on how to crack that defense so that i could learn from everybody's experience.

I'm looking for brain storming.

If i have time i'll offer a software copy of my detailed study of the fund requirements for such a force.

[ajay_ijn]

2- Instead of using the brigade as the lowest manouver component which is self supporting ( like BCT proposed by the pentagon ), i propose to use the reinforced company as the basic fighting unit, the ground forces role would change from that of engagement of enemy ground forces to ambushing his logistic convoies and acting as forward observers for guided artillery like the Krasnopol-M and SMERCH MLRS employing MOTIV-3M top attack munitions, and for ranges beyond 70 Km and up to 280 Km Iskander-E TBM could be used tipped with cluster heads containing MOTIV-3M munitions in the same fashion that was employed in 1969 by the USSR in the 9M21-OF missiles, thus the friendly ground forces would never actualy engage the enemy but attack his logistics and his ground combat elements would be engaged by artillery using UAV for observation and correction.
What about Main Battle Tanks,APC's,IFV,Mortars,HMG,Helicopters,ATGM.

As I said TBM's are not as cheap to be used for low-value targets.

Combined arms teams are the way to win in battle, not a massive preponderance of one particular capability
Exactly,
Infantry and other weapons systems like artillery,Tank,APC,IFV,Helicopter etc must support each other for victory on the battlefield.
Germans During ww2 used Tank-Soldier-Bomber Combination for the Sucess in the battlefield.
Just Imagine the Close Combinationn of Tank-Infantry,tanks will help when Infantry and Infantry will protect tanks against Enemy hand launched ATGM's.
In the Similar Way other Weapon Systems must also Support each other.


1- Using a layered air-defense, S-400 and S-300 for long range coverage, BUK-M2 for middle range engagements and TOR-M1 for point defense.

Again,your concept of single weapon System(SAM) for layered air-defence is not effective.
U need to also include air-defence Fighters,Early Warning Sensors,AWACS etc.


SOF would be used to penetrate deep behind enemy lines to provide intelligence on the where abouts of the enemies stageing areas, his supply depots, and his nodes of command, to be targeted by MRBM in the area of 1500 Km.

There are some Radar's which can even detect crawling men at range of 500m.

[We7det_el_qetal]

Is an armoured division considered low value target?

Is SMERCH a TBM?

there are two systems used in ground warfare, artillery and targets.

Please don't tell me that my air-defense is no good, give proposals to attack such a system.

There are means to do some very good reconaisance from 5-10 Km away such as small size UAV which could be expendable and deployed from jeeps.

[ajay_ijn]

Is an armoured division considered low value target?
For Ballistic Missiles,its a Low Value Target.
Even for Cruise Missiles,its a low Value Target.
Have u ever heard a tomahawk Hitting a tank or a tank division,its absolutely foolish.
Armored Division won't be packed into a single place as Such which can be targetted by TBM and to attack Tanks TBM's must have armor-penetrable Warheads which is completely a weird idea.

Is SMERCH a TBM?
No Smerch is MBRL(Multiple Barrel Rocket Launcher),replacement for traditional Artillery.It provides accurate heavy firepower at long ranges(90km).
MBRL's can also be used for Anti-Tank pruposes.


Please don't tell me that my air-defense is no good, give proposals to attack such a system.

Enemy can easily have Strategy to counter such Single weapon System.
B-2's armed with longrange Air-Launched Missiles will prove effective.

There are means to do some very good reconaisance from 5-10 Km away such as small size UAV which could be expendable and deployed from jeeps.
Even they can be detected and shoot down by SAM's.

[We7det_el_qetal]

Well actually one TBM could engage 54 ground targets which is way more expensive than one missile, and if the target formations are numerically less then they would be engaged by SMERCH :)

The US military is actually questioning the whole value of the B-2 program especially with the introduction of new radar systems such as Tamara and Kolchuga.

[We7det_el_qetal]

Target Counting and Classification
Algorithms for Unnattended
Ground Sensors

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002mines/hohil.pdf

if the mentioned techniques could be combined with on the alert units of MLRS armed with top attack munitions they would pose a serious threat to any armour on the battlefields of tomorrow.

[Gremlin29]

there are two systems used in ground warfare, artillery and targets.

This pearl of wisdom was somehow missed at war college. What size force would you require, and how many tons of munitions would your artillery expend neutraliziing two advancing reinforced armored division? Assume these divisions have organic aviation, artillery (MLRS and SP types).

[We7det_el_qetal]

Organic aviation will have to deal with integrated air defense systems, SMERCH MLRS while saturate the advancing columns with smart top attack munitions while they try to evade hundreds of ATGMs ( HJ-9 ) employed by SWARMING the advance columns with highly manouvrable jeeps engaging the tanks out of a range of 6 Km ,while foroward artillery observer drones are directing laser guided artillery shells from G6 SPA systems employing Krasnopol-M shells while TBM such as Iskander-E are engaging second echlons using cluster heads of 54 top attack munitions each.

[Gremlin29]

Okay, but the important question as I previously posted is:

What size force would you require, and how many tons of munitions would your artillery expend neutralizing two advancing reinforced armored divisions? Assume these divisions have organic aviation, artillery (MLRS and SP types).

Next question is, how many Jeeps with ATGM's do you think you will need to destroy an armored division?

My rotorcraft don't have a viable ADA threat from your proposed system if they are operating at terrain flight altitudes so your Jeeps will be toast before they fire a shot in anger.

What stops my aviation brigades from performing 1 gun raids on your MLRS? The 1 gun raid is immune to counter battery fire.

[Aussie Digger]

I also think your history may be a little lacking. Mass ATGW attacks on armour has already been tried by Egypt against Israeli armour in the Sinai. Whilst they were initially effective and scored some success in destroying the Israeli advance, the Israeli's soon adapted, formed combined arms teams and simpyl steam rolled the Egyptian forces.

Don't try and argue that todays ATGW's will be much more effective, either. Cause you''ll be conviently forgetting that modern armour is equally greater in capability.

Plus, why would you choose the HJ-9 ATGW, when Egypt already operates the effective and battle proven TOW missile systems? In addition why would you want to operate this system from "jeeps"? Such vehicles possess basically no capability to withstand substantial fire of any sort (unless you start armouring them, and then you suffer other problems). In addition, despite your hypothetical country being desert and totally flat, "jeeps" possess far less tactical maneuverability than a tracked vehicle. Their off-road performance is greatly inferior. Why not then at least mount them on IFV's? Which will give your crews at least some protection, should your "impenetrable" SAM's and artillery forces be caught a bit short...

[We7det_el_qetal]

Actually the only time massed artillery was used against armour was in 2nd world war by the russians and it wasn't broken since :).

jeeps are cheap IFVs aren't.

and 40 TELs for Iskander-E, 600 G6 systems and 90 SMERCH vheicles should be just fine.

ATGMs are used to stop the armour from steam rolling through open terrain , they are not used to destroy tanks, and any army that thinks otherwise is GRAVELY mistaken :).

As for ATGM platforms, 2400 jeeps, 600 9P157-2 should do nicely.

I chose HJ-9 coz of range and power.

TOW was proven against T-72s :)

and as for off-road performance I intend to field some squadrons of armoured desert buggies employing similar technology to the monster trucks but adapted to big APC 6x6 chasis, they would employ erectable elevating towers like the swedes devised for their TOW vehicles and would use the mokopa or hermis systems.

[Aussie Digger]

"Jeeps" might be relatively cheap. Men's lives, particularly trained soldiers AREN'T... So you think the threat of ATGW's is sufficient to stop armour do you? Given that ATGM are "not used to destroy tanks? Maybe the US/UK/French etc armoured forces didn't think the Iraqi's had ATGW's in GW1 eh? Cause the "threat" of ATGW's certainly didn't stop the US/UK armoured forces advance in GW 1&2, neither did the use of such weapons. The threat AND use of ATGW's couldn't stop the Israeli's in the Sinai either...

So ATGW's are not actually used to destroy tanks eh? That's a novel idea. What are they used for parades? If you think that ATGW's AREN'T used for destroying tanks, than YOU are gravely mistaken my friend and further discussion of military topics is pointless...

[We7det_el_qetal]

The iraqi's used Malutkas an antique from the 60s, I would welcome ANY MBT u have in mind any day of the week against HJ-9, Khrizantema and Mokopa.

And I wouldn't be risking my men's lives, as they would fire an initial concentrated salvo to stop the armour then run as the artiillery would unleash hell on the advancing columns.

ATGMs aren't the main tank killer as any body could tell u, they are basically used to limit the manuvrability of the opponnent so that smart munitions could engage and destroy the targets successfully, they sure as hell could kill but their tactical employment isn't that, the egyptians tried using mass curtains of ATGMs but it failed coz they didn't have the deep strike capability to use the advantages offered by stopping the enemy's advancing armour, so they learned a good lesson.

systems as SMERCH and Iskander-E offer deep strike capability at a very cheap price compared to developing that ability using air assets.

[Gremlin29]

I could counter your entire force with 2 tactical nukes.

[Pathfinder-X]

Or using conventional means, I'd use a combine arms force consisting of modern MBTs, IFVs and a few SP howitzers. Also new active defence systems mounted on MBTs such as Arena 2 and CRAD will greatly diminsh the effectiveness of ATGMs.

From my experience as a grunt, spotting a target using the optics on a TOW missile beyond 2000 meters is extremely difficult, not to mention guiding the missile to it. Main battle tanks, however, could easily wipe out your ATGM's using HEAT-FRAG rounds at that range. Any commander with half a brain wouldn't use infantry equipped with ATGM to counter frontal enemy armour assault.

And since your "combine" force does not contain any sort of air support, your enemy could fire long range anti-radiation missiles to render your SAM's radar useless. Once most of your SAMs are rendered inoperational, CAS aircraft would be called in to finish off the rest of remaining force.

[ajay_ijn]

Or using conventional means, I'd use a combine arms force consisting of modern MBTs, IFVs and a few SP howitzers. Also new active defence systems mounted on MBTs such as Arena 2 and CRAD will greatly diminsh the effectiveness of ATGMs.

In addition to that MBRL,Attack Helicopters,APC,Helicopter Transportable IFV etc.
Espscially I like Infantry-MBT-Attack helicopter combined force.
Mobility and speed must also be given importance.

[Aussie Digger]

We7, the Iraqi's also had RPG and Milan ATGW's in GW 1 and Kornet E ATGW missiles in GW 2. None of these advanced weapons had much effect on US, UK, or French armour for that matter. 1 or 2 tanks here and there were destroyed or damaged, but overall the presence of anti-armour missiles in these battles achieved very little. Iraq ALSO had G6 SPG's and Russian artillery rocket systems. None of these achieved much...

Gremlin, if I were a tactical commander facing We7's force, I wouldn't worry about the tactical nukes, you wouldn't need them!!! His planned force structure possesses almost no tactical maneuverability whatsoever, his light, predominantly "jeep" mounted forces will possess practically no offensive capability (even in a tactical sense) whatsoever given their inability to withstand fire and thus will be limited to low intensity "peace keeping" missions.

He does not take into consideration, in any fashion the fact that his enemies will ALSO possess weapons with the type of capabilities he talks about. He is convinced that S-300/S-400 SAM's and MLRS type artillery are "invincible" and cannot be eliminated, out- manuevered or out-matched. He is also overly convinced of the usefulness of Tactical ballistic missiles.

He considers also considers them to be invincible and is convinced that an army that soley concentrates it's capability on such a weapon will also be invincible. If you point out that if this is true, then why hasn't some Country already done this, his reply will be that (unlike him) "no-one else is capable of thinking outside the square"... This is exactly what he said to me a bit earlier in his discussions and the reason I'm starting to think he might be a bit of a troll...

[Aussie Digger]

We7, are you aware of the cost of your Iskander-E missiles? About US$5 million a pop, for the missile alone. Your support costs are much greater. this is about the same price as a brand spanking new Western MBT, such as the M1A2 or Challenger 2. Both these platforms will give greater value for money however as they can and are used for many many years. Your Iskander-E missiles can be used once only.

Any sort of drawn out conflict and your only offensive weapon system will be depleted. No nation and certainly not even the USA can afford unlimited stocks of precision guided weapons. The US fired approx 300 Tomahawks in GW2 and this almost completely depleted their stocks of this weapon system. (Which BTW is valued at about $2 million per pop.) Your hypothetical Country will not be able to afford anywhere near the warstock that the USA possesses...

If you wish to find out the reality of this situation and see the costs involved, have a look at this forum.

http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?p=36864#post36864

Syria is attempting to purchase just 18 of these missiles (which btw Russia has never exported to ANYONE) and together with an S-300 and TOR-M1 SAM package is expected to cost US$2 Billion. Your talk of hundreds of similar SAM batteries is simply ludicrous. No nation on earth could afford it no matter how you structure your forces and what capabilities you'd do without...

[We7det_el_qetal]

Kornet E use in GW2 are just claims by the US with no material proof :).

Well as for the G6 part i'll look into it myself.

to Aussie please define offensive capability, coz the way i understand it, it's the ability to destroy an opponents assets to wage war, if u mean a different definition then please share it with me.

and please i want solid steps instead of saying it won't work.

ur the comander of a joint task force what's ur plan?

[We7det_el_qetal]

ONE Iskander-E deploys 54 top attack munitions !

[We7det_el_qetal]

80 missiles cost about 400 million $ add 400 million $ ( let's say each TEL costs 5 million $) that means the total is 800 million us$, Egypt deploys 800 M1A1 tanks at 3.5 million each which is about 2.8 billion us$, so the main question is this:

Is 229 M1A1 better or is 4320 top attack munitions with means to drop them 280 Km away.

U basicly say it's the M1s I say it's the munitions.

that's the question.

[ajay_ijn]

to Aussie please define offensive capability, coz the way i understand it, it's the ability to destroy an opponents assets to wage war, if u mean a different definition then please share it with me.


We7,U must specify,at which level u are discussing,
U are only discussing about army doctrine,then what about Air-power and Navy.
Are u considering WMD'd into the discussion or just Coventional War?
U are only considering Some weapon Systems (SAM,MBRL,TBM) thats all,With that can u Win the war??
Just find out the definition of Military doctrine.
http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/groupgst/en/home/planung/milit.html

Definition of the term military doctrine
Fundamental principles according to which the armed forces or parts thereof accomplish their tasks to achieve the national objectives. These principles are binding, but require circumspect evaluation for practical implementation.
Aim and purpose
Military doctrine is derived from the security policy objectives and the political-strategic, economic, social and technological environment. Military doctrine defines a common view on the principles according to which the armed forces are successfully engaged, and thus enables uniform but nevertheless flexible leadership at all levels. Such doctrine must be sufficiently flexible and adapted to international standards so that room is left for future developments and cooperations with partners where autonomous approaches are insufficient

Here it is clearly specified that,they are the principles according to which armed forces peform.
U also did not specify the Objectives of the Country.
Why do u want to have the armed forces??
With whom u have conflicts??
With what strategy u will fight a war??
Whats Your enemy status and Intentions??
How are your foreign relations??
and many more questions to be answered like these.
For exmaple i will give the link of Russian Military Doctrine.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/991009-draft-doctrine.htm
But till now we were discussing only about the ORBAT and the general tactics used by Army.

[We7det_el_qetal]

I'll settle issues about doctrine one at a time now i'm discussing the feasability of such a proposed force structure then i'll start to answer the problems of navy and air-power, don't worry i'll answer all ur questions, i haven't forgotten or ignored any, i'll just answer them in time.

as for the feasability of the air defense system, Egypt operates 220 F-16C fighters with a unit cost of 34 million us$ each which gives a total of 7.546 billion us $, i think that answers much of the questions about air defense feasability when u know that a battalion of S-300PMU2 costs around 120 million us$.

[We7det_el_qetal]

as for aircraft carriers it all boils down to air-power really, so beat air-power and cruise capability and the land battle will deteriorate into a battle of attrition and u got urself a very interesting idea indeed.

[Aussie Digger]

Yes, but that doesn't mean that 1 Iskander-E WILL destroy 54 targets!!! If I were a commander facing your forces, given your lack of balanced capability, I would simply disperse my forces and conduct probing attacks on your positions. Your lack of any real offensive combat power, means that I would be able to force your only offensive assets (your artillery, including the TBM's) to tactically withdraw in order to protect itself.

My forces would not be at serious risk because your forces are so light, and lack serious maneurverability. In addition your force structure has some very serious force protection issues. Force protection means your ability to protect critical assets from attack.

Offensive capability refers to your capabilities to "take the fight to the enemy", at the Strategic, operational and tactical levels. You possess no strategic firepower capabilities as these are only provided by aircraft, Naval vessles or to a lesser extent ICBM's. Your ability to attack an enemy at extended ranges is very limited. Even 400ks is next to nothing compared to the range of a strike aircraft. Other Countries possess strike aircraft, TBM's and missiles launched from naval vessels to provide a strategic strike capability.

Your operational level of firepower is limited to your Iskandier-E TBM's only. Other Countries capabilities, include strike aircraft, attack helo's, TBM's and Naval strike capabilities. The TBM is the only weapon system you have that has the capability to reach basically anywhere in the battlefield. This severely limits your ability to pour offensive fires on the enemy, from a safe distance as your only other options will require you to simply wait until the enemy gets within range.

You will then be in the situation of having to respond to attacks that have already commenced due to the fact that an enemy with a reasonably modern force will have already commenced it's attacks, due to it's complementary forces and assets that are capable of more than one type of task, such as attack helo's, strike aircraft etc. The enemies "silver bullets" will be tasked with attacking your SAM network, as once a few nodes are taken out, his strike aircraft will have a field day over your territory.

Your tactical firepower is significant but also has numerous problems in my estimation. 1, You lack significant ISR assets. You have no AWACS or even AEW aircraft, let alone a J-STARS type aircraft to control a land battle. 2. You operate UAV's you say, but what's going to protect these assets? You will have no capability to possess the air superiority needed (even if it's only temporary) to protect these assets and allow them to do their job. NATO had as near total air superiority over Bosnia as you'd ever get and still a lot of their UAV's were shot down. If you had no way to protect these assets they would all be shot down before they could be of real use.

Your other recon assets are not mentioned, (other than a brief mention of unattended ground sensors), but these too face significant problems. UGS's rely on sending a radio signal to your forces and providing intell on what they detect via this link. Any decent EW/Intell capability should be able to nullify this capability. They are a long range system but they don't last forever (most last about 1 month at most) and you can only use them on your own territory. Once you're under attack, they can't be moved. Recon capabilities that you seem to lack include ground surveillance radars, night vision/thermal imagers, dedicated recon forces including armoured and dismounted recon forces. A manned tactical air recon capability, recon/attack helo's etc. Specwarries are useful in long range recon, (indeed this is their main wartime role) but a decent specwarrie force is by definition limited. It can only ever be a fraction of a total force and can't be used for everything. If they are your only ability to provide targetting data for your TBM's, they can't be providing a recon capability or a strike capability as they will be stretched too thin...

3. You're going to rely upon your artillery strength to defeat any attacks, but not support these with a battlegroup to take the fight to your enemies battlegroup? Your artillery is to be protected by light infantry mounted in jeeps and perhaps a few APC'S, but not IFV's? Neither APC's or "jeeps" possess any real close combat capability. In order to assault a defensive position your forces need to be able to get to the position. Artillery can help blunt an attack, but your enemy will also possess artillery and will no doubt actively target your 2 main capabilities (Artillery and SAM network) in the opening hours of any campaign, leaving you in the situation of only having light forces to defend your territory, should you be unable to sufficiently protect your artillery...

If you are being attacked concurrently by land, air and Naval forces I think your force structure will prove extremely deficient. Your hope is based on the strength of individual capabilites, not on options available to you should these capabilities not prove as overwhelming as you'd like... Any likely enemy will no doubt study the options available to them (there are ALWAYS various options on the battlefield) and no-one has EVER designed a military capability that can't be defeated in some way...

[Aussie Digger]

I'd be happy to compare the usefulness of a TBM to an M1A1. For starters a TBM can only be used once. If your force of 80 missiles is all you have at the start of a campaign then that's what you have to fight with for the entire campaign. 800 M1A1's will be spread amongst numerous armoured regiments and numerous battlegroups can be formed around these vehicles.

In the Australian army a single tank squadron is formed by 3 troops of 8 tanks, plus a Tank for the Squadron commander, a tank for the Squadron 2IC and a tank for the Squadron Sergeant Major (SSM). 27 tanks in all. The sole Australian Armoured Regiment is currently based on 2 such squadrons which form individual battlegroups at the tactical level when combined with a mechanised infantry battalion, a supporting Artillery battery, a supporting Armoured Reconnaissance (Cavalry) Squadron and other supporting assets including Combat Engineers, Signal/EW elements and other supporting assets (resupply units, medical/dental units, transport units etc).

With 800 M1A1's, plus relevent numbers of other elements, (infantry, artillery, cavalry plus support elements) you could form around 30 battlegroups such as the one I've described above... 3 such battlegroups will give an approximate Brigade strength, and in armoured warfare the battlegroup is the smallest formation usually used. 10 brigades gives you an enormous capability to defend a large area of ground whilst simultaneously giving you a massive close combat capability. Are you honestly going to state that 80 missiles will give your forces more capability and more flexibility than 10 armoured brigades?


In addition, you cannot ensure resupply during a campaign, particularly with no airforce or navy to speak of. (Just look at Argentina during the Falklands Campaign). No other Country is going to use THEIR assets to resupply YOU. Any such act would be considered hostile by YOUR enemy and THEIR assets would be engaged. With no ability to restock your supply of missiles,therefore you would be foolish indeed to waste such a precious resource on a mere tank or even a squadron of tanks.

Also the theoretical capability to destroy 4320 doesn't mean you actually can destroy this many targets in reality. A single US M26 MLRS rocket carries 644 tactical submunitions. An M270 MLRS Vehicle launcher carries 12 rockets and the US Army operates 6 M270 vehicles per battery (I believe). By my calculations (and according to your logic) this means that 1 single salvo from a single US MLRS battery can destroy 46368 targets!!!

Get your calculator out and you'll see what I mean... Unfortunately this is also a bit ridiculous. 46368 targets were NOT destroyed by every MLRS salvo in Iraq. What happen's is that 99% of the munitions will simply impact on the ground and hit nothing... If your enemy is aware of your tactical submunitions capability, he will alter his tactics and movements to suit as much as he can. You will no doubt damage or destroy some of his forces, but you will never get them all, and you could well deplete a very valuable resource that could be profitably employed elsewhere by doing so...

[Aussie Digger]

AS for the F-16 v S-300 argument, an F-16 is also capable of strike (both maritime and land), tactical reconnaisance, air defence (at every practical range and altitude), air defence AND strike on the same mission, air and battlefield interdiction, close air support, SEAD and DEAD missions and any other number of useful tasks.

No surface to air missile can be used for anything other than engaging 1 target at one time. An F-16 can provide air defence at ranges not even comparable to SAM system and a SAM system can only react to an attack, it cannot pre-emptively attack a potential enemy.

Yes an F-16 fleet costs significantly more than any SAM system, but it provides so many more options that it is not even worth comparing the 2 systems. The systems are complementary, not mutually exclusive. Real world experience too, shows that Countries inevitably opt for a fighter aircraft based air defence system prior to a SAM system. Why do you suppose that might be? Something to do with the fact that you can attack you enemies before they get close enough to attack you perhaps? Which afterall provides a greater level of defence than even the best SAM system?

[We7det_el_qetal]

Now ur talking buddy.

1-"Yes, but that doesn't mean that 1 Iskander-E WILL destroy 54 targets!!!" ofcourse it doesn't , but if it's a 50-50 affair then the attacker would have lost 2160 vheicles attributed to the Iskander alone.

2-"If I were a commander facing your forces, given your lack of balanced capability, I would simply disperse my forces and conduct probing attacks on your positions. Your lack of any real offensive combat power" dispersing ur forces is the whole objective of me deploying such fearsome artillery , then ur firepower would be distributed among smaller elements, and probing attacks means i don't know where are the whereabouts of ur forces which can reasonably be aquired using a mix of UAV, ground surveillance radars, battlefield accustic, thermal and electro-optical sensors, and reccon patrols by jeeps, possesing no tanks doesn't mean i possess no offensive capability, I would engage any target I want on the battlefield with HJ-9 out to 6 Km if it's further than that, then by laser guided artillery, still further then by SMERCH, still further then by TBM, for tanks to attack a given target they have to be within 4 Km of that target.

3-"Your lack of any real offensive combat power, means that I would be able to force your only offensive assets (your artillery, including the TBM's) to tactically withdraw in order to protect itself." and how exactly will ur offensive assets pass through to my artillery without being out flanked by faster manouvering jeeps employing ATGMs to their flanks while bringing rains of guided munitions either in strength ( TBM ) or in concentrated salvos ( G6 Krasnopol-M combination ).

4-"because your forces are so light, and lack serious maneurverability" and how does being LIGHT limit ur MANUVRABILITY !.

5-"In addition your force structure has some very serious force protection issues. Force protection means your ability to protect critical assets from attack."

WHICH of my critical assets are prone to WHAT kind of attack?

6-"Offensive capability refers to your capabilities to "take the fight to the enemy", at the Strategic, operational and tactical levels. You possess no strategic firepower capabilities as these are only provided by aircraft, Naval vessles or to a lesser extent ICBM's."

Well let's say I have other views of strategic ability along the lines of asymmetric warfare, which is actually not my specialty as my younger brother is the one concerned with the strategic side, I'm tactical, battlefield within my country and neghibouring countries that's me.

7-"Your operational level of firepower is limited to your Iskandier-E TBM's only. Other Countries capabilities, include strike aircraft, attack helo's, TBM's and Naval strike capabilities. The TBM is the only weapon system you have that has the capability to reach basically anywhere in the battlefield. This severely limits your ability to pour offensive fires on the enemy, from a safe distance as your only other options will require you to simply wait until the enemy gets within range. "

I know of no aircraft which can strike out of the covering range of an S-400 , cruise missiles are highly prone to radar guided AAA and SHORAD systems placed on it's mission's pass or at it's terminal target, ballistic missiles with all their types and B-2s are the only real challenge to S-400, Naval strike capabilities will have to deal with Brahmos and Yakhont missiles unless they employ aircraft ( S-400 ) or cruise missiles ( SHORADs and RADAR guided AAA ),

8-"You will then be in the situation of having to respond to attacks that have already commenced due to the fact that an enemy with a reasonably modern force will have already commenced it's attacks, due to it's complementary forces and assets that are capable of more than one type of task, such as attack helo's, strike aircraft etc. The enemies "silver bullets" will be tasked with attacking your SAM network, as once a few nodes are taken out, his strike aircraft will have a field day over your territory."

Why should i respond? , as soon as i feel hostile intentions on the political level, then welcome asymmetric warfare, welcome MRBM such as shehab-3, welcome deep strike raids by SOFs, ( How do u protect ur airfields against MRBM in the 1,300 Km range employing 600 Kg cluster warheads? ), and even IF ( which is highly unlikely ) my long range and medium range SAMs are taken out, that guy would still have to deal TOR-M1 and Tunguska together with Super-Igla and PL-9D systems, so if we were to have an interview with one of the NATO pilots who flew over Kosovo what would be his opinion on having to go against such systems in strength, if we were to have an interview with an airforce commander what would be his views on the effectiveness of air power as a tool once it has to fly over the attack envelope of such defenses.

9-"Your tactical firepower is significant but also has numerous problems in my estimation. 1, You lack significant ISR assets. You have no AWACS or even AEW aircraft, let alone a J-STARS type aircraft to control a land battle. 2. You operate UAV's you say, but what's going to protect these assets? You will have no capability to possess the air superiority needed (even if it's only temporary) to protect these assets and allow them to do their job. NATO had as near total air superiority over Bosnia as you'd ever get and still a lot of their UAV's were shot down. If you had no way to protect these assets they would all be shot down before they could be of real use."

UAVs are expendable, UAVs were no use to NATO in Kosovo coz they wanted to use their air assets alone with out real ground power , but to me shooting down my UAVs is my ultimate goal coz it provides me with the knowledge that an enemy force is in that area and will be engaged by my ground elements.

10-"Your other recon assets are not mentioned, (other than a brief mention of unattended ground sensors), but these too face significant problems. UGS's rely on sending a radio signal to your forces and providing intell on what they detect via this link. Any decent EW/Intell capability should be able to nullify this capability."

Well, ever heared of spread-spectrum communication, or to cut things quite short, fibre-optic link.

11-"They are a long range system but they don't last forever (most last about 1 month at most) and you can only use them on your own territory. Once you're under attack, they can't be moved. Recon capabilities that you seem to lack include ground surveillance radars, night vision/thermal imagers, dedicated recon forces including armoured and dismounted recon forces. A manned tactical air recon capability, recon/attack helo's etc. Specwarries are useful in long range recon, (indeed this is their main wartime role) but a decent specwarrie force is by definition limited. It can only ever be a fraction of a total force and can't be used for everything. If they are your only ability to provide targetting data for your TBM's, they can't be providing a recon capability or a strike capability as they will be stretched too thin..."

this point have been answered in point 2.

12-"You're going to rely upon your artillery strength to defeat any attacks, but not support these with a battlegroup to take the fight to your enemies battlegroup?"

Why do u need a battle group when u can neutralize ur enemy from a stand-off distance?

13-"Your artillery is to be protected by light infantry mounted in jeeps and perhaps a few APC'S, but not IFV's? Neither APC's or "jeeps" possess any real close combat capability."

Why do i need a close combat capability? u need to get close to use ur abilities which u didn't tell me how u plan to do that, without me knowing it and getting my fearsome firepower to bear on u.

14-" In order to assault a defensive position your forces need to be able to get to the position. "

u need time to turn flat ground into a well dug defensive position, who is going to give u that time?

15-" Artillery can help blunt an attack, but your enemy will also possess artillery and will no doubt actively target your 2 main capabilities (Artillery and SAM network) in the opening hours of any campaign, leaving you in the situation of only having light forces to defend your territory, should you be unable to sufficiently protect your artillery..."

exactly how will his artillery target my artillery?, artillery doing counter battery work died since they put self propeled artillery on wheeled chasis, the longest artillery fire mission takes 30 secs, then u drive the hell away at top speed away from here.

16-"If you are being attacked concurrently by land, air and Naval forces I think your force structure will prove extremely deficient."

Well there's only one way to find out, do a high fidelty simulation on a respected simulation kit and that gives u an idea.

17-"Your hope is based on the strength of individual capabilites, not on options available to you should these capabilities not prove as overwhelming as you'd like... "

Well let's say that the whole skirmish in the open desert is act one, before the real fun begins , so if u can crush my force structure then well done but that's the easiest part to do in many many more to come.

""""Any likely enemy will no doubt study the options available to them (there are ALWAYS various options on the battlefield) and no-one has EVER designed a military capability that can't be defeated in some way..."""

YES... ur absolutely right, the enemy has eyes that don't sleep considering ALL available options and NO ARMY is invincible.




3-"

[Aussie Digger]

I really don't think Counter battery fire is quite dead just yet, Mortar and Artillery locating radars will still track your artillery forces and give an approximate location. An MLRS salvo or even SPG's firing "cargo" rounds (basically submunitions instead of a unitary warhead) will still be a threat.

I presume you mean your comms will be a combined Radio/Fiber optic network? surely you don't mean your going to have a vast network of fibre optics layed all over you country and your forces are going to soley use fixed landlines? As shown in Iraq, fiber optics networks are easily taken out by SOF teams. A simple tap with a hammer and the line is busted. Throw in a couple of tricks such as a few booby traps here and there and your repairmen won't go anywhere near the fibre optic lines...

As I tried to tell you before, wheeled vehicles (of any sort) do not approach a tracked vehicle for it's ability to maneuver off-road. Tracked armoured vehicles can go basically anywhere off road, wheeled vehicles are far more restricted and have to pick their paths with more care. I never said they couldn't drive off-road, simply that they are not as capable as tracked vehicle when doing so. If the majority of your land force is jeep mounted, your tactical maneuver options are going to be extremely limted. A light force based in jeeps, will be mainly required to travel on roads (either sealed or unsealed) for the majority of the time, otherwise off road they simply won't get anywhere. In addition ATGW's mounted in jeeps are restricted in the number of weapons they can carry. Australian SASR troops in Iraq were only able to carry about 10 rounds for their Javelin ATGW's. An MBT normally carries 50 or so rounds for it's main gun, plus several thousand rounds for it's machine guns...

You also take no regard for my forces also possessing long range weapons. You think you're the only one who will have them. There won't be a war of attrition because my long range weapon teams will engage yours while my armour is advancing on your position. Your jeeps will not survive very long and my 30 odd battlegroups will more than likely smash straight through your ground forces, suffering only minor damage, just as they've done in every major War since WW2...

Battle is never a 50-50 affair. If I were an attacker, I would seek to neutralise any obvious capability that greatly exceeded my own, before I ever commenced any attack. This can be done in any number of ways, from damaging the TEL's and the missiles on the ground to attempting to shooting down the missile in flight. To destroying your comms and ensuring your crews never got the orders, or targetting data with which to fire. I would specifically acquire means to do this if I intended to attack you or anyone else. I am not a fool. Obviously the easiest way to do this would be to acquire my own long range standoff weapons (of a similar class) and combine these with strike aircraft and SOF attacks. This attack would be planned, rehearsed and refined any number of times until it had a good chance of succeding.

In addition your SAM network, specifically your S-300 and S-400 would be subjected to similar attacks. They might be capable, but I'd like to see them deal with standoff precision attack weapons, strike and SEAD aircraft, plus deep strike attack helo missions and SOF attacks simultaneously... Remember I don't need to destroy all your SAM's in one go, simply open up a safe corridor and allow my SEAD/EW and strike aircraft room to work...

This is exactly what was done to Iraq on both occasions. A systematic and sustained attack on the biggest threats (Iraqi airforce, long range SAM's and command, control and communications infrastructure) ensured that eventually, the threats were destroyed or nullified sufficiently to allow strike aircraft free range over the enemy territory and it's what Israel did to Syria and Egypt during Yom Kippur, despite being attacked first and caught by surprise...

Again with the PGM's. Laser guided artillery rounds cost about $60,000 per round. How many are you going to be able to fire before THAT starts getting a bit expensive, not to mention depleting your stocks? Despite what you see on CNN, PGM's make up a small component of most army's capabilities. No one can afford total dependance on PGM's not even the USA. In addition laser guided artillery shells, have almost no capability against a moving target. They are designed to attack pin point targets with high levels of precision.

Scoot and shoot tactics as you seem to prefer are not the way to fight an entire battle. They are a tactic designed to catch an enemy off guard. You cannot simply fire a round or 2 and keeping mvoing all day long, you will not be able to put a sufficient weight of fire on the enemy. US and UK artillery forces in Iraq, despite facing some of the artillery that you have chosen for your force (G6 SPG's) often engaged in fire and counter battery fire missions with the Iraq's and used extended gun lines to pummel the iraqi forces. This tactic might cause some losses during, but the risk is weighed up by the commander on the battlefield. War carries risks. Nothing can change this...

[We7det_el_qetal]

Well, to put an answer to these proposed tactics i'll prepare a detailed response and post it, as soon as it's finished.

[We7det_el_qetal]

1-"I really don't think Counter battery fire is quite dead just yet, Mortar and Artillery locating radars will still track your artillery forces and give an approximate location. An MLRS salvo or even SPG's firing "cargo" rounds (basically submunitions instead of a unitary warhead) will still be a threat. "

M270 has a range of approx. 31.8 km and M109 is 30 Km, SMERCH has a range of 70 Km, so the only way which has a very remote chance of success is the ATACMS, it's chances are REMOTE not because lack of range or firepower, but because the SMERCH has prior intelligence on it's intended targets through the recon system, but ATACMS doesn't have prior intellegince until the SMERCH actually shoots, then it has to prepare a fire mission then fire, the main advantage of defense is that u have the time to lay an extensive network of comm. and recon systems on ur land while the attacker is denied of such capability coz he has to deploy his recon assets under the watchful gaze of the defender.

2-"I presume you mean your comms will be a combined Radio/Fiber optic network? surely you don't mean your going to have a vast network of fibre optics layed all over you country and your forces are going to soley use fixed landlines? As shown in Iraq, fiber optics networks are easily taken out by SOF teams. A simple tap with a hammer and the line is busted. Throw in a couple of tricks such as a few booby traps here and there and your repairmen won't go anywhere near the fibre optic lines..."

C4I Modernization

PLA ground forces have long suffered from an inadequate communications infrastructure, characterized by outdated technology, limited capacity, and lack of secure communications. In the past, these weaknesses have severely limited the army's ability to transmit and process large amounts of information or coordinate activities between regions or units, thereby reducing military effectiveness. To overcome these deficits, the PLA has embarked on a well-financed effort to modernize its C4I infrastructure, resulting in a dramatic improvement of transmission capacity, as well as communications and operational security. For their part, the ground forces have contributed significant labor to the construction of this infrastructure, and many ground forces units serve as key nodes of the networks.

Open sources also reveal information about specific pieces of C4I infrastructure, most if not all of which would directly benefit the ground forces. A vague article from Xinhua describes the PLA communications system as comprising underground networks of fiber optic cables, communications satellites, microwave links, shortwave radio stations, and automated command and control networks.A series of articles in Liberation Army Daily between 1995 and 1997 is more specific, describing the C4I system as being composed of at least four major networks: a military telephone network, a confidential telephone network (alternatively described as "encrypted"), an all-army data communications network (also known as the all-army data exchange network or all-army public exchange network), and a "comprehensive communication system for field operations."A third account merges the two accounts, arguing that the PLA underground networks of optical fiber cables, communications satellites in the sky, and microwave and shortwave communications facilities in between form the infrastructure for a military telephone network, a secure telephone network, an all-army data communications network, and the integrated field communications network. Specific details about three of the four networks are scarce. A 1995 article in Liberation Army Daily asserts that the army data network, which was begun in 1987, "is responsible for the all-army automatic transmission and exchange of military information in data, pictures, charts, and writing." The PLA signal corps has trained over 1,000 technicians so far, it is claimed, to operate and maintain this system, which covers "all units stationed in medium and large cities across China and along the coast."

One important development for the PLA communications infrastructure has been the laying of fiber optic lines. From an information security perspective, the advantages of fiber optic cables are that they can carry considerably more communications traffic than older technologies, transmit it faster (rates of 565 megabytes per second and higher), are less prone to corrosion and electromagnetic interference, and are lightweight and small enough for mobile battlefield command as well as fixed military headquarters, while at the same time offering much higher levels of operational security. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal highlights many of the difficulties that fiber cables pose for the National Security Agency global signals intelligence effort. Indeed, in the 1980s, some U.S. Government agencies were opposed to the sale of fiber optic technologies to the Soviet Union and other countries, including China, for this very reason.

PLA interest in fiber optic cables began in 1993, when the former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and the General Staff Department Communications Department agreed to cooperate in constructing 100,000 kilometers of fiber optic cable to form the core of China's long-distance, fiber optic transmission networks and trunk lines. By 1995, the two organizations had jointly constructed 15,000 kilometers of fiber, spanning 19 provinces and municipalities. From 1993 to 1998, more than 1 million officers and men, mainly from the ground forces, worked on these key national optical fiber telecommunications lines. In 1999, an official source asserted that the PLA and PAP participated in the construction of more than 10 large optical fiber communication projects. The military reportedly receives a percentage of the fibers in any given trunk for its own use, making disaggregation of military and civilian communications much more difficult, and the army units stationed along the lines have connected themselves to the backbone.

In terms of specific civilian backbone networks, table 6-1 is a partial list of PLA participation in military-civilian fiber optic cable construction.

In addition, the PLA is building its own set of dedicated fiber optic lines, under a program known as the 975 Communications Trunk Line Project.These networks reportedly connect the central military leadership in Beijing with ground force units down to the garrison level.

As a result of the efforts outlined above, PLA C4I capabilities have reportedly increased substantially. According to a 1997 article, more than 85 percent of key armed force units and more than 65 percent of coastal and border units had upgraded their communications equipment. The same article also offered an early assessment of the operational consequences of these changes:

The use of advanced optical fiber communications facilities, satellites, long-distance automated switches, and computer-controlled telephone systems has significantly accelerated the Chinese armed forces' digitization process and the rapid transmission and processing of military information. The speedy development of strategic communications networks has shortened the distance between command headquarters and grass-roots units, and between inland areas and border and coastal areas. Currently the armed forces' networks for data exchange have already linked up units garrisoned in all medium-sized and large cities in the country as well as in border and coastal areas. As a result of the automated exchange and transmission of data, graphics and pictures within the armed forces, military information can now be shared by all military units.

The available open sources consistently forecast continuity in PLA C4I modernization. In other words, the PLA will continue to build an infrastructure that is increasingly digitized, automated, encrypted, faster, more secure, and broadband.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/China/illus/08_table_6-1.jpg (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/China/illus/08_table_6-1a.jpg)

source : http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/China/10_ch06.htm

[We7det_el_qetal]

3-"As I tried to tell you before, wheeled vehicles (of any sort) do not approach a tracked vehicle for it's ability to maneuver off-road. Tracked armoured vehicles can go basically anywhere off road, wheeled vehicles are far more restricted and have to pick their paths with more care. I never said they couldn't drive off-road, simply that they are not as capable as tracked vehicle when doing so. If the majority of your land force is jeep mounted, your tactical maneuver options are going to be extremely limted. A light force based in jeeps, will be mainly required to travel on roads (either sealed or unsealed) for the majority of the time, otherwise off road they simply won't get anywhere. In addition ATGW's mounted in jeeps are restricted in the number of weapons they can carry. Australian SASR troops in Iraq were only able to carry about 10 rounds for their Javelin ATGW's. An MBT normally carries 50 or so rounds for it's main gun, plus several thousand rounds for it's machine guns... "

I'll present a detailed concept of a 6x6 ( BIG ) APC using monster truck suspensions to increase cross country ability without sacrificing speed, and which will offer a formidable combined platform for SHORAD and anti-armour capability in one vehicle.

4-"You also take no regard for my forces also possessing long range weapons. "

If bylong range weapons u mean ATACMS then review point 1.

5-"There won't be a war of attrition because my long range weapon teams will engage yours while my armour is advancing on your position."

What positions? I'll be engaging u from 6 Km distance using HJ-9 on the move, even BVR using radar guidance then driving like crazy to my next ambush.

[We7det_el_qetal]

6-" Your jeeps will not survive very long and my 30 odd battlegroups will more than likely smash straight through your ground forces, suffering only minor damage, just as they've done in every major War since WW2..."

ADVANCED MUNITIONS

"The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity." Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War,1838.

The bomber's range and payload make it an excellent strike platform, but it is technological innovation which will make Air Force bombers so effective in halting armor. The innovation is Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW), a 1,000-pound, unpowered, multiple kill per pass "smart" munition designated CBU-97.14 Designed specifically for use against mobile hard (tanks and armored personnel carriers) and soft targets (trucks, mobile missile launchers), CBU-97 is many times more effective against mobile hard targets than previous area weapons. A RAND study estimates the effectiveness of CBU-97 at 3.6 vehicles destroyed per munition (in road march formation), though this will vary based on the interval between vehicles.15 SFW effectiveness will be further improved by adding an active laser seeker, an improved warhead, and a greater target search range to the munition. The Air Force will have 1,172 CBU-97 in the inventory by FY98 and 3,264 by FY01; the full buy is 5,000, of which more than half will be the improved variant.16

The improved SFW munition will also be incorporated into standoff weapons such as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). The JSOW is an unpowered Global Positioning System (GPS) aided "glide bomb" that has a stand-off range of 40 miles.17 This weapon can be released well out of range of most surface-to-air threats and, using GPS information, guide itself to a pre-selected point where it will release the anti-armor submunitions over the armored column. Delivery of the anti-armor JSOW starts in FY01 for the Navy and FY03 for the USAF. Quantities will be limited, however. By FY05 the Navy will have 421 of a planned 1,200; the USAF 709 of a planned 3,000.18

Another weapon system that will enhance bomber survivability and flexibility is the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), an inertially guided tail kit that can be bolted to the CBU-97. WCMD allows weapons normally released from low altitudes to be dropped from up to 40,000 feet, beyond the range of the most numerous air defense weapons.19 The Air Force is planning to purchase 40,000 WCMD units; 734 will be delivered by FY00 and over 7,000 by FY03.20

GPS jamming, if employed, will have little effect on these weapons.21 SFW is an area munition; it does not need 10 meter accuracy. If the GPS signal is jammed, the inertial navigation backup in WCMD and JSOW are accurate enough to guide these weapons to their targets.

ASSAULT BREAKING

"...no matter what the central feature of the enemy's power may be--the point on which your efforts must converge--the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in any case will be a significant feature of the campaign."

Clausewitz, On War, 1984.

SFW destroys armor, but it is the number and payload capacity of delivery platforms which determines the number of munitions delivered. The Air Force currently has 95 B-1s, six B-2s and 95 B-52s; 22in FY01 the programmed force is 95 B-1s, 20 B-2s and 66 B-52s.23 With the assumptions and calculations listed in Appendix II, the Air Force can put 46 bombers per day over the target with CONUS-SWA-CONUS operations.24 Multiplying the SFW carry capacity by bomber type gives 1,256 CBU-97 dropped in a single day.25 With a 3.6 kill rate per CBU, over 4,400 vehicles, or the equivalent of two and one-half full divisions could be totally destroyed in a single 24 hr period!26 As an aggressor in a major regional contingency is expected to field eight to ten armored/mechanized divisions,27 asymmetric attacks on armor by bombers could destroy up to 22% of the attacking armored force per day.

Assuming a more reasonable kill rate of two vehicles per CBU-97 (dispersal and/or countermeasures) and the use of the stand-off anti-armor JSOW28on the older and more vulnerable B-52, 46 bombers would still be able to destroy over 2,000 vehicles, still an equivalent of over one division per day.29 Four to five days of such devastating attacks would reduce each division to less than 50% strength, destroying the morale, will and effectiveness of the advancing forces.30 Total annihilation of the armor columns, the operational center of gravity, is not necessary--the CINC's objective for this phase is to halt the advance.

source: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/mcgauvrn.html

Weapons and Sortie Effectiveness

For area weapons, munitions effectiveness devolves to estimating the

number of weapons that must be delivered against a column of

vehicles to achieve a desired level of damage. Once the average

spacing between armored vehicles is specified, damage expectancy

(DE) can be translated into the average number of armored vehicles

damaged or destroyed per weapon expended and per sortie.

Estimating the number of weapons required encompasses a wide

range of variables regarding the capabilities and limitations of the

weapons themselves, U.S. operational concepts for engaging targets

and delivering the weapons, and the enemy’s tactics and operations.

Regarding weapons, our focus is on the CBU-97/Sensor Fuzed

Weapon, which incorporates the Skeet submunition, a well-tested

but as yet not widely understood antiarmor weapon now in production

for the United States Air Force. Figure 4.5 illustrates key components

of the sensor fuzed weapon. When the dispenser released

from an aircraft reaches the appropriate altitude (a few hundred feet

above the ground), it opens and releases ten BLU-108 submunitions.

These are slowed by parachutes, and as they approach ground level,

a small rocket motor fires at the base of each munition, raising it up

and spinning it. Each of the BLU-108s then tosses four Skeets along

predetermined patterns. Collectively, these 40 Skeets cover an area

roughly 400 meters long by 200 meters wide while in flight. Each

Skeet seeks out infrared signatures characteristic of vehicles with

warm engines and, if it finds one, fires at it with an explosively forged

projectile (EFP) that is able to penetrate several inches of armor

plate.

In more than 100 tests of CBU-97s, each weapon, or dispenser, delivered

against a representative column of armored vehicles and trucks

has damaged, on average, three to four armored vehicles. Average

Assessing Future U.S. Capabilities for the Halt Phase 37

SUU-66 dispenser

(with wind-correction modification)

EFP warhead

10 BLU-108s per SUU-66 =

40 warheads

BLU-108

RAND MR958-

4.5

Figure 4.5—The CBU-97 Antiarmor Weapon

spacing between the armored vehicles in these columns has been

around 50 meters. Thus, for the eight armored vehicles that fall

within a single weapon’s 400-meter "footprint," we can expect that

nearly half of them will be damaged to at least an "availability kill"

(or "A-kill") level. This means that some component of the vehicle

has been damaged to the extent that the vehicle must be withdrawn

from the line of march and repaired before continuing on.12

source: http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR958/MR958.chap4.pdf

In the wake of the conflict in Kosovo, Russia is trying to expand exports of its S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Its claimed maximum engagement range is 400 kilometers. In addition, Russia is offering a new, integrated command and control system known as the 45L61. The system is designed to control air defense systems, interceptors, and airborne warning and control systems over a very broad area. The export version is known as the Universal-1E, and it is being offered to CIS countries and perhaps China and India. The system can detect, identify and track airborne targets within a range of 3200 kilometers, flying at a speed of up to 6,000 kilometers per hour, and at altitudes of up to 100 kilometers, according to Russian sources.<A href="http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/Russianvuiw.htm#35">35

source: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/Russianvuiw.htm

[We7det_el_qetal]

7-"Battle is never a 50-50 affair. If I were an attacker, I would seek to neutralise any obvious capability that greatly exceeded my own, before I ever commenced any attack. This can be done in any number of ways, from damaging the TEL's and the missiles on the ground to attempting to shooting down the missile in flight. To destroying your comms and ensuring your crews never got the orders, or targetting data with which to fire. I would specifically acquire means to do this if I intended to attack you or anyone else. I am not a fool. Obviously the easiest way to do this would be to acquire my own long range standoff weapons (of a similar class) and combine these with strike aircraft and SOF attacks. This attack would be planned, rehearsed and refined any number of times until it had a good chance of succeding. "

as for protecting my TELs, well ur SOF has to cross miles and miles of desert to reach their approx AO ( al that has to be done undetected ), and then start searching for them then engage their maximum security SO capable units then destroy them.

8-"In addition your SAM network, specifically your S-300 and S-400 would be subjected to similar attacks. They might be capable, but I'd like to see them deal with standoff precision attack weapons, strike and SEAD aircraft, plus deep strike attack helo missions and SOF attacks simultaneously... Remember I don't need to destroy all your SAM's in one go, simply open up a safe corridor and allow my SEAD/EW and strike aircraft room to work..."

Ur Standoff ground systems short of ICBM missiles will have a hard time indeed, ur air systems will even have a harder time, ur SOF will have a great welcome by my Maximum security detachments.

9-"This is exactly what was done to Iraq on both occasions. A systematic and sustained attack on the biggest threats (Iraqi airforce, long range SAM's and command, control and communications infrastructure) ensured that eventually, the threats were destroyed or nullified sufficiently to allow strike aircraft free range over the enemy territory and it's what Israel did to Syria and Egypt during Yom Kippur, despite being attacked first and caught by surprise..."

Actually what gave Israel time to react was Saddats treatury with Kessinger telling him he will not develop the attack further which Kessinger kindly passed over to Israel allowing her to concentrate her power on Syria with little fear from Egypt, my grandfather was deputy chief of staff of egypt's third army during the war FPRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=", and the first egyptian officer on kilo 101.

10-"Again with the PGM's. Laser guided artillery rounds cost about $60,000 per round. How many are you going to be able to fire before THAT starts getting a bit expensive, not to mention depleting your stocks? Despite what you see on CNN, PGM's make up a small component of most army's capabilities. No one can afford total dependance on PGM's not even the USA. In addition laser guided artillery shells, have almost no capability against a moving target. They are designed to attack pin point targets with high levels of precision."

The 152 mm KRASNOPOL and 155 mm KRASNOPOL-M guided arttillery systems are intended for use against armoured targets. They may also be used to destroy fortifications and for counter-battery and coastal defence anti-ship missions.

Each system comprises a guided artillery projectile, 1D15(1D22) laser target designator-range finder, 1A35 synchronisation unit, an artillery system.

The KRASNOPOL/KRASNOPOL-M uses a semi-active laser guidance system during the latter part of its trajectory. Once a target has been detected by a forward observer, the target information coordinates are transmitted to the battery command post. The gun barrel angle and elevation data are transmitted to the gun position and the forward observer is alerted. The projectile is then fired and the initial part of the trajectory is carried out using a normal ballistic trajectory. As the projectile approaches the target, the forward observer illuminates the target using a tripod-mounted 1D22 Laser Target Designator - Range finder. The designation range for tank-type targets is 7,000 m. Following a mid-trajectory period controlled by inertial navigation, the seeker in the nose of the projectile locks onto the illuminated target and the projectile guidance system makes the necessary flight corrections to guide the projectile towards the target. Shortly before impact, the projectile makes a top attack on the target's upper armour, at an angle between +35 ° and +45 °. The nose-mounted seeker has a footprint of about 1,000 m. Use of the guided projectile reduced ammunition expenditure by 10 ... 15 times, mission accomplishment time is reduced by 3 .. 4 times.

source: http://rusarm.ru/p_frame/main.htm

Threat Update Krasnopol--A Laser-Guided Projectile for Tube Artillery

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/images/ks-12-s.jpg

Mr. Walter Williams

Threat Support Directorate

TRADOC DCSINT

Fort Leavenworth, KSIntroduction

Modern advances in armament and technology are having a revolutionary impact on the development and application of combined arms doctrine and tactics. The technological advances in the development and production of precision weapons and their components are excellent examples of this revolutionary impact. The artillery precision weapon family of munitions includes:

dual-purpose improved conventional munitions,

semiactive laser-guided projectiles,

antipersonnel scatterable mines,

antitank scatterable mines,

terminally-homing submunitions,

terminally-homing cannon projectiles,

terminally-homing mortar projectiles,

sensor-fuzed submunitions,

radiofrequency homing munitions,

flechette-filled shrapnel, and

volumetric explosives (a volumetric explosive is commonly referred to as a fuel-air explosive or enhanced-blast explosive).

The purpose of this article is not to discuss the entire artillery precision weapon family of munitions, but rather the semiactive laser-guided projectile known as Krasnopol.

Description

The Krasnopol is a Russian-developed and Russian-produced semiactive laser-guided projectile designed to effectively defeat:

armored vehicles;

multiple rocket launchers;

self-propelled (SP) artillery systems;

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) centers;

defensive fortifications;

bridges; and

rossings.

The fielding of the Krasnopol provides a tube artillery unit the following advantages. First, tube artillery units are capable of firing at individual targets (to include pinpoint targets such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, field fortifications) with a high probability of a first-round kill. Thus, the traditional requirement for an area fire or artillery barrage is eliminated. Second, a tube artillery unit can fire at group targets using the same gun settings computed relative to the center of mass of the group target. Third, the Krasnopol can be fired without meteorological and ballistic data at a range of ten to twelve kilometers.

The Krasnopol is produced in two variants. The 152-mm Krasnopol is a two-section projectile designed to operate with both towed (D-20, 2A36, 2A65 Msta-B) and SP (2S3 Akatsiya, 2S5 Giatsint, and 2S19 Msta-S) guns and howitzers. A major drawback to this round is the incompatibility with the autoloader of the 2S19 due to the projectile's length.

The Krasnopol-M (152-mm/155-mm) was developed as a follow-on product improvement that is fully compatible with the 2S19 autoloader and enhances the capability for the projectile to be used with western-produced 155-mm howitzers. Figure 1 illustrates the comparative operational characteristics of the Krasnopol, Krasnopol-M, and the U.S. Copperhead laser-guided munitions.

Both the Krasnopol and Krasnopol-M are superior to the Copperhead in the areas of range, projectile weight, targets engaged, attack profile, and operational field handling. However, there is a 15% range difference (three kilometers) between the Krasnopol and the Krasnopol-M.

KRASNOPOL AND COPPERHEAD COMPARATIVE OPERATIONAL DATA Figure 1CHARACTERISTICSKRASNOPOLKRASNOPOL-MCOPPERHEADCaliber (mm)152152/155155 Firing System (NOTE: The following list of systems are presented as examples for each projectile caliber.)TOWED: D-20, 2A36, 2A65 Msta-B SP: 2S3, 2S5, 2S19 Msta-STOWED: D-20, 2A36, 2A65 Msta-B, (US) M114A2, M198 SP: 2S3, 2S5, 2S19 Msta-S, (US) M109, TOWED: M114A2, M198 SP: M109A2/3, M109A6 Range (km)201716 Warhead TypeFrag-HEFrag-HEHEAT Length (mm)1,3009551,370Weight (kg)Projectile504362Warhead20.52022.5 Explosive6.56.56.7 Targets EngagedArmored Vehicles, C4I Posts, Field FortificationsArmored Vehicles, C4I Posts, Field FortificationsArmored Vehicles Target Attack ProfileDiving Top AttackDiving Top AttackLaser Illuminated PointGuidanceInitial PhaseFree FlightFree FlightFree FlightMiddle PhaseInertialInertialInertial Terminal PhaseInertialInertialInertial Max Field Storage Time w/o Shipping CaseNo RestrictionsNo RestrictionsNo longer than 72 hours inside SP Arty systems in a polyethylene bag. Seeker Head Protection While Handling The Projectile.Protected by a nose cap discarded in flight.Protected by a nose cap discarded in flight.None. Seeker head must be protected from impacts. Pre-Fire PreparationConnect both parts of projectile.Same as a standard conventional munition.Before loading, entrance pupil and tail fin slots must be inspected for damage and contamination. Requirements for LoadingSame as a standard conventional munitionSame as a standard conventional munitionNo sand, dust, or moisture. The projectile must be protected from impact with other surfaces.

The 2K25 Krasnopol complex includes the OF-39 Krasnopol projectile; a 1D22, 1D20, or 1D15 laser target designator (LTD); and the 1A35 shot synchronization system (1A35K command device, and 1A35I observation post device). Normally, a LTD operator aims a laser at a target, and one to two rounds are fired for target engagement. A signal confirming the firing of the projectile is transmitted from the firing unit (via a communications link from the 1A35K to the 1A35I) to the battery command observation post (COP). The LTD operator continues to illuminate the target with a laser beam during the terminal phase of the Krasnopol's flight. The Krasnopol's gyroscopic homing head locks onto the target beam, and aerodynamic control surfaces (located on the projectile body) guide the projectile to the target. Once the target is destroyed, the LTD operator can shift to another target and continue to engage either preplanned targets or targets of opportunity.

Training

Russian artillery units train under realistic field conditions in order to effectively use laser-guided munitions like the Krasnopol. The training includes both gun crews and LTD operators engaging and destroying stationary and moving targets. The targets are arrayed as a threat or foreign army would deploy forces on the battlefield. Thus, the LTD operator develops or learns the skills required to determine laser-guided munition targets and conditions that either enhance or degrade the use of the munition. Predicting when a target will enter a kill zone is a very difficult task when using a laser-guided munition. Therefore, LTD operators learn how to plan kill zones along avenues of approach or counterattacks in order to engage and destroy moving targets.

Timeliness is critical during the engagement of a moving target. The likelihood of a Krasnopol achieving a first-round hit is severely reduced if the projectile is not delivered on time. Even the likelihood of a second-round hit is diminished due to the variation in location of a moving target.

Therefore, the employment of the Krasnopol is enhanced through the training of units in preplanning kill zones. Prior to engagement, the LTD operator conducts a terrain reconnaissance of the kill zone using the laser rangefinder on the target designator. The LTD operator predetermines the points of engagement covered by the Krasnopol's seeker footprint (one kilometer radius, two kilometer diameter). The gun range and azimuth settings are calculated (in advance) by the battery fire direction center and recorded by the gun crew chief. This translates into a higher probability of a first-round hit and destruction of the moving target. LTD operators and firing units train to the standard of achieving a direct hit on a moving vehicle on the first or second shot.

Employment

There are many variations in the number of equipment sets related to the employment of Krasnopol-equipped firing units. Various tactical situations and firing systems will dictate the overall employment of the Krasnopol. FM 100-60, Armor- and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force: Organization Guide list a typical opposing force (OPFOR) 152-mm SP howitzer battalion as equipped with four sets of the Krasnopol-M. Each set is composed of the LTD (1D22, 1D20, 1D15), the 1A35 shot synchronization system, and 50 projectiles per LTD.

Thus, a total of 200 Krasnopol projectiles are fielded to each 152-mm SP howitzer battalion. One battery of the battalion is designated as the special-weapons or Krasnopol battery. The Krasnopol battery commander designates one platoon (possibly on a rotating basis to maintain crew proficiency) as the principal Krasnopol firing unit. A Krasnopol platoon basic load consists of the Krasnopol, smoke, and illuminating rounds. The Krasnopol firing platoon retains 140 Krasnopol projectiles, while the sixty remaining projectiles are distributed throughout the battalion at a rate of four Krasnopols per tube. One LTD is distributed to each battery COP (three per battalion) and the battalion's mobile reconnaissance post. The LTD operator uses a concealed location to position the LTD within a 15 arc left or right of the gun target line and no more than seven kilometers (preferably five kilomteres) from the target.

During engagement, each gun (within the Krasnopol platoon) fires one Krasnopol projectile in succession either on command of the LTD operator or on a predetermined time sequence with less than thirty seconds between projectiles per designator. Upon destruction of the initial target, the LTD operator shifts the designator to subsequent targets downwind (from the previous engagement) to reduce smoke and dust interference with the designator.

Countermeasures and Counter-countermeasures

A major shortcoming of employing the Krasnopol (as well as other laser-guided munitions) is the requirement to illuminate the target with the laser beam for five to fifteen seconds. Long target-illumination times enable enemy targets equipped with laser warning detectors to effectively employ countermeasures that prevent the target from further illumination by the laser beam.

Thus, the guidance of the Krasnopol is disrupted and the target survives the engagement. The most effective means of protection are laser warning detectors that automatically cue grenade launchers to fire a number of smoke grenades within two to three seconds after detection of a laser beam. A smoke cloud builds up around the vehicle six to eight seconds after firing. The smoke cloud bends or refracts the laser beam and provides a false homing point for the Krasnopol. In essence, an effective laser protection screen is deployed around the target within eight to eleven seconds after a laser detection. Various open source materials disclose that western laser warning systems are more sensitive (up to fifteen meters) than Russian laser warning systems (less than fifteen meters).

The LTD operator can counter this countermeasure by using an initial laser offset procedure.

The laser offset procedure requires the LTD operator to first determine a land feature or easily referenced landmark within the kill zone. The operator surveys the kill zone for background conditions that may cause sufficient backscatter (from other reflecting surfaces) to provide the target early warning of the LTD laser beam. The LTD operator lases at the predetermined offset point (fifteen to twenty meters from the target) at the beginning of the fire mission.

The LTD operator or his assistant is alerted to the Krasnopol's acquisition of the laser beam either by a "munition approach" light-emitting diode on the 1A35 shot synchronization equipment or a blinking signal light in the optics of the LTD. The LTD operator begins shifting the laser target designator crosshairs to the center of the target four to five seconds after the signal prompt.

The shifting of the laser beam from the offset point to the target is two to three seconds prior to the terminal phase of projectile flight. The offset procedure process takes a total of six to eight seconds. Thus, the Krasnopol is able hit and destroy the target prior to employment of laser countermeasures. The offset procedure requires a skilled LTD operator due to the requirement for increased hand and eye coordination during the laser beam-shifting process.

Summary

The United States demonstrated during Desert Storm that the force that initially attains and maintains fire superiority has the advantage of freedom of maneuver and reduced casualties from enemy artillery fire. The Krasnopol and Krasnopol-M provide users with the capability of target destruction at lower expenditure rates and shorter firing times. The potential low-cost proliferation of these rounds provides potential U.S. adversaries a capability to successfully attack and destroy targets ranging from thinly protected C4I systems to armored vehicles at a critical place and time on a future battlefield. Thus, these rounds can also become a force multiplier for small forces (guerrilla, terrorist, etc.) against a larger, technically advanced force in low intensity conflicts or military operations other than war.

source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/krasnopol.htm

[We7det_el_qetal]

11-"Scoot and shoot tactics as you seem to prefer are not the way to fight an entire battle. They are a tactic designed to catch an enemy off guard. You cannot simply fire a round or 2 and keeping mvoing all day long, you will not be able to put a sufficient weight of fire on the enemy. US and UK artillery forces in Iraq, despite facing some of the artillery that you have chosen for your force (G6 SPG's) often engaged in fire and counter battery fire missions with the Iraq's and used extended gun lines to pummel the iraqi forces. This tactic might cause some losses during, but the risk is weighed up by the commander on the battlefield. War carries risks. Nothing can change this..."

Could u provide me a source to study the operations of the Iraqi forces which employed G6, so that i could gain more insight in that issue.

[Aussie Digger]

Could u provide me a source to study the operations of the Iraqi forces which employed G6, so that i could gain more insight in that issue.

Unfortunately I cannot. It is widely published that Iraq purchased significant quantities of G5 and G6 155mm artillery pieces from South Africa prior to GW1. That info is not hard to find. What is difficult to find is the tactics that were used by Iraqi forces during the actual land engagements during GW1 and GW2. Obviously they were ineffective, however I have never found any serious critical analysis of the performance of the Iraqi forces (including the vaunted "Republican Guard") during thes conflicts.

Everything publicly released has been done so by the Victors, (ie: US/UK and France [GW1 only]) and so is slanted towards their performance. What is clear however is that the Iraqi forces were unable to inflict any significant damage to their enemies despite their being equipped with VERY capable artillery systems.

As to my SOF forces, units such as the 22nd SAS Regt, or even the Australian SASR, have never faced any significant problems (that they couldn't overcome) in achieving their aims (overall) in any theatre, despite the various opposition they have faced. Why do you think your theatre would be any different?

You state that my SOF would have difficulty crossing the miles and miles of desert, yet apparently yours do not suffer the same problems whilst crossing the EXACT same desert? This is despite the fact that you have deliberately hamstrung your SOF forces by limiting their insertion methods by completely doing away with your Navy and Air force? This reasoning is illogical. You are relying almost totally on your SOF to provide targetting data for your TBMS (your ONLY long range strike capability) and yet you deny your SOF the very insertion methods that will give them at least SOME chance of achieving their mission...

My SOF forces can at least insert by parachute operations or by submarine or surface naval vessel. Yours cannot as you have deliberately chosen not to acquire (or actually do away with) such options... If you think my Intell will fail to notice this, than you are deluding yourself and heading for disaster...

You can believe what you like about Israel. She successfully defended herself against a surprise attack on multiple fronts against a numerically superior enemy, comprised of several nations military forces (including Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and the Sudan). This fact is indisputable. (I am referring to Yom Kippur, 1973). Revisionism does not change the "truth"...

You can raise any conspiracy theory you like, but the facts are as plain as day that the reason the attack stopped was the direct result of the performance of the IDF to gradually slow the attack and the stop it completely. On top of this Israel actually pushed it's enemies back so far it gained additional territory to that which it gained in 1967...

[We7det_el_qetal]

"As to my SOF forces, units such as the 22nd SAS Regt, or even the Australian SASR, have never faced any significant problems (that they couldn't overcome) in achieving their aims (overall) in any theatre, despite the various opposition they have faced. Why do you think your theatre would be any different?"

Actually I've read quite a lot about 22 SAS rgt. , and didn't come across an account where SAS faced a highly trained well equiped opponent, basicly it was militia for most of the times, and air head terrorists for the rest of the time, I'd really like to see what SAS could do facing Spetsnaz Vega for a change :) .

"You state that my SOF would have difficulty crossing the miles and miles of desert, yet apparently yours do not suffer the same problems whilst crossing the EXACT same desert? This is despite the fact that you have deliberately hamstrung your SOF forces by limiting their insertion methods by completely doing away with your Navy and Air force? This reasoning is illogical. You are relying almost totally on your SOF to provide targetting data for your TBMS (your ONLY long range strike capability) and yet you deny your SOF the very insertion methods that will give them at least SOME chance of achieving their mission..."

The difficulty facing ur SOF won't be the distance, it would be the surveillance they have to get past, no country to date is thinking of fielding the extensive network of unattended sensors i'm proposing to field, so obviously my SOF are not going to have the hard time ur's will go through, I don't rely exclusively on my SOF for targetting data ( UAV, Surveilance system, normal army combat groups and SOF )

"My SOF forces can at least insert by parachute operations or by submarine or surface naval vessel. Yours cannot as you have deliberately chosen not to acquire (or actually do away with) such options... If you think my Intell will fail to notice this, than you are deluding yourself and heading for disaster..."

Inserting by parachute means u have air-superiority, which to say the least is contested, insertion through beaches is easier to keep an eye to coz it's a liner method of insertion opposed to spatial methods like parachuting.

As for the arab-israely conflict, well everybody is entitled to his or her own views.

[We7det_el_qetal]

Sweden's
Air Force Rangers Flygbasjagara

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of a new Swedish defense strategy, the Swedish Air Force developed a new defense plan. Under the this new plan, termed Bas-90, airfields, aircraft, and supplies would be dispersed at various locations though out the Swedish countryside. Although this plan gives the aircraft a greater chance of survival during air attacks, it also makes them harder to defend on the ground.
The Swedish Air Force high command has determined that the greatest potential threat during the event of hostilities would come from enemy special operations forces (SOF). To counter this threat and any other that may develop, the Swedish Air Force formed a new counter SOF unit.

The new unit, known as Flygbasjagarna (Fbj), or Swedish Air Force (Air Base) Rangers (SAFRs), was formed in 1983. This highly trained unit is tasked with countering incursions by enemy SOFs. Unit members are trained to track, locate, and eliminate an enemy unit before it can strike. To accomplish this mission the unit uses specially trained dogs and dog handlers.

SAFRs are organized into platoons of five squads; one HQ squad, and four Ranger squads. The HQ consists of 8 men while the Ranger squads are made up of 8 men and two dogs. Within each squad each man will have a specialty; Squad leader, Assistant Squad Leader, dog handler, anti-tank/machine gunner, or medic. Squads can be subdivided into two groups of four men each, allowing them to cover larger areas.

Ranger squads patrol outside of the base perimeter at distances up to 15 KM, security inside the base perimeter is provided by Close Protection Platoons (similar to USAF SF). Patrols can last up three weeks in duration. During this time a great deal of physical stress is placed on troops. SAFRs use all standard Swedish small arms, heavy weapon, and vehicles.

source: http://www.specwarnet.com/europe/safr.htm

[Gremlin29]

So what's stops an enemy from mulitiplying his total number of tanks to say,.. 5,000? Can 2400 Jeeps with ATGM's be considered adequate to even slow down such a vast force much less stop it long enogh for it to be targeted and destroyed by long range artillery? You also don't seem to consider that your enemy will not be boxed up all nice and neat waiting to be engaged en masse by your jeeps, or your artillery. Your jeeps will most likely not even get within range of the main force because they will be systematicaly destroyed by attack helicopters using nothing more than chain guns and folding fin rockets as well as the much more maneuverable IFV's equipped with small caliber cannons and their own ATGM's. I'm also trying to figure out how your anti tank force will be sustained because they don't run on solar power. Going back to your original idea of having your 2400 jeeps attack on masse, stopping the enemy who would then be ravaged by artillery...well that's just rediculous. If you wanna believe that jeeps are going to do all that arguing about the rest of your fantasy force is an exercise in futility. There's no possible way for even a respectible percentage of your jeeps to even approach 2 armored divisions on masse let alone engage them. How would that be done...exactly?

[gf0012-aust]

Usually, whenever I see comments about the new "tank killers" that are "fleet of foot" and will make them (the MBT) obsolete, you invariably see that the proponent of the technology has a limited understanding of combined and supported arms with MBT's.

Any light vehicle that could close on an MBT has got there because the MBT support doctrine was not adhered to.

MBT's are supposed to operate with sympathetic assets, and certainly in an environment where the geography may favour an attacker.

No LOS = combined arms.
LOS = combined arms.
No Combined Arms = Moron

[Aussie Digger]

Don't bother guys, We7 will only reply along the lines of "oh yeah? How will YOUR armoured division get within range of my laser guided artillery and TBM's? Anything left can then be destroyed by my jeeps". (Btw "jeeps" haven't actually been employed by a military force for 40 odd years, but that doesn't seem to bother we7 either).

As I stated earlier I'm starting to wonder whether he's anything other than a troll...

[We7det_el_qetal]

If u give me a bit of time i'll answer all ur questions, and i'm not a troll :)

[gf0012-aust]

If u give me a bit of time i'll answer all ur questions, .....

Matey, all I can do is reinforce the below again:

Any light vehicle that could close on an MBT has got there because the MBT support doctrine was not adhered to.

MBT's are supposed to operate with sympathetic assets, and certainly in an environment where the geography may favour an attacker.

No LOS = combined arms.
LOS = combined arms.
No Combined Arms = Moron

Any MBT that went in unassisted without infantry as a supportive element would not be adhering to basic tactics - ipso facto it would lead to an advantage for MANPAT teams.

Some armies work on the principle of saturated attacks, basically miniature versions of "cannae" against a target - but those MANPAT teams would never get in close if decent Infantry support was in play.

It's a fundamental doctrine issue. I'd suggest that any tank commander who went in with a squadron and lacked infantry support would be in for a bollocking after the event (especially if he lost his squadron)

The same philosophy comes into play when air cavalry is opposite, or when the anti-tank elements are arty or MLRS gridding a location.

Each anti-tank posture has a counter response, be it defensive or offensive. At the most simplistic descriptor level, that usually implies aggressive patrolling in advance, be it platoons, counter air (MANPADS or organic) or be it Offensive Air and counter Arty etc....

On that basis, Gremlin can explain the helo drivers role, AussieDig can explain the troopers role and land warfare perspective better than I can. They've got actual operational capability in these fields, so are worth listening to. They're not armchair theorists.

My skillset is mainly acoustic warfare and acoustic intel - so I can tell you how to take out the sniper or go to war in a submarine. ;) I have tried to give you the basics though.

[Aussie Digger]

we7, I'm not entirely convinced by the (I'm not a troll) argument, but I'm willing to give you the benefit of the doubt. If you are serious about a military discussion there are some things to consider, that I'm not sure you've fully comprehended.

1. Developing REAL military capability is not achieved by flicking through brochures and picking out the military capabilities that seem to be the best. Developing significant usable capability takes time and a serious amount of thought. I kind of get the feeling that Iraq tried the brochure method under SH (who considered himself a military genius despite never undertaking a day of training in his life). Iraq pre Gulf War and pre Iran/Iraq war went on a shopping spree and bought the best and most capable "toys" available from the West and Soviet bloc, at that time (including: Mirage fighters, the whole MiG fighter range, Exocet, Scud, RPG, Milan and Frog missiles, Roland, Crotale, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 SAM's, every available AAA and MANPAD type under the sun, the list went on and on).

Unfortunately when it came time to employ said weapons (despite the paper list) the actual capability generated was less than impressive. Even against Iran who Iraq outnumbered and (on paper at least) "out-matched" qualitatively the best they could manage (even when employing WMD's) could only manage a war of attrition and finally a drawn out stalemate. Against a modern professional force comprised predominantly of US/UK/French forces (despite outnumbering it, and possessing a paper "qualitative" advantage in many areas,) they simply couldn't achieve anything.

2. History is able to teach some very valuable lessons. You should never plan to "fight the last war" however valuable lessons are present in every war. One of the most fundamental (and one that many politicians conviently ignore) is that if a war starts you are limited to using whatever equipment/platforms you have.

Developing usable capability in these modern times, takes significant time during peace. You will be extremely unlikely to be capable of developing a significant new capability during war. Moving on from that if your vaunted SAM/TBM system fails, or an enemy is able to exploit a weakness which you didn't think of. That's it. You WILL lose.

The only way to properly provide for the defence of your Country is to acquire and develop your capability as matched against any potential enemies. What's the point of a 300K class TBM if your enemy is 400K's away? It is pointless picking YOUR favourite weapon systems to equip your force without conducting a thorough analysis of any likely enemy's capabilities. You cannot base a force structure on the paper statistics of a particular platform provided by the manufacturer. EVERY weapons manufacturer claims their particular system is the most capable. Only a detailed and rigorous analysis backed up by extensive simulation and operational analysis WILL provide the information that will truly help you sort the "chaff from the wheat". Paper statistics only publicly available websites are worse than useless. They deliberately set out to misinform... How can everything be THE best?

You are also not basing your force structure options on political reality. Your vaunted Iskander-E has NEVER been sold to anyone. It is only operated by Russia. Your S-400 SAM system IS still under development, (you can check this on their website if you like, just as I DID) and has yet to be acquired let alone actually deployed by anyone and like so many Russian programs these days stands a VERY good chance of being canned before it reaches fruition. Russia, like the USA and every other major defence supplier WILL not simply provide ANY weapon system that any particular country wants. This is particularly true for weapon systems such as TBM's, which provide a user with a relatively simple way of striking at an enemy...

Ponder these things and what gf and Gremlin have said, and we might be able to start a more interesting discussion... Cheers.

And not to blow my own trumpet too loudly, but I spent 6 years in the Australian Army's Infantry and Armoured Corps and was an NCO when I resigned. I know a thing or 2 about land warfare, particularly small unit tactics...

[Awang se]

Everythings look good when planners explain it on the piece of maps and papers. but once you throw the idea on the field, there's always somethings unexpected come up no matter how prepared we are.

anyone knows jeep can be an AT platform, but that is for someone who don't have their own tanks or can't bring one in on a short notice. also they usually use it on ambush on the column flank or rear and in a hit and run tactics. i can't imagine a jeeps that suppose to go face to face with the tanks. even an armored TOW hummvee won't make it out in one piece. the thought of it make me shudder.

[BaLRoG]

i'm we7's brother, i wanted to say that aussie is right this is a force structure not a doctrine because we haven't specified the enemy or the objective, not to mention

political and economic facts. from the previous posts i see that the rival was considered the US since some suggested the use of B-2's.

first as for missiles i personally in a normal situation would choose an aircraft over a TBM but that's not the case. aircraft tend to need airbases which tend to be stationary and vulnrable, so there's no point of spending billions on an airforce which will never act, simply trying to compete with the US on air superiority using their methods is just stupid. so which is better having a better strike force which will never see action or having a weaker one which has a very good chance of survival.

second yes aircraft's are very effiecent at air defence but i must be able to keep them alive, the US can strike the airbases with B-2's or if their's a huge air defence it might try using TBM which by my knowledge never has. i have no objection on VTOL/VSTOL aircraft but most of the army must not be centralized because stationary targets are easier to bomb cause they're easier to plan the striking mission for. unlike moving targets which are harder to destroy.

as for missile/airforce comparision iraq had hundreds of aircraft, how many bombed anything, on the other hand iraq was able to launch scud's, i'm not talking about the effectiveness of a missile strike and an airstrike i'm just saying one has a much greater probability to reach it's target than the other. so the only way to have an airdefence is SAM's and i guess that the S-300 PMU is very effective, it has a 150km range and it's mobile, it has a deployment time of 5 minutes, so constantly moving airdefence batteries will be very hard to counter. and i'd like to know what anti-radar missile has a range in excess of 150km. another idea is to buy 3 times the radars needed and i mean mobile radars.

here is how it works, only one radar is operational while the other two are on the move, and then one of them goes online and the first goes off and starts moving this is repeated periodically which will make air missions targeting radars very confusing. as for jeeps having less manuverability in desert terrain, u have got a point and i would suggest a tracked vehicle like the BMP-3 armed with the AT-5 missile which has a range of 6km that's way out of the range of the M1A1, now what would happen if the M1A1 charged and the BMP's retreated will firing, the only solution left would be helicopters which btw can also be engaged with the AT-15. the tanks will have no choice except to continue forward because if they stop artillery will show no mercy, if they retreat the BMP's will pursue.

i know BMP's can't stand ground infront of tanks but u have a technologically superior enemy so u can't hope to stand head to head with him u must improvise. the only reason why i'm thinking this way is because the realistic situation demands that i think differently. i'm not saying i'm right i'm just asking what's wrong with that. and i almost forgot as for the offensive we'll primarily relly on a small number of strikes with extreme force, first because if i don't fire that missile i don't know if it will be there tomorrow to fire.


second to defeat the US u don't have to take over bases u just have to inflict enough damage so that the war becomes intollerable and that's no easy task, americans are not weak nor are they cowards. i must try to make war as short as possibly because economy wise there's no comparison, plus having a 1000 dead in one week makes a lot more effect than in a year. i'd appretiate all comments on this.

[Gremlin29]

I'm going to address BaLRoG's method of dealing with gunships. They will be screening the armored force so your BMP's have to get past that obstacle first. While you could theoretically engage helicopters with the AT-15, chances of success are dismal. I've been engaged by ATGM's and always managed to evade them with relative ease.

Now an issue your BMP's face is with a system like the Hellfire for example. The Hellfire has the AT-15 outranged, and it's mounted on a platform that can maneuver quicker, farther faster. Secondly, if your facing a fairly well equipped modern adversary, their MBT's are going to be supported by infantry and more importantly, mechanized infantry who's vehicles are going to be equipped with the same ATGM type weapons your BMP's are armed with. You will also have to deal with Cavalry units who are likewise equipped with ATGM equipped IFV's. Adding to the fray will be mobile artillery who will have missions called in on your BMP forces.

[Aussie Digger]

The USA does have a TBM it's known as the ATACMS and is fired from the MLRS system and has a 300k range.

V/STOL aircraft provide an excellent opportunity to disperse your air force in an emergency, but certain other tactics (such as that used by Sweden, Singapore etc) like using civilian roads to operate jets from have a degree of operational utility. However, they have significant payload/range issues and basic airframe performance issues, due to the design necessary to achieve their V/STOL capability. They are useful, but they are not a genuine replace for a conventional take off and landing aircraft.

Let's be realistic here. Any small to medium power IS going to get annihilated by the USA in a conventional war. It's as simple as that. A small insight into the capability of the USA is that at the time of the Second Gulf War despite the preponderance of specwarops forces utilised in the Gulf the USA was concurrently running 29 specwarops throughout the world. If they wanted to destroy your country, there is very little most countries could do about it.

Worrying about how you force structure is going to deal with the USA is pointless. There's only 1 or 2 in the World (China or perhaps Russia) that could resist the USA conventionally for very long.

A more realistic goal is the capability to deal with any reasonably forseeable regional conflict. That (and the available budget) is what decides your force structure. When talking about strike capabilities you need to compare them to that which your "enemies" possess. If you want to possess a "defensive" force, than matching the enemy only is what you need. It doesn't have to be the same type of capability, but the minute the enemy thinks you have out-matched him, your "enemy" will start to think about equalising this situation. That is what is unrealistic about We7's force structure. His reliance on one offensive system means that his force structure WILL not provide sufficient options in the face of an attack should it's capability by nullified by acquistion of a similiar capability.

Even if his TBM's ARE as capable as he believe's, the other Countries in his region that he want's to defend against, are going to acquire capabilities to match or exceed yours. Your "defensive" effort will simply turn into an arms race.

In addition the acquisition of such capabilities will simply gender suspicion amongst your "enemies" no matter what you say about your intentions with them. The post I made about Australia's proposed acquisition of air-launched standoff missiles, illustrates this perfectly. Despite Australia reducing it's overall strike capability, and it's statements about the use of such weapons, it's "enemies" have made their own decisions about our acquistions of such weapons...

[BaLRoG]

i'm not sure about the fact that it's impossible to defeat the US, i consider the vietnam war a defeat to the US, and vietnam wasn't the second or third superpower, yes it was supported by china and russia, these are political concerns but the country itself was no superpower.

a more extreme example hannibal defeated the romans in many battles, yes his home land was eventually destroyed but for some time he did something no one thought possible. i'm not saying i'm hannibal, just that there's nothing impossible. and it's never pointless to try think about how to defeat your enemy, no matter how strong he is and how weak you are. it just gets harder never impossible.

all i'm trying to propose is a question, does this force structure stand a chance to inflict casualties on the US forces like the vietnamese did, i.e. 58000 casualties. that's the whole question. and personally i don't consider it such a redicolous argument.

[Gremlin29]

Vietnam does serve as an example that conclusive military victory is not necessary under certain situations. Recreating a similar scenario however would be tremendously difficult if not entirely impossible. To begin with, the America of today is nothing at all like the America of the 1960's. The anti-establishment movement back then played a bigger role in American withdrawl from Vietnam than any other single factor. Vietnam was not a military defeat for the US, it was a political defeat. In addition, the US didn't even fully prosesecute the war. An example would be keeping Hanoi off limits to aerial attack throughout most of the war. In any case, it's a given that the conclussion of the war can be born through military action, political action, or combinations there of. North Vietnam can not claim a military victory because they had their butts handed to them on a silver platter. Ultimately however despite their military failure, they were able to achieve their agenda of uniting both countries under the single flag of communism which was their goal. In any case, the US lost 58,000 troops through the course of 10 years of fighting.

Answering your question more directly, based on your concept I don't see how you could inflict losses of that nature in a short time period with your proposed system, I would expect such a campaign to be over rather quickly with minimal loss of lives based on the destruction of your anti-tank assetts which would occur pretty much as I stated in my last few replies.

[Aussie Digger]

The USA never lost a battle in Vietnam, they were in the end however unable to continue participating in the war. This was as Gremlin pointed out due to political reasons rather than capability reasons. America deliberately hamstrung itself in Vietnam and yet inflicted over 2 million casualties on the North Vietnamese forces. Could Vietnam have continued to withstand this, if the USA prosecuted this war to it's fullest extent (conventionally that is) and stopped the support flowing from Russia and China? I seriously doubt it, however it is a moot point.

You don't need TBM's to inflict Casualties on US troops. You are quite right theyy ARE not invincible. Look at Iraq today, they are suffering far more casualties now than they did during the actual "war".

Their capabilities at present are such that in a conventional war they will destroy any opposing force that does not match them qualitatively. Quantity no longer matters. (The USA and it's allies were out numbered on a man to man and platform to