Counter-Insurgency Warfare

[driftder]

I would like to ask this question. How relevant and effective are the counter-insurgency war tactics used in Iraq by the USA? I ask b3cause I see some counter productive effects. Any comments would be welcome, but please lets keep it professional. No personal attacks or national chest thumping, thanks :)

[viper007]

In CIW, the enemy is always at an advantage coz ur playing to his terms. In Iraq, they are even using tactics like sniping from windows - but not by leaning against them, they stand really back, and cannot be seen from the ground.

Iraqis decide when to attack and when to withdraw, so its their deal.

VIPER

[gf0012-aust]

In CIW, the enemy is always at an advantage coz ur playing to his terms.VIPER

Not necessarily, The British experience in Malaya and Borneo during Konfrontassi was somewhat more positive.

[viper007]

Well yes, but it was a general statement about what happens in my country - India. The army is on its toes, becoz they don't where the guys are, what they are doing. They want to attack where they want to, if the intel is poor, the army gets screwed.

And in my opinion, the north-east guys are better trained, and can create havoc if in large numbers.

[driftder]

In CIW, the enemy is always at an advantage coz ur playing to his terms.VIPER

Not necessarily, The British experience in Malaya and Borneo during Konfrontassi was somewhat more positive.

True - the British exprience in Malaya, Aden, Ireland etc are good points of how to contain a insurgency. Which makes me wonder if the USA are using the right tactics. Methinks they do rely too much on bullets and missiles ie firepower to settle the issue.

I believe the main thing being overlooked is the end result - which is to defeat any insurgency, stability must be introduced. Am I wrong to say that?

Incidentally, Malaya was one of the few insurgencies that was defeated. As for the Indonesian Konfrontasi, its more like an attempt to conduct war by proxy or guerilla war to destabilise the then Malayan government.

[driftder]

Well yes, but it was a general statement about what happens in my country - India. The army is on its toes, becoz they don't where the guys are, what they are doing. They want to attack where they want to, if the intel is poor, the army gets screwed.

And in my opinion, the north-east guys are better trained, and can create havoc if in large numbers.

Ah in what sense? You have to give more details than that, not just sprout your own opinions. Is there any documentary proof to what you stated? Indian intelligence is not that rotted as you believe.

As for the "north-east guys", who are you referring to? The Maoist insurgents in Nagaland?

[viper007]

I know guys working there, so i have some info of how things go about there. My father himself has served there. The army intel network isn't poor, but its not difficult to breach either. Recently they found a new way of bombing - they pick up some nice looking 13 yr old kids and send them to plant explosives. The kid himslef does not know what he is doing. In such cases, if the intel is poor, these plans are hard to trace.

About the North Eastern insurgents, i am talking of an organization by the name NSC (i think), there was a documentry on Indian channels about how these guys are fortifying their positions using the peace-process as a shield. They train well, they are disciplined, they have excellent leadership and they are well equipped. They have modified M-16s, Ak-47/56 and other such weapons.

I think u would like to read some articles about Indian Special Forces and CIJWS.


http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article08.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1970s/Wullar.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article15.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Special-Forces/Mortal.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article12.html

VIPER

[driftder]

I know guys working there, so i have some info of how things go about there. My father himself has served there. The army intel network isn't poor, but its not difficult to breach either. Recently they found a new way of bombing - they pick up some nice looking 13 yr old kids and send them to plant explosives. The kid himslef does not know what he is doing. In such cases, if the intel is poor, these plans are hard to trace.

About the North Eastern insurgents, i am talking of an organization by the name NSC (i think), there was a documentry on Indian channels about how these guys are fortifying their positions using the peace-process as a shield. They train well, they are disciplined, they have excellent leadership and they are well equipped. They have modified M-16s, Ak-47/56 and other such weapons.

I think u would like to read some articles about Indian Special Forces and CIJWS.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article08.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1970s/Wullar.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article15.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Special-Forces/Mortal.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article12.html

VIPER

Ahh, I believe you got it mixed up. My focus is on the ways to contain and control a insurgency type conflaguration, and not so much on special forces tactics and weapons etc.

This thread was started as I have observed that the US-led forces are not having much success in their attempts to control the Iraqi insurgency. However I have notice relative calm with lesser levels of violence in the Iraqi southern regions where its being controlled by the British. Therefore I wonder if there is a change in tactics, what would be the result? Before we can arrive at the result, we need define the tactics needed to quell a insurgency and no, its not just the military means alone.

I hope that clarifys the thread's purpose and that more response with suggestions, preferably personal experiences will lead to a more fruitful discussion, with perhaps the feedback being helpful to any counter-insurgency force ie a sorta private netizen think tank.

[sa_bushwar]

The day Bush declared the war over, I told a friend that the war for the USA in Iraq is only starting now...The USA tactics are wrong: you cannot win a counter insurgency war by just throwing money, material and men at it - Vietnam!!!. Further, their Intel is poor, and they do not have sufficient first-hand information to stop the bombings etc. Again, money and technology does not provide the complete answer to obtain Intelligence. You have to gather in with covert forward observation agents, physical patrols, and infiltrating the enemy ranks to obtain 1st-hand information; while simulatiuosly earn the respect of the local population.

These lessons were learnt in South Africa more than a century ago, when in the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902), the mighty British Empire attacked the 2 Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, having 450 000! men in the field by war's end, -against about 50 000 Boers. The British also declared the war over at the end of the conventional phase, but despite being outnumbered 10:1, and their farms and houses being burnt down, women and children dying in Concentration Camps; the Boers kept the Empire busy for another 2 years in one of the most costly wars for the Empire. (My grandfather fought in the Boer war and his house was also burned down as part of the policy of "scorched earth".)

In more recent history, the former SADF fought a 23 year Counter Insurgeny war in Namibia and Angola, in what became known as the South African Bushwar (1966-1989). The former SADF managed to win this was as is evident by the number of incidents (mines, bombings, attacks, etc.) as illustrated on the webpage: http://www.geocities.com/sa_bushwar. By war's end the confrontation have taken a much more conventional form, with the SADF up against 45000 Cubans suplied with modern Soviet weaponary, FAPLA (Angolan Army), PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia). By 1989, the end of the Cold War, political moves towards peace from the parties concerned, lead to a peaceful sub-continent.

Back to Iraq: The USA can learn from the British in the south how to win the "hearts and minds" of the people as a 1st step in ending a counter insurgency conflict. Typical American arrogance and ignorance is not going to help!

[Defcon 6]

The day Bush declared the war over, I told a friend that the war for the USA in Iraq is only starting now...The USA tactics are wrong: you cannot win a counter insurgency war by just throwing money, material and men at it - Vietnam!!!. Further, their Intel is poor, and they do not have sufficient first-hand information to stop the bombings etc. Again, money and technology does not provide the complete answer to obtain Intelligence. You have to gather in with covert forward observation agents, physical patrols, and infiltrating the enemy ranks to obtain 1st-hand information; while simulatiuosly earn the respect of the local population.

We could have won vietnam is Nixon hadn't had a list of priority targets that we couldn't attack for fear of soviet repraisal. The Iraq war has been won. And the insurgents have been totally unsucessful in all their tactics. Proof of that is the fact that they haven't made one successful attack on the green zone, nor have they managed to stop any recent important events such as the elections. The U.S has earned the respect of the local populance. Anyone who says otherwise doesn't have a informed outlook on anything thats going on there. Anyways, money, manpower and technology is what makes the U.S the #1 super power in the first place. In fact, really I would wager the U.S is the only super power anymore.

These lessons were learnt in South Africa more than a century ago, when in the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902), the mighty British Empire attacked the 2 Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, having 450 000! men in the field by war's end, -against about 50 000 Boers. The British also declared the war over at the end of the conventional phase, but despite being outnumbered 10:1, and their farms and houses being burnt down, women and children dying in Concentration Camps; the Boers kept the Empire busy for another 2 years in one of the most costly wars for the Empire. (My grandfather fought in the Boer war and his house was also burned down as part of the policy of "scorched earth".)

Whats south africa have to do with anything. Not only is it nothing like modern warfare, but it isn't even an example that has the U.S in it.

In more recent history, the former SADF fought a 23 year Counter Insurgeny war in Namibia and Angola, in what became known as the South African Bushwar (1966-1989). The former SADF managed to win this was as is evident by the number of incidents (mines, bombings, attacks, etc.) as illustrated on the webpage: http://www.geocities.com/sa_bushwar. By war's end the confrontation have taken a much more conventional form, with the SADF up against 45000 Cubans suplied with modern Soviet weaponary, FAPLA (Angolan Army), PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia). By 1989, the end of the Cold War, political moves towards peace from the parties concerned, lead to a peaceful sub-continent.

Another pointless example.

Back to Iraq: The USA can learn from the British in the south how to win the "hearts and minds" of the people as a 1st step in ending a counter insurgency conflict. Typical American arrogance and ignorance is not going to help!

No, the U.S has launched and won the most brilliant military campaign of the century. We attacked a country with the fourth largest standing army in the world and won within a very short period of time. I would have to say that insulting us isn't going to do you any good. Or should I say, typical Anti-American arrogance and ignorance?

[KGB]

But has the US actually won any counter insurgency wars? The last example I believe would be in the turn of the century. The US put down an insurgency in the Philippines, but none of the methods used would be acceptable today. Counter insurgency is a dirty war; the rebel is the fish, and the people are the water. Sometimes they drain the fishpond to get at the fish.

[Defcon 6]

So the only reliable tactics are the ones being used. Lets face it, casualties are extremely low in the Iraq War while enemy combatants are dying on a daily basis. Further more all primary objectives (such as securing elections) have been successful. The insurgents have failed and basically the U.S and Iraqi Security Forces are winning without a doubt.

[KGB]

In the end, it will be a matter of political will. The Vietnamese took huge casualties fighting the US but they proved more willing to bleed than the US. On the plus side for the US is that there is no superpower backing up the insurgents. The Vietnamese and the Afghans held off superpowers, but they did get significant help.

[Defcon 6]

The technology gap has gotten so great they just won't be able to pull their own against even the Iraqi securty forces. We are really just talking about a band of extremists with assualt rifles and rpg's. They are already beginning to run out of steam.

[driftder]

ahemm...I can only say please mind your P's and Q's, I rather not have this thread still-born and nipped as a result of bloated egos. So please keep the flaming off, no point in trading insults. I rather we trade opinions and options on how to go about winning a guerilla war, be it against the Al-Queda or the CPM (now dissolved and extinct - so they say...).

Military, the US have inflicted an outstanding defeat conventionally against Saddam's armies. The only problem is the defeated Iraq forces have distintegrated into many splinter cells, taking independent/semi-independent action, taking pot shots at the Allies. Now they are trying to move on to co-ordinated action - witness the aftermath of Fallujah, with terror strikes breaking out elsewhere to act as a diversion.

Another thing I noted about US tactics is their heavy handed way of dishing out firepower. For eg if a sniper shoots at a US patrol, they will call in a air strike on the sniper's position, instead of going in after the sniper with a anti-sniper squad or another sniper. It could be a different tactics, culture but I don't notice that in their US Marines - the Marines over focus on CQB is rather legendary.

So these are some of the issues I would like to bring up hopefully without issues of "my country is better then yours", "we are the meanest moth**r-f***ker outfit" blah blah ad nauseam.

[KGB]

Which brings us to the question; how do they know whether or not a counter insurgency war is being won? What are the parameters that they use to assess the situation? Insurgents nowadays don't seem to follow the old "control the countryside and then isolate the cities" model used by old classic communist insurgencies (except the nepalese insurgency which appropriately is maoist). What they seem to be after (especially those in iraq), is PR.

The Tet offensive was a military disaster for the vietnamese; they didn't gain any of their major objectives and they lost a lot of assets, but they scored big propoganda coup - they eventually persuaded the US that vietnam wasn't worth the cost. My guess is that al quaeda is thinking along these lines - they're into showy targets (world trade center for example).

Anyway, if PR is the insurgets objectives, then body counts and media coverage are their means of keeping score. How does the US military evaluate the results of their operations?

[driftder]

Which brings us to the question; how do they know whether or not a counter insurgency war is being won? What are the parameters that they use to assess the situation? Insurgents nowadays don't seem to follow the old "control the countryside and then isolate the cities" model used by old classic communist insurgencies (except the nepalese insurgency which appropriately is maoist). What they seem to be after (especially those in iraq), is PR.

The Tet offensive was a military disaster for the vietnamese; they didn't gain any of their major objectives and they lost a lot of assets, but they scored big propoganda coup - they eventually persuaded the US that vietnam wasn't worth the cost. My guess is that al quaeda is thinking along these lines - they're into showy targets (world trade center for example).

Anyway, if PR is the insurgets objectives, then body counts and media coverage are their means of keeping score. How does the US military evaluate the results of their operations?

I believe you have hit the nail on the spot this time. Fallujah was the terrs Tet except it fell flat on their face. Whoever was in charge of the US forces was not taking any chances. Need to find out more about this. Could the US have a kind of modified management system where they can forecast the likely outcome of a set of events?

[parm]

I believe you have hit the nail on the spot this time. Fallujah was the terrs Tet except it fell flat on their face. Whoever was in charge of the US forces was not taking any chances. Need to find out more about this. Could the US have a kind of modified management system where they can forecast the likely outcome of a set of events?

I would like to present some website for information:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article12.html

http://news.indiainfo.com/2004/04/06/0604usarmy.html

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=76158

http://www.zoram.com/index.php?module=pagesetter&func=viewpub&tid=3&pid=1334

Indian Army has one of the best experience in counter insurgency thanx to terrorists fighting in Kashmir and north east sates.

Now in the age of Global terrorism and War on Terror, we are sharing our first hand experience with armies of Friendly nations ONLY!:finger

[parm]

I would like to present some website for information:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article12.html

http://news.indiainfo.com/2004/04/06/0604usarmy.html

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=76158

http://www.zoram.com/index.php?module=pagesetter&func=viewpub&tid=3&pid=1334

Indian Army has one of the best experience in counter insurgency thanx to terrorists fighting in Kashmir and north east sates.

Now in the age of Global terrorism and War on Terror, we are sharing our first hand experience with armies of Friendly nations ONLY!:finger


sorry i missed one special article by Pakistani newspaper regarding US army guys being trained in indian CIJWS.

http://www.dawn.com/2004/04/10/int7.htm

[riksavage]

Just read an excellent book on counterinsurgency based on the succesful British efforts in Malaya and the unsuccessful American experiences in Vietnam, specifically the ability of the military to learn and adapt from mistakes made on the ground to transform spearpoint operations to win hearts and minds and destroy insurgent support.

Apparently the book ' Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife' is required reading for US officers deploying to Iraq.

The author, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl led a tank platoon in Desert Storm and served as the Ops Officer in US unit in Iraq in 2004.

A very interesting and insightful read when compared to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[tomahawk6]

Good read on US COIN ops in Iraq. Cordon and search is key approach. In Baghdad we are now employing the ink blot strategy where you secure a neighborhood and spread out from there. The key to COIN ops is to be dynamic constantly adapting to the enemy.


http://216.109.125.130/search/cache?p=COIN+operations&fr=yfp-t-500&toggle=1&ei=UTF-8&u=usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/NovDec05/greer.pdf&w=coin+operations&d=CE-nwiQ8NRHR&icp=1&.intl=us

[Soner1980]

I think the best way is that all cities must be surrounded by military forces entrenched outward. Like Turkish troops did against the bloodthirsty PKK rebels, surrounding the entire village or city with your infantry and tanks, control points for the city in-out, the ability to enter the city must be decreased to some roads and others must be closed. All illegals must be shot or captured alive. Only escorted vehicles/persons may have to leave or enter the village/city.

If you want to go from a city tho another, in the 100 km you can counter maybe 10 control point on the road. I think this way could help the US army in IraQ. But one thing must be done: Civilians must be informed very good of this way of handling.

Also, scattering your entire unit in several squads around a city will have the same effect, but with more friendly way to the civilians.

[vedang]

I think the best way is that all cities must be surrounded by military forces entrenched outward. Like Turkish troops did against the bloodthirsty PKK rebels, surrounding the entire village or city with your infantry and tanks, control points for the city in-out, the ability to enter the city must be decreased to some roads and others must be closed. All illegals must be shot or captured alive. Only escorted vehicles/persons may have to leave or enter the village/city.

If you want to go from a city tho another, in the 100 km you can counter maybe 10 control point on the road. I think this way could help the US army in IraQ. But one thing must be done: Civilians must be informed very good of this way of handling.

Also, scattering your entire unit in several squads around a city will have the same effect, but with more friendly way to the civilians.



And how does someone do this in a place like Jammu&Kashmir whr the environment and the surroundings dont suit u???

[mysterious]

I think the best way is that all cities must be surrounded by military forces entrenched outward. Like Turkish troops did against the bloodthirsty PKK rebels, surrounding the entire village or city with your infantry and tanks, control points for the city in-out, the ability to enter the city must be decreased to some roads and others must be closed. All illegals must be shot or captured alive. Only escorted vehicles/persons may have to leave or enter the village/city.

If you want to go from a city tho another, in the 100 km you can counter maybe 10 control point on the road. I think this way could help the US army in IraQ. But one thing must be done: Civilians must be informed very good of this way of handling.

Also, scattering your entire unit in several squads around a city will have the same effect, but with more friendly way to the civilians.

This seems to me a rather simplistic way to counter the insurgents who are apt to urban warfare. Also the city would have to be of a fairly small size for this to work. A city, lets say, even 5 million inhabitants could tie down a huge chunk of force to neutralize even a couple of thousand insurgents who know the surroundings well and tend to blend in to the local populace freely.

[Ozzy Blizzard]

Agreed. i think there's a whole political aspect to CIW that is vital to sucsess, and simply changing the tactical situation will not bring you Victory. If you look at the resent CIW campaigns that failed, Vietnam, Afghanistan and maybe Iraq (ok its not over yet but things dont look too good), They were all conducted in a tactically sound manner. But they failed to offer the average joe a better deal than the bad guys. But if you look at the malayan insurgancy, most of the bad guys were ethnic chinese, and the malayns were offered indipendance if they stuck by the good guys. Also the commonwealth forces didn't use overly heavy handed tactics re civilian population. The political element is VITAL to ant CIW campaign.

Also simply surrounding urban areas with large ammounts of troops is going to tie down massive ammounts of personell for extended periods of time, any CIW campaign is going to take years. And it isn't going to give you controll of those urban areas. Simply contolling movement isn't going to eliminate an insurgancy. And if the reason to surround urban area's is to stop movement in and out of cities, this could be done with UAV's, mobile patrolls and adequate CAS or arty. Which would take battalions rather than divisions or Corps.

A better idea would be contant patrolling of urban area's once they were secured. Controlling movement through roadblocks and UAV's. Adequate troop levels to provide security throughout the theater. A heavy propaganda campaign. Spending HEAPS of money on humanitarian aid, infestructure development and welfare for the people. And a political insentive that's attractive to everyone in the theater. Body counts arn't going to win a CIW campaign, Hearts and Midns will.

[aaaditya]

i believe that the first and the most important step to be taken in a war against terrorism or insurgence is to identify and freeze the assets of the terrorist organisations and to carefully monitor the sources of their funds(including charities),this would require a cohesive global effort but would prove to be a big blow to terrorism.

[adroth]

Back to Iraq: The USA can learn from the British in the south how to win the "hearts and minds" of the people as a 1st step in ending a counter insurgency conflict. Typical American arrogance and ignorance is not going to help!

To say that the US doesn't know the first thing about how to win the hearts and minds is not a fair statement IMHO. One only need to visit what the US is doing in my island group in the Philippines: Mindanao.

The book Imperial Grunts actually outlines how their efforts are making a difference on the island of Basilan -- home of the Al Qaeda's front in the Philippines. Here are paraphrased examples from the book.

-> US Special Forces conducted extensive, very detailed surveys, of the population. Identifying everything from religion to education. The also took the time to figure what people's main concerns were -- which turned out to be security. All other considerations were secondary. Therefore it became their primary object to make the people feel safe

-> Rules of engagement prohibited US forces from taking a direct part in efforts to apprehend Abu Sayaff terrorists. So they took a passive approach. Using information gained from the local population, they identified the general location of the terrorists home ground and established their base there. This meant that home was no longer home for the Abus, which meant they had to keep moving -- driving them into the gun sights of AFP troops.

-> Another thing the survey found was that large parts of the island, particularly the muslim-dominated areas, were largely undeveloped. Public services were non-existent. To hit multiple birds with one stone, US forces developed permanent, not temporary, support facilities for their camp: roads; water facilities; port facilities; etc. These were assets that they used while they were there -- but were also designed to remain functional long after they had left. This robbed the terrorists of one more tool with which to attract recruits: preceived government neglect.

Their efforts worked. The AFP has replicated this formula in other areas as well, and were just as effective. (Sigh, if only we could have done it earlier)

True, the situation in Iraq appears to be deteriorating, but you have to remember that the perpetrators of the violence may not really be Iraqis themselves. Its a bit hard to win the hearts and minds of extremists that are driven by hate.

[Soner1980]

The US army is in a very different situation if you look to Turkish army who encircles a village or a small town with military elements. Turkish army has always succeeded when a village was hermetically sealed off with control post, pill boxes, squads entrenched well and dug in positions.

The PKK attacked with 5-20 men and sometimes with 100-150 men. Turkish army supported with artillery barrages and air support were always superior against the rebels because of the support and training. I now very well when I saw the pictures from the Gabar mountain that Turkish super cobra attack helicopters and infantry fought off 150 men strong rebel group. Every 20 meters you saw burnt bodies, wich were because of the artillery (mortars) and the 70mm rockets fired from the gunships. So, air support is very important in a clash.

The US army has not so much privileges to take action, also the whole world looks from a different side to the US Army because of the Iraq war. Also, what is mentioned in others writings, the US army is not at their best to win the hearts of the population. This is also very important.

The US army can also use tactics like the Turkish army did against the PKK rebels. The rebels in Iraq look the same as the PKK, so similar tactics can be usefull instead of wait till the first strike and the counter them.

[Big-E]

The US army can also use tactics like the Turkish army did against the PKK rebels. The rebels in Iraq look the same as the PKK, so similar tactics can be usefull instead of wait till the first strike and the counter them.

It's similar to what we did in Fallujah, the only problem is once we clear them out they come right back.

[Soner1980]

The Fallujah operation was good, let them come back is no problem but never wait for incidents. US army can use AFV's against them, especially when dig in the tanks can deliver heavy suport to some infantry.

The Fallujah operation was on big lines the same as of the Turkish tactic used against the rebels. Also Turkish and US army is teaching each other. We learn the experience that we fought against the PKK and the US army is learning the Turkish army other tactics.

But what I would like to tell all armies, the 'patrol tactic' is the worst ever I know. The roadside bombs, ambushes, etc. will give the rebels more motivation and hope, while demoralizing the army. Also some Turkish light APC's and cars are blown away by roads side bombs, so the rebels have their succes. If you wait for them, then you can beat them off and it will work frustrating.

[merocaine]

Whatever about mistakes the US army made in Iraq, they were handicapped in the respect that the Ideological warriors in the white house insisted on a program of debacthifaction which alienated the sunni population.
Confused elections and purple thumbs, with democracy and civil socity and
at the sametime they disbanded the army, and set up a new almost solely shiite one.
As far as the sunni's were concerned the Americans were taking sides in a brewing civil war. As far as the Shiites could see the Americans were arming and training them to fight Sunni's. This perception of support by america was the main reason that the Mahdi armys fight early on in the occupation was never supported by the more main stream Shiites leadership.

Those factors (due to desisions made before the invasion) mean that the forces on the ground will never be able to win Sunni hearts and minds, any comparison with the british situation is rubbish.
The British as far as I can remember took heavy caulities when they were briefly moved into the sunni triangle.

On less you resort to near genocide(saddam vs the kurds, russia in chechnya, syria) CISW is a military operation where the political track takes presidence over any short term military consideration.
The iraq situation came about when a bunch ideological theories came up against a complicated reality, I put it in the same group of ideas as communism, globalisation, and any violent revolution that claims the old has to be washed away with blood and suffering( and that this is price we have to pay if we want to be free, rich, happy, ect).

[Big-E]

If you wait for them, then you can beat them off and it will work frustrating.

So your saying let them congregate into something like this... oh dude!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MH45v0NMOw

:nutkick

[merocaine]

so who were they zapping?

[Soner1980]

I don't know who has been bombed but it seems like a group walking on the street. (deuhh) I saw this on TV and it was a bad quality video, so it was not clear who they were but walking on the street, it might be a rebel group.

So, let them come. Ataturk said: If they want to come, then they also have something to see...

[Big-E]

so who were they zapping?

They were insurgents during the battle of Fallujah.

[FutureTank]

They were insurgents during the battle of Fallujah.

I couldn't tell and probably neiother could the pilot. He was givel a light by GOLD and away he went. How did GOLD know who they were?
He sees a group. He sees some of the group have weapons. He calls in an F-16 (probably on station) and lights up the nearest building, and kaboom

[Soner1980]

There may be also some ground surveiliance units in the vicinity and some of them had already contact with them. In that case the permission to fire is always granted to all units.

This is standard in most armies, especially NATO.

[Big-E]

I couldn't tell and probably neiother could the pilot. He was givel a light by GOLD and away he went. How did GOLD know who they were?
He sees a group. He sees some of the group have weapons. He calls in an F-16 (probably on station) and lights up the nearest building, and kaboom

The ROEs for the battle of Fallujah allowed any targets to be engaged. The town was cleared prior to action and anyone who stayed was presumed hostile. If they were civilians who stayed they must be pretty dumb given the warning they had. It's not like they were disabled, they were running pretty fast from what I saw.

[FutureTank]

Under that ROE I'd be running also :)

[LouDobb]

But has the US actually won any counter insurgency wars? The last example I believe would be in the turn of the century. The US put down an insurgency in the Philippines, but none of the methods used would be acceptable today. Counter insurgency is a dirty war; the rebel is the fish, and the people are the water. Sometimes they drain the fishpond to get at the fish.

Cmon, who has problems with scorthed earth campaigns?

[FutureTank]

Maybe Australia can rent a part of it's territory for people who want to conduct war using scorched earth strategy...we provide scorched earth ;)

[KGB]

The reason why the al Sadr, why Hizballah, why Hamas have such clout is this: THEY PROVIDE THE SOCIAL SERVICES. They provide some security to the population, administer justice, etc. They are the government. As a civilian, how can you afford to not cooperate with the people on whom you and your family's lives and wellbeing depend? There were russians that opposed stalin, and germans who oppossed hitler. But they had to keep quiet or risk getting executed.

[Big-E]

The reason why the al Sadr, why Hizballah, why Hamas have such clout is this: THEY PROVIDE THE SOCIAL SERVICES. They provide some security to the population, administer justice, etc. They are the government. As a civilian, how can you afford to not cooperate with the people on whom you and your family's lives and wellbeing depend? There were russians that opposed stalin, and germans who oppossed hitler. But they had to keep quiet or risk getting executed.


Whats funny about that is much of their funding comes from the West yet we get no credit for that. Now that Hamas is broke maybe they will realize who they should have been thanking.

[DragonKing786]

Whats funny about that is much of their funding comes from the West yet we get no credit for that. Now that Hamas is broke maybe they will realize who they should have been thanking.

You mean FATAH should be thanking US, cause Hamas was never given anything cause they are considered "terrorist group" according to US.

[Big-E]

You mean FATAH should be thanking US, cause Hamas was never given anything cause they are considered "terrorist group" according to US.

The money for the PLO was ending up in the hands of Hamas so funding was cut. Fatah isn't getting anything now either until they can clean up their act.

[radiosilence]

The money for the PLO was ending up in the hands of Hamas so funding was cut. Fatah isn't getting anything now either until they can clean up their act.

Fatah is still receiving about $50 million in aid from the Bush Adminstration. The original amount allocated for Fatah was $86 million but it was reduce to $50 million due to lack of transparency and fear that some of it might end up with hamas. IIRC, hamas is receiving aid from middle eastern countries. The prime minister of the palestinian govt. (hamas) traveled to middle eastern capitals some time ago and was promised emergency aid worth over a hundred million dollars.

[merocaine]

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/world/asia/06afghan.html

good article on dutch counter insurgency tactics in afganistan.

[radiosilence]

The Dutch approach will work in less hostile areas where reconstruction projects are able to get off the ground. However in Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah provinces where the insurgency’s current centre of gravity falls will require more of a military solution to establish the writ of the govt.

[Aussie Digger]

The day Bush declared the war over, I told a friend that the war for the USA in Iraq is only starting now...The USA tactics are wrong: you cannot win a counter insurgency war by just throwing money, material and men at it - Vietnam!!!. Further, their Intel is poor, and they do not have sufficient first-hand information to stop the bombings etc. Again, money and technology does not provide the complete answer to obtain Intelligence. You have to gather in with covert forward observation agents, physical patrols, and infiltrating the enemy ranks to obtain 1st-hand information; while simulatiuosly earn the respect of the local population.

These lessons were learnt in South Africa more than a century ago, when in the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902), the mighty British Empire attacked the 2 Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, having 450 000! men in the field by war's end, -against about 50 000 Boers. The British also declared the war over at the end of the conventional phase, but despite being outnumbered 10:1, and their farms and houses being burnt down, women and children dying in Concentration Camps; the Boers kept the Empire busy for another 2 years in one of the most costly wars for the Empire. (My grandfather fought in the Boer war and his house was also burned down as part of the policy of "scorched earth".)

In more recent history, the former SADF fought a 23 year Counter Insurgeny war in Namibia and Angola, in what became known as the South African Bushwar (1966-1989). The former SADF managed to win this was as is evident by the number of incidents (mines, bombings, attacks, etc.) as illustrated on the webpage: http://www.geocities.com/sa_bushwar. By war's end the confrontation have taken a much more conventional form, with the SADF up against 45000 Cubans suplied with modern Soviet weaponary, FAPLA (Angolan Army), PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia). By 1989, the end of the Cold War, political moves towards peace from the parties concerned, lead to a peaceful sub-continent.

Back to Iraq: The USA can learn from the British in the south how to win the "hearts and minds" of the people as a 1st step in ending a counter insurgency conflict. Typical American arrogance and ignorance is not going to help!

Funnily enough, despite how MANY times they've been told, they are actually only starting to operate in Baghdad this way NOW. The troops are located in their TAOR's permanently rather than co-located at "super bases", they work hand in hand with indigenous forces, they are conducting aggressive patrolling 24hrs per day in their TAOR's and not providing insurgents with room to move or respite from operations.

Furthermore being in place to protect the citizens, whilst simulataneously engaging the leaders of the various factions (except AQ) in dialogue about the issues, is going to go a LONG way towards stabilising and winning or at least ending it satisfactorily for everyone involved...

It has only taken putting the USMC in charge instead of USAF or US Army too...

A good read about these issues can be found here:

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/Iraq%20After%20action.pdf

[merocaine]

A good read about these issues can be found here:

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/...r%20action.pdf





Cheers AD, great read,

[sparta]

everything you guys are mentioning are fantastic arguements, but 1 must remember war is fluid and all the best plans are laid to rest once started so in reality you can apply lessons learned although most times not the same way in process. there is no right all wrong in as long as your goals are being acheived.
but providing security that they require to contain the CIW would take 20 times the troops they have and they would also need full cooperation from countries boardering Iraq as well, media control, dmz areas.
I think that the US like Australia made 1 vital mistake, beleive downsizing a military was a good thing, in the belief that you don't need so many men on the ground by replacing them by technology.

[jconners]

In general...

During Branch training (pre-1966 US Special Forces course required for all enlisted Special Forces qualified), it was taught and accepted that any political or military movement that had more than 5% support of the general population could not be 'eliminated' soley by military means, including counter-insurgency methods.

However, if the object is simply to occupy and control specific resources, then military action can be used when the support for any opposition movement is 100%.

In Iraq the internal public support of the different opposition factions greatly exceeds 5%, therefore, I do not believe that we will achieve any goals intended to gain widespread support for the United States and our strategic interests and policies in the region by the sole application of military force. However, military force can be used to establish a foot hold in the region and allow the United States to develop effective coalitions that moderate the extreme and destructive behavior of some factions. Again, counter-insurgency actions will continue to be effective in maintaining any needed 'foot holds' and the development of the needed international coalitions.

Counter-insurgency operations are ALWAYS appropriate when military force is applied against another nation...however, the objectives of such operations can not be expected to eliminate the oppostion forces when such forces have more than 5% support of the internal population.

On a personal note...each time I write military force, I think of those wearing the uniform and the price that is paid when we conduct operations that place those individuals in harms way...

RANGER Jerry Conners

[KGB]

In general...

During Branch training (pre-1966 US Special Forces course required for all enlisted Special Forces qualified), it was taught and accepted that any political or military movement that had more than 5% support of the general population could not be 'eliminated' soley by military means, including counter-insurgency methods.

However, if the object is simply to occupy and control specific resources, then military action can be used when the support for any opposition movement is 100%.

In Iraq the internal public support of the different opposition factions greatly exceeds 5%, therefore, I do not believe that we will achieve any goals intended to gain widespread support for the United States and our strategic interests and policies in the region by the sole application of military force. However, military force can be used to establish a foot hold in the region and allow the United States to develop effective coalitions that moderate the extreme and destructive behavior of some factions. Again, counter-insurgency actions will continue to be effective in maintaining any needed 'foot holds' and the development of the needed international coalitions.

Counter-insurgency operations are ALWAYS appropriate when military force is applied against another nation...however, the objectives of such operations can not be expected to eliminate the oppostion forces when such forces have more than 5% support of the internal population.

On a personal note...each time I write military force, I think of those wearing the uniform and the price that is paid when we conduct operations that place those individuals in harms way...

RANGER Jerry Conners

Thanks for that informative post. It may or may not be true, but it give insight into how they make decisions.

[KGB]

This is a sensitive question, but it needs to be asked.

Every counterinsurgency/ low intesity conflict that I've read of, has some form of human rights abuse on both sides. Not just collateral damage, really sick stuff: torture, collective punishment, etc. As far as I know, for the US for example, every CI it has been in: Phillipines 1900s, Vietnam, now Iraq, was stained by these abuses. I don't think other countries fared better.

I myself know people who fought in these types of conflict. They're pleasant people, normal - until they start talking about the job. They talk about burning villages rather casually. And they exhibit some sort of paranoia which makes them both inappropriately fearfull, and inappropriately angry at times. When these people are home for rnr they can make you nervous. They must be hell for the civillians where they work.

The question: does participating in a CI do something to the brains of the participants? Does it have particularly severe psychological effects? Are human rights abuses inevitable in a CI setting.

[jconners]

My combat experiences are limited to SE Asia 1959-1966 era.

It has been my observation that any person who uses excessive force or directs excessive force against armed or unarmed persons is damaged by the experience.

It does not take courage to kill, but to fight when decisively engaged...if you manuever then you will experience casualties. Simply destroying a 'target' without yourselve being at risk does not constitute a courageous act.

Counterinsurgency operations are not exempt from these 'rules'.

It has also been my observation that many persons use excessive force in their daily dealings with others in a non-combat civilian environment and I believe they are also damaged for doing so. You see this occurring in 'all walks of life'...or at least in most parts of the world.

The expression "ALL IS FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR" speaks to the problem...it is my opinion that love and war require the best conduct and fairness...or both endeavors will fail...yet few think twice when speaking the "ALL IS FAIR..." statement.

Counterinsurgency operations need not be conducted, should not be conducted in a manner that involves excessive use of force nor directed toward non-combatants. There are many counterinsurgency operations that can be conducted to achieve honorable objectives and minimize unnecessary death and destruction.

RANGER Jerry Conners

[radiosilence]

My combat experiences are limited to SE Asia 1959-1966 era.

It has been my observation that any person who uses excessive force or directs excessive force against armed or unarmed persons is damaged by the experience.

It does not take courage to kill, but to fight when decisively engaged...if you manuever then you will experience casualties. Simply destroying a 'target' without yourselve being at risk does not constitute a courageous act.

Counterinsurgency operations are not exempt from these 'rules'.

It has also been my observation that many persons use excessive force in their daily dealings with others in a non-combat civilian environment and I believe they are also damaged for doing so. You see this occurring in 'all walks of life'...or at least in most parts of the world.

The expression "ALL IS FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR" speaks to the problem...it is my opinion that love and war require the best conduct and fairness...or both endeavors will fail...yet few think twice when speaking the "ALL IS FAIR..." statement.

Counterinsurgency operations need not be conducted, should not be conducted in a manner that involves excessive use of force nor directed toward non-combatants. There are many counterinsurgency operations that can be conducted to achieve honorable objectives and minimize unnecessary death and destruction.

RANGER Jerry Conners


Thanks for your insights. I am interested in your views on the situation in Afghanistan? How do we quell the Insurgency? Is it too late?

[KGB]

Thanks for your insights. I am interested in your views on the situation in Afghanistan? How do we quell the Insurgency? Is it too late?

Or if it's even possible, given the amount of Heroin growing there. The interests of the country's biggest source of income and the interests of NATO collide. Perhaps the real goal of NATO is containment, like the way they treat HIV - they can't get rid of the bug yet but the drugs help keep patients from dying.

[jconners]

Gentlemen:

Per your request...I am prepared to provide more specific recommendations however, the following captures the concept:

"Field" military action primarily in the form of foreign area intelligence, including foreign language, qualified teams 1) conducting covert operations to identify targets of opportunity and once located, coordination for appropriate action AND 2) providing (and participating) non-covert public assistance...long term aid in the form of medical, education, building/transportation/sanitation system, support of local religious beliefs and activities...anything that the people of the country need.

Essential element to be achieved...our actions to be respected by the people of the region...AND a percentage (50%) of the foreign area qualified military force MUST be either a member of the religious faith of the indigenous population or at a minimum...'highly sympathetic and sensitive and respectful of that religion' AND other national values.

Mission objectives of field foreign area qualified (including language) forces:

1. Locate targets of opportunity and destroy or otherwise 'managed' if warranted...via hi-tech or otherwise;
2. Long-term aid provided to develop trust and confidence and build a in-depth and permanent mutually benefiting relationship with the people and countries of the region.

Note: This is a permanent long-term foreign affairs approach...and applies to most conflict scenarios when the public support for the 'insurgents...who are most often respected as national heroes' exceeds 5%. Sophisticated leadership and judgment must be exercised in the decision to destroy discovered 'targets of opportunity'...

Economic justification/objectives...convert 'enemies' into consumers and producers of products needed by the world marketplace...the ideal solution is to not destroy/eliminate but to steadily increase the numbers of consumers and those competitively seeking to produce.

Note: This is an old post WWII concept...that was actually finding root and expanding in some US circles, but fell apart during the Vietnam era.

If you would like my comments on the non-field military endeavors, then I will provide on request. Our actions at the embassy and within other government programs must be conducted and coordinated in a manner that is better orchestrated and committed to helping not dominating...except in extreme situations that require destruction of 'targets of opportunity. Again...these endeavors require excellent leadership and judgment...something that is in 'short supply'.

RANGER Jerry Conners
Chinese Bandit 13

[merocaine]

This threads been dead a while but I guess this article highlights some of the problems of counter insurgency.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2125142,00.html

its a 3 parter

[FutureTank]

This threads been dead a while but I guess this article highlights some of the problems of counter insurgency.


This is not a problem of counter-insurgency tactics, but of the culture of the US forces. What the article describes, sounds a lot like behaviour of the Nazi SS and Gestapo!

It seems like the higher echelons of command have no idea in terms of strategy and tactics appropriate for the situation, and the troops are not under much command and control, or reflect the society they come from.

Not that I'm saying all US troops behave in the ways described, but even if 10% or 50% do so, its bad enough.

Of course the US forces operate in a culture strange to them. However, can that be an excuse?

Seems to me the operations in Iraq failed at a level no FM covers.

Greg

[Manfred2]

It is the easiest thing in the world to compair people to the Nazi SS when they are dealing effectivly with a violent situation... it has become rather common in the last 50 years.

If .01% of our armed forces were that bad, it would be enough to damn us in any case. Show me a city with 150,000 people in it that has less than a dozen bad people in it, and I will crap you a gold brick.

Americans have been called weak, naive and soft-hearted. So sorry if we are not living up to that UK reporter's pre-concieved notion of us, but us Yankees have never been very good at fitting into other people's pidgeon-holes.

[FutureTank]

It is the easiest thing in the world to compair people to the Nazi SS when they are dealing effectivly with a violent situation... it has become rather common in the last 50 years.

I think the problem is not so simple.

Firstly many US troops come from violent social and community backgrounds. Aside from the fact that there is a gun culture in US, and violence is readily found in media, in fact media is saturated with it, the points made in the article are that the military as an organisation does not prepare troop for service in what is not a clear cut case of military deployment. Most troops go through basic preparing to fight a war, not become police. Consider however how police behaves in the US. The 'take downs' that require 6:1 in numbers, and people being shot 10-40 times during an arrest! You see same in the article, but applied by military which can't tell civilians from insurgents, and it seems doesn't want to.

The tactics used are based on the urban combat manual, but are the troops engaged in urban combat? Most of the time they are just being used by locals to settle scores!

This is why I compare them to SS. SS, at least in in Eastern Europe, also went into homes on advice of local police looking for Jews and communists who were dehumanised and devalued. They were also ignorant of the local culture and history, and were seeking to impose own cultural and political values on the population based on an ideal.

If .01% of our armed forces were that bad, it would be enough to damn us in any case. Show me a city with 150,000 people in it that has less than a dozen bad people in it, and I will crap you a gold brick.
I think the suggestion is that the percentage of troops behaving badly is far greater then .01%
You are presenting a challenge of Biblical proportions :-) However, troops are under different expectations then general public. This is why they claim to be disciplined and trained.

Americans have been called weak, naive and soft-hearted. So sorry if we are not living up to that UK reporter's pre-concieved notion of us, but us Yankees have never been very good at fitting into other people's pidgeon-holes
I'm not sure how such a statement relates to the issue at hand. In any case, it seems that the US troops are not living up to their own standards, never mind those of others.

Greg

[gf0012-aust]

I think the problem is not so simple.

Firstly many US troops come from violent social and community backgrounds. Aside from the fact that there is a gun culture in US

Thats a rather bold and empirical statement to make..... the anthropological reference material for this conclusion was sourced from whereabouts?

[FutureTank]

I don't have figures handy (but can get them) which state that the socio-economic breakdown of non-technical specialties in DoD recruitment are predominantly from the lower socio-economic levels of society. Many (and I would be so bold as to say predominantly) who join the military are seeking free education and no-question-asked ability to work. The US DoD like all armies are having a great level of difficulty in recruiting individuals which have the potential to undertake education and work in the areas that require university degrees in civilian employment.
Not everyone is a rifleman.

That there is a huge level of violence in the US society is actually a given considering there are an estimated 270 million guns in private ownership. US has a very high level of crime for a developed country (comparatively), and this shows in the prison populations.

However, I don't particularly want to get into this area because I've been there done that, and eventually it comes down to Americans saying that 'we like it this way'.

Whatever the case, armies usually are representative of their societies.

Cheers
Greg

[gf0012-aust]

Whatever the case, armies usually are representative of their societies.

Cheers
Greg

Brasil has a higher incidence of gun related crime in RdJ than any city in the US. ;)

You need to define the issue of the rule of law in a given society before drawing parallels between the behaviour of their military and the society (or govt) that they are sworn to defend..

there's a huge difference.

if you were going to argue demographic breakup you could look at ADF data for the last 20 years - quality adjusts when the economy shifts. does the quality of discipline change due to less "academic" enrolments going up?

militaries need to be looked at through the prism and veil of their insititutional strength as well as issues of the separation of powers vis a vis the rule of law.

looking at pure anthropologically linked demographic criteria is still a sweeping assumption IMO

[kato]

That there is a huge level of violence in the US society is actually a given considering there are an estimated 270 million guns in private ownership. US has a very high level of crime for a developed country (comparatively), and this shows in the prison populations.


Not really.
1. In comparison to other developed countries (Europe, Japan), the US has a predisposition to more violent crimes, not more crimes in general. Which has to do with the availability of guns, but not on the perps' side. That is, unlike in the US a breaking-and-entering in Germany will rarely be perpetrated in an armed fashion.
2. The US has a rather high prison population because the US judicial system is rather screwy and harsh from a European viewpoint. This is partly due to the entirely different intention behind imprisoning between Europe and the US (resozialization vs punishment-and-deterrence).

Also, as a side note, the "lower socio-economic levels" in the United States have it far better than in other countries, especially than in countries without minimum wages. Both in economic terms and in education terms (at least for members of these social stratas that end up in the military).


As for the original direction of this thread, a look at Afghanistan might be more helpful than Iraq. Especially since different approaches and different basic concepts in approaching in various insurgency environments (and no, not just "North vs South") can be looked at there.

[merocaine]

Americans have been called weak, naive and soft-hearted. So sorry if we are not living up to that UK reporter's pre-concieved notion of us, but us Yankees have never been very good at fitting into other people's pidgeon-holes.

The article was taken from the nation magizine(american), it was reprinted in the Guardian(british).

Future Tank your so full of Sh*t its not true. Most of the actions described come about from the ROE's the troops were operating under, that and lack of command and control by officers and NCO's that should know better and were unprepared for the role they had to play.

This is not a problem of counter-insurgency tactics, but of the culture of the US forces. What the article describes, sounds a lot like behaviour of the Nazi SS and Gestapo!

It is exactly a problem of counter insurgency tactics!
SS and Gestapo???!!!!! there is no point in talking to you about any of this.
Taking your bullshit analogy to its logical conclusion you are implying that America is a nazi dictatorship, since soldiers are a reflection of the socity they live in.
All I can say is your an incredibly ignorent and insulting person.

[KGB]

Was there ever a successful counter insurgency campaign conducted that was free of any atrocities or scandals of this sort? I doubt it ever happened, and whoever is able do such a thing deserves a nobel peace prize.

The psychological pressures placed on the men in a CI situation are severe, the nature of the war tends to alienate the men from the population. The dehumanizing effect is insidious and not unique to soldiers, I've seen the effect on medical staff faced with overwhelming demands. At some point, someone will crack.

speculation about violent crime rates and atrocities reveals more about your own biases than anything else. In truly violent countries, the crimes aren't reported and the criminals aren't in jail. The worst atrocities in ww2 came from cultures that are considered very ordered and civil.

Atrocities are inevitable in extended insurgencies.

[riksavage]

The following link provides access to a very interesting paper written in 1962 by counter insurgency experts from around the globe (US, UK, France to name a few).

The findings / comments and historical facts remain as relevent today as they did back then. Amazing that this was written at the same time the US was getting sucked in to the Vietnam war.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R412-1.pdf

[merocaine]

I think the problem that the most effictive counter insurgency experts, ie the guys in the field who formed there theories by direct contact, encounters is that there seen at best as talented maveriks by the Staff officers.
An Army is essentilly a body of trained professional opinion, and as with all professional opinion there is a prevailling otodoxy, in most western army this is a doctorine of over whelming fire power.
Counter Insurgency warfare IMO is mostly a police action, it leaves little place for a docterine of fire power, hence all those guys hoping to make a carrier in the latest war will do there upmost to make sure that its fought in as close to conventional manner as possible. With as much fire power as possible.

[merocaine]

The following link provides access to a very interesting paper written in 1962 by counter insurgency experts from around the globe (US, UK, France to name a few).

The findings / comments and historical facts remain as relevent today as they did back then. Amazing that this was written at the same time the US was getting sucked in to the Vietnam war.


wow really excellent paper, cheers

[Manfred2]

Good article, and shows that is pays to investigate the wisdom of our elders.

This place never ceases to amaze me. If it is not already, this ought to be the most prestigious sire of it's kind.

I just had a bad thought; asymetrical warfare as practiced nowadays might possibly lead to an era where the only answer to an insurgency is more insurgents... and terrorists with more terroism. This of course would lead to a situation that Humanity is very familiar with; the Dark Ages.

In the mid-1970s, the CIA published a report that the Soviet Economy was failing, and that if they did not initiate an offensive war by 1985, they never would be able to. This turned out to be true.
Have there been any serious, reliable reports on the Future of asymetrical warfare in the next decade?

[funtz]

well no matter what people say anti insurgency operations will continue to claim the lives of well trained armed forces, especially during the initial phase during which the armed force is trying to get a foothold, and throughout the operation there will be casualties, doesn’t matter which force is dealing with the insurgency.

A lot depends on the training and logistical support that the insurgents have for example the extremist Islamic terrorists that the armed forces are dealing with throughout the world, have good training and supply and an active recruitment base which coupled with their knowledge of the battlefield gives them an advantage.

To stay especially on Military Strategy and Tactics which is used to counter terrorists, well having the right men is the only real strategy as every situation encountered on the field will be varied and unique.

The goal is to provide a solid secure environment to the local populace and then give them incentives to stop supporting the insurgents, hence reducing the local support, which is only possible when a political solution to there needs has been worked out and the money and weapons trail has been traced and closed, which is pretty much impossible unless political deals are in place with all the parties involved.

I can’t post links yet (too new a member) but a very good example of stopping a terrorist insurgency is the Punjab state of India, however again it helps no one as all the different operating theaters have different factors a strategy that works in Malaysia-Afghanistan is not necessarily a good strategy in Iraq.

Without including elaborate intelligence operations and political steps there is no way an insurgency can be dealt with. And casualties are sadly imminent and necessary for securing a stable secure world.

[Cletus Wilbury]

I've been reading up everything i can get my hands on about insurgency/insurrection and counterinsurgency. In the literature published by the U.S. Army I found at least one document that said it is important to recognize an insurgency early. I also find in several documents that the appropriate strategy to deal with an insurgency is very different than terrorism.

The discussion about whether a certain situation is an insurgency could be considered a political discussion, but it's also important to determine which strategies will actually work.

This paper is a hot potato, can we talk about it? : AL-QAEDA AS INSURGENCY by Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, United States Marine Corps

[Mumbatik]

In my humble opinion the experience of counter-insurgency done right can be learned with the AFP of the Philippine Military.

Why the Philippines is the example of counter-insurgency done right
Both the Philippine counter-insurgencies proved to be successful. Given the results attained, it would appear that the counter-insurgency efforts were more similar than dissimilar. It is illuminating to examine how the counter-insurgencies were different. The counterinsurgencies were different in ways that proved to be largely irrelevant to the success of the effort. The counter-insurgency at the turn of the century was lead by United States forces who recruited locals to the effort, mostly to serve in civil positions and the local constabulary. The later counter-insurgency was an effort manned exclusively by Filipinos with minor US logistical and intelligence support, fighting an indigenous communist front made up of other Filipinos. The insurgency following the Spanish American War was a collection of loosely linked nodes operating independently, without coordination and with only nominal allegiance to the titular head, Aguinaldo. The Communists in the later insurgency were hyper-organized and controlled although there is the possibility this organization was more apparent on paper at NPA headquarters than on the ground.

Given the differences in who was leading the counter-insurgency, the US in one case, the Philippine Army in the other and the gap in time between the conflicts, it is striking how similar the efforts actually were. Both counter-insurgencies saw the greatest success when it came to rely on dispersed, independently operated units. Both counter-insurgency efforts made a priority of establishing local political control that had a chance to flourish under the protection of arms. Both sought to destroy those elements of the insurgency that were not willing to come under control of the government. The similarities in the two strategies separated by more than seventy years would make it seem that that commanders were operating out the same OPLAN or at least from the same doctrine. However, the counter-insurgency leaders did not adhere to any OPLAN and they had no access to doctrine. The counter-insurgencies in both cases made a virtue of necessity, and by doing so, independently arrived at the most effective strategy at fighting insurgents.

Regarding the issue of doctrine, the Philippine Army commanders engaged in the fight expressly denied that they were conducting the fight in adherence to US Army doctrine. Victor Corpus, a Philippine Army officer who defected to the Communists then returned to fight the insurgency, denied that he had learned anything from US Army doctrine. Instead, he adapted to the situation and what they learned from fighting the war. In the words of Corpus: "we drew mostly upon my experience. We didn't refer to any books. We had read the US manuals on low intensity conflicts, but we blamed those manuals for introducing COIN doctrines that only aggravated the situation. They apply conventional efforts to an unconventional situation. In particular, traditional civic action is a mere palliative. It does not go to the root causes of the problem, to the lack of democracy.”1

To Corpus, the crucial difference in successful vice un-successful counter-insurgency strategy was the sincerity and permanence of efforts to institutionalize democracy and address the legitimate concerns of the "grievance guerrillas."2 The strategy that Corpus advocated resulted in a "feeling among the populace that nonviolent avenues were available for interest articulation and realization." With Corpus and others in the Philippine Army pushing for sincere democratic reforms, people in the countryside were convinced to give up the insurgency. "They had given up precisely because the hardline approach.3

Was the fact that the Philippine Army counter-insurgency strategy so closely mirrored that of US Army counter-insurgency efforts prior to the Vietnam War-vintage COIN doctrine dismissed by Corpus, merely a coincidence? Did the winning strategy transcend the Philippine theater, or is there something unique in Filipino psychology or terrain that channeled strategy in one particular way? These appear to be unexamined questions. There does not seem to be any literature that would support or deny the theory that there is something in Filipino psychology that would result in one particular type of effective counter-insurgency strategy. Rather, it appears that the fact that the same strategy arose some eighty years apart, albeit in the same geographic location, is evidence that the counter-insurgency doctrine hit upon independently decades apart, is the appropriate way to counter “grievance guerrillas.”

The strategies of the successful counterinsurgency that arose independently find support in the US Marine Corps Small Wars Manual. The Marines who wrote that document noticed the imperative to contest insurgents with all available means with an emphasis on the moral and psychological. “The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It. is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development.”4 Serious study of foreign people takes time for a foreign counter-insurgency force, such as the United States Army in the Philippines. As for the Philippine Army, they had a head-start since they were of the same culture and psychology of the insurgents they were battling. Since the Philippine Army battalions were also living in the same environment as the insurgency they fought, those soldiers became all the more attuned to the culture and therefore, all the more effective.

Other successful counter-insurgencies share many of the characteristics of the Philippine campaigns. The Malay Emergency and the current US campaign in Iraq both resemble, in broad terms, the traits apparent in the Philippine counter-insurgency. Richard Clutterbuck, in his book The Long, Long War, identified the keys to the successful counter-insurgency in Malaysia: "Protection of the people and the government structure is essential. An extensive police force at the village level is also required."5 Clutterbuck’s description of the successful counter-insurgency are similar to those in the Philippines and those currently in effect by the US Army in Iraq.

There is little doubt that the Philippine Army, however fortuitously, went about their counter-insurgency in the right way. The key, which went un-remarked by Marks is that the Philippine Army had time to make sure their counter-insurgency worked. In the words of General in the current counter-insurgency fight in Iraq, “Counterinsurgency is a long-term proposition. The ability to fight counterinsurgency requires time and building-block approach for learning…”6 The reason the Philippine Army had the time to make their strategy worked is self evident; the government and the insurgents had no where else to go. Both sides would fight until the war ended one way or the other. Time is a luxury that foreign counter-insurgency forces do not always have, whereas indigenous counter-insurgencies can fight until resolution. However, so long as the counter-insurgency has the time to prosecute the strategy, the doctrine will be validated. If for some reason, the counter-insurgency must leave the field, the strategy will fail.

Ultimately, the Philippine Army had the time to grind down the Philippine Insurgency with a home-grown strategy that focused on the psychology of the insurgency and addressed the concerns of “grievance guerrillas.” Indigenous forces addressed the psychological needs of the grievance guerrillas and had the time to grind down and destroy recalcitrant revolutionaries. This is the essence of a counter-insurgency done right.

Notes:
1. Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003. Pg 136.

2. Ibid. Pg 133.

3. Ibid.

4. United States Marine Corps Publications Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States Government) 1940. Pg 18.

5. Clutterbuck, Richard. From The Long Long War, Quoted in "Insurgency and Counter-insurgency: Lessons from Malaya" in Ohio University

6. Gaskin, Maj.Gen. Walter. “ DoD News Briefing with Maj. Gen. Gaskin from Iraq July 20, 2007” US Department of Defense News Transcript

[Cletus Wilbury]

excellent analysis, Mumbatik.

I'll throw in a few comments and questions:
Regarding the the insurgency following the Spanish American War, I don't think we (the U.S.) could use the brutal tactics used in that campaign. The world community would condemn it, correctly, as genocide.

"address the legitimate concerns of the "grievance guerrillas."", that's critical, as you pointed out. In the case of many Iraqis their concern seems to be the occupation itself. Considering the history of western interventions in the region, the legitimacy of that concern can certainly be argued.

Your points about the troops being of the same culture is also critical, perhaps even having many of their own people who speak the local language?

You write: "If for some reason, the counter-insurgency must leave the field, the strategy will fail.". True, but is that necessarily a bad thing? Would it have been such a bad thing had the U.S. given the Philippines it's independence in 1900? In retrospect, considering Japan in WWII maybe that wouldn't have worked out so well, but my preference for self-determination makes me think Mark Twain was correct.

From your perspective, especially considering the cultural issues you mentioned, doesn't it seem troops from Iraq's neighbors would be more effective in counterinsurgency efforts, while also removing their primary grievance- western military presence.

There also is considerable mention to following the rule of law in dealing with the insurgency. Would you say the counterinsurgency against the Communists (in the 1990s?) followed the rule of law, more or less? I'm not very familar with that effort. I googled one article (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_philippines.html):


...Two Chinese arms shipments in 1972 and 1974 were intercepted and Chinese aid stopped in 1975....

...with President Marcos gone the communists lost their main recruiter...


The 1st of those brings up another important COIN objective, cut off the supplies of the insurgents, which we can't seem to do in Iraq. The 2nd one we already talked about, legitimate grievance.

[Cooch]

In the case of many Iraqis their concern seems to be the occupation itself. Considering the history of western interventions in the region, the legitimacy of that concern can certainly be argued.


I would suggest that, given the history of violence in the region that has no relation to "western intervention" that this argument should be approached with caution.

Was there conflict in Iraq before the Western invasion?..... Yes.
Would conflict cease if all western forces withdrew?...... In all probability, No.

The current inability of the ISF to fully secure the protection of their citizens may in part be a result of poor decisions by the invading coalition, but I see no evidence to support the argument that replacing US troops with those from a middle-eastern country would result in a cessation of the current conflict.

Respectfully.........Peter

[Cletus Wilbury]

...but I see no evidence to support the argument that replacing US troops with those from a middle-eastern country would result in a cessation of the current conflict.

Respectfully.........Peter

Fair enough, if you want to discount the reasons I gave, but it would save us $10 billion month.

[Chrom]

I would suggest that, given the history of violence in the region that has no relation to "western intervention" that this argument should be approached with caution.

Was there conflict in Iraq before the Western invasion?..... Yes.
Would conflict cease if all western forces withdrew?...... In all probability, No.

The current inability of the ISF to fully secure the protection of their citizens may in part be a result of poor decisions by the invading coalition, but I see no evidence to support the argument that replacing US troops with those from a middle-eastern country would result in a cessation of the current conflict.

Respectfully.........Peter Nope, it wouldnt reduce violence right away - in fact, it will certainly increase it for short while. But sooner or later US troops must be withdrawn, and there is no real indication what later situation will be better than now. As such, the sooner US forces will be withdrawn the sooner civil war will end there - whoever will win.

[merocaine]

If I was American I would be happier if the present Administration were able to articulate its long term strategic gaols in Iraq, and the wider Middle East.

American policy in the region is drifting in a highly disturbing fashion.
Sometimes I wake up in the morning look at the news and I think I'm living in a parallel universe.

Its almost 5 years and the Bush Administration still doesent know why its still in Iraq, and why its going to be there for the foreseeable future.

A quick run down

The current fight,

US vs Sunni Islamic fighters (simmering)

US vs Shia Islamic fighters (flaring up

US vs Al Queada (long running)

US vs Iraqi Sunni nationalists (winding down, with the possiblity of flaring up)

Al Queada vs Iraqi Sunni nationalists (flaring up)

Al Queada vs all the Shia factions.

Iraqi (bader brigades, Iranian backed, US backed) vs Madi army elements (nationalist, Iranian Backed) this is the big one...

Iraqi Army vs Sunni nationalists (stalemate, since the Insurgents have smoked the peace pipe with the US the hated Iraqi army has pretty much abandoned the fight, expect this one to heat up again)

Turkey vs Kurdish elements (face it Kurdistan is a fact)

Iran vs Kurdish elements (ditto)

plus many other smaller turf wars...

The US and Iran are backing the same horse in the Islamic Council of Iraq and the Bader Brigades/Kurds. Unfortunately that horse is in favor of dismembering the country on sectarian lines. The Sadrists who they want to destroy, are along with the Sunni nationalists the only groups that want to maintain a united Iraq. Quick point A Nationalist united Iraq would be much more resistant to Iranian influence that a Shia Rump dominated by that one time Iranian Milita the Bader Brigades.

Now I dont believe the Americans want Iraq to be dismembered, but there policies seem to support this out come.

If I had any ideas as to what US long term strategic goals were, I could make a few educated guesses as to what there moves should be.

As for General P. hes done a very good job at running a counter insurgency campaign, he's been helped by a number of factors beyond his control (Sunni /Al Queada civil war and Sadr moving into politics) but done a great job of capitalizing on those events. However without a strategic direction those tactical gains will prove fleeting.

[Chrom]

If

Its almost 5 years and the Bush Administration still doesent know why its still in Iraq, and why its going to be there for the foreseeable future.
fleeting.

Heh, if they dont tell you truth WHY US is there - it doesnt mean they dont know it themselves ;) Really, you believe too much in publicly spoken official words.

[Atilla [TR]]

Turkey vs Kurdish elements (face it Kurdistan is a fact)

Iran vs Kurdish elements (ditto)




Kurdistan is not fact! When you make comments like that it makes me believe that you support the terrorists. May I remind you that PKK is listed as a terrorist state in U.S, and E.U. And over the 20 years of fighting 30 000 people have died. May I also add that while the terrorists keep on trying to make something that is only in there dreams happen, they are killing innocent civilians , they are killing children and even innocent babies. While Turkish soldiers are trying to help Kurdish people hurt or in need the terrorists attack them. Please think before you write comments like that.

[merocaine]

Your off your rocker.

Why dont you visit Northern Iraq and ask what they call it.
Facts on the Ground Pleease.

[kato]

;139887']May I remind you that PKK is listed as a terrorist state in U.S, and E.U.

The Grey Wolves aren't far behind in public opinion in most EU nations...

[Atilla [TR]]

The Grey Wolves aren't far behind in public opinion in most EU nations...

Grey Wolfs have not done 1/10 of what Pkk has done. But yes they are not that great either they did there bad things, but not even close to what PKK has done and most there attacks where focussed on PKK members. And the neo nazi's in your country do not fare any better when they burn Turks homes.

[Cletus Wilbury]

This seems to be slipping under the radar (shoot, I can't post links yet, you'lll have to google it):

Opening Summary to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington, D.C.)
As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C. Thursday, April 10, 2008


...
It was my hope 16 months ago that I could help forge a bipartisan path forward in our Iraq policy that would sustain a steadily lower – but still adequate and necessary – level of commitment for the years needed to yield an Iraq that is an ally against extremists and can govern and defend itself. I continue to harbor this hope for a bipartisan path and will continue to work for it. But I do fear that understandable frustration over years of war and dismay over sacrifices already made may result in decisions that are gratifying in the short term but very costly to our country and the American people in the long term.
We were attacked from Afghanistan in 2001 and we are at war in Afghanistan today in no small measure because of mistakes this government made – mistakes I, among others, made – in the end game of the anti-Soviet war there some 20 years ago. If we get the end game wrong in Iraq, I predict the consequences will be far worse.


Traitor? :confused:

[merocaine]

Traitor?

If saying it as it is is makes you a traitor, then I guess he is.

Reading into this statement it seems that he did'ent anticipate the surge policy as he was looking to implement a disengagement policy.

"It was my hope 16 months ago that I could help forge a bipartisan path forward in our Iraq policy that would sustain a steadily lower – but still adequate and necessary – level of commitment for the years needed to yield an Iraq that is an ally against extremists and can govern and defend itself. I continue to harbor this hope for a bipartisan path and will continue to work for it"

Does he anticipate the failure of the surge policy? or is he future proofing himself.

"But I do fear that understandable frustration over years of war and dismay over sacrifices already made may result in decisions that are gratifying in the short term but very costly to our country and the American people in the long term."

Now is this a warning against adventures in Iran or and premature withdrawal from Iraq. Or both.

Its like reading tea leaves..

[Waylander]

Yeehaw, the old "but your Nazis..." argument.

Thanks god everybody can stop arguing with a german in a civilized manner if he feels he looses his arguments and still appear as a winner... :rolleyes:

[gf0012-aust]

Some of you need to take a cold shower.

Thread closed for a couple of days so that some navel gazing can happen.

[gf0012-aust]

Some of you need to take a cold shower.

Thread closed for a couple of days so that some navel gazing can happen.

thread re-opened.

if it's abused again then any offenders will incur a one week ban automatically...

[Ozzy Blizzard]

If I was American I would be happier if the present Administration were able to articulate its long term strategic gaols in Iraq, and the wider Middle East.

American policy in the region is drifting in a highly disturbing fashion.
Sometimes I wake up in the morning look at the news and I think I'm living in a parallel universe.

Its almost 5 years and the Bush Administration still doesent know why its still in Iraq, and why its going to be there for the foreseeable future.

A quick run down

The current fight,

US vs Sunni Islamic fighters (simmering)

US vs Shia Islamic fighters (flaring up

US vs Al Queada (long running)

US vs Iraqi Sunni nationalists (winding down, with the possiblity of flaring up)

Al Queada vs Iraqi Sunni nationalists (flaring up)

Al Queada vs all the Shia factions.

Iraqi (bader brigades, Iranian backed, US backed) vs Madi army elements (nationalist, Iranian Backed) this is the big one...

Iraqi Army vs Sunni nationalists (stalemate, since the Insurgents have smoked the peace pipe with the US the hated Iraqi army has pretty much abandoned the fight, expect this one to heat up again)

Turkey vs Kurdish elements (face it Kurdistan is a fact)

Iran vs Kurdish elements (ditto)

plus many other smaller turf wars...

The US and Iran are backing the same horse in the Islamic Council of Iraq and the Bader Brigades/Kurds. Unfortunately that horse is in favor of dismembering the country on sectarian lines. The Sadrists who they want to destroy, are along with the Sunni nationalists the only groups that want to maintain a united Iraq. Quick point A Nationalist united Iraq would be much more resistant to Iranian influence that a Shia Rump dominated by that one time Iranian Milita the Bader Brigades.

Now I dont believe the Americans want Iraq to be dismembered, but there policies seem to support this out come.

If I had any ideas as to what US long term strategic goals were, I could make a few educated guesses as to what there moves should be.

As for General P. hes done a very good job at running a counter insurgency campaign, he's been helped by a number of factors beyond his control (Sunni /Al Queada civil war and Sadr moving into politics) but done a great job of capitalizing on those events. However without a strategic direction those tactical gains will prove fleeting.



Merocaine i agree with you completly on this point. Allthough some tactical progress has made US policy does not seem to be aimed at achieveing any clear goal, apart from the vauge notion of an iraq that can defend itself. Mid term security improvement seems to be the only clear objective, and apparantly strategic contradictions are being tollerated in order to achieve that. This is not a long term soloution IMHO, & without a set of clear strategic aims tactical sucsess alone is virtually irrelevent.

This seems to be a failure of policy rather than tactics, which is consistent with the wider war on terror. COIN campaigns are allways fundimentally political/economic in nature I guess this is the biggest lesson we all need to learn.

[Cooch]

Allthough some tactical progress has made US policy does not seem to be aimed at achieveing any clear goal, apart from the vauge notion of an iraq that can defend itself. Mid term security improvement seems to be the only clear objective, and apparantly strategic contradictions are being tollerated in order to achieve that. This is not a long term soloution IMHO, & without a set of clear strategic aims tactical sucsess alone is virtually irrelevent.

This seems to be a failure of policy rather than tactics, which is consistent with the wider war on terror. COIN campaigns are allways fundimentally political/economic in nature I guess this is the biggest lesson we all need to learn.

Permit me to disagree, at least to a certain extent.
The stated aim has been to create a self-governing Iraqi state based upon democratic systems. Security - that is the ability of the elected government to provide security for both itself and its population - has always been a secondary aim. The basis of this objective is that (a) democracies rarely go to war against other democracies and (b) if it could be made to function well, its example to other Arabic populations might be expected to inspire democratic movements in other middle-eastern states - which might, in turn, give certain despotic governments something else to concentrate on , rather than the exporting of terrorism.

This has been clearly stated, and sounds good in theory. In practice, the Iraqis now have a constitution for which they have voted in a referendum, and a government elected in two referendums which were well-supported as far as voter turn-out is concerned. This must be regarded as positive progress towards the goal, and it is quite possible that the time required to create a functioning state of this nature has been under-estimated, particularly by sections of the media and those who forget that it took the English-speaking world the best part of a millennium to arrive at our current state of relative political stability. History does not support the argument that a democratic state will either happen quickly, or not at all. Quite possibly it will take a generation.
One can argue that we have to start somewhere.

As said, the security issue is secondary, but vital. If an elected Iraqi government is to be respected by its citizens, it must be capable of meeting their needs. This includes security.
If it is to be stable, then the sub-sections of the Iraqi population must be convinced that their best interests lie in working with the elected government, rather than fighting against it. Quite obviously, neither of these secondary objectives has been adequately met so-far.

I agree that not all decisions by the US administration and military commanders have, over the past 5 years, been particularly prudent or helpful in achieving these aims,,,,, but the aims have always been there.

Regards.......... Peter

[IrishHitman]

There are only three methods of effectively stopping paramilitary activity in an occupied area.

1. Remove the reasons for insurgency (Northern Ireland for example).
2. Flood the occupied area with troops (Japan, Germany post-WW2, Kosovo)
3. Mass killings (Marius & the Romans vs Teutones, and other Germanic tribes)

1 is the most politically acceptable method, but can be slow to work.
2 depends on the willingness of the occupier to commit troops, and may not be effective in removing resistance without 1.
3 is by far the least politically acceptable method, and the least humane, but is by far the most effective. German resistance in Roman controlled areas was removed completely by this method + 1. However, advocating this position today would be sickening.

[Cooch]

There are only three methods of effectively stopping paramilitary activity in an occupied area.

I suggest that the three things that you suggest may be a part of, but by no means the only ways to demonstrate one simple principle.

It is more to your advantage - you will get more of what you want more quickly - if you work with us, rather than fighting against us.

Peter

[IrishHitman]

I suggest that the three things that you suggest may be a part of, but by no means the only ways to demonstrate one simple principle.

It is more to your advantage - you will get more of what you want more quickly - if you work with us, rather than fighting against us.

Peter

The US is already doing 1 + 2 in Iraq, although probably not enough of both.

[Ozzy Blizzard]

Permit me to disagree, at least to a certain extent.
The stated aim has been to create a self-governing Iraqi state based upon democratic systems. Security - that is the ability of the elected government to provide security for both itself and its population - has always been a secondary aim. The basis of this objective is that (a) democracies rarely go to war against other democracies and (b) if it could be made to function well, its example to other Arabic populations might be expected to inspire democratic movements in other middle-eastern states - which might, in turn, give certain despotic governments something else to concentrate on , rather than the exporting of terrorism.

This has been clearly stated, and sounds good in theory. In practice, the Iraqis now have a constitution for which they have voted in a referendum, and a government elected in two referendums which were well-supported as far as voter turn-out is concerned. This must be regarded as positive progress towards the goal, and it is quite possible that the time required to create a functioning state of this nature has been under-estimated, particularly by sections of the media and those who forget that it took the English-speaking world the best part of a millennium to arrive at our current state of relative political stability. History does not support the argument that a democratic state will either happen quickly, or not at all. Quite possibly it will take a generation.
One can argue that we have to start somewhere.

As said, the security issue is secondary, but vital. If an elected Iraqi government is to be respected by its citizens, it must be capable of meeting their needs. This includes security.
If it is to be stable, then the sub-sections of the Iraqi population must be convinced that their best interests lie in working with the elected government, rather than fighting against it. Quite obviously, neither of these secondary objectives has been adequately met so-far.

I agree that not all decisions by the US administration and military commanders have, over the past 5 years, been particularly prudent or helpful in achieving these aims,,,,, but the aims have always been there.

Regards.......... Peter


Well, originally WMD was stated to be the strategic aim, but i digress on the first line.

Since the start of the "occupation" (I hope that word is not too provocative) the objective of a "self governing Iraqi state based on democratic systems" is anything but a CLEAR strategic goal. Who defines what a functioning democracy in the iraqi social structure looks like? Who defines what a democracy within the Iraqi ethnic structure looks like? Who defines what some sort of victory constitutes? All of these questions are vital in strategic and tactical decision making. i.e. Is a Sunni Majority a democracy? How is a democratic state really going to work were there is little political communication amongst the populous? How is a democracy going to work in a tribalistic social structure? None of these questions were adressed before the invasion, or have been since.

Now after the successful invasion and the installation of a constitution, supported by a "popular vote", the shortcomings of applying "conventional' democratic systems to Iraqi conditions on the ground have become painfully obvious. The large voter turn out supriseingly voted along tribal allegiance and a sunni majority was elected, which the went about persecuting ethnic/religious minorities. Thats hardly a functioning democracy.

Ever since that election the coalition has consistently taken actions to improve the short-mid term security conditions, sometimes at the expence of long term political goals. A good example raised by merocaine is the backing of the Islamic Council of Iraq and the Bader Brigades, who advocate an ethnic break up of the nation. An action that would improve the short-mid term security situation, but seem to be at odds with the whole united democratic Iraq thing. A strategic contradcition that has been tollerated in order to improve the security situation. Short-mid term security has been the only driveing factor in the last 2-3 years, simply because if it did not improve the US would have been forced to withdraw last year.

These contradictions have been tolerated because the coalition has no real idea of what their goal is, beyond a "free and democratic Iraq". Is an Iraq segregated along ethnic lines into 3 individual states acceptable or not? All of the statements made by the Bush administration says no, but their actions on the ground say yes. Thats the difference between having some vague objective and a CLEAR strategic goal, and something as imprecise as a "democratic iraq" is not sufficient IMHO, which was my original point.

[merocaine]

I'm on my holidays at the moment, so i'll be brief!
One of the key battles the Adminstration has had to fight has been convincing congress to continue the occupation.
To do this they had to show a drastic improvement in security, for american forces and for the Iraqis. They have been able to implement this because of two main factors.
1/ The rejection of Al Queda by the Sunni Tribes, due mainly to there inhumanity, rather than any love of the US.
2/ The nutralisation of Sadr, this achived by backing of the current Iraqi Goverment, remember there was a time 6 months ago when most commentators thought that the Prime minister was finished. This did'ent happen due to one main reason, Sadr.

This is the short termism in American Policy.
They have abandoned the more idealistic Democratic objectives for a certain kind of secterian confessionalism.
As I can make out the US has two objectives, the creation of a situation where they can declear victory.
And the neutralisation of Iranian influence in Iraq.

Fine, thats valid enough, its the tactics I don't agree with.

I do believe that if they continue on this path it will result in the dismemberment of the country and allow the rump to be even more open to Iranian influence.

[Cooch]

Well, originally WMD was stated to be the strategic aim, but i digress on the first line.

Hi OB.

While WMD - and more precisely, Saddam's continued refusal to comply with programs and UN resolutions designed to ensure that he didn't have them - were one of the justifications of the invasion of Iraq, the conversion of Iraq to a functional democracy was a stated aim before the invasion commenced.
It is so stated in the Resolution passed in October 2002, by the US Congress authorising the invasion

Since the start of the "occupation" (I hope that word is not too provocative) the objective of a "self governing Iraqi state based on democratic systems" is anything but a CLEAR strategic goal. Who defines what a functioning democracy in the iraqi social structure looks like? Who defines what a democracy within the Iraqi ethnic structure looks like? Who defines what some sort of victory constitutes? All of these questions are vital in strategic and tactical decision making.

I won't argue too much that the use of the term "occupation" is inappropriate, although it is not one in the usual sense as (a) The legitimate and elected Iraqi government wants it to continue for the time being and (b) a number of surveys indicate that the majority of the Iraqi people want it to continue in the short term. (A bit like having the the Yanks here in WW2.... a pain in the neck, but better than having the Japanese here.;) )

Where I disagree with you, and it is more in the semantics than the practicalities, is in that you confuse the process with the goal. A popularly supported constitution, an elected government and Having Saddam tried and sentenced according to the rule of law are all indications of progress.

I suggest that we need not get carried away with the notion that peace must be perfect in order to declare the "occupation" a success. There is no known country in which there is zero violence and zero political dissension. In a country with a tradition of tribalism and conflict, I suggest that "success" will be a popularly elected government which is able to maintain itself against the efforts of those who would depose it by force of arms. When the Iraqi government says to the US, "We can handle this! Thankyou and goodbye...." the "occupation" can be said to have ended successfully. If,,, when,,, and how this comes to pass are separate debates.

Respectfully....... Peter

[IrishHitman]

These contradictions have been tolerated because the coalition has no real idea of what their goal is, beyond a "free and democratic Iraq". Is an Iraq segregated along ethnic lines into 3 individual states acceptable or not?

Partition is usually not a good option.
History has shown this. India and Pakistan for example, or my own country.

[kato]

"Three individual states" on Iraqi soil wouldn't survive more than 10 years.

At that point, they'd be absorbed by Turkey, Iran, and Saudi-Arabia (or Jordan). And even before that point, they'd become a hotbed for contestion between these three nations.

That's not even considering the ethnic cleansing that would ensue before and after a separation.