F-35 Multirole Joint Strike Fighter [Archive]

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SABRE

July 20th, 2004, 06:30 PM

The Joint Strike Fighter, the JSF, is being developed by Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company for the US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps and the UK Royal Navy. The stealthy, supersonic multi-role fighter is to be designated the F-35. The JSF is being built in three variants: a conventional take-off and landing aircraft (CTOL) for the US Air Force; a carrier based variant (CV) for the US Navy; and a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft for the US Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. A 70 – 90% commonality is required for all variants.

The requirement is for: USAF F-35A –air-to-ground strike aircraft, replacing F-16 and A-10, complementing F-22 (1763); USMC F-35B – STOVL strike fighter to replace F/A-18B/C and AV-8B (480); UK RN F-35C – STOVL strike fighter to replace Sea Harriers (60); US Navy F-35C – first-day-of-war strike fighter to replace F/A-18B/C and A-6, complementing the F/A-18E/F (480 aircraft). In January 2001, the UK MOD signed a memorandum of understanding to co-operate in the SDD (System Development and Demonstration) phase of JSF and, in September 2002, selected the STOVL variant to fulfil the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA) requirement. Following the contract award, other nations signed up to the SDD phase are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore and Turkey.

The Concept Demonstration Phase of the programme began in November 1996 with the award of contracts to two consortia, led by Boeing Aerospace and Lockheed Martin. The contracts involved the building of demonstrator aircraft for three different configurations of JSF, with one of the two consortia to be selected for the development and manufacture of all three variants.

In October 2001, an international team led by Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract to build JSF. An initial 22 aircraft (14 flying test aircraft and eight ground-test aircraft) will be built in the programs System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. Flight testing will be carried out at Edwards Air Force Base, California, and Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland. In April 2003, JSF completed a successful Preliminary Design Review (PDR). The Critical Design Review has been postponed from April 2004 to 2005. The first CTOL F-35A has begun airframe assembly and is scheduled for its first flight in August 2006. The STOVL F-35B first flight is set for 2007. The F-35A fighter is expected to enter service in 2008, the F-35B in 2012.

The Lockheed Martin JSF team includes Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Pratt and Whitney and Rolls-Royce. Final assembly of the aircraft will take place at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth plant in Texas. Major subassemblies will be produced by Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems at El Segundo, California and BAE Systems at Samlesbury, Lancashire, England. BAE Systems is responsible for the design and integration of the aft fuselage, horizontal and vertical tails and the wing-fold mechanism for the CV variant, using experience from the Harrier STOVL programme.

DESIGN

In order to minimise the structural weight and complexity of assembly, the wingbox section integrates the wing and fuselage section into one piece. To minimise radar signature, sweep angles are identical for the leading and trailing edges of the wing and tail (planform alignment). The fuselage and canopy have sloping sides. The seam of the canopy and the weapon bay doors are sawtoothed and the vertical tails are canted at an angle.

The Marine variant of JSF is very similar to the Air Force variant, but with a slightly shorter range because some of the space used for fuel is used for the lift fan of the STOVL propulsion system. The main differences between the naval variant and the other versions of JSF are associated with the carrier operations. The internal structure of the naval version is very strong to withstand the high loading of catapult assisted launches and tailhook arrested landings. The aircraft has larger wing and tail control surfaces for low speed approaches for carrier landing. Larger leading edge flaps and foldable wingtip sections provide a larger wing area, which provides an increased range and payload capacity.

The canopy, radar and most of the avionics are common to the three variants.

WEAPONS

Weapons are carried in two parallel bays located in front of the landing gear. Each weapons bay is fitted with two hardpoints for carrying a range of bombs and missiles. Weapons to be cleared for internal carriage include: JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition), CBU-105 WCMD (Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser) for the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, JSOW (Joint StandOff Weapon), Paveway II guided bombs, AIM-120C AMRAAM air-to-air missile; for external carriage: JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile), AIM-9X Sidewinder and Storm Shadow cruise missile.

In September 2002, General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products was selected as the gun system integrator. The air force variant has an internally mounted gun. The Carrier and Marine variants can have an external gun pod fitted.

TARGETING
Lockheed Martin Missile & Fire Control and Northrop Grumman Electronic Sensors and Systems are jointly responsible for the JSF electro-optical system. A Lockheed Martin electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) will provide long-range detection and precision targeting, along with the Northrop Grumman DAS (Distributed Aperture System) thermal imaging system. EOTS will be based on the Sniper XL pod developed for the F-16, which incorporates a mid-wave third generation FLIR, dual mode laser, CCD TV, laser tracker and laser marker. BAE Systems Avionics in Edinburgh, Scotland will provide the laser systems. DAS consists of multiple infrared cameras (supplied by Indigo Systems of Goleta, California) providing 360º coverage using advanced signal conditioning algorithms. As well as situational awareness, DAS provides navigation, missile warning and infrared search and track (IRST). EOTS is embedded under the aircraft’s nose, and DAS sensors are fitted at multiple locations on the aircraft.

RADAR
Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems is developing the advanced electronically scanned array (AESA) AN/APG-81 multi-function radar. The AN/APG-81AESA will combine an integrated radio frequency subsystem with a multifunction array. The radar system will also incorporate the agile beam steering capabilities developed for the APG-77.

COUNTERMEASURES
BAE Systems North America will be responsible for the JSF integrated electronic warfare suite, which will be installed internally and have some subsystems from Northrop Grumman. BAE is developing a new digital radar warning receiver for the F-35.

AVIONICS SYSTEMS
The following will supply the F-35 avionics systems: BAE Systems Avionics - side stick and throttle controls; Vision Systems International (a partnership between Kaiser Electronics and Elbit of Israel) - advanced helmet-mounted display; Ball Aerospace - Communications, Navigation and Integration (CNI) integrated body antenna suite (one S-band, two UHF, two radar altimeter, three L-band antennas per aircraft); Harris Corporation - advanced avionics systems, infrastructure, image processing, digital map software, fibre optics, high speed communications links and part of the Communications, Navigation and Information (CNI) System; Honeywell - radar altimeter, inertial navigation/global positioning system (INS/GPS) and air data transducers; Raytheon - 24-channel GPS (Global Positioning System) with digital anti-jam receiver (DAR).

SYSTEMS

Other suppliers will include: ATK Composites - upper wing skins; Vought Aircraft Industries - lower wing skins; Smiths Aerospace - electronic control systems and electrical power system (with Hamilton Sundstrand), integrated canopy frame; Honeywell - landing system's wheels and brakes, onboard oxygen-generating system (OBOGS), engine components, power and thermal management system driven by integrated auxiliary power unit (APU); Parker Aerospace - fuel system, hydraulics for lift fan, primary flight control electrohydrostatic actuators (with Moog Inc), engine controls and accessories; EDO Corporation - pneumatic weapon delivery system; Goodrich - lift-fan anti-icing system; Stork Aerospace - electrical wiring.

PROPULSION

Early production lots of all three variants will be powered by the Pratt and Whitney afterburning turbofan F-135 engine, a derivative of the F119 fitted on the F-22. Following production aircraft will be powered by either the F135 or the F-136 turbofan being developed by General Electric and Rolls-Royce. Hamilton Sundstrand is providing the engine control system and gearbox.

On the F-35B, the engine is coupled with a shaft-driven lift fan system for STOVL propulsion. The lift fan has been developed by Rolls-Royce Defence. Doors installed above and below the vertical fan open as the fin spins up to provide vertical lift. The main engine has a three bearing swivelling exhaust nozzle. The nozzle, which is supplemented by two roll control ducts on the inboard section of the wing, together with the vertical lift fan provide the required STOVL capability.

To see the pics visit: http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf/

So now USAF has F/A-22 for air superiority and F-35 as all purpose.

SABRE

July 21st, 2004, 08:11 PM

I saw this on BBC World (21/7/04)

Britain iss concerned over LockHead Martin's lack of response towards F-35 and more towards F/A-22

EDS goes back to drawing board to restart software for EF-2000

Dessault concerened after Mirage2000-5 pilot reports computerized glitchs. Glitch accoured in three different Mirage 2000-5 Jets when all three tried same battle tactic moves in the air. If the problem is in software all Mirage2000-5 sold to different countries will have to go under re-development of software.
The pilot said when the Jet was in super sonic speed it projected target at the wrong side and also projected Friendly Jets as target.

gf0012-aust

July 21st, 2004, 08:40 PM

I saw this on BBC World (21/7/04)

Britain iss concerned over LockHead Martin's lack of response towards F-35 and more towards F/A-22

I'm not sure why that would be so. Only four countries are deemed to be viable for F-22 selection, and only one of them can afford it (at this stage)

No one has pulled out of the F35, and the JSF is in all reality a cousin platform.

Salman78

July 22nd, 2004, 01:01 AM

gf0012-aust

July 22nd, 2004, 01:25 AM

JSF program is in some trouble at the moment because quite a few JSF partner nations are unhappy with the workshare. Norway is at the forefront and is threatening to abandon the programme and buy Typhoon or Gripen instead. similar concerns have been voice in recent months by denmark, and netherlands. All these 3 countries are level 3 partners in the programs with a minimum of $125 mil investment.

The stickeing point appears to be US concern about transferring sensitive technology abroad.

Part of the issue of work sharing directly lies at fault with some of those countries. There has been an assumption that they automatically would be gifted with work. OTOH, those countries that went in hard and lobbied right from the outset have picked up quality work. To some extent (but not all) they are victims of their own inertia and political indolence. Buying a ticket to the dance doesn't guarantee that all the attractive girls are ready to dance with you. ;) You still have to make effort, even if you have paid your money for entry. I've been through this issue with Australian companies who assumed that as we were considered a tier 1 ally, that we should automatically get the choice "cuts of meat". It doesn't work that way. IN Australia, those companies that quietly went in and lobbied vigorously picked up work - meanwhile the expectant "mothers" were still complaining as the pie was gradually eaten in front of them.

If they think that looking at the F-22 is an option then they are sorely misjudging things. The diff between the tech levels of the JSF to the F-22 is huge, and the 3 countries mentioned aren't part of the cohort deemed to be the most likely nations to be able to get access to F-22 when exports are considered.

As for the issue of tech transfer, the only nation that has exceptional accessare the Brits, and they distinctly paid for the pleasure of that. Again I'm not sure what they are really complaining about on tech transfer. Australia provides the US with Acoustic/Stealth sub Warfare management systems and even they don't get to see the whole datasets - its ours and we keep it - irrespective of the fact that they are our principle partner. The US accepts that. Just as we accept that not all the intricacies of weaps systems they own that we buy may be exposed to us.

SABRE

July 22nd, 2004, 06:04 AM

gf0012-aust

July 22nd, 2004, 06:45 AM

Hmm. GF you are technicaly right but what Salman is saying is true. BBC world it self reported that. The partner nations are unhappy and r lookin 4ward to EF-2000 and Gripen. They have threatned to pull out. But this is not only because workshare but they along with Britian are saying that LockHead-Martin gives more importance to F-22 project than to F-35. Britain is the only country which does not want to see LockHead-M and any partner country loosing interest and parting the ways.
F-35 project is in trouble and might be delayed.

Meanwhile Gripen and typhoon have toped the list on european nations AFs.

Personally I don't agree with the way the JSF process was done in Australia. We have had an orderly procurement process in the past. Considering the nature of our looming block obsolescence I would have thought that a staged introduction of type was better.

I would have liked to see a partial mix of F-15D's (AESA), Typhoons or Rafales for the strike role absorbed in line with the existing F-111 fleet (36 aircraft). That way we would have had mixed capability and not been restricted to one vendor. If the JSF is delayed (and the assumption with all aircraft development is that there will be a 20% slippage) then we still would have had Gen 4/4.5 capability. A late delivery would not impact so much. The JSF is part of the hi lo set for the F-22, so we need to consider our force mix on that basis.

Gripen doesn't meet our needs in a number of areas, so it was never a contender (and never factored in past the first cut of the consideration list)

There has been intermittent feedback that Australia (along with the UK, Israel and Japan) would be considered favourably if we wanted the F-22. I just think that for a country like us, the $$'s are better spent in another way.

Singapore in my view is taking a much more sensible approach.

SABRE

July 22nd, 2004, 07:53 AM

I just dont understand. Australia is in no conflict zone. Mostly about 90% of the time they are out of any danger. Any attacks against Australian ppl happens in Indonaisa. Than y does Australia keep on building its army specially the air force. No western country will launch strike against Australia and no Eastern country has technology e.g: Careers to carry out strikes on Australia.
On the other hand Australia I think has started to make some enemies by sending its troops abroad. So why is Australia spending so much on defence?

If Australia needs Jets, then they should also get Tornados. More than half of the Australia is desert and Tornados are built to carry out strikes in desert region. Personaly I dont like the Jet but I think all the countries which have conflicts in deserted regions should buy it (I'll advice PAF to buy them aswell) but on the other hand JSF is said to better Jet to fight in desert region than Tornado (Its multi region fighter)

Country like Australia should have Jet technology of its own. Maybe a joint venture but they should hve a jet they can call it their own.

& GF what sensible approach has singpore taken. Please tell.

SABRE

July 22nd, 2004, 10:26 AM

Another Problem arrives for JSF F-35

Weight worries push back F-35's first flight from late 2005 to no earlier than spring 2006

The F-35 joint strike fighter won't make its first flight in 2005 after all, Pentagon and Lockheed Martin officials concede, and a major rewrite of the program's timetable may be announced soon.

Months of work have failed to trim hundreds of unwanted pounds from the simplest of the three F-35 versions. So Pentagon officials have decided that more time is needed to solve the design challenges.

Lockheed spokesman John Kent confirmed Monday that the first flight of the F-35, which was to have occurred late in 2005, will not happen before spring 2006.

"A lot of that is the weight problems we're working with," Kent said.

In October 2001, when the team of Lockheed, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems was awarded $19 billion to develop the F-35, Pentagon weapons chief E.C. "Pete" Aldridge expressed confidence that the first flight would occur by late 2005.

But the teams of engineers are having problems designing a family of aircraft to carry out three very different missions.

For nearly a year, Lockheed and its partners have been struggling to trim the weight of the aircraft to desired levels. An overweight aircraft is less maneuverable, has a shorter range and can carry less payload.

That means that the aircraft can't perform combat missions as well as expected.

The first flight isn't the only important milestone being delayed. A crucial design review scheduled for April, which was expected to result in approval of the majority of the aircraft's design work and decisions to begin building more parts and components, has been pushed back until spring 2005.

F-35 program spokeswoman Kathy Crawford said there will be an evaluation of how else aircraft weight can be reduced.

The development delays mean that fewer parts for prototype aircraft have been released for manufacturing, both in-house and by subcontractors, than originally planned, Kent said. "We're scrutinizing parts in more detail than before," looking for weight savings.

Lockheed, Northrop, BAE and key subcontractors employ more than 6,000 engineers and technicians, about 3,400 of them in Fort Worth, for the design work.

The Pentagon has said it expects to buy 2,600 F-35s over the next two decades, and many other countries are expected to order versions of the aircraft to replace their fighters. Britain has committed to buy at least 150.

Analysts say the JSF program still has solid support, both internally and politically, and is in no grave danger of being canceled. But schedule delays drive up the program's price.

In January, the Pentagon's budget office delayed by a year plans to buy the first F-35s and cut planned purchases for several years afterward to save $5 billion. The money was plugged into the development effort, which officials have said is about $7.5 billion over its original $33 billion budget.

Air Force Gen. Jack Hudson, the program director, is briefing senior Pentagon officials and leaders of the Air Force, Navy and Marines on the issues and discussing alternatives, Crawford said.

Options for restructuring the program include focusing on the Air Force's version of the F-35 first and putting off the Marine version, the most difficult, until later, Crawford said.

Engineers estimate that the Air Force version, the furthest along in the design process and the simplest to produce, is about 8 percent above its desired weight of 29,000 pounds, according to Lockheed spokesman Kent.

The other two versions are similarly overweight. The added weight means that the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing version for the Marines, if built today, might not be able to fly as far as desired with a full load of fuel and weapons, according to Inside the Air Force, a defense newsletter.

Aussie Digger

July 22nd, 2004, 10:28 AM

SABRE

July 22nd, 2004, 10:48 AM

The Tornado is a bit old Saber, that's the problem we have with our air force at the moment, our newest combat platforms are 20+ years old. We prefer to acquire new aircraft rather than continualy upgrade old platforms, that's why we'll most likely be buying the F-35 JSF.

You are right we don't have any "direct" enemies, but it's a bit late once the shooting starts to go, "gee we could really use an airforce right about now"... The horse has already bolted as it were... The Australian Defence Force is maintained for the defence of Australia and possesses very little offensive capability. We don't spend all that much on defence either, btw. We only spend 1.9% of our GDP on defence. Much lower than many countries throughout the world...

Singapore has a requirement to replace it's A-4SU Skyhawks and F-5 Tigers, and has a project to replace same with either F-15E Strike Eagles, Eurofighter Typhoon or Dassault Rafale. Singapore is purchasing 20 or so within the next couple of years to replace the A-4's and will be making an additional purchase later on down the track to replace it's F-5's. This way it's capability is maintained by it's existing F-16's and F-5's while it's A-4's are being replaced. Australia is basically planning on replacing our whole fleet in "one fell swoop" A risky proposition to say the least...

Read my previous link, F-35 just went into another problem. Do u think Australia should be eyeing a jet which keeps going into problems. You should get Typhoon, Gripen, Mirage2000-5,9,H,N or Rafale (At least for now).

You cant replace your entire 20 years old fleet in one sweep and that with just one jet F-35 its risky as u said. You are right abt Tornado but I think Typhoon or Gripen would give Ausi AF a gripping edge. Rafale would look good in Green and Yellow. BTW do u have mirage2000-5 or not I herd Australia was going to buy them.
(BTW what kind of AF NewZeland has?- its the only country that can easily strike Australia cause of its geograhic location, may be Indonesia too ;) )

gf0012-aust

July 22nd, 2004, 11:14 AM

The Typhoon could be considered but is unlikely due to embargo risk issues (France, Sweden and Germany have embargoed Australia in the past), the Gripen doesn't meet some of our performance parameters and the Rafale is unlikely as we have been subjected to embargoes by the French in the past. We would be unlikely to entertain the thought of buying a significant capital platform and be exposed again.

NZ has no combat fixed wing aircraft left. They sold some of their Skyhawks to Singapore, the rest ended up at Davis Monthan.

The problems that are being talked about for the JSF are really quite insignificant. If you take a look at the development history of the F4, F104, F111, F14, Tornado, Harrier (before the US bought the production rights), they had far greater teething problems and ended up as premier aircraft.

These gen 4.5 and gen 5 aircraft are far more complex and delays are expected. As I said before, we typically added 20% slippage to procurement processes - and that is normal in the west. Frances track record witrh the Rafale is actually worse, IIRC they are up to their 53rd significant change control - that's more control changes than aircraft in production.

Aussie Digger

July 22nd, 2004, 11:16 AM

Australia currently only operates F-111's and F/A-18 A/B's in the air combat role. (We will also operate BAE Mk 127 Hawk's in a light strike/point air defence role once they are properly upgraded, though they won't be a frontline aircraft, more likely an "emergency" capability. They are currently only used for advanced lead in fighter training.) We've never acquired Mirage 2000-5, though we operated Mirage 111's prior to the introduction of our F/A-18's. Most of the Mirage's were sold to Pakistan. The rest in storage.

The powers that be (ie: the politicians) not the Airforce have decided that the F-35 is the jet Australia requires. Both sides of politics in Australia have publicly supported acquiring the F-35 JSF so the only real debate will seem to be the numbers, types etc. I'm aware of the problems with the F-35 and am far from convinced that it alone is the right and only choice for Australia, but the political decision seems to be made and that's pretty much it...

There IS starting to be a bit of talk about acquiring a mixed fleet of F-35A coventional take-off and landing JSF's and F-35B VSTOL JSF's to provide a bit more flexibility to our future force, but that may cause the usual hysterics about Australia and Aircraft carrier's (F-35B's could potentially operate off Australia's planned new 27,000 ton Amphibious warfare ships, so we'll have to wait and see about that.

Other than this, F/A-18's will be the main combat aircraft of the RAAF after 2010 (when the F-111 will be retired). Unless there is a major shift in our strategic circumstances or something dramatic happens to our existing fleet (ie: a previously unknown fault that permanently grounds the entire fleet for example...) Australia will not purchase another aircraft until F-35 JSF is ready. It has been considered that Australia would acquire F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets or F-15E Strike Eagles to fill in for our F-111's, but it was deemed too costly so we'll simply have to rely on the F-18 and hope no-one becomes angry with us... :help

New Zealand (NZ) would be the last Country to attack us, even if they wanted to. Their "socialist" Government decided that their fleet of 21 A-4 Skyhawks (their only combat aircraft) was a bit too warlike and scrapped the entire NZ air combat force!!! This leaves NZ with the only air defence capability in all of NZ as being 1x Battery (about 12 lanuchers) of Mistral, Very Short Range Surface to Air Missiles...

Incidentally this capability was only acquired when the United Nations told NZ in no uncertain terms it would have to provide it's own air defence in future after other countries had to protect New Zealand troops from air attack in Bosnia... NZDF now only operates P-3K Orions, C-130 Hercules, UH-1H Iroquois Helicopters, B-757 transporters and light training aircraft in it's "airforce" nowadays...

Indonesia could indeed strike Australia one day (though it lacks the capability to really do so at present) and would be the most likely reason for us to significantly upgrade our air force and indeed our defence forces overall. If Indonesia acquired it's planned 48 SU-30MK's and other capabilities such as air to air refuellers, stand-off attack missiles etc, you could well see further aircraft acquisitions by the RAAF to counteract this. Cheers.

SABRE

July 22nd, 2004, 11:50 AM

gf0012-aust

July 22nd, 2004, 01:37 PM

Hmm. Now I believe that only country that can become threat to Australia is Indonesia cause of Australia's participation in east Timor's independence. But didnt Australia and Indonesia used to enjoy Friendly relationships. Dint u enjoyed close ties?
Why not rebuilt ties with Indonesia then wait for them to turn into even bitter enemies.

Also compare Indonesian AF capability with that of Australia. And will JSF put further pressure on Indonesia and Australia relation. Indonesia can see Australian army and AF's development as a threat.

Sabre, Indonesias poor relationship with Australia has little to do with East Timor.

Australia has provided military training, military equipment, financial aide (we gave Indonesia $1bn to stabilise it's economy during the Asian financial crisis of the late 90's, we train their diplomatic staff at Australian Universities. We are at the moment providing Lawyers experienced in International and Constitutional Law to assist in rewriting their judicial system. In a twist of irony, both Indonesia current judiciary and Iraqs current senior adjudicators are rewriting or have rewritten their constitution by basing it on the Australian Constitution. We currently provide ethem with facilities to train them in proper modern forensics, we provide them with police training, and we assist in co-training Unit 81 of their Kopassus Special Forces. (Their CT unit). We have also donated this year $6m for establishing a modern immigration centre in the south to assist in dealing with refugee issues.

On the other hand, we also have a defence agreement with Malaysia and Singapore (along with the UK and NZ) to assist in protecting them as they have been attacked by Indonesia in the past.

We already liaise with every nation in our region (politically and militarily) about why we are buying and what we are buying - before we tell the Australian public. - No other nation in the world does that with it's regional neighbours

Preaching to us about how we should behave to the Indonesians is a bit rich when you look at the history between the 2 countries. I suggest that you read some history books. Or maybe speak to Awang Se about how Indonesia gets along with his country as well (a fellow islamic state which has not been able to realise the benefits of peaceful co-existence)

Iraq and Indonesia have the dubious honour of being Islamic regimes that have actually waged war on a fellow Islamic country. Australias role with respect to Indonesia has been to assist in the protection of fellow Commonwealth countries. Your comment about East Timor demonstrates that you have little knowledge of much more deeper historical issues.

No nation will abandon it's inherent right to protect itself - and when you consider the aide that has been provided to Indonesia by Australia - even in times of crisis, you can start to understand why some Australians are a little contemptuous of people who question our motives and our right to protect ourselves.

To say that Indonesia sees Australias military structure as a threat says more about the incompetence of their military analysis about our force structure than anything else. Only a fool and complete congenital idiot would see Australias ORBAT as offensive and capable of waging intercontinetal war.

SABRE

July 22nd, 2004, 04:43 PM

XEROX

July 22nd, 2004, 04:53 PM

What is the view of John Howard, from the aussies in DEFENCETALK??

I have seen him talk on tv, he seems to be very arogant, then again im not australian and now dumpty about australian poitics!!

gf0012-aust

July 22nd, 2004, 07:32 PM

cool down mate, u miss understood me. U r right I dnt knw much abt Australia+Indonesia history. Its just that I have seen Australians being crtitcs towards Indonesia. Few words from John HArward on BBC that did not favor Indonesia.

Warwith Indonesia is nothing but bogus talk we r havin here. Its just that Aussi Digger said that Indonesia can strike Australia one day and that is also a pretended asumption.

Now lets stick to the topic JSF F-35 & Australia's interests init. Ok. Cool, Chill

Sabre, I wasn't getting cranky at you - in fact I've just had a few days dealing with "lefty" analysts who seem to think that australians should go to Indonesia, give them all a big "hug" and everything will be fine. :? Plus I have some personal exposure to this as one of my cousins married an East Timorese, so I know what the Indon military and militia did to the local villagers and women. I have also seen maps provided by the locals where the Indon military had marked off the north of Australia as Indonesian territory - where they were hoping to forcibly move the Acehnese and Balinese. - It wasn't official, but official enough to be disturbing.

Politicians will usually make speeches to downplay any hostility - as they should and as is their job - to calm down any ruffled feathers and try to keep everyone happy and content. The reality is that if you poked most australian military personnel hard enough, they would start to acknowledge that the likelihood of Australian going to war with Indonesia is probably more inevitable than not. But, the conflict is not based on religion, it is however based on an emerging notion within some of their military that they can build a Javan Empire. As "wild" and outlandish as that may seem, it does unfortunately have some relevancy and currency.

The majority of our wargames are geared against an enemy that suspiciously looks and acts like Indonesia - we just don't use the "I" word in conversations. ;)

Our force structure (including the JSF's) is designed to deal with the Su-30 and S-300 threat that may occur if Indonesia. It's why our forces are designed to be involved with long range strike, long range detection - it's also why when Konfrontassi and East Timor occurred, we would have bombed Jakarta and targets in their Western-most provinces if it was essential to sending a message to the rogue elements of the Indonesian military to "calm down".

The F-35 is definitely part of the long range strike capability we seek, and that is also why F-15D's and F-22's have never totally been factored out of the purchase equation either. Australia is one of the four nations that the US Govt has indicated it would listen "favourably" to if there was a fundamental requirement to obtain a version of the F-22.

But, as I said b4, I'm not having a shot at you, but I have little time for some "professional" arm chair analysts when they make comments and don't know the subject matter. If I was angry at you I wouldn't bother to try and make such a detailed explanation of the topic.

Believe me, when I'm getting cranky - you'll be able to work it out fairly quickly. :smokingc:

umair

July 23rd, 2004, 06:13 AM

I agree with AD, it's better to be prepared for anything.Afterall a penny's worth of prevention is worth more than a pound's worth of cure.
I really do think RAAF should have opted for the F-15 instead of the Hornets.The Eagles would have provided you with the best airdefence fighter in the world at that time(correct me if I'm wrong, but did'nt u'r hornet deliveries start in 1981-82).A wait of a few years (till 1988) would have then allowed you to replace the Ardvarks with early production Strike Eagles. These aircraft would not only have given you a long lasting edge in the region, but with continous upgrades be kept in service till 2015 or round about(till the JSFs came).But then again hindsight is a gift we enjoy not the guys who plan for the future.

Aussie Digger

July 23rd, 2004, 07:53 AM

I myself have argued this very point Umair. As you say it's history now, but ADF planners felt the F-15 would be out of production in the future (and hence difficult to support...) and was too expensive. We began to receive our F/A-18's in 84/85 as I recall and had an IOC in 86/87 I think... The RAAF would have been far better off IMHO with F-15C/D and F-15E Strike Eagle rather than F-18/F-111, but it didn't happen... Hopefully things will improve with the acquisition of the F-35 JSF, but I doubt it...

Indonesia feels a strong sense of resentment towards Australia, but I'd like to ask what we did wrong? First of all Indonesia invaded East Timor about 25 years ago anyway in a similar set of circumstances to Iraq/Kuwait... When the world finally gets serious due to human rights attrocities committed by Indonesian forces against East Timorese people and demands Indonesia withdraws, pro-indo militia begin to wage civil war against their own people.

Australia leads an Indonesian supported (politically at least) UN "intervention" force, which was established at the UN's direction, to save the civilians from a very widespread slaughter which was to some degree tolerated if not outright supported by the Indonesian military and suddenly Australia is the bad guy? Excuse me if I don't understand what we did wrong...

Incidents such as the "border contact" between Australian and Indonesian forces were entirely Indonesian fault. The Indonesian military opened fire on soldiers of 2RAR because the Indonesian commanders were using maps dating back to the early 1950's, and didn't know where the border was!!! The Indonesian's "thought" Aussie troops were "invading" West Timor due to their outdated maps, yet it's our fault... (Btw, Indonesian military opened fire on Australian troops and copped the worse of the contact with 3 confirmed Indonesia KIA and numerous unconfirmed versus no Australian killed or wounded and again it's all Australia's fault!!!

Or you could mention the time that armed Indonesia F-16's intercepted unarmed Australian F/A-18's (in international airspace, mind you, something that USED to be considered an act of war) whilst the F/A-18's were enroute to Malaysia for an exercise!!! The Indonesian's had been notified of this and had given their understanding and approval (not that it was needed), but the local air force commander decided to intercept them anyway... Maybe that was Australia's fault as well? Lucky the F/A-18's weren't armed or things might have gone down hill...

I'm not an apologist for Indonesia at all. I have no beef with Indonesia other than their rather less than neighbourly attitude towards us and the acts they do towards us, but some people seem to think they can do no wrong. I don't understand this attitude...

I never said Indonesia "would" strike Australia, I meant that Indonesia was physically close enough to make it a potential "enemy" that "COULD" strike Australia. They DO currently have plans to acquire a strike capability that would possess sufficient ability to strike targets in Australia.

SABRE

July 23rd, 2004, 08:31 AM

This Australia-Indonesia thing is realy getting interesting. There should be a separate thread for this, Seriously. OR change this topic "Why Australia wants JSF" & move it to political discussion.

But than we might not have any topic on JSF to discuss here in military aviation.
Better move a part of it- leave out the JSF related thing here and rest to Political discussion.

Aussie Digger

July 23rd, 2004, 08:38 AM

Yeah, well I've had my "spray" about Indonesia. It upsets me a bit how they "treat" or perceive us, when we do so much to help them, but anyway. Back to the JSF, I'll try and dig up an article I saw the other day where a Lockheed Martin official talked about Australia having a requirement for V/STOL F-35B's...

Aussie Digger

July 23rd, 2004, 08:48 AM

Here is the article, short though it may be. It's from the Aus-Aviation website, subscriber access only unfortunately...

• RAAF CONSIDERS STOVL JSF: Mike Cosentino, Lockheed Martin’s head of International Programs for the JSF, has revealed that Australia is considering purchasing a mix of Conventional Take Off & Landing F-35A and Short Take Off & Vertical Landing F-35B Joint Strike Fighters to replace its F/A‑18s and F-111s.
When asked about whether the RAAF had ever enquired about acquiring F/A‑22s, Mr Cosentino responded, “The only mix we’ve heard of is that maybe Australia might be interested in a mix with some STOVL variants in addition to the CTOL variant” of the JSF.
A full report on Mike Consentino’s interview with Australian Aviation appears from page 42 of this issue

SABRE

July 23rd, 2004, 08:56 AM

Well not only Australia wants JSF they want to be a partner in it. Read below:

Australian Group Scouts Possible Lockheed Martin F-35 Work

FORT WORTH, Texas --- Australian government and aerospace industry representatives spent Thursday at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth plant discussing potential opportunities for Australian companies to participate in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. Australia has announced its intention to join the program's development phase in late 2002.

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., a business area of Lockheed Martin Corp., is the prime contractor to develop the next-generation F-35 JSF for the United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, and seven allied nations. Australia would be the eighth international partner to join the F-35 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase and would have the opportunity to develop and supply parts and subsystems, influence the aircraft's design and place representatives in the government's JSF Program Office.

Fourteen Australian government and 26 Australian industry representatives traveled to Fort Worth for a series of F-35 technical presentations, and discussions on potential Australian industrial participation in the program. Activities during the visit included a program overview, demonstrations of the F-35 cockpit and explanations of specific aircraft systems.

A Lockheed Martin F-35 team has traveled to Australia twice this year to evaluate companies' potential contributions to the program.

"Australia has a strong and well-established aerospace industrial base," said Tom Burbage, Lockheed Martin executive vice president and JSF program general manager. "We know the Australians manufacture very high quality, cost-competitive products, and we expect them to compete effectively within the F-35 program's best-value criteria."

To gain JSF work on the highly competitive F-35 program, suppliers must prove that they offer "best value," a combination of quality, affordability and other development and production criteria.

The F-35 is a stealthy (radar-evading), supersonic multirole fighter designed to meet the U.S. government's requirements for a new generation of transformational weapons. The single-engine JSF will be manufactured in three versions: a conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) variant for the U.S. Air Force, an aircraft-carrier version (CV) for the U.S. Navy, and a short-takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) version for the U.S. Marine Corps.

The cornerstone of the F-35 is affordability, achieved in large part through a very high level of common parts and systems across the three versions of the aircraft.

The F-35 is designed to replace aging fighter inventories, including U.S. Air Force A-10s and F-16s, U.S. Navy F/A-18s, U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harriers and F/A-18s, and United Kingdom Harrier GR.7s and Sea Harriers.

Lockheed Martin is developing the F-35 in conjunction with its principal partners, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems. Pratt & Whitney and General Electric are developing two separate but interchangeable engines.

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, is a leader in the design, development, systems integration, production, and support of advanced military aircraft and related technologies. Its customers include the military services of the United States and allied countries throughout the world. Products include the F-16, F-22, F-35 JSF, F-117, T-50, C-5, C-130, C-130J, P-3, S-3, and U-2.

Lockheed Martin Corp., headquartered in Bethesda, Md., is a global enterprise principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, and integration of advanced technology systems, products, and services. Employing about 125,000 people worldwide, Lockheed Martin had 2001 sales of $24 billion.

F-35 JSF Brings Australian Defence Minister, Government Officials to Texas

FORT WORTH, Texas---Australian Minister for Defence Robert Hill today joined the Australian Ambassador to the United States Michael Thawley and the U.S. Ambassador to Australia Tom Schieffer on an orientation visit of the facility where the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will be assembled.

The officials held discussions with U.S. members of the F-35 JSF team at the Fort Worth headquarters of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., a business area of Lockheed Martin Corp. Assembly of F-35 prototypes will begin at the Fort Worth plant in late 2003.

he visit comes one day after Hill signed a Ministerial Exchange of Letters with his U.S. counterpart, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, providing for Australia's entry into the Joint Strike Fighter program. Hill and Rumsfeld signed the letters during the annual Australian-United States Ministerial Consultations in Washington, D.C. Australia becomes the eighth and final international partner in the stealth aircraft's development phase. The United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Denmark and Norway joined the program previously.

The Oct. 30 visit included tours and briefings describing the unprecedented performance of this fifth-generation international aircraft, as well as its lean manufacturing methods and affordable life-cycle development. Hill also "flew" the F-35 cockpit demonstrator.

Australia's nearly $150 million (U.S.) financial contribution to the F-35's System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase represents an unprecedented step for Australia, by enabling the country to participate in the development of a new international fighter. It also establishes a new method of cooperation between business and government on a global scale, and allows the Australian Defence Force to access levels of capability and technology that are a generation ahead of those in contemporary aircraft.

Partnership in the program also ensures that Australian industry is able to compete for F-35 JSF work on a best-value basis and expand participation in the global aerospace supply chain. The JSF program provides opportunities to participate not only in the development phase, but also production and support throughout the life of the program.

Plans call for the F-35 to replace Australia's current fleet of F/A-18 and F-111 fighters. The role of Australian industry in the F-35 JSF program is expected to grow following the country's decision to join SDD.

During the plant visit, ambassador Schieffer highlighted the history of cooperative security between the United States and Australia over the last century. He emphasized that the relationship has entered a new era of partnership, with the JSF program cementing that historic bond and enhancing its effectiveness.

Charles T. "Tom" Burbage, executive vice president and general manager of the F-35 JSF program, told members of the Australian delegation that their visit provided an opportunity to "give you a good look at what's almost magical about this airplane." He cited the program's commitment to reach across international borders to ensure that the aircraft is equipped with the most effective systems, and he explained how the F-35's combination of next-generation technologies will provide capabilities far superior to those of current-generation multirole fighters.

Noting that Australia is the last international development partner, Burbage said, "We're really happy to have the Australians on board so we can make this international program a reality," noting that the first anniversary of the SDD contract was Oct. 26, and there are only three years to the aircraft's first flight. He also said that all international contributions to the program's development equaled almost 15 percent of the SDD price tag, a further incentive to make the program successful.

The F-35 JSF is a stealthy, supersonic multirole fighter designed to replace a wide range of aging fighter and strike aircraft. Three variants derived from a common design will ensure JSF meets the security needs of each country while staying within strict affordability targets.

Lockheed Martin is developing the JSF in conjunction with its principal partners, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems. Two separate but interchangeable engines are under development by Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. Among the aircraft JSF will replace are the A-10, AV-8B Harrier, F-16, F/A-18, and United Kingdom Harrier GR.7 and Sea Harrier.

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, is a leader in the design, development, systems integration, production and support of advanced military aircraft and related technologies. Its customers include the military services of the United States and allied countries throughout the world. Products include the F-16, F/A-22, F-35 JSF, F-117, T-50, C-5, C-130, C-130J, P-3, S-3 and U-2.

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. is a unit of Lockheed Martin Corp., headquartered in Bethesda, Md. Lockheed Martin is a global enterprise principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture and integration of advanced technology systems, products and services. Employing about 125,000 people worldwide, Lockheed Martin had 2001 sales of $24 billion.

Both the news are aperently from 2002. Does any 1 has some thing new on this, some thing from 2004.

SABRE

July 23rd, 2004, 09:09 AM

Well Forget what I have post above. Read this.

New US combat aircraft 'flawed'

The new US jet fighter likely to replace Australia's ageing F-111s and F-18s may not be equipped with a missile to destroy enemy warships, technology vital for the defence of Australia, say Canberra defence experts.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute says in a report on the United States Joint Strike Fighter project that the Federal Government appeared to have rushed to join it because the US told Australia it would miss out if it did not sign up quickly.

The report's author, Aldo Borgu, said if the fighter project delivered all that was promised of it, it would be the best option.

But the US had been progressively narrowing the range of weapons it could carry to keep costs down. It would not come with a specific anti-ship missile, for example.

Mr Borgu said the US did not need the new jet fighter to carry such a missile because it could be carried by other aircraft.

"They don't need it but we do," Mr Borgu said.

Institute director Hugh White said the ability to sink enemy ships was central to the role of Australia's combat aircraft.

The officer in charge of the project, Air Commodore John Harvey, said that by the time the jet was in operation, other anti-ship missiles, such as the Norwegian NSM and the US JASSM, would be available and the jet could carry them.

Australia has contributed $300 million towards the jet's development but has not yet committed to buying the aircraft. It is considered likely to buy up to 100 of the aircraft for about $16 billion, with the first to be delivered in 2012.

The institute said the jet's most potent rival in the region would be the Russian MiG-29 Fulcrum and the Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 Flanker, now entering service with some air forces. Indonesia says it will buy 48 Sukhois but only four have so far been delivered.

The RAAF plans to withdraw the F-111 from service about 2010 and the F-18 between 2012 and 2015.

Mr Borgu said that if planned upgrades to the F-18s ran into trouble, there could be a serious gap in Australia's strike capability. He said it was usual for aircraft development programs to run late and Australia should have a contingency plan. "The first production (JSF) aircraft won't fly until at least 2006 and full production is expected to be reached only in 2008."

Mr Borgu said he did not think the US applied extensive political pressure but it did say that Australia had to join early to be a player.

He said the RAAF argued that the jet was the best aircraft for Australia. "The Government accepted the advice of its professional military advisers," Mr Borgu said.

Mr White said he believed the jet was best for Australia but the Government had not done enough to manage the significant risk that the aircraft might not be delivered on time, on specifications and at the promised price.

"By not covering that risk, they've put at risk the long-term maintenance of our air combat capability," he said.

This could expose Australia to a strategic risk in an uncertain future.

Air Commodore Harvey said that if the JSF were delayed, the RAAF had a number of options including extending the life of the F-111s and F-18s.

gf0012-aust

July 23rd, 2004, 09:24 AM

By Marc Selinger
07/22/2004 09:32:06 AM

FARNBOROUGH, England - Lockheed Martin Corp., the prime contractor for the U.S. Defense Department's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, has developed a proposal that mostly would solve the aircraft's problems with excess weight, a company official said July 21.

Tom Burbage, a Lockheed Martin executive vice president who oversees the company's F-35 efforts, told reporters at the Farnborough Air Show that Lockheed Martin has come up with a combination of weight reductions and thrust-related efficiencies that would have the equivalent effect of losing 2,500 pounds, which is roughly the size of the bulge that Lockheed Martin has been grappling with for more than a year.

The proposal, which focuses on the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant, the main source of the weight woes, would shed about 1,700 pounds through a half dozen or so large reductions, as well as hundreds of smaller cuts.

"We're looking at things that may save one pound," Burbage said. "But it all adds up."

Among the biggest modifications eyed for the STOVL JSF is a slight shortening of the weapons bays, which would save about 200 pounds. The change would not affect any of the weapons that the aircraft initially is required to carry, Burbage said.

Lockheed Martin's proposal would shed another 40 pounds or so by repackaging an actuator that helps the leading edge flap on the front of the wing move up and down.

Besides making the F-35 less heavy, the proposal calls for realizing 800 pounds of more thrust by improving air flows inside the aircraft and by tightening seals on the lift-fan nozzle to make it more efficient.

Although weight has been less of an issue for JSF's other two variants, the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version and the carrier variant (CV), the CTOL and CV aircraft still would receive many of the modifications proposed for the STOVL jet because their performance would benefit, Burbage said. One change they would not get, though, is the shortening of the weapons bays.

Mid-August review

The Lockheed Martin proposal would not provide all of the "margins" that the company would like to have in case the F-35 gains weight sometime in the future, Burbage said. But it "gets us very close" to where the program should be.

"We're in the range that we wanted to be in right now," he said.

The changes suggested by Lockheed Martin would not be made to the first of 22 test aircraft that the company is to build for the program, but the remaining 21 jets would receive the modifications.

The company plans to formally present its proposal to the Defense Department's JSF program office in mid-August and to a high-level Pentagon panel in October. While not commenting on the specifics of Lockheed Martin's proposal, Navy Rear Adm. Steven Enewold, the head of the program office, suggested that he believes the company is on the right track.

"My view is that we're getting to closure on what the configuration ought to be," Enewold said.

To provide more time to fix the weight problems, DOD has instituted a series of delays in the program's schedule, including moving the first flight test from October 2005 to August 2006 and the first fielding from 2010 to 2012 (DAILY, June 29).

Lockheed Martin is developing JSF for the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy and for a host of expected and potential foreign customers. The Air Force revealed earlier this year that it intends to buy the STOVL variant in addition to the CTOL. The Marine Corps plans to acquire the STOVL version, while the Navy hopes to field the CV variant.

In 2004 dollars, the CTOL version is expected to cost in the low- to-mid $40 million range per aircraft. The projected price tag of the CV and STOVL variants is about $10 million more than that, Burbage said.

OSINT alert. No link provided

XEROX

July 25th, 2004, 11:45 AM

Britain fights for larger stake in JSF
A row is brewing over America’s reluctance to share technology for the Joint Strike Fighter project. Report by Dominic O’Connell

A FIBREGLASS MODEL in battleship grey was one of the unlikely stars of last week’s Farnborough air show. While casual visitors gawped at the fighters roaring overhead, or oohed at the sleek, sinister shapes of the latest unmanned stealth aircraft from America, those in the know trudged up through the corporate boxes to scrutinise the unprepossessing mock-up

It was a model of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) — or F-35, to give it its American service name — a combat aircraft that will not go into production for another four years and is unlikely to enter service in Britain until 2011 at the earliest.
It may be some time before it fires a shot in anger, but the JSF has already assumed monumental importance for the future of Britain’s defence industry. Such are the tensions over its development and manufacture that a rift is emerging at the top level of the transatlantic defence alliance between Britain and America.

At issue is the Pentagon’s perceived reluctance to share the sensitive defence technology that would allow Britain to play a bigger part in the programme. In particular, Britain wants access to the software codes that would allow it to repair and upgrade the aircraft, so it can maintain an independent fleet without recourse to America.
Mike Turner, chief executive of BAE Systems, Britain’s largest defence contractor and a member of the Lockheed Martin-led consortium building the aircraft, is forthright.

“It is vitally important as a nation that we are self-capable when it comes to JSF. We need the software codes to have the capability to fit new weapons on the aircraft — otherwise we will have to join a queue with everyone else to have the job done in America,” he said.
British politicians have now taken up the cudgels. Lord Bach, the defence procurement minister, has visited the Pentagon to voice his displeasure at the slow pace of technology transfer, while at Farnborough his boss, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, confirmed he had written to Donald Rumsfeld, his American counterpart.

Hoon would not disclose the contents of his letter, but industry sources said he had reminded Rumsfeld that the two nations had signed an outline agreement on defence technology co-operation two years earlier, but that little progress appeared to have been made since then.

Turner and the politicians are playing for high stakes commercially as well as strategically. The JSF will become probably the largest military programme in history. Sales of the aircraft are expected to bring in between $200 billion and $400 billion (£108 billion- £217 billion), with service and support estimated to rake in four times that sum over the plane’s life.
It will become the backbone of America’s air force, marine corps and navy for the next 40 years, replacing several types of existing aircraft, from Harrier jump jets to out-and-out fighters such as the F-16.

The plane’s promised versatility gives it enormous export potential, especially as America has decided to make its design and construction an international collaborative effort, with 11 partner nations having already signed up. Top of the heap is Britain, which will buy up to 150, and has paid £1.4 billion to be the sole “tier one” partner in the programme.
But the partner nations are not entirely happy with the way America has handled the project, claiming that stateside firms have been handed the lion’s share of the work, and that the Pentagon’s sensitivity to the export of defence technology has stymied plans for their involvement.

Norway, which has invested $125m, has threatened to withdraw its involvement unless more work is forthcoming, while Italy has also complained about America’s reluctance to share defence technology.
Tom Burbage, the Lockheed Martin executive running the programme, is used to the complaints, but points out that the JSF was never intended as a work-share project along the lines of previous international defence schemes. “It’s not about jobs. It’s about finding the best companies internationally and running a programme that is affordable,” he said. Burbage acknowledged that it did involve “some sensitive technology”, but said that so far there had been no hold-ups in obtaining Pentagon clearance for transferring technology to international partners.

Steve Briggs, the JSF vice-president at Northrop Grumman, Lockheed and BAE’s consortium partner, said the size of the programme meant international involvement was inevitable.
“At the peak, we’re talking about making one new JSF every day. That’s a monster to feed. Forget the (Airbus) A380 or the (Boeing) 7E7, this is a monster. We don’t believe, for example, that there are enough high-tech milling machines in the entire US to keep pace with making the components for this production line.”
Those lucky enough to clamber aboard the JSF bandwagon are happy with the results.

Mark Scherrer, managing director of Ferra, an Australian engineering company that has won several pieces of work on the project, said it had led to unforeseen benefits, such as other contracts with multinational companies involved in the programme. “The flow-on effects for Australian industry will be long term,” he said.

One big British beneficiary will be Rolls-Royce, the aero-engine company. It will make the lift fan for the jump-jet version, a mind-boggling piece of equipment that has been described as the world’s most powerful hairdryer.
Driven by a shaft at the front of the JSF’s engine, it will produce as much thrust as a Eurofighter running flat out. In partnership with General Electric, Rolls-Royce is making an alternative powerplant for the aircraft to rival the current Pratt & Whitney engine.

BAE Systems and Britain have another goal: to make sure that if another JSF production line were needed — the principal line will be at Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas, headquarters — it would come to Britain.
For BAE in particular the need is acute. Its aircraft factories at Wharton, Lancashire, and Woodford, Cheshire, are likely to run out of work once their current programmes — Eurofighter and Nimrod respectively — have run their course. The number of Nimrods required by Britain was cut from 18 to 12 in last week’s defence review, and most analysts do not expect Britain to order its full quota of Eurofighters. Without JSF, the factories are likely to close.

Turner said Britain was pushing for a final assembly line, noting that the Dutch and Italian governments were also making strong bids.
It is unclear whether Lockheed and the Pentagon will deem a second production line necessary. Tom Fillingham, the BAE executive who is JSF’s deputy programme manager, said a study had recently begun on new production methods for use at Fort Worth, and that the final decision on a second line was unlikely to be taken for another 12 to 18 months.
The British government takes the prospect of a second line seriously. Last year it commissioned Rand, the American think- tank that played a large part in the formation of the original Pentagon procurement strategy, to examine Britain’s readiness for another line.
The study found that three British companies — BAE, Marshall Aerospace and Dara, the government-owned aircraft-repair agency, had the capability to build the new aircraft

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ - 25/july/2004

SABRE

July 26th, 2004, 01:25 PM

Ppl r seeing more flaws in F-35. Only country that seems serious is Britain. I dnt think with such an attitude F-35 would become a product that it is believed to be. It wouldnt be even near to F-22 in the end and Europe might end up with EF-2000s that JSF.

The project is keep getting delayed. Australia must also consider other Jets too. I c it not a good Idea for the time beeing.

Aussie Digger

July 27th, 2004, 10:07 PM

The problems with this aircraft "officially" relate to the F-35B (STOVL) version, not the F-35A (CTOL) version that Australia is looking at. Despite the "non-official" recent words that Australia may "consider" F-35B's at some point, it has not made any decision to purchase any version of this aircraft yet. That decision is to be made in 2006/7, by which time hopefully, the problems with the F-35 will either be sorted out or made much clearer.

Australia has considered other jets and apart from the F-22 (which we apparently can't afford) none of the available ones besides F-35, meet our requirements. The only stated requirement we currently have is a need for up to 100 aircraft to replace our F-18 and F-111 fleets from about 2012 onwards. No "final" decision has been made as yet, though F-35 WILL be the winner, if it turns out okay.

DRUB

August 6th, 2004, 03:34 AM

gf0012-aust

August 6th, 2004, 03:57 AM

The report which said that Oz was possibly looking at the F-35B's, would that be in light of ppl pushing for the littoral for the RAN? So the littoral could effectively be used as an Aircraft carrier?

Gf- you mentioned that Oz was one of four nations which the U.S would look favourably at for the F-22, are the other nations U.K, Israel, canada???

cheers

Talk has been that it would be Oz, U.K, Israel, Japan.

I would imagine that Canada could, but they haven't been on the US popularity list WRT to Iraq, deserters etc....

DRUB

August 6th, 2004, 04:08 AM

SABRE

August 9th, 2004, 05:57 AM

gf0012-aust

August 9th, 2004, 06:15 AM

SABRE

August 9th, 2004, 05:11 PM

Who is Canada Fighting? They r just waisten good money on arms. No one hates Canada no one will attack Canada not even the AL-Qaida has targets there.

You don't buy weapons to necessarily go to war today - you buy them today in case you have to use them tomorrow, and to make the message clear to anyone who may visit harm on your country that they will pay a price for their actions if they decide to fight you .

Have you even looked at Canadas Military History?

In over 3000 years of reasonable recorded history about conflict and warfare how many nations have escaped conflict, and how many years of total peace have there been? Then have another look at Canadas role in history and tell me where you would have predicted events and outcomes correctly.

Good luck - because if you can get it right, and predict that nature of future conflict for individual nations, then politicians and military officers will beat a path to your door.

You'll be more popular than Nostradamus :D:

Ok How abt this, Santa from North Pole invades Canada. Toronto bombed by FX-3000 the flying Randears. Elf troops take control of the Ottowa City. Canadian navy destroyed by NPNavy controlled by Penguins and Seals. :D: :smokingc:

Just Kiddin, All I wana know is who is going to go all the way up, almost to the top of the world just to invade Canada?

But than there are two countries. Hmm.... USA & Russia. Niether of them have motives. Other than that we will have to wait for them to participate in the coming soon Sequel of WW1 and 2 "The WW3" and may be 4 aswell.

Aussie Digger

August 10th, 2004, 02:45 AM

No, there is no likely threat that any Country will invade Canada, but that doesn't mean that Cananda doesn't require any armed forces. Canada has a long and respectable record of taking part in both peace-keeping and war fighting missions overseas. It is foolish however, to design a defence force around 1 particular type of mission (as the New Zealand Government is doing, ie: Peace-Keeping).

In order to successfully undertake these missions, the ability to escalate the force you're capable of employing is often the only reason peace-keeping missions don't become a "peace-making" missions, ie: peace forcibly imposed upon a region. To do this requires a mix of capabilities including a strong air component. Canada has always maintained a fairly strong air force, and their current CF-18's won't last forever... They are probably looking at the JSF for exactly the same reason as Australia...

tatra

November 23rd, 2004, 01:11 PM

22/11/2004, An Article from Janes:

Equipment swap failure forces Dutch JSF delay
By Joris Janssen Lok JDW Special Correspondent The Hague

The Netherlands is delaying its planned introduction of Lockheed Martin F-35A Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft by two years to 2014.

The measure will release money needed to pay for newly emerging acquisitions, which for a major part have become necessary because of Norway's controversial decision, last September, to cancel a major equipment swap with the Netherlands.

According to the Netherlands Minister of Defence Henk Kamp, postponing the replacement of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF)'s ageing F-16 fleet with new F-35As will generate EUR189 million ($243.8 million). This money will now be used to acquire urgently needed bridgelaying and minefield breaching platforms as well as 155 mm precision-guided artillery munitions. The engineer platforms and 155 mm munitions were supposed to have been provided at no cost by Norway as part of the package deal.

In total, the Norwegian withdrawal from the equipment swap is costing the Netherlands EUR216 million, said Kamp, who earlier expressed his intense disappointment with the Norwegian decision. However, only part of the extra costs (EUR86 million) can be absorbed during the current defence planning period, which runs through to 2009.

This is because other programmes are also confronting the Dutch with previously unplanned extra spending, namely:

EUR106 million related to the earlier-than-planned introduction of new CV9035 Mk III infantry fighting vehicles for the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA);

At least EUR30 million to bring the RNLAF's existing and planned Boeing CH-47D Chinook helicopters to the same avionics standard;

A still-to-be-determined amount for changing the existing contract with NH Industries for 20 NH90 naval helicopters to a new contract for 12 NH90s in naval and eight in maritime transport configuration.

Finding a customer for the RNLA's 18 surplus Krauss-Maffei Wegmann PzH 2000 155 mm howitzer systems - which were at the heart of the equipment swap but which Norway now does not want - will be necessary to pay for part of these as well, Kamp said.

Interest development, considering that both countries are JSF partner nations and that Norway, The Netherlands as well as Denmark were all unhappy with their workshares. In fact, Norway was threatening to abandon the programme and buy Typhoon or Gripen instead. Now their decision not to swap equipment with The Netherlands delays Dutch JSF procurement . Wonder how that will impact on JSF production schedule and price :roll

On the equipment swap with Norway, see http://defencetalk.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=3104

Anybody up for some pre-owned PzH 2000? :D:

gf0012-aust

November 23rd, 2004, 07:14 PM

We've been having discussions on another Australian Military Forum about the PzH's - we all think it's a good idea to buy them! ;)

I met PzH re this platform at the last Land Warfare Conf - damn impressive, and it certainly made some of the other offerings like the K9 and Casear look a little lame.

The presentation was certainly well done (as all of these things are choreographed to do!)

redsoulja

November 23rd, 2004, 10:29 PM

i thought that america wasn't going to allow Isreal to enter the JSF-35 project after what happended to Lavi? and Canada is doing ok with the F-18s although i think the F-35s would be nice :alian

gf0012-aust

November 23rd, 2004, 10:41 PM

i thought that america wasn't going to allow Isreal to enter the JSF-35 project after what happended to Lavi? and Canada is doing ok with the F-18s although i think the F-35s would be nice :alian

Canada has over half of her current Hornet fleet mothballed as they have had budgetary cuts. They're currently parked with about 50 inactivated F5's.

redsoulja

November 23rd, 2004, 10:56 PM

yeha a small fleet might be able to take duty as long as the maintenance costs can be kept down, here in canada the Liberals especially Chretien has neglecte the military to a large degree, so there's an anti-military mentality that exists

Aussie Digger

November 24th, 2004, 10:10 AM

Australia should be trying to acquire some of those CF-18's to try and make up (nubers wise) for the impending loss of our F-111's. They'd be a cheaper option than acquiring F/A-18E/F's or F-15E strike Eagles, to tide us over until the F-35 arrives...

Aussie Digger

November 24th, 2004, 10:49 AM

Here's an in-depth analysis of the F-35. I don't necessarily agree with him, but it's an interesting read nonetheless. Bear in mind that it is an analysis by a man with a vested interest in the F-111 (his professional career has been based on it, to date) and as now appears the F-22 (he is writing more and more about the F-22)...

ANALYSIS: Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(Australian Aviation, May/June 2002, p 28-32, p 24-27.)
Carlo Kopp, PEng
Carlo.Kopp@aus.net
© 2002, Carlo Kopp
©2002, Aerospace Publications, Pty Ltd, Canberra.
July 15, 2002
1 Part 1 A Cold War Anachronism?
Judging from the media rhetoric in early January this year, one could almost be forgiven for believing that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was the anointed replacement for Australia's F/A-18A and F-111 fleets - no doubt to the annoyance of many in Defence who are immersed in the complexities of AIR 6000 capabilitiesdefinition. The reality of the Joint Strike Fighter is much less sparkling as many would like us to believe. In this month's analysis we will explore some of the issues.

The new LM F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has the distinction of being a `first' in more than one respect. It is the first combat aircraft to leverage the massive US Air Force research & development investment in the F-22 family of aircraft. It is also the first attempt since the 1960s TFX (F-111) program failure to produce a fighter which can meet the needs of all three US services with fighter fleets, as well as the needs of export clients. As the Joint Strike Fighter program includes both conventional, carrier capable and STOVL variants, it is the first ever attempt to create a fighter which spans three very distinct deployment regimes. Finally, it is the first attempt to produce a very low cost aircraft with genuine stealth characteristics.

With the prospect of around 3,000 Joint Strike Fighters for the US services, replacing the F-16A-D, A-10A, F/A-18A-D and AV-8B, and the potential to render all European fighter offerings wholly uncompetitive in the large F-16 and F/A-18 replacement markets, the hope of US manufacturers and their congressional supporters is that the Joint Strike Fighter will become the next F-16 and secure the US industry with an unbeatable advantage in the future `commodity' fighter market. Greed is a powerful motivator in the Joint Strike Fighter program and one which is likely to see most of the obstacles to this aircraft, and its inherent limitations, ignored in the quest for market dominance.

The history of the Joint Strike Fighter (formerly the Joint Advanced Strike Technology - JAST) program is by any measure colourful, its earliest origins tracing back to technology demonstration programs for a Harrier follow-on for the US Marine Corps and multirole fighter for the US Air Force (refer AA December 2001 and http://www.jsf.mil/). The shrinking US aerospace industrial base soon saw significant congressional pressure applied for the initial technology demonstration goal to be extended into a production fighter program. In its current shape the Joint Strike Fighter program could lead to the production of around 3,000 Joint Strike Fighter variants replacing US Air Force F-16Cs, A-10s, US Navy F/A-18Cs, and US Marine Corps and RAF/RN Harrier variants. The lead service in the Joint Strike Fighter program remains the US Air Force.

From the very outset the principal aim of the Joint Strike Fighter program was to produce a low cost mass production strike aircraft which exploits the latest avionic/computer, stealth and production technologies. Given the incessant political threats of F-22 program cancellation held over the US Air Force through most of the 1990s, limiting the air superiority capabilities of the Joint Strike Fighter was a political imperative - moreso given that air superiority capabilities such as high thrust/weight ratio and sustained supersonic cruise are not very compatible with very low unit cost. If the Joint Strike Fighter were to be too snappy a performer in the air superiority game, the F-22 would have been promptly axed thereby shifting USD 20B or more of production costs back by at least a decade much to the delight of vote buyers in the US Congress.

Indeed as recently as a year ago the US Air Force had to defend the F-22 against repeated political attacks, most of which clearly illustrated the almost total technical illiteracy of the F-22's critics. Invariably the argument is that the F-22 is `too big, too costly, too capable' or `built around Cold War needs, thus irrelevant to the modern environment' and that a Joint Strike Fighter can do the job well enough.

The US Air Force crafted the basic definition of the Joint Strike Fighter - its size, performance, load carrying ability and target cost around its principal tactical strike fighter, the Lockheed-Martin F-16CG/CJ. In the mid 1990s US Air Force force structure model the F-15C flew air superiority and air defence tasks, the F-111F, F-15E and F-117A performed the `deep strike' penetration tasks, with the latter used in more heavily defended environments. The venerable Fairchild-Republic A-10A Thunderbolt was used for battlefield interdiction and close air support, together with the F-16CG. Defence suppression was performed by the F-16CG, in concert with AGM-130 firing F-15Es, after the retirement of the formidable F-4G Weasel. In this model targets fall into two distinct bands - those within a 400 NMI radius of friendly runways, and those at 600 NMI and beyond.

This force structure model evolved during the latter part of the Cold War, and combined a relatively diverse mix of fighter capabilities. With the 1970s F-111F, A-10 and F-117A, 1980s F-15C/E and F-16C and a mix of weapons with lineages back to the 1960s, this model was a cumulative aggregation of almost three decades of technology and evolving doctrine. This was the force structure which the US Air Force applied with such devastating effect against the SovBloc modelled Iraqi defences in 1991 and it proved itself convincingly.

There is however one important division which can be drawn through this force structure model - size. With the exception of the small single engine single seat F-16, all of these aircraft are large twin engine fighters designed to push the performance envelope in their respective categories.

The ubiquitious F-16 was a uniquely Cold War phenomenon. With NATO and the Warsaw Pact geographically poised along either side of the Iron Curtain, presenting each other with a concentration of force and targets unprecedented in history, significant imperatives existed for both sides to saturate the theatre with high performance fighters. Whoever won the air superiority game over Central Europe held the decisive advantage in the Cold War standoff. Fighter combat radius and endurance over the target are not issues when the geographical environment puts the two largest military forces on the planet head-to-head across a single frontier.

The Light Weight Fighter (LWF) contest saw the GD YF-16 take the laurels and decisive build numbers over the YF-17. The production F-16A was a day-VFR light weight air combat fighter designed for exceptional transonic agility and good supersonic dash performance when clean, armed with Sidewinders and an internal gun. Its principal role was to destroy enmasse the Soviet and allied Warpac strike fighter fleets in close air combat, and then swing into day-VFR battlefield air interdiction and close air support to eradicate Soviet/Warpac land forces, the latter role to be shared with the F-15A, F-4E and F-111D/E/F. With the Soviet/Warpac fighter fleets dominated by the MiG-21, MiG-23/27 and Su-7/17/22 series, the F-16s would have enjoyed a decisively target rich environment.

With the impending retirement of the F-4E Phantom II, the US Air Force needed a substitute to fill the tactical fighter bomber role. The F-16C, equipped with the LANTIRN Terrain Following Radar and FLIR/laser targeting podset, was to fill this niche. With European theatre geography and threats driving this need, the radius of the F-16 airframe was yet again not an issue.

When the Soviet Empire collapsed, the US Air Force was forced into a massive downsizing program. Under significant budgetary pressure, the remaining F-4E and F-4G aircraft were retired, followed by the F-15A, much of the F-16A fleet and early model F-111A/D/E/G aircraft. By the mid to late nineties, the US Air Force fighter fleet comprised primarily the F-15C, F-16C variants, the F-15E and a small number of F-117As. Most of the massive B-52 fleet was retired and the buy of B-2A `batwing' bombers was chopped from 132 to 60 and then finally 21.

Expectations during this period were that the principal strategic problems the US would confront would be troublesome nations in the Balkans and the Middle East, with ethno-religious conflicts between smaller nation states dominating agenda. In this environment problem nations would be unable to threaten US basing, and the enormous political clout during the `Pax Americana' period would see easy access to basing. Concurrently the US Congress showed little interest in the defence budget, and the US Air Force faced the prospect of an aging and increasingly expensive to run fighter fleet, in a strategic environment where air superiority and safe in-theatre basing were virtually guaranteed.

This was the environment which shaped the Joint Strike Fighter program - a situation in which combat radius, endurance over the target, air superiority performance and availability of in-theatre basing were not principal design imperatives. Cost and industrial base survival pressures were the foremost drivers in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The US Air Force needed a cheap mass production bomb truck to provide a one-for-one replacement of its aging F-16C inventory. The US aerospace industry needed another F-16A with which to saturate export markets and retain their eroding market position against the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.

Perhaps the greatest misconception about the Joint Strike Fighter program is that it represents a `repeat scenario' when compared to the YF-16/F-16A program - a low cost highly agile air superiority fighter designed to exploit cutting edge technology to provide a shorter ranging supplement to the top end twin engine large fighter (then F-15A, now F-22A) of the period. This misconception misrepresents the central design objectives of the Joint Strike Fighter program against the Light Weight Fighter program, and also ignores the decisive role shift in the F-16 fleet.

In its day the F-16A was perhaps the nastiest close-in air combat fighter in existance, requiring careful tactics by even the top end F-15A air superiority fighter. While the F-16C Block 40/50 is heavier, it is still a respectable air combat fighter even if a dubious bomb truck. The F-16's central design optimisation was the transonic dogfight, reflected in thrust/weight ratio, wing loading, turn rates, climb rates and acceleration. In these parameters it was competitive against the best in the field, even if it could not compete with the thrust/weight ratio, wing loading, climb rates and acceleration of the F-15A.

The Joint Strike Fighter's central design optimisation is in-theatre strike, battlefield interdiction and close air support, reflected in forward sector stealth, internal weapons/fuel capacity and cruise efficiency in clean configuration. In these parameters it outperforms the incumbent F-16C and F/A-18A/C, while providing relatively similar air superiority performance to these types. Against the current yardstick for air superiority performance, the F-22A, the Joint Strike Fighter is a non-contender - its 35 degree class transonic wing and 1:1 thrust/weight ratio are adequate for self-defensive purposes but not in the league for rapidly establishing air supremacy.

Just as the joint Tactical Fighter eXperimental (TFX) or F-111A/B program was cast at an early stage into a conceptual mold of a high speed long range bomb-truck, the Joint Strike Fighter has been cast into the mold of an incrementally improved F-16C / F/A-18C class light bomb-truck, exploiting stealth and modern avionics to provide a survivability edge over its predecessors. The TFX program crashed and burned on the evolving needs of the US Navy, who wanted more air superiority performance and lower carrier landing weights.

Some critics of the Joint Strike Fighter argue that it will `inevitably go the route of the TFX' experiencing cost growth, weight growth and performance loss as it undergoes development and its respective end users load it up with desired design extras to meet their specific needs. Indeed US reports suggest repeated political clashes in recent years, as the US Marine Corps and Navy sought performance and capability improvements which conflicted with US Air Force unit cost targets. Given that the maritime users of the Joint Strike Fighter do not have an F-22 equivalent to gain the high ground in an air battle, it is not inconceivable that we might see downstream disagreements in the Joint Strike Fighter program as these players try to fill this crucial gap in their basic capabilities.

The broader strategic issue for the Joint Strike Fighter will be its basic sizing in a world environment which sees two mutually supporting strategic trends - `problem nations' acquiring ballistic missiles, both mobile and semi-mobile, weapons of mass destruction, and a concurrent trend to implementing `shoot-and-scoot' SAM/AAA air defence tactics. In air power theoretic terms, the use of `shoot-and-scoot' SAM/AAA and ballistic missile/WMD technologies represent an `anti-access' strategy. Such strategies aim to deny the use of nearby runways by threatening ballistic missile or WMD attacks on runways as well as hosting nations, while providing a persistent and highly mobile air defence threat (A good summary of emerging ballistic missile capabilities in this area is at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/index.html, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/index.html).

Prior to the 11th September, long term US Air Force envisaged a two tier force structure model: the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) , an Air Expeditionary Force comprising 48 x F-22A and 12 x B-2A, would break the opponent's air defences and launch high tempo attacks on critical command/control/communications, WMD sites and ballistic missile forces. As the opponent's defences would crumble, a `sustainment' Air Expeditionary Force, comprising the Joint Strike Fighter, B-1B and B-52H, would then hammer the opponent to collapse. This model makes two implicit assumptions - the enemy cannot bombard friendly runways with ballistic missiles, and these runways are close enough to permit a viable sortie rate (missions/day) by the Joint Strike Fighter and F-22.

If the opponent chooses to play the ballistic missile bombardment game, then this model does get into some difficulty, since the 400-600 nautical mile range of evolved Scud class missiles presents difficulties for the Joint Strike Fighter - nearby nations might deny basing access and bases which are made available might be shut down by ballistic missile strikes. This is less of an issue for the supercruising F-22, as with decent tanker support it can sustain a high sortie rate from a much greater distance - the F-22 can transit to targets at roughly twice the speed of contemporary fighters and the Joint Strike Fighter.

This was a principal strategic argument against the whole concept of the Joint Strike Fighter prior to the September 11th events. Since then we have seen a pivotal shift in bombardment tactics, with long endurance `loitering bombardment' used to successfully engage and destroy fleeting and highly mobile ground targets. This in turn mitigates against smaller fighters and decisively favours aircraft which have larger bomb loads and endurance. The argument that Afghanistan was a `one-off' does not hold up to scrutiny - a campaign against Iran, Iraq, the PRC or more than one African problem nation could see the very same geographical problem issues arise yet again. Well spoken diplomacy is no match against the threat of domestic terrorism across porous Third World borders, or ballistic missile attacks with conventional or even WMD warheads - all being convincing disincentives to the basing of a US-led Air Expeditionary Force.

Whether one is hunting a high technology Russian mobile SAM system, a mobile ballistic missile system, or a bunch of terrorists in a four wheel drive or BTR-60, the inevitable reality is that the best technique is `loitering bombardment' which is not the forte of smaller fighters - including the Joint Strike Fighter.

The revived argument in the US promoting new build B-2C `batwings' and an F-111/FB-111A class `regional bomber' illustrates this important shift in the bombardment paradigm - and the increasing long term exposure of close-in based Air Expeditionary Forces to MRBM attacks. The argument pits direct operational needs for striking radius, sortie rates and bombloads in difficult to export or non-exportable top tier assets against the limited yet highly exportable and thus potentially profitable JSF.

Aussie Digger

November 24th, 2004, 10:52 AM

And now for Part 2...

ANALYSIS: Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(Australian Aviation, May/June 2002, p 28-32, p 24-27.)
Carlo Kopp, PEng
Carlo.Kopp@aus.net
© 2002, Carlo Kopp
©2002, Aerospace Publications, Pty Ltd, Canberra.
July 15, 2002
Part 2 Sizing up the Joint Strike Fighter

The public rhetoric surrounding the Joint Strike Fighter is no less deceptive to the uninitiated as the public rhetoric surrounding many of the other current production types being bid for AIR 6000. In all instances we hear the `latest avionics technology' and`stealth performance' as key attributes of a `modern high tech fighter' designed to `meet the threats of the future'.

In comparing the Joint Strike Fighter against the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, F-16C/B60 and F/A-18E/F, the Joint Strike Fighter will have a decisive advantage in its very moden integrated avionic architecture, which is modelled on that of the F-22A but built using militarised commercial computing technology. With a battery of GigaHertz clock speed processors, high speed digital busses with around 1,000 times the throughput of the Mil-Std-1553B busses in the teen series and Eurocanard fighters, it is no contest - the Joint Strike Fighter is in an unbeatable position. While growth versions of the teen series and Eurocanard fighters might see a similar integrated avionic architecture in the post 2010 period, this is unlikely to be a revenue-neutral design change.

Against all of these contenders, the Joint Strike Fighter has an unassailable survivability advantage in its use of evolved second generation stealth technology, again derived from the F-22A technology base. With a forward sector radar cross section cited to be `close to the F-22' the Joint Strike Fighter will present a challenging target to forward sector radar guided threats.

As a bomb truck, the Joint Strike Fighter falls into a similar payload class to these players, but with the important distinction that it carries its bombs or missiles internally, and it has an internal fuel capacity similar to that of these competing aircraft loaded up with external fuel tanks. In practical terms this means that the Joint Strike Fighter can carry a similar load of fuel and bombs without the critical transonic regime drag penalty of external stores. Therefore it can carry the same bomb load further using a similar fuel load. Claims that the X-35 demonstrator exceeded the Joint Strike Fighter combat radius requirement should come as no surprise - the cited figure of 600+ nautical miles is credible and a distinct gain over the F-16C and F/A-18A/C. This radius is however unlikely to be acheivable if the F-35 is heavily loaded with external stores, since it will like its competitors incur a major drag penalty.

Claims that the Joint Strike Fighter is an `F-111 class bomb truck' are scarcely credible, especially if the F-111 is armed with internal JDAMs or `small bombs' - a variable geometry wing and 34,000 lb of internal fuel is impossible to beat in the bomb trucking game. The comparison of a clean F-35 against an F-111 loaded with external BRU-3A/Mk.82 is not representative of what a post 2020 F-111 weapons configuration would look like. The only decisive system level advantage the Joint Strike Fighter has against the F-111 is its use of second generation stealth technology - no radar cross section reduction on the F-111 will make it competitive against this type. In terms of avionics, if the RAAF retains the F-111 post-2020 then Joint Strike Fighter generation technology would most likely find its way into the Pig and thus render this comparison meaningless.

As an air combat fighter the Joint Strike Fighter is more difficult to compare, since the differences against the teen series and Eurocanards are less distinct. In terms of achievable radar performance its small aperture radar will fall broadly into the same class as its direct competitors. While transonic turn rate performance figures remain classified, the F-35 is a 9G rated fighter and is thus apt to deliver highly competitive transonic close-in dogfight performance against the teen series and Eurocanards. The empty weight of the F-35, at 26,500 - 30,000 lb is deceptive insofar as it must be compared against a conventional competitor's weight including external pylons and empty fuel tanks - nevertheless it is in the empty weight class of an F-15 or F/A-18E rather than F-16C or F/A-18C.

With a nominal payload of 2,000 lb of AAMs the USAF F-35 yields a combat thrust/weight ratio around 1.1:1 which is competitive against a modestly loaded F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanard, but with a typically better combat radius or combat gas allowance - however it is not in the class of an F-15C let alone F-22A. Therefore the F-35 should provide competitive acceleration and climb performance at similar weights to the F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanards. With the upper portions of the split inlets likely to produce good vortices, the F-35 should provide respectable high alpha performance and handling, especially if flight control software technology from the F-22A was exploited fully.

Where the F-35 is apt to be less than a stellar performer is in the supersonic Beyond Visual Range combat regime, which is the sharp end of air superiority performance. This is primarily a consequence of the wing planform design which is in the 35 degree leading edge sweep angle class, thus placing it between the sweep of the F/A-18A/C and F-16A/C. Wing sweep in this class is good for transonic bomb trucking and tight turning, but incurs a much faster supersonic drag rise with Mach number against the supersonic intercept optimised wing planforms seen in the F-15, Typhoon, Rafale and indeed the F-22A. The important caveat is that the teen series and Eurocanards wear a hefty supersonic drag penalty from carrying external missiles and drop tanks, whereas the F-35 will have a clean wing in this regime.

In the absence of published hard numbers for supersonic acceleration, energy bleed and persistence performance, the only reasonable conclusion is that the F-35 is likely to be competitive against the teen series and Eurocanards in combat configuration but decisively inferior to the F-22A.

Another factor in the BVR game is radar performance, limited by the power/aperture of the radar design. While hard numbers on the F-35's radar are yet to be published, what is available suggests an 800-900 element phased array which is in the class of the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards but well behind the massive 2200 element APG-77 in the F-22A. With a superior processing architecture to the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards the Joint Strike Fighter is very unlikely to have inferior radar performance, but may not have a decisively large detection range advantage either.

If used as an air defence interceptor and air superiority fighter, the F-35 will deliver similar capabilities to the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards at similar weights - its limitations in thrust/weight ratio and thus climb rate/acceleration, and wing optimisation for transonic regimes, will limit its ability to engage high performance supersonic threats by virtue of basic aerodynamic performance. Its small radar will also put limitations on achievable BVR missile engagement ranges, although this will be mitigated by very good forward sector stealth performance. A threat with a large infrared search and track set may however get a firing opportunity in a high altitude clear sky engagement. The radar performance bounds will also present similar limitations to those seen with the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanard series when hunting for low flying cruise missiles - without close AWACS support the F-35 may not be very effective in this demanding role.

It is worth noting that the F-35 is not an all-aspect stealth design like the F-22A and YF-23 which have carefully optimised exhaust geometries and thus excellent aft sector radar cross section. The axisymmetric F-135 nozzle is not in this class and thus the F-35 is clearly not intended for the deep penetration strike role of the F-22A.

Attempting to make an all encompassing comparison of the F-35 against current fighters is fraught with some risks, insofar as the design will further evolve before production starts and many design parameters, especially in avionics, may shift. In terms of basic sizing and performance optimisations probably the best yardstick is that the F-35 is much like a `stealthy but incrementally improved F/A-18A/C' which closely reflects the similarity in the basic roles of the two types - strike optimised growth derivatives of lightweight fighters.

The F-35 is clearly out of its league against the F-22A in all cardinal performance parameters, with the exception of its bomb bay size which is built to handle larger weapons than the F-22A. Disregarding stealth capability and baseline avionics, the F-35 is also out of its league against the F-111 in the bomb trucking role by virtue of size and fixed wing geometry.

All of these analytical arguments are essentially contingent upon the JSF meeting its design performance and cost targets. This remains to be seen since the JSF is arguably the highest technological risk program in the pipeline at this time. Key risk factors derive from its reliance upon `bleeding edge' technology to achieve the combination of capability for its size and cost. There are no less than five areas of concern: the COTS derived avionic system departs from established technology and is in many respects a repeat of the F-111D Mk.II avionics idea; the reliance upon software goes well beyond established designs and software systems with many millions of lines of code are not reknowned for timely deliveries; any durability problems with the hot running F135 engines would be handled by derating which cuts into an already marginal thrust/weight ratio; differing needs and expectations by the JSF's diverse customer base could cause divergence in program objectives and cost blowouts in `common' areas; the sheer complexity of what the JSF project is trying to achieve in melding untried technologies with diverse missions could create unforseen problems in its own right. Until we see production JSFs coming off the production line, it remains a high risk option.

The Joint Strike Fighter is a most curious blend of the F-22 technology base, state-of-the-art avionics and Cold War era strategic thinking - in its own way as much a Cold War anachronism as the Eurocanards. Insofar as one of its prime design aims is to shoot down the Eurocanards in the commercial dogfight, it represents an instance of an anachronistic fighter sizing strategy and associated cost structure becoming a principal design driver over achievable combat effect and long term strategic usefulness.

2.1 Joint Strike Fighter vs A6K
With the F-35 being the holy grail of budget minded force planners throughout the West, it has developed some followers in the Canberra defence establishment, especially amongst players who see little importance in the RAAF's established doctrinal and strategic thinking or developing regional environment. Indeed, if we pretend that the PRC doesn't exist and India's strategic competition with the PRC in the region doesn't concern us, and that cruise missiles are not the hottest selling item across the wider region, then the F-35 becomes an attractive proposition - a cheap to buy, cheap to run, stealthy hi-tech fighter which is an incremental improvement over the RAAF's somewhat anaemic F/A-18A Hornet.

As a bomb truck, disregarding stealth performance, the F-35 falls into the gap between the F/A-18A and F-111. As an air combat fighter, it will offer modest performance gains over the F/A-18A HUG and the advantage of stealth. In the eyes of many this is apt to be a `good compromise' at a `good price'.

These arguments may appear superficially reasonable, but are based upon a number of premises which are not reasonable. Regional strategic issues may have disappeared from the press and TV bulletins but remain as they were a year ago:

1.The regional arms race has yet to show signs of abating, and with the War on Terrorism forcing the US to make significant political concessions to China and India we should expect to see both players doing their best to shop for Russian (and Israeli) technology while world attention is focussed elsewhere.

2.Shifting tactics in nations opposed to the West will see mobility become the basic tactic for evading air power, given that Afghanistan has proven yet again that bunkers, caves and tunnels are no defence against air power. Loitering bombardment will become the baseline tactic for defeating mobility, demanding larger fighters.

3.Mobile ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are the most rapidly proliferating weapon class in Asia today, and given their value in implementing `anti-access' strategies against Western air power, and political coercion, this is unlikely to change soon. Korea has made a successful business out of the export of extended range Scud derivative technology.

4.The cumulative total of Su-27/30 orders in Asia still remains around the 500 aircraft mark, representing an environment where a 600 nautical mile class subsonic combat radius is not a decisive strategic advantage against the Sukhoi's similar or better radius performance.

5.Turmoil in the Middle East is likely to see long term growth in alternative sources of oil and gas, accelerating development in Australia's Timor Sea and North West Shelf energy industries - and Australia's strategic vulnerability as a result.

6.Uncertainties in the RAAF gaining basing access in South East Asia during a regional crisis remain. While the War on Terrorism may have shifted the focus of Australia's regional interactions, the reality is that much of the region is culturally Muslim and whatever the outcome of the war, political sensitivies in the region will be exacerbated over the nearer and longer term.

The sad reality is that the regional strategic drivers remain as is - they are a consequence of the ongoing economic and military growth in Asia. While India's current relationship with the West has thawed, this situation may not persist over coming decades - the strategic timeline which concerns A6K planning.

What the War on Terrorism will produce, other than major strategic changes in the Middle East and Central Asia, is an increased move to mobility in Asian armed forces as the Afghan campaign is understood fully. It is also apt to produce a longer term demand for coalition campaign forces to support the US in expeditionary warfare.

If we make the assumption that A6K will aim to field only new technology fighters with a very long term development future, then the only relevant candidates are the F-22 and F-35 - both stealthy and using the latest generation avionic architectures and engines.

Numerous strategies exist - with or without F-111 replacement - for implementing the A6K program. If the F-111 is to disappear in 2015-2020, then the choices are a single type replacement using only the F-22, or only the F-35, or some Hi-Lo mix of the F-22 and F-35. If the F-111 is to be stretched beyond 2020, then the F/A-18A could be replaced with either the F-22 or the F-35. This provides no less than 5 possible force structure models, each with different funding needs and capability mixes. Which is best? That depends on the priorities of the observer.

The case for a mix of F119 powered F-111s and F-22s was argued in some detail in AA late last year and presents a robust case in capabilities, with the benefit of significant domestic spending but the drawback of some developmental risk. The case for an F-22 and F-35 mix depends crucially on the perceived importance of bomb-trucking performance vs survivability of the F-35 against the F-111. The F-35's stealth advantage must be weighed against the F-111's superior ability to haul big loads over big distances - with an F-22 escort to kill opposing fighters and SAMs the survivability argument may prove narrower than many may think. A mix in which transonic F-35s escort supercruising F-111s is arguably non-viable and is merely a new technology reimplementation of the existing F/A-18 and F-111 mix.

The alternatives of single type total force replacements with the F-22 or F-35 also raise interesting issues. While the F-35 at this time carries larger bombs than the F-22, it is a decidely inferior performer in the air combat game and the deep penetration strike game. With supercruise capability in a baseline bombing role using `small bomb' payloads the supercruising F-22's higher sortie rate at longer ranges suggests that one F-22 can perform a similar workload to a pair of F-35s, with the caveat that two or more F-35s will be needed to perform the air defence coverage of a single F-22. In terms of deterrent credibility and potency in combat, the F-22 is unbeatable, in terms of political whining from air power detractors of every ilk, it is a guaranteed magnet (deja vu - F-111 1967?). Conversely, a pure F-35 force structure is apt to leave important capability gaps in air superiority, cruise missile defence and deep penetration strike, while pushing up total numbers and thus aircrew demands - the latter likely to be a major long term issue with ongoing demographic shifts.

A key factor in any F-22 vs F-35 contest is that the F-35 order book is full, but the F-22 buy was hatcheted from around 750 down to 332 thus providing significant incentives for an export sale of an aircraft which would be exclusively available, like the F-111 during the 1960s, only to close and trusted allies of the US. US sources suggest a revived build of 750 F-22s would push the unit cost down to USD 74M, similar to an F-15E.

Which of these strategies proves to be most attractive to Australia's leadership is yet to be seen - and if the government is serious about the A6K effort this will not be known until a decision is reached around the middle of the decade.

What is clear at this stage is that the fighter market is stratifying in a manner without precedent - two decades ago a buyer had more than one choice in any given size/weight/performance class. By 2010 this will be untrue - in non-stealthy fighters there is apt to be only the F/A-18E/F and Typhoon with different weights, aerodynamics and mission avionic capabilities, and in stealthy fighters the F-22 and F-35 which are much more diverse in capabilities than their teen series predecessors, the F-15 and F-16. Therefore a choice of fighter will determine the choice of strategy/doctrine since different classes of fighter provide distinctly different possibilities - and limitations - in roles and missions.

One might ask the question of whether the `classical' model of a fighter competition is even relevant any more? With the only gains from the competitive process likely to be in ancillary benefits such as domestic support programs - aircraft prices being largely fixed by the domestic markets of the manufacturers - one might seriously contemplate the primary focus of the A6K evaluation being in assessing the ability of particular fighter types or mixes/numbers thereof to perform the intended roles, rather than the historical game of playing manufacturers off to secure the best pricing package.

In the context of A6K, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is most notable in terms of the roles andmissions it cannot do well, rather than those it can. If air superiority and long range strike are thelong term priorities which government policy ostensibly declares them to be, then the F-35may not be the best choice for replacing the F/A-18A or the F-111, either singly or in amix.

Admin: A-D, would you mind making these smaller in future. Better to have multiples than a single one that is a monster to read at one go. ;)

Kurt Plummer

December 8th, 2004, 02:12 AM

Thoughts,

1. The shortening by 14" of the STOVL JSF weapons bay most assuredly DOES 'pose a problem' inherent to carriage of large glide munitions like JSOW and theoretically any Quickshot/SWAK equivalent JDAM. I also expect it will effectively deny any 'straight across' derivation of HARM (AARGM or now ASARM) and probably a couple of other key 'fattyXlongie' weapons to include, yes, Harpoon.

OTOH, I don't really understand the importance of a 2,000lb internal weapons carriage option /anyway/ since most of the post-OIF analysis showed that even superpenetrators in the GBU-37 class were not doing much to the Iraqi presidential complexes and the only reason you go after hardXdeep targets is because you either lack the ordnance or the targeting to kill 'live' threats (IADS and TBM etc.) as they popup.

What I am