WW-II: Normandy landing

[ullu]

Did allies have any other option than to land on Normandy beach in ww-ii? If there was, what was it and would the results have been similar as they were after landing at normandy?

[turin]

Not really.

Churchill proposed in 1943 an extension of the invasion of Sicily in Southern Italy, with possible support of the guerillas in Yugoslawia, Albania and Greece. Yet that consideration also included the invasion in the Normandy. The US feared, that concentrating more troops than necessary in Italy would delay the invasion in France, so Overlord took place as planned.

IMO the invasion on Normandy beach was the only possibility to threaten the german forces in Western Europe. In Italy it would have been necessary to cross the alps to reach german territory. The overall territory in Italy supports a defender because of the narrow passages. So the allied troops deployed to Italy where kept at a limit. This was one of the reasons why german troops where able to keep a presence in Italy until 1945.

Also Germany was forced to move a lot of troops to the Normandy in response of the invasion, troops that would otherwise have been relocated to the eastern front. Athough already superior in terms of manpower, the russians fought a war of attrition and additional german troops might have been able to at least stop further russian advance.

Most german leaders (except Rommel) expected an allied invasion at Pas-de-Calais (little bit to the north of Normandy, closer to UK) and concentrated more forces there. Yet this was only exactly what the allied forces wanted.

Spain was neutral and Scandinavia was no place for an invasion at all. A more direct assault lets say in the Netherlands or north western Germany would have been recognized by german reconaissance and might have been disastrous for allied forces. I dont see other possibilities.

[adsH]

It was tactical error to launch a two pronged assault for the germans, I bet there is more that meets the eye!!, i don't know why the germans were so intent on taking control of Moscow at the same time they were trying for Western Europe. all russia realy wanted was arms i think . Turin whenever you have some time and feeling up to the Question go right ahead i'm all ears.

[Gremlin29]

The most interesting point of the Normandy invasion to me is the fact that the Germans could have easily repulsed the invasion had they reacted quickly enough (through no fault of the units involved).

[joker]

Stalingrad was Hitler's biggest mistake. His infatuation with seeing Stalin fall cost him the war. The Germans pretty much raised Stalingrad to the ground. All they had to do was contain it and move onto the caucasus and the Caspian.

[gf0012-aust]

The Turks were also in discussion in 1943-1944. They were only prepared to enter the war if the landing was conducted through the Dardanelles. A Dardanelles approach would not have made logistical and tactical sense, so Turkey didn't enter the war.

[turin]

It was tactical error to launch a two pronged assault for the germans, I bet there is more that meets the eye!!, i don't know why the germans were so intent on taking control of Moscow at the same time they were trying for Western Europe. all russia realy wanted was arms i think . Turin whenever you have some time and feeling up to the Question go right ahead i'm all ears.

Of course it was a tactical error and I think, even a strategical one.
Hitlers decision to attack the SU was largely a political and idiological one. To give some keywords here, one could name "Lebensraum" or the dominance of the germanic race over europe and the inferiour "weak" races.
Yet Russia was always, even back to the 19th century, considered a thread to Europe as a whole. Just have a look at Bismarcks policiy to contain Russia on the Balkans and the UK's actions to prevent them reaching the Dardanelles. When the communist regime was raised in Russia, this became even worse and Russia/SU was always considered a long term thread by the allies as well.

So this drawed a lot of support of the german generals to Hitler (Also remember: we won the war against Russia in 1917! Now with Stalin and his purge of the red army most people thought, its a piece of cake!).
Ironically, today a considerable part of the germans (not being neo-nazis at all!) still believe that an attack by the SU was imminent in 1941 and that, after all, Hitler only made the first move. There arose a heavy debate about this only some years ago in Germany, when new information became available from russian archives.

IMO the best move would have been to continue the campaign in western europe, finishing off the UK. As everybody knows, we lost the battle over britain and that was the main reason (besides the russian campaign) to shelve the invasion plan for the UK (operation "Seeloewe" or "Seal"). We lost the BoB for some reasons, mainly because we had no strategical bomber command and only tactical bombers.

We should have concentrated ops on strategical targets such as industry and the military complex in the south western part (around the invasion area). Then, since no invasion in the SU would have taken place, transfer all available man power to France, build some useful landing fleet (the one we had was crappy to most parts) and even if we had no complete air dominance in Britain, we should have tried the invasion. I firmly believe that as soon as we would have gained a foothold in south western GB they would have been lost since then the transfer of additional troops could take place. We had about 3 million troops to attack the SU, most of these troops battle proven and now available to the invasion of GB.

As for Russia, even if there would have been an imminent risk of attack from their side (and I seriously doubt that regarding their reaction to the invasion in june 1941), I would have strengthened our defenses in Poland and continued relations as usual.

When we would have reached control of GB, you could say "game over". Now we would have been able to transfer large parts of the Luftwaffe to the eastern "front" as well as army units. Our submarines now could operate freely in the Atlantic Ocean without being forced to shut down trade lanes to Britain. The navy yards now would concentrate on builing A LOT more subs (as they did in 1944, when everything was already lost) to effectively deter the US from launching an invasion of some kind. Now we would have concentrated our ressources to the SU. I will wait for responses and post my thoughts about such a campaign another time.

Sorry for writing so much but this is a quite complex issue and would easily fill some pages.

[srirangan]

Great post turin!

[WebMaster]

Sorry for writing so much but this is a quite complex issue and would easily fill some pages.



Don't worry about writing so much. Great post. If you can write so much, we can read as much. :D

[adsH]

this is good stuff !! you must be a really good student of.. is it!! International politics did you say !! its a good tactical revision of the strategy. but i think if an attack was imminent then Germany should off invaded A part of SU instead of going the full length to moscow. that way they would of needed less troops and resources to control The occupied Russia. the Russians did nothing when they were being invaded i found that odd but Stalin had this weird thinking that the Germans might just retreated or something or was he so obsessed with germany that he would of never minded becoming apart of it. i think german elite were (i apologize for this turin) obsessed with the fact that they were a superior race i think it was this propaganda that gave hitler the Unchallenged controll over his troops and country. they had never dreamed of a defeat and had actually convinced them selves at some mental level that they would of been victorious no matter how much the odds became against you. i think Hitler was obsessed with this feeling and attitude that led to his defeat (not Germany's) and ended him feeling humiliated when he was put on trial by the enemies he thought of inferior. that is too much to bare for a once proud Man wouldn't you think so!!

[turin]

but i think if an attack was imminent then Germany should off invaded A part of SU instead of going the full length to moscow. that way they would of needed less troops and resources to control The occupied Russia.

I totally agree. Therefore I recommended an improved eastern defense while being active against Great Britain. Yet as I said before, a russian attack was IMO unlikely, at least for the year 1941, if not at all. So we would have had all the time in the world to finish the western campaign and IF there would have been a russian offensive, we would have been able to hold them off for a while and maybe, depending on the situation, launch some small counterstrike.

I see just now that I have to explain something additonal:
It was tactical error to launch a two pronged assault for the germans

The double assault against east and west was not intented in the beginning. Actually Hitler thought that Great Britain would accept the new situation in 1939 after the invasion of Poland. He (and most of his generals) did make plans for a short campaign in the west until GB would accept things as they were and make peace with Germany.
When he and his advisors heard about the british declaration of war, they were just stunned.
The invasion of Russia/SU was always in his mind, it was one of his...well... "dreams". Yet he wanted to have good relations with Great Britain (not necessarily with the US and definitely not with France, in fact no one was worried when they heard about the french declaration of war. No offense to french readers intended here, its just plain fact!)

So the western campaign, especially the part against Britain, was rather an "accident" than a planned move.


i think german elite were (i apologize for this turin) obsessed with the fact that they were a superior race i think it was this propaganda that gave hitler the Unchallenged controll over his troops and country.

No apology necessary here! You hit the point with that. Remember that in 1940 we took down France within two months. That was simply incredible, especially when compared to the brutal fightings of WW I, when France combined with british and american troops proved to be a neverending nightmare to the imperial german forces.
Through this immense victory, achieved through Blitzkrieg-tactics of combined arms, Hitler received the undivided praise and trust of his generals, even the ones criticizing him before did not dare to say anything against him.
Additionally the Wehrmacht now was considered unstoppable. All these factors play a major role as well as the ones I mentioned in my other post before when Hitler and the german forces now thought about the attack against the Soviet Union.

So what was it about the eastern campaign? Very often I hear people comparing Napoleons operation and that of the Wehrmacht and saying that history repeated itself, yet there are some clear differences.
Napoleon, employing about half a million troops, marched in a straight line towards Moscow. He did not care for seizing territory except for securing his flanks and supplying his army. But his army shrinked more and more since he had to secure his rear as well with garrison troops. When he approached Moscow he met the russian winter as well, what proved to be disastrious. Also the russians fled the city reducing his victory to a shiny nothing. Since he was not able to seize the territory permanently, he had to retreat and his army, already heavily battered, simply decomposated.

From the beginning the german army had the task to secure the russian territory as well, not only reaching the capital ASAP. That means the division into three parts marching on a wide front into the SU. As one can see on every map, Russia gets wider and wider from west to east, so did the german front. Hitler personally pressed for the occupation of the northern russian territories around Leningrad as well as the Ukraine in the south and the Donesz area. The "Heeresgruppe Mitte" / "Army group Center" (one of the three army groups the forces where divided in) alone had a front line of about 1.000 km!
This stretched the lines of supply and when heavy rainfalls came around October, especially wheeled vehicles had incredible difficulties overcoming the muddy roads (nearly nothing paved there of course).

If the Wehrmacht would have gone for a direct assault on moscow, decapitating and decentralizig the russian command, I guess, we would have succeeded, at least in proposing a peace treaty comparable to that of Brest-Litowsk in 1917 and finishing this part of operations before the russian winter began. Yet there were considerable forces of the Red Army around and of course they needed to be destroyed if we wanted to prevent counter attacks from various directions. But that would have been not so much a problem if we created more compact army groups avoiding the risk of overstretching the front lines. I would have used the support of the baltic states (their people welcomed the german troops, when they arrived there!) in the north to secure some parts in this area, avoiding further advance beyond the line Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov.
Yet that goes to far away from Hitlers thinking. He wanted to seize and destroy Stalingrad as a symbolical move, he wanted to get the caucasus, eventually drawing a line at the caspian sea...ridiculous.

Thats why Hitler certainly WASNT the great military leader he is sometimes referred to even today. He was a charismatic politician with a fantasy of ruling an empire way off (and of course his view of the world in terms of social darwinism was just insane). As long as he employed the advice of his generals, he won. When he took over military business, Germany began to lose.

PS: I am aware that this last part already goes off topic, so when responding to new comments, I will open a new thread based on then emerging topics.

[gf0012-aust]

Part of Germanys problems stemmed from the fact that everything that they did and planned against Germany after the Rapollo agreement was known by the Russians.

So the absolute effect of surprise was always compromised somewhat. The Russians had the "privelige" of watching the Germans set up, trial and perfect their platform development. By association it also meant that they saw some of their tactics for such platforms evolve. In the early 30's they had already anticipated that Germany could turn on them, some took the potential seriously, others were more naive. BUT, absolute surprise against Russia was never achieved due to this prior knowledge, and due to the fact that Russian Intelligence was substantially better than Germanys (even when it was managed by Canaris).

It's an interesting topic. But I'm curious to see how one of our UK posters named "Winter" sees this.

I must say that I disagree a little with your assessment of how the invasion of england could have been achieved. The german Airforce didn't have dominance for a number of reasons, and to achieve that dominance would have required a substantial shift in airframe production of different types, and it also would have been considerably difficult as Germany did not have the airlift capacity to eject paratroopers over England with relative ease.
There was too much of a mismatch between platform types, and platform availability. The biggest mistake made was discouraging Rommel from completing his surge to Dunkirk and the surrounding evacuation points. If that had been achieved then it would have altered the time scale and pressure matrix on the UK by a considerable margin.

The other factor is that Germany as far back as 1865 had determined that the US was going to be a world power, that had been reinforced in 1898, and Germany would never have been able to dominate the US due to resource and capability mismatch. They could have only begun to have contested US resource and production capability if they had total dominance and military control of every country that they defeated. Their fronts would have been too large, and in the end I believ they would have suffered from a disintegrating empire as they would have ended up fighting on two fronts, with two determined enemies. Germany would not have had the scale and depth of delivery to absolutely control Russia across it's girth, and then deal with a UK which never would have submitted easily.

Mackinders Theory is very much dominant when you consider what Germany would have had to do to sustain and hold an empire that could have been bigger than what Genghis Khan achieved.

[neel24neo]

The other factor is that Germany as far back as 1865 had determined that the US was going to be a world power, that had been reinforced in 1898, and Germany would never have been able to dominate the US due to resource and capability mismatch. They could have only begun to have contested US resource and production capability if they had total dominance and military control of every country that they defeated.
I guess that was the reason why hitler wanted to conquer soviet union.i hve heard that he had this over confident attitude that he can run over USSR in no time.and the initial successes seemed to prove that.that may also be the reason why he wanted the caucusses badly(his obsession with psychological victory over stalin defeated his aims i guess,when he ordered his army group to split and attack caucusses and stalingrad at the same time).as we can see hitler was his own nemesis.

[neel24neo]

another thing i want to ask u guys is that i have heard allies could have made the beach landings in the western front as far back as 1943 and that churchill was so very obsessed with his 'soft underbelly' theory that he didnt give it adequate support and hence that half hearted abortive raid where the germans mowed down canadians(i forgot the name-was that dieppe raid????).and further that if they had opened the front in 43 they could have won the war in weeks....please comment

[tatra]

another thing i want to ask u guys is that i have heard allies could have made the beach landings in the western front as far back as 1943 and that churchill was so very obsessed with his 'soft underbelly' theory that he didnt give it adequate support and hence that half hearted abortive raid where the germans mowed down canadians(i forgot the name-was that dieppe raid????).and further that if they had opened the front in 43 they could have won the war in weeks....please comment

Very unlikely

[Gremlin29]

Dieppe was not an invasion attempt at all, it was a test and as such was very successful in helping the allies determine the best way to assault Normandy.

Why did Hitler invade Russia in the first place? It was his intention to all along. In Hitlers book "Mein Kempf" he clearly and in no uncertain terms outlines his belief that Germany was not nearly big enough (physically) to support the Germans and that it was a matter of natural selection that Germany "take" all of eastern europe. He further explains in his book that eastern europeans would be used as slaves, and would spend their lives toiling away on farms and in factories strictly to support the German people.

WW2 would have never happened if the French and the British would have honored their treatise and agreements with Poland and Czechloslovakia as well as taken action against Germany when they broke the Versailles Treaty by invading the Sudetenland and Austria. Hitler was emboldened by France and Britains total lack of conviction to her allies and the documents they had signed at the end of WW1. Hitler was in fact scared to death that France and or Britain would attack from the west when he invaded the Czechs and in fact, Germany's 2 divisions on the western front were outnumbered by the French by more than 12 to 1. France could have ended WW2 before it ever started.

Without the allied invasion of Normandy, Germany could have IMHO turned the course of the war around in their favor within the next 12 months.

[gf0012-aust]

Germany had intended to invade Russia even when they signed the Rapollo agreement - the problem is the Russians had broken their intel codes so had a fair idea of what was about to come.

As for your Dieppe theory and a change in time for wars end. No

[neel24neo]

France could have ended WW2 before it ever started.

france was in great political turmoil during that period.governments kept coming and going.there was one that lasted just 30 days or so,moreover french army was still in ww1 mode,relying on static defense offered by maginot line.whatever armour they had was dispersed-defensively.the french generals were clearly in a defensive frame of mind and conservative and rigid in their outlook towards modern war.the concept of blitzkrieg was already around then,even within french army(general de gaulle was a prominent supporter),but the higher upswouldnt budge...that cost them the war,i guess.
Without the allied invasion of Normandy, Germany could have IMHO turned the course of the war around in their favor within the next 12 months.
i doubt it .hitler had already committed all his forces-he had no fresh divisions(that was the case in 1943 at the time of stalingrad),whereas red army was growing in size day by day.i heard they had 300+divisions and they were winning and on the roll.in the eastern front the germans were clearly finding the going getting tough and allied bomber raids were wreaking havoc.german industries suffered,critically maiming their war machine and they lost their oil fields with the lose of romania.the war would have carried on for a bit more,but i doubt that the germans could turn the tide.

[gf0012-aust]

More to the point. What would have been a possible change in outcome if:

1) Hitler has relinquished interference and blessed autonomy to the Theatre Commanders

2) If the germans had adequate logistics and bypassed Stalingrad and Moscow and pushed further behind

[neel24neo]

1) Hitler has relinquished interference and blessed autonomy to the Theatre Commanders

then they would have had a chance at winning the war.but it could still have gone either way...but then,hitler delegating authority to his commanders would mean hitler not being hitler...remember he was an autocrat and not a democrat.he had to be in control all the time atleast he had to show people who was in command.
2) If the germans had adequate logistics and bypassed Stalingrad and Moscow and pushed further behind
the important point here is adequate logistics i guess.but the russians could still fight on until their oil fields and their industries at urals were taken.infiltration of irregulars behind german lines and sabotage of supply lines and other logistics by them would have been the major headache for the germans and holding the land they captured would have tied them down i guess.

[Gremlin29]

First consider this, Barbarosa started 6 weeks late. There is no question that the Germans simply ran out of time (the set of winter) when they were a mere 30 km from Moscow (the closest they ever came). Nobody could argue that the Germans would have encircled Moscow had Barbarosa started earlier as was planned and encouraged by the generals but Hitler was always very squimish about starting a campaign and prone to delaying them day after day.

When the Germans launched Zitadelle they were within 2 weeks of producing a significant defeat on Russian forces when Hitler called it off so he could pull divisions from the eastern front to be sent to Italy.

The Germans didn't lose the oil fields of Rumania until 1944, and that's because even more divisions were tied up in the west.

As far as war making capacity, the German armaments industry produced more of everything in December of 1944 than at any other time. At that time they also assembled a large force (nobody thought they had the resources to do this) to attack through the Ardennes which was a huge gamble that could have paid dividends if Hitler would have listened to his generals reduced the strategic objectives of the offensive. The Me 262 was just enetering service and many USAAF planners concluded that this airplane alone and in sufficient numbers could have reversed the Germans fortunes in the air war and could have in fact ended the strategic bombing of the allies once and for all.

While it is often said that Hitler was a terrible military strategist he was the driving force behind every victory the Germans ever had simply because the German generals argued against every single campaign Hitler proposed. Hitlers greatest failure was his inability to understand global warfare, that is he could not be convinced to think about strategic interests outside of europe. They could have tied up the British much sooner in the Med theater which would have produced significant strategic advantages for the war in europe, this is perhaps the first fatal step towards ultimate failure.

I agree, France was a political mess. It's a shame really because France had the resources to end WW2 before it ever started. French communists have much to be blamed for in this instance.

[turin]

1) Hitler has relinquished interference and blessed autonomy to the Theatre Commanders

Cant give examples for all the decisions that would have been influenced by that, but the loss of the 6th army at Stalingrad would have been avoided. That would have helped in stabilizing the eastern front, giving time to reorganize and adapt german capabilities on the situation.
As was mentioned before, it is correct that without Hitlers "ideas" some very big successes for the Wehrmacht woud have not existed. However due to his interference esp. towards the end of the war all these successes were paid for with similar losses.
The Me 262 jet fighter would have been operational much earlier at a time when there were still many good pilots available (the most serious problem in the last two years) without Hitlers interference (tactical bomber conversion) as well. same goes for rocket and cruise missile development, though their success is debatable.

2) If the germans had adequate logistics and bypassed Stalingrad and Moscow and pushed further behind


I am not sure wether its a good idea to leave hot spots behind. If the campaign started only two weeks or so, Moscow would have been seized most certainly. The symbolic value of that might have been an important factor. As for Stalingrad, it depends on the term "adequate". If it would have been enough to go for the oil fields and emergeny industries of the russians at the Ural, that would complete the major objectives of Hitler. I am still not convinced that this approach would have ended problems on the eastern front. As neel24neo pointed out, the issue of control remains, binding major ressources. Complete control of Russia was an illusion thinking of available troops and ressources. Containment remained the only option IMO.

[gf0012-aust]

If it would have been enough to go for the oil fields and emergeny industries of the russians at the Ural, that would complete the major objectives of Hitler.

That becomes a multiple objective. ie, Romania for Oil and Moscow for neutralisation.

That then raises the issue of whether under those circumstances Churchill might have then seriously entertained letting Turkey come in as an underbelly strike and create another front.

Romania is a substantial key to continuing and maintaining any degree of success.

[Gremlin29]

That then raises the issue of whether under those circumstances Churchill might have then seriously entertained letting Turkey come in as an underbelly strike and create another front.

Romania is a substantial key to continuing and maintaining any degree of success.


This is precisely why Hitler saved the Italians who were having there butts kicked in Greece. Hitler's biggest worry concerning the allies in 1942/43 was an invasion through Greece and the taking of the Rumanian oil fields.

[Awang se]

I think the real knock out punch came during Ardennes Offensive or better known as Battle of the bulge. German Failure in this offensive help to open up Berlin to the Invasion. Hitlers came up with the most irrational plan one could imagine given the status of the german army at that time, to retake antwerp. then he come up with another disasterous plan that he called the great blow. In this operation, hitler lost most of its best troops, aircrafts and train pilots. So when the Allied and the Russian invade germany, there not much left to defend the country except some inexperiance conscripts and reserve troops.

[yasin_khan]

That was the best part of war by the Allied side but late.

[tatra]

I think the real knock out punch came during Ardennes Offensive or better known as Battle of the bulge. German Failure in this offensive help to open up Berlin to the Invasion. Hitlers came up with the most irrational plan one could imagine given the status of the german army at that time, to retake antwerp. then he come up with another disasterous plan that he called the great blow. In this operation, hitler lost most of its best troops, aircrafts and train pilots. So when the Allied and the Russian invade germany, there not much left to defend the country except some inexperiance conscripts and reserve troops.

Those inexperiance conscripts and reserve troops (and fanatical 12 year old hilter youths) put up a hell of a fight locally. Not a cakewalk.

[Gremlin29]

Actually the Ardennes offensive was bold and reallistically the only viable option left to the Germans. If Hitler would have settled for a smaller more localized objective, the war could have been prolonged at least another 6 months and quite possibly Germany would have been on semi favorable terms to sue for a peace in which she would have still come out of the war with more than she went in with. This could have possibly also fueled some alternative history policitcally speaking.

What is amazing about the Normandy operation itself is that the Germans actually had the means to repel the invasion however Hitler forbade any troop movement without his expressed permission. nearly 48 of the most critical hours of the invasion were carried out with 2 German armor divisions plus panzergrenadier divison being withheld from the fight because Hitler could not be reached for permission to move them into battle. Had the German generals acted like Americans in this one instance, there is a very good chance that the invasion could have been repulsed.

What is so fascinating about WW2 is the numerous times the allies simply "lucked out". It can almost be said that the allies won despite themselves.

[neel24neo]

What is so fascinating about WW2 is the numerous times the allies simply "lucked out". It can almost be said that the allies won despite themselves.

IMHO luck has a crucial role in all wars ,battles and engagements.caesar was the first one(AFAIK) to acknowledge the role of luck in combat.
analyse any major battle and in most you would see that the victor won because he was lucky.not just in europe,in the battle of midway islands,the japanese lost because they couldnt destroy the four american aircraft carriers at pearl harbour(they were out at sea that day) and during the battle itself the pilots from american carriers had more than their share of luck in spotting the japanese fleet.
further to say that the war could have been won if they had done this or that(our way)is not quite logical,because warfare is a very complex system.you change one variable,and the implications of that change is beyond us because the system is too complex.you cannot predict to certainity what changes would be made in the outcome.thats the way life is...

[Pendekar]

Luck is one of the vital part in war

[ajay_ijn]

What is amazing about the Normandy operation itself is that the Germans actually had the means to repel the invasion however Hitler forbade any troop movement without his expressed permission. nearly 48 of the most critical hours of the invasion were carried out with 2 German armor divisions plus panzergrenadier divison being withheld from the fight because Hitler could not be reached for permission to move them into battle. Had the German generals acted like Americans in this one instance, there is a very good chance that the invasion could have been repulsed.
Hitler had direct command over panzer divisions,So Erwin rommel immediately tried to contacted Htiler but it was being said that Hitler was sleeping at that time and not to be disturbed.

Poor rommel had to wait for many hours.Even after hitler was contacted,he kept saying that it was not the main line attack so he would not deploy any panzer divisions.
In the evening Hitler realized but it was too late,Allied soldiers secured the beachheads.
The moment Allies landed in france nothing could stop the defeat of germany.

But panzer divisions got their credit by giving allies stiff resistance at st.nazaire and in battle of hedgerows.

[tatra]

... IMHO probably one of the reason that Rommel was involved in the Stauffenberg plot to assassinate Hitler.

[Odorf]

Napoleon, employing about half a million troops, marched in a straight line towards Moscow. He did not care for seizing territory except for securing his flanks and supplying his army. But his army shrinked more and more since he had to secure his rear as well with garrison troops. When he approached Moscow he met the russian winter as well, what proved to be disastrious.

Just for your info, timeline of Napoleon's invasion of Russia:

June 24 - Great Army crosses the frontier
September 7 - Borodino battle
September 14 - Napoleon enters Moscow
October 19 - Napoleon leaves Moscow
October 24 - Battle of Maloyaroslavetz, after which Napoleon was on full retreat along the same route he came.
November 26 - Beresina crossing, the core of the remaining army is destroyed. The river has not been frozen yet btw.
December 6 - Napoleon leaves his troops and runs to Paris.
December 14 - Russian army reaches the frontier.

You might be amuzed with this fact, but winter had very few to do with Napoleons defeat.

[Col.Gen.]

In my opinion Hitler should have never tried to invade Russia in the first place. Of course history allows us to tell what was done improperly but...
Invading the Soviet Union was an operational level mistake in that the SU had the ability to fight the war on one solid front while the Germans had to deal with occupying France, fighting the Tunisian Campaign and dealing with Russia. When you gentlemen open a forum about what should have been done then I'll go in depth but I think its safe to say that Hitler made a fatal mistake fighting Stalin.

[General_Conway]

In my opinion Hitler should have never tried to invade Russia in the first place. Of course history allows us to tell what was done improperly but...
Invading the Soviet Union was an operational level mistake in that the SU had the ability to fight the war on one solid front while the Germans had to deal with occupying France, fighting the Tunisian Campaign and dealing with Russia. When you gentlemen open a forum about what should have been done then I'll go in depth but I think its safe to say that Hitler made a fatal mistake fighting Stalin.

I agree on both counts. By the way, Col, I love your signature statement!

[stephen weist]

as a soldier in WW1 Hitler should have known better than to launch a second front. I think his mistake was to jump at the western powers too quickly when they declared war over Poland. His main goal was to the east anyway and if he would have launched east at this time Russia was his. He should have contained the west until defeating Russia and then sued for peace with the west. Churchill was no great fan of the Russians and I think would have been agreeable to a peace with Germany.

[turin]

as a soldier in WW1 Hitler should have known better than to launch a second front. I think his mistake was to jump at the western powers too quickly when they declared war over Poland. His main goal was to the east anyway and if he would have launched east at this time Russia was his. He should have contained the west until defeating Russia and then sued for peace with the west.

Actually would he have not marched into France, then the french forces would have posed a significant threat to Germany. The french military had better equipment and superior numbers. Its defeat was achieved through the heavy use of combined arms and other new tactics not seen before. The element of suprise was substantial. Also in 1939 the Wehrmacht did not have the numbers to seize and hold a substantial part of russian territory. It took a considerable amount of the german forces only to invade Poland. It was very much to the advantage of Hitler that France did not undertake any offensive operations since there would have been barely a defense.

[crazypole]

Though the French had superior numbers and in some ways technology, it would have been unlikely that the French would have attacked. Post-1918 the French commanders were firmly entrenched in the idea of fighting a defensive battle, to try and not reproduce the losses of WW1. Basically the whole french army was not set up to attack, the French could not visualise the 2nd World War to go any differently from the 1st, ie. initial assault by the Germans followed by fairly static defensive warfare. The only difference this time was that the French intended to keep the German troops off French soil, hence the Maginot Line.
The French actually had such an opportunity to attack during the time that the German forces were engaged in Poland, and Scandinavia. But the French would have been limited to atacking across a much narrower front than the Germans eventually did, because French forces would have maintained the neutrality of Belgium. This means that the Germans could also have needed a lot fewer divisions to hold back any incursion by the French, seeing as they only needed to cover a much shorter front.

[Ender89]

One thing hitler could have done different was change the fortifications so that his forces could have had flanking position on the invading troops. My idea was a T-shaped structure the entered the shore line.

EX: T^T^T^T^T T=structure ^= shore

This would have given the allies less area to spread out and make it easier for german forces to use devastating cros fire on the invasion force.:gun

[Brenus]

Actually would he have not marched into France, then the french forces would have posed a significant threat to Germany. The french military had better equipment and superior numbers. Its defeat was achieved through the heavy use of combined arms and other new tactics not seen before. The element of suprise was substantial. Also in 1939 the Wehrmacht did not have the numbers to seize and hold a substantial part of russian territory. It took a considerable amount of the german forces only to invade Poland. It was very much to the advantage of Hitler that France did not undertake any offensive operations since there would have been barely a defense.

First of all hello everyone and sorry for digging through old threads.
I am answering Turin because i am not totaly agree with him, at least on the tactics point. ;)
in 1940 the French defense has prouved its effectiveness during several battles, well maybe one or 2 :D
The reason of the fall of France begin with Belgium neutrality, you have to remember where the main French forces are, all along the Belgium border and waiting for the Germans to invade Belgium, then and only then the French and English will be allowed to enter Belgium to fight the Germans. but when the French and English forces are moving through Belgium the Germans are moving through Ardennes. The so basic and so expected but unexped plan schleifen threatened the main forces flank in Belgium and when they are finally in position to fight back the Germans they are forced to move back to avoid the German wraping move. what a waste of time and ressources.
And when your forces begin to move back you are offering your equipments to your enemies. Tanks running out of fuel are abandoned, damaged vehicles are abandoned, usually in a battle if your tanks are damaged this is not a problem if you are not losing ground, just repair them and they will be ready for the days after. I am blaming Belgium for this terrible mistake, but i am of course blaming the French generals much more for their incredible stupidity.
even when recon planes are reporting the Germans tanks moving slowly through the Ardennes they are ignoring the information. :flaming

And sorry for my Frenchized English. :D :p:

[rattmuff]

It is worth mentioning Operation Bodyguard.

The operation had three main goals.

1. To induce the German command to believe that the main assault and follow up will be in or east of the Pas de Calais, thereby encouraging the enemy to maintain or increase the strength of his air and ground forces and his fortifications there at the expense of other areas, particularly of the Caen area.

2. To keep the enemy in doubt as to the date and the time of the actual assault.

3. During and after the main assault to contain the largest possible German land and air forces in or east of the Pas de Calais for at least fourteen days.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bodyguard

The allies made alot of things to make this work. Building a fake invasion force , not just make alot of stuff but also fill the air with radio messages from made up units on various locations. Another job was to hide the actual invasion force. They also used captured german spies to send "wrong" intelligence to the german high command.
The allies thought of everything and planed everything, for example the bombings of bridges, roads and other places of value. They bombed theese places in such way that the invasion would accure at Pas de Calais and still the bombings had the expected effect when Normandy was taken... I belevie the operation started in 1942 or could it have been 1941.

Operation Bodyguard played a significant role before/during/after the Normandy landing. :rolleyes:

[steve33]

There is a perception that if the German forces had got to the beaches in the first 24 hours they would have destroyed the allied forces but it would have been interesting to see how the german Panzer divisions coped with all the warships ranging from destroyers to Battleships which would have opened fire on them with everything they had and we also had i understand 6,000 aircraft available that day with total air supremacy and the German forces coming forward would have been totally exposed.

[TrangleC]

Warships back then were capable against fortifications, but not so much against a moving tank force they can't see. Another problem would have been that they might have accidently fired at the retreating allied troops in such a case.

I agree that the air superiority would have been a bigger problem for the Wehrmacht troops, but maybe not such significant.
1.) Back then tanks could hide from aircraft pretty good.
2.) Only a fraction of this 6000 Aircraft were equiped for ground attack missions.
3.) It needs time to call in air support. And the target most likely will have done what it wanted to do and moved on till the attack aircraft arrive.
4.) Accuracy of air attacks against moving targets was not very high. At least with bombing attacks. That is why the Germans developed "destroyer" aircraft that used big guns to hunt tanks instead of bombs. For a long time the Luftwaffe kept air superiority on the eastern front but bomb dropping fighters turned out to be not very effective in a tank hunting role.

Air superiority certainly won the war, but only because it enabled the allies to perform massive bombardements on cities and industrial facilities. The armed forces of all sides weren't bothered so much by the lack of air superiority, once they were out in the field.

What you hear about the Kosovo campaign, even modern attack aircraft didn't do so well against tanks and other armoured vehicles in a terrain with an average percentage of forrests.

[steve33]

If the German forces had to wipe out the beaches they would not really be able to sit still and be hidden they would have to come forward and that would expose them and even a fighter with just cannons could have caused enough problems for the German infantry to stop them going forward espically with the number of aircraft we had available.

The German forces found in Normandy they had a terriable time trying to move in daylight and attempting to mass for attacks was nearly impossiable because the airpower would come in and disperse them.

The airborne forces we had landed inland may have been able to call in gunfire from the ships but either way the normandy landings were do or die for us if the germans started to really threaten the landings they would have opened fire with everything they had and some of the forward troops would have been sacrificed to save the operation and many other lives.

There was a landing at i think it was Salerno in Italy and we used ship and airpower to turn the tables.

[TrangleC]

You don't have to move directly on to the beach where the ships can see you to drive back a invading force to it. And also the most common and most successful tactic back then was to encircle enemy forces and to cut them off from supplies and more important in this case, from retreat.
Why else do you think the german tank forces specialized on swift advances? Mobility wouldn't have been an issue and there wouldn't have been a "Blitzkrieg" if just moving forward towards the enemy would have been the tactic. That was outdated.

I am not a specialist for tactical/historical details of the "Ardennen Offensive", but as far as i know the few successful actions of the Wehrmacht were just done like that, by tanks moving through half dried out river banks and appearing in the backs of the allies when not expected aso.
So if Rommel would have gotten free hand from Hitler before it was too late, i suspect that was what he would have done on a much larger and better organized scale and extend.
He most likely would have encircled the allied forces and driven them away from the beach, towards fortified infantry forces, while shelling the so created "Kessel" (german for kettle) with artillery.
That basically was how all the big land battles of WW2 were won first by the Wehrmacht, then by the Red Army, till the western allied forces joined in and pretty much just advanced in closed lines and drowned their enemies in reinforcements where neccessary, the old fashioned way.

And i'm not exaggerating or bragging (because i take no pride of the military achievements of the Wehrmacht just like i feel no shame for the crimes against humanity they committed) when i say thet the organisation of the Wehrmacht troops was advanced enough not to be bothered too much by aircraft harassment maybe preventing them from massing for attacks.
The Wehrmacht was the first armed force to realize that it is more effective to scatter an army into small groups, hold together by radio communication and rejoining them IN and not before battle, if neccessary, instead of bulking them to big and slow forces.

It seems to be common sense by historians (and i am not only talking about german historians, because it was american and british documentations i learned this from) that Rommel could have defeated the invading force if he would have had a free hand and if Hitler wouldn't have been unavailable for him at the first day of the invasion.

[steve33]

As far as historians go it,s just there opinion as what i am saying is just my opinion.

At i think it was salerno the Germans had us on the ropes and we used our air power and ships to prevail and get ashore and i have no doubt the same would have happened at Normandy.

They would have to break our flanks to encirle us and we had over 100 warships from destroyers to Battleships and there fire was being directed from planes and ground observers so it would be accurate and continuous we would have been able to put down devastating forepower on our flanks and we also had an air force consisting of 2,800 heavy bombers,1,500 medium and light bombers and 3,700 single engine fighters of which 1,700 were fighter bombers armed with anti tank rockets.

I have a book and it states that German accounts of the battle speak of the paralyzing effect of overwelming ship bombardments that shattered the offence spirit of the infantry and halted almost every attempted counterattack,notably that of the 12th SS Panzer Division of sep7th and they were one of the best German divisions in Normandy.

The Germans could have hurt us more if they had reacted quicker but the overwelming firepower we had to throw against them would have prevailed allowing us to build up a solid beach head and then start to more inland and from there it would have been a battle of attrition which germany couldn,t win,they were a great army but the end was coming for them they were to over stretched.

Thats just my opinion as i said before.

[Big-E]

Once Germany opened up a second front against the USSR the war was over. The only way they could have stopped the Normandy landing is to of had the Eastern forces available for a counter offensive.

[Rich]

The Germans could have hurt us more if they had reacted quicker but the overwelming firepower we had to throw against them would have prevailed allowing us to build up a solid beach head and then start to more inland and from there it would have been a battle of attrition which germany couldn,t win,they were a great army but the end was coming for them they were to over stretched

I question just how "great" they actually were. In the early war they fought well but most of what they achieved was thru audacity and spinelessness in the west. In the east they achieved much, early, due to poor Soviet judgement and inept leadership. The Germans did use combined arms very effectively in the early war.

But by June 1944 they were not in the same league as the Allied juggernaut being launched against them in the west. I would say their tank corps were pretty good but the average German soldier on the Atlantic war wasnt worth much. The exception of course being at Omaha where the battle hardened 352'nd waited.

Normandy was, if anything, an example of all that was wrong with the German army. The leadership of the front was divided and Rommel couldn't make many decisions due to the diluted chain of command. He rightly judged keeping armor away from the beachheads wasnt a solution because allowing the Allies to establish a beachhead, in the first place, would guarantee the armor would be destroyed in the end result anyways.

But going back to my point, in 1944. man for man, the German army wasnt what it was in 1939. By June 1944 Germany was sending its children off to fight and many units had very little training. Even the Battle of the Bulge had many volksturm and poorly trained units involved. But going back to Normandy while there were some fine, and capable, units like 12'th SS many of the German units in theatre were far undermanned and under-equipped.

I think air power was far less a factor at Normandy, and Pre-Falaise pocket, then many think. German records dont reflect allied air power as being decisive, tho I'm sure it had impact. The day, and days immediately following 6 June had poor weather conditions which neutralized allied air power. The Germans acclimated by moving mostly at night. Of course once we broke into the open country, and the weather improved, all hell broke loose from the Jabos. But naval gunnery had far more impact on D-Day, and the days after, then air power did.

[FutureTank]

Of course it was a tactical error and I think, even a strategical one.
Hitlers decision to attack the SU was largely a political and idiological one. To give some keywords here, one could name "Lebensraum" or the dominance of the germanic race over europe and the inferiour "weak" races.
Yet Russia was always, even back to the 19th century, considered a threat to Europe as a whole. Just have a look at Bismarcks policiy to contain Russia on the Balkans and the UK's actions to prevent them reaching the Dardanelles. When the communist regime was raised in Russia, this became even worse and Russia/SU was always considered a long term threat by the allies as well..
It seems to me Russians can also make the argument that Bismark was seeking to expand Germany (Bavarian King of Greece), and British were looking for a foothold in Middle east, which they secured later.

(Also remember: we won the war against Russia in 1917! .
I don't think you can say "won" when the other army packs up and goes home!

Now with Stalin and his purge of the red army most people thought, its a piece of cake!).
Who? Most of his own General Staff were against it.

As everybody knows, we lost the battle over britain and that was the main reason (besides the russian campaign) to shelve the invasion plan for the UK (operation "Seeloewe" or "Seal"). We lost the BoB for some reasons, mainly because we had no strategical bomber command and only tactical bombers..

I must be a bit slow, but I thought it was the failure of the Luftwaffe to realise the British had radar controled interception of the German bombing raids, and therefore filure to destroy these radars. One doesn't need strategic bombers to support amphibious landings.

We should have concentrated ops on strategical targets such as industry and the military complex in the south western part (around the invasion area). Then, since no invasion in the SU would have taken place, transfer all available man power to France, build some useful landing fleet (the one we had was crappy to most parts) and even if we had no complete air dominance in Britain, we should have tried the invasion. I firmly believe that as soon as we would have gained a foothold in south western GB they would have been lost since then the transfer of additional troops could take place. We had about 3 million troops to attack the SU, most of these troops battle proven and now available to the invasion of GB..

The only problem is that this would have left USSR an obvious next target, and made surprise (albeit to Stalin by denial only) impossible in 1941.

As for Russia, even if there would have been an imminent risk of attack from their side (and I seriously doubt that regarding their reaction to the invasion in june 1941), I would have strengthened our defenses in Poland and continued relations as usual..
Good, because Soviet tactics strongly emphasised breakthroughs of fortified regions :)

When we would have reached control of GB, you could say "game over". Now we would have been able to transfer large parts of the Luftwaffe to the eastern "front" as well as army units. Our submarines now could operate freely in the Atlantic Ocean without being forced to shut down trade lanes to Britain. The navy yards now would concentrate on builing A LOT more subs (as they did in 1944, when everything was already lost) to effectively deter the US from launching an invasion of some kind. Now we would have concentrated our ressources to the SU. I will wait for responses and post my thoughts about such a campaign another time..

One problem. Firstly, as mentioned above, the Soviet Union would have been forewarned. Secondly, all those submarines still needed fuel, and USA had a lot more of it then Germany.

Cheers
Greg

[FutureTank]

In point of fact the 'English' is derived largely from Germana nd French as it is. There is very little of the original Britonic Celt left in it :)
Cheers
greg

[Big-E]

(Also remember: we won the war against Russia in 1917! .
I don't think you can say "won" when the other army packs up and goes home!


Really? :confused:

[FutureTank]

There was a Russian Revolution...beginning of Soviet Union. Troops introduced unit elections and Imperial officers were replaced with Commisars which promptly disbandoned many units and sent them home. The Tzar abdicated and the General Staff begun to fight the Bolsheviks whech were supported by clidestant means by Germany. The Baltic states and Ukraine declared independence and requested German troops as occupation forces to maintain order and restrain Communists. All other available troops were sent to the Western Front.
Cheers
greg

[FutureTank]

It seems to me a strange question!
How else does one invade a sub-continent? The USSR would not 'share' its front, and Italy was a b**** ;) to move through.
Most of the troops were in UK, so it made sense from logistic point of view to retain shortest lines of communications possible for most of troops possible.
However if Allies had air superiority, they may have tried to invade in Danmark rather then France. This may have forced earlier end of war by placing Allied forces closer to Berlin, and caused less destruction in France.
It seems to me the use of airborne troops was a bit of a waste in terms of overall planning.

[Big-E]

There was a Russian Revolution...beginning of Soviet Union. Troops introduced unit elections and Imperial officers were replaced with Commisars which promptly disbandoned many units and sent them home. The Tzar abdicated and the General Staff begun to fight the Bolsheviks whech were supported by clidestant means by Germany. The Baltic states and Ukraine declared independence and requested German troops as occupation forces to maintain order and restrain Communists. All other available troops were sent to the Western Front.
Cheers
greg

Russian actions at Tannenburg ,the Masurian and Naroch Lakes battles were pathetic. Germany crushed them at every turn, Russia lost that one.

[FutureTank]

Ok Big-E, but did these battle outcomes decide the course of war on the Russian front?

[Big-E]

Ok Big-E, but did these battle outcomes decide the course of war on the Russian front?

It is my belief that these losses are what caused the Bolshevik revolution. If Nicholas had been kicking Wehrmacht butt I doubt it would have been succesfull. It was after all the deserting soldiers that made up the bulk of Bolshevik forces and the October Revolution. If everyone was happy with progress in the war they would keep the powers that be. It was after all the strain of the war that made life so hard.

[TrangleC]

If Nicholas had been kicking Wehrmacht butt I doubt it would have been succesfull.
Not that it would be important, but there was no Wehrmacht in WW1. The german army was called "Kaiserliche Armee" (= Imperial Army) at that time.

[Big-E]

Not that it would be important, but there was no Wehrmacht in WW1. The german army was called "Kaiserliche Armee" (= Imperial Army) at that time.

I thought Heer was army?

[FutureTank]

Russian actions at Tannenburg ,the Masurian and Naroch Lakes battles were pathetic. Germany crushed them at every turn, Russia lost that one.

This is a very unbalanced presentation of WW1's Eastern Front!
Tannenberg was in 1914, and failed so far as strategic goals go. Masurian lakes were indecisive. What about the Brusilov offinsive?
What about Germans having to bolster Austria-Hungary, and Romania entering the war when Russian crossed the Carpathin Mountains?

It seems to me that by 1917, just as in 1944, the end was in sight for all to see. The difference was in the pre-existing political fracturing in the Russian Empire. In WW2 Stalin thwarted that in 1937.
In 1917 Germans, French, Russians and others were deserting or refusing to fight. Even the citizenry realised that their generals raised on lessons of 1871 had no way of preventing wholesale slaughter. This is what made commanders like Monash stand out later.
Communism was not far from minds of Germans either...remember Bavaria?

It seems to me that Normandy landings were an incredible achievement in the light of other amphibious operations, and could easily have been a defeat for the Allies. It is difficult to think of alternatives.

[Big-E]

It seems to me that Normandy landings were an incredible achievement in the light of other amphibious operations, and could easily have been a defeat for the Allies. It is difficult to think of alternatives.

This thread brings back the war stories my grandfather would share with us about D-Day. He was part of the forward logistics train that came in the second wave on Omaha beach. These were the guys who actually had to deal with helping the corpsman pick up and care for the wounded... His vivid detail would give me nightmares to this day. It was these men who died to save not only France but the Soviet Union as well. Without the second front it was hopeless. It was also the "doughboys" of WWI that saved France and again the Soviet Union from being the pawn of Germany. In WWI even though Germany lost they still got a peace treaty from the CCCP that just wreaked of "YOU LOST!"

[FutureTank]

Without the second front it was hopeless.
Look Big-E. I'm sorry, but we are not on the same page. I am not saying this disrespectfully, and I don't wan to offend you, but the Second Front would have been very usefull in 42, and Italy was usefull in 1943 coming as it did smack in the middle of Kursk, but Normandy benefited more from "Bagration" then the other way around. North Africa had almost negligible effect on operations on the Eastern Front.

It was also the "doughboys" of WWI that saved France and again the Soviet Union from being the pawn of Germany.

I think perspective is what is called for, if only from the Australian perspective. The Anzac Corps that had been fighting from Gallipoli, broke the back of German defenses in one of the most decisive and brilliant combined arms operations of the war by one of the most brilliant commanders in the Allied armies.
Of all the American troops that made it to France, only four divisions actually fought in the front line over a period of last few months. The first use of American troops was under Australian command, and they were literally useless because they were completely dispersed! PLEASE do not take this as some sort of insult against American troops. This is the essence of a report made by Monash himself on performance of American troops because the Allies didn't know their quality and didn;t know how to use them since the US Army came to France underequipped and untrained. So much so that Monash had to give American officers a 3 hour briefing before the battle just to bring them up to speed on the Australian tactics that sought to achieve objectives without incurring large losses.
Afther this 'performance' there was a decision made to parcel US troops out to other contingents because they could not be put into line due to their lack of reliability. There followed a great degree of political wrangling to reverse this decision, and from that moment on there is a standing order that US troops never again fight under non-US command.

So here it is from Wikipedia which is sufficient for this thread:
The Battle of the Hindenburg Line, which began September 18, 1918, was a key turning point in the Hundred Days Offensive that eventually led to the end of World War I.

Australian general John Monash launched the earliest attack of the battle on September 18th. At 5:20 AM, the Australian Corps, along with artillery support and only 8 tanks (along with some dummy tanks) broke through some German positions. Roughly 1,000 Australians were wounded or killed in this assault, but they had taken 4,300 Germans prisoner by the end of the day.

The British arrived at the line next, the British First Army attacking the Wotan-Stellung section of the wall early in the battle followed by Douglas Haig's forces against the Siegfried-Stellung. The British Third, Fourth, and Fifth along with the French First Army and the American Expeditionary Force all joined over the course of the battle.

On September 27 the US 27th and 30th Divisions launched the initial attack, with the Australian 3rd and 5th Divisions intended to "leapfrog" through the American forces. Although the Americans were eager for the fight they were inexperienced and did not clear German positions as effectively as they might have. This forced advancing Australians to fight again for the ground the Americans had just taken. Australians took the village of Montbrehain on October 5 as their final action in the battle. Their forces had been fighting on the front lines since March 27 and 27,000 men had been killed or wounded just since the Battle of Amiens in early August. Although the Australians withdrew, the line was completely cleared by October 10.

So far as Soviet union is concerned, what really helped was Lend Lease, and trucks in particular, as well as radios and copper wire. With destruction of the Army group Mitte, and breaching of the Carpathian mountains the war was almost over in the East. Red Airforce had air superiority, and absolute superiority in firepower. Finland was out, and Roumania would soon follow.

I'm not unappreciative of the American contribution in either war, their effort or their fighting spirit. However I do believe in perspective. I think America has had some outstanding commanders, but comparatively less expereinced then other Allied or Axis commanders in either war. Expereince takes time, and the US did not have as much time in combat as others. Its just a fact of history.

[Simon9]

It was also the "doughboys" of WWI that saved France and again the Soviet Union from being the pawn of Germany.

Rubbish. American forces arrived in France too late to alter the course of the war. WWI in the West was won by the French and British. Specifically, France took the heavier burden and the British led the attack which defeated the German Army in the field.

The real American contribution to WWI was in the power they represented - millions of fresh troops - which helped convince Germany that further resistance was hopeless. But even that was a secondary consideration compared to German battlefield losses and the British naval blockade.

Initial American actions on the Western Front were debacles, at a stage where the British and French were capable of launching fairly successful attacks. The Americans basically had to learn all the lessons the British and French had been learning for four years, and they initially refused to take advice. They paid for it heavily in casualties.

A brief breakdown of battle deaths among the Allied powers on the Western Front and related theatres, from Wiki:

Australia 60,000
Canada 67,000
India 43,000
New Zealand 18,000
South Africa 9,000
Newfoundland 1,000
UK 703,000
Total British Empire: 901,000

France 1,376,000

Portugal 7,000
Belgium 14,000

Total non-US battle deaths: 2,298,000

Total US battle deaths: 126,000

% US deaths on the Western Front: 5.5%

That doesn't even count the Eastern front, or the Italians, which would add another 2 million Allied death and a similar number of Central Powers. The US contribution, in terms of actual fighting, was a mere pinprick. For you to say, in effect, that the US won WWI is a gross distortion of the truth, and I question your impartiality. Either that, or you need to do some serious research.

[eckherl]

@Simon9

Good post on the casualty figures and information.

[gf0012-aust]

I think perspective is what is called for, if only from the Australian perspective. The Anzac Corps that had been fighting from Gallipoli, broke the back of German defenses in one of the most decisive and brilliant combined arms operations of the war by one of the most brilliant commanders in the Allied armies.

Of all the American troops that made it to France, only four divisions actually fought in the front line over a period of last few months. The first use of American troops was under Australian command, and they were literally useless because they were completely dispersed! PLEASE do not take this as some sort of insult against American troops. This is the essence of a report made by Monash himself on performance of American troops because the Allies didn't know their quality and didn;t know how to use them since the US Army came to France underequipped and untrained. So much so that Monash had to give American officers a 3 hour briefing before the battle just to bring them up to speed on the Australian tactics that sought to achieve objectives without incurring large losses.

Afther this 'performance' there was a decision made to parcel US troops out to other contingents because they could not be put into line due to their lack of reliability. There followed a great degree of political wrangling to reverse this decision, and from that moment on there is a standing order that US troops never again fight under non-US command.



It needs to be poiinted out that the doughboys came in absolutely green, and they were shackled with Pershing who also seemed to think that sheer brute force and enthusiasm would change the outcome.

Monash was decidedly concerned about US troop quality (ie lack of experience) and insisted through Plummer and Haig that they be trained or put under an experienced commander for opening events. Pershing actually tried to force everyones hand but was eventually told that either the US went under Monashes command - or not enter the main event at all.

Monash then went through a rigorous process of training the american forces by both buddying up and simulating likely offensive moves.

That is no reflection on the calibre of US forces, after all, they were green and amongst some of the most battle hardened of all allied forces. As a side note, the australian troops had been at it for so long it almost led to a mutiny later on - they were almost burnt out emotionally and physically.

Nobody should underestimate the french, they took the bulk of the heavy hitting and all credit should be accorded.

What the americans did was hilight that fresh troops and a basically unmolested logistics support train would make the germans and her allied forces see that they were on a rapidly declining foundation.

In very real terms - and with a complete absence of malice, the hard work had already been tipped and the US became the rather large feather that broke the camels back.

[FutureTank]

Nobody should underestimate the french, they took the bulk of the heavy hitting and all credit should be accorded.

Yes, but I felt it was more appropriate to compare like-sized forces, rather then French and US Armies.

Still, it is difficult to compare Dominion forces with that of the USA given the disparity in time these have been involved in operations by the time US troops arrived.

[Big-E]

Total US battle deaths: 126,000

% US deaths on the Western Front: 5.5%

That doesn't even count the Eastern front, or the Italians, which would add another 2 million Allied death and a similar number of Central Powers. The US contribution, in terms of actual fighting, was a mere pinprick. For you to say, in effect, that the US won WWI is a gross distortion of the truth, and I question your impartiality. Either that, or you need to do some serious research.

Both you and Waylander admit the doughboys are what broke the camels back. If the US hadn't entered the war the fight would have kept on going. The British tanks, while innovative, were by FAR from effective. It would have been years of trench warfare until one side gave up. I didn't say the US did it's share of fighting but there is something you should realize from an American perspective. In that era the US were EXTREME isolationists. All they cared about was what happened 10 miles from their house. It wasn't until they turned on the radio from reports of Gallipoli that they realized the true cost of that war. The thousands of ANZACs being wasted to do the bidding of the Imperial whip infuriated many. With these detailed battle reports coming in American sentiment began to turn. With the resulting indiscriminate actions of the Kriegsmarine the rest is history. As Waylander said it is the "millions of fresh troops" that made the difference. Wether they actually fought is of little concern when it was what influenced the Chancellor to surrender.

[FutureTank]

It seems to me that US was always isolationist unless there was a real gain from their actions.

So far as US role on the Western Front in WW1 is concerned, the influx of US troops was negligible to Germans. A year prior Russia left the war and vast numbers of experienced troops became available. The German offensive which caught British by surprise, and Australians were thrown in to plug, was the last effort for very different reason - they had run out of ammunition.

The simple truth is that someone in the Administration realised that Allies are going to win, and that it would be useful to be on the winning side when bidding for reconstruction contracts. Actually something better happened when Germans asked for a loan.

Same thing pretty much happened in WW2. Although Japanese invaded China in 1933, and Germany's new NAZI government made no effort to hide their intentions towards either human rights or democracy after that year, US waited. Actually they didn't wait exactly, because the US companies continued to trade with German companies and German companies were allowed to buy into US companies.

Finally after December 7, 1941 US was forced into a war by denying Japan access to scrap metal (effectively imposing US limit over Japan's industrial capacity though that capacity was being used to build naval vessels).

Was US getting ready to enter the war against Germany in 1941 by making preparations since 1933, 1936, 1939? Nope, neither Hitler's coming to power, not his support for Franco in Spain or Italy in Africa, or annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia and invasion of Poland jolt US into frantic preparation to enter the war on Allied side. Only when Moscow, widely predicted to fall, didn't, do US really swung into action.

Not that once this action begun it was not appreciated. However when Stalin asked for a Second Front, he almost certainly didn't expect the route taken to be the longest available! Of all the ways to invade Europe, going through North Africa and Italy was surely the worst possible. Even Hannibal recognized this 2,000 years earlier.

Now when I had a chance to think, it seems that there was an alternative to Normandy.

In 1942 (particularly after Stalingrad) Rommel's Africa Corps was spent. It was not receiving replacements, equipment and most importantly fuel. It was never going to threaten Egypt again.
It seems to me that the Western Allies were quite able to convince neutral Portugal to join Allied cause in 1943, invade and depose Franco, and advance into France by the same route Wellington took in 1812. I am absolutely sure that crossing the Pyrenees laterally with support of Spanish Army (even if only a part) is far easier then crossing the Apennines longitudinally fighting the Italian Fascists.

Imagine the lives saved by not having to conduct multiple opposed amphibious assaults in Italy, and breaking through mountain passes and fortified lines. Imagine German efforts to stretch their supply lines to the Spanish border while preparing for Typhoon instead of an easy reach of Italy. Imagine having to send troops to defend Southern France while still expecting a possible invasion in the North.

Hmmm…who was that great strategist that chose Torch as American entry into the European Theatre?

So why was this strategy rejected?

Some background from http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/goldp6.html
Prior to the outbreak of WWII, England was Portugal’s largest trading partner in 1938. Portugal had joined the British early in WWI and sent 50,000 troops to the front lines.

Portugal’s association with Nazi Germany emerged during the Spanish Civil War. During the conflict, the strong man dictator Dr. Antonio de Oliviera Salazar sided with Franco and Hitler. Salazar helped Germany smuggle arms to Franco’s forces and dispatched Portuguese volunteers to fight with Franco. In doing so, Salazar hoped to achieve his long-term goal of stabilization and development of the country's economy. By the end of 1938, Germany was Portugal’s second largest trading partner. Salazar did however, protest Hitler’s invasion of Catholic Poland.

Salazar’s choice to remain neutral during WWII had as much basis in geography as it did in any ideology. Portugal occupied a strategic position on the map of Europe in that it had many ports along its Atlantic coast that would be harder for Britain to blockade. However, Salazar’s main fear was an invasion of Portugal by the Nazi war machine. After the occupation of France, the Wehrmacht was less than 260 miles from Portugal's border. His other fear was that if Hitler and Franco would form an alliance placing Nazi troops at Portugal’s border. Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State, expressed the opinion that Salazar granted favors to Germany in the trade war after computing "the relative danger of German and allied military pressure on him."

Salazar promised both Britain and Germany open trade for Portugal's valuable domestic and colonial resources. By remaining neutral, Portugal’s economy benefited tremendously. Portugal’s balance of trade went from a $90 million deficit in 1939 to a $68 million surplus in 1942. Assets in private banks nearly doubled over the first four years of the war, while the assets of the Bank of Portugal more than tripled. Both the Nazis and Allies waged an economic war through threats and lucrative trade deals. However, Portugal couldn’t cut its ties with the Allies, as it was dependent upon the U.S. for imports of petroleum, coal, ammonium sulfate, and wheat. In October, Britain capitalized on its long-standing relationship with Portugal by inducing Portugal to accept sterling in payment for goods. At the time, Britain’s gold reserves were low, and Sweden and Switzerland were demanding gold for payment.

Portugal’s economic success hinged on its rich wolfram ore deposits. The Nazis were totally dependent on Portugal and Spain for its wolfram supplies. Wolfram or tungsten has a variety of uses including its use as the filament in light bulbs. However, it was of particular value in producing war munitions. Germany’s machining industry used tungsten carbide almost exclusively, whereas the U.S. was still largely using inferior molybdenum tipped tools, primarily because of the cartel agreement GE held with Krupp concerning carboloy or cemented tungsten carbide. Additionally, tungsten was useful in armor piercing munitions. [and also steel machining tools in armour manufacturing - FT]Britain and the U.S. agreed that Germany’s minimum requirements for wolfram were 3,500 tons per year.

Considering the quantity the Nazis required and the extraordinary means they went to insure supplies of the ore, the Allies correctly surmised that for the Nazis wolfram was a vital resource. It was equally important to the Allies, but the Allies were not solely dependent upon Portugal or Spain and could obtain wolfram from other sources. Thus, one of the allied goals was to deprive Nazi Germany of as much wolfram ore as possible. In this end, the Allies bought as much wolfram as possible from Portugal. The competition for the ore was intense and by 1943, to Portugal’s benefit, the price of ore had increased 775 percent over pre-war rates. Production also soared from 2,419 metric tons in 1938 to 6,500 tons in 1942.

To maintain its neutrality, Portugal set up a strict export quota system in 1942. The system allowed each side to export ore from their own mines and a fixed percentage of the output from independent mines. England owned the largest mine, while Germany owned two mid size concerns and several smaller mines. The output of Portugal's second largest mine was owned by France and the output was tied up in legation throughout 1941. In January 1942, Portugal concluded a secret trade pact with Germany. The pact allowed the Nazis export licenses for up to 2,800 tons of wolfram. In turn, Germany was to supply Portugal with coal, steel, and fertilizer, which Portugal needed and which the Allies could not supply. In 1943, the Allies tried to negotiate a new wolfram agreement. Portugal asked for price reductions in ammonium sulfate, petroleum products, and other materials from the Allies. The Allies refused any price reductions and Portugal refused to increase the Allies export licenses. At the same time, Portugal completed a new agreement with Nazi Germany.

Parallel with the wolfram negotiations were the negotiations to acquire air bases in the Azores islands. The islands would be able to provide a critical base for antisubmarine warfare, as the battle in the Atlantic was reaching a peak. The Allies had failed to take the Azores by force, fearing Germany would invade Portugal as a reprisal. On August 17, 1943, Britain concluded an agreement with Portugal to use the islands starting in October after invoking the old Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. In late 1943, Portugal interrupted the agreement as to include the U.S. air force as well.

By April 1944, the U.S. decided to use economic sanctions to induce Portugal to cut off the Nazi’s supply of wolfram. Portugal was dependent upon the U.S. for petroleum and other products. On June 5, 1944, the Allies pressed Portugal to cease wolfram shipments to Germany. The Germans immediately began to cloak their mining interests in Portugal by selling them and buying up other businesses. By June 1946, the Allies estimated that the Nazis had cloaked about $2 million dollars in hotels, cinemas, etc. At the same time a German U-boat seized a Portuguese vessel, increasing the anti-German sentiment inside Portugal. The U.S. also began negotiations to construct an air base in the Azores. Construction was delayed until and agreement was reached on a wide range of supplies and services. On November 28, 1944, the agreement was signed. Additionally, the U.S. agreed to Portuguese participation in the campaign to liberate Timor from the Japanese.
An even longer description can be seen here http://ideas.repec.org/p/rut/rutres/200008.html

In Bowen, Wayne H. Spain during World War II. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006 also provides interesting insight into why the strategy was not followed. However to support the strategy there is also much there:

the first chapter concludes by repeating that during much of 1940 both Franco and Hitler wanted Spain as an actively belligerent military ally of Germany, and such an alliance failed to materialize due to the Fuehrer's unwillingness to make serious promises to Madrid rather than the Caudillo's rejection of Berlin's offers.

With the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the strategic position of Spain transformed overnight. For one thing, it was no longer likely that the Germans would invade Spain, or pressure it to allow for an assault on Gibraltar, no matter how frustrated they were with Franco. For another, the Nazi return to anticommunism was tremendously popular. Spontaneous anticommunist demonstrations, encouraged by members of the regime, erupted throughout Spain at the news. For many Spaniards the invasion was more than just an extension of the existing conflict—it was a "war for the cause of Europe" and a "total European enterprise" against the "virus" of communism. While Falangists, Alfonsin monarchists, Carlists, Catholics, and those with business interests may have had major political differences, they shared in hatred for communism and anger at the Soviet Union for having assisted the Second Republic. Franco appears to have briefly considered declaring war, at the request of Germany, but Spain's economic dependence on Great Britain made this action unlikely. While Spain did not enter the war after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi betrayal of Stalin began the greatest period of open collaboration between Franco's Spain and Hitler's Germany, a collaboration that would cause serious damage to the Spanish economy as well as to Spain's international image and its practical interests.

To demonstrate its "moral belligerency," Spain recruited a division of volunteers—the Division Espanola de Voluntarios, or Blue Division—dispatched to the Russian Front to serve as a formation of the German Army. Bowen briefly outlines the service of the Blue Division, quickly noting that the British took considerable exception to such a violation of Spain's neutral status, to the extent that Churchill nearly ordered an invasion of the Canary Islands. Following American entry into the war, the Allies began a program of squeezing Spain with economic sanctions designed to prevent Franco from moving any closer to Hitler. In the wake of the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942, the Spanish Army underwent mobilization, but at the same time Franco realized Spain's strategic position had been entirely transformed. At this point the Generalissimo began to succumb to Allied pressure, gradually limiting or ending various concessions previously offered to the Axis, such as refueling facilities for U-boats. (Bowen does not otherwise address the issue of U-boats and German supply ships in Spanish waters.) The fall of Mussolini in the summer of 1943 also gave Falangist leaders pause as they considered how rapidly their comradely regime had collapsed.

In October Franco announced that Spain was shifting its policy from non-belligerency to neutrality. A few weeks later the Blue Division was withdrawn from the Russian Front. In addition, Spanish workers were gradually recalled from Germany. By the time Allied ground troops in France reached the Spanish border, permanently isolating Spain from Germany, Madrid's realignment to strict neutrality was almost complete, and "...the Franco regime made every effort to get on the good side of the Allies." http://sonic.net/~bstone/archives/060813.shtml

It seems to me the way was more then open for the Allies to land unopposed in Portugal and march across Spain into France avoiding Italy and Normandy.

[Big-E]

The simple truth is that someone in the Administration realised that Allies are going to win, and that it would be useful to be on the winning side when bidding for reconstruction contracts. Actually something better happened when Germans asked for a loan.

So we gave 126,000 lives for reconstruction contracts... that is very disrespectful to those who died for a noble cause.


Finally after December 7, 1941 US was forced into a war by denying Japan access to scrap metal (effectively imposing US limit over Japan's industrial capacity though that capacity was being used to build naval vessels).

So we went to war because we couldn't sell Japan scrap. What planet are you on? :alian2

[FutureTank]

So we gave 126,000 lives for reconstruction contracts... that is very disrespectful to those who died for a noble cause.
So we went to war because we couldn't sell Japan scrap. What planet are you on? :alian2

Big-E, do you think propaganda is unique to enemies of America?

Ok, let me spell it out for you.

Firstly the number killed in WW1 do not reflect either intensity of combat or patriotism of the troops, but only the industrialised killing power of WW1.

Prior to WW2:
Japan mimicked European powers.
To be an Empire it needed a Navy.
To build Navy industry needs steel.
Japan invades Korea, and then China, but still not enough resources are available.
Japan turns to US.
At first all is well.
However resources were still short, particularly oil, so the Japanese occupation of northern Indochina in 1940 brought with it an embargo on U.S. exports of iron and steel to scrap to Japan.

NOTE. German occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland did not bring such trade embargos.

Negotiatiations to remove embargo continue but are fruitless.
This culminates with Japanese attack on the US Pacific Fleet.

[Big-E]

Big-E, do you think propaganda is unique to enemies of America?

Ok, let me spell it out for you.

Your propaganda sounds like something the enemies of America would say.

Let me spell it out for you...


Firstly the number killed in WW1 do not reflect either intensity of combat or patriotism of the troops, but only the industrialised killing power of WW1.

You said that America entered WWI because they wanted to be on the winning side so they could get reconstruction contracts. Now you even further tarnish the memory of those who served by trivializing their sacrifice by blaming industrialization for their deaths. Let me set the record straight... Lusitania... remember?


Prior to WW2:
Japan mimicked European powers.
To be an Empire it needed a Navy.
To build Navy industry needs steel.
Japan invades Korea, and then China, but still not enough resources are available.
Japan turns to US.
At first all is well.
However resources were still short, particularly oil, so the Japanese occupation of northern Indochina in 1940 brought with it an embargo on U.S. exports of iron and steel to scrap to Japan.

NOTE. German occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland did not bring such trade embargos.

Negotiatiations to remove embargo continue but are fruitless.
This culminates with Japanese attack on the US Pacific Fleet.

Japan didn't attack the US because they embargoed them, they attacked on a gamble that the carriers would be in port. They weren't negotiating, they were stalling for time to decieve their intentions. Who writes your history books? :drunk1

[Grand Danois]

Japan didn't attack the US because they embargoed them, they attacked on a gamble that the carriers would be in port. They weren't negotiating, they were stalling for time to decieve their intentions. Who writes your history books? :drunk1

The US embargo was a de facto ultimatum. Discontinue the war in China, or we [US] will shut down your war machine.

Japan made its own choice, securing the resources of SEA instead of using American. To do that, the Japanese needed to secure their LOCS, and that policy went through Pearl harbor.

[Big-E]

The US embargo was a de facto ultimatum. Discontinue the war in China, or we [US] will shut down your war machine.

Japan made its own choice, securing the resources of SEA instead of using American. To do that, the Japanese needed to secure their LOCS, and that policy went through Pearl harbor.

Japan had already secured a steel supply in Manchuria.

"In the period from 1932-1944 one of the largest iron and steel centers on the Asiatic continent came into being in Manchuria, comperable in size with the developments at Kuznetsk and in India... Manchuria... was to be developed as an extension of the homeland. Capital and effort were poured into the creation here of a mainland industrial base strong enough to support Japan's military ambitions on the continent. The larger part of the effort was devoted to the iron and steel industry... Japanese estimates... totaled two chief deposits of 4450 million metric tons of medium grade ore."

Rodgers, Allen. The Manchurian Iron and Steel Industry and Its Resource Base. Geographical Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 1948), pp. 48

Japan had MORE than enough ore reserves in Manchuria to meet any wartime demands that they might have. Taiwan, Korea, and China practically had NOTHING, Malay had a meager 75 million tons. They had been lacking in ways to smelt the medium grade ore to get a good purity. It was not the failure of Japanese industry that made Manchuria unable to supply enough quality steel, it was the poor smelting processes that they conducted their operations that provided such little quality steel from the massive amounts of ore available.

They didn't invade China for oil as no real sources had been found.

You can't blame the war on the US just because Japanese industry lacked the ability to make quality steel from medium quality ore. The Japanese lied to the US State Department so they could wipe out PACFLT. They were in no danger until they attacked.

[Grand Danois]

Japan had already secured a steel supply in Manchuria.

"In the period from 1932-1944 one of the largest iron and steel centers on the Asiatic continent came into being in Manchuria, comperable in size with the developments at Kuznetsk and in India... Manchuria... was to be developed as an extension of the homeland. Capital and effort were poured into the creation here of a mainland industrial base strong enough to support Japan's military ambitions on the continent. The larger part of the effort was devoted to the iron and steel industry... Japanese estimates... totaled two chief deposits of 4450 million metric tons of medium grade ore."

Rodgers, Allen. The Manchurian Iron and Steel Industry and Its Resource Base. Geographical Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 1948), pp. 48

Japan had MORE than enough ore reserves in Manchuria to meet any wartime demands that they might have. Taiwan, Korea, and China practically had NOTHING, Malay had a meager 75 million tons. They had been lacking in ways to smelt the medium grade ore to get a good purity. It was not the failure of Japanese industry that made Manchuria unable to supply enough quality steel, it was the poor smelting processes that they conducted their operations that provided such little quality steel from the massive amounts of ore available.

That may be right and most likely is. The embargo on oil was of far greater importance, though.

I'm quoting Wiki here, as it corroborates the history books I have read.

The League of Nations, the U.S., the UK, Australia, and the Netherlands, which had territorial interests in Southeast Asia and the Philippines, condemned the Japanese attacks on China and applied diplomatic pressure. Japan resigned from the League of Nations in response. In July 1939, the U.S. terminated the 1911 U.S./Japanese commerce treaty, which both showed official disapprobation and removed legal barriers to imposition of trade embargoes. Japan continued its military campaign in China and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, formally ending World War I hostilities, and declaring common interests. In 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Fascist Italy to form the Axis Powers.

These Japanese actions led the U.S. to embargo scrap metal and gasoline, and to close the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. The situation worsened, and in 1941, Japan moved into northern Indochina. The U.S. responded by freezing Japan's assets in the U.S. and instituting a complete oil embargo.[1] Oil was Japan's most crucial resource; her own supplies were very limited, and 80% of Japan's imports were from the U.S. The Imperial Navy relied entirely on imported bunker oil stocks.[2]

There was considerable division in the Japanese high command. The Army wanted to "go south", to capture the oil and mineral reserves of the Dutch East Indies. The Navy was certain this would bring the U.S. into the war. To forestall American interference, an attack on the Pacific Fleet was considered essential. (The certainty of American aid to Britain in the Pacific was far from clear at the time, even to today.)

Diplomatic negotiations with the U.S. climaxed with the Hull note of November 26, 1941, which Prime Minister Hideki Tojo described to his cabinet as an ultimatum. Japanese leaders felt they had to choose between complying with the demands of the U.S. and UK — backing down from its actions in China and surrounding areas — and continuing to expand. Concerned about losing status and prestige in the international community ("loss of face") if compelled to comply, and with the perceived threat to national survival posed by the western powers, the Japanese leadership (under Emperor Hirohito) decided to implement contingency plans, choosing war with the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands as a direct response.

On September 4, 1941, at the second of two Imperial Conferences attended by the Emperor considering an attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Cabinet met to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters. It was decided that:

Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defence and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war ... [and is] ... resolved to go to war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands if necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#Background

You can't blame the war on the US just because Japanese industry lacked the ability to make quality steel from medium quality ore. The Japanese lied to the US State Department so they could wipe out PACFLT. They were in no danger until they attacked.

I don't blame the US for the Pacific War/Pearl Harbor attack. The embargo was rightfully a US prerogative and Pearl Harbor was solely a Japanese decison.

And yes, they were not sanguine in their diplomacy (lied through their teeth) in order to get surprise at Pearl.

[Big-E]

That may be right and most likely is. The embargo on oil was of far greater importance, though.

I'm quoting Wiki here, as it corroborates the history books I have read.


I don't blame the US for the Pacific War/Pearl Harbor attack. The embargo was rightfully a US prerogative and Pearl Harbor was solely a Japanese decison.

And yes, they were not sanguine in their diplomacy (lied through their teeth) in order to get surprise at Pearl.

I posted that more for the benifit of Future Tank than anyone else. He stated


Finally after December 7, 1941 US was forced into a war by denying Japan access to scrap metal (effectively imposing US limit over Japan's industrial capacity though that capacity was being used to build naval vessels).

The scrap metal and oil embargoes are two different things. The scrap embargo came from the Japanese allying with Hitler. The oil embargo came from attacking IndoChina.

To rely on wiki for interpretations is not wise... let me go and edit that so it's right. :lam

If Japan wanted to avoid US interference they should never have allied with Hitler... that was the begining of the end for them, not attacking SEA countries. The US had sat idely by for decades... they really didn't care until they sided with Facists and drew blood.

[Grand Danois]

Have fun on Wiki then :D

[Big-E]

Have fun on Wiki then :D

It really is absurd how easy it is to alter their info. If you sign up you can change anything without retribuiton... it is disgusting.

[Waylander]

@Big-E
I haven't posted anything in this thread so far. Looks like you mistake me woith somebody else.
I am just a quiet reader in this interesting thread. :)

[Big-E]

@Big-E
I haven't posted anything in this thread so far. Looks like you mistake me woith somebody else.
I am just a quiet reader in this interesting thread. :)

I meant Garry... you should feel honored I confused you with him. :D

[Waylander]

Aaah.
I'm honoured. :cool:

[FutureTank]

you even further tarnish the memory of those who served by trivializing their sacrifice by blaming industrialization for their deaths. Let me set the record straight... Lusitania... remember?
WW1 was an industrialized war in the sense that casualties reflected use of massive fires (either infantry such as MG or artillery). Casualties were not indicative of massed heroism as in wars before where troops would bravely stand in lines and deliver volleys, but simply for being there and suffereing a barrage without firing a shot back or even seeing the enemy. The US casualties thefore can not be used to describe the 'sacrifice'. Nor were US casualties a sacrifice in the same way French, German and British casualties were in some of the earlier battles (and later like Battle of Passchendaele). By the time Americans arrived these tactics were banned by their respective governements, and that was the reason Monash received an award from the King in the field. It was not only for actually achieving real results, but also the relatively low cost in lives that that result was achieved.
I would suggest that US casualties need be examined with greater statistical diligence, and on case by case basis, then using them in this emotional way.

Lusitania was a God-sent to US, and a blunder by Germans. The US public was generally NOT in support of participation in the European war. For US to enter the war, it had to be a 'good war' cause, and sinking of Lusitania made it that. Public opinion changed overnight.

Japan didn't attack the US because they embargoed them, they attacked on a gamble that the carriers would be in port. They weren't negotiating, they were stalling for time to decieve their intentions. Who writes your history books?
My books are writen by historians, but you apparently only read movie scripts.

The need to attack US Pacific Fleet carriers was a tactical objective that existed within larger operational and strategic scopes of operations, military, political and economic.

Let's review major STRATEGIC events in the Asia-Pacific.
•1939: U.S. notifies Japan that it will abrogate the 1911 treaty of commerce and navigation.
•1940: Japan sets up a puppet government in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei.
•1940: Japan demands that Britain and France stop providing aid to Chungking through Indochina and Burma. Burma Road closed for July-September 1940.
•1940: September; tripartite German-Italian-Japanese axis alliance signed in Berlin.
•1940: In response to tripartite axis alliance, Churchill reopens the Burma Road.
•1940: September: France occupies northern Indochina. U.S. embargoes export of scrap iron.
•1941: March: Japan signs non-aggression treaty with Soviet Union.
•1941: June: Hitler attacks the Soviet Union
•1941: July: Japan occupies southern Indochina
•1941: July: U.S. freezes Japanese assets.
•1941: December: Japan strikes at Pearl Harbor, and throughout the southwestern Pacific.

Your argiment that Japan had sufficient access to iron ore is not convincing. Firstly iron ore in Manchuria was low grade as I recall.
Secondly the Japanese, despite building aircraft carriers, were still, like Europeans, believers in the battleship (as were many US Navy senior officers). Shps require an awfull lot of steel to manufacture, and the Japanese knew US production capabilities. Their only hope was that US would be dragged into war in Europe, and that they would be able to consolidate their positions in the Pacific.

In December 1941 the Japanese plans were in some ways acceptable and in some ways not. While US did not enter the European war against Germany (that begun in 1939, and there was little sign of this cpability being available in 1942, the Soviet Army had been driven to the walls of Moscow, and threrefore was unlikely to present a threat in China. The Japanese Army faction then in power agreed that if US was not attacked in 1941, by 1942 its industrial prduction may begin to be geared to wartime footing, and enable ti to react more swiftly to Japanese military strategy. It was therefore decided to conduct an attack sooner rather then later. This was forced on Japanese because they were rapidly running out of fuel since they had no deliveries from the US between July and September without Roosevelt's knowledge!

Here is how it looked from Tokyo:
"The United States contributed to that turn of events by instituting a de facto embargo on [exports of] oil [to Japan]. The freezing of Japanese assets, announced on 25 July [1941], had been followed by a week of intensive work by State Department, Treasury, and other officials to set up a machinery for implementing the order. The idea, which Roosevelt approved, was to let the Japanese apply for export licenses which would then be examined on a case-by-case basis and necessary funds released from blocked Japanese monies to purchase the goods. Oil, too, would be dealt with in this fashion. But the processing of applications for licenses and the releease of funds took time, and the matter was overseen by Dean Acheson, assistant secretary of state, who refused to release funds, intent upon punishing Japan for its southern expansionism [into Indochina]. The result was that Japan never got any oil after 25 July, a fact that even Roosevelt did not find out until early September. But the Japanese were under no illusion about the matter. They now realized that a total oil embargo was being put into effect. Japanese strategy would now have to take that development into consideration.... Prime Minister Konoe himself told the war and navy ministers that matters stood 'only a step this side of entering into a major war'. They reasoned that the American oil embargo would force the nation to... incorporate the region [of southeast Asia with its oil fields] into the [Japanese] empire. But such action would inevitably draw the United States, Britain, and the Dutch into war.... The oil embargo was seen as tantamount to an act of war, and Japan would respond by its own military action..." Origins of the Second World War in Asia and in the Pacific Review of Akira Iriye's (New York: Longman, 1987)

Now, are you old enough to remember the 1973 oil crisis first began on October 17, 1973? It was in fact an oil embargo on the USA. Do you remeber Washington saying 'never again'? Do you remember why US-led forces liberated Kuwait in 1991?
Why do you think Japanese would respond differently to being starved of oil just when their Empire is growing nicely and European colonies are collapsing under their strategy?

Failure to achieve damage on US carriers was just a tactical failure. It was a failure, but in Japanese view acceptable (subject to current understanding of naval warfare) an acceptable one, and a testament to the age old knowledge that no plan ever went 100% to plan :)

Now I suggest you calm down, have a :drunk1 and do a bit more reading then :usa waving

[Simon9]

Both you and Waylander admit the doughboys are what broke the camels back. If the US hadn't entered the war the fight would have kept on going. The British tanks, while innovative, were by FAR from effective. It would have been years of trench warfare until one side gave up. I didn't say the US did it's share of fighting but there is something you should realize from an American perspective. In that era the US were EXTREME isolationists. All they cared about was what happened 10 miles from their house. It wasn't until they turned on the radio from reports of Gallipoli that they realized the true cost of that war. The thousands of ANZACs being wasted to do the bidding of the Imperial whip infuriated many. With these detailed battle reports coming in American sentiment began to turn. With the resulting indiscriminate actions of the Kriegsmarine the rest is history. As Waylander said it is the "millions of fresh troops" that made the difference. Wether they actually fought is of little concern when it was what influenced the Chancellor to surrender.


No, that's not what I said. I said they were a major factor, but the war would have ended within a few months anyway because the British defeated the German Army in the field, and the British Navy effectively starved the German civilian population.

The biggest contribution the US made was forcing the Germans to launch their 1918 Spring Offensives before the bulk of the US forces arrived. They had to try and force an issue before the US troops made their presence felt.

This probably ended the war some months early because the Germans lost massive numbers of troops (I don't recall exact numbers but I'm thinking 450,000 casualties) which they could not replace. But the Germans WOULD have been defeated without the US troops for the reasons I already mentioned.

The biggest US contribution was in shortening the war, and like you said in the potential they represented. In that, you are correct, it doesn't matter that few of them actually fought.

It must also be said that the US forces, by the end, had adapted remarkably quickly and were on par with the British and French. Had the war continued a few more months, into 1919, the Americans would have become the decisive force in the West. But the combination of factors I've already mentioned (one of which was American potential) meant Germany surrendered in 1918.

[FutureTank]

a noble cause

Just so we get this right, WW1 has another name which better describes this cause...War of Serbian Independence.

Do you think USA in 1918 supported Serbian Independence?