15 February 2006 JDW
Running on Empty
Time is running out to revive Russia's moribund military aviation industry
Robert Hewson
Editor, Jane's Air-Launched Weapons
For more than a decade there has been no realistic domestic market for Russia's military aircraft builders. Bold state initiatives promising more aircraft and new aircraft have evaporated. The required state funding has failed to materialise. What money has been spent has often disappeared into black holes of inefficiency and corruption.
With no reliable customers at home, Russian industry has looked abroad to stay alive. Its success has been patchy. The giant Soviet-era industrial bureaucracy of the aviation sector has singularly failed to reform and adapt to the business realities of the post-Soviet world. Instead, the cornerstone Russian fighter producers – MiG and Sukhoi – have had to rely on traditional export customers such as China, India, Vietnam and elsewhere for revenue.
These customers have been sold the very best in Russian late 1980s/early 1990s technology – because no serious product development has been done in Russia since that time. With no investment in its products and now a declining interest among a diminishing set of potential buyers, Russia's military aviation industry is edging ever closer to oblivion.
Lest anyone doubt the scale of the problem facing Russia and its air forces, the procurement plans for 2006 include one Tu- l 60 bomber, "several" Su-34 attack aircraft and eight Mi-28N night-capable attack helicopters – this at a time when defence spending is supposed to be increasing.
All of these are legacy programmes; indeed, the Tu-160 is not actually in production. This final ninth aircraft had to be rescued from the shut-down assembly line and cobbled together from spare parts. The Su-34, intended as a replacement for the Su-24, has been progressing at glacial speed since production was authorised in 1986. A prototype flew in 1990 and just seven flying aircraft have been built. For years the Su-34 has been hailed as the aircraft that will revitalise tactical aviation in Russia, but nothing could be further from the truth.
The Mi-28N is another antique programme. Once cancelled and later revived, it dates back to the early 1990s. The capabilities of the Mi-28N – and the rival Kamov Ka-50 – are desperately needed by Russian Army aviation but the two competing programmes have been locked in internecine warfare for the last 10 years in a spectacular example of Russian short-termism and fundamental lack of investment.
With such tiny volumes of aircraft being delivered to the Russian Ministry of Defence, it begs the question: What are Russian aerospace firms doing? RSK MiG has about 15,000 employees, a plethora of design and production facilities and has not built a new aircraft for over 10 years. The situation at Sukhoi is better – that company has won significant orders for its Su-30 family – but the aircraft are built at three different sites and two manufacturing blocks (Irkut and KNAAPO) each claim ownership over 'their designs' and compete aggressively with each other, inside and outside the Sukhoi organisation.
It had been hoped that the formation of a single Unified Aircraft Corporation within Russia, the much-heralded OAK, would solve many of these problems. Under OAK all research, development and production would be rationalised and set on some kind of competitive footing for the future. OAK remains a pipedream.
Under the plan put forward in 2005 to create the single company, it was predicted that OAK would generate USD2.5 billion to USD2.8 billion of annual revenue, mostly in military sales. By 2015 production was expected to rise by a factor of 10 (military and civil aircraft sales combined).
These figures have almost no basis in reality. If Russia's military industry is on life support then, sadly, the plug was pulled on its civil manufacturing base a long time ago. There are two prospective commercial airliner projects in Russia: the Sukhoi Russian Regional Jet (RRJ) and the Yakovlev-led MS-21. Both are paper designs and neither have
realistic sales prospects. There is also a serious worry that some of these programmes are being used as 'cash sponges', to soak up investment that will never be channelled into actual development work and will simply disappear when projects are abandoned.
The formation of OAK is bitterly opposed by many of the entities it is supposed to include. More importantly, it intrudes on the personal fiefdoms of senior officials who have no interest in seeing their hard-won positions diluted or disappear altogether. To many observers within Russia, the OAK plan is a bad joke and they look with dismay at the agreements Western companies have made with an organisation that does not exist.
President Putin has instructed Russian industry to form more joint ventures and international partnerships. It is only export sales that have kept the Russian ship afloat, but the ship is springing leaks. There is a real danger that Russia's manufacturers have sold everything they have to offer and have no new aircraft or systems to sell for the future.
The relationship with China sends some clear signals. Sukhoi's multibillion-dollar deal to supply Su-27s has come to an end. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has absorbed these aircraft and is turning its attention to sustaining and upgrading them itself, with much-reduced foreign involvement. The follow-on Su-30MKK and Su-30MKK-II programmes were for far fewer aircraft and the planned Su-30MKK-III variant has been dropped.
China continues to buy specific technology items from Russia but the days of the big aircraft deals might well be over. Russia's early input into the FC-1 and J-10 fighter programmes has been of great assistance to China's young design teams, but they are now capable of doing most of the work themselves.
For Russia the plan for the future, as far as there is one, is based almost entirely on the PAKFA next-generation fighter programme, for which Sukhoi is developing the 1-50 design. At a press briefing in January Russian Air Force Commander General Vladimir Mikhailov said that development "is proceeding well and generally on time", while also admitting a lack of funding.
Building and flying an aircraft should not be a problem for Sukhoi. Developing and integrating the avionics, sensors and weapon fit that a 21st century combat jet demands is another matter. Russia's once-mighty aerospace sector has withered in a climate of greed, disinterest and inertia that has robbed it of a future.
Looking with disbelief at the course of events since the fall of the Soviet Union, one Russian analyst shook his head and said: "It is as if they have no children."
Robert Hewson Editor, Jane's Air-Launched Weapons
I can't wait to hear all the ".....but India is going to work with Russia on the new 5th generation fighter.....<sniff!><sniff!>." It ain't happenin' boys. As the old saying goes: No Bucks, no Buck Rogers!
The only credible option left for the Russians is a joint program with France. India's a/c military procurement future lies with US coop projects.
Running on Empty
Time is running out to revive Russia's moribund military aviation industry
Robert Hewson
Editor, Jane's Air-Launched Weapons
For more than a decade there has been no realistic domestic market for Russia's military aircraft builders. Bold state initiatives promising more aircraft and new aircraft have evaporated. The required state funding has failed to materialise. What money has been spent has often disappeared into black holes of inefficiency and corruption.
With no reliable customers at home, Russian industry has looked abroad to stay alive. Its success has been patchy. The giant Soviet-era industrial bureaucracy of the aviation sector has singularly failed to reform and adapt to the business realities of the post-Soviet world. Instead, the cornerstone Russian fighter producers – MiG and Sukhoi – have had to rely on traditional export customers such as China, India, Vietnam and elsewhere for revenue.
These customers have been sold the very best in Russian late 1980s/early 1990s technology – because no serious product development has been done in Russia since that time. With no investment in its products and now a declining interest among a diminishing set of potential buyers, Russia's military aviation industry is edging ever closer to oblivion.
Lest anyone doubt the scale of the problem facing Russia and its air forces, the procurement plans for 2006 include one Tu- l 60 bomber, "several" Su-34 attack aircraft and eight Mi-28N night-capable attack helicopters – this at a time when defence spending is supposed to be increasing.
All of these are legacy programmes; indeed, the Tu-160 is not actually in production. This final ninth aircraft had to be rescued from the shut-down assembly line and cobbled together from spare parts. The Su-34, intended as a replacement for the Su-24, has been progressing at glacial speed since production was authorised in 1986. A prototype flew in 1990 and just seven flying aircraft have been built. For years the Su-34 has been hailed as the aircraft that will revitalise tactical aviation in Russia, but nothing could be further from the truth.
The Mi-28N is another antique programme. Once cancelled and later revived, it dates back to the early 1990s. The capabilities of the Mi-28N – and the rival Kamov Ka-50 – are desperately needed by Russian Army aviation but the two competing programmes have been locked in internecine warfare for the last 10 years in a spectacular example of Russian short-termism and fundamental lack of investment.
With such tiny volumes of aircraft being delivered to the Russian Ministry of Defence, it begs the question: What are Russian aerospace firms doing? RSK MiG has about 15,000 employees, a plethora of design and production facilities and has not built a new aircraft for over 10 years. The situation at Sukhoi is better – that company has won significant orders for its Su-30 family – but the aircraft are built at three different sites and two manufacturing blocks (Irkut and KNAAPO) each claim ownership over 'their designs' and compete aggressively with each other, inside and outside the Sukhoi organisation.
It had been hoped that the formation of a single Unified Aircraft Corporation within Russia, the much-heralded OAK, would solve many of these problems. Under OAK all research, development and production would be rationalised and set on some kind of competitive footing for the future. OAK remains a pipedream.
Under the plan put forward in 2005 to create the single company, it was predicted that OAK would generate USD2.5 billion to USD2.8 billion of annual revenue, mostly in military sales. By 2015 production was expected to rise by a factor of 10 (military and civil aircraft sales combined).
These figures have almost no basis in reality. If Russia's military industry is on life support then, sadly, the plug was pulled on its civil manufacturing base a long time ago. There are two prospective commercial airliner projects in Russia: the Sukhoi Russian Regional Jet (RRJ) and the Yakovlev-led MS-21. Both are paper designs and neither have
realistic sales prospects. There is also a serious worry that some of these programmes are being used as 'cash sponges', to soak up investment that will never be channelled into actual development work and will simply disappear when projects are abandoned.
The formation of OAK is bitterly opposed by many of the entities it is supposed to include. More importantly, it intrudes on the personal fiefdoms of senior officials who have no interest in seeing their hard-won positions diluted or disappear altogether. To many observers within Russia, the OAK plan is a bad joke and they look with dismay at the agreements Western companies have made with an organisation that does not exist.
President Putin has instructed Russian industry to form more joint ventures and international partnerships. It is only export sales that have kept the Russian ship afloat, but the ship is springing leaks. There is a real danger that Russia's manufacturers have sold everything they have to offer and have no new aircraft or systems to sell for the future.
The relationship with China sends some clear signals. Sukhoi's multibillion-dollar deal to supply Su-27s has come to an end. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has absorbed these aircraft and is turning its attention to sustaining and upgrading them itself, with much-reduced foreign involvement. The follow-on Su-30MKK and Su-30MKK-II programmes were for far fewer aircraft and the planned Su-30MKK-III variant has been dropped.
China continues to buy specific technology items from Russia but the days of the big aircraft deals might well be over. Russia's early input into the FC-1 and J-10 fighter programmes has been of great assistance to China's young design teams, but they are now capable of doing most of the work themselves.
For Russia the plan for the future, as far as there is one, is based almost entirely on the PAKFA next-generation fighter programme, for which Sukhoi is developing the 1-50 design. At a press briefing in January Russian Air Force Commander General Vladimir Mikhailov said that development "is proceeding well and generally on time", while also admitting a lack of funding.
Building and flying an aircraft should not be a problem for Sukhoi. Developing and integrating the avionics, sensors and weapon fit that a 21st century combat jet demands is another matter. Russia's once-mighty aerospace sector has withered in a climate of greed, disinterest and inertia that has robbed it of a future.
Looking with disbelief at the course of events since the fall of the Soviet Union, one Russian analyst shook his head and said: "It is as if they have no children."
Robert Hewson Editor, Jane's Air-Launched Weapons
I can't wait to hear all the ".....but India is going to work with Russia on the new 5th generation fighter.....<sniff!><sniff!>." It ain't happenin' boys. As the old saying goes: No Bucks, no Buck Rogers!
The only credible option left for the Russians is a joint program with France. India's a/c military procurement future lies with US coop projects.