| | Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT)
I've had permission from the original "author" of this post on DACT to reproduce it here. It's an interesting thread and seeks to demystify and correct some of the assumptions made about aggressor/dissimilar air combat training. It was initially posted to bring some "lightness and reason" about the Cope India 04 exercise between the USAF and IAF. I've chopped in a few other pertinent comments from elsewhere to round it off.
The guy who penned this has had long term exposure to air combat and dissimilar air combat training, so he is an expert in his field.
There are some serious misconceptions out there about how air combat training is conducted so I’ve decided to write a post about how it really happens. Everybody seems to want to cite a particular exercise as proof of their point, when in reality, they have no contextual reference for these results they are referencing. Realize that I am writing from a USAF/USN/USMC/NATO perspective. If anyone else can provide some information about how it’s done elsewhere, please chime in.
Air-to-air combat is an extremely complex and dynamic undertaking. The combination of speed and the ability to maneuver in three dimensions creates an environment that is constantly changing and rarely allows any of the participants to see and understand the entire picture at once. In order to be successful in this environment, participants must be highly skilled, (reasonably) intelligent individuals who fight in these types of battles regularly.
Fighter pilots from countries all over the world are expected to use hardware purchased with national treasure to defend their homeland against attackers or attack others as directed by their leaders. In order to effectively accomplish those missions, pilots must regularly train for air combat. Air combat skills are perishable and even the best pilots are not as keen as they might be if they haven’t flown in a while – especially when flying in large force exercises where one decision may be the difference between success and failure.
Definitions: Air Combat Training (ACT) is a term used to describe a battle between similar aircraft. If 2 F-16s are fighting against 2 other F-16s, this would be an ACT war, whereas 2 F-15s fighting 2 F-16s would be termed Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT).
When planning a DACT exercise, planners typically will build an Offensive Counterair (OCA) strike package and Defensive Counterair (DCA) package with appropriate aircraft - this was displayed in the Cope India exercise when a strike package consisting of SU-30s, Mirages, and Jaguars attacked a target defended by F-15s. Besides designating types of aircraft and missions, planners will also draw up objectives for the exercise. These objectives can be very specific or quite broad depending on the situation.
A broad objective may be stated as “building trust between countries†or “familiarize pilots with other air forces.†More specific objectives may be “effectively integrate air forces for lane defense.†In order to accomplish these objectives, rules of engagement (ROE) will also be set.
ROE consist of weapons load, identification criteria, maneuvering limitations, tactics restrictions, and just about anything else you can think of. ROE can be pretty liberal or very restrictive, depending on the objectives, experience level of the pilots, or number and type of aircraft involved. If the objective is to “build trust†between nations, you can bet your ass that the rules are going to be damn restrictive to try to ensure there will be no accidents/dangerous or stupid stunts that would embarrass one side or the other or result in needless loss of life. This is why briefings are conducted, and “pickup games†are not allowed. (This is also the reason why this article about the Typhoons getting bounced by F-15Es is absolute bollocks.) Regardless of the particular ROE established, somebody needs to be the bad guy.
In most exercises there will be a threat aircraft and weapons designated as the training aid for the other side. In U.S. exercises such as Red Flag, this will be something like a MiG-29 with aa-10s and aa-11s, and will be referred to as “opfor†or “red air.†Red air will usually consist of F-15s or F-16s (or whatever they can get) and will do their best to simulate that threat by limiting their radar modes, lock ranges, tactics, etc. “Blue air†will fly with their normal weapons loadout and will normally not have any restrictions other than operating their systems in a training/peacetime mode. There may be other restrictions imposed based on the objectives. Typically, the threat capabilities will start out low – short range missiles and very benign tactics, then increase as the exercise continues, as long as the blue air players are learning something and they are ready to progress to the next level. If the blue air fighters are getting their butts handed to them, the threat level will remain low, but if they are doing well, the threat capability will increase so the training is useful.
Notice that the red air players are training aids. They are supposed to follow the rules and die like men when blue air is executing well. If, however, the blue air screws something up and they have an opportunity to kick some tail, they are expected to do so. Violating the ROE by using a capability that is restricted, shooting beyond a specified range, or not adhering to an established ID criteria is considered a training rule violation and is dealt with severely. Several pilots have been sent home from exercises and have even been reassigned because they didn’t like to follow the rules.
By now it should becoming clear why one side or the other in these exercises often has a larger kill:loss ratio than the other. Red air is supposed to die – even if there are more capable aircraft on the red side. This is how many of the “surprising†results occur in large exercises – the threat level is tailored to the training needs of the blue air so they can learn from their mistakes in the debrief.
When conducting the debrief, kills must be assessed in order to find out what really happened. In order to do this, pilots must review the recording of the mission so they can evaluate their targeting and weapons employment. Red and blue air will get together, exchange data, and together decide who shot who and when. This is often an inexact science, however, with ACMI monitoring and extensive recording equipment in the aircraft, it is getting better. With results in hand, the blue fighters can then determine what they did wrong, and how to do better next time. This training is very effective for the blue air, but it usually sucks for red. What about exercises with real “threat†aircraft like MiG-29s, MiG-25s, etc? This is obviously the best training there can be, however, there is a problem.
When participating in an international exercise, both sides are probably going to hold some information back. This is not a “you show me yours, I’ll show you mine†game. In many cases, the shot data/weapons performance is classified, and not releasable to those on the other side. This is exactly the case in Cope India 04.
How do you debrief an engagement when neither side wants to say what really happened? Nobody is going to walk into the debrief and say “I shot that guy at this time and this range with this missile,†because they are basically giving away their capabilities. There are a couple of ways to deal with this, one of which is to not relay any of the shot information, but to merely say “that guy is dead at this time.†In that situation, no information (other than the f-pole) is released to the other side. However, astute people on the other side can extrapolate the data and figure out approximately when the shot was fired and can have a pretty good idea as to the performance of the missile. The other thing you can do is to establish a theoretical missile, with a nominal range to be used by both sides. This levels the playing field and rewards the side which executes better, rather than the side with the longer range missiles.
Detailed assessments that would normally take place to validate shots can't/won't happen in an exercise like this, therefore the overall results are not really accurate. However, as you say, they most certainly will debrief to get some results regardless of the potential inaccuracies. How valid the results are depends on how the exercise was planned.
As you can see, the results of these exercises (especially those released to the public) are quite likely not accurate. And, for one side or the other to claim victory in one of these exercises is either dishonest or just plain ignorance. Normally, the results are released as a series of politically correct statements such as those we’ve seen by the authorities after Cope India. Both sides are happy, they learned a lot, and can’t wait to do it again.
It should be noted that these types of exercises are planned many months in advance. A key part of the training syllabus is to agree on the types of scenarios to be performed during initial planning.
Most of the learning experience occurs on the ground, not in the air. The evolution from Air Tasking Order to Mission Planning/C3I/Asset Coordination to Aircraft Generation is where air battles are won or lost. The mechanics of flying airplanes and shooting off ordnance is icing on the cake.
I’m certainly not trying to stifle the spirited debate that goes on here. It’s fun reading the arguments for and against various aircraft, however, be careful when you’re quoting the results of some exercise when making your point!
I'm only saying that without details, all of this, "my airplane kicked your airplane's butt" is entertaining, but silly. One valuable part of the exercise is simply watching how the other side operates, what kind of tactics they use (they may have been "modified" along with the weapons), how they talk on the radio, etc. Obviously, the technology represented by the Su-30s is of great interest to the USAF also. |
