An alternative comparative analysis: LCA vs FC-1
The aim of this essay is to explore the relative merits of the two essentially equivalent designs on a “single-system†basis. In doing so we must bear in mind that an aircraft is deployed as part of a wider warfighting system and therefore aircraft/weapons data, although a factor, is not in itself a sound basis for assessing combat capability. However, comparing aircraft performance, capabilities and suchlike, remains of great interest to the airpower enthusiast and amateur strategist.
One problem with this type of analysis surrounds the validity of the data, mostly gleamed from the web. Patriots embellish capabilities, estimations are optimistic and most data is presented out of context. But by browsing widely and trying to home in on more credible sources, we hope not be too far off.
It is also useful to compare them with equivalent aircraft worldwide, particularl Taiwan’s Ching Kuo fighter, South Korea’s proposed F-50 Golden Eagle (dedicated fighter variant of T-50/A-50) and Sweden’s superb Gripen aircraft. The latter is perhaps the benchmark, and as our analysis will show, is generally superior to either design.
Executive overview
Neither fighter is likely to be particularly outstanding. Whilst the LCA is generally credited with having superior performance and weapons systems, the FC-1 carries the price advantage. Neither fighter is likely reduce their respective airforce’s dependency on foreign systems for key combat capabilities as much as would have been hoped at their inception. In the case of both India and Pakistan, better solutions could have been obtained “off the selfâ€, and indeed this is happening.
BVR capability
Both aircraft will have an up-to-date beyond visual range capability. Whilst nothing new for the IAF, it represents a quantum leap for Pakistan who currently makes do with Sparrows, it’s Mirage and Chinese fighter’s having no BVR capability whatsoever.
Whilst we know that Pakistani FC-1s will probably be equipped with the SD-10 missile (even if it is not up to PAF standards, there seems little choice), more uncertainty surrounds the LCA’s fit. It is generally supposed that it will employ the Astra BVR missile currently in development. This is despite India already buying AA-10 Alamo, AA-12 Adder, Derby and MICA systems. Whilst the Astra is generally claimed to posess Adder like capabilities, it would be a great surprise if it actually lives up to such expectations. It will certainly be bigger and heavier, and probably less ‘deadly’ than either the Derby or MICA. This begs the question: why not simply switch to either Derby or MICA? It would probably be quicker and cheaper to use these highly credible foreign designs, and have less impact on aircraft performance.
Having just assassinated the Astra, let me turn to the SD-10. In common with its India counterpart, it is notionally an advanced BVR missile. It probably features much Adder technology including the seeker, although speculation of anti-radiation seekers persists. It reportedly has a lock-on jam capability which is a good feature, although unremarkable today. Again it is bigger, heavier and almost certainly less ‘deadly’ than the likes of AMRAAM, Derby and MICA. Pakistan now has access to AMRAAM (albeit export models), so the SD-10 will not be all that even in PAF service.
So what we have is lightweight fighters equipped with comparatively bulky BVR missiles…
Both countries (Pakistan and India) ought to have learnt from Taiwan’s IDF (“Ching Kuoâ€) program. Similarly motivated by the effect of sanctions, the Taiwanese sought to develop an indigenous fighter and equip it with indigenous missiles analogous with AMRAAM. The Taiwanese missile is called the Skysword II. Although few specific performance details have been released, presumably because they are embarrassing, it is almost certainly less effective than AMRAAM. Like Pakistan and India, sanctions faded and Taiwan was able to purchase Western fighters/missiles (Pakistan buying F-16Cs with AMRAAM, India buying Mirage 2000-5s with MICA….). Taiwan jumped at the opportunity, cutting Ching Kuo production (greatly increasing effective unit cost) and brought both F16s with AMRAAM and Mirage 2000-5s with MICA. What is more, it wasn’t until several years after the introduction of the Ching Kuo that the Skysword II could be described as an operational reality.
The only solace for the Ching Kuo progam is that at least the Skysword IIs are carried semi-recessed, thus reducing performance deterioration, something neither the FC-1 nor LCA has employed. Given the Ching Kuo’s somewhat lackluster performance to start with, it’s hardly worth partying about.
By comparison, other lightweight fighters are way ahead; the F-50 will almost certainly carry AMRAAM and the Gripen can carry AMRAAM, MICA and R-Darter (South African BVR missile believed to borrow from Derby), not to mention the Meteor when it enters service. The ramjet powered Meteor is a further quantum leap of missile capability.
Both the LCA and FC-1 are likely to be equipped with credible X-band pulse Doppler multi-mode radars. The LCA’s is indigenous, which may cause delays and cost overruns (what system doesn’t these days??? But crucially, the radar is still in development). Like the Astra program, India’s indigenous radar is generally reported optimistically, yet the end result seems questionable. The FC-1 has at least an off-the-shelf radar fit, presumed to be the Italian FIAR Grifo S-7 in PAF service. This series of radar is already produced in Pakistan for the J-7M aircraft. It was conceived as an upgrade replacement for baseline APG-67 which equips most export F-16s, so we can safely assume that it outperforms most models of APG-67. However, it is said to lack multi-target tracking/engagement capability, which obviously detracts from basic air-defense efficiency.
Both radar systems are a generation behind the leading European, Russian and American systems now entering service. By comparison, the Gripen, notionally a lightweight fighter, is complimented for its network-centric avionics and represents a major capability step-up compared to either the LCA or FC-1.
Dogfight capability
The traditional strongpoint of the lightweight fighter was good old-fashioned WVR engagement. Both the LCA and FC-1 represent a performance improvement over the F-5E, Mig-21 and even F-16A generation of lightweight fighters. The FC-1 is credited with an +8.5g limit which is a shade behind the LCA’s +9g, implying that the LCA is probably more agile.
The FC-1 in PAF service is likely to be equipped with AIM-9P Sidewinder and/or Chinese PL-9 missiles. The AIM-9P in particular is not particularly good by today’s standards, lacking many of the features considered standard for current generation fighters, such as helmet mounted sighting and high off-boresight capability. Idle speculation that the FC-1 will now be equipped with AIM-9X advanced WVR missiles now that the US has lifted sanctions seems unlikely in the initial operations of the FC-1 in PAF service. If AIM-9X is deployed, priority will surly go to the F-16Cs expected to enter service. The PL-9 is on paper a step above the AIM-9P with a high off-boresight capability, high agility, compatibility with helmet mounted sighting and suchlike. However, it does not appear to be a runaway success, since China’s flagship J-10 fighter is consistently seen carrying PL-8 missiles and Janes Defense Review has expressed the opinion that it is very short ranged.
The LCA will probably be equipped with AA-11 Archer WVR missiles. Whilst not as cutting edge as they were when they first entered service, but nonetheless features helmet mounted sighting, high off-boresight lock-on and carries a distinct performance advantage over the AIM-9P and likely PL-9. If Israel sells the incredibly lethal Python 4 or 5 missiles to India, the LCA could well jump further ahead.
Getting back to the AIM-9P issue, it is worth noting that most Gripens also carry similar Sidewinder models, whilst South Africa apparently deploys the promising A-Dartar. But Swedish Gripen’s a slated to get the next generation IRIS-T missile which is likely far more capable than either AIM-9P or PL-9. The F-50 looks set to get AIM-9X, though the Ching Kuo is stuck with the modest Skysword I Sidewinder copy.
Both aircraft are equipped with the reliable but unremarkable twin GSh-23mm cannon.
Weapons load
On paper the LCA appears to have a marginally greater weapons load than the FC-1 although the round figure of 4000kg appears an estimate.
Perhaps a better indicator is the thrust to weight ratio. The higher the figure, the greater the margin for bolting on various bits of kit, such as missiles, with (simplistically) less effect on performance. To calculate the thrust to weight ratio I’ve used the maximum thrust with afterburner and the normal take-off weight. Both come out with a 0.91 ratio. That’s not bad, but a far cry from the >1 (i.e. more thrust than weight) claimed by the F-15 and Su-27 families of aircraft. So, no prospect of impressive “cobra maneuvers†at airshows from these two.
A key factor in translating on-paper thrust to weight ratios to actual combat performance is the likely weapons fit. If we assume that both aircraft will be deployed with two BVR missiles and 2 WVR missiles, we can calculate the weight of the typical in-combat fit (keeping the fuel load factor in the back of our minds):
FC-1 = 2 x AIM-9P and 2 x SD-10 = 520kg
LCA = 2 x AA-11 and 2 x Astra = 518kg
Even-Stevens, although if the FC-1 carries the heavier PL-9 in place of the AIM-9P, the weight goes up noticeably to 590kg. By comparison, weapon loads of four Derby missiles weighs 484kg and four MICAs just 360kg.
It should be noted that I used the GE F404-F2J3 turbofan rated at 18,097 lbst in my calculations for the LCA. The as yet unproven Kavari engine will supposedly develop 20,000 lbst. That would increase the thrust to weight ratio to close to that of the Gripen. However, 20,000 lbst is only an estimate, and without credence, I discounted it from my calculations.
Cost
Indigenous fighter programs are on the face of it expensive. Taiwan’s Ching Kuo was supposed to have a fly-away cost of $24m (US) in 1994. But with the limited production run (intended 420 down to 130), it is likely far higher than that. The LCA is often quoted at about $26m (US) but that seems grossly optimistic, as its detractors constantly remind us. The FC-1 apparently carries a $15m (US) price tag which again seems optimistic. However, Chinese fighters are generally quite cheap, so the FC-1 will almost certainly be significantly cheaper than the LCA. If China does purchase the FC-1 (as the JF-17), as now seems likely, then costs alt to be reduced, although whether Pakistan will benefit from this economy of scale is uncertain.
However, the LCA as a potential export market, provided the Kavari engine materializes. The FC-1 could be exported by China, thus reducing unit cost, but its prospects are limited due to its Russian engine; Russia apparently attaching the condition that the FC-1 is not marketed against the similarly engined Mig-29 Fulcrum.
But for about $30m (US) you can get Gripen (whether the Swedes would sell to either India or Pakistan now is open to debate).
Conclusion
Neither aircraft is as impressive as many of the patriots would like us to believe. In the quest for increased self-sufficiency in arms, both Pakistan and India are paying the price attached to indigenous development of fighter aircraft; a trend mirrored in Taiwan’s Ching Kuo and Japan’s F-2 programs. South Korea’s Golden Eagle program proves that such projects are possible, but in many respects the Golden Eagle is unadventurous. And the rewards are correspondingly modest.
The real weakness of both aircraft is likely to be th missile systems. Whilst notionally “currentâ€, they are unlikely to outperform off the shelf systems widely available.
The aim of this essay is to explore the relative merits of the two essentially equivalent designs on a “single-system†basis. In doing so we must bear in mind that an aircraft is deployed as part of a wider warfighting system and therefore aircraft/weapons data, although a factor, is not in itself a sound basis for assessing combat capability. However, comparing aircraft performance, capabilities and suchlike, remains of great interest to the airpower enthusiast and amateur strategist.
One problem with this type of analysis surrounds the validity of the data, mostly gleamed from the web. Patriots embellish capabilities, estimations are optimistic and most data is presented out of context. But by browsing widely and trying to home in on more credible sources, we hope not be too far off.
It is also useful to compare them with equivalent aircraft worldwide, particularl Taiwan’s Ching Kuo fighter, South Korea’s proposed F-50 Golden Eagle (dedicated fighter variant of T-50/A-50) and Sweden’s superb Gripen aircraft. The latter is perhaps the benchmark, and as our analysis will show, is generally superior to either design.
Executive overview
Neither fighter is likely to be particularly outstanding. Whilst the LCA is generally credited with having superior performance and weapons systems, the FC-1 carries the price advantage. Neither fighter is likely reduce their respective airforce’s dependency on foreign systems for key combat capabilities as much as would have been hoped at their inception. In the case of both India and Pakistan, better solutions could have been obtained “off the selfâ€, and indeed this is happening.
BVR capability
Both aircraft will have an up-to-date beyond visual range capability. Whilst nothing new for the IAF, it represents a quantum leap for Pakistan who currently makes do with Sparrows, it’s Mirage and Chinese fighter’s having no BVR capability whatsoever.
Whilst we know that Pakistani FC-1s will probably be equipped with the SD-10 missile (even if it is not up to PAF standards, there seems little choice), more uncertainty surrounds the LCA’s fit. It is generally supposed that it will employ the Astra BVR missile currently in development. This is despite India already buying AA-10 Alamo, AA-12 Adder, Derby and MICA systems. Whilst the Astra is generally claimed to posess Adder like capabilities, it would be a great surprise if it actually lives up to such expectations. It will certainly be bigger and heavier, and probably less ‘deadly’ than either the Derby or MICA. This begs the question: why not simply switch to either Derby or MICA? It would probably be quicker and cheaper to use these highly credible foreign designs, and have less impact on aircraft performance.
Having just assassinated the Astra, let me turn to the SD-10. In common with its India counterpart, it is notionally an advanced BVR missile. It probably features much Adder technology including the seeker, although speculation of anti-radiation seekers persists. It reportedly has a lock-on jam capability which is a good feature, although unremarkable today. Again it is bigger, heavier and almost certainly less ‘deadly’ than the likes of AMRAAM, Derby and MICA. Pakistan now has access to AMRAAM (albeit export models), so the SD-10 will not be all that even in PAF service.
So what we have is lightweight fighters equipped with comparatively bulky BVR missiles…
Both countries (Pakistan and India) ought to have learnt from Taiwan’s IDF (“Ching Kuoâ€) program. Similarly motivated by the effect of sanctions, the Taiwanese sought to develop an indigenous fighter and equip it with indigenous missiles analogous with AMRAAM. The Taiwanese missile is called the Skysword II. Although few specific performance details have been released, presumably because they are embarrassing, it is almost certainly less effective than AMRAAM. Like Pakistan and India, sanctions faded and Taiwan was able to purchase Western fighters/missiles (Pakistan buying F-16Cs with AMRAAM, India buying Mirage 2000-5s with MICA….). Taiwan jumped at the opportunity, cutting Ching Kuo production (greatly increasing effective unit cost) and brought both F16s with AMRAAM and Mirage 2000-5s with MICA. What is more, it wasn’t until several years after the introduction of the Ching Kuo that the Skysword II could be described as an operational reality.
The only solace for the Ching Kuo progam is that at least the Skysword IIs are carried semi-recessed, thus reducing performance deterioration, something neither the FC-1 nor LCA has employed. Given the Ching Kuo’s somewhat lackluster performance to start with, it’s hardly worth partying about.
By comparison, other lightweight fighters are way ahead; the F-50 will almost certainly carry AMRAAM and the Gripen can carry AMRAAM, MICA and R-Darter (South African BVR missile believed to borrow from Derby), not to mention the Meteor when it enters service. The ramjet powered Meteor is a further quantum leap of missile capability.
Both the LCA and FC-1 are likely to be equipped with credible X-band pulse Doppler multi-mode radars. The LCA’s is indigenous, which may cause delays and cost overruns (what system doesn’t these days??? But crucially, the radar is still in development). Like the Astra program, India’s indigenous radar is generally reported optimistically, yet the end result seems questionable. The FC-1 has at least an off-the-shelf radar fit, presumed to be the Italian FIAR Grifo S-7 in PAF service. This series of radar is already produced in Pakistan for the J-7M aircraft. It was conceived as an upgrade replacement for baseline APG-67 which equips most export F-16s, so we can safely assume that it outperforms most models of APG-67. However, it is said to lack multi-target tracking/engagement capability, which obviously detracts from basic air-defense efficiency.
Both radar systems are a generation behind the leading European, Russian and American systems now entering service. By comparison, the Gripen, notionally a lightweight fighter, is complimented for its network-centric avionics and represents a major capability step-up compared to either the LCA or FC-1.
Dogfight capability
The traditional strongpoint of the lightweight fighter was good old-fashioned WVR engagement. Both the LCA and FC-1 represent a performance improvement over the F-5E, Mig-21 and even F-16A generation of lightweight fighters. The FC-1 is credited with an +8.5g limit which is a shade behind the LCA’s +9g, implying that the LCA is probably more agile.
The FC-1 in PAF service is likely to be equipped with AIM-9P Sidewinder and/or Chinese PL-9 missiles. The AIM-9P in particular is not particularly good by today’s standards, lacking many of the features considered standard for current generation fighters, such as helmet mounted sighting and high off-boresight capability. Idle speculation that the FC-1 will now be equipped with AIM-9X advanced WVR missiles now that the US has lifted sanctions seems unlikely in the initial operations of the FC-1 in PAF service. If AIM-9X is deployed, priority will surly go to the F-16Cs expected to enter service. The PL-9 is on paper a step above the AIM-9P with a high off-boresight capability, high agility, compatibility with helmet mounted sighting and suchlike. However, it does not appear to be a runaway success, since China’s flagship J-10 fighter is consistently seen carrying PL-8 missiles and Janes Defense Review has expressed the opinion that it is very short ranged.
The LCA will probably be equipped with AA-11 Archer WVR missiles. Whilst not as cutting edge as they were when they first entered service, but nonetheless features helmet mounted sighting, high off-boresight lock-on and carries a distinct performance advantage over the AIM-9P and likely PL-9. If Israel sells the incredibly lethal Python 4 or 5 missiles to India, the LCA could well jump further ahead.
Getting back to the AIM-9P issue, it is worth noting that most Gripens also carry similar Sidewinder models, whilst South Africa apparently deploys the promising A-Dartar. But Swedish Gripen’s a slated to get the next generation IRIS-T missile which is likely far more capable than either AIM-9P or PL-9. The F-50 looks set to get AIM-9X, though the Ching Kuo is stuck with the modest Skysword I Sidewinder copy.
Both aircraft are equipped with the reliable but unremarkable twin GSh-23mm cannon.
Weapons load
On paper the LCA appears to have a marginally greater weapons load than the FC-1 although the round figure of 4000kg appears an estimate.
Perhaps a better indicator is the thrust to weight ratio. The higher the figure, the greater the margin for bolting on various bits of kit, such as missiles, with (simplistically) less effect on performance. To calculate the thrust to weight ratio I’ve used the maximum thrust with afterburner and the normal take-off weight. Both come out with a 0.91 ratio. That’s not bad, but a far cry from the >1 (i.e. more thrust than weight) claimed by the F-15 and Su-27 families of aircraft. So, no prospect of impressive “cobra maneuvers†at airshows from these two.
A key factor in translating on-paper thrust to weight ratios to actual combat performance is the likely weapons fit. If we assume that both aircraft will be deployed with two BVR missiles and 2 WVR missiles, we can calculate the weight of the typical in-combat fit (keeping the fuel load factor in the back of our minds):
FC-1 = 2 x AIM-9P and 2 x SD-10 = 520kg
LCA = 2 x AA-11 and 2 x Astra = 518kg
Even-Stevens, although if the FC-1 carries the heavier PL-9 in place of the AIM-9P, the weight goes up noticeably to 590kg. By comparison, weapon loads of four Derby missiles weighs 484kg and four MICAs just 360kg.
It should be noted that I used the GE F404-F2J3 turbofan rated at 18,097 lbst in my calculations for the LCA. The as yet unproven Kavari engine will supposedly develop 20,000 lbst. That would increase the thrust to weight ratio to close to that of the Gripen. However, 20,000 lbst is only an estimate, and without credence, I discounted it from my calculations.
Cost
Indigenous fighter programs are on the face of it expensive. Taiwan’s Ching Kuo was supposed to have a fly-away cost of $24m (US) in 1994. But with the limited production run (intended 420 down to 130), it is likely far higher than that. The LCA is often quoted at about $26m (US) but that seems grossly optimistic, as its detractors constantly remind us. The FC-1 apparently carries a $15m (US) price tag which again seems optimistic. However, Chinese fighters are generally quite cheap, so the FC-1 will almost certainly be significantly cheaper than the LCA. If China does purchase the FC-1 (as the JF-17), as now seems likely, then costs alt to be reduced, although whether Pakistan will benefit from this economy of scale is uncertain.
However, the LCA as a potential export market, provided the Kavari engine materializes. The FC-1 could be exported by China, thus reducing unit cost, but its prospects are limited due to its Russian engine; Russia apparently attaching the condition that the FC-1 is not marketed against the similarly engined Mig-29 Fulcrum.
But for about $30m (US) you can get Gripen (whether the Swedes would sell to either India or Pakistan now is open to debate).
Conclusion
Neither aircraft is as impressive as many of the patriots would like us to believe. In the quest for increased self-sufficiency in arms, both Pakistan and India are paying the price attached to indigenous development of fighter aircraft; a trend mirrored in Taiwan’s Ching Kuo and Japan’s F-2 programs. South Korea’s Golden Eagle program proves that such projects are possible, but in many respects the Golden Eagle is unadventurous. And the rewards are correspondingly modest.
The real weakness of both aircraft is likely to be th missile systems. Whilst notionally “currentâ€, they are unlikely to outperform off the shelf systems widely available.
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