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Afghan National Army Air Corps

This is a discussion on Afghan National Army Air Corps within the Air Force & Aviation forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; "Russia could however hand over some of the retiring L-39s" That would be a good idea. Russia gives hundreds of ...


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Old March 11th, 2009   #16
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"Russia could however hand over some of the retiring L-39s"
That would be a good idea. Russia gives hundreds of scholarships to ANA officers/NCOs to study in Russia.

Unfortunately, last year the Afghan MoD (Ministry of Defense) was caught between Russia and NATO. Maybe the L-39s offer a way around that; and can coincide with greater Russian involvement in the ANAAC. {Within Afghanistan there have been angry editorials castigating NATO for using Afghanistan in its conflict with Russia, versus helping the Afghans fight the Taliban and AQ linked networks . . . as the Afghans want.}

My concern is that the ANAAC gets new birds with low intermediate term maintenance and operations costs (which is less likely if they are used.) ANAAC is very dependent on foreign funding . . . and cannot guarantee funding for spares.
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Old August 19th, 2009   #17
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The latest summary of the ANAAC (Afghan National Army Air Corps) from CSTC-A, which is responsible or training and equipping the ANSF:
http://csis.org/files/publication/090727_ansf_draft.pdf
Page 34 in Adobe, and page 24 on the document:
By end2015, the ANAAC plans to have a total of 139 aircraft and 7254 personnel:
* Rotary wing aircraft
o 58 MI-17v5 (battlefield mobility, close air support)
o 3 Mi-17DV (VIP transport)
o 6 trainers (e.g. B-407)
* Fixed wing aircraft
o 20 C-27 propeller transport (18 transport, 2 transport configurable for VIP transport)
o 4 propeller cargo aircraft / ISR (e.g. C-208)
o 14 propeller light attack / ISR (e.g. A-29)
o 20 light multi role attack / air superiority jets (e.g. L-159)
o 8 propeller basic trainers (e.g. C-208)
o 6 propeller advanced trainers (e.g. A-29)

Any thoughts on this end state for the ANAAC. What do other commentators here think the end state should look like?

I have many questions:
1) Why is a subsonic L-159 jet better than an A-29 type turboprop? Isn't the A-29 much cheaper when measured over its life time?
2) Why shouldn't ANAAC field a small squadron (14 aircraft) of light attack supersonic fighters with slight multifunction capabilities such as the F/A 50 or a Chinese aircraft or India's Tejas instead of procuring 20 L-159 type subsonic jets? Might Afghanistan not be better off with having many cheap A-29s for CAS and having a small number of supersonic light attack fighters that could be used in air defense or air defense suppression in an emergency (which the L-159 is not as good at performing)?
3) Could one or two of ANAAC's twenty C27s be converted to a close air support platform the way the Marines use the C130s? Might this be useful up in the mountains?
4) What is the lifecycle cost of an A 29? Cost per hour flown (fuel+maintenance+future upgrade/refits)? I assume munition costs would be similar to an L-159. Is this true?
5) Wouldn't Afghanistan need more close air support at end state? Are light attack turboprop (A29, KT01s) the most cost effective way to provide it?

Thanks in advance for everyone's insights.
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Old August 26th, 2009   #18
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ANAAC article:
Afghan National Army Air Corp (ANAAC) Order of Battle update: August 2009 - The Long War Journal
The Long War Journal: Comment on Afghan National Army Air Corp (ANAAC) Order of Battle update: August 2009

Why is ANAAC buying only 14 turboprops? What is the lifecycle cost of ownership for a turboprop? Cost to fly per hour (maintenance + fuel)?

ANAAC strikes me as massively underfinanced. Some would rather spend $100 billion a year on ISAF operations than a fraction of that on the ANAAC.
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Old August 27th, 2009   #19
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What do other commentators here think the end state should look like?
I'll just give you my 2 cents. And I hope others will chime in to enrich the discussion for your benefit. BTW, I just want you to know that you are asking questions in a way that is unlikely to elicit a response from another enthusiast.

Let me give you example. If you go to a car forum and ask people: Please tell me how to drive a car? Few forum members will respond. However, if you are talking about certain specific features or mods to the car, you will get more responses. The problem with your posts is that it is clear you asking basic questions when you are capable of discovering the answers for yourself, particularly since some aspects have been covered in prior threads. You seem to be asking the same T-50 questions again, which was covered in this T-50 thread.

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I have many questions:
1) Why is a subsonic L-159 jet better than an A-29 type turboprop? Isn't the A-29 much cheaper when measured over its life time?
First you must understand the difference between fast movers (F-16, T-50, BAE Hawk or L-159) and low movers (turboprops or specialist jets like the A-10) in a CAS role. I won't explain but there is a prior thread called 'airpower for counter insurgency'. Please read gf0012-aust, chrisrobsoar and what other professionals are saying in their posts in that thread. These should serve as a starting point for your own further searches/reading on how slow movers are employed.

The most important thing to know about air power in A2G missions is the guy on the ground. Please acquaint yourself with the role of ground based FACs or Forward Air Controllers (to call air strikes). For a US centric perspective go here. Please note that not all countries require their FACs to be rated pilots for cost reasons.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
2) Why shouldn't ANAAC field a small squadron (14 aircraft) of light attack supersonic fighters with slight multifunction capabilities such as the F/A 50 or a Chinese aircraft or India's Tejas instead of procuring 20 L-159 type subsonic jets?
The ANAAC is not a capable organisation and is unlikely to gain sufficient proficiency in the next decade against another A2A threat (ie. go to war against another air force). In fact, I doubt if the ANAAC will be competent in their required A2G role in the same time period. I'm not being harsh, I'm just realistic. The Afghans need FOs or Forward Observers (to call and shift artillery fire or indirect fire) and FACs. For the Americans, they now have people with both FO and FAC skills in a new combined role. These people are called JFOs or Joint Fires Observers. Singapore calls our equivalent STORM. I've now given you all the key words for you to google and read up.

The basic fact is that the Afghans need lots of FOs, FACs or JFOs in the next decade rather than more capable jets - as you wouldn't want to call air strikes on troops in contact without a guy in the ground. They have a bigger problem than just a lack of FOs/FACs/JFOs. The Afghan government and the ANA at an army level are not competent. Pockets of ANA are competent but they as a force can't operate a division level. In fact, as most armies understand it, there is nothing 'special' about Afghan commando units. The Americans just give them that title to make them feel good for slightly better basic soldiering skills (in contrast to the non-elite ANA units). The ANA only look competent when compared to the Afghan police. The Americans are stuck in Afghanistan because the local Afghan partners suck. They suck so much that they make the present Iraqi army look good. So basically they are poor workmen. All tools given to poor workmen will be misused or employed wrongly. From my perspective, I only care about how they are trained (and if they can retain trained personnel). I could not careless about what they use. In many ways, third world countries need to work out their own third world solutions - you can't impose 'logical' first world solutions for them.

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Might Afghanistan not be better off with having many cheap A-29s for CAS and having a small number of supersonic light attack fighters that could be used in air defense or air defense suppression in an emergency (which the L-159 is not as good at performing)?
Please read the basic specs for the Super Tucano and the Czech L-159. Please do some work on the differences and I hope other forum members will chime in here.

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5) Wouldn't Afghanistan need more close air support at end state? Are light attack turboprop (A29, KT01s) the most cost effective way to provide it?
What do you think (after reading the specs)?

Last edited by OPSSG; September 1st, 2009 at 10:36 AM.
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Old August 27th, 2009   #20
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OPSSG, thanks for your information and response. I did read the specifications. There remain many things I don't understand.

On air controllers, for now this function is carried out by OMLTs and other ETTs. However developing this capacity is an important intermediate term priority for the ANA. However, Gen McChrystal seems reluctant to allow the ANA to call air strikes on its own in the short run since he has greatly restricted close air support (CAS) by ISAF and ANAAC (the latest ANAAC briefing confirmed this.) For that matter, this seems to be the de facto view of President Karzai as well (to greatly limit CAS in support of the ANSF and ISAF.)

Comparing subsonic L159 to turboprop light attack for the four ANAAC requirements:
1) L159 is better at air to air combat
2) L159 is better at suppressing ground based air defense. But how much better?
3) I don't see why the L159 would be better than turboprop at close air support (CAS) and strategic bombing. {L159 flies faster and could reach its target more quickly; however the turboprop could dwell near the potential target longer and might be more accurate in its air strikes.}
4) L159 is much more expensive to operate per hour in the air than a turboprop, but how much more expensive? What are the costs for the two aircraft per hour flown (fuel + maintenance)?

If the need for ground attack is managed by turboprop, then the question becomes what aircraft is best at managing air to air and ground based air defense suppression. Here I would think that a supersonic light attack fighter such as the F/A 50, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon would be much better than a subsonic L159. Is this true? Are supersonic aircraft much better than subsonic aircraft at these two functions? Another question I have is the relative cost per hour flown between an F/A 50 (or Guizhou JL-9, Hongdu L-15 Falcon) and an L159?

I would think that the ANAAC should probably have:
-12 F/A 50s, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon (air to air and ground air defense suppression)
-30 to 35 light attack turboprop (A29 or KT-1) for ground attack;
rather than the current proposal for 20 L159s and 14 turboprops light attack aircraft.

Strategically developing the ANAAC is very important since the Afghan public is more likely to accept ANAAC CAS than ISAF CAS, especially over the long run. The Afghans have long mountainous borders, large scale foreign infiltration, and have substantial need for CAS along the mountains.

Quality of the ANA:
The vast majority of militaries in the world are low quality. Only a couple such as Singapore's, Australia's, South Korea's, Japan's, some NATO countries are competent. Is Malaysia's competent? I don't know. Indonesia's sucks. Almost every Arab, Latin American and African military is atrocious. So does Pakistan's. Pakistan has lost more dead soldiers and police to the Taliban recently than the sum of all foreign troops that have died in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. If you compare the ANA to Pakistan's army, they aren't doing quite as bad as some critics of the ANA imply.

Biggest ANA challenges:
-funding (only $242 million annual budget in 2006)
-illiterate (only half of officers can read. Illiteracy among NCOs is much higher.) The ANA added its first class of 84 4 year academy graduates in January, 2009. That is it for the entire ANA right now. There is a major shortage of educated captains, let alone senior officers. {More positively, there are many good quality lieutenants.}
-senior officers don't use NCOs properly
-lack of professionalism, discipline, team work and planning
-too much focus on politics, respect for authority, and following orders; not enough initiative is permitted by ANA senior officers.
-hiring and promotion by nepotism and politics rather than meritocracy.
-most of the ANA joined the army very recently and had an abbreviated basic training. Through put (number training at any given point in time) is perhaps a fifth of what it needs to be.
ANA's strengths:
-recklessly brave . . . or as some put it . . . too brave
-highly motivated to fight . . . in fact too motivated to fight and chase the enemy. Too eager to kill Taliban even when COIN suggests they shouldn't
-many more applicants eager to join the ANA than the ANA can hire
-eager to become educated and attend training academies
-one good quality ANA Corps that is capable of division level operations (ANA 203 Corps.)
-several good quality brigades

If the international community funds educating more officers and NCOs, the quality of the ANA is likely to improve significantly. In particular, ANAAC shouldn't have a shortage of educated highly capable personnel within a few years. {Afghanistan now has 45,000 freshman a year in college versus about one thousand per year in 2001.}
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Old August 27th, 2009   #21
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There remain many things I don't understand.
Try to read more and make friends in the forum. That way more people will be willing to respond to your posts.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
Comparing subsonic L159 to turboprop light attack for the four ANAAC requirements:
1) L159 is better at air to air combat
2) L159 is better at suppressing ground based air defense. But how much better?
3) I don't see why the L159 would be better than turboprop at close air support (CAS) and strategic bombing. {L159 flies faster and could reach its target more quickly; however the turboprop could dwell near the potential target longer and might be more accurate in its air strikes.}
4) L159 is much more expensive to operate per hour in the air than a turboprop, but how much more expensive? What are the costs for the two aircraft per hour flown (fuel + maintenance)?
(i) If you want to talk about A2A combat, then only consider a jet in the class of the F-16 (whose performance is optimised in the trans-sonic zone). Forget about the subsonic L159, as it is too slow and has too many other limitations to be 'fit for purpose' in an A2A combat role. Correctly understood, the L159 has some self defence capability but it is not a true A2A fighter.

(ii) ANAAC does not have a requirement for air defense suppression. Read up on the key words DEAD, SEAD and electronic warfare to see why you are mistaken. Kindly also see my response on defensive aids further below.

(iii) Read the DT thread I cited again. You are not reading it carefully enough to enable you to understand the unique advantages of slow movers (that fast movers cannot match). If I maybe honest, you are reading it with your existing preconceived notions. Your preconceived notions are interfering with your ability to understand. This is why you are asking the wrong questions. Let me explain:
(a) Only rich countries can orbit their fighters waiting for action in support of a planned mission (which is why tankers are put to so much use by the US). Poor countries only fly sorties when needed. When the fuel runs out during a sortie, the air support support ends. That is why turboprops are good and their loiter time is valued for planned missions. As these are planned missions, ANAAC turboprops have their slow transit time factored in.

(b) ANAAC will never have the resources to provide ad-hoc CAS missions that USAF have in place to support US troops. This means that when the ANA call for unplanned missions, the ANAAC will easily need another 30 mins to 2 hours to get ready for a mission from the time of call for help. When you factor in transit time to remote locations, help can take a long time to come (which means that the fight could be over before air support arrives). Fast movers reduce response time over a wider area. This will enable the ANAAC to have less air bases and to contribute in preventing ANA outposts from being overrun over a wider area.
Therefore both aircraft types (slow movers vs fast movers) have different unique advantages and are suited to serve different purposes. Slow movers perform a complimentary role to the role performed by attack helicopters and it is not useful to compare them to fast movers. If you've got a hot LZ, attack helicopters and slow movers are ideal for suppressing ground fire as your transport helicopters attempt to land. Fast movers are less than idea in the role of suppressing ground fire on a hot LZ. These limitations are explained in the DT thread cited.

(iv) If the equipment is 'NOT fit for purpose', operating cost considerations is irrelevant (ie. ANA bought the wrong gear). OTOH, even if a piece of gear expensive, if it is absolutely essential for operations, then costs be dammed. An example of essential expensive stuff is precision guided munitions (PGMs). PGMs need not be targeted by the latest fancy USAF gear (which can stream live video for the guys on the ground), it could be something cheaper. Laser guided Paveway bombs (LGBs) can work just as well, if there is a trained guy on the ground. All the Afghan FAC on the ground needs is a laser designator to guide the LGBs. If the ANAAC don't have them, even if the aircraft arrive and the troops are in contact (ie. the enemy hugs them and are too close), the aircraft would not be able to deliver ordinance to support the fight. If you don't have this class of weapons, it will become a strategy of the Taliban to neutralize ANAAC airpower. Fundamentally, air power prevents the Taliban from moving in large groups and on roads in groups, as it is too dangerous - so just having the right gear constrains your opponent's tactical choices, which will have important consequences for your plans.

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If the need for ground attack is managed by turboprop, then the question becomes what aircraft is best at managing air to air and ground based air defense suppression.
What ANAAC needs is aircraft with 'defensive aids' (and these aids are already specified by US military) that can deal with hand held SAMs. ANAAC does not have a requirement for air defense suppression. You are mistaken. Air defense suppression is a tertiary air force capability - not something we want to help the ANAAC achieve and not necessary in the fight against the Taliban.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
Are supersonic aircraft much better than subsonic aircraft at these two functions?
(i) When you say better. Better for what? If you are dealing with the Third World - don't think like that. Think of these key words: 'fit for purpose'. If it can do the job then it is fit for purpose. No need to nitpick over small differences.

(ii) On Afghan A2G missions, the targeting tools, the size of combat load, the aircraft's range and ease of maintenance are more important than supersonic speed. This is partly because with a full A2G combat load, most jet fighters operate at subsonic speeds anyway.

(iii) Supersonic speeds is only important if it is a existing requirement based on each country's threat matrix. Let me use 2 examples to explain:
(a) If I may over simplify it, for the Indian Air Force (InAF), they assume that they will not be able to operate in an air superiority environment (given that they have capable potential aggressors). Therefore the InAF prefer supersonic aircraft that are able to jettison their A2G munitions to run away. This feature will enable their guys to fight another day.

(b) For the SAF, we always assume that we will be fighting a bigger aggressor, with bigger numbers and resources. Therefore, the RSAF has a singular focus on sortie generation as part of our strategy to achieve air superiority. Sortie generation multiplies our air power. Hence an all supersonic fleet is a preferred requirement. In fact even our lead-in-fighter-trainers (LIFT) will be pressed into service, as our offensively orientated conscript army will only be fighting in a war of national survival (and never a war of choice). If we lose, we don't exist as a country.
In the case of the ANAAC, supersonic performance is not a requirement in contrast to the above over simplified Indian and Singaporean examples. Remember, if a country has a big COIN threat, a slow mover is usually part of air power requirements.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
Another question I have is the relative cost per hour flown between an F/A 50 (or Guizhou JL-9, Hongdu L-15 Falcon) and an L159?
I don't know. Not an area of my interest.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
I would think that the ANAAC should probably have:
-12 F/A 50s, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon (air to air and ground air defense suppression)
-30 to 35 light attack turboprop (A29 or KT-1) for ground attack;
rather than the current proposal for 20 L159s and 14 turboprops light attack aircraft.
Many Chinese aircraft models are not an area of my interest. Don't give me a list of single engined jets made in the Third World and ask if they are as good as the F-16 as a multi-role fighter. IMO, they are not (even the Aviation Industry Corporation of China admitted that China’s WS-10 engine is unsatisfactory in quality). Read up on the following technology key words listed below, as a starting point for further research:
(i) the impact of helmet cueing systems such as DASH (and Python-4) and JHMCS (and AIM-9X) for off-boresight cueing of WVR missiles in A2A combat (see surprisingly good article on helmets by a man that is disliked by many in this forum);

(ii) the impact of radar and BVR missile development in A2A combat, more specifically, the F-16's AN/APG-68(V)9 radar for the block 52s and the AN/APG-80 AESA Radar for the block 60s. You can also read up on the AIM-120C7 (and the development work on the AIM-120D) for BVR combat;

(iii) the impact of targeting pods like Lockheed Martin's Sniper XR targeting pod and other competitor pods for A2G missions like the older LANTIRN, which is a system of two pods (and how it can be used to guide Paveway bombs); and

(iv) the impact of the Great Engine War for how GE (F110 Engine) & PW (F100 Engine) competed in F-15 and F-16 engine development.
There's a reason why the J-10 is considered as within the F-16 class but for more details you will need to ask other forum members who have the appropriate China military expertise (ie. not me).

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
The vast majority of militaries in the world are low quality. Only a couple such as Singapore's, Australia's, South Korea's, Japan's, some NATO countries are competent.
I would not compare conscript armies to all volunteer tier-one armies (like that of the US or Australia). I think it would be a mistake to overstate the SAF's capabilities, as I was a former conscript in it. Further, we have some equipping gaps and some very old equipment. Take for instance our AMX-13 SM1s. When the Indians soldiers saw them, they were surprised and asked why we are still using their father's generation of light tanks (ie. old and outdated)... To understand that, you must get used to un-American idea of 'fit for purpose'. The trick is to understand the true purpose of the equipment.

IMO, the SAF is only well regarded for our offensive orientation in capability development, our planning (which means making hard choices with limited funds) and our level of logistics integration. Please see this defence logistics video below:


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Is Malaysia's competent? I don't know.
IMO, in the areas that matter, yes (they are more than competent). Keep in mind, that while the Malaysians had external help, in the end they prevailed against the Malayan Communist Party. They beat their insurgents and won their counterinsurgency war - so they are fit for purpose. However, they do have significant logistics issues and capability gaps that take away from their fighting ability. The blame for their problems can be placed on the shoulders of 1 person - Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad, their former PM (which was discussed in the RMAF thread).

Remember, Black Hawk down in Mogadishu? It was Pakistani tanks and Malaysian APCs that came to the rescue of the US Rangers. One Malaysian died and eight others were wounded to save US lives - you should remember their contribution.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
Indonesia's sucks.
But you forget. The Indonesians were not given their independence. In their 1945-49 war of independence, they were able to drive out the Dutch, who were the colonial power of the day. You may think they suck but the TNI really don't care about what you think, as they have intend and are prepared to fight with a guerrilla ethos against any foreign power (like the Vietcong). Since their founding the TNI has been engaged in COIN type of 'constructive pacification' against internal rebels, such that, their war machine remains well oiled. As the 4th most populous country in the world, their point of view is that they have an endless supply of people and they have the benefit of terrain. Trying to fight the TNI on their own turf would make the American involvement in the Vietnam War look like a Sunday walk in the park. Further, the country sits right on a Maritime Chokepoint - the Malacca Straits.

IMO, the TNI's current problem is lack of force projection capabilities and the presence of significant gaps in their capability matrix.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
So does Pakistan's. Pakistan has lost more dead soldiers and police to the Taliban recently than the sum of all foreign troops that have died in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. If you compare the ANA to Pakistan's army, they aren't doing quite as bad as some critics of the ANA imply.
Pakistan's army is capable and it is prepared to fight the Indians who do conduct large scale 10 division sized exercises. This means that the Pakistan's army can operate at division, corp and army level (whereas the Afghan Army operates mainly at battalion level). However, the Pakistani Army is not ready to fight insurgents. So they are capable but they are a little caught off guard in this fight.

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Originally Posted by anan View Post
If the international community funds educating more officers and NCOs, the quality of the ANA is likely to improve significantly. In particular, ANAAC shouldn't have a shortage of educated highly capable personnel within a few years. {Afghanistan now has 45,000 freshman a year in college versus about one thousand per year in 2001.}
That's a promising sign. In the days ahead, the ANAAC will need to be able to provide direct and indirect fire support to ANA troops so as to overwhelm the Taliban.

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Old September 16th, 2009   #22
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Thanks for the info OPSSG. I really appreciate it.

New Afghan National Security Forces Order of Battle update:
Afghan National Army Order of Battle September 2009 update - The Long War Journal
Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle (OOB)
http://www.longwarjournal.org/multim...Bpage4-ANA.pdf

The US is considering Land/Lease or giving 112 F15s and 134 F16s to the Iraqi Air Force. These are aircraft currently in use that would otherwise be retired or stored.

Could America give a small number of the F16s to the ANAAC (with the Iraqis getting the vast bulk of them) in lieu of Iraq getting the whole lot?

Two disadvantages that I can see:
1) Pakistan flips out
2) It will be a few years before the ANAAC has sufficient qualified college educated personnel
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Old November 12th, 2009   #23
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China is supplying two squadrons (36 advanced fighter jets) of J-10 fighters for $39 million a pop, or $1.4 billion total.
Ink Spots: Brave new world, same as the meek old world

I don't think J-10s are a good fit for ANAAC, since they don't need anything that high end and because the Pakistanis would rather have better quality aircraft than the ANAAC (which they view with suspicion.) However, are there any estimates available for the life time ownership costs of J-10s, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon. Cost per hour flown information?

What would the life time cost of ownership for a squadron of Guizhou JL-9s or Hongdu L-15 Falcons be? I think they would be a better choice for ANAAC than L-159s.

Moreover, China--as Afghanistan's largest trading and investment partner--could potentially be persuaded to foot the bill.
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